Today is Wednesday, December 13, 2017
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
.R. No. 208790 January 21, 2015
LENN VIÑAS, Petitioner,
.
ARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
EYES, J.:
or review is the Decision rendered on January 29, 2013 and Resolution issued on August 7, 2013 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
1 2
A-G.R. CV No. 96448. The CA set aside the Decision dated January 29, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo Cit
3
anch 30, in Civil Case No. SP-6564(09), which declared the marriage between Glenn Vifias (Glenn) and Mary Grace Parel-Vifias
Mary Grace) as null and void.
Antecedents
n April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old, respectively, got married in civil rites held in Lipa City,
atangas. Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The infant, however, died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment. Glenn
4
eged that the infant’s death was caused by Mary Grace’s heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy.
he couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a bartender, while Mary Grace was a production engineer.
ometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn. Glenn subsequently found out that Mary Grac
ent to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition was filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet.
n February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.He alleged that Mary
5
race was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house. She
oroughly enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked heavily even whenshe was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused to
erform even the most essential household chores of cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace had not exhibited the
regoing traits and behavior during their whirlwind courtship. 6
enn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about the death of the infant whom she delivered. She lived as if she
ere single and was unmindful of her husband’s needs. She was self-centered, selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted her
bout her behavior, she showed indifference. She eventually left their home without informing Glenn. Glenn later found out that she
ft for an overseas employment in Dubai. 7
efore Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace, he consulted the latter’s friends.
hey informed him that Mary Grace came from a broken family and was left to be cared for by her aunts and nannies. The foregoin
rcumstance must have contributed to her sense of insecurity and difficulty in adjusting to married life. 8
o ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional guidance and submitted himself to a psychological evaluation by Clinical
sychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found him as "amply aware of his marital roles" and "capable of maintaining a
ature and healthy heterosexual relationship." 9
n the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality through the data she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin,
odelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Graceway back in college.
ary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a college graduate. She belongs to a middle class family. Her father is an
verseas contract worker, while her mother is a housewife. At the time Dr. Tayag prepared her report, Mary Grace was employed in
ubai and romantically involved with another man. 10
ccording to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and physically harmed Glenn during the couple’s fights. Mary Grace is also ill-
mpered and carefree, while Glenn is jolly, kind and family-oriented. 11
r. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag concluded
at Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not founded on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Henc
r. Tayag recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple’s marriage. 12
drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained that:
he said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to be severe, serious, grave, permanent and chronic in proportion and is incurable
y any form of clinical intervention. It has already been deeply embedded within her system as it was found to have started as early
s her childhood years. Because of such, it has caused her to be inflexible, maladaptive and functionally[-]impaired especially with
gards to heterosexual dealings.
uch disorder of [Mary Grace]is mainly characterized by grandiosity, need for admiration and lack of empathy[,] along with her
attern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others[,] which utterly distorted her perceptions and views especially in terms of
fitting marital relationship. Such disorder manifested in [Mary Grace] through her unrelenting apathy, sense of entitlement and
rogance. Throughout her union with [Glenn], she has exhibited a heightened sense of self as seen in her marked inability to show
oper respect for her husband. x x x She is too headstrong that most of the time[,] she would do things her own way and would not
ay close attention to what her husband needed. She had been a wife who constantly struggled for power and dominance in their
lationship and [Glenn], being too considerate to her, was often subjected to her control.x x x She is into many vices and loved
anging out with her friends at night[,] and she even got involved in an illicit relationship[,] which was still going on up to the present
me. x x x.
he root cause of [Mary Grace’s]personality aberration can be said to have emanated from the various forms of unfavorable factors
her milieu way back as early as her childhood years[,] which is the crucial stage in the life of a person as thisis the time when the
dividual’s character and behavior are shaped. [Mary Grace] came from a dysfunctional family with lenient and tolerating parents[,]
ho never impose any restrictions [upon] their children. Considering such fact, she apparently failed to feel the love and affection of
e nurturing figures that she had[,] who were supposed to bethe first to show concern [for] her. x x x She has acquired a
omineering character as she was not taught to have boundaries in her actions because of the laxity she had from her caregivers
nd also because she grew up to be the eldest in the brood. She sees to it that she is the one always followed with regards to
aking decisions and always mandates people to submit to her wishes. She has not acquired the very essence of morality [and] ha
ertainly learned set of unconstructive traits that further made her too futile to assume mature roles. Morals and values were not
stilled in her young mind that as she went on with her life, she never learned to restrain herself from doing ill-advised things even
he isamply aware of the depravity of her actions.
he psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical antecedence as it was already inher system even prior to the
olemnization of her marriage with [Glenn]. x x x. (Underlining ours)
13
n February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
ubstituted service of summons was made upon Mary Grace through her aunt, Susana Rosita. Mary Grace filed no answer and di
14
ot attend any of the proceedings before the RTC.
uring the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito were offered as evidence. Glenn and Rodelito described Mary
race as outgoing, carefree, and irresponsible. She is the exact opposite of Glenn, who is conservative and preoccupied with his
ork. On her part, Dr. Tayag reiterated her findings in the psychological report dated December 29, 2008.
15
Ruling of the RTC
n January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as null and void on
16
ccount of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC cited the following as grounds:
he totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn] warrants [the] grant of the petition. Reconciliation between the parties under the
rcumstances is nil. For the best interest of the parties, it is best that the legal bond between them be severed.
he testimonies of [Glenn] and his witness [Rodelito] portray the miserable life [Glenn] had with [Mary Grace] who is a Narcissistic
ersonality Disordered person with anti[-]social traits and who does not treat him as her husband. [Glenn] and [Mary Grace] are
eparated in fact since the year 2006. [Mary Grace] abandoned [Glenn] without telling the latter where to go. x x x Had it not for the
sistence of[Glenn] that he would not know the whereabouts of his wife. The law provides that [a] husband and [a] wife are obliged
live together, [and] observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. x x x For all intents and purposes, however, [Mary Grace] was in a
uandary on what it really means. x x x.
om the testimony of [Glenn], it was established that [Mary Grace] failed to comply with the basic marital obligations of mutual love
spect, mutual help and support. [Glenn] tried his best to have their marriage saved but [Mary Grace] did not cooperate with him.
Mary Grace] is x x x, unmindful of her marital obligations.
he Court has no reason to doubt the testimony of [Dr. Tayag], a clinical psychologist with sufficient authority to speak on the subje
psychological incapacity. She examined [Glenn], and was able to gather sufficient data and information about [Mary Grace]. x x x
his [Narcissistic] personality disorder of[Mary Grace] is ingrained in her personality make-up, so grave and so permanent, incurabl
nd difficult to treat. It is conclusive that this personal incapacity leading to psychological incapacity is already pre-existing before th
arriage and was only manifested after. It has become grave, permanent and incurable. (Underlining ours and italics in the origina
17
he Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its Order dated December 1,
18
010.
The Appeal of the OSG and the Ruling of the CA
n appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent evidence exist proving that Mary Grace indeed suffers from a
arcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision failed to ci
e root cause of Mary Grace’s disorder. Further, the RTC did not state its own findings and merely relied on Dr. Tayag’s statement
nent the gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The RTC resorted to mere generalizations and conclusions sansdetails
esides, what psychological incapacity contemplates is downright incapacity to assume marital obligations. In the instant case,
econcilable differences, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were shown, but these do not warrant the grant
Glenn’s petition. Mary Grace may be unwilling to assume her marital duties, but this does not translate into a psychological
ness. 19
enn, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of the OSG’s appeal.
n January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision reversing the RTC ruling and declaring the marriage between
enn and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting. The CA stated the reasons below:
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
hysical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
nd discharged by the parties to the marriage which, asso expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
bligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
tendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
sorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
sychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The psychological condition must be characterized by (a)
avity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
the instant case, [Glenn] tried to prove that [Mary Grace] was carefree, outgoing, immature, and irresponsible which made her
nable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He likewise alleged that she refused to communicate with him to save the
arriage and eventually left him to work abroad. To Our mind, the above actuations of [Mary Grace] do not make out a case of
sychological incapacity on her part.
hile it is true that [Glenn’s] testimony was corroborated by [Dr. Tayag], a psychologist who conducted a psychological examination
n [Glenn], however, said examination was conducted only on him and no evidence was shown that the psychological incapacity of
Mary Grace] was characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
ertainly, the opinion of a psychologist would be of persuasive value in determining the psychological incapacity of a person as she
ould be in the best position to assess and evaluate the psychological condition of the couple, she being an expert in this field of
udy of behavior. Although the psychologist stated that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, she did no
lly explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she makea conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. Moreover, she admitted
at she was not able to examine the respondent[,] hence, the information provided to her may be subjective and self-serving.
ssential in this petition is the allegation of the root causeof the spouse’s psychological incapacity which should also be medically o
nically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing
the time of the celebration of the marriageand shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave
nough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 an
ticles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition,
stablished by evidence and explained in the decision.
nfortunately for [Glenn], the expert testimony of his witness did not establish the root cause of the psychological incapacity of [Mar
race] nor was such ground alleged in the complaint. We reiterate the ruling of the Supreme Court on this score, to wit: the root
ause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified; b) alleged in the complaint; c) sufficiently proven
y experts; and d) clearly explained in the decision.
scoursing on this issue, the Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, has this to say:
rticle 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological– not physical, although its manifestations and/
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or on
mptoms may be physical.
f them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person coul
ot have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could no
ave given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacit
eed be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under th
rinciple of ejusdem generis x x x[,] nevertheless[,] suchroot cause must b
dentified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained
xpert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinica
sychologists."
he Supreme Court further went on to proclaim, that"Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cu
e marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves ". It refers to a serious psychologica
lness afflicting a party evenbefore the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grav
nd permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of th
matrimonial bond one is about to assume." Psychological incapacity should refer to no les
han a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of th
asic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the partie
o the marriage.
om the foregoing, We cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage of the parties for the obvious failure of [Glenn] to show that
e alleged psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for his
ilure to observe the guidelines outlined in the afore-cited cases.
erily, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to [Glenn]. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
xistence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted from the fact that both our
onstitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. (Citations omitted, underlining ours and emphasis
20
nd italics in the original)
he CA, through the herein assailed Resolution dated August 7, 2013, denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Glenn.
21 22
Issue
nperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court the issue of whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTC’s declaratio
nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
support thereof, Glenn points out that each petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage should be judged according to its own
et of facts, and not on the basis of assumptions, predilections or generalizations. The RTC judge should pains takingly examine th
ctual milieu, while the CA must refrain from substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. Further, Glenn argues that in
23
arcos v. Marcos, the Court ruled that it is not a sine qua non requirement for the respondent spouse to be personally examined b
24
physician or psychologist before a marriage could be declared as a nullity. However, if the opinion of an expert is sought, his or
25
er testimony should be considered as decisive evidence. Besides, the findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of the
26
tnesses should be respected. 27
seeking the denial of the instant petition, the OSG emphasizes that the arguments Glenn raise for our consideration are mere
iterations of the matters already resolved by the CA. 28
Ruling of the Court
he instant petition lacks merit.
he lack of personal examination orassessment of the respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a
etition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. "If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
capacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to." 29
the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence offere
o not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The evidence merely shows that Mary
race is outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined to perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai and is romanticall
volved with another man. She has not been maintaining lines of communication with Glenn at the time the latter filed the petition
efore the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand, is conservative, family-oriented and is the exact opposite of Mary Grace. While Glenn an
ary Grace possess incompatible personalities, the latter’s acts and traits do not necessarily indicate psychological incapacity.
umbaua v. Rumbaua is emphatic that:
30
Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
omplying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling toperform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor
n adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his
ssential marital obligations – had to be shown and was not shown in this cited case.
the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never
oven to be rooted in some psychological illness. x x x Likewise, the respondent’s act of living with another woman four years into
e marriage cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that
omiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring
nd faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in later.
x x To use the words of Navales v. Navales:
ticle 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance ofand to assume basic marital obligations. Me
ifficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different fro
ncapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness . Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexu
fidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselve
arrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’
efusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychologica
ness that is contemplated by said rule . (Citations omitted, underlining ours and emphasis in the original)
31
is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing
stablished fact shows that living together as spouses under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace’s departure from their hom
2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with her husband.
urther, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to present more
onvincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the former’s condition. Glenn, however, failed in
is respect. Glenn’s testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenn’s
atements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to Mary Grace’s traits and acts, which she exhibited
uring the marriage. Hence, there isnary a proof on the antecedence of Mary Grace’s alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that,
x months before they got married, they saw each other almost everyday. Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring and well[-]educated
32
erson" in Mary Grace.
33
nent Dr. Tayag’s assessment of Mary Grace’s condition, the Court finds the same as unfounded. Rumbaua provides some
1âwphi1
34
uidelines on how the courts should evaluate the testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nulli
marriage, viz:
e cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the
formation fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
rcumstance alone does notdisqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the
pplication of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only
agnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and
ow he would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s probes.
r. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-
entered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who "believes that the world revolves around him"; and who "used love as a…
eceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him." x x x.
e find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychologic
capacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the
ot cause of the respondent’s narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither
d it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his
uties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s
onclusion in her Report – i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality
sorder declared to be grave and incurable" – is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous
haracterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a
ir gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s
ondition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent’s psychological condition based on the information fed by
nly one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
vidence.
xxxx
careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that at the time the parties were married,
spondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties and
sponsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain howshe came to the conclusion that respondent’s condition was
ave and incurable. x x x
xxxx
rst, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way. In
hort, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the respondent
an besaid to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how an
hy it was already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent’s awareness of and his
apability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of the petitioner’s case.
econd, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the petitioner related tohe
x x If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot b
dmitted and given credit. No such independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in this cas
articularly about the respondent’s early life and associations, and about events on orabout the time of the marriage and immediate
ereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appearto us to be no more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided an
eagre facts that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify the nullificatio
the marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities of the respondent’s life were examined and given focus; none of thes
ualities were weighed and balanced with the better qualities, such as his focus on having a job, his determination to improve himse
rough studies, his care and attention in the first six months of the marriage, among others . The evidence fails t
mention also what character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, fo
xample, why the respondent’s family opposed the marriage and what events led th
espondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this allegation is at a
orrect. To be sure, these are important because not a few marriages have failed, no
ecause of psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basi
ncompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to psychological incapacity .
x. (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
35
the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to Mary Grace’s status as the eldest among her siblings, her father’s being
36
n overseas contract worker and her very tolerant mother, a housewife. These, however, are not sufficient to establish and explain
37
e supposed psychological incapacity of Mary Grace warranting the declaration of the nullity of the couple’s marriage.
he Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of witnesses who can attest to the antecedence
a person’s psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what the law requires.
hile the Court also commiserates with Glenn’s marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented provides inadequate basis for
e Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her obligations as Glenn’s spouse.
HEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 29, 2013 and Resolution dated August 7, 2013 of the
ourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448 are AFFIRMED.
O ORDERED.
ENVENIDO L. REYES
ssociate Justice
E CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
e opinion of the Court's Division.
RESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ssociate Justice
hairperson
CERTIFICATION
ursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
onsultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
hief Justice
ootnotes
* Additional member per Raffle dated January 12, 2015 vice Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza.
Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Leoncia Real-
1
Dimagiba, concurring; rollo, pp. 26-33.
2
Id. at 24.
3
Rendered by Acting Judge Honorio E. Guanlao, Jr.; CA rollo, pp. 7-13.
4
See Certificate of Marriage, id. at 22.
5
Original Records, pp. 4-13.
6
Id. at 5.
7
Id. at 6-7.
8
Id. at 8.
Id. at 8-10.
9
10
Please seethe psychological report of Dr. Tayag, dated December 29, 2008, Folder of Exhibits, p. 20.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 23, 26.
13
Id. at 23-26.
14
Original Records, pp. 18, 20.
15
CA rollo, pp. 82-83.
16
Id. at 7-13.
17
Id. at 12-13.
18
Id. at 14-15.
19
Please seeAppellant’s Brief, id. at 40, 44-46.
20
Rollo, pp. 30-33.
21
Id. at 24.
22
CA rollo, pp. 88-92.
23
Id. at 6.
24
397 Phil. 840 (2000).
25
Rollo, p. 6.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 7.
28
Id. at 45-47.
29
Zamora v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 701, 708 (2007).
30
612 Phil. 1061 (2009).
31
Id. at 1083-1084.
32
TSN, October 5, 2009, p. 19.
33
Original Records, p. 5.
34
Supra note 30.
35
Id. at 1084-1092.
36
TSN, September 14, 2009, p. 12.
37
Id. at 18.
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