Vedānta is a school of Hindu philosophy which is based on the teachings of the Upanishads.

The
Upanishads are ancient Hindu scriptures which cons;tute the final sec;on of the Vedas. Thus, the
Upanishads have also been called the Vedanta. Vedānta literally means “end of the Vedas.” Vedānta
philosophy interprets and develops the teachings of the Upanishads.
Where all versions of Vedānta intersect in their effort to provide a consistent and defendable
interpreta;on of the Brahma Sūtra, on philosophical and hermeneu;c grounds. Given the common
textual bases, there are certain doctrinal invariances amongst the various sub-schools of Vedānta. The
three main branches of Vedānta philosophy are: 1) Advaita (i.e. non-dualism), which represented by the
teachings of Śamkara , 2) Visishtadvaita (i.e. qualified non-dualism), which is represented by the
teachings of Rāmānuja, and 3) Dvaita (i.e. dualism), which is represented by the teachings of Mādhva.
Śamkara argued that Brahman is undifferen;ated being and that Brahman and Ātman are a unity.
Rāmānuja argued that Brahman is a unity, but that it has two forms, the self and maYer. Madhva argued
that Brahman is differen;ated being, and that it is different from both the self and maYer.
In accordance with the Upaniṣads, these schools of Vedānta hold that there is an ul;mate en;ty, called
Brahman, which also is referred to by scripture as “Ātman” (“Self”). The Vedānta schools recognize, in
accordance with the Upaniṣads, that Brahman plays a key role in the organiza;on of the universe.
AYainment of Brahman by an individual cons;tutes its highest good: moḳsa.
The chief areas of disagreement amongst the various schools of Vedānta are on the nature and
ontological status of individual selves, objects of cogni;on and Brahman, as well as the relevance and
importance of ethics or duty (dharma) to the good life.
For classical Advaita Vedānta, Brahman is the fundamental reality underlying all objects and experiences.
It is explained as pure existence, pure consciousness and pure bliss. All forms of existence presuppose a
knowing self. Brahman or pure consciousness underlies the knowing self.
Consciousness, according to the Advaita School, unlike the posi;ons held by other Vedānta schools, is
not a property of Brahman but its very nature. Brahman is also one without a second, all-pervading and
the immediate awareness. This absolute Brahman is known as nirguņa Brahman, or Brahman “without
quali;es.” This Brahman is ever known to Itself and cons;tutes the reality in all individual selves, while
the appearance of our empirical individuality is credited to avidya (ignorance) and māyā (illusion).
Brahman thus cannot be known as an individual object dis;nct from the individual self. However, it can
be experienced indirectly in the natural world of experience as a personal God, known as saguņa
Brahman, or Brahman with quali;es. It is usually referred to as īśvara (the Lord). The appearance of
plurality arises from a natural state of confusion or ignorance (avidya), inherent in most biological
en;;es.
Given this natural state of ignorance, Advaita provisionally accepts the empirical reality of individual
selves, mental ideas and physical objects as a cogni;ve construc;on of this natural state of ignorance.
But from the absolute standpoint, none of these have independent existence but are founded on
Brahman. From the standpoint of this fundamental reality, individual minds as well as physical objects
are appearances and do not have abiding reality. Brahman appears as the manifold objects of experience
because of its crea;ve power, māyā.
Māyā is that which appears to be real at the ;me of experience but which does not have ul;mate
existence. It is dependent on pure consciousness. Brahman appears as the manifold world without
undergoing an intrinsic change or modifica;on. At no point of ;me does Brahman change into the world.
The world is but a superimposi;on on Brahman. The world is neither totally real nor totally unreal. It is
not totally unreal since it is experienced. It is not totally real since it is sublated by knowledge of
Brahman.
There are many examples given to illustrate the rela;on between the existence of the world and
Brahman. The two famous examples are that of the space in a pot versus the space in the whole cosmos
(undifferen;ated in reality, though arbitrarily separated by the con;ngencies of the pot just as the world
is in rela;on to Brahman), and the self versus the reflec;on of the self (the reflec;on having no
substan;al existence apart from the self just as the objects of the world rely upon Brahman for
substan;ality).
The existence of an individual jīva and the world are without a beginning. We cannot say when they
began, or what the first cause is. But both are with an end, which is knowledge of Brahman. According to
classical Advaita Vedānta, the existence of the empirical world cannot be conceived without a creator
who is all-knowing and all-powerful. The crea;on, sustenance, and dissolu;on of the world are overseen
by īśvara. īśvara is the purest manifesta;on of Brahman.
The cosmic aspect belongs to one īśvara, and the individual aspect, avidya, belongs to many jīvas. But
the difference is that īśvara is not controlled by māyā, whereas the jīva is overpowered by avidya. Māyā
is responsible for the crea;on of the world. Avidya is responsible for confounding the dis;nct existence
between self and the not-self. With this confounding, avidya conceals Brahman and constructs the
world. Śamkara described avidya as beginningless. He considered that to search the origin of avidya itself
is a process founded on avidya and hence will be fruitless.
Both Rāmānuja and Śamkara's systems of Vedanta were predicated on their respec;ve interpreta;ons of
the Upanishads and Brahmasutra Bhasya. Since the heterogeneous Upanishads presented inconsistent
views on God, containing contradictory passages about the unity and diversity of Brahman, it is not
surprising that Rāmānuja and Śamkara developed different perspec;ves on Brahman. Whereas Śamkara
aYempted to reconcile the conflic;ng Upanishadic passages by posi;ng two levels of reality (nirguna and
saguna Brahman), Rāmānuja, in contrast, postulated three interrelated theories to account for the unity
and diversity of Brahman: (1) the "Body of God" doctrine, (2) co-ordinate predica;on
(samanadhikaranya), and (3) the body-inner-controller rela;onship (sarira-sariri bhava). Each of these
theories will be briefly explained below.
Subsequent tradi;on has applied the label “Viśiṣṭādvaita” to the philosophy of Rāmānuja. The term
“Viśiṣṭādvaita” is oien translated as ‘Qualified Non-Dualism.’ An alterna;ve transla;on is “Non-duality of
the qualified whole,” or perhaps ‘Non-duality with qualifica;ons.” The label aYempts to mark out
Rāmānuja’s effort to affirm the unity of the many, without giving up on the reality of dis;nct persons,
quali;es, universals, or aesthe;c and moral values.
According to Rāmānuja, the universe is made up of souls (jīva), maYer (jagat), and Brahman. He asserted
that souls and maYer are en;rely dependent on Brahman and qualify Brahman's existence. Thus, the
whole universe is the body of God, which consists of two modes: finite souls and maYer. The rela;onship
between these two modes is inseparability. Consequently, Rāmānuja 's system of thought is called
Visistadvaita (qualified non-dualism), because Brahman is allegedly qualified (visesya) by souls (cit) and
maYer (acit).
Rāmānuja used the concept of co-ordinate predica;on to show how two aspects of Brahman can be
dis;nct from each other yet inseparable. The universe, while dis;nct from Brahman, is s;ll a part of
Brahman- it is an aYribute and not an independent principle capable of func;oning on its own. In other
words, the universe is dependent on, and inseparable from God.
Rāmānuja taught that souls and maYer are uYerly dependent on Brahman for their existence. Brahman
is the supreme Soul who is present in all finite souls and maYer. Brahman dwells in the souls
unrecognized and unknown un;l libera;on (moksa) is reached. During libera;on, the finite souls realize
their divine nature but do not become iden;cal with God—Brahman and souls remain dis;nct yet
inseparable.
Rāmānuja’s gives the cosmological doctrine of śeṣa and śeṣin (dependant and dependant upon).
According to Rāmānuja, Brahman is the Self of all. However, this is not because our individual
personhood is iden;cal with the personhood of Brahman, but because we, along with all individuals,
cons;tute modes or quali;es of the body of Brahman. Thus, Brahman stands to all others as the soul or
mind stands to its body. The metaphysical model that Rāmānuja thus argues for is at once cosmological
in nature, and organic. All individuals are Brahman by virtue of cons;tu;ng its body, but all individuals
retain an iden;ty in contradis;nc;on to other parts of Brahman, par;cularly the soul of Brahman.
Where all versions of Vedānta intersect is in their effort to provide a consistent and defendable
interpreta;on of the Brahma Sūtra, on philosophical and hermeneu;c grounds. Given the common
textual bases, there are certain doctrinal invariances amongst the various sub-schools of Vedānta. In
accordance with the Upaniṣads, the various schools of Vedānta hold that there is an ul;mate en;ty,
called Brahman, which also is referred to by scripture as “Ātman” (“Self”). The Vedānta schools
recognize, in accordance with the Upaniṣads, that Brahman plays a key role in the organiza;on of the
universe. AYainment of Brahman by an individual cons;tutes its highest good: soteriological libera;on or
moḳsa.
The chief areas of disagreement amongst the various schools of Vedānta are on the nature and
ontological status of individual selves, objects of cogni;on and Brahman, as well as the relevance and
importance of ethics or duty (dharma) to the good life. Rāmānuja’s foils in the ar;cula;on of his
philosophy are two forms of Vedānta that were not clearly dis;nguished during his day: these are the
Bhedābheda view, and the Advaita philosophy. Both these views take a similar stance on the rela;onship
of an individual’s subjec;vity and Brahman: on both accounts, the conscious principle of the individual is
of a piece with Brahman. In the case of Advaita Vedānta, the consciousness of an individual is regarded
as numerically iden;cal with the consciousness of Brahman. On this view, the psychological ego or sense
of individuality is something dis;nct from consciousness: it is its object.
In accordance with much of the monism of Upaniṣadic passages, Rāmānuja maintains that there is a way
in which the individual self (jīva, or jīvātman) is iden;cal with the Ul;mate Self (Ātman or Paramātman).
According to Rāmānuja, each jīva shares with Brahman an essen;al nature of being a knower. However,
due to beginningless past ac;ons (karma) our true nature (as being knowers and dependants upon
Brahman) are obscured from us. Moreover, our sharing this nature in no way implies that we have the
same rela;onship to other things. In other words, our likeness in one respect with Brahman does not
imply that we are either omnipotent, omniscient or all good.