MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

Marriage Conflict of Laws

Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation
of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.  (Article 1,
Family Code of the Philippines)
In marriage cases, conflict of laws usually arises due to the presence of foreign element.
This foreign element may appear in a situation where the marriage is celebrated abroad and this
marriage is sought to be recognized in another jurisdiction. It may also appear in situations where
the parties to the marriage are citizens or nationals of different states such that their capacity to
contract marriages is governed by their national laws. In these instances, the validity of the
marriage is implicated as forum law may not look kindly on the marriage celebrated abroad.
As a general rule, all marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in the Philippines. However, the following are not recognized in our jurisdiction:

1. Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of his
parents or guardians;
2. Those bigamous and polygamous marriages not falling under Art. 41;
3. Those contracted through mistake of one of the contracting party as to the identity of the other;
4. Those subsequent void marriages under Art. 53;
5. Psychological incapacity; and
6. Marriages void by reasons of public policy:
• Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood;
• Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth
civil degree;
• Between step-parents and step-children;
• Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
• Between adopting parent and adopted child;
• Between surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
• Between surviving spouse of the adopted child and adopting parent;
• Between adopted child and legitimate child of the adopter;
• Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
• Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other
person’s spouse or his or her own spouse.

Full Faith and Credit

The Philippines gives full faith and credit to marriages celebrated abroad as a matter of
comity with other nations. Marriage celebrated outside the Philippines are valid and binding
unless they violate public policy or contravene our prohibitive laws. Recognition of foreign
marriages is important since almost all societies value marriage as a social institution.
 In determining the validity of foreign marriages, courts usually look to the compliance by
the parties of the requirements of foreign laws. Hence, if a marriage is valid in the place of
celebration, it must also be valid here. Validity is adjudged according to the law of the place
where the marriage is celebrated. The reason for this rule is the “predictability and the intestate
order arising from society’s interest in marriage.” Otherwise, chaos would ensue if a man or a
woman can or may be married in one jurisdiction and not considered married in another. Society
would disintegrate if marriages were only valid in the place of execution.
While some requirements of foreign law may be strange and not similar to ours, so long
as the marriage is considered valid by the law of the place of execution, it is also valid here. It
must be noted that certain rituals performed by members of indigenous trbes are also considered
valid through state recognition and practice.

US v Jarvison
Facts: The government indicted Ben Jarvison for aggravated sexual abuse of a minor child in
Indian Country, it attempted to compel Esther Jarvison to testify against him.   Esther, an 85-
year-old Navajo woman who speaks quite limited English, and Jarvison, who is 77 years old, are
residents of the Navajo Indian Reservation and enrolled members of the Navajo Tribe. During
the hearing, Esther emphatically stated that she did not want to testify against her husband and
that she and Jarvison had married in a traditional Navajo ceremony in Coyote Canyon within the
Navajo Reservation on June 25, 1953.   The district court found that the Jarvisons had a valid
marriage based on this 1953 traditional Navajo ceremony, and concluded that the spousal
testimonial privilege applied under Trammel v. United States. The United States contends that
the district court erred in determining that the Jarvisons were married under traditional Navajo
law, and that even if married, the marriage was a sham or moribund and was created solely to
avoid testifying.  

Issues: Whether or not the marriage was valid

Whether full faith and credit should be accorded said marriage

Ruling:
First issue: The Court’s analysis of the district court's conclusion that the Jarvisons had a valid
marriage requires us first to examine what law would apply to the question of a marriage
between two Navajo tribal members who live completely within the boundaries of the Navajo
Reservation.  It is often assumed without discussion by courts that, in cases arising on an Indian
Reservation within a State, the substantive law of the State is controlling in such situations.  
owever, because the Navajo Nation retains sovereign authority to regulate domestic relations
laws, including marriage of its Indian subjects, Navajo law is dispositive as to the validity of the
marriage in question. Both Esther and Ben Jarvison are subject to Navajo Nation laws regarding
marriage and domestic relations.   Because domestic relations are considered by the Tribe as
being at the core of Navajo sovereignty, we conclude that Navajo law is the appropriate law
under which to evaluate the validity of the marriage. 

Second issue: Navajo law currently recognizes multiple ways to establish a valid marriage.   It
recognizes both those marriages contracted outside the Navajo Reservation (if valid by the laws
of the place where contracted), and those within the Reservation under the requirements of Title
9 of the Navajo Nation Code. Navajo Code recognizes both traditional and common law
marriage. Because the alleged marriage in this case spans more than a fifty-year period, a proper
understanding of the evolution of Navajo law on traditional and common-law marriage is
required to resolve the validity of the Jarvisons' marriage. Under Navajo tradition, celebration of
a traditional marriage ceremony and the knowledge thereof by the community were sufficient to
create a valid marriage.   A marriage license or other documentation was unnecessary. Despite
the seemingly clear language in this Resolution, subsequent Navajo court decisions interpreted
the Resolution as making the license requirement “directory” rather than mandatory, and court
decisions and subsequent Tribal Council Resolutions recognized the validity of both unlicensed
traditional and common law marriages. 

Cook v Cook
Facts: In 1996, the Arizona legislature amended this state's marriage statutes to provide that
certain marriages, even though "valid by the laws of the place where contracted," were
nonetheless "void and prohibited" in Arizona.  Alan R. Cook appeals from a decree of
dissolution. He contests the trial court's jurisdiction, alleging that there was no valid marriage.
Appellant and Peggy Cook were married on April 7, 1984 in Virginia. They are first cousins.
Marriage between first cousins was then (and is now) valid in Virginia. The parties have one
minor child, born July 11, 1986.  In 1989 the parties moved to Arizona. Arizona's statutory
scheme (then and now) provides that a marriage between first cousins in Arizona is "void."
A.R.S. § 25-101.[2] However, when the Cooks moved to Arizona,  our law also provided that
"marriages valid by the laws of the place where contracted are valid in this state." Thus, under
the plain language of § 25-112(A), the Cook's marriage was "valid" in Arizona in 1989 (when
they moved here) but subsequently declared "void" by the 1996 amendments. On January 3,
1997, appellant filed a petition for marital dissolution in the superior court. Though initially
alleging there was a marriage, appellant subsequently filed a motion to amend/dismiss
dissolution proceedings alleging that the parties' marriage was void and prohibited under A.R.S.
§§ 25-101 and -112(A). The trial court denied the motion. It held, in part, that Arizona law prior
to the 1996 amendments did not preclude recognition of a marriage valid in other states that was
void in Arizona pursuant to § 25-101. It then reasoned that because the law prior to the 1996
amendments permitted recognition of the first cousin marriage in this circumstance, the 1996
amendments could not be retroactively applied to void a marriage that was valid at the time the
parties moved to Arizona. After denial of the motion, trial ensued. The trial court entered various
orders as to property, spousal maintenance, and other issues. Appellant timely appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage was valid?

Ruling:
The first question to be decided is whether the validity of the marriage should be determined
under Arizona or Virginia law. If determined under Virginia law, the marriage is valid; if
determined under Arizona law, we are presented with statutory and constitutional issues as to
whether the marriage is valid. It is unnecessary to address those issues if Virginia law
applies. With a significant exception applicable here, Arizona follows the general rule that it is
the law of the place where the marriage is celebrated, not the law of the place where the divorce
takes place, that determines the validity of the marriage.  Just as enduring as the general rule,
however, has been Arizona's exception to that rule; namely, that the power to define a valid
marriage is vested in this state's legislature and not in the legislature (or judiciary) of another
state nor in the judiciary of this state. Thus, under a conflict-of-law analysis, Arizona authorities
require us to recognize the preeminence of the Arizona legislature's express statutory enactments
as to whether a particular out-of-state marriage is valid or void in Arizona. We do not apply the
law from the state of Virginia, even though Virginia had the most significant relationship to the
parties at the time of the marriage. Though not controlling, our conclusion that appellee has a
vested right in the validity of her marriage is also supported by Arizona law pertaining to
community property. A spouse's interest in the marital community includes a "vested property
interest." Further, A.R.S. § 1-244 (2000) expressly provides that "no statute is retroactive unless
expressly declared therein. The Court can give effect to the legislature's use of the word "void" in
the 1996 amendments by applying that term to exclude vested rights in existing marriages as we
have described them. Had the legislature chosen to nullify existing marriages (thus having the
retroactive effect described) it could have expressly stated so. It did not. Accordingly, we can
give legitimate meaning to the term "void" in the 1996 amendments by applying it to marriages
from other jurisdictions in which the parties had no vested right to have their marriage
recognized in Arizona. As to these marriages, the use of the term "void" applies and means that
such a marriage "shall have no force and effect for any purpose within the State of Arizona." By
construing the term "void" to apply to marriages where rights in Arizona have not "vested," we
adopt an "alternate construction" that "avoids constitutional difficulty" as required by our law. 

Importance of Marriage
All societies consider marriage as essential to the functioning of society. Marriage hold
the members together and prevent the disintegration of family life. It is an institution whose
maintenance the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of family and of society,
without which they would neither be civilization nor progress.”
Section 2, article XV of the 1987 Constitution defines marriage as an “inviolable social
institution” and as the foundation of family life. This is reiterated in Article 1, Chapter 1, Title 1
of the Family Code of the Philippines. The same Section 2 of the Constitution mandates the state
to protect the marriage institution, with the State defending the “right of spouses to found a
family in accordance with their religious convictions.”

Marriages not subject of recognition

While the Philippines gives full faith and credit to conventions and contracts performed
abroad, the same is true only when the acts and contracts do not violate public policy or
prohibitive laws. Hence, not all marriages celebrated abroad and valid in the place of celebration
are avlid in our jurisdiction. There are exception to the general rule of according validity to
marriages celebrated abroad.

The following marriages shall not be recognized in our jurisdiction:

1. Incestuous Marriages under Article 37, Chapter 3, Title1 of the Family Code
2. Void Marriages by reason of public policy under Article 38, Chapter 3, Title 1 f the
Family Cde
3. Polygamous or bigamous marriages under Article 35, Chapter 3, Title 1 of the Family
Code
4. Same-sex marriages under Article 2, Chapter 1, Title 1 of the Civil Code
 If the foreign marriage falls under any of the foregoing categories, the same is not
recognized in our jurisdiction. Hence, there can be no marriage between first cousins in our
jurisdiction, though other jurisdictions may allow the same. Also while same-sex marriages have
been legalized in some jurisdictions, the Philippines is still sticking to the time-honored
definition of marriage as being between a man and a woman. The Philippines also has no law on
same-sex unions as tthe same is still a union between man and man or woman and woman.

Obergefell v Hodges
Facts: James Obergefell and John Arthur, a same-sex couple alleging that the state discriminates
against same-sex couples who have married lawfully out-of-state. Arthur, who was terminally ill
and suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), sought to identify Obergefell as his
surviving spouse on his death certificate based on their July 11, 2013, Maryland marriage. The
couple was granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting state officials from listing Arthur as
unmarried on his death certificate, in the event he died before the court could consider the case.
Arthur died on Oct. 22, 2013. On Dec. 23, 2013, U.S. District Judge Timothy Black ordered
Ohio authorities to recognize same-sex marriages on death certificates, saying the state's ban on
such unions is unconstitutional and that states cannot discriminate against same-sex couples
simply because some voters “don't like homosexuality.” The narrow ruling applied only to death
certificates. But the State of Ohio appealed that ruling to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Issues: Whether or not the fourteenth amendment requires a state to license a marriage between
two people of the same sex
Whether the fourteenth amendment requires a state to recognize a same sex marriage licensed
and performed in a state which grants that right

Ruling:
First issue: Yes. The ancient origins of marriage confirm its centrality, but it has not stood in
isolation from its developments in law and society. The nature of marriage is that, through its
enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and
spirituality.
Reversing the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court held on June 26, 2015,
that same-sex marriage is a protected right under the Constitution. State bans prohibiting same-
sex marriages were struck down, and all states must recognize same-sex marriages performed out
of state. 

Justice Kennedy identified four "principles and traditions" that provided precedent for the
protection of same-sex marriage under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
1. Personal choice in marriage "is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy."
2. Marriage is "fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its
importance to the committed individuals."
3. Marriage "safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights
of childrearing, procreation, and education."
4. Marriage "is a keystone of [the country]'s social order" and there "is no difference
between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle."
Justice Kennedy also noted marriage equality can be "derived" from the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointing to the interracial marriage case, Loving v. Virginia,
Kennedy wrote, "Indeed, in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has recognized
that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most
fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged."

Responding to criticism that democratic debate should not have been substituted with judicial
action, Kennedy noted there has been "far more deliberation than this argument acknowledges,"
including referenda, legislative debates, grassroots campaigns, scholarly writing, and the more
than 100 amicus filings in Obergefell. Regardless, Kennedy wrote, "An individual can invoke a
right to constitutional protection when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees
and even if the legislature refuses to act."

Kennedy concluded, "It would misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the
idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its
fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded
from one of civilization’s oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law.
The Constitution grants them that right."

Second issue: Yes. The Court, in this decision, holds same-sex marriage couples may exercise
the fundamental right to marry in all States. It follows that the Court also must hold—and it now
does hold--that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex
marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.

Civil unions
A civil union is a legal relationship between two people that provides legal protections to
the couple only at the state level. A civil union is not a marriage, though. Civil unions do not
provide statutory protections, benefits, or responsibilities to couples, and a civil union may not
be recognized in our jurisdiction. Civil unions, similar to domestic partnerships in some ways,
were established primarily as an alternative for same-sex couples in states where marriage was
unavailable. Under longstanding tradition, marriage in our jurisdiction consisted of a union of
one man and one woman (a “traditional marriage”). Certain jurisdictions have enacted laws
recognizing the right of same sex couples to live together as husband and wife. Some
jurisdictions call these civil unions, while others refer to them as same sex unions. However,
these unions are different from the traditional marriage relationship. Civil unions are a creation
of statute where the rights and obligations of the parties are governed by the law creating the
relationship. Hence, no husband and wife relationship is created in civil unions as this kind of
relationship inheres only in the traditional marriage relationship. Same sex couples cannot
therefore rely on the rights and obligations of couples in the traditional marriage relationship as
these two kinds of civil unions are different from one another.

An example of a distinction between a traditional marriage relationship and same-sex

civil union is the case of Langan v. St Vincent’s Hospital. Langan and Spicehandler entered into
a civil union in Vermont. Conrad met an accident and was brought to St. Vincent’s Hospital
where he subsequently died. John thus sued the hospital for wrongful death. The Supreme Court
ruled that a same-sex partner does not have legal standing to maintain the action inasmuch as
“surviving spouse” did not contemplate same-sex life partners pursuant to EPTL 5-4.
Notwithstanding the landmark Obergell v. Hodges case upholding the validity of same-sex
marriages, it may not affect the validity of the Langan ruling since the latter involved a same-sex
union and not a same-sex marriage.

The sanctity of marriage is valued in the Philippines. Acts that will weaken the
foundation of the family as a social institution are deemed inimical to such values. Among such
acts are divorces obtained abroad. In Tenchavez v. Escano, the court ruled that the valid marriage
between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano remained subsisting despite the decree of
absolute divorce obtained in the state of Nevada. At the time of the divorce decree, Vicenta and
Tenchavez were still Filipino citizens, thus, subject to Philippine Law, specifically Article 15 of
the Civil Code. The Philippines does not admit of absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii.
The present Civil Code only provides for legal separation, and even in that case, it expressly
provides that marriage bonds shall not be severed.

The Philippines, however, has given limited recognition of divorce where the non-
recognition will work injustice and unfairness to Philippine nationals. In Van Dorn v. Romillo,
the Supreme Court ruled that private respondent has no standing to sue petitioner for accounting
of his business since pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the petitioner’s
husband. The divorce decree obtained in Nevada is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. It is true that owing to the national principle, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In San Luis v. San
Luis, the Court ruled that the Van Dorn ruling is equally applicable in the instant case. The
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee would absolutely allow Felicisimo to remarry. However,
the records show that there is insufficient evident to prove the validity of the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of responded and Felicisimo under the laws of
U.S.A.

A divorced husband cannot file a case for adultery against his divorce wife. In Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera, the crime of adultery can only be prosecuted except upon the sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the
status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. In
the present case, the fact that private responded obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divotce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle
in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera (G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989)

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. 
Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned.  Thus, under
the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner
and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit. 

Roehr v. Rodriguez (G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003)

First, it is important to point out that the divorce was validly obtained and is recognized
in the Philippines. It has been consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. In this case, the divorce decree has not been questioned by either party. Only the
custody of the children is doubted.
While the court in Germany that granted the divorce decree has decided regarding the
custody of the children, as a general rule, the legal effects of divorce, even if obtained abroad,
must still be determined by our courts. This includes issues on custody and care and support of
children. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the
award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to
the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court. It should be noted that the proceedings in the German court
were merely summary. It cannot be said that Carmen Rodriguez was given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the German court. While Wolfgang was represented by two counsels,
Rodriguez had no lawyers to assist her in the proceedings.
In addition, the divorce decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse
was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial
court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care,
support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in consonance with the
provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount
consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.

RIGHT TO RE-MARRY AFTER DIVORCE

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
 Citizens of the Philippines whose foreign spouses have obtained a divorce abroad are
capacitated to re-marry under our laws.
 It is important, however, that the divorce be judicially recognized first by the Philippine
courts before the Philippine national can rely on the effects of such divorce.

Republic v. Orbecido (G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005)

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the lattertoremarry.
However, in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted as to the claim of
Orbecide that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and
had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration
could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his
favor. Thus, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is granted.

RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE AND CORRECTION OF ENTRY

Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
 The entries pertaining to marriage, judgments of annulment of marriage, and judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning may be cancelled or corrected in the civil
registry.
 When the foreign spouse obtains foreign divorce, the same may be given effect in the
Philippines by filing a petition for correction of entry in the civil registry.
 The rule for declaration of a status or condition is different from a civil case which is for
the enforcement of a right against another. However, the court now allows that both be
made in a special proceedings to avoid multiplicity of suits.

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas (G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2011)

The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code
because the substantive right it establishes is in favour of the Filipino spouse.  Only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second par of Art 26 of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by
the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with conformity to alien’s
national law.
The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the foreign decree of
divorce on the petitioner and respondent’s marriage certificate without judicial order recognizing
the said decree.  The registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is void.

NATURE OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS

 Recognition of foreign divorce are proceedings to prove the validity of a foreign
judgment. The party must present proof of the appropriate foreign laws as well as
authenticity of the documents obtained from foreign courts.
  Philippine courts are not allowed to re-litigate the issues already settled by a foreign
court. Such decision is already res judicata to the case.
 Local court’s role is only to assure that there is indeed a foreign judgment, that such
judgment is in conformity with foreign laws, and that the latter are duly proved in the
proceedings.
 Foreigners may petition for the recognition of foreign divorce so long as foreign
judgment affects his status or condition as a person.

Fujiki v. Marinay (G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013)

Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC
that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”  While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy
is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of
the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or
a particular fact.”Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any  act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register,  may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute
their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a
party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment
is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.