Jebat: Malaysian Journal of History, Politics & Strategic Studies, Vol.

39 (1) (July 2012): 50-75

@ School of History, Politics & Strategic Studies, UKM; ISSN 2180-0251 (electronic), 0126-5644 (paper)

AZMI Arifin
Universiti Sains Malaysia

PERAK DISTURBANCES 1871-75: BRITISH COLONIALISM, THE

CHINESE SECRET SOCIETIES AND THE MALAY RULERS1

This article is a re-interpretation of the history of ‘power struggles’,

‘civil wars’ and ‘anarchy’ which were asserted to have happened in
Perak, one of the Malay states in the Malay Peninsula during the period
of 1871-75. Up until now, historians tend to suggest that the ‘Malay
feudalism’, i.e. the political disputes and the power struggle among the
Malay rulers; were the main factors that prompted the Perak 1871-75
mayhem. This writing, however, finds that allegations of ‘civil wars’
and ‘anarchy’; blamed for their so-called roles that pushed Perak to
the brink of collapse and eventually led to British intervention; has
not been credibly supported. By utilizing authoritative primary and
secondary sources, the author argues that these are merely imaginary
excuses invented by the British colonial officials to paint the negative
perception that the disturbances happened at large in Perak and that
the indigenous rule was deteriorating in shape. These excuses were
made to simplify justifications by the British in its quest to intervene
into the Malay states affairs in the last quarter of the 19th century.

Keywords: Malay States, Perak, Raja Abdullah, Ngah Ibrahim, British

Colonialism, Larut War, Chinese Secret Societies

Introduction

Historians in general have conceded that the scarcity of sources hinders more
comprehensive study on history of the Malay states in the 19th century. Much
research on the subject therefore relies on past official records produced by
the British colonial administrators as primary references. However, failure to
balance the colonial historical perspectives gives rise to never-ending confusion
that hampers thorough understanding of the actual historical developments
taking place in Perak throughout the 19th century.
W. D. MacIntyre explains that the colonial reports portray the inordinate
influence of colonial ideologies and the element of ‘racial superiority’ that
as a whole represents how the European generally perceived the indigenous
world. The non-European political regions, including Malay Peninsula, were
invariably viewed as ‘uncivilised’ and ‘barbarous’.21 The typical attitudes of
the British towards the Malays can be deduced from a number of colonial
records, for instance, by the words of Thomas Braddel, ‘The innate superiority
of the ordinary Englishmen, in his sense of honour and justice, is sufficient
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 Perak Disturbances 1871-75

to dominate the inferior character of the Malays...’3 or Hugh Clifford, ‘I, the
European, the white man, belonging to one of the most civilised races in the
Old World; the Malays, civilised too, but after the fashion of unchanging Asia,
which differs so widely from the restless progressive civilisation of the West’.4
There had also been views that envisaged the benefits and prosperity
these ‘half civilised’ and ‘half wild’ Malays could enjoy if they were to be
governed by the European powers. According to the British Governor of
the Straits Settlements, Harry Ord, ‘...the subjection of these native States
of the Peninsular to Powers greater and more civilised than themselves is
an advantage to themselves and to all who have relations with them.’5 He
therefore emphasised the need for the inevitable intervention; ‘I feel that it
would be greatly to the advantage of the Settlement if our influence could be
thus extended over the Peninsula and I shall not fail to avail myself of any
opening that may present itself for doing so.’6
Patrick Sullivan explains that the excessive influence of the colonial
ideologies in the interpretation of the Malay states history in 19th century
brought about two main after-effects. First, there is the reinforcement of
the colonial myth of anarchy and decay in the Malay states prior to British
‘salvation’.7 Kimberley, for example, emphasises the British role in Perak and
other Malay states in the 19th century as ‘...to rescue, if possible, these fertile
and productive countries from the ruin which must befall them, if the present
disorders continued unchecked.’82 Since the indigenous political system was
functioning distinctively disparate to the perpetually glorified, the ‘ideal-
typical’ European monarchy, it was viewed as the worst kind of monarchy for
an ‘Asiatic’ society. Violence, disunity among the rulers and the seemingly
unchallenged power of the local aristocrats were attributed to the incompetence
of the indigenous ruling. These circumstances led to, according to Frank A.
Swettenham, ‘The sultan of Perak invited the British to teach him how to rule
this unruly country...’, but then added, ‘...the circumstances alone made that
interference the duty of the paramount power’.9
Second, the Malay Archipelago was seen as an object within
the discourse of Orientalism that dictated how the European assessed the
inhabitants. This is illustrated through the inclined portrayal by the European
writers of the typical ‘Asiatic’ characters of the Malay - decadency, ignorance
and the mischief under the indigenous autocratic rulers - assumed only to
be happening outside of Europe.10 At the same time, the introduction of the
European-style ruling system was drummed up as the most practical solution
to all the misery of the ‘Asiatic’ world.
According to Michael Adas, the indigenous historiographies by the British
imperialists are always being based on dichotomy before and after the colonial
era.11 Before the British arrival, the Malay states were supposed to be in decline
and ‘anarchy’.12 The whole of the Malay Peninsula, according to Ord, was in
the hands of ‘...the lawless and the turbulent...’13 while Swettenham alleged,
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‘In each State the ruler, whether he was sultan, raja, or chief of lower rank, was
supreme and absolute. His word was law, and oppression and cruelty were the
result.’14
The colonial era, on the other hand, was described as the beginning
of the age of enlightenment. Clifford describes the British governance in the
Malay states, which was said to have shattered the authoritarian rule and the
tyranny, as an era that ‘...has brought peace, happiness, and prosperity to those
to whom these things were formerly strangers; and has given to the Malays
a new life – a life which for the first time in their history is a thing worth the
living.’15 The above presumption continues to be cultivated by the historians of
subsequent generations. Mills, for instance, described that the Malay states in
the 19th century ‘...were committing political “hara kiri” among themselves.’16
R. O. Winstedt and R. J. Wilkinson, on the other hand, asserted that ‘...the most
convinced supporter of the rights and customs of small people must admire the
Pax Britannica in Perak and bless the work of British protection in bringing
out of centuries of great tribulation this rich and beautiful country and her
ancient line.’17 In 1991, a local historian elucidated that ‘Malay feudalism’
has brought about severe disunity among the Malays since the Malacca Malay
Sultanate up until the 19th century.

Feudalism is the only element that allowed us to understand the reason

the Malay governments in the Malay Peninsula were in constant
chaos and rapidly declining during the 19th century, which eventually
saw them falling into the hands of British, one after another...the
discordance among the peninsular Malay states has been self-existence
due to the feudalistic nature of the political and social system. If we
focus our attention to the development of each of the Malay state since
the Melaka Sultanate until the 19th century, the truth of this statement
becomes more prevalent. For example, when the powerful Malacca
government fell in 1511 and was replaced with the emerging Johor, the
fights and disunity continued to haunt...Throughout the whole of the
19th century, no Malay state in the peninsular was spared from splits
and power struggles: Kedah/Perlis 1821-1848, Terengganu 1831-1839,
Kelantan 1838-1839, Johor 1840-1855, Pahang 1857-1863, Selangor
1867-1874, Negeri Sembilan 1869-1889 and Perak 1871-1877.18

The Perak Power Struggles in Malaysian Historiography

The ‘power struggles’ and the ‘civil wars’ that were claimed to have happened
in Perak in 1871-75 were frequently referred to illustrate the decline of the
Malay States in the 19th century. According to the British colonial version,
the Perak crisis began in 1870s soon after the demise of Sultan Ali (1865-71).
The late sultan left behind a few potential successors, all vying to ascend the
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 Perak Disturbances 1871-75

throne. This sparked off an ugly struggle for the Perak throne involving three
possible candidates, namely Raja Abdullah (Raja Muda), Raja Ismail (Raja
Bendahara) and Raja Yusof (Raja Di Hilir).
The colonial version has it that Raja Muda Abdullah was the rightful
successor to the throne. Clarke described Raja Abdullah as ‘...a man of
considerable intelligence, who was supported by all chiefs present [in Pangkor]
except the Mantari.’19 However, Raja Abdullah was dismissed after failing to
turn up for Sultan Ali’s funeral and his installation ceremony as the new sultan.
Instead, Raja Ismail - an elderly man from Siak and not a direct descendant of
the Perak royals - was appointed to succeed Sultan Ali. This decision created
resentment among those who were opposed to the new ruler, and thus conflicts
ensued.
The British colonial officials viewed Raja Ismail’s appointment
as conflicting with the customary practice of the Perak Malay politics, and
concluded this as an attempt to grab power through illegitimate means. Many
of them, from W. H Read to R. O. Winstedt, believed that Raja Abdullah
should have been the sultan but was denied by Raja Ismail and his followers.
According to Read, ‘The legitimate heir, Abdullah, was, by an intrigue, passed
over, and Rajah Bandaharah Ishmael was appointed Sultan; but, the other chief
having his partisans, civil war broke out in the country.’20 To Winstedt, ‘He
[Raja Abdullah] was the rightful heir and was intelligent and Europeanized
and to disallow his claim because he had failed to attend a funeral seemed
to Victorian rationalists frivolous’.21 Another British Governor of the Straits
Settlements, W. R. Jervois blamed Raja Ismail’s actions that triggered a state of
disorder in Perak, reiterating ‘...the anarchy of the country caused by Ismail’s
claims.’22
There were also assertions that a number of Perak chiefs had exploited
the situation for their own gains. For instance, the Mentari of Larut Ngah
Ibrahim was divulged as ‘the main figure’ that played a key role in getting Raja
Ismail into power. His purpose of influencing the appointment of an elderly
and someone who was ‘unrelated’ to the royals was to ensure that he could
align himself as the next successor.23
The dispute became more worrying as each side was said to be
engaging help from the Chinese triads (namely the Hai San and the Ghee Hin)
in an attempt to usurp to power. Further impasse brought about total chaos and
anarchy, which saw the Perak government rapidly deteriorating; the entire state
was in absolute disorder, civil wars broke out, pirates were rampaging and
people were killed to the extent that there was no longer peace and safety in
the whole state.24 Perak rulers were also said to be too weak to exert control on
the chaos, which began to cause danger to British interests in Penang.25 These
are the state of circumstances that are said to prevail in Perak in the early 1870s
that drove the then ‘Perak Sultan’ to write a letter to the British, appealing for
intervention to save Perak and to assist him to govern the country.
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The Beginning of a Crisis? Sultan Ali’s Demise and the enthronement of

Raja Ismail

All the descriptions put forward in the colonial officials’ reports above are
actually confusing. These descriptions tend to picture only the negative aspects
on the indigenous discordance and put blame on the Perak Malay rulers as
being power hungry. The actual events were never explained objectively
and comprehensively, but rather interpreted from the perspective of British
colonialism and interest adding further to the confusion as to the real cause of
the political instability in Perak. This state of confusion can be articulated in
further details when the actual developments taking place in Perak in the early
1870s are described in the subsequent sections.
The Perak crisis were said to begin when Sultan Ali, the ruling sultan,
passed away in Sayong in May 1871. The Perak Malay customary tradition
spelled out that Raja Bendahara, whose roles were to be an acting ruler and
a custodian of the royal regalia, would be responsible to extend invitation
to Raja Muda of Perak for appointment as the successor within seven days
period. However, the legitimate successor, Raja Abdullah never responded to
the invitation for both Sultan Ali’s funeral and his appointment as a new sultan.
No solid reason was made available for Raja Abdullah’s action, although
historians tend to explain that Raja Abdullah feared the threat of Raja Yusof,
who was also the legitimate candidate for the throne.26
Nevertheless, there have been other reasons that triggered the above
situation. First, it was understood that Raja Abdullah and the late Sultan Ali
had a long history of personal feud.27 Previous royal altercations indicate that
it is common for disputing sides to boycott attending the ailing sultan and the
funeral without jeopardising the appointment process of the successor (Raja
Muda). Second, Raja Abdullah was suffering from loss of credibility after his
wife, Raja Tipah eloped with a Selangor prince, Raja Daud. Raja Abdullah’s
failure to take stern action and re-possess his wife was an embarrassment to the
whole of Perak chiefs and this adversely affected his reputation as a legitimate
state ruler. Most likely, Raja Abdullah’s hesitation to attend his appointment
ceremony was due to humiliation. Moreover, Raja Tipah’s brother had sent a
warning to kill him if he dared stepping his foot in Sayong.28
Notwithstanding, the Orang Besar-Besar (Perak Chiefs) were still
hoping to appoint Raja Abdullah as the new sultan as opposed to the other two
candidates, Raja Yusof and Raja Ismail. Raja Yusof was not favoured due to his
known characters as a ruthless and vengeful person as was evident after the coup
of his father’s throne, Sultan Abdullah (1851-57) by Raja Ali (later Sultan Ali).
Raja Ismail, on the other hand, was not preferred by the Orang Besar-Besar
as a suitable candidate as he was not from the Perak’s royal family by descent.
The Orang Besar-Besar’ refusal to appoint Raja Ismail was acknowledged by,
for example, Khoo Kay Kim who describes that the concerted decision of the
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 Perak Disturbances 1871-75

chiefs when considering the appointment of a Sultan before 1874 was not to
put forward Raja Ismail, even for the Raja Muda.29Raja Ismail also accused of
collaborating with Panglima Perang Semaun in a conflict that ended with the
murder of Dato’ Shahbandar.
Perhaps these are also the reasons Raja Ismail, despite being loyal
and a close ally of Sultan Ali, was not appointed the Raja Muda when the
latter was in power. Instead, Sultan Ali made Raja Abdullah the Raja Muda,
bypassing both Raja Ismail and Raja Yusof in the process. This move inferred
that Sultan Ali endorsed Raja Abdullah as the sultan in-waiting.30 One month
went past after Sultan Ali’s death and Raja Abdullah still had not shown any
sign of securing his title. Orang Besar-Besar began to lose patience. They
started planning to install another candidate, Raja Usman (Sultan Ali’s son) as
the new ruler, but the latter declined and suggested Raja Ismail instead.
Lack of other credible candidates left the Perak chiefs with little
choice, and soon all collectively agreed to accept Raja Ismail as the new
sultan.31 Raja Ismail himself at first declined the offer, but later changed his
mind after much persuasion. He ascended the throne with the official title
of Paduka Seri Sultan Mu’abidin Shah. The whole process was so smooth;
there was no resistance whatsoever. In fact, days after Raja Ismail’s selection,
Dato’ Laksamana, a close ally of Raja Abdullah and Raja Ismail’s foe, was
said to publicly acknowledge the appointment and ‘...would carry out all the
obligations as instructed by the new Sultan, including the Shahbandar too.’32
Therefore, narratives that implied that the appointment instantaneously
led to ‘civil war’ among the Perak Malays can be argued as rather baseless.
Raja Ismail’s status as Sultan was recognised by the all parties, including the
British,33Raja Yusoff and Raja Abdullah himself.34The issue of choosing a new
Perak sultan was finally resolved through collective agreement between the
Orang Besar-Besar, and the eventual appointment was well acknowledged by
all parties. At this point Wilkinson wrote;

There was no question of any violent usurpation of the throne by

[Raja] Ismail. He was not the rightful heir, it is true, nor was he even
a prince of Perak in the direct male line; still he had done his duty by
the heir and had been put on the throne with the full consent of chiefs
and people. He was the de facto ruler and [Raja] Abdullah was only
a claimant at the time when Sir Harry Ord left the Straits and was
succeeded by Sir Andrew Clarke.35

Early Reactions of Raja Muda Abdullah

Soon after Raja Ismail’s appointment, Raja Abdullah did not show any
imminent sign of challenging the former’s legitimacy as the new sultan, despite
being ‘discontented’ for being dismissed. He was believed to have kept quiet
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and continue his normal life in Purbayan, (Hilir Perak) and never made any
attempt to confront Raja Ismail openly and claim his own right.36
Raja Abdullah realised that he had no more legitimacy to the throne,
and was in no position to change things. His political influence was limited
and that most of those loyal to him were of weaker gender. He knew that he
was in a rather powerless position to lead any sort of upheaval. As for the
Orang Besar-Besar, who initially attempted to make Raja Abdullah sultan, the
appointment of Raja Ismail as the new legitimate ruler must now be honoured
and protected. The group even criticised Raja Abdullah’s attitude, which had
been an embarrassment to the royal customs. Disappointment led the Orang
Besar-Besar to express that Raja Abdullah was not qualified to ascend the
throne, ‘...all greatly blamed Rajah Muda saying that he was not fit to rule
for there could not be shown one single instance of his having benefitted his
Country.’37
The situation stood as it was for a year. However, things gradually
changed after Raja Abdullah was hit with a serious financial adversity, mainly
driven by his own extravagant lifestyle.38 It was during this time that some
‘hidden hands’ appeared to offer financial lifeline to him for their own agenda.
Perak was a wealthy state and rich in natural resources; by exploiting the
state’s political fragility, this unscrupulous third party could make maximum
gains through these resources. Raja Abdullah’s ears were drummed with the
idea of openly challenging the legitimacy of Raja Ismail. He was promised an
undivided, powerful backing that included financial assistance and political
interference.
Backed by this support, he went ahead to challenge Raja Ismail’s
position and made public his claim by writing to the British, alleging that: (1)
Raja Ismail’s installation as sultan was contradicting to Perak customary royal
tradition; (2) invitation for his royal appointment was not done according to the
way a next-in-line sultan should receive; (3) Raja Ismail had been deceptive and
forceful in getting himself into power; (4) Raja Ismail was supposed to be the
acting sultan for a certain time until his (Raja Abdullah) official appointment;
(5) and he did not make any previous attempt to challenge Raja Ismail’s status
quo to avoid chaos and disunity, which would adversely affect British citizen
and trade interest in Perak.39

Raja Abdullah’s Financial Problems and the Perak Sultanate Rights

The role of these ‘hidden hands’ behind the Perak political conflict in 1870s was
important but attracted little attention in historical writings. Local historians
barely touch on the subject of these ‘hidden hands’. Their background and roles
in Perak crisis were almost never been discussed especially in the Malaysian
history textbook. Arguably, without their intervention, conflicts and power
struggle in Perak might not have happened.
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 Perak Disturbances 1871-75

The ‘hidden hands’ as is used in this article refers to the European-

Chinese capitalist and the leaders of the Chinese triads in the Straits Settlements,
who were closely linked to highly influential individuals such as Edward Bacon,
W. H. Read and Tan Kim Ching.40 They had interest in the capitalist activities of
the British big companies in the Malay states, especially in Perak. They played
a big role in triggering political conflict in Perak and were the main actors in
the plot to make Raja Abdullah the new sultan. Furthermore, they had been
actively engaging in campaigns to discredit the local political situation in an
effort to urge the British to interfere. This coup d’etat was smartly engineered
by tactfully persuading Raja Abdullah and offering conditional support. Raja
Abdullah’s weakness and vulnerability especially in the context of his financial
problems made him an easy prey.
Raja Abdullah was seen by the ‘hidden hands’ and then the British
as a puppet in a plot to monopolize Perak’s economy and wealth. Through the
guides of the parties-with-interest, Raja Abdullah made new claims, one after
another. Envisaging himself as the new sultan, he began imagining taking the
wealthy Larut back from Ngah Ibrahim and handing it over to a business group
that would be willing to pay a high price. At the same time, he continued to
lobby to the British to recognize him as the rightful sultan, despite knowing
that this would antagonise the Perak chiefs.41
In an attempt to weaken Ngah Ibrahim’s position in Larut, Raja
Abdullah began to collaborate with the Ghee Hin triad, which had previously
defeated the Hai San group (backed by Ngah Ibrahim) in the Second Larut
War. In January 1873, Raja Abdullah, together with Dato’ Laksamana, Dato’
Shahbandar and Raja Idris made a trip to Penang to make a pact with a Ghee
Hin leader, Ho Gui Siu. An agreement was signed on 28 February 1873, which,
among others, encouraged the triad to continue its involvement in the Larut
War.42 In addition, if Larut could be successfully seized from Ngah Ibrahim,
the Ghee Hin would be given a concessions and monopoly of the tin mines in
Larut. In addition, Raja Abdullah committed to bear half of the expenses that
the Ghee Hin spent during the armed conflicts with Ngah Ibrahim-backed Hai
San group. In another meeting also in Penang, Raja Abdullah even tried to sell
the Kerian-Larut concession to Bacon. However, the British foiled the attempt
under Ord’s instruction. Ord, at that time, fully supported Ngah Ibrahim’s
position.43
In truth, all attempts by Raja Abdullah before 1871 to take over Larut
from Ngah Ibrahim were never successful. He failed to get the backing of the
Perak chiefs, especially those in Hulu Perak. His effort to get British support
was also in vain despite numerous appeals. Without these supports, he was
helpless and his ambition to seize power seemed coming to nought. However,
a renewed confidence blossomed when he was introduced to a Singapore-
based merchant, Tan Kim Ching. Also a member of the Ghee Hin, Tan had the
motive to secure Larut’s wealth for himself and was willing even to recognize
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Article: Azmi Arifin

Raja Abdullah as the new Perak sultan.

Tan sought help from his European business partners who had strong
influence in the British administration in the Colonial Office and the Straits
Settlements such as Thomas Scott and Read. Promised by Raja Abdullah a
lucrative 10-year concession of Larut, a plot to make Raja Abdullah the new
sultan was charted. Read and Tan were two individuals responsible to bring
Raja Abdullah’s claim to Ord’s attention, and later to Clarke, Ord’s successor.
The role played by the two and another British officer, J. G. Davidson was
of particular importance. They were believed to have drafted a letter dated
30 December 1873 using Raja Abdullah’s name, signature and official
seal,44requesting the Governor Clarke to act as ‘umpire’ in the ‘power struggle’
in Perak, accord British protection and suggested that British rendered
personnel assistance in Perak’s governance.45
Through the plot between the European-Chinese capitalists, the
leaders of the Chinese Secret Societies in Penang and Singapore, who took
advantage of Raja Abdullah’s financial fragility, and their own conspiracy with
those in the Colonial Office, as well as the urge to interfere, Clarke had an
inevitable decision to make. He decided that it was time for the British to
intervene. Raja Abdullah was declared the official Sultan of Perak through the
Pangkor Treaty signed in 1874. The treaty was seen as the first step towards a
direct British intervention in Perak.

The Chinese Secret Societies, the Larut Wars and ‘Power Struggle’ in
Perak

It is essential to reiterate that there had never been a genuine ‘civil war’ or
‘anarchy’ among the Perak Malays in 1870s until the involvement of external
parties, which had ulterior motives. Conflicts, stirred by the external elements,
began to surface involving a few select individuals, particularly between Raja
Abdullah and Ngah Ibrahim, as the former tried to seize tin-rich Larut from the
latter. However, this conflict was more personal in nature and did not involve
the majority of the Perak chiefs and the Malay population. There had been
neither threat to the citizens of Perak nor major bloodsheds and certainly no
anarchy that would threaten the political stability of the state. In sum, ‘Malay
feudalism’, ‘civil war’ and ‘anarchy’ that had been frequently asserted to
prevail in Perak in the 1870s are just terms invented especially by the British
colonial officials to justify their intervention.
Civil war can only be said to exist in Perak, more precisely in Larut
in 1870’s if it was viewed as armed conflicts between two opposing Chinese
triads, the Ghee Hin and Hai San. This war had no connection whatsoever with
the Malay conflicts and was in no way related to the power struggle between
the Malay rulers. Instead, the whole saga was part of the quarrels that had been
inherited from mainland China since before the turn of the 19th century. Major
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 Perak Disturbances 1871-75

fights occurred near the tin mines, mainly in Larut, where the majority of the
Chinese was populated.
These fights did not spread throughout all parts of Perak. In fact, Hulu
Perak, which was a Malay-dominated settlement, was in a state of peace and
stability. Nevertheless, certain quarters tried to connect the Chinese fights with
the Malay political impasse. The British officials, in their reports, for instance,
were inclined to view these fights between the Chinese as a byproduct of the
Malay rulers fighting for power and soliciting external helps. They explained
the wars among the Chinese triads as ‘...a symptomatic of anarchic state of
affairs throughout the state of Perak.’46
In this context, the British colonial officers tend to put the blame on
Ngah Ibrahim as the one who gave rise to the crisis. He was labelled as an
‘opportunist’, someone who would be willing to collaborate with any party that
can help him remains in authority.47 From these officials’ views, his obsession
with power created ‘anarchy’ in Larut and eventually turned things to be out of
control. As Birch put it, ‘...the Mantri’s evil influence was the principal cause
of all the trouble, and Chinese disturbances’.48In truth, Ngah Ibrahim was a
victim who had been caught in between of the two fighting Chinese groups.
The disturbances caused by the Chinese triads apparently created
more trouble to Ngah Ibrahim. Caught in the middle, Ngah Ibrahim was left
to choose between the two fighting groups, and he sided with the one that he
thought can win the war. He believed that the war would not last long and that
Larut would return to an eventual peace under his ruling.
Since 1862, Ngah Ibrahim had been pledging his support to the Hai
San, which was the earliest group of the Larut miners and had helped him with
financial support. The group also had twice the number of Ghee Hin members,
creating good odds in winning a war against the Ghee Hin. But he was wrong.
In 1872, a Hai San defeat in the war against the Ghee Hin put Ngah Ibrahim
in limbo. Worried that he might lose power and revenues, he switched his
allegiance back and forth several times to the group that he felt was on the
winning side. Wilkinson explained ‘It was a matter of indifference to him
[Ngah Ibrahim] which side was the winner, so long as he continued to receive
the revenues of Larut.’49
The truth is that, if anyone were to be called opportunist - other than
the British themselves - it should be the European-Chinese capitalists and
the leaders of the Chinese triads. They took advantage of the Perak’s fiasco
to manipulate it to their own gains through a number of ways. First, they
interfered into the Malay politics by encouraging Raja Abdullah to proclaim
himself the legitimate Perak sultan. By lobbying Raja Abdullah, they expected
him to pave way for them to grab the shares of the resources in return for
their support. Second, they encouraged fights among the triads in Larut to the
point that it was beyond containment. Weapons and immigrants were brought
from China in large numbers, masked with ‘British citizenship’ to join the
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fights.50Third, they manipulated their position and influence in the British

administration since 1857 to urge for direct annexation by British of Perak and
other Malay states, focusing on political corruptions, wars, piracy and violence
of the Malay rulers and protection of their trade interest as their justifications.
They played an undeniably major role in laying the foundation that led to the
eventual British intervention in the Malay states.

British Intervention and the Pangkor Treaty of 1874

Apart from the European-Chinese capitalists who manipulated the Perak

situation to expand their capitalist activities, the British had also their own share
of hands in disturbing the political stability in Perak. During the 19th century
imperialism, the British began to have influence and power in determining
the political landscape of the Malay states. All parties acknowledged this
colossal British power. The British referred to by the Malay chiefs, the leaders
of the Chinese Secret Societies and the European-Chinese capitalists to voice
their grievances, solicit recognition or request for support when facing with
certain conflicts. Those successful in getting British sympathy would usually
find themselves in an upper hand position. This was proven when the British
supported and brought victories to Tengku Zhia’uddin (Kudin) in Selangor and
Ngah Ibrahim in Larut, Perak.
Notwithstanding, the British policy of interfering into other Malay
states’ affairs was motivated by their own interest and driven by the frequently
inconsistent personal decisions of the British officials. A Malay ruler could
retain authority or be helped to grab power as long as the British could reap
benefits from it. If a ruler was seen as a threat to British interest, the British
would not hesitate to manoeuvre a move to replace him with a pro-British
ruler. This was what happened in Perak in the 1870s.
Under the Governor Ord, the policy of interference practiced by the
British in Perak was mostly indirect, and occasionally, direct, with the British
publicly pledging their backing to Ngah Ibrahim and acknowledging his rule
in Larut. In a letter dated 3-5 September 1873, Ord officially expressed his
support to Ngah Ibrahim and indicated willingness even to offer military help
to him and his ally Hai San.51 At one point, the British recognised Raja Ismail
as the legitimate Perak Sultan, but quickly rescinded when the claims by Raja
Abdullah surfaced. Ord never recognized Raja Abdullah as the rightful sultan
and had vehemently declined the requests made by the Chinese merchants and
the triads to intervene in Perak. In short, the British at first supported Ngah
Ibrahim and halted Raja Abdullah’s effort to rise to power.
Clarke’s appointment as Governor of the Straits Settlement in 1873
began what was seen as an era where the British policies were shadowed by the
influence or the ‘skilful pressure’ of a number of British officials-merchants in
the Straits Settlements and the Colonial Office in London. These policies were
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 Perak Disturbances 1871-75

incorporated with much interest put on the British companies that supported
direct interference.52The urge for this intervention was made paramount
through a petition by 248 Chinese traders in the Straits Settlements who were
asking for British intervention due to the prevailing situation of Malay states
being ‘lawless’ and ‘in the state of anarchy.’53
An order was issued by the Secretary of the British Colony, Earl of
Kimberley to Clarke on 20 September 1873, requesting the latter to make a
serious evaluation of the situation, expedite course of actions to restore order
and to consider an establishment of a British residential system in the Malay
states.54Kimberly’s written order, which amongst others, raised concerns on
the interest of the investment of Read’s company, was not primarily aimed
to protect the British investment which was allegedly under threat, but rather
aimed to seek a platform for new investment opportunities for the European-
Chinese capitalists.
Soon after the arrival of Clarke in Singapore in November 1873, Read
and Tan, who had been anticipating the new Governor’s presence, quickly
arranged a meeting with Clarke and hand over Raja Abdullah’s claims. At the
same time, the opposing Chinese triads were also requesting appointment of
a British Resident who could mediate and resolve their disputes in Larut. All
these demands were timely, as Clarke had been waiting for the right opportunity
to intervene in Perak. Moreover, Raja Abdullah had also promised to comply
with the British demands, which included accepting a Resident in Perak and
introduction of any new system deemed necessary. To Clarke, these promises
are a gift handed on a silver platter, and for that, he made the vital decision to
support Raja Abdullah’s claims.
At the onset of British intervention in Perak, Clarke persuaded the Malay
rulers and the Orang Besar-Besar to attend a meeting in Pangkor in January
1874. Without providing adequate opportunity for the chiefs to meet and
deliberate among themselves for a decision, Clarke ‘forced’ the Perak chiefs
to sign the Pangkor Treaty in January 1874. This treaty had obviously been
signed without the full consent of the majority of the Malay rulers, especially
those in Hilir Perak, even though Clarke claimed otherwise.55 There were a
number of delegations who had been forced to attend and signed the treaty
due to threats.56Jervois explained the real situation of the Pangkor meeting,
inside a British warship and escorted by a fully armed military personnel, as
the follows;

In a British vessel, with a British man-of-war alongside, we collected

together some Perak chiefs, to elect a sultan, when we just put down
one who was absent and set up another who was present, that other
being the wretched individual I have now described [Raja Abdullah].57

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Perak Post-Pangkor Treaty

The Pangkor Treaty, signed on 20 January 1874, dramatically changed the

political landscape in Perak. Through the treaty, Raja Abdullah was appointed
as the new Perak Sultan. In return, under Clause 6, it was prescribed that a
Resident, which would act as the sultan’s adviser, was to be appointed and his
advice ‘...must be asked and acted upon all questions other than those touching
Malay religion and custom.’58 The British also sent a letter to Raja Ismail (who
did not turn up in Pangkor) that informed him that he was to be stripped off
the title of Sultan but allowed to continue using the Raja Muda title.59 Ngah
Ibrahim was no longer recognized as the independent ruler of Larut, but rather
to be treated as one of the many equally ranked Perak chiefs under the purview
of the new sultan.
After his appointment as the new sultan, Raja Abdullah did not wait
too long to initiate the handover process of the concessions in Kerian-Larut
to the Chinese capitalists in the Straits Settlements who had supported him
all along. He drew up an agreement with Chee Ah Him, a Chinese merchant
and triad leader from Penang to develop a number of mining areas in Perak.
Despite the earlier cautions by the British officials to obtain the Governor’s
consent before making any major decision, Raja Abdullah neglected the advice
and proceeded with his own plan. In July 1874, Raja Abdullah received an
initial payment of $13,000 (from the agreed $26,000) from Lee Cheng Tee,
who was Tan Kim Ching’s agent. This was the reward agreed for authorising
Tan to collect revenues in Kuala Sungai Perak.60Raja Abdullah fulfilled all his
commitments as promised.
Although the treaty successfully mediated disputes between the
Chinese, it failed miserably to reunite the Malays. In fact, the Malay politics
was thrown into an even larger turmoil. Raja Ismail unanimously rejected
the conditions of the treaty, which he felt was made without full consent and
consultation of Perak’s Orang Besar-Besar. The British recognition of Raja
Abdullah as the new sultan angered the Malay Perak chiefs, especially in Hulu
Perak and contributed to an alarming crisis. Suddenly, Perak had two sultans,
each claiming to be the rightful ruler. One was selected and enthroned by the
Orang Besar-Besar Perak and another put on the throne by the British through
the Pangkor Treaty of 1874.
In order to garner the Malay support, the British attempted their
best to ensure the official appointment of Raja Abdullah as the new sultan.
Nevertheless, they were faced with tenacious resistance. Attempts to unveil
Raja Abdullah officially as the new sultan failed as Raja Ismail used all
possible avenues to make known his rejection of the Pangkor Treaty. He was
not willing to relinquish his power and surrender all the Perak royal regalia,
despite the umpteen efforts by the British officials asking him to do so. Many
of the Perak Malay chiefs were also unwilling to cooperate with the British
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 Perak Disturbances 1871-75

nor acknowledge the treaty.61Followers of Raja Ismail viewed Raja Abdullah’s

appointment as illegitimate. Furthermore, majority of the Perak Malays still
pledged their loyalty to Raja Ismail, whom they considered their de facto
ruler.62
As long as the Perak royal regalia were not surrendered to Raja
Abdullah, he could not be officially enthroned as the sultan, and Raja Ismail
would maintain his status quo as the rightful ruler.63This means Raja Abdullah
could not be fully utilised by the British to gain support from the Malay chiefs
and the Perak Malays for its policy implementation. The British administrators,
especially the Resident J. W. W. Birch, was not aware that the supreme state
power did not merely lie with the incumbent sultan, but also through strong
support of the Perak chiefs. Without their support, Raja Abdullah would not
have enough authority to fulfil the British demands.
Failure to understand the Malay customs and political tradition in Perak
explained why Birch blundered in his effort to mediate the Raja Ismail-Raja
Abdullah conflict. Neither persuasion nor threats to Raja Ismail had worked
to get the latter surrender the royal regalia and consequently acknowledge
Raja Abdullah’s appointment. Birch’s economic policies, which had been
exploitative, were also not favoured by the chiefs and the Malays, especially
Raja Ismail’s followers in Hulu Perak. Raja Ismail’s sympathizers disputed
Birch’s rights and power to implement changes in Perak under the name of
Raja Abdullah as Raja Abdullah himself was not recognized as the legitimate
ruler. Birch was subsequently reminded to respect the position of all Orang
Besar-Besar in Perak.

We inquire about our friend’s having got kuasa (written authority)

over this country of Perak, to become Resident and govern Perak,
collecting all the taxes of the country. From whom did our friend get
that kuasa? Our friend must let us know clearly. If our friend got it
from Rajah Abdullah, we will in no way accept a single clause of it,
for Rajah Abdullah is not the only ‘Waris’ (blood royal) of the country
of Perak; there are many other ‘Waris’ better than he... Moreover, we
inform the gentlemen in Penang, Singapore, and other places that the
kingdom for which they have made a Rajah is in the hands of us all, the
‘Waris’ of the country of Perak; and that, as regards Rajah Abdullah
whom they installed, we will in no way, any of us, accept him, for it
is against (or perhaps “he is outside the pale of”) Malay laws and
customs. Moreover, the kuasa which you have received from Rajah
Abdullah, we will none of us accept it. If you wish to use force to
us, even then we will not accept it, but if it is only that you want the
country of Perak, we will in no way resist you, for we none of us wish
to fight with you, having no power to do so. Therefore you must show
us plainly what is our fault towards you.64
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Birch’s ill-advised policies were not only met with lukewarm response
from the Malay chiefs, many of whom in support of Raja Ismail, but also faced
resistance from Raja Abdullah’s patrons. This development began to make
Raja Abdullah reluctant to fulfil Birch’s request. Raja Abdullah himself may
not be anti-British, but signs were growing that many quarters were opposing
the British manoeuvres in Perak. Birch’s attitude had also further antagonized
the rakyat of Perak.
Raja Abdullah was concerned that if he were to agree to hand over
all the tax collection rights to the British as Birch had requested, the Malay
chiefs of Perak, many of whom had been relying on the earnings from the tax
they collected, would lose their main source of income. He would therefore
be regarded as a traitor, including by his own supporters. Raja Abdullah was
also hesitating to endorse Birch’s plans fearing that he would become more
unpopular among the Perak Malays, including people in Hilir Perak.65 The
increasing pressure made him realize that he was not the sole and absolute
authority in Perak, but rather was made part of a mechanism that would allow
the British to exert control and power.
Anguished with Birch’s continued pressure, in January 1875, Raja
Abdullah acted to caution Raja Ismail not to sign the Pangkor Treaty nor
surrender the Perak regalia to him. Such actions, according to Raja Abdullah,
would only bestow Birch an even bigger room to exercise his authority.

If Mr. Birch asks for the Regalia, or desires to make me King, do not
my royal grandfather give up the Regalia, or consent to my being
nominated King. And should my royal grandfather give his consent that
I be made King, on that day, of a truth, the country of Perak will be
given over to the English, for my words have caused me to be very much
indebted to the English.66

Raja Abdullah’s failure to fulfil the British requests had inevitably

angered Clarke. On 22 April, Clarke delivered a letter to Raja Abdullah,
reminding that he was obligated to comply with all the clauses as stipulated in
the Pangkor Treaty. Clarke also raised warning to all quarters not to carry out tax
collections without getting an approval from the British Resident.67Although
Raja Abdullah attempted to explain to Clarke that Birch’s hurried measures
were creating discontentment and pressure, he was severely castigated by
Clarke.68Raja Abdullah’s last efforts to send his representatives to discuss
with Clarke came without much success. Clarke was in no appetite for a
compromise.
Things became worse after Clarke was replaced by a new Governor,
William R. Jervois in May 1875. Jervois, who had an even more rigid stance,
had taken actions without getting the necessary approvals from the British
government.69 Soon after his appointment as the new British Governor, he
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 Perak Disturbances 1871-75

immediately arranged a visit to Perak in September 1875 to meet Raja Ismail,

Raja Abdullah and the Chiefs of Perak, pressuring them to accept the measures
taken by the British Resident. Nevertheless, Jervois’ attempt failed as the Perak
rulers would not budge from their position and defied his insistence.
As a result, Jervois considered Raja Ismail and Raja Abdullah obstacles
to the British progress in the state. He was of the opinion that British power
could only be realised in Perak and other Malay states through annexation and
forceful means.70In an effort to strengthen the British grip on Perak, Jervois
instructed Birch to forcefully make Raja Abdullah relinquish his power to
the British. In return, the British would pay him a living allowance of $2000
monthly. Again, this attempt was fruitless. Raja Abdullah rejected the idea. Not
to be outdone, Jervois drafted three letters - two for Raja Abdullah, and another
for Raja Yusuf- to be delivered through Birch to both of them. The letters
stated that if Raja Abdullah did not transfer his power to the British, Raja Yusuf
would be appointed as the new sultan to replace him.71
The incessant pressure on Raja Abdullah began to crack him to
a point that he finally agreed to sign a declaration to transfer power of tax
collection to the British Resident. Then, Birch continued to push with other
declarations that include a surprise designation of British Resident as the state
judge with absolute power on the laws and related matters, the appointment
of administrators and chiefs, as well as the authority to collect all state taxes.
Raja Abdullah considered this further demand unreasonable. He eventually
signed the declarations, but through numerous excuses, did not accompany
his signature with the official royal seal.72Birch, enraged with Raja Abdullah’s
actions, severely reprimanded the latter with all guns blazing in a meeting and
reminded him about the letters that threatened to replace him with Raja Yusuf.
Birch wanted him to know that he was at the mercy of the British and that they
were serious. Soon after venting his anger, he chased Raja Abdullah away.73
Tension escalated when Birch violated the Pangkor Treaty by protecting
indebted slaves, mainly women, who ran away from their masters and provided
sanctuary for them in his residence in Bandar Baru.74 This sparked an enormous
outrage and suspicious among the Malay rulers and people about Birch real
intentions and motives.75The series of incidents, perceived as a reflection of
Birch’s irrational actions, triggered anger and resentment among all quarters
in Perak. Nevertheless, the Malay rulers were still willing to negotiate and
undertake the diplomatic route to urge the British to be more considerate in
bringing about changes in the state. Fully aware that their inferior military
capability put them in no position to respond in a combative manner, the local
rulers resisted the British passively by simply being uncooperative.
All these diplomatic and peaceful efforts failed to circumvent the
British intention to continue interfering in the Perak state affairs. Persistent
provocations by the British administrators such as Birch and Jervois
compounded the predicament even further. Jervois, for instance, continued his
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insistence that the British should deploy a direct, military-backed occupation

in Perak and was in favour to the use of force rather diplomacy.76The British
arrogance inevitably began to push the local rulers to the edge. Tempers were
boiling. With little option left, the Malay leaders decided to retaliate. This
culminated with two important events that followed: the assassination of Birch
and the anti-British upheaval in 1875.
The revolt by the Malay chiefs in Perak was then fully utilised as an
opportunity for the British to eliminate the resurging opponents, including
supporters of Raja Ismail, Raja Abdullah, Ngah Ibrahim and other Malay
chiefs. Raja Yusuf, a pro-British prince was later appointed as the Acting
Sultan. Birch’s assassination and the Malay uprising in 1875 were used as the
perfect excuse for the British to exert, retain and expand its power throughout
the state of Perak. It was also a prelude to a direct intervention and the eventual
British colonization of the Malay states.

Conclusion

The discussion above has explained some major weaknesses discovered in

the previous writings that discussed the political turbulence and crisis in the
Malay states at the onset of British intervention in the 19th century. Generally,
the existing literature tend to view the conflicts in all the Malay states as a
manifestation of the so-called ‘Malay feudalism’ that is generally supposed to
have begun as early as during the Melaka Sultanate era.
This research articulates that conflicts between the Malay rulers and
chiefs had always been personal in nature and were associated with small-
magnitude opposing faction. Moreover, these conflicts rarely triggered large
scale ‘bloodshed’ or ‘civil war’ as was alleged, that would create a total
chaos, result loss of people’s lives or threaten the downfall of the government
of the day. Behind the negative perceptions that arise from the struggle for
power among the Malay rulers, it was acknowledged that these events were
to be a part of the ‘purification’ process of the Malay political tradition that
consequently propagated a new, stronger and more stable political leadership
than the previous era.
Nevertheless, this political ‘purification’ can never happen, if the
state of concern is subject to external influences and elements that attempt to
designs the political course, which subsequently agitates the balance of power
and brings about crisis of higher magnitude. In the case of Malay political
development in the 19th century, outside interventions and colonization
by foreign power saw a creation of highly asymmetric power balance that
continued to grow among the disputing Malay rulers. Previous conflicts
had been resolved by assessing the support of the Malay chiefs and through
diplomatic negotiations. However, as the third parties interfered, the situation
was made more complex, with these third parties willing to lend support to
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 Perak Disturbances 1871-75

those that could protect their own interest.

This can be elucidated with the case happening in Perak in the 1870s.
The conflict between Raja Abdullah and Raja Ismail was actually solved with
Raja Abdullah backing down after the majority of the Malay chiefs expressed
their collective preference in Raja Ismail. Nevertheless, a renewed conflict was
sparked off again later mainly due to the provocation by the triad leaders and
the European-Chinese capitalists in the Straits Settlements. These unscrupulous
leaders and capitalists knew, by pledging support to a side favourable to their
ambitions and making instability, they would reap maximum gains in the form
of wealth and economic power in Perak.
The political turbulence also became more complicated due to the
British administrators’ own stand, which had been generally in cohort with the
capitalists’ goals in the Settlements. They were more willing to accommodate
these capitalists’ needs and desires for a full-scale British colonization of the
Malay states. By showing their support to the local group that could fulfil their
conditions, the British orchestrated a direct engagement to bestow power to
their preferred choice and triggered a political disorder. This was later used
as a convenient excuse for the British to begin their campaign to colonize the
Malay states.

End Notes

1. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Universiti Sains Malaysia

for the funding made available through the USM Short Term Grant
for this project for 2010-2012.
2. W. D. MacIntyre, The Imperial Frontier in the Tropics, 1865-75, New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967, p. 71.
3. C. 1111 Memorandum by the Attorney-General, 20 September 1873,
p. 221.
4. Hugh Clifford (1897), In Court and Kampong, London: Grant
Richards, 1927, p. 175-76.
5. CO 273/18 Ord to Buckingham., 8 April 1868.
6. Ibid.
7. Patrick Sullivan, Social Relations of Dependence in a Malay State:
Nineteenth Century Perak, Monograph No. 10, Kuala Lumpur:
MBRAS, 1982, p. xvi.
8. CO 273/75 Kimberley to Clarke, 20 September 1873.
9. F. A. Swettenham, About Perak as was quoted by Patrick Sullivan,
Social Relations of Dependence in a Malay State, p. xvi.
10. Some of the British officials for instance interpreted the ignorance
and violence of the Malay rulers as ‘...the usual habit of all Orientals.’
CO 273/52 Extract from The Times, 13 September 1871.
11. See Micheal Adas, “Imperialist Rhetoric and Modern Historiography:
Jebat Volume 39 (1) (July 2012) Page | 67
Article: Azmi Arifin

The Case of Lower Burma before and after Conquest”, Journal of

Southeast Asian Studies 3 (2), p. 175-92.
12. C. 1111 Anson to Kimberley, 19 October 1871: 141; Report by
Braddell, 28 January 1874, p. 161.
13. C. 1111 Ord to Kimberley, 10 July 1873: 30.
14. F. A. Swettenham, “British Rule in Malaya” in P. H. Kratoska (ed.),
Honourable Intentions: Talks on the British Empire in Southeast
Asia delivered at the Royal Colonial Institute 1874-1928, Singapore:
Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 178.
15. Clifford as quoted in Kratoska, Ibid., p. 248.
16. L. A. Mills, British Malaya 1824-67, Reprint, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1925, p. 170-173.
17. R. O. Winstedt and R. J. Wilkinson, A History of Perak, Reprint No.
3, Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS, 1934, specifically, p. 2 and 96.
18. See Cheah Boon Kheng, “Feudalisme Melayu: Ciri-Ciri dan
Pensejarahannya” in Abu Talib Ahmad & Cheah Boon Kheng
(eds.), Isu-Isu dalam Pensejarahan, Penang: Penerbit Universiti
Sains Malaysia, 1991, p. 16-17. Refer also to his other writings in
English, “Feudalism in Pre-Colonial Malaya: The Past as a Colonial
Discourse”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 25 (2), 1994, p. 243-
269. Similar view was shared by other local historian, for instance
Wong Lin Ken, who indicated; “Subsequent to the dissolution
of the Malacca Sultanate, the Malay political structure gradually
disintegrated in the course of the centuries. In the 19th century, Malay
society in the tin states had become so degenerate and unstable that
there was no central authority in any of them capable of controlling or
powerful enough to control the whole territory.” Wong Lin Ken, The
Malayan Tin Industry to 1914, Tucson: University of Arizona Press,
1965, p. 21.
19. C. 1111 Clarke to Kimberley, 26 January 1874, p. 71.
20. W. H. Read, Play and Politics, London: Wells Gardner, Darton and
Co., 1901, p. 24
21. R. O. Winstedt (1935), A History of Malaya, 3rd Edition, Kuala
Lumpur: Marican & Sons, 1962, p. 226.
22. C. 1512 Jervois to Carnovan, 10 February 1876, p. 8.
23. The allegation that pointed Menteri Larut Ngah Ibrahim as the
mastermind behind Raja Ismail’s attempt for state power was actually
made firstly by a British officer, C. J. Irving. See SSR (G7) Irving’s
memorandum, 30 April 1872.
24. C. 1111 Campbell to Birch, July 1874, p. 10.
25. CO 273/58 Report of A. N. Birch, 1 Mac 1872.
26. For the reason why Raja Abdullah failed to present himself to be
enthroned by Assembly of Orang-Orang Besar, see P. L. Burns (ed.),
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 Perak Disturbances 1871-75

The Journals of J. W. W. Birch, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University

Press, 1976, p. 12, footnotes 5.
27. The relationship between the two turned to conflict when Raja
Abdullah tried to seize Ngah Ibrahim’s source of income in the areas
ruled by the latter in the Kerian-Larut areas. Raja Abdullah received
encouragement by Edward Bacon, a Eurasian investor in Penang. As
a result, Sultan Ali sought help from the Lieutenant-Governor A. E.
H Anson to caution the Penang traders not to intervene or strike any
deal with Raja Muda Abdullah. In 1870, Raja Abdullah continued to
act beyond his power by endowing the Kerian revenues to Bacon and
other investors in Penang. He attempted to justify this through a letter
allegedly signed by Sultan Ali. Ngah Ibrahim was notified of this in
1871, and later, Sultan Ali rescinded the lease and indicated that Raja
Abdullah’s action was done behind his back. SSR (G7) Raja of Perak
to Hatchell, 18 March 1871; SSR (G7) Raja of Perak to A. N. Birch,
25 April 1871.
28. P. L. Burns (ed.), The Journals of J. W. W. Birch, p. 12, footnotes 5.
29. Khoo Kay Kim, The Western Malay States 1850-1873: The Effects of
Commercial Development on Malay Politics, Reprint, Kuala Lumpur:
Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 135.
30. Ibid.
31. According to Burns, ‘…there is evidence that the Mantri, along
with the Sri Maharaja Lela and the Temenggung, favored the latter
ruler’s son, Raja Osman, against Ismail the candidate of Datos Nara,
Panglima Kinta and Sagor and Maharaja Lela. When Osman refused
nomination, his supporters accepted Ismail.’ Burns’s view was based
on the statements by Kuloop Rheo on 24 January 1877 in Perak
Enquiry Papers, Vol. 3.
32. SSR (G7) Mantri of Laroot to Governor, 20 May 1872. According
to Burns, Dato’ Laksamana agreed not to oppose to Raja Ismail’s
appointment as sultan in order to please Ngah Ibrahim, his son-in-
law. See Burns (ed.), The Journals of J. W. W. Birch, p. 12, footnotes
6.
33. Soon after being made sultan, Raja Ismail delivered a letter to the
British, informing his official appointment on 17 August 1871. The
letter was sent to the Lieutenant Governor of British in Penang, A. N.
Birch who eventually acknowledged and recognized his installation.
SSR (G7) Sultan Ismail to A. N. Birch, 17 August 1871; SSR (G7)
Lieutenant-Governor Penang to Sultan Ismail, 30 August 1871.
34. R. J. Wilkinson, A History of the Peninsular Malays, Singapore:
Kelly & Walsh, 1923, p. 116; W. L. Wynne, Triad and Tabut, London
and New York: Routledge, 1941, p. 282.
35. Ibid.
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36. According to Irving, ‘After the Raja Muda had become conscious of
his real position, he appears to have taken no active steps to assert
his rights for some months, but to have remained at Purbayan in
great discontent, but without forming any plan as to how to better his
position.’ C. 1111 Memorandum relative to the Affairs of Perak, 1872,
p. 131.
37. Khoo Kay Kim, The Western Malay States, p. 161-62.
38. At the peak of his financial troubles, Raja Abdullah was living in
desperation. He did not even have his own house and had to live in
a boat. See C. M. Plunket, Enquiry as to Complicity of Chiefs in the
Perak Outrages: Precis of Evidence, 1 December 1876, p. 2.
39. Buyong Adil, Sejarah Perak, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan
Pustaka, 1971, pp. 62-65.
40. Apart from them, there had also been other important individuals who
were involved in the capitalist activities and interventions in other
Malay states. These included Thomas Scott, Che Yam Chuan, Ho
Ghee Siu, J. E. Westerhout, C. J. Irving and J. G. Davidson, who were
merchants and leaders of the Chinese triads in the Straits Settlements.
Some of them also had interest in British conglomerates, mainly those
owned by Read. For further explanation about their involvements, see
Khoo Kay Kim, The Western Malay States, particularly p. 222.
41. SSR (G7) Irving’s memorandum, 30 April, 5 Jun and 8 August 1872.
42. C. M. Plunket, Enquiry as to Complicity, p. 2.
43. Ibid. See also M. L. Wynne, Triad and Tabut, p. 270; P. L. Burns (ed.),
The Journals of J.W.W. Birch, p. 16.
44. C. 1111 Sultan Abdullah to the Governor of the Straits, 30 December
1873, p. 85.
45. Read admitted to play a role in drafting the letter. See W. H. Read,
Play and Politics, pp. 25-26. However, Plunket discovered that Tan
Kim Ching was also involved. See C. M. Plunket, Enquiry as a
Complicity, p. 3. Apart from the two, another British colonial officer,
J. G. Davidson, who had shares in the Selangor Tin Mining Company
and later was appointed as the first British Resident in Selangor,
also took part in drafting the letter. See R. O. Winstedt, A History of
Malaya, p. 225; M. L. Wynne, Triad and Tabut, p. 283.
46. Patrick Sulivan, Social Relations of Dependence in a Malay State, p.
14. There was a widespread belief among the colonial officials that
the power struggle between the Malay Rulers was not only a part of
the fights among the Chinese triads in Larut to; it was this struggle
that actually triggered the fights. For instance, as A. M. Skinner put
it, “The dispute as to the Perak Sultanship has practically become a
struggle for Laroot, a struggle in which the Muntri takes the place of
the Bandahara [Raja Ismail]....The dispute about the Perak succession
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 Perak Disturbances 1871-75

has tended to exasperate the Chinese factions, both the contending

Malay chiefs having taken sides...The whole of the Laroot difficulty
may in effect be traced to two causes: The inefficiency of the Malays
to govern a subject Chinese population, and the tendency of the
Chinese themselves to quarrel vi et armis about the smallest trifles,
which makes it almost hopeless to look for peaceable self-government
among them.” See C. 1111, Precis of Perak Affairs Skinner, No. 52,
p. 119 and 125. On the violence triggered by the Chinese triads as the
main cause of anarchy in Perak, Kratoska explained; British officials
generally “...preferred to lay such matters aside, instead drawing
attention to the supposed harshness and injustice of indigenous Malay
government from which the population had happily been delivered
by the introduction of British rule.” P. H.Kratoska (ed.), Honourable
Intentions, p. 3. .
47. C. 1111 Clarke to Kimberley, 26 January 1874, p. 72; C. 1111
Instructions to Major McNair and Captain Dunlop, 7 January 1874,
p. 77.
48. P. L. Burns, The Journal of J.W.W. Birch, p. 67.
49. R. J. Wilkinson, A History of the Peninsular Malays, p. 104.
50. According to Wynne, ‘Chinese in Perak, both Triad and Tokong
members, claiming to come from Penang, were mostly regarded as
British subjects, although in fact many of them were professional
fighting men specially imported from China.’ M. L. Wynne, Triad
and Tabut, p. 265.
51. C. 1111 Memorandum to the Lieutenant-Governor of Penang, 3
September 1873; C. 1111 Letter to the Orang Kaya Muntri of Larut, 3
September 1873, p. 160.
52. W. D. MacIntyre, “Britain’s Intervention in Malaya: The Origin
of Lord Kimberley’s Instructions to Sir Andrew Clarke in 1873”,
Journal of Southeast Asian History 2 (3), 1961, pp. 47-69. See also
The Imperial Frontier in the Tropics, pp. 199-206.
53. C.1111 Petition to Ord, 28 March 1873, pp. 30-32.
54. C.1111 Kimberley to Andrew Clarke, 20 September 1873, pp. 38-
39. Disorder and demands from the Chinese merchants in the Straits
Settlements were made as the main reason for the intervention.
55. Clarke frequently claimed that the chiefs had chosen Raja Abdullah as
the legitimate Sultan of Perak and voluntarily agreed to all conditions
during the meeting with British in Pangkor. The truth of the claim is
to be doubted since soon after the Pangkor Treaty 1874 was signed,
the majority of the Malay chiefs convened a series of meetings and
collectively agreed to oppose the conditions set up in the treaty.
56. According to Buyong Adil, Ngah Ibrahim for example was threatened
with military actions to get him sign the Pangkor Treaty. See Buyong
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Article: Azmi Arifin

Adil, Sejarah Perak, p. 72. Similar view was also put forth by Burns
and Cowan who indicated that Clarke had used force and threats to
silent Ngah Ibrahim’s opposition in Pangkor and prevented him from
influencing other Malay chiefs. See C. D. Cowan, Nineteenth Century
Malaya: The Origins of British Political Control, London: oxford
University Press, 1961, pp. 185-86; P. L. Burns (ed.), The Journal of
J.W.W. Birch, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976, p. 75.
57. Jervois as quoted by E. Sadka, The Protected Malay States 1874-
1895, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 11. See also
Buyong Adil, Sejarah Perak, p. 72.
58. W. G. Maxwell and W. S. Gibson, Treaties and Engagements Affecting
the Malay States and Borneo, London: James Truscott and Son, 1924,
pp. 28-29.
59. Letter from the Governor to the Rajah Bandahara Ismail, 20 January
1874 in Plunket, Enquiry as Complicity, Appendix No. III.
60. Ibid., p. 5. See also P. L. Burns and C. D. Cowan (eds.), Sir Frank
Swettenham’s Malayan Journals 1874-76, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1975, p. xxviii.
61. In February 1874, a meeting to oppose the Pangkor Treaty convened.
It was chaired by Dato’ Laksamana and attended by a number of
other main Perak chiefs. In the meeting, the chiefs claimed they were
unaware of the Clarke’s real intentions in getting them to sign the
treaty. In addition, in March 1874, Menteri Ngah Ibrahim hired a
Penang-based lawyer, R. C. Woods for $12,000 to initiate a legal suit
of the opposition to the Pangkor Treaty to the British Parliament but
was immediately vetoed by Raja Abdullah, worrying that his position
as the new Sultan will be affected. W. L. Wynne, Triad and Tabut, p.
299.
62. C. 1320 Birch to Braddell, April 1875, p. 88.
63. C. 1512 Jervois to Carnovan, 10 February 1876, p. 12.
64. The letter by the Perak Malay chiefs found in Haji Ali’s possession.
See Plunket, Enquiry as Complicity, Appendix No. XXXIX.
65. Jervois himself admitted that Raja Ismail’s position in Perak was
strengthening after November 1874. Many of the Malay chiefs
including Raja Yusuf and Raja Abdullah’s followers began to switch
allegiances to Raja Ismail’s side. C. 1503 Jervois to Carnovan, 10
February 1876, p. 10.
66. Plunket, Enquiry as Complicity, p. 7.
67. Ibid. Appendix No. XVII; C. 1320 Governor to the Sultan Abdullah,
22 April 1875, p. 93.
68. Ibid. Appendix No. XXI.
69. Jervois’s attitudes and policies was fiercely criticised by Carnovan.
See C. 1512 Carnovan to Jervois, 20 May 1876, p. 75-85.
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 Perak Disturbances 1871-75

70. C. 1512 Jervois to Carnovan, 10 February 1876, p. 23.

71. Plunket, Enquiry as Complicity, p. 71. Threats in the letter handed
to Raja Abdullah carried the following words; “Now we propose to
our friend that officers of the British Government shall govern the
country in the name of our friend. If our friend agrees to this, our
friend will still be recognized as Sultan and receive a large allowance,
but if our friend does not agree to this, we cannot help our friend, and
our friend will be no longer Sultan.”
72. Raja Abdullah explained that the official Perak seal was damaged to
free himself from being bound by the declaration. See Ibid. p. 14.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. See Khoo Kay Kim, “J.W.W. Birch: A Victorian Moralist in Perak’s
Augen Stable?” Journal of Malaysia Society of University Malaya 4,
1965/66, pp. 33-47.
76. C. 1512 Jervois to Carnovan, 10 February 1876: 12; C. 1512 Carnovan
to Jervois, 20 Mei 1876, p. 83.

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Biographical Notes

Azmi Arifin is a senior lecturer of history at the Universiti Sains Malaysia of

Penang. He obtained his doctoral degree from Universiti Kebangsaan
Malaysia, Bangi. He specialized in Malaysian Political History, Malay
Historiography and Modern European Studies. He is a co-author of the
book Nasionalisme dan Revolusi di Malaysia dan Indonesia and is currently
working on his second book Konsep Feudalisme: Sejarah dan Pensejarahan. He
can be contacted at History Section, School of Humanities, Universiti Sains
Malaysia, 11800 USM, Penang, Malaysia [email: azmiarifin@usm.my].

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