The pluralist position advanced by John Hick has been and continues to be one of
the most, if not the single most, significant and influential philosophical approach-
es to religious pluralism. It has garnered both considerable praise and consider-
able criticism from a variety of fronts. After outlining the main features of Hick’s ar-
guments, we will also examine a few of the most substantial criticisms they have
received.
Hick begins from the position that the world as it appears is ambiguous with re-
gard to religion – that is, there is no inherent epistemological obstacle to experi-
encing and interpreting the world from the point of view of one religion rather than
another, or indeed from a non-religious perspective. From here, he proceeds to his
central claim that diverse religious traditions have emerged as various finite, histor-
ical responses to a single transcendent, ultimate, divine reality. The diversity of tra-
ditions (and the belief claims they contain) is a product of the diversity of religious
experiences among individuals and groups throughout history, and the various in-
terpretations given to these experiences. Hick’s claim that diverse interpretations
are responses to a single transcendent Real draws on the Kantian distinction be-
tween noumenon and phenomenon; that is, the Real is epistemologically unavail-
able to human beings in itself, but we can nevertheless experience it “as the range
of gods and absolutes which the phenomenology of religion reports”. Thus, Hick
argues that no single description or set of descriptions applied to the Real from
within the realm of human experience can apply literally to the Real. Nevertheless,
the Real remains the final referent of the ontological claims made by the different
religious traditions, even though such claims can at best only partially approximate
the real truth of divine reality. Hick understands the multiple claims from diverse
religious traditions that the object of their respective beliefs is ultimately unsayable
and incomprehensible as supportive of his argument. As for the content of particu-
lar belief claims, Hick understands the personal deities of those traditions that
posit them as personae of the Real, explicitly invoking the connotation of a theatri-
cal mask in the Latin word persona. Alongside these, he recognizes impersonae of
the Real: concepts such as Brahman, nirvana, and Tao that represent ultimate real-
ity in a non-personal way. Since the ideas in both of these categories arise from
our experience of phenomenal reality, none of them can adequately describe the
Real as it is in itself. The only way that humans can describe the Real directly is by
using formal language such as “ultimate truth” or “ground of experience”.
In light of his epistemological arguments, Hick claims that all religious understand-
ings of the Real are on equal footing insofar as they can only offer limited, phe-
nomenal representations of transcendent truth. This position, which he calls the
“pluralistic hypothesis,” brings together elements of several philosophical perspec-
tives on religion into a complex whole. At the phenomenal, historical level in which
humans live and religious traditions emerge, Hick advances the view that meaning
is constituted largely by practice (linguistic and otherwise) within the contexts
of particular cultures. Thus, the justification of belief claims rests on the relation of
various practical commitments within a certain tradition or culture, and evaluation
of or comparison between claims of distinct cultures appears problematic at best.
This aspect of Hick’s position seems to rely heavily on the cultural-linguistic model
of religion that places little importance on any cognitive content that belief claims
may carry. However, Hick also maintains that the content of religious belief claims
necessarily implies the believer’s sincerity in supposing that such claims actually
refer to the transcendent reality that they purport to describe. That is, Hick main-
tains that the belief claims of the various historical religions have traditionally been
articulated in ways that imply a realist perspective. Hick’s response to this issue is
to posit that the referent of religious belief claims is ultimately real, but that any
claims or knowledge about it must necessarily be historically and culturally medi-
ated. If this is the case, then, as the pluralist hypothesis maintains, each religious
tradition has some grounds for holding to its own beliefs and practices while no
one tradition has grounds for claiming an exclusive or privileged status.
Hick claims that the pluralist hypothesis is more reasonable than either anti-realism
or exclusivism given the broad extent and wide diversity of religious experiences
and traditions. In response to religious anti-realism, Hick argues it is at least no
less plausible to postulate a real, transcendent referent for religious belief claims
than it is to reject such a reality in favor of a purely naturalistic explanation. Fur-
thermore, he argues (drawing on William James) that a religious individual’s basic
trust in her own experience is rationally justified, given the fundamental ambiguity
of the world as it appears. In response to exclusivism, Hick maintains that adopt-
ing an exclusivist stance toward the justifiability of beliefs is not rationally defensi-
ble. Even if it were the case that only one religious tradition correctly represented
the Real, it would not be possible for humans to know this with any certainty.
However, Hick is clear that this is not a case of merely epistemological uncertainty;
because the Real positively transcends all human description, no one way of de-
scribing can even possibly be true.
The moral and soteriological content of diverse religious traditions is also an im-
portant focus of Hick’s argument. He posits that, in various ways, all the major reli-
gious traditions that emerged from the “axial age” understand the salvation from or
transformation of the present world as a central aspect of the human relation to the
Real. The ability to bring about such a transformation, as well as to promote a
generally moral way of life, is perhaps the only common method by which one can
evaluate diverse religious traditions. Thus, despite the various concrete paths to
such an end proposed by the world’s major religious traditions, Hick affirms that
the soteriological process at work in them is essentially the same. Furthermore, he
points to what he sees as a broad consensus regarding basic moral claims among
religious traditions to advocate the equal validity of diverse traditions with respect
to their soteriological claims. Similarly to his argument regarding the ontological
claims of various traditions, Hick does not ignore the fact that the details of both
moral and soteriological prescriptions of these traditions often not only differ but
conflict with each other. Nevertheless, he maintains that their overall moral themes
generally agree and that their soteriological visions depict in various ways a path of
transformation from self-centeredness to “Reality-centeredness.” The logic of this
aspect of his position is also similar to the ontological-epistemological aspect in-
sofar as no phenomenal experience can provide humans with certainty about the
true effectiveness of any one soteriological path. In principle, such knowledge can
only be attained when salvation is achieved; according to Hick, such a point would
be the proverbial mountain peak at which the various upward paths converge.
CRITICISM- not in syllabus
Hick’s version of pluralism has garnered a wide variety of critical responses since it was first pro-
posed; nearly every aspect of his argument has encountered some kind of challenge.
Some of Hick’s critics argue that his claim that the same process of transformation from self-cen-
teredness to Reality-centeredness is at work in each of the world’s major religious traditions is not
a valid interpretation of the different forms of diverse religions’ soteriological paths. While, from
the point of view of philosophical or sociological studies, there may be structural similarities be-
tween the ultimate aims of different religious traditions, it is more difficult to take the further step
of positing that these aims are essentially the same. Furthermore, it seems a crucial part of many
religions’ self-understanding that their beliefs and practices are uniquely suited to achieving a true
salvation not offered by other traditions. This is an issue, of course, with which any pluralist ap-
proach must contend, but Hick’s critics maintain that his argument does not address it more
clearly than other possible perspectives. In order to maintain the identity of soteriological paths
across religions, Hick seems forced to minimize or ignore differences while translating important
concepts out of their native terms into ones that members of particular traditions may not accept.
Among the criticisms of the soteriological aspect of Hick’s perspective, one of the most radical is
that offered by S. Mark Heim. Heim argues that Hick’s position rests on two basic assumptions:
the unity of the Real and the convergence of soteriological aims toward a single religious end. The
first, says Heim, rests largely on Hick’s interpretation and acceptance of a Kantian distinction be-
tween the noumenal and phenomenal – a distinction that, Heim points out, is not always easily
reconcilable with particular religious claims. The second assumption, argues Heim, undermines
Hick’s concession that religious diversity does truly exist, since the unity of the soteriological
process would render non-soteriological differences ultimately insignificant unless they inhibit this
process for the religious individual. However, Heim explains that Hick seems to deny that such
impediment is even possible in principle, so that any salvific human effort participates in the same
soteriological process.
Heim’s alternative – what he calls a “more pluralistic hypothesis” – combines a modified inclu-
sivism with the concession of the possibility of a real plurality of ultimate ends. The former part of
his argument holds that the concrete claims of diverse traditions regarding avenues for salvation
ought to be acknowledged in their particularity and on their own terms, and that the sincerity of
their adherents’ commitments to such claims is significant. The latter part of Heim’s argument,
however, rests on an epistemological humility regarding one’s possible knowledge of eschatologi-
cal reality and acceptance of the notion that such reality may in itself be plural. This puts Heim’s
position in close proximity to that of process philosophical approaches.
Criticisms of the epistemological and ontological aspects of Hick’s argument proceed in a
vein similar to those of the soteriological aspects. Some claim that Hick’s hypothesis does not
provide adequate support for the claim that the world is religiously ambiguous and that one is
thus justified not only in treating one’s religious experience or belief as valid but also, perhaps, in
treating it as superior to conflicting beliefs. Plantinga, for instance, does not concede that aware-
ness of religious diversity necessarily calls for alteration of one’s previously held beliefs, though it
might invite new reflection on them. Against Hick (and others), he defends a version of exclu-
sivism, which he defines minimally as holding that “the tenets or some of the tenets of one reli-
gion—Christianity, let’s say—are in fact true” and that “any proposition, including other religious
beliefs, that are incompatible with those tenets are false” (Plantinga 1995, p. 194). However, this
minimal definition of exclusivism is not necessarily that which stands in need of defense since it
could include non-culpable ignorance of others’ actual conflicting beliefs, so Plantinga narrows
his version of exclusivism to include sticking to one’s beliefs despite awareness of other religions,
acknowledgment that they contain examples of genuine piety, and belief that one does not have a
conclusive rational argument that proves the truth of one’s own beliefs (1995, p. 196). He recog-
nizes that challenges to this version of exclusivism are made on moral and
epistemological grounds, and attempts to defend it against both by showing that, in one way or
another, these challenges ultimately undermine themselves. If the moral argument is that exclu-
sivism is arrogant, then Plantinga claims that either this argument itself is also arrogant (that is,
that one ought to withhold belief from beliefs that contradict those of others) or that it lacks
grounds (1995, p. 200). Plantinga breaks down the epistemological challenge to exclusivism into
those centered on justification, on rationality, and on warrant. His defense in each case remains
largely the same: either the pluralist position succumbs to the same criticism that it levels against
exclusivism, or it cannot provide sufficient grounds for its own reasoning. Ultimately, he contends
that religious diversity itself can prove neither the falsity nor the lack of warrant of particular be-
liefs – though it may tend to reduce confidence in belief (1995, p. 214). At the same time, though,
Plantinga suggests that awareness of and reflection of diversity can also serve to strengthen the
exclusivist’s conviction.
Plantinga also levels a challenge to the logical consistency of Hick’s position, contending that it
would be nonsensical to suggest that the Real cannot have either of two strictly contrary proper-
ties (similar to the criticism made by Rowe [1999, p. 146]). As Plantinga puts it, the Real “could
hardly be neither a tricycle nor a non-tricycle, nor do I think that Hick would want to suggest that
it could” (2000, p. 45). However, Hick replies that he does indeed mean to suggest that the Real is
“neither a tricycle nor a non-tricycle,” neither green nor non-green, and so forth, both because
these sorts of concepts cannot apply either positively or negatively to the Real and because they
are not religiously relevant. Hick finds Plantinga’s argument unacceptable because, when trans-
lated from an irrelevant concept (tricycle or non-tricycle) to a religiously relevant one (for example,
personal or non-personal), it forces an exclusivist choice between different conceptions of the
Real – a choice that seems to have no stronger support than personal preference or cultural
background (Hick 2004, p. xxii).
Another, more recent epistemological criticism of Hick’s position takes aim at precisely this point:
namely, his contention that to a significant extent our religious beliefs are contingent products of
factors such as where and when we were born, and that this contingency poses a problem for
claims to religious knowledge and, particularly, exclusivism (Hick 2004, p. 2). Tomas Bogardus
argues that the inferences from contingency to pluralism or skepticism in this argument are in-
valid. He specifies, first, that the problem of the contingency of belief is only a significant problem
if it deals with “only unreflective religious belief, belief formed genuinely, for example, on the basis
of passive receipt of testimony during childhood” (Bogardus 2013, p. 378). Reflective belief must
escape this problem, since otherwise pluralism (which is itself a reflective position) would be sub-
ject to the contingency objection. Bogardus then further specifies that Hick’s (and others’) contin-
gency-based objections seem to target the “safety” of beliefs – that is, if a person had been born
elsewhere than she was and used the same method to form her beliefs as she actually has, then
(in light of her actual beliefs) she might have believed falsely. Bogardus reads the contingency ob-
jection as inferring from this statement that religious beliefs are, in fact, not formed safely, and
therefore they do not constitute knowledge (2013, p. 380). Yet, he maintains that these inferences
are invalid because, in the first place, “[t]he fact that something might have happened which
would have rendered my faculties unsafe does not entail that my faculties are actually unsafe,”
and, in the second place, because safety is not necessary for knowledge (2013, p. 381-2). After
offering a similar criticism of the version that makes the contingency objection a question not of
safety but of accidentality, Bogardus departs from his criticism of Hick to consider the issue of
epistemic symmetry between conflicting beliefs held for contingent reasons (cf. Kitcher 2011).
However, he maintains that this version of the contingency objection is either self-defeating or
else excuses reflective belief. He concludes with the suggestion that even the unreflective believ-
ers specifically targeted by the narrow version of the contingency objection that he has consid-
ered may be excused due to non-culpable ignorance (2013: 391).
These epistemological challenges are distinct from, but related to, the issue of Hick’s ontology:
the central claim that there is one ultimate, noumenal Real to which the different religions address
in a variety of ways. Critics charge that it is difficult to maintain that all religious representations of
ultimate reality refer to the same Real given not simply the wide variety of different actual repre-
sentations but particularly those elements of them that seem to be incompatible or contradictory
(cf. Rowe 1999). On this point, it is not obvious why Hick maintains the unity of the Real rather
than positing a plurality of ultimate referents to match the plurality of ways it is
signified; Mavrodes(1995) goes so far as to describe Hick’s position as actually polytheistic. In
addition, if the Real is as epistemologically inaccessible as Hick maintains, then explaining how
religious concepts can refer to it at all becomes problematic (cf. Plantinga 2000). Hick’s responses
to these and other related criticisms are by and large pragmatic, appealing to a principle of global
religious irenicism or claiming that his hypothesis is offered as a “‘best explanation,’ not an iron
dogma” (Hick 2004, pgs. xxii, xxvii).
