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[NUMBER] [CASE TITLE]

Docket No.| Date | Topic | Ponente | Digest Maker

Petitioner:
Respondents:

Case Doctrine:

FACTS:

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not (YES/NO)
Whether or not (YES/NO)

HELD:
 [1] [Marbury v. Madison]
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) | February 24, 1803 | Judicial Review | Marshall | Ty

Petitioner: William Marbury

Respondents: James Madison

Case Doctrine: Doctrine of Judicial Review

FACTS:Thomas Jefferson was elected as the President of the United States in the 1880 US
Presidential Elections. Prior to his inauguration as the new US President, his predecessor, John
Adams, started to appoint judges at the last minute to gain influence over the Jefferson
administration. These appointments came to be known as the “Midnight Judges” by supporters
of Thomas Jefferson.

Petitioner William Marbury was among the “Midnight Judges” appointed by Adams prior
to Jefferson’s inauguration. However, he was not able to formally assume his duties as a judge
due to the failure of the then-Secretary of State John Marshall (through his brother, James) to
deliver his commission before Jefferson was inaugurated. The new Secretary of State, James
Madison, also failed to act on Marbury’s appointment and therefore, Marbury’s commission still
remained undelivered. This caused Marbury to institute legal action against Madison for his non-
action towards his commission.

During the proceedings, Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was found to be
unconstitutional. This was because of the provision’s feature of increasing the power of the
Supreme Court to have original jurisdiction on cases. While in the US Constitution on Article III
Section 2, writs of mandamus (such as the one filed by Marbury against Madison) can only go
under the appellate jurisdiction when heard in the Supreme Court, Section 13 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 puts such cases under “original jurisdiction”. As a result, the Supreme Court decided to
strike down Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 even though the US Constitution does not
explicitly give federal courts the right to strike down laws through judicial review.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to strike down laws through judicial
review (YES)

HELD:

It was decided in this case that the Supreme Court has the power to strike down laws
using judicial review. Such action is allowable because the law in question (Section 13 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789) was found to be unconstitutional. Given that, American federal courts now
have the right to refuse to give effect to any laws passed by congress if they are found to be
unconstitutional.
 [2] [Heirs of Roxas v. IAC]
GR No. 67195 | 29 May 1990 | Judicial Review | Cortes | Villaganas

Petitioner: HEIRS OF EUGENIA V. ROXAS et al.

Respondents: INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT private respondent: Heirs of Eriberto
Roxas

Case Doctrine: It is a recognized principle that courts of justice will generally not interfere in
executive and administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies, such as, the grant of licenses, permits, leases, or the approval, rejection or revocation
of applications therefor. However, there is a limit to the deference accorded by the courts to the
actions of such agencies.

FACTS:

1. The case is about the dispute between the Heirs of Eufrocino and Eugenia Roxas
regarding the operation of a restaurant within the Hidden Springs Resort in Laguna.
Petitioner corporation, Heirs of Eugenia V. Roxas, Inc. (referred to as HEVR), was
incorporated by the late Eufrocino Roxas and his seven children. When Eufrocin, the
chairman of the board of directors died his son Eriberto succeeded his father. Soon after
Eriberto got sick and died one of his heirs Guillermo (private respondents) took over and
continued the operations under the name Hidden Valley Agri-Business and Restaurant,
(HVABR).
2. The HEVR Board commenced an inquiry into the financial status of the resort. It appeared
that the resort’s financial difficulty was because the restaurant was not managed and
operated by HEVR itself and that the concession fee paid by private respondents was not
even enough to pay for the interest and amortizations on the loan secured by HEVR to
upgrade the restaurant. It was suggested that HEVR should take over the operation of the
restaurant. The Board adopted a resolution of its intent to take over the operation of the
restaurant and they sent HVBAR a notice informing them of the said resolution and asking
them to vacate the restaurant premises and to turn over possession.
3. Private Respondents filed with the RTC to prevent the closure of the resort and the
unilateral termination by HEVR of the concession agreement. Petitioners prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint. In the meantime, HVABR filed with the Bureau of Tourism
Services of the Ministry of Tourism (MOT) a petition to increase the food and beverage
prices at the resort restaurant. HEVR, being the holder of a license to operate the resort,
contested this petition by impugning the authority of HVABR to file the petition and to
continue operating the restaurant.
4. Pending resolution of HVABR’s petition in the MOT, the RTC dismissed the private
respondent’s complaint. With the decision of the trial court to support them, HEVR
immediately caused the temporary closure of the resort. Private respondents, on the other
hand, appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) and the IAC granted a temporary
restraining order which not only directed petitioners to refrain from further commission of
"acts that will tend to interfere, impede, frustrate and obstruct the operation by private
respondents of the restaurant and liquor concession at the Hidden Valley Springs Resort,"
but also "to undo such acts" if already done.
5. Meanwhile, the MOT promulgated its resolution dismissing HVABR’s petition, finding that
HVABR was operating the restaurant and liquor facilities of the resort without the requisite
MOT license. Private respondents filed a Manifestation (actually a motion for
reconsideration) seeking to hold in abeyance the execution of the aforementioned
 judgment. However, the MOT subsequently issued its Order reiterating its findings and
emphasizing the final and executory nature of its directive.
6. Petitioners then filed with the IAC a Manifestation inviting the attention of the appellate
court to the above MOT resolution and Order. In the following month, petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal alleging that private respondents had no right to operate the
restaurant per the MOT Order, and that in fact they had ceased operating the same since
September 8, 1983, thereby rendering the appealed injunction case moot and academic
7. However, the IAC promulgated a resolution whereby petitioners were enjoined from
disturbing the status quo or from doing acts that tend to frustrate, impede, obstruct, disturb
or interfere with the operation by private respondents of the restaurant and liquor
concession. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with the IAC. Meanwhile the
MOT denied private respondents’ motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioners once again
filed a Manifestation with the IAC, informing it of this denial. Petitioner filed another
Manifestation and Motion with the IAC, bringing to said court’s attention pf the decision of
the Bureau of Domestic Trade wherein the Bureau found that HVABR was operating the
restaurant in violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law because one of its
stockholders, Rebecca Boyer-Roxas, was a foreigner actually participating in the
operation and management of the restaurant. This notwithstanding, the IAC promulgated
a resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and motion to dismiss the
appeal. Aggrieved by the IAC resolutions, Petitioners, brought a petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S: WON the IAC gravely abused its discretion tantamount to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction? Yes.

HELD: It is a recognized principle that courts of justice will generally not interfere in executive and
administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies, such
as, the grant of licenses, permits, leases, or the approval, rejection or revocation of applications
therefor. However, there is a limit to the deference accorded by the courts to the actions of such
agencies. Jurisprudence is replete with cases wherein the Supreme Court expounded on the
exception to the general rule.

In laying down the guidelines for the review of decisions of administrative agencies in the exercise
of their quasi-judicial powers, the Supreme Court, in the oft-cited case of Pajo v. Ago: In general,
courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative
departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise
of judgment or discretion, and findings of fact. Findings of fact by an administrative board or
officials, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where
the board or official has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers
or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion. And
the court have repeatedly held that there is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of
the writ of certiorari only when there is capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. This
standard has been unequivocally embraced in the 1987 Constitution, which affirms the power of
the judiciary to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

The Court holds that it was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion on the part of public
respondents to have issued, and thereafter to have refused to revoke, the restaurant license in
favor of private respondents knowing that: (1) the latter was not the owner of the restaurant for
which the license was sought; (2) the latter’s right to possess the same was being disputed by no
less than petitioner as restaurant owner; and, (3) the subject restaurant was already leased to
Valley Resort Corporation pursuant to a contract of lease approved by the department. Public
respondents’ action, which contravenes the acceptable standards of justice and reason, is
indicative of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

[3] [Espinosa v. Makalintal]

G.R. No. L-1334 | August 29, 1947 | Judicial Power | Perfecto, J. | Navarro

Petitioner: MARTA ESPINOSA, ET AL.

Respondents: QUERUBE C. MAKALINTAL, ET AL.

Case Doctrine:
The powers granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce by the pertinent provisions
of law invoked by petitioners are all of executive and administrative nature, such as granting of
licenses, permits, leases, and contracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating, or cancelling
applications, or deciding conflicting applications.
The controversies between the parties appear to have arisen upon disagreements in civil or
contractual relations between the litigants to which the legal provisions invoked by petitioner are
not and cannot be applicable.
These are questions judicial in nature and only courts of justice can decide them.

FACTS:

Petitioners pray that the Court of First Instance of Iloilo be ordered to dismiss civil case No. 200
for lack of jurisdiction.

The complaint in said case prays that the defendant be ordered to return to the plaintiff the
material possession of the parcel of public forest land described in the complaint and to pay
plaintiff as damages P12,000, plus P4,000 for each year of illegal possession of the land in
question. The land is located in the municipality of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo; is the object of lease
agreement No. 123, executed on February 12, 1941, between plaintiff and the Commonwealth
of the Philippines, represented by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce; is now a
fishpond.

On December 27, 1945, defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint upon the theory
that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Their theory is that
the litigation properly belongs to the jurisdiction and competency of the Department of
Agriculture and Commerce.

The lower court denied it on January 15, 1946.

On February 8, 1947, defendants moved for reconsideration of the order of January 15, 1946,
insisting that the amended complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The motion was
denied on February 11, 1947.

Petitioners invoke sections 3, 4 and 63 of Act 4003, as amended by Commonwealth Act 471,
paragraph (o) of section 33 of Administrative Order No. 14 of the Department of Agriculture and
Commerce and sections 2, 3, and 4 of Commonwealth Act 141.
Petitioners are laboring that the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce was granted judicial
power, whether exclusive or concurrent, to decide the legal controversies as raised by the
pleadings.

ISSUE/S:Whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce has jurisdiction to

the case - No

HELD:The powers granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce by the pertinent
provisions of law invoked by petitioners are all of executive and administrative nature, such as
granting of licenses, permits, leases, and contracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating, or
cancelling applications, or deciding conflicting applications.

The controversies between the parties, as raised in the pleadings in case No. 200 of the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo appear to have arisen upon disagreements in civil or contractual
relations between the litigants to which the legal provisions invoked by petitioner are not
and cannot be applicable.

It should be far-fetched to recognize in the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce the power of
determining whether or not, as alleged by Paranpan, he has been deprived by defendants of the
possession of the fishpond in question and of the legal effects of such alleged deprivation, or
upon the nature of the two contracts of mortgage in the form of sale with right to repurchase.

These are questions judicial in nature and only courts of justice can decide them.

[4] [Chung Fu v. CA]

GR NO 96283| February 25, 1992 | General Rule and Methods of Review |J. Romero|
Jalandoni
Petitioner: CHUNG FU INDUSTRIES (PHILIPPINES), INC., its Directors and Officers namely:
HUANG KUO-CHANG, HUANG AN-CHUNG, JAMES J.R. CHEN, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG,
VICENTE B. AMADOR, ROCK A.C. HUANG, JEM S.C. HUANG, MARIA TERESA SOLIVEN and
VIRGILIO M. DEL ROSARIO
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ (Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Makati [Branch 57]) and ROBLECOR PHILIPPINES, INC
Case Doctrine: Even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared “final” by law are
not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. Thus, in the case of Oceanic Bic Division
(FFW), et al. v. Flerida Ruth P. Romero, et al., this Court had occasion to rule that: “x x x x Inspite
of statutory provisions making ‘final’ the decisions of certain administrative agencies, we have
taken cognizance of petitions questioning these decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave abuse
of discretion, violation of due process, denial of substantial justice or erroneous interpretation of
the law were brought to our attention.

FACTS: On May 17, 1989, petitioner Chung Fu Industries (Philippines) (Chung Fu for brevity)
and private respondent Roblecor Philippines, Inc. (Roblecor for short) forged a construction
agreement whereby respondent contractor committed to construct and finish on December 31,
1989, petitioner corporation’s industrial/factory complex in Tanawan, Tanza, Cavite for and in
consideration of P42,000,000.00. In the event of disputes arising from the performance of the
subject contract, it was stipulated therein that the issue(s) shall be submitted for resolution before
a single arbitrator chosen by both parties. Apart from the aforesaid construction agreement,
Chung Fu and Roblecor entered into two (2) other ancillary contracts, to wit: one dated June 23,
1989, for the construction of a dormitory and support facilities with a contract price of
P3,875,285.00, to be completed on or before October 31, 1989;2 and the other dated August 12,
1989, for the installation of electrical, water and hydrant systems at the plant site, commanding a
price of P12.1 million and requiring completion thereof one month after civil works have been
finished.

However, respondent Roblecor failed to complete the work despite the extension of time allowed
by Chung Fu. Subsequently, the latter had to take over the construction when it had become
evident that Roblecor was not in a position to fulfill its obligation. Claiming an unsatisfied account
of P10,500,000.00 and unpaid progress billings of P2,370,179.23, Roblecor on May 18, 1990,
filed a petition for Compulsory Arbitration with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before
respondent Regional Trial Court, pursuant to the arbitration clause in the construction agreement.
Chung Fu moved to dismiss the petition and further prayed for the quashing of the restraining
order. Subsequent negotiations between the parties eventually led to the formulation of an
arbitration agreement which, among others, provides:
The parties mutually agree that the arbitration shall proceed in accordance with the
following terms and conditions:—
‘d.The parties mutually agree that they will abide by the decision of the arbitrator including
any amount that may be awarded to either party as compensation, consequential damage
and/or interest thereon;
‘e.The parties mutually agree that the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and
unappealable. Therefore, there shall be no further judicial recourse if either party
disagrees with the whole or any part of the arbitrator’s award.
‘f.As an exception to sub-paragraph (e), above, the parties mutually agree that either party
is entitled to seek judicial assistance for purposes of enforcing the arbitrator’s award;
Respondent Regional Trial Court approved the arbitration agreement thru its Order of May 30,
1990. Thereafter, Engr. Willardo Asuncion was appointed as the sole arbitrator.On June 30, 1990,
Arbitrator Asuncion ordered petitioners to immediately pay the respondent contractor, the sum of
P16,108,801.00. He further declared the award as final and unappealable, pursuant to the
Arbitration Agreement precluding judicial review of the award.

Consequently, Roblecor moved for the confirmation of said award. On the other hand, Chung Fu
moved to remand the case for further hearing and asked for a reconsideration of the judgment
award claiming that Arbitrator Asuncion committed twelve (12) instances of grave error by
disregarding the provisions of the parties’ contract. Respondent lower court denied Chung Fu’s
Motion to Remand thus compelling it to seek reconsideration therefrom but to no avail. The trial
court granted Roblecor’s Motion for Confirmation of Award and accordingly, entered judgment in
conformity therewith. Moreover, it granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution filed
by respondent.

Chung Fu elevated the case via a petition for certiorari to respondent Court of Appeals. On
October 22, 1990 the assailed resolution was issued. The respondent appellate court concurred
with the findings and conclusions of respondent trial court. A motion for reconsideration of said
resolution was filed by petitioner, but it was similarly denied by respondent Court of Appeals thru
its questioned resolution of December 3, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not subject arbitration award is indeed beyond the ambit of the court’s power
of judicial review. - NO
HELD: The Supreme Court rule is negative. It is stated explicitly under Art. 2044 of the Civil Code
that the finality of the arbitrators’ award is not absolute and without exceptions. Where the
conditions described in Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040 applicable to both compromises and
arbitrations are obtaining, the arbitrators’ award may be annulled or rescinded.n Additionally,
under Sections 24 and 25 of the Arbitration Law, there are grounds for vacating, modifying or
rescinding an arbitrator’s award. Thus, if and when the factual circumstances referred to in the
above-cited provisions are present, judicial review of the award is properly warranted.
What if courts refuse or neglect to inquire into the factual milieu of an arbitrator’s award to
determine whether it is in accordance with law or within the scope of his authority? How may the
power of judicial review be invoked?

This is where the proper remedy is certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is to
be borne in mind, however, that this action will lie only where a grave abuse of discretion or an
act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the voluntary arbitrator is clearly shown. Even
decisions of administrative agencies which are declared “final” by law are not exempt from judicial
review when so warranted. Thus, in the case of Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Flerida Ruth
P. Romero, et al., this Court had occasion to rule that: “x x x x Inspite of statutory provisions
making ‘final’ the decisions of certain administrative agencies, we have taken cognizance of
petitions questioning these decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion,
violation of due process, denial of substantial justice or erroneous interpretation of the law were
brought to our attention.

[5] [MEDALLA VS SAYO]

GR No. L-54554 | 30 March 1981 | Judicial Review | Melencio-Herrer, J. | Aguinaldo

Petitioner: EUSTAQUIO M. MEDALLA, JR.|||

Respondents: THE HONORABLE MARCELINO N. SAYO, Judge of the CFI of Rizal, Branch
XXXIII and HONORATO G. MACKAY, acting Hospital Administrator of the Caloocan City General
Hospital and the CITY MAYOR OF CALOOCAN|||

Case Doctrine:
The power of judicial review should be upheld in so far as jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
to review by Certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the
Presidential Executive Assistant is concerned. |||

FACTS:
Petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, Jr., is the Chief of Clinics of the Caloocan City General
Hospital, Caloocan City. Private respondent, Dr. Honorato G. Mackay, was the Resident
Physician thereat.

When the position of Assistant Hospital Administrator of the Caloocan City General Hospital
became vacant upon the resignation of the incumbent, former Caloocan City Mayor Alejandro A.
Fider designated and subsequently appointed, as Assistant Hospital Administrator, private
respondent Dr. Mackay, a Resident Physician in said hospital. Petitioner, Dr. Medalla, Jr.,
protested Dr. Mackay's designation and subsequent appointment alleging among others that, as
Chief of Clinics, he (Medalla) was next-in-rank. The then Acting City Mayor Virgilio P. Robles,
who succeeded former Mayor, now Assemblyman Alejandro A. Fider, in his 4th Indorsement
dated September 20, 1978, sustained Mackay's appointment

The Mayor of Caloocan City appointed Dr. Mackay, a Resident Physician, to the position of
Hospital Administrator of the Caloocan City General Hospital, in disregard of the Decision of the
Presidential Executive Assistant sustaining the Order of the Civil Service Commission which
revoked the appointment of Dr. Mackay as Assistant Hospital Administrator and found the
protestant Chief of Clinics, Dr. Medalla, entitled to the said position, being next in rank and
possessed of the same qualifications as Dr. Mackay. On protest by Dr. Medalla, the Civil Service
Commission disapproved Dr. Mackay's appointment and ordered the Mayor to appoint the
protestant instead. Mackay moved for reconsideration but before the same could be resolved, he
filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction with the Court
of First Instance which Dr. Medalla sought to dismiss but failed. Hence, this petition to restrain
the Court of First Instance from proceeding with the hearing of the case for lack of jurisdiction.|||

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance has the jurisdiction to review by Certiorari
decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the Presidential
Executive Assistant - YES

HELD:To start with, under the Revised Charter of the City of Caloocan (RA No. 5502), it is clear
that the power of appointment by the City Mayor of heads of offices entirely paid out of city funds
is subject to Civil Service law,rules and regulations (ibid., section 19). The Caloocan City General
Hospital is one of the city departments provided for in the said law (ibid., sec. 17). The Hospital
Administrator is appointed by the City Mayor (ibid., section 66-B). The Hospital Administrator is
the head of the City General Hospital empowered to administer, direct, and coordinate all activities
of the hospital to carry out its objectives as to the care of the sick and the injured.

The prescribed procedure has been followed by petitioner Medalla. He had appealed to the
department head and from thence, in view of the latter's unfavorable action, to the Civil Service
Commission and thereafter to the Office of the President. Resolution No. 49 of the Civil Service
Merit Systems Board, its Decision of June 27, 1979, and the Decision of the Presidential Executive
Assistant dated April 24, 1979, were all rendered in Medalla's favor. The special reason given by
the Acting City Mayor for Mackay's appointment, which is, that he had completed all academic
requirements for the Certificate of Hospital Administration, is not tenable, since Medalla himself
was found to be in possession of the same qualification. But while the qualifications of both
petitioner Medalla and private respondent Mackay are at par, yet, it is clear that the position of
Chief of Clinics is the next lower position to Hospital Administrator under the organizational line-
up of the hospital. Consequently, at the time of Mackay's appointment as Assistant Hospital
Administrator and subsequently Hospital Administrator, Medalla outranked Mackay who was only
a Resident Physician and, therefore, as the next-in-rank, Medalla is entitled to appointment as
Hospital Administrator.|||

The power of judicial review should be upheld in so far as jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
to review by Certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the
Presidential Executive Assistant is concerned. The Supreme Court has ruled that "when a
presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the
Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under
judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above
the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or implement it (the law).
A judicial review of the President's decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service
Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the Courts should
be governed by the same principles as govern the judicial review of all administrative officers."
(Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals, et al., 101 Phil 490, 492-493 [1957]. Further, "the
courts may always examine into the exercise of power by a ministerial officer to the extent of
determining whether the particular power has been granted to the officer, whether it is a legal
power that could have been granted to him, and whether it has been exercised in a legal manner.
This jurisdiction does not depend upon an act of the legislature authorizing it, but inheres in the
courts of general jurisdiction as an essential function of the judicial department.|||

The Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to review by Certiorari
decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the Presidential Executive
Assistant; but rather than remanding the case for further proceedings decided the case on the
merits holding, that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Civil Service Commission
and the Presidential Executive Assistant since (1) the appointing power of the City Mayor is
subject to the next-in-rank rule of the Civil Service law,rules and regulations; (2) the petitioner has
followed the prescribed administrative procedure for redress of his grievance; and (3) the assailed
Decision contains a judicious assessment of the qualifications of both the contenders for the
position.
Petition granted.
[6] [ALFI v. Garin]
GR NO 217872| August 24, 2016 | General Rule and Methods of Review |J. Mendoza|
Paralejas
Petitioner: ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION, PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALFI) AND
ATTY. MARIA CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, IN HER OWN BEHALF AND AS PRESIDENT OF
ALFI, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, ROSIE B. LUISTRO, ELENITA S.A. SANDEJAS, EMILY R. LAWS,
EILEEN Z. ARANETA, SALVACION C. MONTIERO, MARIETTA C. GORREZ, ROLANDO M.
BAUTISTA, RUBEN T. UMALI AND MILDRED C. CASTOR
Respondents: HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, SECRETARY-DESIGNATE OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, NICOLAS B. LUTERO III, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF HEALTH, OFFICER-IN-
CHARGE, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, AND MARIA LOURDES C. SANTIAGO,
OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, CENTER FOR DRUG REGULATION AND RESEARCH
Case Doctrine: Notwithstanding, considering that the Secretary of Health is the principal
respondent in these petitions, any decision by the FDA in this particular case should be directly
appealable to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court. Verily, procedural rules, whether issued by quasi-judicial agencies or embodied in
statutes enacted by the Congress, are subject to alteration or modification by the Court in the
exercise of its constitutional rule-making power.
FACTS: The subject petitions sprouted from Imbong v. Ochoa and other cases (Imbong) where
the Court declared Republic Act No. 10354 (RH Law) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(RH-IRR) as not unconstitutional, save for several provisions which were declared as violative of
the Constitution.
Controversy began in September 2014, when petitioner Rosie B. Luistro chanced upon the FDA's
Notice inviting Marketing Authorization Holders (MAH) of fifty (50) contraceptive drugs to apply
for re-evaluation/re-certification of their contraceptive products and directed "all concerned to give
their written comments to said applications on or before October 8, 2014."
Petitioner Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) believed that the contraceptives
enumerated in the Notice fell within the definition of "abortifacient" under Section 4(a) of the RH
Law because of their "secondary mechanism of action which induces abortion or destruction of
the fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb."
As for the certificates of product registration for the hormonal contraceptives, "Implanon" and
"Implanon NXT," the petitioners contend that these certificates of product registration were issued
in haste because they were released just three (3) days after the Senate Committee on Finance
required FDA certifications for contraceptives as conditions for government funding for family
planning commodities.

The petitioners further aver that even before the issuance of these certificates, the DOH, as early
as February 2015, had been administering Implanon in Cebu City. Pointing to a news article in
the Panay News, they claim that respondent Health Secretary Janette L. Garin (Secretary Garin)
even defended the decisions of the DOH to administer these contraceptives. The petitioners add
that photographs of several tarpaulins17 show that the DOH has undertaken the distribution of
contraceptives as early as March 25, 2015.

The petitioners allege that despite the Court's declaration that several portions of the RH Law and
the RH-IRR are unconstitutional, the DOH has not effected any amendment in the RH-IRR to
conform with the Court's judgment. They claim that the RH-IRR posted on the DOH website still
contain the provisions which were declared by the Court to be unconstitutional.
Thus, the petitioners assert that absent any compliant rule of procedure issued by the FDA, or
consultation regarding its re-evaluation/re-certification, or consideration of their opposition, the
approval, procurement, distribution, administration, advertisement, and promotion of
contraceptive use by the FDA and the DOH should be enjoined as they are tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
ISSUE/S: Whether the re-certification proceedings are beyond the ambit of the court’s
power of judicial review. - NO

HELD: As to the contention that the subject recourse is improper as it involves the FDA's exercise
of its regulatory powers, suffice it to say that the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials as there is no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Consequently, the Court dismisses the notion that the re-certification of contraceptive drugs and
devices by the FDA in exercise of its regulatory function is beyond judicial review. After all, the
Constitution mandates that judicial power include the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The Court notes that Section 32 of R.A. No. 3720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711, and its
implementing rules provide that a party aggrieved by the orders, rulings or decision (or inaction)
of the Director-General of the FDA has the remedy of appealing the same to the Secretary of
Health. The Court likewise notes that under Section 9 of E.O. No. 247 the decisions of the
Secretary of Health would first have to be appealed to the Office of the President, in conformity
with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Notwithstanding, considering that the Secretary of Health is the principal respondent in these
petitions, any decision by the FDA in this particular case should be directly appealable to the
Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Verily,
procedural rules, whether issued by quasi-judicial agencies or embodied in statutes enacted by
the Congress, are subject to alteration or modification by the Court in the exercise of its
constitutional rule-making power.
DUE PROCESS – (IN CASE NA ITANONG)
After an assessment of the undisputed facts, the Court finds that the FDA certified, procured and
administered such contraceptive drugs and devices, without the observance of the basic tenets
of due process, without notice and without public hearing, despite the constant opposition from
the petitioners. From the records, it appears that other than the notice inviting stakeholders to
apply for certification/re-certification of their reproductive health products, there was no showing
that the respondents notified the oppositors and conducted a hearing on the applications and
oppositions submitted.

Rather than provide concrete evidence to meet the petitioners' opposition, the respondents simply
relied on their challenge questioning the propriety of the subject petition on technical and
procedural grounds. The Court notes that even the letters submitted by the petitioners to the FDA
and the DOH seeking information on the actions taken by the agencies regarding their opposition
were left unanswered as if they did not exist at all. The mere fact that the RH Law was declared
as not unconstitutional does not permit the respondents to run roughshod over the constitutional
rights, substantive and procedural, of the petitioners.
Due to the failure of the respondents to observe and comply with the basic requirements of due
process, the Court is of the view that the certifications/re-certifications and the distribution of the
questioned contraceptive drugs by the respondents should be struck down as violative of the
constitutional right to due process.

Verily, it is a cardinal precept that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, the courts
are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void
for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings,
for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where
he stands to lose the same.

[7] [Peralta v. Phil. Postal]

GR No. 223395| December 4, 2018 | Judicial Review | J. Tijam | Delos Reyes

Petitioner: RENATO V. PERALTA

Respondents: PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION (PHILPOST), REPRESENTED BY MA.
JOSEFINA MDELACRUZ IN HER CAPACITY AS POSTMASTER GENERAL AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF PHILPOST, REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRMAN CESAR N. SARINO

Case Doctrine:
Power of judicial review is subject to the following limitations:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the constitutionality of the questioned act must be raised by the proper party;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota (the cause of the suit or action) of the
case.

FACTS: PhilPost issued a stamp commemorating Iglesia ni Cristo's Centennial Celebration.

The design of the stamp showed a photo of INC founder, Felix Y. Manalo with the designation on
the left side containing the words "Felix Y. Manalo, 1886-1963 First Executive Minister of Iglesia
ni Cristo", with the Central Temple of the religious group in the background. At the right side of
Manalo's photo is the INC's centennial logo which contained a torch enclosed by two concentric
circles containing the words "IGLESIA Nl CRISTO CENTENNIAL 1914-2014".

Peralta filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC assailing the constitutionality of the printing,
issuance and distribution of the INC commemorative centennial stamps, allegedly paid for by
respondent PhilPost using public funds. He alleged that the printing and issuance of the INC
commemorative stamp involved disbursement of public funds

He argued that respondents' act of releasing the said stamps was unconstitutional because it was
tantamount to sponsorship of a religious activity; it violated the separation of the Church and the
State; and the non-establishment of religion clause. RTC denied

Respondents maintained that no public funds were disbursed in the printing of the INC
commemorative stamps. They claimed that the proceeds of the sale of the stamps will not redound
to the sole benefit of INC. They maintained that any sectarian benefit to the INC is merely
incidental.

RTC denied petitioner's application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and dismissed the
action.

CA ruled that although the action is considered as a taxpayer's suit, the printing and issuance of
the commemorative stamp did not violate the Constitution.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE/S:W/N Judicial Review is valid → YES

HELD:Power of judicial review is subject to the following limitations:

(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the constitutionality of the questioned act must be raised by the proper party;1
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota (the cause of the suit or action) of the
case.
Actual case or controversy

1
the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion
of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.

This is the Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this
requirement is simplified by merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the assailed governmental act. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.

It is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either

branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action.

Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy in this case.

PhilPost - under the express orders of then President Benigno Aquino III through Proclamation
No. 815 printed, issued and sold the INC commemorative stamps. PhilPost's act gave rise to
petitioner's injunction suit in which he made the following allegations: (1) the printing of the INC
commemorative stamps violated Sec. 29(2), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution; and (2) the purpose
of the stamp as indicated in the MOA is "tantamount to sponsorship" of a religious activity, violative
of the non-establishment clause.

While this Court agrees that the issue on the remedy of injunction availed of by the petitioner may
no longer be viable to enjoin PhilPost's acts, considering that the act sought to be enjoined already
transpired, this does not necessarily mean that the question on the constitutionality of the said
acts would automatically be rendered academic.

It is precisely PhilPost's issuance, printing and sale of the INC commemorative stamps
that created a justiciable controversy since the said acts allegedly violated Sec. 29(2), Art.
VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The moot-and-academic principle is not a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts
from resolving cases, because they will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if they find
that:
(a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(b) the situation is of exceptional character, and paramount public interest is involved;
(c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; or
(d) a case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest, involving as they do,
the alleged misuse of public funds and the non-establishment clause which is one of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion.

Legal Standing
A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed,
or that the public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is
wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A
person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
Here, petitioner made an allegation of PhilPost's misuse of public funds in the printing of
1,200,000 INC commemorative stamps. Petitioner pointed out that only 50,000 pieces were
shouldered by the INC

Petitioner, thus, concluded that the production of the additional 1,150,000 stamps were made
possible only with the use of public funds and property. On this basis, petitioner indeed, is invested
with personality to institute the complaint for injunction with the RTC.

[8] [LAO TANG BUN VS FABRE]

G.R. NO. L-1673 | October 22, 1948 | Judicial Review | Bengzon | Garay

Petitioner: LAO TANG BUN (alias VICENTE UY), NG BUN HO (alias ONG CHI BEN) LU
BON KING (alias LEE), YAP LIM SUN (alias PIA UY), and GAN PING (alias TANG ENG
TIAN)
Respondents: ENGRACIO FABRE, JESUS BAUTISTA, and OSCAR ARANETA,
Commissioners of Immigration, and THE CHIEF OF POLICE, City of Manila, Philippines

Case Doctrine: Here - Courts are not free to review the weight, admissibility, or sufficiency of
evidence adduced before this board of special inquiry; and the decision of the Bureau of Customs,
based upon evidence, is deemed conclusive.

The decision of the immigration authorities is final and may not be disturbed by the courts when
the hearing was fair and no error of law was committed and there is evidence to support their
conclusion.

Background of the case: Five Chinese citizens detained by our immigration authorities for
purposes of deportation have instituted this proceeding to test the legality of their confinement
and proposed expulsion from the Philippines. The use of habeas corpus to accomplish that
objective is now a settled practice.

FACTS: It appears that, having received information that Tan Eng Tian, Pia Uy, Vicente Uy, Lu
Bon King alias Lee and Ong Chi Ben, all Chinese nationals residing in this country, were
communist actively engaged in communistic work and were disseminating red propaganda in
addition to trafficking in firearms destined for subversive elements, the respondent Commissioner
of Immigration issued warrants for their apprehension for investigation according to law with a
view to deportation.

The Board of Commissioners reached the unanimous conclusion that the detainees were really
guilty as charged, and ordered that said Chinese (here in petitioners) “be immediately placed
under custody in the Immigration Detention Station and that they be deported to Amoy.

Basis of the banishment decree are the findings by the Commissioners:

1. solicitation of contributions undertaken by the respondents to help Luis Taruc and

the Hukbalahaps,

2. the supply of arms and ammunitions made by three of the respondents to the Huks
in Angeles, Pampanga,
 3. the making of public speeches, urging a revolution to overthrow the present
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to establish the Soviet form of
government, the distribution of leaflets printed in red favoring indirectly Communism, and
committing other subversive acts

That the Batangas Chinese Elementary School was founded in memory of Chua Kensi a
Chinaman killed by the Japanese during the occupation; that the said school fell soon after its
establishment under the control of Chinese Communists;

That as early as 1946. these five respondents were taken to the MPC Headquarters in Batangas
where they were investigated by Major Magallanes for communistic activities since they had been
covered to be active Communists in Batangas, Batangas

the That on August 13, 1947, the Batangas Chinese Elementary School was raided by the MPC
of Batangas and in the course of the raid many books and other papers were taken, some of
which were found to be of communistic; and that the principal, respondent Lu Bon King alias lee,
the president of the Board of Trustees, respondent Gan Ping alias Tan Eng Tian, and the
members of said Board, Yap Lim Sun alias Pia Eng Tian, and the Members of said Board, Yap
Lim Sun alias Pia Uy and Lao Tang Bun alias Vicente Uy, were fully aware of the character and
contents of those books and papers;

xxx xxx xx

The pertinent legal provision is section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613 as amended by Republic
Act No. 144. It reads in part as follows;

(a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners
of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien;

xxx xxx xxx

(8) Any alien who believes in, advices, advocates or teaches the overthrow by force and
violence of the Government of the Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who
disbelieves in or is opposed to organized government, or advises, advocates, or teaches the
assault or assassination of public officials because of their office, or who advises, advocates, or
teaches the destruction of property, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization
entertaining, advocating or teaching such doctrines, or who in any manner whatsoever lands
assistance, financial or other wise, to the dissemination of such doctrines.

It is undisputed that every sovereign nation has the inherent power to exclude aliens from
its territory or to deport them upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-
preservation or public interest. In the exercise of such sovereign power the Philippine
Legislature enumerated in above section 37 the reasons for which aliens are to be banished
herefrom. At the same time it ordered that "no alien shall be deported without being informed
of the specific grounds for deportation, nor without being given a hearing under rules of
procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration," (sec. 37 [c], these
requisites being undoubtedly the minimum requirements for compliance with the "due clause" of
the Constitution.
It is course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action. The
order of deportation is not a punishment, it being merely the turn to his county of an alien who
has broken the conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders. The
deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not to
be conducted strictly in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings. It is essential,
however, that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient information about the charges
against him relating the facts relied upon. It is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with
the assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before unprejudiced investigators. However, all the
strict rules of evidence governing judicial controversies do not need to be observe; only such as
are fundamental and essential, like the right of cross-examination. Hearsay evidence may even
be admitted, provided the alien is given the opportunity to explain or rebut it.

ISSUE/S:
1. WON the decision of the immigration authorities may still be reviewed by the Court. - No.
2. WON the respondents did abuse their power in ordering the banishment of the petitioners. (The
court is not in the position to declare)

HELD: The decision of the immigration authorities is final and may not be disturbed by the
courts when the hearing was fair and no error of law was committed and there is evidence
to support their conclusion. The courts will not weight the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of the witnesses or otherwise substitute their judgment for that of the immigration
officers on the sufficiency of the proof. These matters are for decision by the immigration
authorities and their findings will not be reversed if there is evidence to sustain them, no matter if
the courts might find differently from them on the whole evidence submitted.

Time and again this Supreme Court has announced the view that the decisions of the customs or
immigration authorities are final, unless there has been an abuse of discretion or power, or where
they have acted in open violation of the law.

The record of the proceedings for deportation of herein petitioners had before the Immigration
officials is presented to us for examination. It is not complete: as pointed out by the Solicitor
General's memorandum several exhibits have not been attached. Nevertheless the main papers
are here, and they sufficiently show: firstly, that herein petitioners were apprised, in the order
for their apprehension,of the charges against them, secondly, that they had time to prepare
for the investigation; thirdly, that they were ably represented by about four lawyers in said
investigation who had ample opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against their
clients; fourthly, that no incident or circumstance is pointed out to indicate prejudice or
unfairness on the part of the immigration commissioners; fifthly, that enough evidence was
submitted to said commissioners to support their conclusion that herein petitioners were
communists, propagated communism in the Philippines, advocated the overthrow of the
Philippines by the revolution, and helped the Hukbalahaps, a rebellious organization.

It is this last point that petitioners vigorously assail, most of the pages of their voluminous printed
memorandum having discussed the personal credibility of the credibility of the witnesses for the
Government, the extent and meaning of their assertions as contrasted or compared with those of
the defense and the alleged erroneous admission of hearsay evidence to the prejudice of their
interests. Yet we have already said hereinbefore that, in these proceedings, hearsay evidence
is not necessarily inadmissible. As to the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the
evidence we should not interfere, substituting our estimate of the situation for that of the
Commissioners.
The Solicitor General, calls attention to the fact that whereas the Government presented 39
exhibits none of them have been submitted here by petitioners. He urges that under the
circumstances this Court is not in a position accurately to determine whether respondents
have committed abuse of discretion. There is merit to the contention. We note, for instance,
that some witnesses, in testifying before the Commissioners identified and ratified certain
affidavits they had previously sworn to, and these affidavits, as marked as exhibits, were
subsequently introduced in evidence, without objections of the petitioner herein.

Counsel for petitioners devoted the major portion of their printed memorandum to a close scrutiny
of the Government witnesses' testimony calling attention to reportedly glaring discrepancies
therein, and other features that impugn their credibility. Apparently they accomplished a thorough
job. However, the trouble is that the order of deportation does not need to be justified by
"preponderance of the evidence beyond reasonable doubt." It is not our duty to determine whether
the calibration of the evidence made by respondents was accurate or not. It is enough that there
is some evidence to support the order of deportation. The credibility of the witnesses or the weight
of the evidence or preponderance thereof is not open to inquiry.

The record shows that the board of special inquiry which decreed and recommended the
petitioner's deportation had investigated the case and received among other evidence the
testimony of Si Kim Tee (alias Chua Ang Shi), justifying the action taken. There is no merit in the
appellant's contention that the testimony of this witness should not have been given credence.
Courts are not free to review the weight, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence adduced
before this board of special inquiry; and the decision of the Bureau of Customs, based
upon evidence, is deemed conclusive.

The sworn statements of Lieutenant Valdez and the other witnesses show the objectionable
activities and preachings of these Chinese communists who advocate the overthrow of the
present government by force and furnished arms to the rebellious elements. Such statements
may not be as strong and as unimpeachable as could be, but they are there to support the order
of deportation.

Wherefore, under the precedents applicable and in view of the incomplete record, we are not in
a position to declare that the respondents did abuse their power in power in ordering the
banishment of herein petitioners, who fall within section 37 (a) (8) of the Immigration Act
hereinabove quoted.

[9] [AQUINO V MARIANO]

G.R. No. L-30485| May 31, 1984| General Rule and Methods of review| Relova | HIDALGO

Petitioner: BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, as Provincial Fiscal of Rizal

Respondents: HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Branch X), and LUCIO ADRIANO, JR.

Case Doctrine: Before filing the present action for mandamus in the court below, private
respondent Adriano, Jr. should have availed of this administrative remedy and his failure to do
so is fatal. The conclusion is therefore inevitable that the filing of a mere motion in the criminal
case to achieve the same purpose as prayed for in the petition for mandamus is not only an
adequate remedy but even a plainer, speedier, and more adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law than mandamus.
FACTS:Rizal Provincial Fiscal Benjamin H. Aquino filed an information in the then Court of First
Instance at Pasig, Rizal vs Lucio Adriano, Jr. et al, for estafa thru falsification of official and/or
public documents. They falsified plans and technical descriptions of a particular parcel of land. It
was approved by the Land Registration Commission. Adriano instituted a petition for mandamus
in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal praying for an order directing Fiscal Aquino to include
as defendants in the information filed by him, Commissioner Antonio Noblejas of the Land
Registration Commission, who, in the meantime, resigned from the office. The judge granted the
Mandamus.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner prosecutor can be compelled to include former Commissioner
Antonio Noblejas as one of the accused in Criminal Case (NO)

HELD: Petitioner had expressed the view that a strong prima facie case exists against
Commissioner Noblejas and, therefore, recommended strongly that he be allowed to file the
corresponding information against said commissioner whom he found in his investigation to be
criminally liable for the offense complained of. However, Fiscal Aquino addressed a
memorandum, dated September 2, 1968, to the then Secretary of Justice stating, among others,
that in view of the offer of Commissioner Noblejas to resign from office and in the fight of the
Commissioner's explanation, he (herein petitioner) found the responsibility of said
commissioner,to be only administrative in nature. Thus, the information was filed without including
Commissioner Noblejas as one of the accused.

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that can be resorted to only in cases of extreme necessity
where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief where there is no other clear,
adequate and speedy remedy. Before a writ of mandamus may be issued, it is obligatory upon
the petitioner to exhaust all remedies in the ordinary course of law. He must show that the duty
sought to be performed must be one which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office. Thus, if appeal or some other equally adequate remedy is still available in the ordinary
course of law, the action for mandamus would be improper.Adriano, Jr. did not request Fiscal
Aquino to include in the information Commissioner Noblejas as one of the accused. Had he done
so and the same was met with a denial Adriano, Jr. could have appealed to the Secretary of
Justice who may reverse petitioner and designate another to act for the purpose. That way, the
filing of a simple motion with the Fiscal to include or to amend the information is much more
speedy and adequate than a petition for mandamus.

[10] [PHIL. SINTER V. CAGAYAN]

GR No. 127371 | April 25, 2002| Doctrine of Non-Interference | SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
| Jimenez

Petitioner: Philippine Sinter Corporation And Phividec Industrial Authority

Respondents: Cagayan Electric Power And Light Co., Inc

Case Doctrine: Settled is the rule that where the law provides for an appeal from the decisions
of administrative bodies to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies
are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the
control of the latter.

FACTS: In 1987, President Cory Aquino approved a Cabinet Reform Policy for the power sector
and issued a Cabinet Memorandum, Item No. 2 of which provides that: Continue direct connection
for industries authorized under the BOI-NPC Memorandum of Understanding of 12 January 1981,
until such time as the appropriate regulatory board determines that direct connection of
industry to NPC is no longer necessary in the franchise area of the specific utility or
cooperative.

Pursuant to the Memorandum, respondent Cagayan Electric Power and Light, Co. (CEPALCO),
grantee of a legislative franchise to distribute electric power, filed with Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB) a petition that sought the discontinuation of all existing direct supply of power by the
National Power Corporation (NPC, now NAPOCOR) within CEPALCOs franchise area.
The ERB issued a notice of public hearing which was published in the newspapers and posted in
the affected areas. It likewise furnished NAPOCOR and the Board of Investments (BOI) copies of
the petition and directed them to submit their comments.
After hearing, the ERB granted the petition and ordered the discontinuation of the supply of power
of NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration but the ERB denied the same. CA,
on petition for review, denied the same and declared that the assailed decision had become final
and executory. SC affirmed.
To implement the decision of ERB, CEPLCO wrote to Petitioner Phil. Sinter Corporation(PSC)
and advised them of its desire to have the power supply of PSC, directly taken from NPC
(NAPOCOR), disconnected, cut and transferred to CEPALCO. PSC refused. PSC then filed a
complaint for injunction against CEPALCO to restrain the execution of the ERB Decision.
RTC ruled in favor of PSC. CA, on appeal, set aside the RTC decision. PSC filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied hence this instant petition.

ISSUE/S:Whether or not the injunction lies against the final and executory judgment of the
ERB (NO)

HELD: No, the injunction does not lie against the final and executory judgment of the ERB.
Clearly, an injunction to stay a final and executory decision is unavailing except only after a
showing that facts and circumstances exist which would render execution unjust or inequitable,
or that a change in the situation of the parties occurred. Here, no such exception exists as shown
by the facts earlier narrated. To disturb the final and executory decision of the ERB in an injunction
suit is to brazenly disregard the rule on finality of judgments.

Corollarily, Section 10 of Executive Order No. 172 (the law creating the ERB) provides that a
review of its decisions or orders is lodged in the Supreme Court. Settled is the rule that where the
law provides for an appeal from the decisions of administrative bodies to the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in
terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. Hence, the trial court,
being co-equal with the ERB, cannot interfere with the decision of the latter. It bears
stressing that this doctrine of non-interference of trial courts with co-equal administrative bodies
is intended to ensure judicial stability in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent
jurisdiction.

[11] Ortua v. Encarnacion

GR. 39919 | January 30, 1934 | Questions of Fact | Malcom, J. | Saquido

Petitioner: FORTUNATO ORTUA

Respondents: VICENTE SINGSON ENCARNACION, Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, ET AL
FACTS:In January, 1920, the petitioner Fortunato Ortua filed an application with the Bureau of
Lands for the purchase of a tract of public land situated in the municipality of San Jose, Province
of Camarines Sur. Following an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Ortua's
application was rejected, allowing him, however, to file a sale or lease application for the portion
of the land classified to be suitable for commercial purposes, within a period of sixty days from
the date of the decision and upon payment of P3,000 for accrued rents. Two motions for
reconsideration of the decision were filed and denied. On appeal to the then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (Agriculture and Commerce), the decision was affirmed,
except that the sum of P3,000 was reduced to P400. One condition for the purchase of a tract of
public agricultural land, is that the purchaser shall be a citizen of lawful age of the Philippine
Islands or of the United States. Fortunato Ortua in his application stated that he was a Filipino
citizen, but the Director of Lands held that on the contrary, Ortua was a Chinese citizen. On this
question, the Director of Lands found established the following facts: Fortunato Ortua was born
in 1885 in Lagonoy, Camarines Sur, Philippine Islands, being the natural son of Irene Demesa, a
Filipina, and Joaquin Ortua, a Chinese. In 1896 Fortunato was sent to China to study. While he
was in China his father and mother were legally married. Fortunato returned to the Philippines in
1906, that is, when he was twenty-one years of age. Conceded by the Director of Lands that
presumptively Fortunato Ortua was a Philippine citizen, but certain acts of Ortua were pointed to
as demonstrating that he had forfeited his Philippine citizenship. Thus it was stated that Ortua
voluntarily applied for a landing certificate of residence which was issued by the Insular Collector
of Customs and which is only given to Chinese persons. Also, when Ortua applied for the
registration of a boat, and it was denied by the Insular Collector of Customs on the ground that
the appellant was a Chinese citizen.

ISSUE/S:Whether or not Fortunato Ortua Should be Considered to be a Filipino Citizen - YES

HELD: The Director of Lands performs his functions pursuant to the provisions of the
Public Land Law. In accordance with this law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is
made the executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of the Public Land Law, and
he performs this duty through the Director of Lands (sec. 3). Subject to the control of the executive
head, the Director of Lands is by law vested with direct executive control over land matters, "and
his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce." (Sec. 4). The court hold that the Director of Lands has been
made by law a quasi-judicial officer. As such officer he makes findings of fact, even passes
upon questions of mixed fact and law, and considers and decides the qualifications of
applicants for the purchase of public lands. A discretion is lodged by law in the Director of
Lands which should not be interfered with. The decisions of the Director of Lands on the
construction of the Public Land Law are entitled to great respect by the courts. There is, however,
another side to the case. It certainly was not intended by the legislative body to remove
from the jurisdiction of courts all right to review decisions of the Bureau of Lands, for to
do so would be to attempt something which could not be done legally. Giving force to all
possible intendments regarding the facts as found by the Director of Lands, yet so much
of the decision of the Director of Lands as relates to a question of law is in no sense
conclusive upon the courts, but is subject to review. In other words, any action of the
Director of Lands which is based upon a misconstruction of the law can be corrected by
the courts. Fortunato Ortua had a sort of a dual citizenship, and had it within his power either to
elect to become a Philippine citizen or a Chinese citizen. Predicated on these assumptions, we
doubt very much if it could be found that Ortua has by his own acts repudiated his Philippine
citizenship and chosen Chinese citizenship. The Director of Lands gave too much prominence,
we think, to two minor facts, susceptible of explanation. When Ortua returned from China at the
age of twenty-one, it was the most natural thing in the world for him to land as a Chinese, for this
would facilitate entry and obviate complications. Again, when Ortua applied for the registration of
a boat, there may have been any number of reasons why he did not care to appeal from the
decision of the Insular Collector of Customs. On the other hand, some consideration should be
given to the intention of the petitioner, and he vigorously insists that it is his desire to be
considered a Philippine citizen. He has taken a Filipino name. He has gone into business and has
improved the property here in question to a great extent. There has been no implied renunciation
of citizenship, because the petitioner has been domiciled in these Islands except for a short period
during his infancy when he temporarily sojourned in China for study. On the contrary, he states
that he has always considered himself to be a Filipino, and that he has elected to remain as a
Philippine citizen. Therefore, on the facts found by the Director of Lands, we hold that clear error
of law resulted in not considering petitioner a Philippine citizen and so qualified under the Public
Land Law to purchase public agricultural lands.

[12] [Atlas v. Factoran]

G.R. L-75501 | September 15, 1987 | Questions of Fact | Paras, J. | Bernardino

Petitioner: Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation

Respondents: Hon. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. and Asterio Buqueron
Case Doctrine: In reviewing administrative decisions, the Court cannot reexamine the sufficiency
of evidence as if originally instituted therein, and receive additional evidence that was not
submitted to the administrative agency concerned, the findings of fact in this case must be
respected.

FACTS: This is a petition for review which sought to set aside the decision rendered by the
respondent in reinstated and confirmed the decision of the Director Mines and Geo Sciences and
set aside the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources.

Atlas claimed that it is a registered surface land owner and locator of six lode claims duly
registered with the Office of the Mining Recorder. When Atlas registered the location of its “Master
VII Fr.” mining claim, the private respondent, Buqueron, also registered his mining claims known
as “St. Mary Fr.” and “St. Joseph Fr.” with the same Mining Recorder. Atlas claimed that it has
established its possessory rights over the land where Buqueron’s mining claims are located. Atlas
claims that Buqueron, without its written permission, caused the “table” location and survey and
applied of his alleged mining claims even when it is hardly possible without having been seen or
noticed by Atlas and its personnel.

Buqueron denied the allegation of Atlas by way of affirmative defense and alleged that all of the
claims of Atlas are null and void for having been located in areas which were closed to mining
locations in open and gross violation of the Mining Act.

The Director of Mines has established that there is an overlapping of mining claims and that as a
matter of record, the mining claims of Atlas were registered subsequent to Buqueron. The Minister
of Natural Resources, however, held Buqueron’s mining claims as null and void and declared
Atlas’s claim to be valid.However, Atlas asked the Court to look into the said findings because of
the open divergence of views and findings by the adjudicating authorities in this mining conflict
involving highly contentious issues which warrant appellate review.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the question of the valid location and discovery of the disputed mining
claims is a question of fact.
HELD: Yes, the question regarding the valid location and discovery of the disputed mining claims
is a question of fact which is best left to the determination of the administrative bodies charged
with the implementation of the law they are entrusted to enforce. The Court held that it is sufficient
that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence. In the case at bar, the record shows
that the decision of the Director of Mines was supported by the substantial evidence. The Court
repeatedly ruled that judicial review of decision of an administrative official is subject to certain
guideposts laid down in man decided cases. Thus, for instance, findings of fact in such decision
should not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but review is justified when there
has been denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the
administrative proceeding, where the procedure which led to factual findings is irregular; when
palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness is manifest. In the case at bar, none of the above circumstances is present, which
would justify the overturning of findings of facts of the Director of Mines which were affirmed by
the Office of the President. Petition is denied.

[13] [EMERALD GARMENT v CA]

G.R. No. 100098 | December 29, 1995 | Questions of Fact | Kapunan, J. | Teñido

Petitioner: EMERALD GARMENT MANUFACTURING CORPORATION

Respondents: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER and H.D. LEE COMPANY, INC.

Case Doctrine: A question of fact is, as a general rule, the concern solely of an administrative
body, so long as there is substantial evidence of record to sustain its action, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or preponderant.

FACTS: Private respondent H.D. Lee Co., Inc., a foreign corporation, filed with the Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks & Technology Transfer (BPTTT) a Petition for Cancellation of Registration
(Supplemental Register) for the trademark "STYLISTIC MR. LEE'' used on skirts, jeans, blouses,
socks, briefs, jackets, jogging suits, dresses, shorts, shirts and lingerie in the name of petitioner
Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation, a domestic corporation organized and existing
under Philippine laws.

Private respondent invoked the Trademark Law and the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, averred that petitioner's trademark "so closely resembled its own trademark,
'LEE' as previously registered and used in the Philippines, and not abandoned, to cause
confusion, mistake and deception on the part of the purchasing public as to the origin of the goods.

Petitioner contended that its trademark was entirely and unmistakably different from that of private
respondent and that its certificate of registration was legally and validly granted. He then filed an
application for the registration of the trademark “Stylistic Mr. Lee”.

Private respondent filed a notice of opposition to the application of registration. Which the Director
of Patents granted (19 July 1988). Director of Patents, using the test of dominancy, declared that
petitioner's trademark was confusingly similar to private respondent's mark because "it is the word
'Lee' which draws the attention of the buyer and leads him to conclude that the goods originated
from the same manufacturer. It is undeniably the dominant feature of the mark.

Petitioner appealed to the CA. It filed with the BPTTT a Motion to Stay Execution of the 19 July
1988 decision of the Director of Patents on grounds that the same would cause it great and
irreparable damage and injury. Private respondent submitted its opposition.
The BPTT issued a resolution granting the petitioner's motion to stay execution.
The CA promulgated its decision affirming the decision of the Director of Patents dated 19 July
1988 in all respects

ISSUE: Whether or not a trademark which causes confusion and is likely to deceive the public is
a question of fact (YES)

HELD: The determination as to who is the prior user of the trademark is a question of fact and it
is this Court's working principle not to disturb the findings of the Director of Patents on this
issue in the absence of any showing of grave abuse of discretion. The findings of facts of the
Director of Patents are conclusive upon the Supreme Court provided they are supported by
substantial evidence.

In determining whether colorable imitation exists, jurisprudence has developed two kinds of tests
— the Dominancy Test applied in Asia Brewery, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and the Holistic Test
developed in Del Monte Corporation v. Court of Appeals. As its title implies, the test of dominancy
focuses on the similarity of the prevalent features of the competing trademarks which might cause
confusion or deception and thus constitutes infringement.

. . . If the competing trademark contains the main or essential or dominant features of another,
and confusion and deception is likely to result, infringement takes place. Duplication or imitation
is not necessary; nor it is necessary that the infringing label should suggest an effort to imitate.
The question at issue in cases of infringement of trademarks is whether the use of the marks
involved would be likely to cause confusion or mistakes in the mind of the public or deceive
purchasers.

On the other side of the spectrum, the holistic test mandates that the entirety of the marks in
question must be considered in determining confusing similarity. In determining whether the
trademarks are confusingly similar, a comparison of the words is not the only determinant factor.
The trademarks in their entirety as they appear in their respective labels or hang tags must also
be considered in relation to the goods to which they are attached. The discerning eye of the
observer must focus not only on the predominant words but also on the other features appearing
in both labels in order that he may draw his conclusion whether one is confusingly similar to the
other.

[14] [Boiser v. CA]

GR No. L-61438| June 24, 1983 | Judicial Review (of Administrative Action/Decision):
Questions of Law | GUTIERREZ, JR., J. | Almase

Petitioner: ERDULFO C. BOISER doing business under the name and style PREMIERE
AUTOMATIC TELEPHONE NETWORK

Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO.,

CONRADO HERNANDEZ, ROMAN JUEZAN and WILSON MORRELL
Case Doctrine: Jurisdiction; Administrative Law; Damages; Communications; The
National Telecommunications Commission has no authority to decide breach of contract
cases and to award moral and exemplary damages.—PLDT has cited in full the authority and
powers given by Presidential Decree No. 1 to the Board of Communications, now National
Telecommunications Commission. There is nothing in the Commission’s powers which authorizes
it to adjudicate breach of contract cases, much less to award moral and exemplary damages. The
two authorities cited by the private respondents in the bid to dissolve the CFI restraining order do
not appear adequate to disregard the thirty (30) day prior notice provided by the Interconnecting
Agreement. But even if they were, this question is one which should be clarified in the civil case
for breach of contract.

FACTS:The petitioner has been operating a telephone system in Tagbilaran City and other
municipalities in the province of Bohol since April 15, 1965, doing business under the name and
style of Premiere Automatic Telephone Network. Sometime in August, 1965, the petitioner and
private respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) entered into a
contract denominated as "Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT bound itself to provide
Premiere with long distance and overseas facilities through the use of the PLDT relay station in
Mandaue City, Province of Cebu. The arrangement enabled subscribers of Premiere in Bohol to
make or receive long distance and overseas calls to and from any part of the Philippines and
other countries of the world. Petitioner on the other hand had the obligation to preserve and
maintain the facilities provided by respondent PLDT, provide relay switching services and
qualified radio operators, and otherwise maintain the required standards in the operation of
facilities under the agreement.chanrobles law library

On February 27, 1979, without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT issued
a "circuit authorization order" to its co-respondents, PLDT employees Roman Juezan and Wilson
Morrell to terminate the connection of PLDT’s relay station with the facilities of the petitioner’s
telephone system in the province of Bohol. Petitioner avers that this order was in gross violation
of the aforecited "Interconnecting Agreement." To avert serious consequences to the public and
private sectors resulting from any disruption of the petitioner’s telephone network and, of course,
to the long distance and overseas aspects of its business, the petitioner was compelled to seek
judicial relief. It instituted Civil Case No. 17867 with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu now
a Regional Trial Court, for injunction and damages.

On March 2, 1979, the Court of First Instance of Cebu issued a temporary restraining
order against respondent PLDT and directed the preservation of the status quo between the
parties.

On August 2, 1979, or five (5) months after the issuance of the temporary restraining order,
the private respondents filed a motion to dissolve or lift the restraining order. Thereafter, the
petitioner and the private respondents submitted the merits of the main case to a hearing and
agreed to consider jointly in said trial on the merits the motion to dissolve or lift temporary
restraining order including the propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

The hearing on the merits progressed and petitioner was already in the process of winding
up its evidence in Civil Case No. 17867 before the Court of First Instance, Cebu when on July 20,
1982, or nearly three (3) years after the filing of their motion to dissolve or lift temporary restraining
order, the private respondents elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals by filing the
petitioner for certiorari. CA-G.R. No. 14554-SP.
 The petition filed with the Court of Appeals had for its object the setting aside of the CFI
restraining order which enjoined PLDT and the other respondents from disconnecting the
Mandaue Tagbilaran telephone connections.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the National Telecommunications Commission is the body with
jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies arising from the operation of telephone systems or
the interconnection of communications facilities, not the Court of First Instance. (NO)

HELD:The case before the trial court is for injunction arising from breach of contract. Premiere
asks for compliance with the terms of the contract and for the payment of P100,000.00
exemplary and moral damages in addition to attorney’s fees.

PLDT has cited in full the authority and powers given by Presidential Decree No. 1 to the
Board of Communications, now National Telecommunications Commission. There is nothing in
the Commission’s powers which authorizes it to adjudicate breach of contract cases, much less
to award moral and exemplary damages. The two authorities cited by the private respondents in
the bid to dissolve the CFI restraining order do not appear adequate to disregard the thirty (30)
day prior notice provided by the Interconnecting Agreement. But even if they were, this question
is one which should be clarified in the civil case for breach of contract.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Clearly, therefore, what the petitioner is questioning is an order which does not merely
involve "a purely internal transaction of a telecommunications company" but one which would
necessarily affect rights guaranteed it by the contract allegedly violated.

[15] [OCEANIC VS ROMERO]

G.R. No. L-43890 |July 16, 1984 | QUESTIONS OF lAW | GUITEREZ JR. J | PINTO

Petitioner: OCEANIC BIC DIVISION (FFW), PABLITO ORDANOSO

Respondents: FLERIDA RUTH P. ROMERO AS VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, OCEANIC BIC
MANUFACTURING, and GLICERIO LEDESMA

Case Doctrine: A voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial
capacity. There is no reason why her decisions involving interpretation of law should be beyond
this Court’s review. Administrative officials are presumed to act in accordance with law and yet
we do not hesitate to pass upon their work where a question of law is involved or where a showing
of abuse of authority or discretion in their official acts is properly raised in petitions for certiorari.

FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari to interpret PD No.21. Petitioner Pablito Ordanoso
entered into a contract of temporary employment for the period of six (6) months beginning from
October 3, 1973 to April 3, 1974 with the respondent corporation. When the contract expired on
April 3, 1974, Ordanoso entered into another 6-month contract ofemployment, this time as
probationary worker with the respondent company, from April 4, 1974 to October 4, 1974.

The respondent company through "group leaders" conducts periodic performance ratings on the
workers. The results are considered for the workers' conversion from probationary to regular
permanent employment. The criteria for performance ratings were cooperation, attendance,...
quality of work, skill, initiative and interest in work, leadership, obedience and intelligence.

On September 10, 1974, a memorandum was issued by Ledesma to some workers, among them
Ordanoso, warning them of their low average performance with the advice to perform on the
average performance level. On October 3, 1974, Ledesma terminated Ordanoso's services in the
company because of his below average performance rating.

"On October 4, 1974, complainant union (FFW Oceanic BIC Manufacturing Chapter) through its
union president, Alfonso Leonido sent a letter dated October 3, 1974, to the Management of the
respondent company wherein the union asked the company for a grievance conference in order...
to discuss the dismissal of complainant Pablito Ordanoso effective October 4, 1974. Apparently,
the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement in the grievance conference. On October 25,
1974, the complainants (the local union and Pablito Ordanoso) filed a complaint with the NLRC,
Dept. of Labor, docketed as NLRC Case No. Lr-6538.
On January 20, 1975, the Federa-tion of Free Workers, the mother federation of complainant
union, sent a letter to the management of respondent company wherein the Federation suggested
three (3) names to select from, as voluntary arbitrator. The parties failed to mutually... select any
of the three named in said letter but later selected Atty. Flerida Ruth P. Romero of the U.P. Law
Center, Diliman, Quezon City.

"No employers may shut down his establishment or dismiss or terminate the services of regular
employees with at least one year of service without the written clearance of the Secretary of
Labor."

ISSUE/S: whether or not the Court does not have the power to review the voluntary arbitrator’s
award on the ground that: 1) Presidential Decree No. 442, (Labor Code) precludes this Court from
reviewing voluntary arbitration awards save on special circumstances which are not present in
the instant case; and 2) the nature of voluntary arbitration awards should be considered final.

HELD: It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or

legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies
on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute’ (73 C.J.S.
506, note 56).

"The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and
protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions’ (73 C.J.S. 507, Sec. 165). It is part
of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls
arbitrary and unjust adjudications.

A voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. There is no
reason why her decisions involving interpretation of law should be beyond this Court’s review.
Administrative officials are presumed to act in accordance with law and yet we do not hesitate to
pass upon their work where a question of law is involved or where a showing of abuse of authority
or discretion in their official acts is properly raised in petitions for certiorari.

[16] [BAGATSING VS COMMITTEE]

G.R. No. 112399 |July 14, 1995 | QUESTIONS OF lAW | QUIASON J | RICASIO

Petitioner: REPRESENTATIVE AMADO S. BAGATSING

Respondents: COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY
and THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Case Doctrine: The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more
weight than the interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer.

FACTS:

PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1966
under the corporate name "Esso Philippines, Inc." (ESSO) as a subsidiary of Esso Eastern, Inc.
and Mobil Petroleum Company, Inc.

In 1973, at the height of the world-wide oil crisis brought about by the Middle East conflicts, the
Philippine government acquired ESSO through the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).
ESSO became a wholly-owned company of the government under the corporate name PETRON
and as a subsidiary of PNOC.

The petition asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to stop respondents from
selling the 40% block to a foreign buyer.

Among others, petitioners question the regularity and validity of the bidding. Petitioners claim that
the public bidding was tainted with haste and arbitrariness and that there was a failed bidding
because there was only one offeror.

Petitioners urge that said Westmont was only given two days to conduct a review PETRON's vast
business operations in order to comply with the technical and financial requirements for pre-
qualification. Petitioners also complain that the pre-qualification and actual bidding were
conducted on the same day, thus denying a disqualified bidder an opportunity to protest or to
appeal. They question the fixing of the floor price on the same day as the public bidding and only
after the bids had been submitted. Likewise, they say that the approval of the bid of ARAMCO by
the Assets Privatization Trust on the same day it is submitted is anomalous.

On the claim that there was a failed bidding, petitioners contend that there were only three bidders.
One of them, PETRONAS, submitted a bid lower than the floor price while a second, failed to pre-
qualify. Citing Section V-2-a of COA Circular No. 89-296 dated January 27, 1989, they argue that
where only one bidder qualifies, there is a failure of public auction.

COA CIRCULAR:

For justifiable reasons and as demanded by the exigencies of the service, disposal thru negotiated
sale may be resorted to and undertaken by the proper committee or body in the agency or entity
concerned taking into consideration the following factors:

a. There was a failure of public auction. As envisioned in this Circular, there is a failure of public
auction in any of the following instances:

1 if there is only one offeror.

In this case, the offer or bid, if sealed, shall not be opened.

2 if all the offers/tenders are non-complying or unacceptable.

A tender is non-complying or unacceptable when it does not comply with the prescribed legal,
technical and financial requirement for pre-qualification.

ISSUE/S: WON there was a failure in the public auction. NO (issue discussed in cruz)

HELD:

Under said COA Circular, there is a failure of bidding when: 1) there is only one offeror; or (2)
when all the offers are non-complying or unacceptable.In the case at bench, there were three
offerors: SAUDI ARAMCO, PETRONAS and WESTMONT.

It was held that if there is only one participating bidder, the bidding is non-competitive and, hence,
falls short of the requirement. There would, in fact, be no bidding at all since, obviously, the lone
participant cannot compete against himself."

The COA itself, the agency that adopted the rules on bidding procedure to be followed by
government offices and corporations, had upheld the validity and legality of the questioned
bidding. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight than
the interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer.

[17] [MACHETE v. CA]

G.R. No. 109093 | November 20, 1995 | Doctrine of primary jurisdiction | BELLOSILLO, J.
| Grefal

Petitioner: LOPE MACHETE, NICASIO JUMAWID, SANTIAGO JUMAWID, JOHN JUMAWID,

PEDRO GAMAYA, RENATO DELGADO, FERNANDO OMBAHIN, MATIAS ROLEDA,
PASIANO BARO, IGNACIO BARO, MAMERTO PLARAS and JUSTINIANO VILLALON
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO VILLALON

Case Doctrine:

FACTS: Private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and
damages before the RTC against petitioners. The complaint alleged that the parties entered into
a leasehold agreement with respect to private respondents’ landholdings in Poblacion Norte,
Carmen, Bohol, under which petitioners were to pay private respondent a certain amount of
percentage of their harvests. However, despite repeated demands, petitioners failed to pay their
respective rentals.

Petitioners maintain that the alleged cause of action of private respondent arose from an agrarian
relation and that respondent appellate court failed to consider that the agreement involved is an
agricultural leasehold contract, hence the dispute is agrarian. The laws governing its execution
and the rights and obligations of the parties are necessarily RA 3844, RA 6657 and other pertinent
agrarian laws. Considering that the application, implementation, and enforcement or interpretation
of said laws and matters which have been vested in DAR, this case is outside the jurisdiction of
the trial court.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Regional Trial Courts are vested with jurisdiction over cases for
collection of back rentals from leasehold tenants. NO

HELD: Section 17 of EO 229 vested DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform except those

RA 6657 was passed containing provisions which evince and support the intention of the
legislature to vest in the DAR exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. Section 50
thereof provides that “The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.”

Section 3, par. (d), thereof defines the term "agrarian dispute" as referring to any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over
lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farm workers' associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.

Consequently, there exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is exclusively
cognizable by the DARAB. The failure of petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold
contract with private respondent is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the
trial court to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate
unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with
an administrative body of special competence.

In Quismundo v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that the resolution by the DAR is to
the best advantage of the parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being
the administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. Further,
the proceedings therein are summary in nature and the department is not bound by the technical
rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be
adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding.

Consequently, let the records of this case be immediately transmitted to the appropriate
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for proper adjudication.

[18] ABEJO VS. DELA CRUZ]

L-63558| May 19, 1987 | Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Prior Resort | Teehankee,
C.J. | Jamilano

Petitioner: SPOUSES JOSE ABE JO AND AURORA ABEJO, TELECTRONIC SYSTEMS, INC.
Respondents: HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
(NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH CLX-PASIG), SPOUSES AGAPITO
BRAGA AND VIRGINIA BRAGA, VIRGILIO BRAGA AND NORBERTO BRAGA
Case Doctrine:

Disputes involving controversies between and among stockholders fall within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC under Section 5 of PD 902-A.

Filing of action for rescission and annulment of sale of stocks before the Regional Trial Court will
in no way deprive the SEC of its primary and exclusive jurisdiction to grant or not the writ of
mandamus ordering the registration of shares so transferred.

Stockholders need not be a registered one before SEC can take cognizance of a suit
seeking to enforce his right as stockholders. There is no requirement that a stockholder
of a corporation must be a registered one in order that the Securities and Exchange
Commission may take cognizance of a suit seeking to enforce his rights as such
stockholder.

SEC by express mandate has "absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all
corporations" and is called upon to enforce the provisions of the Corporation Code.

FACTS:

1. These two cases involve the question of who, between the Regional Trial Court and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the dispute between the principal stockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell Philippines,
Inc. (Pocket Bell).

2. Telectronic Systems Inc. purchased stocks from the spouses Abejos making the former
become the majority stockholder , holding 56% of the outstanding stock and voting power of the
corporation of Pocket Bell (tone and voice paging corporation).

3. Telectronics requested the corporate secretary of the corporation, Norberto Braga, to register
and transfer to its name, and those of its nominees the total 196,000 Pocket Bell shares in the
corporation's transfer book, cancel the surrendered certificates of stock and issue the
corresponding new certificates of stock in its name and those of its nominees. Norberto Braga
refused to register the aforementioned transfer of shares asserting that the Bragas claim
preemptive rights over the 133,000 Abejo shares.

4. Bragas assert that the regular civil court has original and exclusive jurisdiction as against the
Securities and Exchange Commission, while the Abejos claim the contrary. SEC ordered Norberto
Braga, as corporate secretary of Pocket Bell to register in their names the transfer and sale of the
aforesaid 196,000 Pocket Bell shares (of the Abejos and Virginia Braga, cancel the surrendered
certificates as duly endorsed and to issue new certificates in their names.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute between
the principal stockholders of the corporation. - YES

HELD Filing of action for rescission and annulment of sale of stocks before the Regional
Trial Court will in no way deprive the SEC of its primary and exclusive jurisdiction to grant
or not the writ of mandamus ordering the registration of shares so transferred. The claims
of the Bragas, which they assert in their complaint in the Regional Trial Court, praying for
rescission and annulment of the sale made by the Abejos in favor of Telectronics on the ground
that they had an alleged perfected pre-emptive right over the Abejos' shares as well as for
annulment of sale to Telectronics of Virginia Braga's shares covered by street certificates duly
endorsed by her in blank, may in no way deprive the SEC of its primary and exclusive jurisdiction
to grant or not the writ of mandamus ordering the registration of the shares so transferred. The
Bragas' contention that the question of ordering the recording of the transfers ultimately
hinges on the question of ownership or right thereto over the shares notwithstanding, the
jurisdiction over the dispute is clearly vested in the SEC.

Stockholders need not be a registered one before SEC can take cognizance of a suit
seeking to enforce his right as stockholders. There is no requirement that a stockholder
of a corporation must be a registered one in order that the Securities and Exchange
Commission may take cognizance of a suit seeking to enforce his rights as such
stockholder.

SEC by express mandate has "absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations"
and is called upon to enforce the provisions of the Corporation Code, among which is the stock
purchaser's right to secure the corresponding certificate in his name under the provisions of
Section 63 of the Code. Needless to say, any problem encountered in securing the certificates of
stock representing the investment made by the buyer must be expeditiously dealt with through
administrative mandamus proceedings with the SEC, rather than through the usual tedious
regular court procedure. Furthermore, as stated in the SEC order of April 13, 1983, notice given
to the corporation of the sale of the shares and presentation of the certificates for transfer is
equivalent to registration: "Whether the refusal of the (corporation) to effect the same is valid or
not is still subject to the outcome of the hearing on the merits of the case.

[19] [Rajah Lahuy Mining v. Pajares]

No. L-69261| May 13, 1985 | Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Prior Resort | J. Aquino|
Jalandoni
Petitioner: RAJAH LAHUY MINING COMPANY, represented by its President, RICARDO D.
LACUNA, and WEST PACIFIC RICH MINERALS, INC., represented by its President,
SEBASTIAN ORDUNA, II
Respondents: JUDGE JAMES B. PAJARES, Regional Trial Court, Naga City, Branch 19,
RAQUEL ENRIQUEZ y ALVAREZ, MA. RAMONA ARENILLO y ALVAREZ, EMILY STA. ANA y
ALVAREZ and DIRECTOR OF MINES AND GEO-SCIENCES
Case Doctrine: We hold that the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences under its organic law,
Presidential Decree No. 1281, has jurisdiction to determine the compensation payable to the
surface owners. The Regional Trial Court has no authority to make that determination in the first
instance.

FACTS: This case is about the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to fix the compensation due
to the owner of a mineral land for prospecting or exploring therein. Raquel Enriquez, Ma. Ramona
Arenillo and Emily Sta. Ana are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 24
hectares located at Barrio Gata, Lahuy Island, Caramoan, Camarines Sur.On August 23, 1984
they sued in Civil Case No. 84-470 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur Rajah Lahuy
Mining Company and West Pacific Rich Minerals for the payment of just compensation or rental
due to them as surface owners as the sine qua non for the grant of authority to conduct mining
operations on the island.

The instant certiorari and prohibition case was filed by the Lahuy company and Wespar because
Judge Pajares refused to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, lack of jurisdiction, res judicata and prescription.

The SC impleaded the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences who in his comment dated March 18,
1985 confirmed the opinion of the bureau’s senior legal officer, Roberto R, Blanco, and the view
of the petitioners that the issues in Civil Case No. 84-470 are within his jurisdiction, He cited the
pertinent laws and regulations.

Presidential Decree No. 512, which took effect on July 19, 1974, declares prospecting and other
mining operations to be of public use and benefit. It establishes the basis, and prescribes the
rules and procedures, relative to the acquisition and use of surface rights in mineral prospecting,
development and exploitation and gives protection and compensation to surface owners.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences has jurisdiction to determine
the compensation payable to the surface owners. - YES

HELD: Yes, the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences has jurisdiction to determine the
compensation payable to the surface owners. To expedite matters, the complaint of respondents
Raquel Enriquez, et al., of which the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences had already been
furnished, should be indorsed to its Regional Director in the Bicol Region for hearing in
accordance with its Office Circular No. MRD 44, series of 1985.

[20] [Commissioner of Customs v. Navarro]

No. L-33146| May 31, 1977| Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Prior Resort | Fernando, J.|
Gonzales
Petitioner: THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, and THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

Respondents: HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch II (Pasig, Rizal), and JUANITO S. FLORES, doing business under the name and style of
JS. F. ENTERPRISES and ASIATIC INCORPORATED, represented by EUGENIO
VILLANUEVA

Case Doctrine: The question of seizure and forfeiture is for the administrative authorities to
determine, the Collector of Customs in the first instance and then the Commissioner of Customs.
This is a field where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction controls. Thereafter an appeal may be
taken to the Court of Tax Appeals. A court of first instance is thus devoid of competence to act on
the matter.

FACTS: Private respondents Juanito S. Flores and Asiatic Incorporated are importers of 1,350
cartons of fresh fruits which importation was seized by the Bureau of Customs on November 4,
1966. Said importation was classified as non-essential consumer commodities, they are banned
by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289,294 and 295 as prohibited importation or importation contrary
to law and made subject to forfeiture proceedings by Petitioner Bureau of Customs. It was only
on January 12, 1967 that the warrant of seizure and detention was issued. The respondents
contend that the issuance of warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of
jurisdiction over the subject matter on the case. On March 7, 1967 respondent Judge Pedro S.
Navarro issued an order for the release of the articles in question, thus preventing Bureau of
customs from proceeding with the auction sale.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not respondent court acquires jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases
for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code.

HELD: No, the question of seizure and forfeiture is for the administrative in the first instance and
then the commissioner of Customs. This is the field where the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
controls. Thereafter an appeal may be taken to the Court of Tax Appeals. A Court of First Instance
is thus devoid of competence to act on the matter. There is further judicial review, but only by the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its certiorari decision. Consequently, a Collector of Customs
when sitting in forfeiture proceedings constitute a tribunal upon which the law expressly confers
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching the forfeiture and further disposition of
subject matter of such proceedings.

[21] [ENTERPRISES V. CA]

G.R. No. 88550 | April 18, 1990 | Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Prior Resort |
Melencio-Herrera, J. | Maningo

Petitioner: INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC.

Respondents: THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARINDUQUE MINING & INDUSTRIAL

CORPORATION, THE HON. GERONIMO VELASCO, in his capacity as Minister of Energy AND
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

Case Doctrine:In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of
administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the
case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the
proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved,
then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied
by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction. It applies „where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes
into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body;
in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view (United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59, italics
supplied).

FACTS:Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Bureau of
Energy Development (BED), for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. IEI asked
the Ministry of Energy for another to contract for the additional three coal blocks. IEI was advised
that there is another coal operator, Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI and
MMIC signed a Memorandum of Agreement on which IEI will assign all its rights and interests to
MMIC. IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum plus damages against the MMIC and the
Ministry of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC started
operating in the coal blocks prior to finalization of the memorandum. IEI prayed for that the rights
for the operation be granted back. Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant
because they have mortgages in favor of MMIC. It was dismissed. Strangely enough, Mr. Jesus
Cabarrus is President of both IEI and MMIC.
RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and for the reinstatement of the contract in favor
of IEI. CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating that RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter.

ISSUE/S:W/ON RTC has jurisdiction? (NO)

HELD:While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil
contract cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be
rescinded is derived from a coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to
develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal
operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the integrated national
program for coal-development and with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal-
supply-demand balance, IEI's cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the
reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was that in its Decision ordering
the rescission of the Agreement, the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of the
coal-operating contract in IEI's favor and directed the BED to give due course to IEI's application
for three (3) IEI more coal blocks. These are matters properly falling within the domain of the BED.

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in
many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It
may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means
that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative
bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first
be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even
though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case
the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its
view"

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what
coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating
contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative
agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not
have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration,
exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude
an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they
have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative
agency.

[22] United Housing Corporation vs. Dayrit

76422 | JANUARY 22, 1990 | Jurisdiction | Fernan | Valentino
Petitioner: UNITED HOUSING CORPORATION,
Respondents: HON. ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, SPOUSES JOSE M. TAPIA, JR. and LYDIA C.
TAPIA

Case Doctrine:There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an
administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency’s special
expertise.

FACTS:Jose M. Tapia, Jr. bought a lot from United Housing Corporation under a Novated
Contract to Sell a Parcel of Land. Tapia has long fully paid the purchase price of said lot but
Petitioner Corporation has not executed the Absolute Deed of Sale nor transferred the title in favor
of Tapia despite repeated demands.

Tapia filed a complaint against Petitioner Corporation before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). A compromise agreement was arrived later by the parties wherein
Petitioner Corporation promised among others, to deliver the title of the subject lot within two (2)
months from the date of the compromise agreement.

Petitioner Corporation, however, failed to honor its commitment under said compromise
agreement to secure the release of subject title and to deliver the same to the private respondents.

Respondent Tapia moved for the execution of the judgment but was opposed by Petitioner
Corporation. Instead of acting on the motion, the HLURB forwarded the records to the Senior
State Prosecutor for violation by herein petitioner of Section 25 of P.D. 957, consisting in its failure
to deliver the subject title to private respondent and to comply with the Compromise Agreement
submitted by the parties and approved by the Commission.

Having failed to the effect the execution of the judgment upon compromise, private respondents
Spouses Tapia filed a complaint for specific performance with damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.

Later, Petitioner Corporation moved for the dismissal of the aforesaid complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction by virtue of PD 1344, as amended by EO 648. The motion was then dismissed,
hence, this appeal to the S.C.

ISSUE/S:Whether a case of specific performance decided by the HLURB whose decision has
already become final, may be relitigated in the Regional Trial Court on the same issue and
between the same parties. [NO]

HELD:The case of specific performance decided by the HLURB whose decision has already
become final, cannot be relitigated in the Regional Trial Court on the same issue and between
the same parties.

As explicitly provided by law, jurisdiction over actions for specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner or
developer, is vested exclusively in the HLURB. There is no question that a statute may vest
exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies
falling within the agency's special expertise.
Moreover, the S.C. was not oblivious to the stark fact that the parties herein had arrived at a
compromise agreement. No one can dispute that the "essence of compromises, being mutual
concessions by the parties, is to avoid or end litigation. It is therefore a well-settled rule that a
compromise, once approved by final orders of the court has the force of res judicata between the
parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery".

A judgment rendered upon a compromise agreement, not contrary to law or public policy or public
order has all the force and effect of any other judgment, it being a judgment on the merits, hence,
conclusive upon the parties and their privies. As such, it can be enforced by writ of execution.

Thus, under Section 3 of said P.D. 1344, it is specifically provided that: "As soon as the decision
has become final and executory, the HLURB "shall on motion of the interested party, issue a writ
of execution, enforceable in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines"

Upon failure then of the HSRC to act on their motion for execution of the judgment, private
respondents should have instituted mandamus proceedings to compel the HSRC to perform its
purely ministerial duty of enforcing its final and executory decision. For the reasons hereinabove
discussed a new complaint in court for specific performance was untenable.

The undeniable fact is that the Compromise Agreement has long become final and executory. Its
terms can no longer be changed and petitioner cannot seek to defer its execution indefinitely. The
day of reckoning must come soon if justice is to acquire real meaning. To require private
respondents to plead anew before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board for the execution
of the Compromise Agreement would be circuitous and time-consuming. The fairest and most
equitable course to take under the circumstances is to write finis to the controversy between the
parties, who are both within the jurisdiction of the court, by ordering petitioner to perform its
obligation under the long final and executory Compromise Agreement.

[23] [Topical Homes v. NHA]

G.R. No. L-48672 | July 31, 1987 | Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Prior Resort |
Gutierrez, Jr., J | Dula

Petitioner: TROPICAL HOMES, INC.

Respondents: NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, PROVINCE
OF RIZAL, and ARTURO CORDOVA

Case Doctrine:The fact that a law does not specifically provide for judicial review of
administrative decisions affirmed or reversed by the President, does not necessarily preclude
judicial review.

A statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes
and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The very definition of an
administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing
variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the
active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed
in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts.

FACTS:Petitioner Tropical Homes, Inc. entered into a contract with private respondent Arturo P.
Cordova for the sale to the latter of a lot at Better Living Subdivision in Paranaque, Metro Manila.
Cordova was informed through a letter signed by Manuel M. Serrano, executive vice-president
and general manager of the petitioner corporation that the contract was cancelled due to non-
payment of installments for a period of seven (7) months in violation of the contract, particularly
the above-mentioned section. All the earlier payments were considered forfeited in favor of the
corporation as liquidated damages.

Cordova filed a letter-complaint with the Investigating Committee of the Department of Trade
asking for a refund of the total payments he made amounting to P8,627.86. This case was referred
to respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) which, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 957,
was vested with jurisdiction over the said case. NHA ordered the refund to petitioner.

Thereafter P.D. No. 1344 was passed. Section of the said law provides:

Section 2. The decision of the National Housing Authority shall become final and executory after
the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of its receipt. It is appealable only to the President
of the Philippines and in the event the appeal is filed and the decision is not reversed and/or
amended within a period of thirty (30) days, the decision is deemed affirmed. Proof of the appeal
of the decision must be furnished the National Housing Authority.

Petitioner contends that P.D. No. 1344 is unconstitutional on grounds that a) it deprives herein
petitioner access to courts of law and b) the manner of appeal provided for therein is violative of
due process.

ISSUE/S:Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1344 limiting the appeal of NHA decision
decisions only to the President of the Philippines, is constitutional. (Yes)

HELD:The fact that P.D. No. 1344 does not specifically provide for judicial review of NHA
decisions affirmed or reversed by the President, does not necessarily preclude judicial review.

On the issue of "affirmance-by-in action," failure on the part of the President to act upon an appeal
does not necessarily mean that the appealed decision automatically becomes final and executory.
Access to the courts of law may still be made. Therefore, any such decision is far from being final
and executory.

There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an

administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's
special expertise. The very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested
with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to
administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative
agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies
which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts.

Moreover, there is the well-settled principle that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor
of the constitutionality of a statute, for which reason, it will not be set aside as violative of the
constitution except in "clear cases" (People v. Vera, supra).

We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1344 in so far as the vesting of exclusive original jurisdiction
over cases involving the sales of lots in commercial subdivisions to NHA and the mode of appeal
provided therein are concerned, is not unconstitutional.
 [24] [Antipolo Realty v. NHA]
G.R. No. L-50444 | August 31, 1987 | Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction | J. Feliciano | Acain

Petitioner: ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION

Respondents: THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his capacity
as General Manager of the National Housing Authority, THE HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in
his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON

Case Doctrine:

FACTS:
Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the
Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation
under a Contract to Sell.

On 28 August 1974, Hernando transferred his rights over the said lot to private respondent Virgilio
Yuson, embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor. However, for failure of
Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under Clause
17 of the Contract to Sell (subdivision beautification), Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages
pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly
installment payments falling due thereafter.

On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson
advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and
requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr.
Yuson replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth
of the representation in the notice.

In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request, citing the
decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976 in Case No. 252
(entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes, respondent") declaring Antipolo
Realty to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the
Contract to Sell. A formal demand was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of
P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the
period while the improvements were being completed — i.e., between September 1972 and
October 1976.

Yuson refused to pay the September 1972 - October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay
the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell,
and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson.

Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before NHA. Antipolo Realty filed a motion to
dismiss, which NHA denied. After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering
the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell under the conditions of: 1) ARC shall sent Yuson
statement of account for mothly amortizations from November 1976 to present; 2) No penalty
interest shall be charged from November 1976 until the date of issuance of said statement of
account; 3) Yuson shall be given 60 days to pay arrears.

A motion for reconsideration filed by Antipolo Realty was also denied. On October 2, 1978, they
also petitioned for certiorari and certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction, the
same being denied.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the NHA in ordering the reinstatement of the Contract To Sell, acted on a
matter beyond its competence [NO]

HELD:
It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and
perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited
delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission) is
well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and
experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or
specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our
regular courts have remained crowded and clogged.

As provided by Presidential Decree No. 1344, the NHA is empowered to regulate the real estate
trade and business, and has jurisdiction over cases of unsound real estate business practices,
refund claims and those involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations
filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman.

The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of
ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered."

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may
exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an
administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions
of the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency
concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private
parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the
interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a
uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts.
 [25] [GARMENTS and TEXTILE EXPORT BOARD (GTEB) v. CA]
G.R. No. 114711. | February 13, 1997 | Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Prior Resort |
HERMOSISIMA , JR ., J | Maulion

Petitioner: GARMENTS and TEXTILE EXPORT BOARD (GTEB)

Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and AMERICAN INTER-FASHION CORPORATION

Case Doctrine: Citing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the GTEB further argues that being "a
highly specialized administrative agency endowed with regulatory and quasi-judicial powers . . .
it enjoys the fundamental presumption that it has the technical expertise and mastery over such
specialized matters, so much so that its findings as to the latter would ordinarily deserve the
respect of the courts."

FACTS:

1. AIFC was a corporation organized under Philippine Laws engaged in the business of
manufacturing and exporting garments. Prior to its incorporation, the original incorporators
of AIFC were awarded the initial export quota (EQ) allocation by virtue of the resolution of
the Garments & Export Textile Board (GTEB) dated July 30, 1984.
2. Before AIFC's incorporation, Glorious Sun, a corporation organized under Philippine Laws
sometime in 1977, was a recipient of a substantial number of EQ allocations from the
GTEB. On April 27, 1984, Glorious Sun was charged before the GTEB with, and was
found guilty of, misdeclaration of values of its imported raw materials resulting in dollar
salting, and other related frauds, in connection with its importations in 1983.
3. As a result, the EQs of Glorious Sun as well as its license to operate a bonded
manufacturing warehouse were cancelled and its stockholders and officers were
disqualified from engaging in garment exports. Its EQs were thereafter given to two newly-
formed corporations — De Soleil and the herein petitioner American Inter-Fashion
Corporation (AIFC). Glorious Sun continues to claim its rights over the aforementioned
EQ.
4. Glorious Sun filed an appeal with the office of the President (OP), which, in turn, set aside
the GTEB decision adverse to Glorious Sun and remanded the case for genuine hearings
where due process would be accorded both parties. This decision was upheld by the SC.
After finding that 'AIFC was created obviously to be the recipient of export quotas arbitrarily
removed from the rightful owner [Glorious Sun]', SC affirmed the decision of the OP
remanding the case for further proceedings to the GTEB.
5. Pending its appeal to the OP, Glorious Sun filed before the SEC a Petition to Declare the
Forfeiture of the Registration of AIFC. AIFC’s registration was revoked on the ground of
'fraud'. AIFC appealed to the SEC en banc, but the latter upheld the revocation. SC en
banc upheld the cancellation of AIFC’s certificate of registration with finality .
6. GTEB adopted a resolution which states that, among others, “the instant case is hereby
terminated with prejudice; and that the Board, under existing rules, regulations and
policies, is not in a position to restore the balance of the cancelled quotas.”
7. Incidentally, Glorious Sun also filed on September 21, 1992, GTEB Case No. 92-50 for
the cancellation of the subject quotas allotted to AIFC and for restoration of the same to
Glorious Sun. This case has not yet been resolved by GTEB.
8. AIFC requested the GTEB to release its EQ allocation for 1993. This request was,
however, refused by the GTEB in a resolution dated January 11, 1993. This GTEB
resolution was the subject of the petition filed by AIFC before the respondent Judge after
GTEB refused to lift said order. This case prayed for the annulment of GTEB's
aforementioned order, for the issuance of a temporary injunction restraining the
 implementation of said order, and for the immediate release of the regular EQ of AIFC for
1993. A TRO was thereafter issued by respondent Judge on April 13, 1993, enjoining
GTEB from implementing its questioned order and from otherwise delaying the release of
AIFC's EQ entitlement for 1993.
9. On April 7, 1993, AIFC filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule
65 against the GTEB with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, entitled
"American Inter-Fashion Corporation, Petitioner, v. Garments and Textile Export Board,
Respondent" AIFC sought to annul, on the alleged ground of lack of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion, the GTEB's Resolution dated January 11, 1993 deferring AIFC's
request for the release of its 1993 EQs.
10. In its Order dated May 3, 1993, RTC denied AIFC's application for the issuance of the
writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Through its Order dated May 25,
1993, RTC denied AIFC's motion for reconsideration of the May 3, 1993 Order. AIFC filed
with the CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus from the aforementioned Orders of the
trial court.
11. On January 21, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision subject of GTEB's
petition in G.R. No. 114711 in favor of AIFC and AIFC International, annulling the trial
court's Orders of May 3, 1993 and May 25, 1993. Hence, this petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE/S: Whether the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB) have the power and
authority to grant or cancel export quotas or authorizations? YES

HELD:
1. In support of its assertion that it is "the sole entity possessed with the power, jurisdiction
and discretion to grant and disapprove export allocations such as export quotas," the
GTEB makes reference to Executive Order No. 537, as amended, including its
implementing rules and regulations, and the fact that among the functions of the GTEB
therein enumerated are "the approval of export allocations, as well as the monitoring,
administration and regulation thereof." Citing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the GTEB
further argues that being "a highly specialized administrative agency endowed with
regulatory and quasi-judicial powers . . . it enjoys the fundamental presumption that it has
the technical expertise and mastery over such specialized matters, so much so that its
findings as to the latter would ordinarily deserve the respect of the courts."
2. AIFC, on the other hand, argues that inasmuch as none of the powers specified in EO
537, gives the GTEB any judicial powers, nor any specific jurisdiction to hear and decide
actions, as the term is understood under Section 1, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, and
inasmuch as GTEB Case No. 92-50 is such an action between private litigants, the GTEB
has no jurisdiction over said case. To reinforce its argument, AIFC cites our ruling in Globe
Wireless Ltd.v. PSC. In said case, it was held:
"Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the
jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies . . . are limited to those expressly
granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body;
and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective . . ."
3. For its part, Glorious Sun joins the GTEB in the latter's assertion that it is the GTEB which
has the jurisdiction to act and rule on Glorious Sun's petition for the cancellation and
restoration to it of the quotas awarded to AIFC.
4. After examining the arguments raised by all parties concerned, SC found the arguments
of the GTEB and Glorious Sun to be impressed with merit, and accordingly hold that the
power and jurisdiction to adjudicate on the question of AIFC's entitlement to the export
allocations subject of the above-entitled petitions (be they export quotas or export
 authorizations), which includes the discretion to grant and disapprove said export
allocations, belongs solely to the GTEB, and not to the regular courts.
5. It cannot be denied that GTEB Case No. 92-50 was instituted by Glorious Sun for the
purpose of securing the cancellation of EQs then alleged by it as being illegally held by
AIFC. This being the case, it likewise cannot be denied that, as Glorious Sun correctly
observes, such a proceeding is clearly within the ambit of the GTEB's powers, more
specifically, the power granted to it by Section 3 subparagraph (h) of Executive Order No.
537 (as amended by E.O. No. 952) to "cancel or suspend quota allocations, export
authorizations and licenses for the operations of bonded garment manufacturing
warehouses or disqualify the Frm and/or its principal stockholders and officers from
engaging in garment exports and from doing business with the Board," in case of violations
of its rules and regulations.
6. In light of the above, AIFC's reliance on our ruling in Globe Wireless Ltd. v. PSC, is clearly
misplaced. On the basis of the provisions of law cited by both the GTEB and Glorious Sun,
that the power to adjudicate on the question of an entity's entitlement to export allocations
was expressly granted to the GTEB, or at the very least, was necessarily implied from the
power to cancel or suspend quota allocations, is beyond cavil.
7. In addition, SC must take judicial notice of the fact that AIFC, in cases involving the same
controversy as that in the above-entitled petitions, has recognized the exclusive
jurisdiction of the GTEB to award or cancel export allocations to deserving entities.
8. It is the GTEB, and not the regular courts, nor the Court of Appeals, which has the
jurisdiction to adjudicate on the question of AIFC's entitlement to the export
allocations subject to these petitions.

[26] [GSIS v. CSC]

G.R. No. 87146 | December 11, 1991 | Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Prior Resort | J.
Medialdea | Chua

Petitioner: Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)

Respondents: Hon. Civil Service Commission (CSC) and Maria Asuncion Salazar

FACTS: Salazar was employed by GSIS as a casual laborer in 1968. She became a permanent
employee in the same office in 1974 with a designation of stenographer. Thereafter, she was
promoted to Confidential Technical Assistant Aide also under permanent status on December 9,
1975. Salazar’s GSIS Service Record however, revealed that also on the same year, she was
appointed to the position of Confidential Executive Assistant in the office of then GSIS President
and General Manager Roman A. Cruz, Jr. on a permanent status. In 1982, she was promoted to
Technical Assistant III, the position she held when in 1986, her services were terminated by the
newly appointed President and General Manager of the GSIS for the reason that her position was
co-terminous with the term of the appointing authority, Roman Cruz, Jr. Salazar filed a petition for
reconsideration with the GSIS Board of Trustees, but reconsideration was denied. Thereafter, she
filed a petition for reconsideration of the denial with the Review Committee created under
Executive Order No. 17. The said Review Committee referred the petition both to the Merit
Systems Promotion Board and the Civil Service Commission, stating that Salazar's removal or
separation from office was not by virtue of the general re-organization program of the government
for which the Review Committee was created.

CSC - ordered the reinstatement of Salazar

The Board, referred to it by the Review Committee - affirmed her termination and Salazar’s
reinstatement was without merit.
Then, Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration of the Board's order and manifested that the
Commission already resolved her petition on July 22, 1987. On June 30, 1988. the Board set
aside its previous Order affirming Salazar's dismissal in view of the Commission's prior resolution
of the case. The Civil Service Commission is a higher administrative appellate body on matters
concerning the removal of officers and employees from the service. Hence, the Board cannot in
any manner modify or alter the determinations and actions of the Civil Service Commission.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the respondent Civil Service Commission erred in not holding that it
was the Merit Systems Board, not said Commission, which had appellate jurisdiction over the
subject personal action of termination of services of private respondent

HELD: It is the contention of GSIS that it is the Merit Systems Protection Board, not the
respondent Civil Service Commission that is vested with jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
appealed to it by those aggrieved by personnel actions of appointing authorities. It is not disputed
that ..., the Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests
relating to the Civil Service ..." There is however a need to clarify the jurisdiction of the
Commission in relation to the Merit Systems Board.

One of the relevant laws issued during the past regime is Presidential Decree No. 1409, creating
the Merit Systems Board. Under Sec. 5 of P.D. 1409 the Merit Systems Board has, inter alia, the
following powers and functions: (2) Hear and decide cases brought before it by officers and
employees who feel aggrieved by the determination of appointing authorities involving
appointment, promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment and other personnel actions, as well as
complaints against any officers in the government arising from abuses arising from personnel
actions of the these officers or from violations of the merit system. (emphasis supplied)

The public respondent Civil Service Commission had long recognized and implemented said
provision of P.D. 1409. In 1978, it issued Memorandum Circular No. 6 where it expressly stated:
As provided in Presidential Decree No. 1409, which amended Presidential Decree No. 807, the
heads of ministries and agencies, on the one hand, and the Merit Systems Board on the other,
have concurrent original jurisdiction over disciplinary and non-disciplinary cases and, where the
heads of ministries and agencies assume jurisdiction first, their decisions and determinations are
appealable to the Merit Systems Board. The Civil Service Commission, however, remains the
final administrative appellate body in these matters, as provided in Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 1409 ...

When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be
proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies
have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Presidential Decree No. 1409 clearly provides that
the Merit Systems Board shall take cognizance of appeals from parties aggrieved by decisions of
appointing officers involving personnel action. The Commission therefore cannot take original
cognizance of the cases specified under Section 5 of P.D. 1409, except in the case specified
under Section 9 (j) of the Civil Service Decree which directly gives it such power, to wit:

SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall administer the
Civil Service Commission and shall have the following powers and functions: j) Hear and decide
administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought
to it on appeal.
If the Commission were vested with the authority to take original cognizance of all matters
involving government personnel, P.D. 1409 would appear to be a mere surplusage as the
rationale for the existence of the Merit Systems Protection Board would be rendered meaningless
and inutile. This is not the intention of the law creating the Board.

In the case at bar, We note that the appeal of Salazar was endorsed by the Review Committee
created under Executive Order No. 17 to both the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service
Commission. In the absence of a decision from the Merit Systems Board, the Commission cannot
legally assume jurisdiction over the appeal. Hence, its decision (Resolution No. 87230) in favor
of Salazar dated July 22, 1987 and all subsequent resolutions of the Commission in this case are
void. Likewise, the Order of the Board dated June 30, 1988, setting aside its previous order
upholding the termination of Salazar in deference to the Commission's final appellate jurisdiction
over the matter, is null and void. Jurisdiction is vested by law and is not lost nor be legally
transferred by voluntary surrender in favor of a body not vested by law with such jurisdiction.

[27] [SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC AND PILIPINO CORPORATION (PITEL) VS/

NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC)]
Docket No. 151908 & 152063| August 12, 2003 | Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction | Ynares-
Santiago | Lim

Petitioner: Smart Communications, Inc., Pilipino Telephone Corporation, Globe Telecom,

Inc. and Isla Communications Co.
Respondents: National Telecommunication Commission (NTC)

Case Doctrine: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency
exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes,
the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence
pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it
should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined
some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It
applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has
been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

FACTS: Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating
rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. On August 30, 2000, the NTC
issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained
measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. This
was followed by another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 addressed to all public
telecommunications entities, which reads: This is to remind you that the validity of all prepaid
cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least two (2) years from date of
first use pursuant to MC 13-6-2000. In addition, all CMTS operators are reminded that all SIM
packs used by subscribers of prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond shall be valid
for at least two (2) years from date of first use. Also, the billing unit shall be on a six (6) seconds
pulse effective 07 October 2000.

On October 20, 2000, petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone
Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph
A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C.
Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the
Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The complaint was docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-00-42221 at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77.

Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, inter alia, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the
sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the
Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing
Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against
deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment
of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of
the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers
and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular
be declared null and void ab initio.

In the meantime, respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of petitioners’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

ISSUE:Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies in this case.

HELD: In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative
agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized
disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special
competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior
to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it
should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined
some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It
applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has
been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued
by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of
rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within
the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.

Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. Q-00-42221.
The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court and in dismissing the case.

[28] [PT & T Corp. v. Smart.]

G.R. No. 189026| November, 9, 2016 | Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction | Jardeleza |
Feraren

Petitioner: Philippine Telegraph Telephone Corp.

Respondents: Smart Communications, Inc.

Case Doctrine: With regard to access charge arrangements between two public
telecommunication entities the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the
primary jurisdiction to hear and settle the controversy over the RTC.

FACTS:

Since 1979, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has been in charge of
regulating the telecommunications industry. The Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the
Philippines (RA 7925) gave the NTC the authority to approve or adopt access charge
arrangements between two public telecommunication entities. The issues here are whether the
NTC has primary jurisdiction over questions involving access charge stipulations in a bilateral
agreement, and whether regular courts can restrain the NTC from reviewing the negotiated
access charges. c

Petitioner Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation (PT&T) and respondent Smart
Communications, Inc. (Smart) entered into an Agreement for the interconnection of their
telecommunication facilities.

The Agreement provided for the interconnection of Smart's Cellular Mobile Telephone System
(CMTS), Local Exchange Carrier (LEC) and Paging services with PT&T's LEC service. Starting
1999, however, PT&T had difficulty meeting its financial obligations to Smart.

Thus, on November 28, 2003, the parties amended the Agreement, which extended the payment
period and allowed PT&T to settle its obligations on installment basis.

The amended Agreement also specified, among others, that Smart's access charge to PT&T
would increase from P1.00 to P2.00 once PT&T's unpaid balance reaches P4 Million and that
PT&T's access charge to Smart would be reduced from P8.69 to P6.50. Upon full payment,
PT&T's access charge would be further reduced to P4.50.

On April 4, 2005, Smart sent a letter informing PT&T that it increased the access charge from
P1.00 to P2.00 starting April 1, 2005 in accordance with the amended Agreement. However, on
September 2, 2005, PT&T sent a letter to Smart claiming that the latter overcharged PT&T on
outbound calls to Smart's CMTS.

Thereafter, PT&T filed a letter-complaint with the NTC raising the issue that the access charges
imposed by Smart were allegedly "discriminatory and not in conformity with those of other carriers.
In response the NTC ordered Smart and PT&T to attend mediation conferences in order to thresh
out the issues.

But before the parties were able to submit the pleadings, Smart filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City (RTC) against PT&T, which the RTC later granted.

In its answer, PT&T sought for the dismissal of the civil case on the grounds of non-observance
of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the NTC has the primary jurisdiction to settle their case and not the
RTC. (YES)

HELD:

Yes the NTC (National Telecommunications Commission) has the primary jurisdiction and not the
RTC.

While it is true that regional trial courts, as courts of general jurisdiction, can take cognizance of
cases that are incapable of pecuniary estimation-including actions for breach of contract and
damages-the fact that the interconnection agreement between Smart and PT&T involved access
charges warrants a more nuanced analysis.

R.A. 7925 or the Public Telecommunications Policy Act gave the NTC the authority to approve
or adopt access charge arrangements between two public telecommunication entities. Section 18
of the law states that:

In adopting or approving an access charge formula or revenue sharing agreement between two or more
carriers, the Commission shall ensure equity, reciprocity and fairness among the parties concerned.
In so approving the rates for interconnection between the telecommunications carriers, the
Commission shall take into consideration the costs of the facilities needed to complete the
interconnection…

This law mandates that any agreement pertaining to access charges must be submitted to the
NTC for approval; in case the parties fail to agree, the matter shall be resolved by the NTC.

Therefore, the Agreement should have been submitted to the NTC for its review and approval in
accordance with the second paragraph of Section 18. Conspicuously, however, neither Smart nor
PT&T claims that the access charges in the Agreement have been submitted to, much less
approved, by the NTC. This further justifies the intervention of the NTC.

The mere fact that Smart and PT&T negotiated and executed a bilateral interconnection
agreement does not take their stipulations on access charges out of the NTC's regulatory reach.

A contrary ruling would severely limit the NTC's ability to discharge its twin mandates of protecting
consumers and promoting consumer welfare, and would go against the trend towards greater
delegation of judicial authority to administrative agencies in matters requiring technical
knowledge.

[29] [VIVENCIO, EUGENIO, JOJI AND MYRNA, ALL SURNAMED MATEO, Petitioners VS
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
MARIANO T. RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. )]
Docket No. 186339| February 17,2015 | Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction | Reyes| Arellano

CASE DOCTRINE: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on
matters demanding the special competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are
at the same time within the jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its determination the
expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of some administrative board or commission because
it involves technical matters or intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an
appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts although
the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The application of the doctrine does not call
for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its suspension until after the matters within
the competence of the administrative body are threshed out and determined.

FACTS: [The Mateos] were the registered owners of [coconut and rice lands] with [a total area]
of 1,323,112 square meters situated at Fabrica, Bacon, Sorsogon and [were] covered by TCT No.
T-22822. A portion of the land[s] was brought under the coverage of the [CARP] of the government
and for this reason[,] the [DAR] entered the premises sometime in June 1994. [LBP] valued [the
Mateos'] land at fifty-two thousand pesos (₱52,000.00) per [ha]. [The Mateos,] however[,] rejected
the LBP's valuation. On April 30, 1997, [the Mateos] filed a complaint against LBP, [DAR], and
the farmer beneficiaries of the land for just compensation. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 97-6331 and raffled to the [SAC], presided by respondent Judge Honesto A. Villamor.

The LBP and DAR filed their respective answers arguing that since no summary administrative
proceedings to determine the amount of just compensation had been conducted yet, the
complaint of Mateos was premature. Pre-trial ensued and was terminated. The SAC granted the
request of the parties for the appointment of two commissioners.

Ruling of the SAC: Under R.A. No. 6657, it provides that in determining the just compensation,
the initial determination thereof may be agreed upon by the [LBP], the official entity made
responsible under Executive Order No. 405, series of 1990 to determine the valuation and
compensation of agricultural landholdings made under the coverage of the CARP and the
[l]landowner. In the event of disagreement, the matter is referred to the DAR Adjudication Board
for further determination. If no agreement is reached, the landowner may elevate the matter for
judicial determination.The land was initially valued the property for an aggregate amount of 2.9M
but this was rejected by the petitioners. After due consideration,the SAC adopted the valuation
provided by Engr. Dino amounting to 71Million.

LBP and the DAR filed an appeal before CA, the former argued that the complaint of the Mateo
was premature as the DARAB has not yet made an administrative valuation of the property and
the SAC has failed to consider the guidelines in determining just compensation.

The C.A dismissed and set aside the decision of the RTC, the ratio, to wit:

Since the DARAB is clothed with quasi-judicial authority to make a preliminary

determination of just compensation of lands acquired under R.A. No. 6657, x x x and it appearing
from the records and [the Mateos'] own admission that [the] said administrative agency had not
yet taken cognizance of, and passed upon the issue of just compensation when [the Mateos]
prematurely filed with the court a quo the complaint for determination of just compensation, thus
failing to exhaust the prescribed administrative remedy and, in the process, preventing the
DARAB from complying with [the] said administrative process which is mandatory

Aggrieved, Mateos filed an appeal before the S.C

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in negating the jurisdiction of the RTC, as a SAC, to
determine in the first instance and in the absence of the conduct of prior administrative
proceedings, questions of just compensation to be paid to landowners.
HELD: YES. Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, in part, provides that the DAR is vested with ''primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters" and "exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform" except those falling
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources.

Section 57, on the other hand, confers "special" and "original and exclusive" jurisdiction to the
SAC over all petitions of landowners for the determination of just compensation. In San Miguel
Properties, Inc. v. Perez, we explained the reasons why Congress, in its judgment, may choose
to grant primary jurisdiction over matters within the erstwhile jurisdiction of the courts, to an
agency: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction bas been increasingly called into play on matters
demanding the special competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the
same time within the jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its determination the
expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of some administrative board or commission because
it involves technical matters or intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an
appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts although
the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The application of the doctrine does not call
for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its suspension until after the matters within
the competence of the administrative body are threshed out and determined.

Belista and Heirs of Vidad as bases to show that SACs possess original and exclusive jurisdiction
to determine just compensation, regardless of prior exercise by the DAR of its primary jurisdiction
which acknowledge the grant of primary jurisdiction to the DAR, subject to judicial review.

Considering the validity of the grant of primary jurisdiction, our ruling in Heirs of Vidad should also
be reconciled with the rationale behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In this sense, neither
landowner nor agency can disregard the administrative process provided under the law without
offending the already established doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

In finality, the case of Alfonso is unequivocal that administrative remedies cannot be dispensed
with and direct resort to the SAC is proscribed. However, the foregoing rule cannot be applied in
the case at bar for reasons discussed: while the Court recognizes the primacy of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies in our judicial system, it bears emphasizing that the
principle admits of exceptions, among which is when there is unreasonable delay or official
inaction that irretrievably prejudices a complainant. This exception is attendant herein where the
LBP and the DAR entered the property of the Mateos sometime in 1994, but deposited cash and
Agrarian Reform Bonds as payment therefor only on December 13, 1996 and February 11, 1997.
The LBP and the DAR were indisputably aware that the Mateos rejected the price offered as just
compensation for the subject property. Still, at the time the Mateos filed their suit before the SAC,
no summary administrative proceeding was yet initiated by the DAR to make further valuation.
The SAC even had to issue no less than three orders dated November 12, 1997, January 7, 1998
and March 18, 1998 for the DAR to conduct the necessary proceedings.DAR's delay and inaction
had unjustly prejudiced the Mateos and precluding them from filing a complaint before the SAC
shall result in an injustice, which the law never intends. It bears stressing as well that on December
21, 2000 and March 22, 2001, while trial before the SAC was underway, the DARAB rendered
decisions in the summary administrative proceedings upholding the valuations previously made
by the LBP and rejected by the Mateos.At that point, referring the case back :to the DAR would
have been completely moot as any challenge raised against the valuation shall be cognizable by
the SAC. Clearly, there were no more administrative remedies to exhaust. The C.A erred in
dismissing the Mateos claim.
 [30] [Roxas &Co vs Court of Appeals]

GR No. 127876| December 17, 1999 | Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Prior Resort |
Puno | Mansilla

Petitioners: Roxas & Co. Inc

Respondents: Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)

Doctrine: Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.

Facts: Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three
haciendas (Palico, Banilad, and Caylaway). During the incumbency of Corazon Aquino, she
signed the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) and Executive Order 229 providing the
mechanisms to implement the program. Before the effectivity of the said law, petitioner filed with
respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O.
No. 229. Petitioner then informed DAR that it was withdrawing its Voluntary Offer to Sell and
applying for the conversion of the hacienda from agricultural to other uses but was denied.
Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent
DAR in accordance with the CARL.

Petitioner reiterated its request to withdraw the voluntary offer to sell claiming that there was a
certification from Department of Agriculture that said lands are not feasible and economically
sound for further agricultural development, and several resolutions from the LGU approving the
reclassification of the lands.

Petitioner instituted a case with respondent DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for the
cancellation of Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued by DAR in the name of
several persons. Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are
located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the land is not suitable for agricultural production,
and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land to non-agricultural.

Respondent DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of whether the property
was subject to agrarian reform, hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination.

Petitioner then filed with Court of Appeals questioning the expropriation of its properties under the
CARL and the denial of due process in the acquisition of its landholdings but the petition was
dismissed by Court of Appeals.

Issue:
1. Whether the court can take cognizance of the petition (yes)
2. Whether the acquisition proceedings by DAR was valid (no)
3. Whether the court could take cognizance of the conversion proceedings (no, case
remanded to DAR)

Held:
Exhaustion of administrative remedy
As a general rule, before a party may be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice,
he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress. This is not absolute,
however. There are instances when judicial action may be resorted to immediately. Among these
exceptions are: (1) when the question raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body is
in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for
judicial intervention; (5) when the respondent acted in disregard of due process; (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the
implied or assumed approval of the latter; (7) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (8) when
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (9) when strong public interest is involved;
(10) when the subject of the controversy is private land; and (11) in quo warranto proceedings.

Petitioner rightly sought immediate redress in the courts. There was a violation of its rights and to
require it to exhaust administrative remedies before the DAR itself was not a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy.

The Validity of the Acquisition Proceedings Over the Haciendas. (proceedings were
defective)

Petitioner allegation of lack of due process goes into the validity of the acquisition proceedings
themselves.

For a valid implementation of the CAR program, two notices are required: (1) the Notice of
Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the
representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to
DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under
Section 16 of the CARL.

In the case at bar, respondent DAR claims that it, through MARO Leopoldo C. Lejano, sent a
letter of invitation entitled "Invitation to Parties" dated September 29, 1989 to petitioner
corporation, through Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of Hacienda Palico.

Jaime Pimentel (receiver of the notice) is not the president, manager, secretary, cashier or
director of petitioner corporation.

Petitioner's evidence does not show the official duties of Jaime Pimentel as administrator of
petitioner's haciendas. The evidence does not indicate whether Pimentel's duties is so integrated
with the corporation that he would immediately realize his responsibilities and know what he
should do with any legal papers served on him. At the time the notices were sent and the
preliminary conference conducted, petitioner's principal place of business was listed in
respondent DAR's records as "Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes, Manila," and "7th Flr. Cacho-
Gonzales Bldg., 101 Aguirre St., Makati, Metro Manila." Pimentel did not hold office at the principal
place of business of petitioner. Neither did he exercise his functions in Plaza Cervantes, Manila
nor in Cacho-Gonzales Bldg., Makati, Metro Manila. He performed his official functions and
actually resided in the haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas, a place over two hundred kilometers
away from Metro Manila.

Nevertheless, assuming that Pimentel was an agent of petitioner corporation, and the notices and
letters of invitation were validly served on petitioner through him, there is no showing that Pimentel
himself was duly authorized to attend the conference meeting with the MARO, BARC and LBP
representatives and farmer beneficiaries for purposes of compulsory acquisition of petitioner's
landholdings. Even respondent DAR's evidence does not indicate this authority. On the contrary,
petitioner claims that it had no knowledge of the letter-invitation, hence, could not have given
Pimentel the authority to bind it to whatever matters were discussed or agreed upon by the parties
at the preliminary conference or public hearing. Notably, one year after Pimentel was informed of
the preliminary conference, DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued and this required that the
Notice of Coverage must be sent "to the landowner concerned or his duly authorized
representative."

The Conversion of the three Haciendas (Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve
petitioner's application for conversion)

Petitioners claim that the three haciendas are not subject to agrarian reform because they have
been declared for tourism, not agricultural purposes, due to President Marcos Proclamation 1520
declaring the municipality of Nasugbu Batangas a tourist zone. Petitioner claims that Proclamation
1520 was also upheld by DAR when it approved conversion of 1.8k hectares in Nasugbu as a
tourist area.

We do not agree, respondent DAR's failure to observe due process in the acquisition of
petitioner's landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over
petitioner's application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. The
agency charged with the mandate of approving or disapproving applications for conversion is the
DAR.

At the time petitioner filed its application for conversion, the Rules of Procedure governing the
processing and approval of applications for land use conversion was the DAR A.O. No. 2, Series
of 1990. Under this A.O., the application for conversion is filed with the MARO where the property
is located.

Applications for conversion were initially governed by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1990 entitled
"Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands and Non-
Agricultural Uses," and DAR A.O. No. 2, Series of 1990 entitled "Rules of Procedure Governing
the Processing and Approval of Applications for Land Use Conversion." These A.O.'s and other
implementing guidelines, including Presidential issuances and national policies related to land
use conversion have been consolidated in DAR A.O. No. 07, Series of 1997.

Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority
to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body
of special competence. Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner's application
for conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The
power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence,
exempt from the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this Court.

The failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition
proceedings does not give this court the power to nullify the CLOA’s already issued to the farmer
beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short circuit the administrative process, which has yet to
run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses
in the acquisition proceedings.

[31] [Jariol v. COMELEC]

G.R. No. 127456 | March 20, 1997 | Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies |
DAVIDE, JR. J. | Merle

Petitioner: JESUS A. JARIOL

Respondents: COMELEC
Case Doctrine:The COMELEC performed a purely administrative function when it promulgated
Resolution No. 2879. A party aggrieved thereby must not merely initiate the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also must pursue it to its appropriate conclusion
before seeking judicial intervention in order to give that administrative agency an opportunity to
decide the matter by itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.
This is the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.

FACTS:The case is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul
and set aside Resolution No. 2879 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of 12 December
1996, which adopted the calendar of activities for the recall election of the Mayor, Vice Mayor and
six (6) members of Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Basilisa, Province of Surigao del
Norte, and scheduled said recall election on 25 January 1997.

Petitioners, as the officials sought to be recalled, submit that:

1. Not all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly were notified of the meeting for
the recall of said municipal officials;
2. The notice of the meeting did not state the purpose thereof, much less, that it was for the
recall of the Mayor, Vice Mayor and six Sangguniang Bayan members;
3. The meeting was not open to the public, but behind closed doors; and
4. The recall election is scheduled on January 25, 1997, within one year immediately
preceding a regular election of barangay officials in May, 1997.

The Office of the Solicitor General then urges us to dismiss the petition because: (a) of
prematurity, since petitioners had not asked the COMELEC to reconsider Resolution No.
2879; (b) it raises factual issues which are not proper subjects of a petition for certiorari; and (c)
the barangay election on 12 May 1997 will not bar the recall election in question in light of our
decision in Paras v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 123169, 4 November 1996) where we
held that the regular election referred to in Section 74(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991
refers to the election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will
be contested and be filled by the electorate, which is not the barangay election on 12 May 1997,
but the election for Mayor, Vice Mayor and members of the SB in May of 1998.

As regards the claim of COMELEC that petitioners should have first contested the factual findings
of the PRA before the COMELEC instead of filing this petition, petitioners allege that "they did not
have enough opportunity to do so" for the challenged resolution was promulgated on 12
December 1996 and the recall election was scheduled on 25 January 1997. Further, the
Resolution was first published only on 20 December 1996, and petitioners only learned of this the
following day in Surigao City as no newspapers are circulated in Basilisa, and the copy of the
resolution sent to petitioners was delivered to petitioner Jariol on or about 3 January 1997

ISSUE/S: Whether the petition should be dismissed? Yes.

HELD: After due deliberation on the arguments adduced in the foregoing pleadings, we resolved
to DISMISS this petition for prematurity and for petitioner's failure to sufficiently show that
respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course
to the recall petition and in promulgating Resolution No. 2879.

As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, if petitioners were unsatisfied with
the findings of the COMELEC, they should have first moved for reconsideration before filing this
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioners were fully
aware of the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The COMELEC performed a purely administrative function when it promulgated Resolution No.
2879. A party aggrieved thereby must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure
to obtain relief, but also must pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial
intervention in order to give that administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself
correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court. This is the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies. A motion for reconsideration then is a pre-requisite to the
viability of a special civil action for certiorari, unless the party who avails of the latter can
convincingly show that his case falls under any of the following exceptions to the rule: (1) where
the question is purely legal, (2) where judicial intervention is urgent, (3) where its application may
cause great and irreparable damage, (4) where the controverted acts violate due process, (5)
failure of a high government official from whom relief is sought to act on the matter, and (6) when
the issue for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.

In the instant case, the only reason advanced by petitioner was lack of "enough opportunity to do
so." We disagree. Petitioner first learned of the promulgation of the Resolution on 21 December
1996 through the 20 December 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin and formally received a copy of
the Resolution on 3 January 1997. They had sufficient time to file a motion for its reconsideration
since the recall election was scheduled on 25 January 1997. Instead of filing this petition on 6
January 1997, petitioners should have first filed a motion for reconsideration.

[32] [Carale vs Abarintos]

GR No. 120704 | March 3, 1997 | Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies | Davide |
Brubio

Petitioner: HON. BARTOLOME C. CARALE, Chairman, National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC), HON. IRENEA A. CENIZA,Presiding Commissioner, Fourth Division, NLRC, and
HON.REYNOSO A. BELARMINO, Executive Labor Arbiter, Regional Arbitration Branch, Region
VII
Respondents: HON. PAMPIO A. ABARINTOS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
22,Cebu City, and FERDINAND V. PONTEJOS

Case Doctrine: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies;Non-exhaustion of administrative

remedies is not jurisdictional—it only renders the action premature, i.e., the claimed cause of
action is not ripe for judicial determination and for that reason a party has no cause of action to
ventilate in court.—The motions to dismiss separately filed in the trial court by petitioners Carale
and Presiding Commissioner Ceniza were principally anchored on lack of jurisdiction due to the
failure of Pontejos to exhaust administrative remedies. Obviously, the petitioners failed to
appreciate that non exhaustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional. It only renders the
action premature,i.e., claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination and for that
reason a party has no cause of action to ventilate in court. Their motions to dismiss must then be
understood to be based on: (a) lack of jurisdiction; and (b) lack of cause of action for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.

The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the
presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the
matter, will decide the same correctly.
FACTS: Pontejos was issued an original and permanent appointment dated January 10, 1989 as
“Labor and Employment Development Officer (RAB VII)” in the NLRC. In 1992, the aforesaid
position was reclassified as “Labor Arbitration Associate”.

Petitioner Chairman of the NLRC, issued Administrative Order No. 10-03 series of 1994,
detailing/reassigning private respondent to the NLRC, Fourth Division, Cebu City, effective
October 17,1994.Similar personnel actions, prior to and after Pontejos’ reassignment to NLRC,
Cebu City, were also effected by petitioner Carale pursuant to his exercise of administrative
authority and supervision over all NLRC officials and employees.

Private respondent filed a complaint before the RTC of Cebu City against herein petitioners for
Illegal Transfer with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction with Damages.

Motions to dismiss dated November 8, 1994 and November15, 1994, were respectively filed by
petitioner Ceniza and Carale, arguing that it is the Civil Service Commissionwhich has exclusive
jurisdiction over any question concerning personnel movement.

Respondent judge issued the first questioned order denying petitioners’ Motions to Dismiss
Holding that alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies before “where the surrounding
circumstances of the matter before this Court indicate an urgency of judicial intervention”.

ISSUE/S: Whether the Respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to review the validity of the transfer
order issued by the chairman of NLRC since the controversy is within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the civil service?

HELD: The motions to dismiss separately filed in the trial court by petitioners Carale and Presiding
Commissioner Ceniza were principally anchored on lack of jurisdiction due to the failure of
Pontejos to exhaust administrative remedies. Obviously, the petitioners failed to appreciate that
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional. It only renders the action
premature, i.e., the claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination and for that reason
a party has no cause of action to ventilate in court. Their motions to dismiss must then be
understood to be based on: (a) lack of jurisdiction; and (b) lack of cause of action for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.

Observance of the mandate regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is a sound practice

and policy. It ensures an orderly procedure which favors a preliminary sifting process,particularly
with respect to matters peculiarly within the competence of the administrative agency, avoidance
of interference with functions of the administrative agency by withholding judicial action until the
administrative process had run its course, and prevention of attempts to swamp the courts by a
resort to them in the first instance.The underlying principle of the rule rests on the presumption
that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide
the same correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for this principle. The
Administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and more speedy solutions to
disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review, and
provides a system of administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the courts, for reasons of law,
comity and convenience, will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies
have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and
correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.
Accordingly, the party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before
seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide
the matter by itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.

In the instant case, Pontejos did not attempt to seek administrative relief, which was both available
and sufficient.Initially, he could have asked for reconsideration of the detail order,failing which, he
could have gone directly to the CSC, through theMSPB, which is empowered to:

(2) Hear and decide cases brought before it by offices and employees who feel aggrieved
by the determination of appointing authorities involving . . .transfer, detail, reassignment and other
personnel actions, as well as complaints against any officers in the government arising from
personnel actions of these officers or from violations of the merit system.
Nothing in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-16671 convince us that Pontejos ever
thought of pursuing the available administrative remedies. Neither do we find sufficient basis for
his invocation of the exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. What he
offered were nothing but vague and general averments that could best qualify as motherhood
statements. Further, they were unsupported by allegations of fact or law which would prima facie
bring his case within any of the accepted exceptions to the rule, namely: (1) where the question
is purely legal, (2) where judicial intervention is urgent, (3) when its application may cause great
and irreparable damage, (4) where the controverted acts violate due process, (5) failure of a high
government official from whom relief is sought to act on the matter,and (6) when the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
 [33] [UP vs. CATUNGAL]
GR No. 121863| May 05, 1997 | Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies-
General Rule | Davide Jr., J. | Ruth Tan
Petitioner: University of the Philippines, Chancellor Roger Posadas, Vice Chancellor Rolando
Dayco, Vice Chancellor Martin Gregorio, Prof. Arturo Balbastro, Prof. Cecilia Florencio, Prof.
Leticia Penañ O-Ho
Respondents: Hon. Elpidio Catungal Jr., Hon. Oscar Herrera Jr., Hon. Pedro Areola, Salvador
Carlos
Case Doctrine: The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass
up on the matter, will decide the same correctly. The courts- for reason of law, comity, and
convenience- will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been
resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given the opportunity to act and correct
errors committed in the administrative forum

FACTS:In 1994, RTC Quezon City issued a search warrant against Carlos, a UP professor, after
3 of his students alleged that Carlos threatened them with a gun to have sex with them, and then
took nude photos of them.

In the search, the police confiscated the following: unlicensed caliber revolver, bullets,
pornographic materials, and sexual paraphernalia. Hence, Carlos was detained at the QC jail.

Thereafter, Dayco ordered a preliminary investigation from Atty. Lambino of UPD Legal Office.
Atty Lambino confirmed that a prima facie case existed and recommended that Carlos be charged
with grave misconduct and be placed under preventive suspension for 90 days.

A formal charge for grave misconduct was filed against Carlos, and a tribunal was constituted to
hear the case.

After several postponements, walkouts, failures to appear before the Tribunal, the latter finally
submitted a report to Posadas stating that they found Carlos guilty of grave misconduct and
recommended the penalty of his dismissal.

However, while the case was still pending in the tribunal and before it released the report to
Posadas, unknown to it, Carlos filed a complaint for injunction before RTC QC praying for the
Tribunal to cease and desist from proceeding with the administrative case. He alleges that he
opted to seek immediate judicial redress, since the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was inapplicable to him, considering that any appeal before the Tribunal would have
been futile.

RTC issued a TRO against the Tribunal and subsequently granted a writ of preliminary injunction
which directed the Tribunal to refrain from proceeding with the administrative case.

Upon appeal to SC, the latter issued a TRO enjoining the respondents from implementing their
orders.

Thereafter, Posadas issued an order adopting in toto the findings and recommendation of the
Tribunal.

Hence, petitioners filed the present special civil action to secure the nullification of the orders of
the respondent judges.
ISSUE/S: W/N the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was correctly raised by
Carlos. (NO)

HELD: NO. The doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies will not apply when the
question to be resolved is purely legal or when the administrative action from which relief is sought
is patently illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive, or when the exhaustion of administrative remedies
would result in irreparable damage. An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin
includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which produce hurt,
inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate
standard of measurement. An irreparable injury to authorize an injunction consists of a “serious
charge of, or is destructive to the property it affects, wither physically or in the character in which
it has been held and enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its
pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss thereof.
In the present case, Carlos was able to participate at the preliminary conference, agreed to the
matters therein taken up, attended the hearings and cross-examined a witness. Thus, it is deemed
that he had waived any legal issue which he initially raised. Furthermore, the acts of the tribunal
was due to Carlo’s and his counsel’s faults. Hence, it could not be said that the Tribunal’s action
was illegal, arbitrary, or oppressive.

Hence, Carlo’s immediate recourse to the court was effectively barred by his failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.

[34] [Paat vs CA]

G.R. No. 111107 | January 10, 1997 | Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies |
Torres | Mansilla
Petitioners: Leonardo Paat (OIC, Regional 2), Jovito Layugan (Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer)
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Victoria de Guzman

Doctrine: If a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be
sought.

Facts: The truck of respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR while on its way
from Bulacan to San Jose because the driver could not produce the required documents for the
forest products concealed in the truck.

Layugan issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15 days to explain why
the truck should not be forfeited but the respondents failed to submit such explanation. DENR
regional executive sustained the action of confiscation. Respondents filed a letter of
reconsideration but was denied. Petitioners then brought the case to the Secretary of DEN\R
pursuant to the respondent’s statement in their letter that in the case that their letter would be
denied, “this letter should be considered an appeal to the secretary”. Pending resolution, a suit
for replevin was filed by the respondents against the petitioners with RTC Cagayan which issued
a writ ordering the return of the truck to the respondents. Petitioners then filed a certiorari with
Court of Appeals which sustained the trial court’s order ruling that the question involved is purely
a legal question.

Issue: Whether the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck
was under administrative seizure proceedings, invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. (no)

Held: This court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative process afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can
still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s
cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case is susceptible of
dismissal for lack of cause of action.

However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of remedies is not an
ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and
uniqueness of factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded when:
1. There is a violation of due process
2. When the issue involved is purely a legal question
3. When the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
4. When there is estoppel on the part of administrative agency concerned
5. When there is irreparable injury
6. When the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter
7. When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable
8. When it would amount to a nullification of a claim
9. When the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings
10. When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
11. When there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention

In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the secretary of
DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for
reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of
reconsideration, private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to
which they seek to avail, as they did avail in the resolution of their case.

By appealing to the Secretary, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy
still available and open to them in the ordinary course of law, thus, they cannot now, without
violating the principle of exhaustion of remedy, seek court’s intervention by filing an action for
replevin for the grant of relief during the pendency of administrative proceedings. Moreover, the
suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and
forfeiture issued by DENR in pursuance to the authority given under PD 705. Section 8 of the said
law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of Bureau of Forest Development concerning the
enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the secretary of DENR and
that courts may not review the decisions of the secretary except through a special civil action for
certiorari or prohibition.

[36] [Montes vs. Civil Service Board]

 G.R. No. L-10759 | May 20, 1957 | Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies |
Labrador | Garay

Petitioner: Leonardo Montes

Respondents: Civil Service Board

Case Doctrine: The doctrine of exhaustion, of administrative remedies requires where an

administrative remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be sought by exhausting
this remedy before the courts will act. The doctrine is a device based on considerations of comity
and convenience. If a remedy is still available within the administrative machinery, this should be
resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency
opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature
resort to the courts.

FACTS:
Petitioner-appellant was a watchman of the Floating Equipment Section, Ports and Harbors
Division, Bureau of Public Works. In Administrative Case instituted against him for negligence in
the performance of duty (Dredge No. 6 under him had sunk because of water in the bilge, which
he did not pump out while under his care), the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him, on
the basis of findings made by a committee. But the Civil Service Board of Appeals modified the
decision, finding petitioner guilty of contributory negligence in not pumping the water from the
bilge, and ordered that he be considered resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without
prejudice to reinstatement at the discretion of the appointing officer.

Petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to review the decision, but the
said court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss, on the ground that petitioner had not
exhausted all his administrative remedies before he instituted the action.

ISSUE/S: WON the trial court erred in dismissing the action. (NO)

HELD: The law which was applied by the lower court is Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 598,
which provides:

The Civil Service Board of Appeals shall have the power and authority to hear and decide
all administrative cases brought before it on appeal, and its decisions in such cases shall
be final, unless revised or modified by the President of the Philippines.

It is urged on the appeal that there is no duty imposed on a party against whom a decision has
been rendered by the Civil Service Board of Appeals to appeal to the President, and that the
tendency of the courts has been not to subject the decision of the President to judicial review. It
is further argued that if decisions of the Auditor General may be appealed to the courts, those of
the Civil Service Board of Appeals need not be acted upon by the President also, before recourse
may be had to the courts because such a courts. It is also argued that if a case is appealed to the
President, his action should be final and not reviewable by the courts because such a course of
action, would be derogatory to the high office of the President.

The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to recognize the most
important principle in our system of government, i.e., the separation of powers into three co-equal
departments, the executive, the legislative and the judicial, each supreme within its own assigned
powers and duties. When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to
be implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The
legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior to the courts,
but because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret,
apply or implement it (the law). A judicial review of the President's decision on a case of an
employee decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the
bringing of the case to the courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the judicial
review of all administrative acts of all administrative officers.

The doctrine of exhaustion, of administrative remedies requires where an administrative remedy

is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the
courts will act. The doctrine is a device based on considerations of comity and convenience. If a
remedy is still available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before
resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency opportunity to decide
the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.

Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 598 above-quoted is a clear expression of the policy or
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the President, under whom the Civil Service
directly falls in our administrative system as head of the executive department, may be able to
grant the remedy that petitioner pursues, reasons of comity and orderly procedure demand that
resort be made to him before recourse can be had to the courts.

[36] Smart v. Aldecoa

GR. 166330| September 11, 2013 | Doctrine of Admin Remedies | Leonardo-De Castro, J. |
Saquido

Petitioner: SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

Respondents: ARSENIO ALDECOA, JOSE B. TORRE, CONRADO U. PUA, GREGORIO V.
MANSANO, JERRY CORPUZ and ESTELITA ACOSTA

FACTS:Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the telecommunications business. On

March 9, 2000, petitioner entered into a contract of lease 4 with Florentino Sebastian in which the
latter agreed to lease to the former a piece of vacant lot, measuring around 300 square meters,
located in Barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela (leased property).Petitioner, through its contractor,
Allarilla Construction, immediately constructed and installed a cellular base station on the leased
property. Inside the cellular base station is a communications tower, rising as high as150 feet,
with antennas and transmitters; as well as a power house open on three sides containing a 25KVA
diesel power generator. Around and close to the cellular base station are houses, hospitals,
clinics, and establishments, including the properties of respondents Arsenio Aldecoa, Jose B.
Torre, Conrado U. Pua, Gregorio V. Mansano, Jerry Corpuz, and Estelita Acosta. Respondents
filed before the RTC on May 23, 2000 a Complaint against petitioner for abatement of nuisance
and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioner sought the dismissal of respondents’ Complaint; the denial of respondents’ prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction; the
award of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages in the amounts which the court deem just and
reasonable; and the award of attorney’s fees in the sum of ₱500,000.00 and litigation expenses
as may be proven at the trial.

On September 11, 2000, petitioner filed its Pre-Trial Brief and Motion for Summary Judgement.
RTC issued its Order granting petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing
respondents’ Complaint.
Respondents filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, The appellate court declared the
cellular base station of petitioner a nuisance that endangered the health and safety of the
residents of Barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela because: (1) the locational clearance granted to
petitioner was a nullity due to the lack of approval by majority of the actual residents of the
barangay and a barangay resolution endorsing the construction of the cellular base station; and
(2) the sound emission of the generator at the cellular base station exceeded the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) standards.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies and Primary Jurisdiction has
been availed of - NO.

HELD: Based on the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and its corollary doctrine
of primary jurisdiction, it was premature for the Court of Appeals to take cognizance of and rule
upon the issue of the validity or nullity of petitioner’s locational clearance for its cellular base
station.

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction were explained at length by the Court in Province of Zamboanga del Norte v.
Court of Appeals, as follows: The Court in a long line of cases has held that before a party
is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself
of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the / administrative
machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted
first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the
court is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or
estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without its practical and legal
reasons. Indeed, resort to administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and provides for
speedier disposition of controversies. Our courts of justice for reason of comity and convenience
will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and
complied with so as to give the administrative agency every opportunity to correct its error and to
dispose of the case. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. We have held that while the administration grapples
with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of our resources,
the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establishes the basic rule that the court will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies.

In fact, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative
procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial
intervention. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests
on the presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery, is afforded a
chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly. (Citations omitted.)

The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) is the planning, regulatory, and
quasi-judicial instrumentality of government for land use development. In the exercise of
its mandate to ensure rational land use by regulating land development, it issued HLURB
Resolution No.R-626, series of 1998, Approving the Locational Guidelines for Base
Stations of Cellular Mobile Telephone Service, Paging Service, Trunking Service, Wireless
Loop Service and Other Wireless Communication Services (HLURB Guidelines). Said
HLURB Guidelines aim to protect" providers and users, as well as the public in general
while ensuring efficient and responsive communication services."

The HLURB Guidelines require the submission of several documents for the issuance of a
locational clearance for a cellular base station and provides administrative remedies for
non-compliance with its requirements.

There is no showing that respondents availed themselves of the afore-mentioned administrative

remedies prior to instituting Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 before the RTC. While there are
accepted exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, respondents never asserted nor argued any of them. Thus, there is no cogent
reason for the Court to apply the exceptions instead of the general rule to this case.

Ordinarily, failure to comply with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction will result in the dismissal of the case for lack of cause of action.
However, the Court herein will not go to the extent of entirely dismissing Civil Case No. Br. 23-
632-2000. The Court does not lose sight of the fact that respondents’ Complaint in Civil Case No.
Br. 23-632-2000 is primarily for abatement of nuisance; and respondents alleged the lack of
HLURB requirements for the cellular base station, not to seek nullification of petitioner’s locational
clearance, but to support their chief argument that said cellular base station is a nuisance which
needs to be abated. The issue of whether or not the locational clearance for said cellular base
station is valid is actually separate and distinct from the issue of whether or not the cellular base
station is a nuisance; one is not necessarily determinative of the other. While the first is within the
primary jurisdiction of the HLURB and, therefore, premature for the courts to rule upon in the
present case, the latter is within the jurisdiction of the courts to determine but only after trial proper.

[37] Lihaylihay v. The Treasurer

GR. 192223 | July 23, 2018 | Doctrine of Exhaustion of Admin Remedies |
Leonen, J. | Gonzales, F.

Petitioner: DANILO A. LIHAYLIHAY

Respondents: THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ROBERTO C. TAN, SECRETARY
OF FINANCE MARGARITO B. TEVES, SECRETARY . . OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, AND THE GOVERNOR OF BANG KO
LEONEN, MARTIRES, and TIJAM, JJ. SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP)
FACTS:This resolves a Petition for Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer for a Writ of
Garnishment, praying that former Treasurer of the Philippines Roberto C. Tan (Treasurer Tan),
former Secretary of Finance Margarito B. Teves (Secretary Teves), the Governor of Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, and the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(collectively, respondents) be ordered to deliver to Danilo A. Lihaylihay (Lihaylihay) the amounts
of P11,875,000,000,000.00 and P50,000,000,000.00, and several government lands as
informer's rewards owing to Lihaylihay's alleged instrumental role in the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth from former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos), his family, and their
cronies.

In his Petition, erstwhile presidential candidate Lihaylihay identified himself as a "Confidential

Informant of the State (CIS) pursuant to Republic Act No. 2338, duly accredited and registered
as such with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG)."

Lihaylihay particularly recalled sending two (2) letters, both dated March 11, 1987, to Atty. Eliseo
Pitargue (Atty. Pitargue), the former head of the Bureau of Internal Revenue-Presidential
Commission on Good Government Task Force, concerning information on former President
Marcos' ill-gotten wealth.

The first letter concerned gold bullions and diamonds. The second letter concerned alleged dollar
deposits at the Union Bank of Switzerland.

Almost 20 years later, on November 29, 2006, Lihaylihay wrote to then Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, Jose Mario C. Buñag (Commissioner Buñag), demanding payment of 25% informer's
reward on the P118,270,243,259.00 supposedly recovered by the Philippine government through
compromise agreements with the Marcoses. He also insisted on the need for the government to
collect Fortune Tobacco Corporation's tax deficiencies amounting to P97,039,862,933.40, to
recover P47,500,000,000,000.00 of Marcos' deposits in Switzerland, and to deliver to him the
informer's rewards corresponding to the recovery of these.

On January 10, 2008, Lihaylihay wrote to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President
Macapagal-Arroyo), insisting on the need to recover the Marcos' wealth that he identified and his
corresponding entitlement to an informer's reward.

Acting on Lihaylihay's letter, Assistant Executive Secretary Lynn Danao-Moreno referred the
matter to the Presidential Commission on Good Government, which eventually referred the matter
to the Department of Finance.

Lihaylihay wrote to then Department of Finance Secretary Teves on August 11, 2009, reiterating
his entitlement to an informer's reward. On September 1, 2009, Lihaylihay wrote to both Secretary
Teves and Treasurer Tan, again insisting on his entitlement to an informer's reward.

On May 31, 2010, without waiting for Secretary Teves' and Treasurer Tan's official actions on his
letters, Lihaylihay filed the present Petition, dubbed a Petition for "Mandamus and Damages, with
a Prayer for a Writ of Garnishment." Insisting on his entitlement to informer's rewards, he prays
that Treasurer Tan and Secretary Teves be ordered to deliver to him the amount of
P11,875,000,000,000.00; that the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources be ordered
to transfer to him several government lands; and that the Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
be ordered to garnish in his favor P50,000,000,000.00 worth of jewelry recovered from former
First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner Danilo A. Lihaylihay is entitled to a writ of mandamus to
compel respondents then Treasurer of the Philippines Roberto C. Tan, then Secretary of
Finance Margarito B. Teves, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and the Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to deliver to him proceeds and
properties representing 25% informer's reward pursuant to Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2338.

HELD: This Petition should clearly be denied.

A writ of mandamus is equally unavailing because there is evidently another "plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." This, of course, is the processing of his claims
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Department of Finance, and their final resolution by
the Secretary of Finance.

Petitioner's own recollection of antecedents reveals his initial attempt at complying with the
prescribed procedure with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, but also his own impatience for
these pending proceedings. This Court cannot indulge his impetuosity for proceedings in
progress. It cannot legitimize a manifest attempt at infringing statutorily institutionalized
processes.

The availability of a more basic recourse ahead of a Petition for Mandamus before this Court
similarly demonstrates that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Apart from his
non-compliance with the specific requirements of Rule 65, Section 3, petitioner's failure to
exhaust administrative remedies represents a distinct ground for dismissing the present Petition
as it effectively lacks a cause of action:

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action
cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies have first been exhausted. If remedy
is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be
made to courts. It is settled that non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is one of the grounds in the Rules of Court
justifying the dismissal of the complaint.

The need for petitioner to have previously exhausted administrative remedies is congruous with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue's and the Finance Secretary's preeminent competence to
consider the merits of his claims. Indeed, between this Court on the one hand, and the Bureau
of Internal Revenue and the Department of Finance on the other, the latter are in a better
position to ascertain whether or not the information supplied by an informer has actually been
pivotal to the discovery of tax offenses, and the conviction and punishment of offenders. Having
direct access to their own records, they are in the best position to know if the information
supplied to them is novel, not having been previously within their knowledge or not otherwise
having been the subject of previous proceedings.

Petitioner's direct recourse to this Court is an invitation for it to run afoul with the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction:
In cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an
administrative agency of special competence in observance of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. The Court has ratiocinated that it cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute
administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in
determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative
agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the
proceeding before the court. It applies where claim is originally cognizable in the courts and
comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative
body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.

The Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

[38] [CIR VS V.Y. DOMINGO]

G.R. NO. 221780| MARCH 25, 2019 | GEN. RULES AND REASON |PERALTA, J. | PINTO
Petitioner: COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
Respondents: V.Y. DOMINGO JEWELLERS, INC

Case Doctrine: Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of
all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her.

FACTS: The BIR issued a PAN against V.Y. Domingo at P2,781,844.21 for deficiency income tax
and value-added tax, inclusive of interest, for the taxable year 2006. V.Y. Domingo filed a Request
for Re-evaluation/Re-investigation and Reconsideration dated September 17, 2009 with the
Regional Director of BIR - Revenue Region No. 6. V.Y. Domingo then received a Preliminary
Collection Letter (PCL) dated August 10, 2011 from the RDO No. 28 - Novaliches, at
P3,164,617.43. On September 12, 2011, V.Y. Domingo sent a letter to the BIR RDO in Quezon
City, requesting certified true copies of the assessment notices. Upon receipt thereof on
September 16, 2011, it filed a Petition for Review with the CTA in Division, to have the PCL and
the assessment notices declared null for allegedly having been issued beyond the prescriptive
period for assessment and collection of internal revenue taxes.

During trial, the CIR moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. She argued that under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 1125, it is neither the assessment nor the formal letter of demand that is appealable to
the CTA but the decision of the CIR on a disputed assessment, arguing there was still no such
decision. The CTA First Division granted the CIR's motion and dismissed. It held that it was
without jurisdiction to entertain the petition, as the rule is that for the CTA to acquire jurisdiction,
as assessment must first be disputed by the taxpayer and either ruled upon by the CIR to warrant
a decision, or denied by the CIR through inaction.

The CIR argues that assessment notices are not appealable to the CTA as the power to decide
disputed assessments is vested in the CIR, subject only to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
the CTA.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CIR have jurisdiction over V.Y. Domingo's petition for review? In other words,
does its receipt of the PCL entitle the taxpayer to go to the CTA?

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled for CIR. No, the CTA has no jurisdiction. No, receipt of the PCL does
not grant the CTA jurisdiction. According to Section 7 of R.A. No. 1125, as amended by R.A. No.
9282, a protesting taxpayer like V.Y. Domingo has only three options to dispute an assessment:

1. If the protest is wholly or partially denied by the CIR or his authorized representative, then
the taxpayer may appeal to the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the whole or partial
denial of the protest;
2. If the protest is wholly or partially denied by the CIR's authorized representative, then the
taxpayer may appeal to the CIR within 30 days from receipt of the whole or partial denial
of the protest; or
3. If the CIR or his authorized representative failed to act upon the protest within 180 days
from submission of the required supporting documents, then the taxpayer may appeal to
the CTA within 30 days from the lapse of the 180-day period.

Here, records show that on August 11, 2011, V.Y. Domingo received the PCL issued by petitioner
CIR. However, instead of filing an administrative protest against the assessment notice within
thirty (30) days from its receipt of the Assessment Notices on September 15, 2011, V.Y. Domingo
elected to file its petition for review before the CTA First Division on September 16, 2011.

The word "decisions" in the aforementioned provision of R.A. No. 9282 means the decisions of
the CIR on the protest of the taxpayer against the assessments. It does not signify the assessment
itself. Where a taxpayer questions an assessment and asks the Collector to reconsider or cancel
the same because he (the taxpayer) believes he is not liable therefor, the assessment becomes
a "disputed assessment" that the Collector must decide, and the taxpayer can appeal to the CTA
only upon receipt of the decision of the Collector on the disputed assessment.According to
Section 7 of R.A. No. 1125, as amended by R.A. No. 9282, a protesting taxpayer like V.Y.
Domingo has only three options to dispute an assessment:

1. If the protest is wholly or partially denied by the CIR or his authorized representative, then
the taxpayer may appeal to the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the whole or partial
denial of the protest;
2. If the protest is wholly or partially denied by the CIR's authorized representative, then the
taxpayer may appeal to the CIR within 30 days from receipt of the whole or partial denial
of the protest; or
3. If the CIR or his authorized representative failed to act upon the protest within 180 days
from submission of the required supporting documents, then the taxpayer may appeal to
the CTA within 30 days from the lapse of the 180-day period.

Here, records show that on August 11, 2011, V.Y. Domingo received the PCL issued by petitioner
CIR. However, instead of filing an administrative protest against the assessment notice within
thirty (30) days from its receipt of the Assessment Notices on September 15, 2011, V.Y. Domingo
elected to file its petition for review before the CTA First Division on September 16, 2011.

The word "decisions" in the aforementioned provision of R.A. No. 9282 means the decisions of
the CIR on the protest of the taxpayer against the assessments. It does not signify the assessment
itself. Where a taxpayer questions an assessment and asks the Collector to reconsider or cancel
the same because he (the taxpayer) believes he is not liable therefor, the assessment becomes
a "disputed assessment" that the Collector must decide, and the taxpayer can appeal to the CTA
only upon receipt of the decision of the Collector on the disputed assessment. Evidently, V.Y.
Domingo's immediate recourse to the CTA First Division was in violation of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. The records of the case show that V.Y. Domingo
did receive the certified true copies of the Assessment Notices it requested on September 15,
2011, the day before it filed its petition for review before the CTA First Division. V.Y. Domingo
cannot now assert that its recourse to the court was based on its non-receipt of the Assessment
Notices that it requested.

Likewise, Allied Banking Corporation v. CIR does not apply here because that decision was
grounded on the language used and the tenor of the demand letter, which indicates that it was
the final decision of the CIR on the matter.
 [39] La Trinidad v. CFI of Baguio
L-33899 | JUNE 28, 1983 | Exception | Escolin | Valentino

Petitioner: THE MUNICIPALITY OF LA TRINIDAD, PROVINCE OF BENGUET, ET AL.,

Respondents: THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO-BENGUET, BRANCH I, HON.
PIO R. MARCOS, PRESIDING JUDGE, and DOROTHY OIDI,

Case Doctrine:
While it is true that no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have been
exhausted, and that special civil actions against administrative officers should not be entertained
if superior administrative officers can grant relief, the rule is not absolute. It is subject to certain
exceptions. It is not applicable where the questions involved are essentially judicial, where the
controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or where the respondent officer acted in utter disregard of due process.

FACTS:
Mario Damilo wrote Mayor Cipriano Abalos a letter- complaint charging respondent Dorothy Oidi
assistant municipal treasurer of La Trinidad, with "dishonesty and grave misconduct in her
business transactions with him and with others. Upon receipt of the complaint, Mayor Abalos
issued an order suspending Oidi from office effective November 6, 1970.
Simultaneously, he referred the complaint to the municipal council of La Trinidad for investigation.
The municipal council issued a resolution declaring Dorothy Oidi "resigned from office for the
good of the service, effective November 6, 1970.” After the resolution was confirmed by mayor
Abalos, Oidi appealed the same to the then Secretary of Finance. The latter endorsed the case
to the Civil Service Commission.

Oidi contended (1) that Section 2201 of the Revised Administrative Code has already been
repealed by Sec. 34 Act No. 2260 making it the Municipal Treasurer of La Trinidad, with the
approval of the Dept. of Finance, and not the Municipal Mayor, who has the power to order
preventive suspension from office as a subordinate employee in the Municipal Treasury and (2)
that administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over the respondent is not vested in the Municipal
Mayor and/or the Municipal Council of La Trinidad, but in this Department pursuant to the
provisions of Section 33 of Republic Act No. 2260, as amended by Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 6040.

CSC rendered a decision declaring that Oidi’s preventive suspension was null and void. Oidi then
instituted a petition for mandamus plus damages, with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, to set aside the November 5, 1970 order of Mayor Abalos as well as the resolution of
respondent municipal council.

Petitioners sought the dismissal of the case on the ground of want of jurisdiction of the court for
failure of Oidi to exhaust all available administrative remedies. CFI Baguio instead of dismissing
the case, conducted a hearing and thereafter granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Petitioners instituted this instant petition that respondent court has no jurisdiction to entertain
Special Civil Case No. 2779 for failure of Oidi to exhaust all administrative remedies available to
her.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in this case. [NO]

HELD:
The Court finds the contention devoid of merit.

While it is true that no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have been
exhausted, and that special civil actions against administrative officers should not be entertained
if superior administrative officers can grant relief, the rule is not absolute. It is subject to certain
exceptions. It is not applicable where the questions involved are essentially judicial, where the
controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or where the respondent officer acted in utter disregard of due process.

It contains allegations which remove the case from the ambit of the general rule. She repeatedly
asserted therein the want of authority of Mayor Abalos to order her suspension from office and
the similar lack of authority of the members of the municipal council to conduct an administrative
investigation against her and to order her dismissal from the service. Said averments indisputably
make out a legal question that is properly addressed to a regular court of justice rather than to an
administrative body.

What is more, her claim that she was denied the right of due process makes the rule of exhaustion
of administrative remedies inapplicable.
Also, Considering the fundamental principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
upon the allegations set forth in the complaint, the jurisdiction of the court must be sustained.

It is also a settled rule that non-exhaustion of administrative remedies affects the sufficiency of
the cause of action and not the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter

Instant petition is hereby dismissed.

 [40] [Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA]
G.R. No. 76633 | October 18, 1988 | Exceptions to the Doctrine of Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies | J. Cruz | Acain

Petitioner: EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC

Respondents: PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA),
MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and
KATHLEEN D. SACO

Case Doctrine: This case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the questions the
petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law. Moreover, the private respondent himself has
not objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure would
delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice.

FACTS:
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband. The decision is
challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the
case as the husband was not an overseas worker.

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in
Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the
complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have
been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and
after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award
consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.

The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for
dismissal.

Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the
errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the
questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law. Moreover, the private
respondent himself has not objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that
the usual procedure would delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies

HELD:
Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the
errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the
questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law. Moreover, the private
respondent himself has not objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that
the usual procedure would delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice.
[39] [ALEJANDRO TY v. HON. TRAMPE, THE MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF PASIG AND THE
MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF PASIG]
GR 117577| 05 DEC. 1995| EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES |
PANGANIBAN| CJ ARELLANO

DOCTRINE: Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to
judicial action can prosper, there is a well-settled exception in cases where the controversy does
not involve questions of fact but only of law.

FACTS: Petitioner Alejandro B. Ty is a resident of and registered owner of lands and buildings
in the Municipality (now City) of Pasig, while petitioner MVR Picture Tube Inc. is a corporation
duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and is likewise a registered owner of lands and
buildings in said Municipality

On 06 January 1994, respondent Assessor sent a notice of assessment respecting certain real
properties of petitioners located in Pasig.

Not satisfied, petitioners on 29 March 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 163, presided over by respondent Judge, a Petition for Prohibition
with prayer for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to declare null and void the
new tax assessments and to enjoin the collection of real estate taxes based on said assessments.
Respondent Judge denied the petition for lack of merit.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Rebuffed by said Decision
and Order, petitioners filed this present Petition for Review directly before this Court, raising pure
question of law.

Respondents argue that this case is premature because petitioners neither appealed the
questioned assessments on their properties to the Board of Assessment Appeal, pursuant to Sec.
226 nor paid the taxes under protest, per Sec. 252.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking
judicial relief. NO – the court cited the exception to this general rule.

The provisions of Sections 226 and 252 of R.A. 7160, being material to this issue, are set forth
below
 SECTION 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. — Any owner or person having legal
interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city or municipal
assessor in the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of
the written notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province or
city by filing a petition under oath in the form prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of
the tax declarations and such affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal.

SECTION 252. Payment under Protest. — (a) No protest shall be entertained unless the
taxpayer first pays the tax. There shall be annotated on the tax receipts the words "paid under
protest." The protest in writing must be filed within thirty (30) days from payment of the tax to the
provincial, city treasurer or municipal treasurer, in the case of a municipality within Metropolitan
Manila Area, who shall decide the protest within sixty (60) days from receipt.

Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicial action
can prosper, there is a well-settled exception in cases where the controversy does not involve
questions of fact but only of law. 20 In the present case, the parties, even during the proceedings
in the lower court on 11 April 1994, already agreed "that the issues in the petition are legal" 21 ,
and thus, no evidence was presented in said court.

In laying down the powers of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, R.A. 7160 provides in Sec.
229 (b) that" (t)he proceedings of the Board shall be conducted solely for the purpose of
ascertaining the facts . . .." It follows that appeals to this Board may be fruitful only where questions
of fact are involved. Again, the protest contemplated under Sec. 252 of R.A. 7160 is needed where
there is a question as to the reasonableness of the amount assessed. Hence, if a taxpayer
disputes the reasonableness of an increase in a real estate tax assessment, he is required to "first
pay the tax" under protest. Otherwise, the city or municipal treasurer will not act on his protest. In
the case at the bench however, the petitioners are questioning the very authority and power of
the assessor, acting solely and independently, to impose the assessment and of the treasurer to
collect the tax. These are not questions merely of amounts of the increase in the tax but attacks
on the very validity of any increase.

On November 5, 1991, the Court issued a Resolution clarifying its earlier one of May 16, 1991. It
pointed out that the authority of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals ‘to take cognizance of
the factual issues raised in these two cases by virtue of the referral by this Court in the exercise
of its extraordinary or certiorari jurisdiction should not be confused with its appellate jurisdiction
over appealed assessment cases under Section 36 of P.D. 464 otherwise known as the Real
Property Tax Code. The Board is not acting in its appellate jurisdiction in the instant cases, but
rather, it is acting as a Court-appointed fact-finding commission to assist the Court in resolving
the factual issues raised in G.R. Nos.97618 and 97760.’"

In other words. the Court gave due course to the petitions therein in spite of the fact that the
petitioners had not a priori exhausted administrative remedies by filing an appeal before said
Board. Because there were factual issues raised in the Mathay, Et. Al. cases, the Supreme Court
constituted the Central Board of Assessment Appeals as a fact finding body to assist the Court in
resolving said factual issues. But in the instant proceedings, there are no such factual issues.
Therefore, there is no reason to require petitioners to exhaust the administrative remedies
provided in R.A. 7160. nor to mandate a referral by this Court to said Board.
 [42] [MARIA NATIVIDAD VDA DE TAN VS. VETERANS BACKPAY COMMISSION]
Docket No. l-12944| March 30, 1959 | Doctrine of Administrative remedies | Reyes, JBL |
Lim

Petitioner: Maria Natividad Vda De Tan

Respondents: Veterans Backpay Commission
Case Doctrine: The respondent Commission is in estoppel to invoke the rule on the exhaustion
of administrative remedies, considering that in its resolution, it declared that the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice were"advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or ignored by the
office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the court for recourse", thereby leading
the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by the
Commission.

FACTS: On March 5, 1957, petitioner-appellee, Maria Natividad vda. de Tan, filed with the Court
of First Instance of Manila a verified petition for mandamus seeking an order to compel the
respondent-appellant Veterans Back Pay Commission: (1) to declare deceased Lt. Tan Chiat Bee
alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese national, entitled to backpay rights,, privileges', and prerogatives
under Republic Act No. 304, as amended by Republic Act No. 897; and (2) to give due course to
the claim of petitioner, as the widow of the said veterans, by issuing to her the corresponding
backpay certificate of indebtedness. Against the decision, the respondent instituted this appeal
averring once more, in its assignment of errors, the special and affirmative defenses that the
petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies; that the suit is, in effect, an action
to enforce a money claim against the government without its consent; that mandamus will not lie
to compel the exercise of a discretionary function; and that Republic Act Nos. 304 and 897 already
referred to were never intended to benefit aliens.

ISSUE/S:Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in this case.

HELD: We find no merit in the appeal. As to the claim that mandamus is not the proper remedy
to correct the exercise of discretion of the Commission, it may well be remembered that its
discretion is limited to the facts of the case, i.e., in merely evaluating the evidence whether or not
claimant is a member of a guerrilla force duly recognized by the United States Army. Nowhere in
the law is the respondent Commission given the power to adjudicate or determine rights after
such facts are established. Having been satisfied that deceased Tan Chiat Bee was an officer of
a duly recognized guerrilla outfit, certified to by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, having served
under the United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines, a guerrilla Unit recognized by the
United States Army and forming part of the Philippine Army, it becomes the ministerial duty of the
respondent to give due course to his widow's application. (See sections 1 and 6, Republic Act
897.) Note that the Chief of the Finance Service, Camp Murphy, has accepted the backpay due
the petitioner's husband and the same was passed in audit by the representatives of the Auditor
General.
It is insisted by the respondent Commission that aliens are not included within the purview of the
law. We disagree. The law as contained in Republic Act Nos. 304and 897 is explicit enough, and
it extends its benefits to members of "guerrilla forces duly recognized by the Army of the United
States." From the plain and clear language thereof, we fail to see any indication that its operation
should be limited to citizens of the Philippines only, for all that is required is that the guerrilla unit
be duly recognized by the Army of the United States.

It was, therefore, unreasonable if not arbitrary on the part of respondent Commission to deny
petitioner's claim on this basis. It is further contended by the Commission that the petitioner should
have first exhausted her administrative remedies by appealing to the President of the Philippines,
and that her failure to do so is a bar to her action in court. The respondent Commission is in
estoppel to invoke this rule, considering that in its resolution (Annex F of the Stipulation of Facts)
reiterating its obstinate refusal to abide by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice, who is the legal
adviser of the Executive Department, the Commission declared that—

"The opinions promulgated by the Secretary of Justice are advisory in nature, which may either
be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the court
for recourse," (Annex F) thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling
in her favor would be accepted by the Commission.

Neither is there substance in the contention that the petition is, in effect, a suit against the
government without its consent. The relief prayed for is simply "the recognition of the rights of the
petitioner-appellee" under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 897, and consists
in "directing an agency of the government to perform an act * * * it is bound to perform." Republic
Act Nos. 304 and 897 necessarily embody state consent to an action against the officers entrusted
with the implementation of said Acts in case of unjustified refusal to recognize the rights of proper
applicants.
 [43] [Laganapan v. Asedillo]

G.R. No. L-28353 | September 30, 1987 | Exceptions of the Doctrine of Exhaustion and
Administrative Remedies | Padilla, J. | Bernardino

Petitioner: Solano Laganapan

Respondents: Mayor Elpidio Asedillo and Epifanio Ragotero

Case Doctrine: The Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is not a hard and fast
rule. It has been repeatedly held that a principle requiring previous exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one; where the
controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction;
where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President,
bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter. The rule does not also apply where the
respondent has acted in utter disregard of due process

FACTS: Laganapan was summarily dismissed from his position as Chief of Police in the
municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna by Mayor Asedillo, on the ground that his appointment was
provisional and that he has no civil service eligibility. He filed a petition for mandamus, quo
warranto with preliminary mandatory injuction against herein respondents before the CFI Laguna
and sought reinstatement to the position of chief of police.

Mayor Asedillo and Epifanio Ragotero, who was appointed as the acting chief of police, claimed
that the appointment of Laganapan was only temporary hence, his services could be terminated
with or without cause, at the pleasure of the appointing power, and further alleged that petitioner
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. They contended that Lagapanan should have first
exhausted all administrative remedies before he reported to the courts and suggested that he
should have appealed the order of his dismissal to the Commissioner of Civil Service.

The lower court held that summarily dismissal of Laganapan was illegal and that Mayor Asedillo
should reinstate Lagapanan to his former position and restore the appropriation for his salary and
pay him back his salaries.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Lagapanan should have exhausted administrative remedies before
bringing this action to the Court.

HELD: No. It has been repeatedly held that the principle requiring previous exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one where
the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed. The rule does not also apply where the
respondent has acted in utter disregard of due process. In the instant case, there is no doubt that
in terminating the services of Laganapan, Mayor Asedillo acted summarily without any semblance
of compliance or even an attempt to comply with elementary rules of due process. Furthermore,
Police Act of 1996 states that, “Members of the local police agency shall not be suspended or
removed except upon written complaint filed under oath of the Board of Investigators provided for
misconduct or incompetence, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Government, serious irregularities in
the performance of their duties, and violation of law. Following such, there was no need for
exhaustion of administrative remedies before petitioner could come to court for the protection of
his rights. It appears that the order was immediately executed and Lagapanan was immediately
removed from office and replaced by Ragotero on the same day, so that appeal to Commissioner
of Civil Service was not an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. To require Lagapanan
to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing this action could easily result in a grave
injustice of barring him forever rom bringing the matter to the courts of justice for judicial
determination.

[45] [CIPRIANO V. MARCELINO]

G.R. No. L-27793 | February 28, 1972 | Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies (Exception) | CASTRO, J. | Jimenez

Petitioner: Leticia Cipriano

Respondents: Gregorio P. Marcelino And The Honorable Rafael Dela Cruz, Presiding
Judge Of The Third Branch, Court Of First Instance, Camarines Sur

Case Doctrine:The court ruled that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
without exception, not is it a condition precedent to judicial relief. The principle may be disregarded
when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

FACTS:Cipriano serves as record clerk in the office of municipal treasurer Marcelino of

Calabanga, Camarines Sur for 3 years at a monthly salary of 80 pesos. When she resigned,
Marcelino refused to pay her salary for the period from September 1, 1965 to January 15, 1966
(P349) as well as the commutation equivalent of her accumulated vacation and sick leaves
(P600). Cirpriano filed with the CFI an action for mandamus to compel Marcelino to pay her the
total amount. Marcelino moved to dismiss upon the ground that she had not "exhausted all
administrative remedies before filing the present action," arguing that exhaustion of all
administrative remedies is a condition precedent before an aggrieved party may have judicial
recourse. Granting the motion, the court a quo ordered the dismissal of the case.
Cipriano’s motion for reconsideration was denied hence the present petition for certiorari on pure
questions of law.

Cipriano’s contention: no law that requires an appeal to the Provincial Treasurer, Secretary of
Finance, Auditor General and then the President of the Philippines, from the refusal by a municipal
treasurer to pay the salary and money value of the unused vacation and sick leaves of a municipal
employee; that assuming that an appeal all the way up to the President of the Philippines is an
administrative remedy authorized by law, the same is not plain, speedy and adequate; that the
doctrine of exhaustion is not applicable when the questions to be resolved are purely of law; that
to require a small government employee such as the petitioner Cipriano to appeal all the way up
to the President of the Philippines on such an inconsequential matter as the collection of the sum
of P949, would be oppressive and expensive not only to the employee but also to her dependents
as well.

Marcelino’s contention: the petition for mandamus below states no cause of action as the
petitioner Cipriano has not exhausted all administrative remedies available to her.
ISSUE/S:Whether or not Cipriano has exhausted all administrative remedies available to her
(YES)

HELD:Yes. Cipriano has exhausted all administrative remedies available to her. The court ruled
that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without exception, not is it a
condition precedent to judicial relief. The principle may be disregarded when it does not provide
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It may and should be relaxed when its application may
cause great and irreparable damage.
It is altogether too obvious that to require the petitioner Cipriano to go all the way to the President
of the Philippines on appeal in the matter of the collection of the small total of nine hundred forty-
nine (P949) pesos, would not only be oppressive but would be patently unreasonable. By the time
her appeal shall have been decided by the President, the amount of much more than P949, which
is the total sum of her claim, would in all likelihood have been spent.

In De Leon vs. Libay, this Court, with considerable emphasis, made this statement which is
aproposof the case at bar: .
The theory that a party must first exhaust his remedies in the administrative branch before seeking
the aid of the strong arm of equity must give way to the reality that a government employee must
depend for the support of himself and his family upon his salary, and were he to be deprived of
that even alone for a few months, possibly even less, that must mean starvation because more
often than not, a government employee lives hand-to-mouth existence and he awaits with eager
hands the arrival of the forthnightly envelope because upon it must hinge the supply of rice and
fish and clothing of his spouse and children and himself and with it only can be maintained, and
therefore were the dogmatic rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies be made to mean that
he should wait for the most final administrative decision in his case, the only logical result must
be vital disaster to his dependents and to himself, so that this is the reason why the rule of
exhaustion of administrative remedies has always been understood to mean that the same have
furnished a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

The petition is granted. Marcelino is ordered to pay Cipriano.

[46] [DE LARA VS CLORIBEL]
GR No. L-21653 | 31 May 1965 | Exceptions |Bautista Angelo, J. | Aguinaldo

Petitioner: VICENTE DE LARA, JR., ET AL.|||

Respondents: GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, ET AL.|||
Case Doctrine:The rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable if it should
appear that an irreparable damage and injury will be suffered by a party if he should await, before
taking court action, the final action of the administrative official concerned on the matter.|||

FACTS:On June 17, 1963, the P & B Enterprises Co., Inc. filed a complaint before the Court of
First Instance of Manila for injunction and damages against Vicente de Lara, Jr. and the Bureau
of Forestry. It was alleged that Vicente de Lara, Jr. was granted on August 5, 1957 a timber
license to log over an area of about 300 hectares in Claveria, Misamis Oriental, for which he was
authorized to cut annually about 600 cubic meters of timber. Although De Lara failed to undertake
any operation in the area covered by his license, he was, however, able to secure its renewal
from year to year up to 1961, while his latest renewal for 1962 was rejected by the Bureau of
Forestry.|||
In the meantime, De Lara's petition for renewal of his license for 1963 was approved, which, as
amended, included a portion of the forest concession area originally granted to P & B Enterprises
Co., Inc., whereupon the latter protested against such approval insofar as the portion of the area
in conflict is concerned, but the protest was overruled. Hence, the company appealed the Director
of Forestry's decision to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, but until now the
appeal remains pending study and consideration by said official. Despite its protest and its appeal
as above stated, however, De Lara, aided by his men as well as by Acting Governor Maximo G.
Rodriguez of Misamis Oriental, continued his logging operation even if, in doing so, he trespassed
upon and used the road constructed by the company in the transportation of his logs cut within
the contested area. The protest of the company against such act and usurpation was at first
heeded by the Director of the Bureau of Forestry by prohibiting De Lara to use the road
constructed by the company, but the same was later countermanded, thus prompting the
company to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who on June 7, 1963
issued an order prohibiting De Lara from entering and operating within the contested area until
after the conflict existing between the two loggers shall have been finally decided. However, since
despite this order De Lara continued to operate and cut logs within the contested area to the great
damage and prejudice of the company, the latter commenced the present action as stated in the
early part of this decision.|||

ISSUE/S:Whether or not the respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in

issuing ex parte the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by respondent company?||| -
NO

HELD:It should be recalled that one of the grounds invoked by petitioner De Lara before
respondent court in his motion to dismiss the complaint filed by respondent company is that the
latter has failed to exhaust all its administrative remedies in that it filed said complaint before the
appeal taken from the order of the Director of Forestry allowing De Lara to use the logging road
constructed within the contested forest area could be finally acted upon by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, thereby implying that such action was premature. But this
motion was denied excepting only insofar as it affects the logs already cut by De Lara on the
uncontested area whose transportation was allowed to pass through the logging road constructed
by the company. And now it is contended that such denial constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.
While as a rule a petition for certiorari which is interposed to dispute the validity of an
order or decision that may be rendered by an administrative official in pursuance of the powers
and duties with which he is invested cannot be entertained if the party in interest fails to avail
of the administrative remedies that the law affords to him under a particular situation upon the
theory that administrative officials are the most competent to pass upon matters that
exclusively come within their jurisdiction, such rule may be relaxed when its application may
cause great and irreparable damage which cannot otherwise be prevented except by taking
the opportune appropriate court action. Stated otherwise, the rule is inapplicable if it should
appear that an irreparable damage and injury will be suffered by a party if he should await,
before taking court action, the final action of the administrative official concerned on the
matter. This is the situation herein obtained. Because of the conflict existing between
petitioner and respondent company regarding a portion of the logging area awarded to them,
as well as the use of the logging road constructed by the company, the case was taken to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for his final resolution, who in the meantime
directed petitioner "to refrain from entering and operating within the contested area until the
said case shall have been finally decided," but before such resolution could come De Lara
disregarded the directive and continued operating within the contested area to the irreparable
damage and injury of the company. This act of defiance prompted the company to take the
 needed appropriate action. In the circumstances, we find the action taken by respondent court
proper and justified even if no final decision has as yet been rendered by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Respondent court did nothing but to maintain and put into
effect the directive issued by said official. Indeed, before the protest lodged by the company
could be decided regarding the conflicting interests it is best that the status quo be maintained
as was done by respondent court. We see on this matter no abuse of discretion.
[47] [National Devt v. Customs]
No. L-19180| October 31, 1963 | Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies-
Exceptions | J. BAUTISTA ANGELO| Jalandoni

Petitioner: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ET AL

Respondents: THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF MANILA
Case Doctrine: Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the appeal to the
administrative superior is not a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
as where it is undisputed that the respondent officer has acted in utter disregard of the principle
of due process.

FACTS: The National Development Company which is engaged in the shipping business under
the name of “Philippine National Lines” is the owner of steamship “S.S. Doña Nati” whose local
agent in Manila is A. V. Rocha. On August 4, 1960, the Collector of Customs sent a notice to C.
F. Sharp & Company as alleged operator of the vessel informing it that said vessel was
apprehended and found to have committed a violation of the customs laws and regulations in that
it carried an unmanifested cargo consisting of one RCA Victor TV set 21” in violation of Section
2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code.

C. F. Sharp & Company, not being the agent or operator of the vessel, referred the notice to A.
V. Rocha, the agent and operator thereof, who on August 8, 1960, answered the notice stating,
among other things, that the television set referred to therein was not a cargo of the vessel and,
therefore, was not required by law to be manifested. Rocha stated further: “If this explanation is
not sufficient, we request that this case be set for investigation and hearing in order to enable the
vessel to be informed of the evidence against it to sustain the charge and to present evidence in
its defense.”

The Collector of Customs replied to Rocha on August 9, 1960 stating that the television set in
question was a cargo on board the vessel and that he does not find his explanation satisfactory
enough to exempt the vessel from liability for violating Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs
Code. In said letter, the collector imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on the vessel and ordered payment
thereof within 48 hours with a threat that he will deny clearance to said vessel and will issue a
warrant of seizure and detention against it if the fine is not paid.

And considering that the Collector of Customs has exceeded his jurisdiction or committed a grave
abuse of discretion in imposing the fine of P5,000.00 on the vessel without the benefit of an
investigation or hearing as requested by A. V. Rocha, the National Development Company, as
owner of the vessel, as well as A. V. Rocha, as agent and operator thereof, filed the instant special
civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila
against the official abovementioned. The court, finding the petition for injunction sufficient in form
and substance, issued ex parte the writ prayed for upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P5,000.00. Respondent stated several defenses, one of which was that petitioners have not
exhausted all available administrative remedies.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner was not given an opportunity to prove that the television set
complained of is not a cargo that needs to be manifested as required by Section 2521 of the Tariff
and Customs Code. - YES

HELD:Yes, petitioner was not given an opportunity to prove that the television set complained of
is not a cargo that needs to be manifested as required by Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs
Code. Not only was he denied this chance, but the respondent collector immediately imposed
upon the vessel the huge fine of P5,000.00. This is a denial of the elementary rule of due process.
True it is that the proceedings before the Collector of Customs insofar as the determination of any
act or irregularity that may involve a violation of any customs law or regulation is concerned, or of
any act arising under the Tariff and Customs Code, are not judicial in character, but merely
administrative, where the rules of procedure are generally disregarded, but even in the
administrative proceedings due process should be observed because that is a right enshrined in
our Constitution.
Another point raised is that petitioners have brought this action prematurely for they have not yet
exhausted all the administrative remedies available to them, one of which is to appeal the ruling
to the Commissioner of Customs. This may be true, but such steps do not consider a plain, speedy
or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law as would prevent petitioners from taking the
present action, for it is undisputed that the respondent collector has acted in utter disregard of the
principle of due process.
 [48] [Arrow Trans v. Board of Transpo]
GR No. L-39655 | March 21, 1975 | Exception to the Doctrine of Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies | Fernando, J. | Dula

Petitioner: ARROW TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION

Respondents: BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and SULTAN RENT-A-CAR, INC.

Case Doctrine:The Court was impelled to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage
(pending MR in an administrative body), not only because of the importance of the issue raised
but also because of the strong public interest in having the matter settled.

FACTS:Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car are domestic corporations.
The former has in his favor a certificate of public convenience to operate a public utility bus air-
conditioned-auto-truck service from Cebu City to Mactan International Airport and vice-versa
with the use of twenty (20) units.

Private respondent filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a certificate of
public convenience to operate a similar service on the same line. Eight days later, without the
required publication, the Board issued an order granting it provisional permit to operate such auto-
truck service on the line applied for.

There was a motion for reconsideration and for the cancellation of such provisional permit filed
but without awaiting final action thereon, this petition was filed. That petitioner has not waited for
the resolution of his Motion for Reconsideration before going to this Court considering that the
question involved herein is purely a legal one, aside from the fact that the issuance of the Order
without the Board having acquired jurisdiction of the case yet, is patently illegal or was performed
without jurisdiction.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the SC could take cognizance of the case pending the MR filed with
the respondent board. (Yes)

HELD:Under the facts of that case, the procedural due process infirmity amounting to lack of
jurisdiction is quite apparent. The opposite is true with this present petition which deals with a
grant of provisional permit. It would be to lift out of context the reference made in the aforesaid
opinion with reference to notification to the competitors to give a color of applicability to the
situation before us. Clearly then, the allegation of a failure to follow the command of the due
process guarantee is bereft of any legal foundation.

The question of whether the controversy is ripe for judicial determination was likewise argued by
the parties. For it is undeniable that at the time the petition was filed. there was pending with the
respondent Board a motion for reconsideration.

Ordinarily, its resolution should be awaited. Prior thereto, an objection grounded on

prematurity can be raised. Nonetheless, counsel for petitioner would stress that certiorari
lies as the failure to observe procedural due process ousted respondent Board of whatever
jurisdiction it could have had in the premises.

This Court was impelled to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage, not only
because of the importance of the issue raised but also because of the strong public
interest in having the matter settled.
As was set forth in Executive Order No. 101 which prescribes the procedure to be followed by
respondent Board, it is the policy of the State, as swiftly as possible, to improve the deplorable
condition of vehicular traffic, obtain maximum utilization of existing public motor vehicles and
eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, as well as update the standard
of those carrying such business, making it "imperative to provide, among other urgently needed
measures, more expeditious methods in prescribing, redefining, or modifying the lines and mode
of operation of public utility motor vehicles that now or thereafter, may operate in this country.

It is essential then both from the standpoint of the firms engaged as well as of the riding public to
ascertain whether or not the procedure followed in this case and very likely in others of a similar
nature satisfies the procedural due process requirement. Thus its ripeness for adjudication
becomes apparent.

To paraphrase what was said in Edu v. Ericta where the validity of a legislation was passed upon
in a certiorari proceeding to annul and set aside a writ of preliminary injunction, to so act would
be to conserve both time and effort. Those desiring to engage in public utility business as well as
the public are both vitally concerned with the final determination of the standards to be followed
in the procedure that must be observed. There is, to repeat, a great public interest in a
definitive outcome of the crucial issue involved. One of the most noted authorities on
Administrative Law, professor Kenneth Culp Davis, discussing the ripeness concept, is of the view
that the resolution of what could be a debilitating uncertainty with the conceded ability of the
judiciary to work out a solution of the problem posed is a potent argument for minimizing the
emphasis laid on its technical aspect.
 49] [TIANGCO vs. LAUCHANG]
GR No. L-17598 | Sept. 30, 1963 | Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies-
Exceptions | Padilla J. | Ruth Tan

Petitioner: Jacinto Tiangco, Jose Lazaro

Respondents: Faustina Lauchang

HIZON vs. LAUCHANG

GR No. L-175984| Sept. 30, 1963 | Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies-
Exceptions | Padilla J. | Ruth Tan

Petitioner: Asuncion Hizon

Respondents: Faustina Lauchang

Case Doctrine: Exhaustion of administrative remedies not necessary where subject of litigation
is not part of the public domain, but of private ownership acquired by the Government for resale
to private persons.

FACTS:The Tambobong Estate(480sqm) in Malabon, Rizal, was formerly leased by the

Archbishop of Manila to Matea Suarez. Thereafter, Suarez sold her leasehold interest in the land
to Anacleto Lauchang for P200.00. After Anacleto’s death, his daughter, Faustina occupied and
subleased the property to Tiangco, Lazaro, and Hizon, who built their respective houses on the
lot. She also continued to pay rents to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila until August
1927, as the latter has sold the property to the Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines.

A complaint was filed with the main issue of w/n the occupants have preferential rights to purchase
the portion which they respectively occupy.

The petitioners contended that the action brought should have been dismissed for lack of cause
of action, in view of respondent’s failure to exhaust all administrative remedies.

ISSUE/S: W/N petitioners contention is correct. (NO)

HELD: No. The subject lot is not part of the public domain, but of private ownership acquired by
the Government for resale to private persons, and for that reason any aggrieved party may bring
an action in court without the need of exhausting all administrative remedies.

[50] [Soto v. Jareno]

G.R. No. L-38962 | September 15, 1986 | Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies: Exceptions | J. Cruz | Chua

Petitioner: In Re: Motion to Correct Original Certificate of Title No. P-672 covering Lot No. 4569
Cauayan Cad. Francisca Soto
Respondents: Marina S. Jareno, Josefina S. Medel, and Lilia S. Alilain

Case Doctrine: Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it
will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If
not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can then take
cognizance of the case and try it. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
applicable to private lands, as also settled in a number of decisions rendered by this Court.
Once registered, the homestead granted to Sergio Serfino ceased to have the character of
public land and so was removed from the operation of the said doctrine.

FACTS: The change sought is in the civil status of the registered owner, whom the petitioner
wants to be described in the certificate of title as married to her rather than as a widower. The
registered owner was Sergio Serfino, who was married in January 1933 to the petitioner. In
1939, he filed an application for a homestead patent, describing himself as “married to
Francisca Soto”, but in 1953, when the original certificate over the homestead was issued, it
was in favor of “Sergio Serfino, widower”. Serfino died in 1965, and soon thereafter the
petitioner filed a motion with the CFI of Negros Occidental praying that his description as a
“widower” be changed to “married to Francisca Soto”. Two daughters of the couple opposed the
motion. While conceding that their parents were married in 1933, the oppositors nonetheless
pointed out that their mother had abandoned them in 1942 to live with another man. Later, they
said, she had adulterous relations with still a second man by whom she gave birth to eleven
children. According to these oppositors, it was their father himself who had described himself as
a widower in 1953 because he had not heard from the petitioner since 1942. Their purpose,
obviously, was to prevent the land from being considered conjugal and therefore equally owned
by the spouses.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to order an amendment of a certificate of title
without previous exhaustion of administrative remedies? (NO)

HELD: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable to private lands,
as also settled in a number of decisions rendered by this Court. Once registered, the homestead
granted to Sergio Serfino ceased to have the character of public land and so was removed from
the operation of the said doctrine. But notwithstanding the above principles, the petition will still
have to be dismissed because the change sought is not authorized under Section 112 of Act
496, as interpreted by this Court.

According to Tangunan v. Republic, the amendment of a certificate of title is allowed under this
section only "if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious
objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes controversial and
should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs."

In another case, it was held that "it is not proper to cancel an original certificate of Torrens title
issued exclusively in the name of a deceased person, and to issue a new certificate in the name
of his heirs, under the provisions of Section 112 of Act 496, when the surviving spouse claims
right of ownership over the land covered by such certificate."
It is obvious that in asking for the amendment of the certificate of title issued exclusively in the
name of Sergio Serfino, the petitioner was seeking to reserve the title to one half of the subject
land as her conjugal share. Appellees, for their part, reject this claim. Clearly, therefore, Section
112 of Act 496 is not applicable in this case.

The proper procedure is to institute the intestate proceedings of the Sergio Serfino, where the
appellant may file against its administrator the corresponding ordinary action to claim her alleged
rights over the lot in question.

[51] [Morcoso v. CA]

G.R. No. 96605| May 8, 1992 | Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies |
Martinez | Ty
Petitioner: Feliciano Morcoso
Respondents: Estrella Briones
Case Doctrine: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

FACTS:In 1984, private respondent Rosa Tirol (now Rosa Tirol-Maquirang) filed a complaint
against Feliciano Morcoso for the recovery of possession and declaration of ownership of a fish
pond located in Aklan. During the proceedings, Morcoso claimed that the only fish pond that
Tirol was entitled to recover was the one that he was evicted from in 1971, rather than the fish
pond that is subject to this case.

The fish pond that is the subject of this case was developed by Morcoso after BFAR personnel
assured him that the area where the fish pond is located is in a forest area and therefore, suitable
for fish pond development. Morcoso then applied for a fish pond permit in 1973 and declared said
fish pond under his name for taxation purposes.

In connection to that, Morcoso assailed the jurisdiction of the trial court over the case involving
the second fish pond as the said fish pond is also the subject of a pending administrative case in
the BFAR in relation to the conflicting claims between him and Tirol over it. However, the trial
court went ahead and decided to award the fish pond to Tirol, citing that the fish pond is not in a
land that is part of public domain, and therefore, the doctrine of prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply to this case. This decision was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE/S:Whether or not the doctrine of the exhaustion administrative remedies applies

to cases involving land that is not under public domain (NO)

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of the exhaustion administrative remedies
does not apply to cases involving land that is not under public domain. Morcoso was wrong to
claim that the doctrine of administrative remedies applies to his administrative case with the
BFAR involving a fish pond. The said fish pond that was subject to the administrative case with
the BFAR is a private property, rather than one that is under public domain. Furthermore, when
the BFAR issued Morcoso a fish pond permit for the fish pond in this case, it did not mean that
the fish pond is now the property of the government. Such action of the BFAR is of regulatory
nature only and thus, the fish pond still remains private property. Therefore, the doctrine of
exhaustion administrative remedies is inapplicable to Morcoso’s fish pond.
[52] [CORPUS v. CUADERNO]
G.R. No. L-17860 | March 30, 1962 | Doctrine of Exhaustive Remedies; Exceptions | DE
LEON, J.: | Grefal

Petitioner: R. MARINO CORPUS

Respondents: MIGUEL CUADERNO, SR., THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
THE MONETARY BOARD AND MARIO MARCOS

Case Doctrine: The doctrine does not apply where, by the terms or implications of the statute
authorizing an administrative remedy, such remedy is permissive only, warranting the conclusion
that the legislature intended to allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative remedy
has not been exhausted

FACTS: While petitioner-appellant was holding the position of Special Assistant to the Governor
of the Central Bank of the Philippines, he was charged in an administrative case, for alleged
dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority, oppression, misconduct, etc.
preferred against him by employees of the Bank, resulting in his suspension by the Monetary
Board of the Bank and the creation of a 3-man committee to investigate him.

The committee submitted its Final Report, finding that there is no basis upon which to recommend
disciplinary action against respondent and recommends that he be reinstated. Unable to agree
with the committee report, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 957 on July 20, 1959
which considered "the respondent, R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his
suspension."The Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 995, dated July 23, 1959, approving
the appointment of herein respondent Mario Marcos to the position involved in place of petitioner
R. Marino Corpus.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto, with preliminary mandatory
injunction against respondents. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. After several hearings,
another order was issued granting the motions to dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioner
did not exhaust all administrative remedies available to him in law. The lower court was of the
opinion that petitioner-appellant should have exhausted all administrative remedies to him, such
an appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service, under Republic Act 2260, or the President of the
Philippines who under the Constitution and the law is the head of all the executive departments
of the government including it’s agent and instrumentalities.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner-appellant should have exhausted all administrative remedies available
to him. NO

HELD: NO. A report to these administrative appeals is voluntary or permissive, taking into account
the facts obtaining in this case.

(1) There is no law requiring an appeal to the President in a case like the one at bar. The fact that
the President had, in two instances cited in the orders appealed from, acted on appeals from
decisions of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, should not be regarded as precedents, but
may be viewed as acts of condescension on the part of the Chief Executive.

(2) While there are provisions in the Civil Service Law regarding appeals to the Commissioner of
Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals, the petitioner is not bound to observe them,
considering his status and the Charter of the Central Bank.
Section 14, Republic Act 265, creating the Central Bank of the Philippines, "is sufficiently broad
to vest the Monetary Board with the power of investigation and removal of its officials, except the
Governor thereof. In other words, the Civil Service Law is the general legal provision for the
investigation, suspension or removal of civil service employees, whereas Section 14 is a special
provision of law which must govern the investigation, suspension or removal of employees of the
Central Bank, though they may be subject to the Civil Service Law and Regulations in other
respects."

In this case, the respondent Monetary Board considered petitioner resigned from the office to
which he has been legally appointed as of the date of his suspension, after he has been duly
indicted and tried before a committee created by the Board for the purpose.

The doctrine does not apply where, by the terms or implications of the statute authorizing an
administrative remedy, such remedy is permissive only, warranting the conclusion that the
legislature intended to allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative remedy has not
been exhausted (42 Am. Jur. 583).
 [53] [Bordallo v. PRC]
G.R. No. 140920| Nov. 19, 2001 | Exceptions to Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies| KAPUNAN, J| MERLE
Petitioner: JUAN LORENZO B. BORDALLO, RESTITUTO G. DE CASTRO AND NOEL G.
OLARTE
Respondents: THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION AND THE BOARD OF
MARINE DECK OFFICERS
Case Doctrine: The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute but admits of
exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the question is purely legal.

FACTS: President Ramos approved Republic Act No. 8544, otherwise known as the "Philippine
Merchant Marine Officers Act of 1998." The law took effect on March 25, 1998, after fifteen (15)
days following its publication in the Malaya. Section 2 of R.A. No. 8544 declares it the policy of
the State to "institutionalize radical changes as required by international and national standards
to insure that only qualified, competent and globally competitive Marine Deck/Engineer Officers
as determined through licensure examinations shall be allowed entry to the practice of the
Merchant Marine profession." The law provides for, and governs, among others, "the examination,
registration and issuance of Certificate of Competency to Merchant Marine Officers."

Section 17 lays down the requirements for an examinee to be qualified as having passed the
examination: must obtain a weighted general average of seventy percent (70%), with no grade
lower than sixty percent (60%) in any given subject. Significantly, the passing rating prescribed
by the above provision (70%) is lower than that prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 97
(Regulating the Practice of the Marine Professions in the Philippines), otherwise known as the
Philippine Merchant Marine Officers Law. Section 9 thereof sets a passing rating of seventy-five
percent (75%)

On April 25, 26 and 27, 1998, respondent Board of Marine Deck Officers conducted the
examination for deck officers. Petitioner Juan Lorenzo Bordallo took the examination for Chief
Mate, petitioner Restituto de Castro for Second Mate, and petitioner Noel Olarte for Third Mate.
At that time, the Board had not yet issued the syllabi and the rules and regulations pursuant to
Republic Act No. 8455.

Subsequently, petitioners received notices from respondent Professional Regulatory Commission

(PRC) that they failed in their respective examinations. Petitioners secured certifications from the
PRC their respective ratings. None of the petitioners obtained a general weighted average of
75%, although all of them had general weighted averages of more than 70%. None of them had
a rating of less than 60% in any of the subjects.

On May 21, 1998, petitioners filed a petition before the Board of Marine Deck Officers claiming
that, in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 8544, they should be considered as having passed
the April 1998 Examination for Deck Officers. On January 22, 1999, the Board of Marine Deck
Officers issued an Order denying the petition.

Petitioners received a copy of the Board's Order on February 9, 1999. On February 25, 1999,
petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus, naming the PRC and the
Board of Marine Deck Officers as respondents. The Court of Appeals, however, denied the
petition, prompting petitioners to seek relief in this Court.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition on two grounds. First, petitioners did not appeal from
the adverse order of the Board of Marine Deck Officers to the PRC but went straight to the Court
of Appeals on mandamus, in contravention of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8544. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the 15-day period within which petitioners could appeal to the PRC had already lapsed
and that the petition for mandamus could not be used as a substitute for the lost appeal.

ISSUE/S:Whether the CA is correct is stating that the petitioners can still appeal with PRC.
- No.

HELD: We do not agree that the resort to mandamus in the Court of Appeals was unwarranted.
As a rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative board,
body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute but admits of exceptions. One of
these exceptions is when the question is purely legal, such as the one presented in the case at
bar. The failure of petitioners to appeal to the PRC, therefore, is not fatal to petitioners' cause.

Second, the Court of Appeals held that even if it disregarded "the inappropriateness of Petitioners'
recourse," "the ratings provided for in [Section 17 of] Republic Act 8544 cannot be applied."
According to said court, "[t]he approval of the Rules and Regulations implementing Republic Act
8544 [pursuant to Section 10 (l)] and the requisite syllabi [under Section 10 (k)] are conditions
sine qua non" for the application of Section 17. As these conditions were not satisfied at the time
petitioners took the examination, they cannot be deemed to have passed the same. The flaw in
both the rulings of the Board of Marine Deck Officers and the Court of Appeals is that they apply
the passing rating decreed by P.D. No. 97 even when the latter had already lost its effectivity,
having been expressly repealed by Section 38 of R.A. No. 8544. Upon the effectivity of the
repealing statute, R.A. No. 8544, the repealed statute, P.D. No. 97, in regard to its operative
effect, is considered as if it had never existed. Courts, or administrative agencies for that matter,
have no power to perpetuate a rule of law that the legislature has repealed.

[54] [Banco de Oro v.Republic]

G.R. No. 198756| August. 16, 2016 | Exceptions to Doctrine of Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies| Leonen, J| RICASIO
Petitioner: BANCO DE ORO, BANK OF COMMERCE, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION,
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, AND PLANTERS
DEVELOPMENT BANK

Respondents: RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION AND RCBC CAPITAL

CORPORATION

Case Doctrine:

FACTS: The Bureau of Treasury (BTr) in a notice announced the auction of 10- year Zero-Coupon
Bonds denominated as the Poverty Eradication and Alleviation Certificates or the PEACE Bonds,
which the BTr states shall not be subject to 20% final withholding tax since the issue is limited to
19 buyers/lenders.

At the auction, RCBC participated on behalf of Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-
NGO) and won the bid.

bonds were issued to RCBC, who, as appointed issue manager and lead underwriter of CODE-
NGO, then sold and distributed said government bonds to petitioner-banks.

On October 7, 2011, barely 11 days before maturity of the peace Bonds, the BIR issued the
following:

BIR Ruling No. 370- 201119 declaring that the peace Bonds, being deposit substitutes,
were subject to 20% final withholding tax . Under this, DOF directed BTr to withhold 20%
final tax from the face value of the peace Bonds. BIR Ruling No. DA 378-201157 clarified
that the final withholding tax should be imposed and withheld not only on RCBC/CODE
NGO but also on all subsequent holders of the Bonds.

Banco de Oro, et al. thus filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus contending the
assailed 2011 BIR Ruling, with urgent application of TRO and/or writ of Preliminary Injunction.

SC then issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of the BIR ruling, subject to the condition that
20% FWT be delivered to the banks to be placed in escrow. SC granted petition and ruled that
the number of lenders/ investors at every transaction determines whether a debt instrument is a
deposit substitute subject to 20% FWT. When at any transaction, funds are simultaneously
obtained from 20 or more lenders/investors, there is deemed to be public borrowing and bonds
are deemed deposit substitutes. Hence, seller is required to withhold 20% FWT on the imputed
interest income from the bonds.

The two BIR Rulings is void for disregarding the 20-lender rule provided in Section 22 (Y) of the
Tax Code. BTr reprimanded for its continued retention of the amount corresponding to 20% FWT.
Separate Motions for Reconsideration and clarification were filed both by BDO, et al and the
Republic, et al.

Among others, respondents questioned the propriety of petitioners' direct resort to this
Court. They argued that petitioners should have challenged first the 2011 Bureau of
Internal Revenue rulings before the Secretary of Finance, consistent with the doctrine on
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
ISSUE/S: WON tCTA has jurisdition to determine the constitutionality or validity of tax
laws, rules and regulations, and other administrative issuances of CIR - Yes.

HELD: Interpretative rulings of the Bureau of Internal Revenue are reviewable by the Secretary
of Finance under Section 441 of the National Internal Revenue Code. However, because of the
special circumstances availing in this case-namely: the question involved is purely legal; the
urgency of judicial intervention given the impending maturity of the PEACE Bonds; and the futility
of an appeal to the Secretary of Finance as the latter appeared to have adopted the challenged
Bureau of Internal Revenue rulings-there was no need for petitioners to exhaust all administrative
remedies before seeking judicial relief.

The Court of Tax Appeals has undoubted jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality or validity
of a tax law or regulation when raised by the taxpayer as a defense in disputing or contesting an
assessment or claiming a refund.

This Court, however, declares that the Court of Tax Appeals may likewise take cognizance of
cases directly challenging the constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation or administrative
issuance.

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, is explicit that, except for local taxes, appeals
from the decisions of quasi-judicial agencies6 (Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Commissioner
of Customs, Secretary of Finance, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Secretary of Trade and
Industry) on tax-related problems must be brought exclusively to the Court of Tax Appeals.

In other words, within the judicial system, the law intends the Court of Tax Appeals to have
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all tax problems. Petitions for writs of certiorari against the acts
and omissions of the said quasi-judicial agencies should, thus, be filed before the Court of Tax
Appeals.

Republic Act No. 9282, a special and later law than Batas Pambansa Blg. 12968 provides
an exception to the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over actions
questioning the constitutionality or validity of tax laws or regulations. Except for local tax
cases, actions directly challenging the constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation
or administrative issuance may be filed directly before the Court of Tax Appeals.

Furthermore, with respect to administrative issuances (revenue orders, revenue memorandum

circulars, or rulings), these are issued by the Commissioner under its power to make rulings or
opinions in connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws. Tax
rulings, on the other hand, are official positions of the Bureau on inquiries of taxpayers who
request clarification on certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, other tax laws,
or their implementing regulations.

[55] [BLOOMBERRY V. BIR]

G.R. No. 212530 | August 10, 2016 | Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies |
Perez, J. | Maningo

Petitioner: BLOOMBERRY RESORTS AND HOTELS, INC.

Respondents: BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, represented by COMMISSIONER KIM S.
JACINTO- HENARES

Case Doctrine :If a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction,
then such remedy must first be exhausted before the court’s power of judicial review can be
sought. The party with an administrative remedy must not only initiate the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief but also to pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before
seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide
the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.

FACTS: This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to annul Revenue Memorandum Circular
(RMC) No. 33-2013 subjecting contractees and licensees of PAGCOR to income tax.

PAGCOR granted to petitioner a provisional license to operate a resort-casino complex at the

Entertainment City project site of PAGCOR, particularly, Solaire Resort and Casino. Pursuant to
such license and to PAGCOR’s Charter (PD 1869), Petitioner only paid license fees in lieu of
taxes. PAGCOR’s charter provided for exemptions in favour of entities contracting with it. RA No.
9337 amended Sec. 27(c) of the NIRC, which excluded PAGCOR from the GOCCs exempt from
paying corporate income tax. In the case of PAGCOR v. BIR, PAGCOR assailed the
constitutionality of the amendment, but the Court upheld its validity. Hence, PAGCOR’s exemption
was removed.

BIR then issued the said RMC to implement RA 9337, which provided that in addition to the 5%
franchise tax on its gross revenue, PAGCOR will now have to pay corporate income tax. The said
law also provides that PAGCOR’s contractees and licensees, including entities involving
gambling/recreation, are also subject to income tax.

Petitioner (direct to Supreme Court (SC) ): PD 1869 (PAGCOR Charter) as amended by RA 9487,
is a valid existing law, expressly exempting PAGCOR’s contractees and licensees from all taxes
except the 5% franchise tax; that such was not repealed by the deletion of PAGCOR from the list
of tax-exempt entities; that BIR acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the RMC as it, in
effect, repealed/amended the Charter; and that the RMC will adversely affect an industry seeking
to promote tourism and generate jobs.

Petitioner (justifications): this involves a pure question of law; the gaming industry is one involving
national interest; In essence, Petitioner contends that the CIR cannot issue RMCs that are
inconsistent with law; and that since the RMC would affect the exemption granted, it was issued
by the CIR with grave abuse of discretion.

Henares: no grave abuse of discretion as the RMC did not alter, modify, or amend the intent of
the Charter. It merely clarified the taxability of PAGCOR and its contractees and licensees for
income tax purposes.

ISSUE/S:
WON the petition should not have brought directly to the SC. (YES)

HELD:

In Asia International Auctioneers v. Parayno, the court ruled that RMCs are considered
administrative rulings, which are appealable to the CTA, and to no other Courts. Petitioner should
not have brought the petition to the SC directly as it has failed to have complied with the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the rule on hierarchy of courts. However, pursuant
to its jurisdictional prerogative, the SC took cognizance of the case.

Therefore, it was held that under R.A. No. 1125,12 which was thereafter amended by RA No.
9282, such rulings of the CIR (including revenue memorandum circulars) are appealable to the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), and not to any other courts.

In the same case, the court further declared that failure to ask the CIR for a reconsideration of the
assailed revenue regulations and RMCs is another reason why a case directly filed before us
should be dismissed. It is settled that the premature invocation of the court’s intervention is fatal
to one’s cause of action. If a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to
by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy must first be exhausted before the court’s power of judicial review
can be sought. The party with an administrative remedy must not only initiate the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief but also to pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before
seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide
the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.

Thus, the Petition was Granted and the BIR was ordered to Cease and Desist.

[57] [Republic v. Gallo]

G.R. No. 207074 | January 17, 2018 | Exceptions to Doctrine of Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies | Leonen, J. | Maulion

Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondents: MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO

Case Doctrine: Failure to raise the issue of non-compliance with the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction at an opportune time may bar a subsequent filing of a motion to
dismiss based on that ground by way of laches.
FACTS:
1. Gallo prayed before the RTC of Ilagan City, Isabela for the correction of her name from
"Michael" to "Michelle" and of her biological sex from "Male" to "Female" under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name,
"Soriano"; her mother's middle name, "Angangan"; her father's middle name, "Balingao";
and her parent's marriage date, May 23, 1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as these
were not recorded.
2. As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's certification, official
transcript of records, medical certificate, mother's birth certificate, and parents' marriage
certificate.
3. RTC, having found Gallo's petition sufficient in form and substance, set a hearing on
August 2, 2010. OSG authorized the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear on its
behalf. Trial then ensued.
4. During trial, Gallo testified on her allegations. She showed that her college diploma, voter's
certification, and transcript indicated that her name was "Michelle Soriano Gallo." The
doctor who examined her also certified that she was female. On cross-examination, Gallo
explained that she never undertook any gender-reassignment surgery and that she filed
the petition not to evade any civil or criminal liability, but to obtain a passport.
5. RTC, in its December 7, 2010 Order, granted the petition. Further, it concluded that there
was a necessity to correct Gallo's Certificate of Live Birth and applied Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court,
6. OSG appealed, alleging that the applicable rule should be Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
for Petitions for Change of Name. It argued that Gallo did not comply with the jurisdictional
requirements under Rule 103 because the title of her Petition and the published Order did
not state her official name, "Michael Gallo." Furthermore, the published Order was also
defective for not stating the cause of the change of name.
7. CA, in its assailed April 29, 2013 Decision, denied the OSG's appeal. It found that Gallo
availed of the proper remedy under Rule 108 as the corrections sought were clerical,
harmless, and innocuous. CA also discussed that Rule 103, on the other hand, "governs
the proceeding for changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil
register."
8. Citing Republic v. Mercadera , petitioner argues that "only clerical, spelling, typographical
and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised" in petitions for correction
under Rule 108. Thus, the correction must only be for a patently misspelled name. As
"Michael" could not have been the result of misspelling "Michelle," petitioner contends that
the case should fall under Rule 103 for it contemplates a substantial change.
9. Finally, petitioner insists that Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as Republic Act No. 9048 allegedly now governs the
change of first name, superseding the civil registrar's jurisdiction over the matter.
10. Respondent Gallo, in her Comment, counters that the issue of whether or not the
petitioned corrections are innocuous or clerical is a factual issue, which is improper in a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. In any case, she argues that the
corrections are clerical; hence, the applicable rule is Rule 108 and not Rule 103, with the
requirements of an adversarial proceeding properly satisfied. Lastly, she contends that
petitioner has waived its right to invoke the doctrines of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies and primary jurisdiction when it failed to file a motion to dismiss before the
Regional Trial Court and only raised these issues before this Court.
ISSUE/S:
1. whether or not petitioner has waived its right to invoke the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction because it failed to file a
motion to dismiss before the RTC and only raised these issues before the Supreme
Court. YES
2. whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo's petition involves a substantive change under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court instead of mere correction of clerical errors NO

HELD:
Issue 1:
1. Considering that Gallo did not first file an administrative case in the civil register before
proceeding to the courts, petitioner contends that respondent failed to exhaust
administrative remedies and observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction under Republic
Act No. 9048.
2. On the other hand, respondent argues that petitioner has waived its right to invoke these
doctrines because it failed to file a motion to dismiss before the Regional Trial Court and
only raised these issues before the Supreme Court.
3. This Court rules in favor of Gallo. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, a party must first avail of all administrative processes available before seeking
the courts' intervention. The administrative officer concerned must be given every
opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust
administrative remedies affects the party's cause of action as these remedies refer to a
precedent condition which must be complied with prior to filing a case in court.
4. However, for reasons of equity, in cases where jurisdiction is lacking, this Court has
ruled that failure to raise the issue of non-compliance with the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction at an opportune time may bar a subsequent filing of a motion
to dismiss based on that ground by way of laches.
5. Thus, where a party participated in the proceedings and the issue of noncompliance was
raised only as an afterthought at the final stage of appeal, the party invoking it may be
estopped from doing so.
6. Petitioner does not deny that the issue of non-compliance with these two (2) doctrines
was only raised in this Court. Thus, in failing to invoke these contentions before the
Regional Trial Court, it is estopped from invoking these doctrines as grounds for
dismissal.

Issue 2:
1. This Court rules that Gallo's Petition involves a mere correction of clerical errors.The
applicable law then for the correction of Gallo's name is Republic Act No. 9048.
2. Itis the civil registrar who has primary jurisdiction over Gallo's petition, not the Regional
Trial Court. Only if her petition was denied by the local city or municipal civil registrar can
the Regional Trial Court take cognizance of her case.
3. The prayers to enter Gallo's middle name as Soriano, the middle names of her parents
as Angangan for her mother and Balingao for her father, and the date of her parents'
marriage as May 23, 1981 fall under clerical or typographical errors as mentioned in
Republic Act No. 9048.
4. However, the petition to correct Gallo's biological sex was rightfully filed under Rule 108
as this was a substantial change excluded in the definition of clerical or typographical
errors in Republic Act No. 9048.
5. It was only when Republic Act No. 10172 was enacted on August 15, 2012 that errors in
entries as to biological sex may be administratively corrected, provided that they involve
a typographical or clerical error.
6. In Cagandahan, this Court ruled that a party who seeks a change of name and biological
sex in his or her Certificate of Live Birth after a gender reassignment surgery has to file a
petition under Rule 108.
 [58] [DPWH v. CMC]

GR No. 179732 | 13 Sept 2017 | Exceptions to the Doctrine of Exhaustion of

Administrative Remedies | Leonen | Villaganas

Petitioner: DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS

Respondents: CMC/MONARK/PACIFIC/HI-TRI JOINT VENTURE

Case Doctrine: To require respondent to wait for the DPWH Secretary's response while
respondent continued to suffer financially would be to condone petitioner's avoidance of its
obligations to respondent. Hence, even assuming that sub-clause 67.1 was not applicable, the
case would still fall within the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies since strict application of the doctrine will be set aside when requiring it would only be
unreasonable under the circumstances.

FACTS:

1. Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), and CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri J.V. (the Joint Venture) executed "Contract
Agreement for the Construction of Contract Package, Sixth Road Project, Road
Improvement Component Loan for a total contract amount of P700M. Thereafter DPWH
hired BCEOM French Engineering Consultants to oversee the project.
2. On October 2002 the Joint Venture's truck and equipment were set on fire. On March 2003
a bomb exploded at Joint Venture's hatching plant located at Zamboanga del Sur.
According to reports, the bombing incident was caused by members of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front. The Joint Venture made several written demands for extension and
payment of the foreign component of the Contract. There were efforts between the parties
to settle the unpaid Payment Certificates.
3. BCEOM French Engineering Consultants recommended that DPWH promptly pay the
outstanding monies due the Joint Venture. The letter also stated that the actual volume of
the Joint Venture's accomplishment (the project 80% complete when it was halted).
4. The Joint Venture filed a Complaint against DPWH before the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC).
5. Meanwhile, the Joint Venture sent a "Notice of Mutual Termination of Contract", to DPWH
requesting for a mutual termination of the contract subject of the arbitration case. This is
due to its diminished financial capability of the DPWH. Then DPWH Acting Secretary
Florante Soriquez accepted the Joint Venture's request for mutual termination of the
contract.
6. The CIAC promulgated an award directing DPWH to pay the Joint Venture its money
claims plus legal interest. CIAC, however, denied the Joint Venture's claim for price
adjustment due to the delay in the issuance of a Notice to Proceed under Presidential
Decree No. 1594.
7. Petitioner claims the filing of the claim before CIAC was premature, since under CIAC
rules, there must be an exhaustion of administrative remedies first before government
contracts are brought to it for arbitration. Respondent, on the other hand, denies violating
the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. It claims that it sent at least 17 demand
letters to petitioner, four (4) of which were sent to the DPWH Secretary directly.it.

ISSUE/S: WON the case is premature due to Joint Venture's non-compliance with the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies? No
HELD: The court held that petitioner's argument fails to convince. The case is not premature.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the concerned administrative agency
must be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an action is brought
before the courts, otherwise, the action will be declared premature.

In this case, CIAC found and correctly ruled that respondent had duly complied with the
contractual obligation to exhaust administrative remedies provided for under sub-clause 67.1 of
the Conditions of Contract before it brought the case before the tribunal.

The Claimant further alleged that, despite of such knowledge, no relief from the Secretary was
forthcoming. It would therefore be an exercise in futility if Claimant, after it had sent respondent
the seventeen (17) demand letters and despite the unequivocal admission by Respondent's
foreign consultant in charge of the project of respondent's liability and failure to pay, will further
be required to undergo another series of presentation and exchange of documentation. Moreover,
Respondent has not indicated any practical benefit of resending the demand to the Secretary nor
any prejudice for not doing so.

In this particular contract project, the procedural requirements governing the Settlement of
Disputes is specifically provided under Clause 67 of the Conditions of the Contract which Claimant
has complied with pursuant to the first paragraph of its letter. In the last paragraph of the letter on
September 10, 2004, Claimant has requested Respondent for a definitive ruling on the disputes
which were enumerated therein so that Claimant could avail of the remedies given to it by the
aforesaid Clause 67.1. In spite of Claimant's request, respondent DPWH did not act on the same.

The evidence also disclosed that as far as delayed payments are concerned, Claimant made
various verbal and written demands for payment that were evidenced. The demands were not
heeded. A total of 17 demand letters were sent to petitioner to no avail. To require respondent to
wait for the DPWH Secretary's response while respondent continued to suffer financially would
be to condone petitioner's avoidance of its obligations to respondent. Hence, even assuming that
sub-clause 67.1 was not applicable, the case would still fall within the exceptions to the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies since strict application of the doctrine will be set aside
when requiring it would only be unreasonable under the circumstances
 [59] [Demaisip v. CA]

G.R. No. L-13000| September 25, 1959 | Judicial Review (of Administrative
Action/Decision): Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Appeal to the
President | BAUTISTA ANGELO, J. | Almase

Petitioner: MANUEL R. BARTE

Respondents: DEMETRIO A. DICHOSO and JUAN VILLEGAS (in their capacities as City
Treasurer and Auditor, respectively), respondents-appellants

Case Doctrine:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; FAILURE TO

APPEAL DEPARTMENT SECRETARY'S DECISION TO PRESIDENT NOT VIOLATION OF
THE RULE.— Although the plaintiff failed to appeal from the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines when the Secretary
reversed the decision of the Director of Fish and Game Administration, and ruled that the lease
application of plaintiff should be denied, such failure cannot preclude plaintiff from taking court
action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter ego of the
President. The presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the
President unless the same is disapproved by the latter.

FACTS:

The late Geronimo Destacamento filed his application for a fishpond permit on 01 April
1927. Before his death, Destacamento, without the knowledge and consent of the Director of
Forestry, executed a deed of sale covering the lots in question in gavor of Seragin Villanueva –
an act which was illegal and contrary to the rules of the permit granted him. Nevertheless, the
Director of Forestry requested Villanueva to apply for a fishpond permit over the same lots, but
the latter neglected and failed to do so.

Gaudencio Demaisip then filed with the Fish and Game Administration a fishpond permit
application for the same lots. He complied with all the prerequisites necessary for the issuance
of a fishpond permit, namely, payment of annual rental of P21 and posting a surety bond in the
sum of P350. When said fishpond permit was ready to be issued to Demaisip, Villanueva
executed a deed of sale covering the lots in question in favour of Luis Buenaflor who started to
occupy the land and introduced improvements thereon consisting of a big dam.

The Director of Fish and Game Administration decided that Demaisip be given due course
upon payment of an additional rental of P16 which is 1% of the value of improvements assessed
at P1,600. However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reversed the said
decision. Demaisip then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction over the said case, due to the fact that
Demaisip had not exhausted all administrative remedies before approaching the judiciary. (NO)
HELD:

It is true that the plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources to the President, but such failure cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking
court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the
President. The presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the
President, unless disapproved by the latter. It is therefore incorrect to say that plaintiff’s action
should not be entertained.

Furthermore, it cannot be said that there is interference of the courts with the acts of
executive officers for such defense might only be valid in special civil actions – this is not one –
wherein the petitioner must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy.

[60] [Calo v Fuentes]

G.R. No. L-16537 | June 29, 1962 | Appeal to the President | Padilla, J. | Tenido

Petitioner: FRANCISCO C. CALO

Respondents: DELFIN C. FUERTES, DIRECTOR OF LANDS and SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES

Case Doctrine: Appeal to the President is the last step he should take in an administrative case

FACTS:
In a Cadastral Case in Butuan City entitled Francis C. Calo, claimant-contestant, vs. H.A. Delfin
C. Fuertes, applicant-respondent, the Director of Lands rendered an opinion denying a dismissing
former's claim and contest against the Homestead Application of Delfin C. Fuertes, was ordering
him to vacate the premises within sixty days from receipt of a copy of the opinion, and stating that
upon finality thereof homestead patent would be issued to Delfin C. Fuertes. His request for
reconsideration having been denied by the Director of Lands, Francisco C. Calo brought to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the case. On 28 February 1958 the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources modified the opinion of the Director of Lands.
Calo appealed to the President of the Philippines, but withdrew it before the President could act
thereon. He later filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan a petition for writs of certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction praying that the enforcement of the opinions of the Director
of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be enjoined among others. For
failure to state a cause of action, for lack of jurisdiction and for not exhausting all the administrative
remedies available to the petitioner in the ordinary course of law, the Court resolves to dismiss
as it hereby dismisses the herein petition with costs against petitioner. The petitioner then appeals
to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the appeal to the President is a condition precedent to the appeal to the Courts
of Justice. (YES)

HELD:
Yes. The appellant’s contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the
alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal
from the decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had
appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of
the Director of Lands, he had exhausted all the administrative remedies, is untenable.
The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not
appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal because the appeal to the President is the last
step he should take in an administrative case. Furthermore, a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only when "there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In the case at bar, appeal from an
opinion or order by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the
Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. Therefore, the
judgment appealed had already become final and cannot be reviewed. The appeal is dismissed,
with costs against the petitioner-appellant.
 [62] [ALFI v. Garin]

GR NO L-23155 | September 9, 1974| Appeal to the President |J. Zaldivar| Paralejas

Petitioner: RUFINO G. BARTULATA

Respondents: HON. MACARIO PERALTA, JR

Case Doctrine: In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that the doctrine requiring the
previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed
approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. The present proceedings having
been brought against the Secretary of National Defense, respondents' contention is clearly
untenable.

FACTS: The evidence and the record show that Rufino G. Bartulata began his service in the
armed forces of the Philippines on January 15, 1924 upon his enlistment in the Philippine
Constabulary. When the Pacific war broke out in 1941, he held the rank of sergeant in the
Philippine Constabulary. When the order for surrender to the enemy was issued by the high
command of the USAFFE, he refused to surrender and, instead, he joined the 108th Infantry,
10th Military District, a guerrilla organization in Mindanao. This guerrilla outfit was recognized on
February 13, 1943 by the Headquarters, Philippine Ryukyus Command of the United States
Armed Forces, which recognition was later revised to take effect as of September 16, 1942.

While in the service of the aforementioned guerrilla outfit, petitioner Bartulata was promoted to
the rank of third lieutenant effective November 1, 1942, and to second lieutenant effective April
1, 1943. His name, rank (2nd Lt.) and serial number (0-24220 PA) appeared in the Roster of
Reserve Officers in the Headquarters, Mindanao Zone Military Police Command, Philippine
Army, per General Order No. 358, dated June 28, 1946, Army Headquarters APO 75

After the war, petitioner still carrying the rank of 2nd Lieutenant, continued to render service
under the postwar Philippine Army. He was assigned as Junior Officer of the 62nd Military
Police Command (PA). As second lieutenant he was paid his salaries and allowances and was
allowed to wear his uniform as such officer. His services ended when he was honorably
discharged, effective January 31, 1947, as a second lieutenant.

Contending that he should be retired as second lieutenant instead of staff sergeant, petitioner
Bartulata, on several occasions, requested re-adjustment of his retirement rank, but said
requests were denied by General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and by the
Secretary of National Defense, upon the ground that his name does not appear in the
approved reconstructed roster of his guerrilla outfit, and as such it is "conclusive that his service
was not recognized or that the recognition of his guerrilla status was revoked.

Petitioner claims that he is a recognized guerrilla officer by virtue of the recognition of the 108th
Infantry, 10th Military District, the guerrilla outfit for which he was an officer. Further, he claims
to be a reserve officer with the rank of second lieutenant under the terms of Executive Order No.
21 of the late President Sergio Osmeña, issued on October 28, 1944

Respondents, however, would contend that the present action should be dismissed because
petitioner "has not exhausted all administrative remedies" available to him before coming to
court. Respondents would want petitioner to appeal his case to the Office of the President
before availing of court processes.

ISSUE/S: Whether petitioner had exhausted all administrative remedies - YES

HELD: In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that the doctrine requiring the previous
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed approval of
the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. The present proceedings having been
brought against the Secretary of National Defense, respondents' contention is clearly
untenable.

[62] [TAN VS. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY]

L-24548| October 27, 1983 | Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies- Appeal
to the President | Makasiar, J. | Jamilano

Petitioner: WENCESLAO VINZONS TAN

Respondents: THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA, THE SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO

Case Doctrine:
President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees,
the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust
his administrative remedies.

A timber license may be revoked any time pursuant to its express terms. The terms and
conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry,
and that this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so
require. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license
is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.

FACTS:

1. Sometime in April 1961, The Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public
bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales. Finally, of the ten
persons who submitted proposals, the area was awarded to herein petitioner-appellant
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry.

2. On June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the
Bureau of Forestry. It stated that the said area is established as a watershed forest reserve for
Olongapo, Zambales and that the bids received by the Bureau of Forestry for the issuance of the
timber license in the area during the public bidding be rejected.
3. On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation made by Ravago Commercial Company,
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated an order declaring Ordinary
Timber License No. 20-’64 issued in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as having been issued
by the Director of Forestry without authority, and is therefore void ab initio.

4. Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources denied the motion.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the petitioner has not exhausted all available administrative remedies. -Yes.

HELD: A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner-appellant’s contentions are
untenable. As already observed, this case was presented to the trial court upon a motion to
dismiss for failure of the petition to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (Rule 16 [g],
Revised Rules of Court), on the ground that the timber license relied upon by the petitioner-
appellant in his petition was issued by the Director of Forestry without authority and is
therefore void ab initio.

Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No.
238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed
Forest Reserve. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or
acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal
is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that he has
no other speedy and adequate remedy. In the case at bar, petitioner-appellant’s speedy and
adequate remedy is an appeal to the President of the Philippines

Petitioner-appellant contends that “this case is not a suit against the State but an application of a
sound principle of law whereby administrative decisions or actuations may be reviewed by the
courts as a protection afforded the citizens against oppression”

He cannot use that principle of law to profit at the expense and prejudice of the State and its
citizens. The promotion of public welfare and the protection of the inhabitants near the public
forest are property, rights and interest of the State.

“The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of
Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so
require”. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not
a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can
be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
 [63] [.Kilusang v. Dominguez]

G.R. No. 85439| Jan. 13, 1992| Appeal to the President | Davide, JR. | Hidalgo

Petitioner: KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG

PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA, INC. (KBMBPM), TERESITA A. FAJARDO,
NADYESDA B. PONSONES, MA. FE V. BOMBASE, LOIDA D. LUCES, MARIO S. FRANCISCO,
AMADO V. MANUEL and ROLANDO G. GARCIA, incumbent members of the Board, AMADO G.
PEREZ and MA. FE V. BOMBASE, incumbent General Manager and Secretary-Treasurer

Respondents: HON. CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ, Secretary of Agriculture, Regional Director of

Region IV of the Department of Agriculture ROGELIO P. MADRIAGA, RECTO CORONADO and
Municipal Mayor IGNACIO R. BUNYE, both in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila and as Presiding Officer of Sangguniang Bayan ng Muntinglupa, and JOHN DOES

Case Doctrine: As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this
requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an
alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by
him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most
needed. There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse
to the courts could be had immediately

FACTS:

Petitioners questions the validity of the order Secretary of Agriculture Hon. Carlos G. Dominguez
which ordered: (1) the take-over by the Department of Agriculture of the management of the
petitioner (KBMBPM), a service cooperative organized by and composed of vendors occupying
the New Muntinlupa Public Market in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 175 and Letter of Implementation No. 23; its articles of incorporation and by-laws
were registered with the then Office of the Bureau of Cooperatives Development, pursuant to the
Department's regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175, as amended,
and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 13, (2) the creation of a Management Committee which
shall assume the management of KBMBPM upon receipt of the order, (3) the disbandment of the
Board of Directors, and (4) the turnover of all assets, properties and records of the KBMBPM the
Management Committee.

the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa thru its then Mayor entered into a contract with the
KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA SA BAGONG PAMILIHANG
BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA, INC. (KBMBPM), for the latter's management and operation of the
new Muntinlupa public market. The contract provides for a twenty-five year term.

The new mayor succeeding the former mayor who entered into the contract with kilusang want to
rescind the contract since it was a "virtual 50-year term of the agreement, contrary to the provision
of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337," and the "patently inequitable rental,"
He sought opinions from both the Commission on Audit and the Metro Manila Commission (MMC)
on the validity of the instrument. Who recommended its rescission. The Mayor went to the stalls
announced to the general public and the stallholders thereat that the Municipality was taking over
the management and operation of the facility, and that the stallholders should henceforth pay their
market fees to the Municipality, thru the Market Commission, and no longer to the KBMBPM
.KBMBPM filed with Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati a complaint for breach of
contract, specific performance and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
the Municipality and its officers, KBMBPM filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a letter-
complaint charging Bunye (The mayor) and his co-petitioners with oppression, harassment, abuse
of authority and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for taking over the
management and operation of the public market from KBMBPM. the Office of the Special
Prosecutor directed Bunye and his co-petitioners to submit within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof counter-affidavits two (2) days before the expiration of the period granted to file said
documents, Bunye, et al. filed by mail an urgent motion for extension of "at least fifteen (15) days
from October 22, 1988" within which to comply with the subpoena.

respondent Madriaga and Coronado, allegedly accompanied by Mayor Bunye and the latters'
heavily armed men, both in uniform and in civilian clothes, allegedly through force, violence and
intimidation, forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners located at the second floor
of the KBS Building, new Muntinlupa Public Market, purportedly to serve upon petitioners the
Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture dated 28 October 1988, and to implement the same,
by taking over and assuming the management of KBMBPM, disbanding the then incumbent Board
of Directors for that purpose and excluding and prohibiting the General Manager and the other
officers from exercising their lawful functions as such. The board of directors were removed and
were replaced thereafter, they filed a case questioning the legality of the order of the Secretary of
Agriculture to the Supreme court. Respondents claim that petitioners failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies.

ISSUE/S:Whether or not the order of the Secretary of Agriculture was valid

HELD:Petitioners, as ousted directors of the KBMBPM, are questioning precisely the act of
respondent Secretary in disbanding the board of directors; they then pray that this Court restore
them to their prior stations. As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-
settled that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless
actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access
to the courts when most needed. There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of
the President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the
question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently
illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is
correct.

[64] [Penafrancia vs 168 Shipping Lines]

GR No. 188952| Sept 21, 2016 | Appeal | Jardeleza | Brubio
Petitioner: PEÑAFRANCIA SHIPPING CORPORATION AND SANTA CLARA SHIPPING
CORPORATION
Respondents: 168 SHIPPING LINES, INC

Case Doctrine:
The decisions of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) are not subject to the review of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)Secretary. This is not to say,however,
that decisions of the MARINA are not proper subjects of appeal to the Office of the President
(OP). —ReadingSection 39 together with Section 38, the decision of an attached agency such as
the MARINA in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function is not subject to review by the department.
Section 39 makes it clear that the supervision and control exercised by the department over
agencies under it with respect to matters including the exercise of discretion (performance of
quasi-judicial function) do not apply to attached agencies. Thus, in this respect, petitioners are
correct in saying that the decisions of the MARINA are not subject to the review of the DOTC
Secretary. This is not to say, however, that decisions of the MARINA are not proper subjects of
appeal to the OP.
Decisions of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) Board are proper subjects of appeal to the
Office of the President (OP), having been made by its members in their ex officio capacity, and
not as his alter egos. —TheDOTC Secretary does not have supervision and control over the
MARINA,which is an attached agency to the DOTC. Consequently, it cannot review the decisions
of the MARINA Board. However, decisions of the MARINABoard are proper subjects of appeal to
the OP, having been made by its members in their ex officio capacity, and not as his
alter egos . Failing to avail of such appeal, petitioners’ petition for review with the CA was properly
dismissed.

FACTS:
168 Shipping Lines, Inc.(respondent) filed with the MARINA Regional Office V (MARINARO V),
Legaspi City an application for the issuance of a Certificate Of Public Convenience (CPC) to
operate M/V Star Ferry I.

Peñafrancia Shipping Corporation and Santa Clara ShippingCorporation (petitioners), existing

operators who own and operate ferry boats serving the ports of Allen, Northern Samar and
Matnog,Sorsogon, intervened in the proceeding and opposed the application on the following
grounds: (1) respondent failed to submit a Certificate of Berthing as required under MARINA
MemorandumCircular No. 74-B; (2) the proposed schedule of trips in the original application is
physically impossible to perform by the applicant's lone vessel, the M/V Star Ferry I;and (3) there
exists anovertonnage in the route applied for by the respondent, thuswarranting the intervention
of MARINA.Respondent counter that under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9295 and its
ImplementingRules and Regulations (IRR): (1) an application for CPC is not adversarial in
character and thus, a motion to intervene and opposition are not allowed; and (2) there is no
requirement for the CPC applicant to secure a Certificate of Berthing from the Philippine Ports
Authority.

MARINA RO V required respondent to file an amended CPC application with workable sailing
frequencies/schedule of trips.However, instead of complying with the directive, respondent merely
submitted a pleading denominated as RE: ADOPTION OF AMENDED SCHEDULE OF TRIPS.
MARINA RO V, in its Decision dated February 1, 2008,denied due course to respondent’s
application. Respondent filed its Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied.
Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of the MARINA Administrator. MARINA
Administrator Vicente T. Suazo,Jr.,all acting by authority of the Board, reversed the Decision of
theMARINA RO V and granted respondent’s application for issuance of CPC.

Petitioners appealed to the CA via Rule 43. However, CA dismissed the petition for failure of the
petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies, hence, for lack of cause of action.The CA ruled
that the Petitioners’ failure to resort to the DOTC Secretary and then the Officeof the President,
in case of an adverse decision, and the filing of the herein petition before this Court is a premature
invocation of the Court's Intervention which renders the instant petition without cause of
action,hence, dismissible.

ISSUE/S:Whether the decision of the MARINA Board in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function
should be appealed first to the DOTC Secretary, and subsequently to the OP, before appeal to
the CA.

HELD: Petitioners claim that this provision of the IRR shows that “the appropriate remedy
against the adverse ruling of the MARINA Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.” However,as correctly pointed out by the respondent, paragraph 2, Section 1,Rule XV of
the IRR applies only to an appeal of the order, ruling,decision or resolution of the MARINA
Administrator. There is no procedure for appeal of the decisions of the MARINA Board.Hence,
the IRR cannot be the basis for petitioners’ appeal.Moreover, no procedure for appeal before
the courts is provided byR.A. No. 9295. Rules and regulations issued to implement a law cannot
go beyond its terms and provisions. Rule 43 governs all appeals from awards, judgments, final
ordersor resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of quasi-
judicial functions. Resort to the CA is authorized by Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
which provides that theCA shall have jurisdiction over the decisions or final orders of quasi-
judicial agencies. The MARINA is a quasi-judicial agency,and though it is not among the
enumerated agencies in Rule 43, the list is not meant to be exclusive.

However, while Rule 43 provides for the appeal procedure from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA,
the aggrieved party must still exhaust administrative remedies prior to recourse to the CA.
Thus,Executive Order No. 292 otherwise known as the AdministrativeCode of 1987 provides for
the framework of administrative appeal prior to judicial review. The above procedure
notwithstanding, decisions of the various agencies of government have been appealed to the OP,
consistent with the President’s power of control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices.
We defined the presidential power of control over the executive branch of government as “the
power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the
latter.”

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the OP to review any

determination or disposition of a department head. The doctrine allows, indeed requires, an
administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level
before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review

The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the
presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the
matter, will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for the
principle.While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is flexible and may be
disregarded in certain instances we find, however, that the case does not fall under any of the
recognized exceptional circumstances. Petitioners claim that appeal to the DOTC Secretary, who
is already the chairman of theMARINA Board, is a needless superfluity, the latter being the alter
ego of the President. Moreover, petitioners state that filing an appeal with the Office of the
President would be impractical because amember of the MARINA Board also came from the
Office of thePresident. Both arguments fail to convince.

Following our ruling in Manalang-Demegillo , the actions of theDOTC Secretary and the Executive
Secretary, as ex officio members of the MARINA Board were made not in their capacity as alter
egos of the President. As such, an appeal to the OP is still warranted. If Petitioners are still
dissatisfied with the decision of the OP, then it would be the proper time to file a petition for review
under Rule 43 with the CA.

[65] [Republic v. Sandiganbayan]

G.R. No. 112708-09 | March 29, 1996 | Non-compliance | Francisco, J. | Navarro

Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
Respondents: SANDIGANBAYAN, SIPALAY TRADING CORPORATION and ALLIED
BANKING CORPORATION

Case Doctrine:Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions.
The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause
of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground
is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it.

FACTS: Petitioner PCGG issued separate orders against private respondents SIPALAY and
ALLIED to effect their sequestration. Two (2) separate petitions were led by SIPALAY and ALLIED
before this Court assailing the sequestration orders. After the consolidation of these petitions and
the ling of the comments, other pleadings and certain motions by the parties, this Court referred
the cases to public respondent SANDIGANBAYAN for proper disposition.

Concerning SIPALAY, its 360, 875, 513 shares of stock in Maranaw Hotels and Resort
Corporation which owns the Century Park Sheraton Hotel are, according to the PCGG, part of
Lucio C. Tan's ill-gotten wealth, thus, PCGG sequestered these shares under a "Sequestration
Order and Supervisory Committee". SIPALAY maintained that the sequestration was without
evidentiary substantiation, violative of due process, and deemed automatically lifted when no
judicial proceeding was brought against it within the period mandated under Article XVIII, Section
26 of the Constitution.

ALLIED went to court for the same reason that the PCGG was bent on implementing the order.
ALLIED contended that this order is not one for sequestration but is particularly a general search
warrant which fails to meet the constitutional requisites for its valid issuance.

Seven (7) years after SIPALAY and ALLIED originally filed their petitions, PCGG filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the former should have first exhausted administrative remedies by
challenging the sequestration orders in the Office of the President before resorting in court.

ISSUE/S:
 1. Whether or not the denial of PCGG’s motion to dismiss was in order by reason of
laches.
2. Whether or not SIPALAY and ALLIED should have first resorted to administrative
remedies before going to court.
3. Whether or not the sequestration order and the search and seizure order are
constitutional.

HELD:
On the issue of Laches
The length of time the PCGG allowed to drift away and its decision to file its motion to dismiss
only at the homestretch of the trial hardly qualify as "proper time." With its undenied belated action,
seven (7) years in the making at that, it is only proper to presume with conclusiveness that the
PCGG has abandoned or declined to assert what it bewailed as the SIPALAY and ALLIED
petitions' lack of cause of action. More accurately, the PCGG should be deemed to have waived
such perceived defect in line with the " Soto " case, for "proper time" cannot mean nor sanction
an unexplained and unreasonable length of time such as seven (7) years. The leniency extended
by the Rules (Rule 9, Section 2, Rules of Court) and by jurisprudence ("Ocampo case") in allowing
a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action led after the answer or at any stage of the
proceedings cannot be invoked to cover-up and validate the onset of laches — or the failure to
do something which should be done or to claim or enforce a right at a proper time which, in this
case, was one of the PCGG's follies. Indeed, in matters of timeliness, "indecent waste" is just as
reprehensible as "indecent haste".

On the issue of Non-Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

In respect of the second key issue, the PCGG faults the SANDIGANBAYAN for incorporating in
the judgment the resolution of its motion to dismiss, arguing that said motion should have been
resolved first and separately. That would have been unnecessary and injudicious in the light of
the "peculiarities" of this case where the motion was filed only at the tail end of the trial and when
the PCGG has visually presented all its evidence. At that stage, there was in fact nothing left for
the parties to do but to await the forthcoming judgment of the SANDIGANBAYAN, save for the
submission of the PCGG's written formal offer of documentary evidence as directed by the court,
which the PCGG failed to do within the 20-day period given it because it led the motion to dismiss
instead. In this connection, the PCGG's contention that the 20-day period for the submission of
its written formal offer of evidence was suspended upon the ling of the motion to dismiss has no
merit.

On the issue of the validity of the sequestration order (SIPALAY) and the search and
seizure order (ALLIED)
The SANDIGANBAYAN voided the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY " for lack of
sufficient prima facie factual foundation, . . ." In so concluding, it only took into account the
testimonies of PCGG witnesses Doromal, Bautista and Alonte.

The SANDIGANBAYAN had no other choice, for these testimonies in fact constitute the entire
evidence for the PCGG, inasmuch as no documentary evidence which might have supported the
testimonial evidence were offered by the PCGG below. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence
decree that "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered."

From whatever definition we look at it, Dr. Doromal's and deceased Commissioner Bautista's
testimonies are by no means sufficiently strong evidence to make up a prima facie case for the
PCGG. What gave them colorable weight were the unoffered documents. But as things stand in
the absence of such documentary evidence, they are empty and crumble on their own even
without counter-explanation or contradiction, as anything that may tend to prove the proposition
that the SIPALAY shares in Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation were/are ill-gotten is just
nowhere extractable from these testimonies by and in themselves.

There can be no doubt that the order which the PCGG issued against ALLIED typifies a search
warrant (full text of which appears in the early part of this decision). Not only is the order captioned
as SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER, the body thereof clearly enjoined the branch manager to
make available to the PCGG team all bank documents precisely for the purpose. It is unauthorized
because nowhere in the same Executive Order No. 1 (particularly Section 3) invoked by the
PCGG to justify the search and seizure order was the PCGG expressly empowered to issue such
specie of a process in pursuant of its mandated purpose of recovering ill-gotten/unexplained
wealth.

In addition to its unauthorized issuance (as just discussed), the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER
is also constitutionally defective. Firstly, as it suffered from the same inherent weakness or
emptiness as that which marred Dr. Doromal's testimony (as earlier discussed extensively),
deceased Commissioner Bautista's in-court declarations did not in any way establish probable
cause. Secondly, the PCGG has no authority to issue the order in the rst place. Only a "judge"
and "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" were empowered by the
FREEDOM CONSTITUTION to do so, and the PCGG is neither. Thirdly, the order does not
provide a specification of the documents sought to be searched/seized from ALLIED.
 [66] [DARAB vs. CA]
266 SCRA 404| 1/21/1997 | Effect of Non-Compliance | J. Davide, Jr. | Delos Reyes

Petitioner: DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) AND

PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATOR FE ARCHE-MANALANG, DEPARTMENT
OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR)
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, BSB CONSTRUCTION AND AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, AND CAROL BAUCAN

Case Doctrine:Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is fatal to a party's cause of action and
a dismissal based on that ground is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action.

FACTS:These cases were consolidated in view of the fact that they involve the same petitioners
and the same issue concerning the right of BSB Construction to develop a parcel of land into a
housing subdivision, against the claim of private respondents that they are tenant-farmers entitled
to the benefits of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

Background of CA-G.R. SP NO. 30474

Abogne, Catamora and Ordan filed a complaint with the PARAD praying that they be maintained
in the peaceful possession and cultivation of a portion, consisting of 12 hectares, of the land in
question.

In their complaint private respondents alleged that they are farmworkers and occupant-tillers of
the land in question that the portion of the land they were cultivating had been bulldozed at the
instance of Federico Balanon and other individuals acting in behalf of the petitioner BSB
Construction, as a result of which the improvements made by them on the land were destroyed.

They asked the PARAD for an order restraining the herein petitioners from further bulldozing the
property and maintain them in the peaceful possession of the land. Provincial Adjudicator issued
an order enjoining the BSB Construction and all persons representing it "to cease and desist from
undertaking any further bulldozing and development activities on the property under litigation or
from committing such other acts tending to disturb the status quo."

Petitioners filed a complaint with the DARAB in which they sought the nullification of the
restraining order issued by the PARAD. They alleged that the land in question is not an
agricultural, but residential, land and that the petitioners before the PARAD are not tenant-farmers
but mere squatters

Without waiting for any action on their complaint before the DARAB, the petitioners filed
the present petition for certiorari, substantially alleging the same matters and praying for
the annulment of the restraining order issued by the PARAD

Background of CA-G.R. SP NO. 31179

Another group, claiming the same right to the cultivation of the land in question, filed a complaint
with the DARAB against the petitioner BSB Construction, represented by its president, Federico
Balanon.

The complainants alleged that they too are farmworkers and occupant-tillers of the same portion
being cultivated by the private respondents in the other petition. In substantially the same way,
they alleged that they had invested money and effort to develop the portion of the land into a
"compact agricultural undertaking," planting it with various fruit trees and root crops
Order by the PARAD is hereby given to:
BSB Construction and Agricultural Development Corporation not to bulldoze and scrape
the fruit-bearing trees and root crops thereon, harass and disturb the peaceful possession
of Petitioners over the landholding in question pendente lite under pain of contempt by
this Board

Before the Court of Appeals, private respondents BSB Construction and Agricultural Development
Corporation and Carol Baucan sought to annul the temporary restraining order issued by PARAD
and the Status Quo order issued by DARAB contending that: the DARAB SQO, having been
issued after the Court of Appeals had given due course to their petition "betray[ed]
disrespect to the Court and the rule of law."

The petitioners then filed the instant petition wherein they assert that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction petitioners argue
that the directive was premature and constituted undue interference with quasi-judicial
proceedings governed by a distinct set of rules, especially in light of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction

ISSUE/S:W/N Administrative remedies were exhausted → NO

HELD:We note that the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 30474 was filed on 19 March 1993, shortly
after the private respondents' "complaint" to nullify the PARAD's TRO was filed with the DARAB
on 12 March 1993.

It is precisely for this reason that the petitioners asserted in their answer that exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not had below, hence the petition "lacks a cause of action for being
evidently premature."

The "complaint," was in reality nothing but an appeal to the DARAB from the PARAD order
granting the TRO on the ground of grave abuse of discretion

This was a matter covered by §§1 and 2, Rule XIII of the DARAB Revised Rules. Among those
matters which may be appealed is an "order or decision of the Regional or Provincial Adjudicator,"
on the ground of "grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional or Provincial Adjudicator."

This appeal is, undoubtedly, an administrative remedy, which has not been shown to be
inadequate. Not having yet fully exhausted the administrative remedies which they had already
invoked, the private respondents cannot be permitted to abandon the same at their chosen time
and leisure and invoke the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is fatal to a party's cause of action and a dismissal
based on that ground is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action.
 [67] [National Development Company v. Hervilla]
G.R. No. L-65718 | June 30, 1987 | Effect of Non-Compliance | Padilla, J. | Maulion

Petitioner: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY AND DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC.

Respondents:WILFREDO HERVILLA

Case Doctrine: Hervilla failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a flaw which, to our mind, is
fatal to a court review. The decision of the Director of Lands has now become final. The Courts
may no longer interfere with such decision.

FACTS:
1. An action for Recovery of Possession and Damages filed on December 20, 1973 by
Wilfredo Hervilla against Dole Philippines, a duly registered corporation doing business
in Polomolok, South Cotabato, involving 3 lots, each 4 hectares, more or less, situated at
Sitio Balisong, Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato, now in the possession of defendant
corporation as Administrator of the properties of National Development Corporation
(NDC) impleaded as party defendant.
2. Claimant Rolando Gabales, for a consideration of P450.00, sold to Hernane Hervilla all
his rights and interest over a 4-hectare land located in Palkan, Polomolok, South
Cotabato but identified only by its boundaries. It was apparent on the strength of the Tax
Declaration No. 1376 that Hernane Hervilla was induced to acquire it.
3. Its adjoining occupant-claimant, Fernando Jabagat, for a consideration of P270.00, also
sold his interest and rights to Hernane Hervilla over another 4 hectares of land, situated
at Balisong, Bo. Kablon, Tupi, South Cotabato, identified by its boundaries. At the time of
these transfers, the boundary between these places had not definitely been settled.
Hence, the discrepancy.
4. On June 1, 1961, Wilfredo Hervilla, claiming to be the successor-in-interest of his
brother, Hernane Hervilla who vacated these properties, [in favor of the former], filed
with the District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands in General Santos City Free Patent
Applications over the lots.
5. On April 1, 1963, as claimant and occupant of the lots situated at Balisong, Kablon, Tupi,
South Cotabato since 1945, Candido de Pedro filed with the Bureau of Lands, Manila,
his Free Patent Application, having planted it to abaca, coffee, banana, corn and other
seasonal crops, erecting therein a farm house. Land taxes from 1945 until 1963 were
paid per Official Receipts. Then, exactly four months after filing his application, Candido
de Pedro ceded all his rights to the National Development Corporation, represented by
Pedro Changco, Jr.
6. On April 27, 1968, Wilfredo Hervilla who was then in Palawan, thru his wife, Emma V.
Hervilla, filed an ejectment suit against Dole before the Municipal Court of Tupi, South
Cotabato alleging that 'sometime in the early part of March 1968 defendant by means of
threats, of force, intimidation, strategy and stealth and against the will of the plaintiffs,
entered and occupied the entire parcels. This was dismissed for failure to state a cause
of action and without the benefit of trying it upon the merits.
7. On June 15, 1973, the Provincial Officer of Koronadal, South Cotabato, pursuant to the
report of the Land Investigator, Jesus Ma. Baltazar, issued an order:
'That the Free Patent Applications of Wilfredo D. Hervilla xxx are, modified in the sense
that the disposition therein contained shall in the order named refer to Lots Nos. 3284
and 3283, GSS-269-D and, as thus modified, further action on the herein mentioned
 application held in abeyance pending the final determination of the adverse claim of
Dolephil.
8. Armed with that recommendation, counsel for Hervilla wrote Dolephil demanding the
immediate return of the Lots to Wilfredo Hervilla.
9. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of the
NDC and Dole Philippines, Inc., (Dolephil), by dismissing Hervilla's complaint against
them. Hervilla appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which, on 10 November
1983, rendered the herein assailed decision, thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and set aside and another one entered herein;
1. Declaring that plaintiff-appellant, Wilfredo Hervilla, the rightful possessor of the subject
lots or lots designated as Lots Nos. 3283 and 3284, GSS-269-D, situated at Palkan,
Polomolok, South Cotabato;
2. Ordering the NDC and DOLE to vacate the said lots and deliver possession thereof to
the said plaintiff-appellant;
10. MR and Supplement to the MR was filed by NDC and DOLEPHIL. They alleged therein
that while the case was pending with respondent Court, the Bureau of Lands issued the
free patents in favor of Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest.
11. On 9 August 1985, respondent Court issued a resolution denying the MR and its
Supplement. Hence, the present petition for Certiorari interposed by the National
Development Company (NDC).

ISSUE/S: Whether or Not the Court in deciding a case involving recovery of possession declare
null and void title issued by an administrative body or office during the pendency of such case
NO

HELD:
1. It is now well settled that the administration and disposition of public lands are committed
by law to the Director of Lands primarily, and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. The jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the
determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which
involve disposition and alienation of public lands. The jurisdiction of courts in possessory
actions involving public lands is limited to the determination of who has the actual,
physical possession or occupation of the land in question (in forcible entry cases, before
municipal courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion publiciana in cases before
Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts).
2. In any event, petitioners' possession of the lands in question has been confirmed by the
issuance of Free Patents in favor of their predecessor-in-interest. By this act, nothing
more is left for the courts to pursue. Thus, the private respondent's cause of action has
been rendered moot and academic by the decision of the Director of Lands
3. Moreover, records do not show that private respondent Wilfredo Hervilla ever filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Director of Lands issuing free patent
over the lands in dispute in favor of petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. Neither did he
appeal said decision to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, nor did he
appeal to the office of the President of the Philippines. In short, Hervilla failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, a flaw which, to our mind, is fatal to a court review. The
decision of the Director of Lands has now become final. The Courts may no longer
interfere with such decision.
 4. WHEREFORE, the decision dated 10 November 1983 and the resolution dated 9 August
1985 of the respondent Appellate Court are hereby reversed and set aside. The decision
of the court a quo dated 28 February 1979 is hereby ordered reinstated. No costs.

[68] [Atlas Consolidated v. Mendoza]

2 SCRA 1064 | 1961 | Effect of Non-Compliance | Conception | Villaganas

Petitioner: ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

Respondents: THE HON. JOSE M. MENDOZA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
and CONSTANCIA D. VEGA

Case Doctrine: Failure of a party to exhaust the procedure of administrative remedies provided
by law therefor affects his cause of action, not the jurisdiction of the court over the Subject matter
or the case.

FACTS:

1. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (Atlas) filed with the Director of
Mines, a Lode Lease Application covering the several mineral claims. One Constancia
Vega wrote to a communication stating that she had an adverse claim to the said mineral
claims. In reply to said communication, the Director of Mines advised Vega that the filing
of her adverse claim was "not in order" since notice of the filing of the aforesaid application
of Atlas had not has yet been published, as provided in section 72 of the Mining Act,
although she could, under section 61, file her verified protest to said application. Instead
of heeding this advice, Vega instituted Civil Case in the Court of First Instance against
said Atlas. Vega alleged that she is the locator and registered owner of mineral lode claims
and that Atlas, through threats of force and intimidation, unlawfully barred her from
entering the area covered by the claims. She prayed that Atlas be ordered to immediately
vacate the areas in question and to stop its mining operation, as well as enjoined from
reentering the same, and pay damages.
2. Atlas filed a motion to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground that the same issue
between the parties is pending before the Bureau of Mines, which has original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear all cases and disputes arising out of conflicts over mining
claims; that the filing of said complaint is premature, improper and without legal basis, for
the lode lease application in question had not, as yet, been given due course by the
Bureau of Mines, and that Vega had "not yet fully exhausted all available administrative
remedies".
3. Upon the denial of this motion, the Corporation filed its answer to said complaint, alleging,
among other defenses, that the lower court has no jurisdiction to hear the case, owning to
the non-exhaustion of the administrative remedy provided for in section 61 of the Mining
Act. Respondent, Hon. Jose Mendoza, as Judge of the Court of First Instance, had set
the case for trial, petitioner instituted the present action of prohibition for the purpose of
enjoining said respondent from, proceeding with the hearing.
ISSUE/S: WON Vega’s failure the exhaust administrative remedies affected the jurisdiction of the
lower court to hear the case? No

HELD: The Mining Act prescribes two (2) proceedings for the settlement of the conflicting mining
claims. One refers to the manner of disposing of the same, before publication of the notice
required in section 72. This is the subject matter of section 61. The other is that which provided
for the determination of issues raised by adverse claims filed during the period of said publication.
This is governed by sections 72 and 73. In the first case, to which the one at bar belongs, the
procedure is for the Director of Mines to hear the conflicting claimants and settle the issue
between them, without prejudice to either party appealing from the decision of said officer to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources or to the proper court, to which the parties may,
also, appeal from the decision of said Department head.

The court agrees with the petitioner that respondent Vega is bound by law to follow this procedure.
However, her failure to do so, at best, deprived her of a cause of action. It did not affect the
jurisdiction of the lower court to hear the case. The court has repeatedly held that, failure of a
party to exhaust the procedure or administrative remedies provided by law therefor affects his
cause of action, not the jurisdiction of the court over the Subject matter or the case. Hence,
petitioner Atlas is not entitled to the writ of prohibition prayed for.
 [69] [Fortich v. Corona]
G.R. No. 131457| April 24, 1998 | Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action/ Doctrine of
Immutability of Judgment | Martinez | Delos Reyes

Petitioner: HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON.

REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Respondents: HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON.
ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Case Doctrine:
It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force
and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata

FACTS:
*Sorry sobrang haba ng facts
Just take not that the Office of the President issued a decision reversing DAR’s denial of
conversion. Alleged farmers undertook a hunger strike, which prompted the Office of the
President to make changes to their decision, which was already final and executory because
MR was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioners allege the issuance of the Office of the President of a "Win-Win" Resolution
substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become final and
executory.

The said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area
only to the extent of 44 hectares, and ordered the remaining 100 hectares to be
distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

This case involves a 144-hectare land located at Bukidnon. In 1984, the land was leased as a
pineapple plantation to DMPI for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and
Grower's Agreement. During the existence of the lease, DAR placed the entire 144-hectare
property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land

NQSRMDC resisted the DAR's action. It sought and was granted by the DARAB a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered "to desist from pursuing any activity or
activities" concerning the subject land "until further orders."

Despite the DARAB order, DAR Regional Director issued a memorandum directing the Land
Bank to open a trust account for NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings to determine
the just compensation of the subject property.

NQSRMDC objected to DAR’s action and filed an Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order
and to nullify the summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land
Bank on the valuation of the subject property.

Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-

classifying 144 hectares of land from agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of
providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject new economic vitality, provide more
jobs and raise the income of its people. Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved the
said Ordinance.
The said industrial area is supposed to have the following components: Development Academy
of Mindanao, Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park, Forest development, and Support facilities

NQSRMDC Proposal was adopted by the Department of Trade and Industry as one of its
flagship projects. National Irrigation Administration interposed NO OBJECTION to the proposed
conversion.

Despite the favorable recommendation, the DAR invoking its powers to approve conversion of
lands issued an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject land from
agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory coverage of
CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries

Governor Fortich appealed the order of denial to the Office of the President and prayed for the
conversion/reclassification of the subject land filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction

Court of Appeals issued a Resolution ordering the parties to observe status quo pending
resolution of the petition.

Office of the President issued a Decision reversing the DAR Secretary's decision. DAR filed a
motion for reconsideration of the OP decision.

When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it
discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out
that during the pendency of both the Petition it filed against DAR and the appeal to the
President. DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title
and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines

NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the RTC for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and
injunction against DAR and 141 others. RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining Order

An Order was issued by then Executive Secretary Torres denying DAR's motion for
reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The
said order further declared that the OP decision had already become final and executory.

DAR filed a second motion for reconsideration writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
RTC was challenged by some alleged farmers before the Court of Appeals through a petition for
certiorari and prohibition praying for the lifting of the injunction and for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition from further trying the RTC case.

Some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the DAR Compound to
protest the OP Decision asking that the OP Decision allowing the conversion of the entire 144-
hectare property be set aside.

President Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to resolve their grievance
within the framework of the law. Office of the President resolved the strikers' protest by issuing
the so-called "Win/Win" Resolution
● NQSRMDC's application for conversion is APPROVED only with respect to the
approximately forty-four hectare portion of the land adjacent to the highway, as
recommended by the Department of Agriculture.
 ● The remaining approximately hectares traversed by an irrigation canal and found to be
suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries in accordance
with RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
● Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further directed to expedite payment of just
compensation to NQSRMDC for the portion of the land to be covered by the CARP

In seeking the nullification of the "Win-Win" Resolution, the petitioners claim that the
Office of the President was prompted to issue the said resolution "after a very well-
managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in
pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this
purely political decision to appease the 'farmers,' by reviving and modifying the Decision
which has been declared final and executory

ISSUE/S:
W/N “Win-Win” Resolution is valid → NO

HELD:
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are
embodied in Administrative Order No. 18.

SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as

otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof
is filed within such period.

Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in
exceptionally meritorious cases.

When the Office of the President issued the Order declaring the Decision final and executory, as
no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its
jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision.

Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration
filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed
"Win-Win" Resolution.

Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court
mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken. And even if a
second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in "exceptionally meritorious cases,"
still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for
reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision to lapse into finality.

Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its
Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and
basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.

It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative

agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the
force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata. The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of
public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the
judgments of courts having general judicial powers

Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield
the power of adjudication.

[70] [Civil Service Commission v Gabriel Moralde]

Docket No.211077| August 15, 2018 |

Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action| Justice Leonen | Arellano

Case Doctrine: A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. Finality becomes
a fact when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such
period. As a consequence, no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify
a decision that has become final. When a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable

FACTS: Moralde's services were engaged as a Dental Aide in the Province's Provincial Health
Office. He was assigned to the municipalities of Villanueva and Claveria. According to the
Province, he had a history of falsifying public documents by forging his immediate supervisor's
signature onto his Daily Time Record. The Province also noted that he had a track record of
"frequent absences without leave, and . . . habitual tardiness."

Moralde was formally charged with falsifying his Daily Time Records. Atty. Rubio, the
Provincial Attorney recommended that Moralde be dismissed from service. Unknown to the
Province's officials, Moralde went to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) while the
administrative case against him was pending. He filed an "application for retirement" under
Republic Act No. 8291, otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977."

The very next day, Governor Calingin issued a Memorandum finding Moralde guilty of
Falsification of Public Documents and dismissing him from service. There was no showing that
Moralde informed any of the Province's officials about his pending retirement application with
GSIS. Moralde filed an appeal before the CSC because he was supposedly dismissed in violation
of due process.

GSIS approved Moralde’s application for retirement under.

The Province filed before the CSC a Motion for New Trial and/or Modification of Judgement
upon discovering that Moralde bypassed his administrative case through retirement.

CSC: denied the Province's Motion for New Trial and/or Modification of Judgement. The issue of
Moralde's reinstatement to the service with payment of backwages has become moot and
academic.
 Moralde filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals. He maintained that the
Civil Service Commission's ruling on his reinstatement was immutable and that, in any case, he
had never retired, but merely received separation pay.

CA: ruled in favor of Moralde. It noted that a judgment or order becomes final without a perfected
appeal or duly filed motion for reconsideration. Moralde's reinstatement was not rendered moot
and academic.

ISSUE/S: Whether the CSC resolution/judgment is final and executory.

HELD:YES. A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. Finality becomes a
fact when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period.
As a consequence, no court (not even this Court) can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review a
case or modify a decision that has become final.

When a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer
be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine
is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time. The doctrine of immutability
and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose: (1) to avoid delay in the administration
of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business and (2) to put
an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts
exist.

The doctrine of immutability of final judgments applies to decisions rendered by the Civil
Service Commission. A decision of the Civil Service Commission becomes final and executory if
no motion for reconsideration is filed within the 15-day reglementary period under Rule VI, Section
80 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service:

Section 80. Execution of Decision.—The decisions of the Commission Proper or its Regional
Offices shall be immediately executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, unless a motion
for reconsideration is seasonably filed, in which case the execution of the decision shall be held
in abeyance.

The doctrine of immutability of judgments is not itself absolutely and inescapably immutable.
Jurisprudence enumerates instances in which a final judgment's execution may be disturbed: (1)
the correction of clerical errors; (2) nunc pro tunc entries that do not prejudice a party; (3) void
judgments; and (4) whenever supervening events or circumstances transpire after the decisions'
finality, making the decision's execution unjust and inequitable.

Q: When does judgment become immutable and unalterable?

A: A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. Finality becomes a fact when the
reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. As a
consequence, no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a decision
that has become final. When a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable
 [71] [Gelito v. Heirs of Castillo]
GR No. 196367 | February 5, 2020 | Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action/
 Doctrine of Immutability of Judgment | N/A since Notice | Dula

Petitioner: RECARIDO GELITO

Respondents: HEIRS OF CIRIACO TIROL, REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
SOCRATES TIROL

Case Doctrine:Under the doctrine of immutability of judgment, a decision becomes immutable

and unalterable once it turns final. The court also loses its jurisdiction; it may no longer modify or
amend the decision even to correct conclusions of fact and law.

This doctrine is anchored on public policy considerations. In Social Security System v. Isi:
The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose:
1. to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business and
2. to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely
why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of
every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.

The rule on immutability of judgment is not a hard and fast rule. It is subject to a few exceptions,
namely:
1. the correction of clerical errors;
2. the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
3. void judgments; and
4. whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable.

FACTS: In 1968, Gelito began cultivating 2.31 hectares of unirrigated rice land in Boracay Island,
Malay, Aklan. The land, which was covered by the Operation Land Transfer under Letter of
Instruction No. 474, had previously been owned by the heirs of Ciriaco Tirol (Tirol). In 1974, the
government issued Gelito Certificate of Land Transfer No. 00008-1.

Thereafter, the heirs of Tirol filed a Complaint seeking the annulment of Gelito's Certificate of
Land Transfer. Later, Provincial Adjudicator Erlinda S. Vasquez (Provincial Adjudicator Vasquez)
canceled the certificate for being invalid (“1992 decision”).

Five (5) years later, Gelito filed a Complaint 10 before Provincial Adjudicator Valentin F. Nagaynay
(Provincial Adjudicator Nagaynay). The decision ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate.

The heirs of Tirol countered that Gelito had actually received a copy of the 1992 Decision on
November 16 that year, making it final. They claimed that Gelito was now in estoppel and his
Complaint was barred by laches and res judicata.

On appeal before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Gelito mainly argued
that his constitutional rights to due process and adequate legal assistance were violated. The
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board dismissed the case for lack of merit.

On appeal petitioner claimed that the 1992 Decision was void because only the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform is authorized by law to cancel the Certificate of Land Transfer.
Respondents argue that there was no violation of due process because the 1992 Decision was
issued after a hearing. Moreover, it attained finality after the lapse of the period to appeal.

ISSUE/S:Whether or not the doctrine of immutability of judgment applies in this case.

HELD:Under the doctrine of immutability of judgment, a decision becomes immutable and

unalterable once it turns final. The court also loses its jurisdiction; it may no longer modify or
amend the decision even to correct conclusions of fact and law.

This doctrine is anchored on public policy considerations. In Social Security System v. Isi:

The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose: (1) to
avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge
of judicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors,
which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and
obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.

Nevertheless, the mandatory character of this rule must not be a vehicle to perpetuate injustice.
If warranted, it must "yield to practicality, logic, fairness, and substantial justice."

Thus, the rule on immutability of judgment is not a hard and fast rule. It is subject to a few
exceptions, namely:
(1) the correction of clerical errors;
(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
(3) void judgments; and
(4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable.

Clerical errors, such as typographical errors and miscalculations, may be corrected without
violating the doctrine of immutability of judgment, since the correction does not affect the
decision's substance.

A nunc pro tunc correction is made to "enter into the record an act previously done by the court,
which had been omitted through inadvertence or mistake." It is not made to correct judicial error,
but solely for the records to reflect a "judicial action which has been actually taken."

If a judgment is void, it is considered a nullity and never acquires finality The doctrine of
immutability of judgment, then, will not apply. A void judgment does not have any legal effect; it
cannot be a "source of any right nor of any obligation." Any writ of execution or order issued based
on a void judgment is also void.

Lastly, a supervening event may justify the modification or alteration of a judgment if the event
caused a material change in the circumstance of the case. In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of
Appeal a supervening event is defined in this wise:

Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become final and executory
or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality, including
matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in
existence at that time.

To invoke this exception, the following must be established:

(1) the supervening event must have "transpire[d] after [the] judgment has become final and
executory"; and
(2) the supervening event must affect or change the judgment's substance that its execution is
rendered inequitable.

[First contention that there is a supervening event:]

In this case, petitioner argues that the 1992 Decision must be set aside since it was only in 2006
— when Proclamation No. 1064 was issued — that Boracay was declared alienable and
disposable, which meant respondents could not have claimed ownership over the land in 1991.

Proclamation No. 1064 cannot be considered a supervening event here. It does not divest
ownership from respondents who are recognized landowners by the government under the
Operation Land Transfer.

Hence, petitioner cannot claim ownership over the land simply because he was issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer. At most, he only has an inchoate right over the land, which may be
revoked by the government if warranted.

[Second contention that the 1992 decision is void]

Petitioner contends that the 1992 Decision is void for lack of jurisdiction. Only the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, he insists, has the authority to cancel the Certificate of Land Transfer.

A review of the relevant laws and issuances shows that the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board was never conferred jurisdiction over the cancellation of certificates of land
transfer.

Here, petitioner filed his Complaint before Provincial Adjudicator Nagaynay in 1997, 97 when the
1994 Rules of Procedure were in place. Being an administrative function, the cancellation of the
certificate of land transfer is exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.

Consistently, the 1994 Rules of Procedure did not mention that the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board has jurisdiction on the issuance, correction, or cancellation of
certificates of land transfer.

Even if the prior 1989 Rules of Procedure were followed, the cancellation of certificates of land
transfer still does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Board. The 1989 Rules merely refer to the
issuance and administrative correction of certificates of land transfer. Cancellation does not fall
under "administrative correction" because the term merely refers to "rectification of wrong or
insufficient information in the patent and not to something as substantial as the actual cancellation
thereof."

As stated under Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1994,
"administrative correction" includes "non-identification of spouse, corrections of civil status,
corrections of technical descriptions and other matters related to agrarian reform."

The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board was never accorded jurisdiction to cancel
certificates of land transfer. At most, it can only issue and make administrative corrections on
certificates.
Hence, the 1992 Decision is void for lack of jurisdiction. Respondents' Complaint for the
annulment of the Certificate of Land Transfer should have been filed before the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, not the Provincial Adjudicator. Thus, despite the lapse of time from the issuance
of the 1992 Decision, petitioner can assail its validity. The doctrine of immutability of judgment
cannot be applied to a void judgment.