RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A

STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"

DOCTRINE

All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private
practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an
indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good
fidelity towards the courts. 

FACTS

On July 27, 2010, the UP College of Law faculty members gave their opinion on the
matter of plagiarism in Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo’s ponencia in the case
of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary by issuing an article titled “Restoring Integrity: A
statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” signed overall
37 faculty members.   In said article, the faculty expressly gave their dismay saying
that the court had the hopes of relief from those “comfort women” during the war
“crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the
Highest Court of the Land.” 
The cause of publishing the article as a protest happened on April 28, 2010 when the
decision of the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary was promulgated with Justice
Del Castillo as its ponente.  On July 19, 2010, counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H.
Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed
a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited
for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of
the Vinuya decision. 
The most notable ground was that not only did the ponente of the case plagiarized at
least 3 books and articles in discussing the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes,
but have also twisted such quotations making it appear contrary to the intent of the
original works.  
The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: 1) Evan J Criddle and Evan
Fox-Decent’s A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens published in 2009 in the Yale Journal
of International Law; 2) Christian J. Tams’ Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in
Internation Law published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and 3) Mark
Ellis’ Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime published in the Case
Western Reserve Journal of Internation Law in 2006.
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July
19, 2010, journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled
"SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak website.
The same article appeared on the GMA News TV website also on July 19, 2010. On
July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in
the Manila Standard Today. In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan
Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya
decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been
plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddle’s response to the post by Julian Ku
regarding the news report15 on the alleged plagiarism in the international law blog,
Opinio Juris.
Thereafter, on August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010 titled "Restoring
Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of
Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court"
was posted in Newsbreak’s website and on Atty. Roque’s blog. A report regarding the
statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News
TV and the Sun Star sites, on the same date. The statement was likewise posted at
the University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board allegedly on August
10, 2010 and at said college’s website.
In the article, it was stated that plagiarism, as appropriation and misrepresentation of
another person’s work as one’s own, is considered as “dishonesty, pure and simple.”
Hence, it was argued that since the decision in the Vinuya case form part of the
Philippine judicial system, the Court, in fine, is allowing dishonesty to be promulgated.
Furthermore, the plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Vinuya case undermines
the judicial system of our country and is a dirt on the honor and dignity of the
Supreme Court, the article sought for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo.
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the
University of the Philippines College of Law Faculty to the Court, through Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona.
The Ethics Committee was given a copy of the signed UP Law Faculty Statement that
showed on the signature pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81
faculty members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement was
that only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have signed the same.
The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc. In response to the
said article, the Court issued a resolution stating that the remarks and choice of words
used were such a great insult to the members of the Court and a threat to the
independence of the judiciary, a clear violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and the Rules
1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  Thereafter, the Court
ordered the signatories to show cause on why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar for such alleged violations.
In fulfillment of the directive by the Court, the signatories passed a Common
Compliance stating therein that their intention in issuing the article in question “was
not to malign the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure
continued confidence in the legal system” by the words used therein as “focusing on
constructive action.”  Also, it was alleged that the respondents are correct in seeking
responsibility from Justice del Castillo for he, indeed, committed plagiarism thus,
rectifying their issuance of the article.  Furthermore, the respondents argued that the
article in question is a valid exercise of the freedom of expression as citizens of a
democracy, and an exercise of academic freedom.

ISSUE/S
1.) Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of
expression.
2.) Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’ academic
freedom as law professors.
3.) Whether or not the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violation of various Canons
and Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING

1. The Court held that the Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their
freedom of expression. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that
it was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that
they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said
Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious language by
which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have
expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the
"proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution.
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’ freedom of
expression when it stated that:
“While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free
and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only
goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to
become harmful and irresponsible attacks.”

2. The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’ academic
freedom.
The Court reminded the respondents that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano
v. Monsod, lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of
law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach
law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal
profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same
canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the
fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are
lawyers.
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed
academic freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine what they will teach
their students and how they will teach. We must point out that there is nothing in the
Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can
teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the
principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to
disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue
intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure,
even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.
3. The Court ruled that the Common Compliance given by the respondent-signatories
in the questioned article is not sufficient in reasoning why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as
follows:

“CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the
text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which
has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the
court.”

The adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use
strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing
but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged.
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his
pleadings must be dignified.
Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement
exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech.
In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have
monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers
passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by certain
rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it
should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and
courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All
lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private
practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an
indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good
fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law
professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to
which they belong.”
The Court further reminded the respondent law professors “of their lawyerly duty,
under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due
respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending
to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the
administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court
finds his Compliance to be satisfactory.

(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents… is found UNSATISFACTORY.

These 35 respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under
Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect
to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to
influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the
administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.

(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of
violation of Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to
be more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a
Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the
Court and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these
proceedings. However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a
Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional
conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.

(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.

VICTOR C. LINGAN, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB AND

JIMMY P. BALIGA, RESPONDENTS.
DOCTRINE
This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this
court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from
performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period
of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in government requiring
the authority to practice law.

FACTS
In the resolution dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and
Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and of the Lawyer's Oath. Respondents allowed their secretaries to
notarize documents in their stead, in violation of Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial
Law. This court suspended respondents from the practice of law for one year,
revoked their notarial commissions, and disqualified them from reappointment as
notaries public for two years.

After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the
Commission on Human Rights en banc issued the resolution dated January 16, 2007,
suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the. Commission on
Human Rights Regional Office for Region II. According to the Commission en banc,
Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law "prevented him from assuming his
post as Regional Director for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to
practice law is suspended, which was downgraded to an admonishment for violating
his notarial commission. The Commission later downgraded the suspension in favor
of an admonition. On May 8, 2009, this court received ·a letter from complainant
Lingan, alleging that Atty. Baliga continued practicing law and discharging his
functions as CHR RD, in violation of this court's order of suspension. Complainant
Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a CHR RD necessarily required
the practice of law. A CHR Regional Director must be a member of the bar and is
designated as Attorney VI. Since this court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice
of law, he was in effect "a non-lawyer . . . and was disqualified from holding the
position of RD whilst suspended."

O.B.C. Found that the period of suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga had
already lapsed. It recommended that respondents be required to file their respective
motions to lift order of suspension with certifications from the IBP and the Executive
Judge of the court where they might appear as counsel and state that they desisted
from practicing law during the period of suspension. Baliga alleged that his
suspension from the practice of law did not include his suspension from public office.
Atty. Baliga alleged that as Regional Director, he "perform[ed], generally, managerial
functions," which did not require the practice of law. The CHR’s comment argued that
"the penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and
distinct from any penalty that may be imposed upon him as a public official for the
same acts." According to the Commission, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice
of law is a "bar matter" while the imposition of penalty upon a Commission on Human
Rights official "is an entirely different thing, falling as it does within the exclusive
authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body." Nevertheless, the Commission
manifested that it would defer to this court's resolution of the issue and would "abide
by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives at on [the] matter. " In February
2010, this court lifted the order of suspension of Atty. Calubaquib, who was allowed to
resume his practice of law and perform notarial acts.

ISSUE
The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of suspension
should be granted.

HELD
We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We, therefore,
suspend him further from the practice of law for six months. Practice of law is "any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are
characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which]
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Work in government that
requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice. of law. In Cayetano v.
Monsod, this court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and
agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use
of] legal knowledge or legal talent" is practice of law.

The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the

Constitution with power to investigate "all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights[.]" It is divided into regional offices with each office having
primary responsibility to investigate human rights violations in its territorial jurisdiction.
Each regional office is headed by the Regional Director who is given the position of
Attorney VI. The powers and functions of a regional director are characteristic of the
legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are usually performed by members of the
judiciary and notaries public - officers who are necessarily members of the bar.
Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the Commission's
legal officer. Discussing immediate courses of action and protection remedies and
reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal
officer require the use of extensive legal knowledge. The exercise of the powers and
functions of a CHR RD constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director must
be an attorney - a member of the bar in good standing and authorized to practice
law. When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as when he or she is
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a
necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or
suspended lawyer must desist from holding the position of Regional Director.

We remind Atty. Baliga him that the practice of law is a "privilege burdened with
conditions." To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere] to the
rigid standards of mental fitness, [maintain] the highest degree of morality[,] and
[faithfully comply] with the rules of [the] legal profession."
TOLENTINO, petitioner V. NATANUAN, respondent

FACTS:
Complainant Dolores alleged that she is a co-owner (with her siblings
Rafaela, Ernestina, and Romulo [Dolores, et al.]) of a parcel of land with
an area of about 50,000 square meters located in Tagaytay City.2 On
January 3, 1978, they sold this land to Alejo Tolentino (Alejo) for
P500,000.00. At the time, the title to the property had not yet been issued
by the Land Registration Commission.3 The parties thus agreed that
payment for the same shall be made in installments, as follows:
P80,000.00 upon the execution of the contract and the remaining balance
in two (2) installments, payable one (1) year after the issuance of the title
and then one (1) year thereafter.4chanrobleslaw

On August 9, 1979, and after the execution of the contract of sale between
the parties, the Register of Deeds of Cavite issued Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-1075935 in Alejo's favor. Despite several requests from
Dolores, et al., Alejo, however, failed to settle the remaining obligation.
Thus, on May 14, 1991, Dolores, et al. filed a case against Alejo and his
wife Filomena, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1188, for the recovery of
possession of immovable property, declaration of nullity of the deed of
sale, and damages.6chanrobleslaw

On March 30, 1993, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) promulgated a

Decision7 in Civil Case No. TG-1188 declaring the rescission of the contract
of sale. Consequently, it ordered: (1) the reconveyance of the land back to
Dolores, et al.; (2) the cancellation of TCT No. T-107593; (3) the issuance
of a new title in favor of Dolores, et al.; and (4) the payment of damages
by Alejo and Filomena.

Sometime in June 1993, Dolores discovered that the TCT No. 107593
under Alejo's name was issued not on the basis of the January 3, 1978
contract but on a Deed of Sale dated August 3, 1979, purportedly
executed by their father Jose Natanauan (Jose), Salud Marqueses,
Melquides8 Parungao and Asuncion Fajardo (Jose, et al.).9 She further
discovered a Joint Affidavit dated August 6, 1979, purportedly
executed by Jose, et al. attesting to the absence of tenants or lessees in
the property10 and another Deed of Sale dated March 9, 1979,
executed between Dolores, et al. as vendors and Atty. Tolentino as vendee
covering purportedly the same property. 11chanrobleslaw

Dolores claims that the foregoing documents were falsified as Jose, who
died in Talisay, Batangas on June 12, 1977, could not have signed the
Deed of Sale dated August 3, 1979 and the Joint Affidavit dated August 6,
1979.12 Furthermore, the Deeds of Sale were all notarized by Notary Public
Perfecto P. Fernandez (Perfecto) who Dolores later on discovered was not
commissioned as a notary public for and in the City of Manila for the year
1979.13chanrobleslaw

It was also around the same time that Dolores discovered that the title to
the property has been subsequently registered, under TCT No. T-21993, in
the name of Buck Estate, Inc., where Atty. Tolentino is a
stockholder,14 and mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation for
Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00).15chanrobleslaw

Thus, on June 1, 1994, Dolores filed the present disbarment complaint

against Atty. Tolentino and Perfecto for their alleged acts of falsification. In
her complaint, Dolores attached an Affidavit dated December 2, 1980,
where Alejo and Filomena attested that the subject property never
belonged to them in truth or in fact, the true and absolute owner of the
same being Alejo's brother, Atty. Tolentino.16 Notably, this Affidavit bears
Atty. Tolentino's conformity.

On December 4, 1996, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for
investigation, report and recommendation.29 Due to Atty. Tolentino's
repeated failure and refusal to appear on the scheduled hearings, Dolores
was allowed to give testimony and present her evidence ex-
parte.30chanrobleslaw

On August 6, 2013, Atty. Tolentino filed a Manifestation and/or

Motion45 claiming that he was denied his constitutional right to due process
when the IBP Board failed to give him an opportunity to be heard and
present his side. Atty. Tolentino claims that neither he nor his counsel
received a subpoena or notice of the order directing parties to file their
memorandum. He likewise challenges the findings made by Commissioner
Espina, on the ground that the latter simply relied on Dolores'
Memorandum, there being no transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings.46 Atty. Tolentino further decries the IBP Board's decision to
increase the recommended penalty from six (6) months to three (3) years
suspension from the practice of law, as this was done without giving him
the opportunity to be notified and heard.47chan
ISSUES:
1. whether there was a violation of Atty. Tolentino's constitutional right
to due process
2. whether Atty. Tolentino committed deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct through the aforementioned falsifications in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath which
would merit his disbarment and removal from the legal profession.

RULING:
1) No, There was no violation of due process, the rule states:
Rule 138, Section 30 of the Revised Rules of Court also
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sec. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. - No attorney

shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he
has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges
against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by
himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and
answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex-
parte.

Contrary to his claims, Atty. Tolentino was not denied due process or
deprived of an opportunity to be heard. The records show that his then
counsel Atty. Fuentes filed a Comment on his behalf. He also filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the May 13, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board, and a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. His participation through
pleadings and motions cured whatever defect that may have attended the
issuance of notices regarding the proceedings held before the IBP.

In Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,50 we held that

any defect in the observance of due process is cured by the filing of a
motion for reconsideration and that denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked by a party who was afforded the opportunity to be
heard.51 We likewise reiterated that defects in procedural due process may
be cured when the party has been afforded the opportunity to appeal or to
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 52chanrobleslaw

Knowing that there is a pending administrative complaint against him,

Atty. Tolentino should have actively and voluntarily participated in the case
especially so when he believes that his defense is meritorious. Instead,
after filing his Comment containing bare denials and facts unsupported by
any proof, Atty. Tolentino deliberately failed to participate in the
proceeding and now hides behind the flimsy excuse that no notices were
received by him or his counsel.

2) Yes, Rule 138 provides:

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred from the practice of law for any of the following
grounds:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1) Deceit;
2) Malpractice;
3) Gross misconduct in office;
4) Grossly immoral conduct;
5) Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6) Violation of the lawyer's oath;
7) Willful disobedience to the lawful order of the court;
8) Willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority to do so; and
9) Solicitation of cases at law for the purpose of gain either personally or through paid
agents or brokers.58
In the case at bar, Atty. Tolentino is charged with violating the Lawyer's
Oath and Canons 1, 7, and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Lawyer's Oath is a covenant every lawyer undertakes to become and

remain part of the legal profession.63 It is not mere facile words, drift and
hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. 64 It is a
source of obligation and duty for every lawyer, 65 which includes an
undertaking to obey the laws and legal orders of duly constituted
authorities therein, and not to do falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court. All lawyers are obligated to uphold their Oaths lest they be
subjected to administrative cases and sanctions.66chanrobleslaw

Canons 1, 7, and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, on the

other hand, read as follows:ChanRoblesVirtuala
Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated
Bar.
 Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the
court.

Atty. Roberto P. Tolentino purchased said parcel of land through the

intervention of a certain Juan Luna; on January 3, 1978, they were
accompanied by Juan Luna to the Office of Atty. Roberto P. Tolentino
located at Roxas Boulevard, Manila. Thereat, Atty. Roberto P. Tolentino,
paid them the amount EIGHTY THOUSAND (P80, 000.00) PESOS for and
as downpayment for the purchase of said parcel of land. After receiving
such amount, they were asked by him to sign a Deed of Sale dated August
3, 1979 x x x subject to the condition that he will cause the transfer of
ownership of the said parcel of land from Jose Natanauan to them and
thereafter, he will pay the unpaid balance of the purchase price.

Instead of transferring said ownership from Jose Natanauan to them, she

declared that Atty. Roberto Tolentino caused the transfer of ownership
from Jose Natanauan to Spouses Alejo Tolentino and Filomena Tolentino by
executing a falsified Deed of Sale dated August 3, 1979 x x x and Joint
Affidavit dated August 6, 1979 x x x; Atty. Roberto P. Tolentino falsified
and forged the signatures of Jose Natanauan, Salud Marqueses,
Melquiades [Parungao] and Asuncion Fajardo in such documents making it
appear that they (Jose, Salud, Melquiades and Asuncion) sold the said
parcel of land to Spouses Alejo Tolentino and Filomena
Tolentino.69 (Emphasis supplied.)
The court agrees with Commissioner Espina's finding that there is sufficient
proof to hold that Atty. Tolentino was involved in the falsification. The
totality of evidence (consisting of the falsified documents, Dolores'
testimony detailing the transactions surrounding the land, and the
investigation conducted by this Court) leaves no doubt as to Atty.
Tolentino's involvement in, or at the very least, benefit from the acts of
falsification imputed against him.
ESTRADA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

DOCTRINE

The Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar from

making such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for
or against a party.

FACTS

The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting through
his counsel Attorney Alan F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et al. The Petition
prays – "1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable
Court disqualify themselves from hearing and deciding this petition; "2. That the
assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and 3. That
Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the
Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

"Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the inhibition of
the members of the Supreme Court from hearing the petition is called for under Rule
5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in
any partisan political activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have
violated by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner contends that the justices have thereby prejudged a case that
would assail the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent
decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is,
petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and due process

According to atty Paguia It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to

include these material facts which are obviously undeniable. Besides, it is the only
defense of President Estrada.’  "On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order
denying the foregoing motion, as well as the motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner.
Remarking in open court that to grant Estrada’s motion would result in chaos and
disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged ‘bias and partial attitude’ of the
Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their
disqualification. On 31 July 2003, petitioner received the two assailed resolutions, i.e.,
the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 28 July 2003, denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of 6 July 2003; viz: The instant petition assailing the
foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for gross insufficiency in substance and for
utter lack of merit.

The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion, an indispensable

requirement to warrant a recourse to the extraordinary relief of petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. On the one hand, petitioner
would disclaim the authority and jurisdiction of the members of this tribunal and, on
the other hand, he would elevate the petition now before it to challenge the two
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. He denounces the decision as being a patent
mockery of justice and due process. Attorney Pagula went on to state that- ‘The act of
the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the public office.1awp++i1 But the act of the
public officer, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the public office. Consequently, the act
of the justices, if LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme Court. But the act of the justices,
if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the Decision in
ESTRADA vs. ARROYO being patently unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of the CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not the act of the Supreme Court but is merely the wrong or
trespass of those individual Justices who falsely spoke and acted in the name of the
Supreme Court. (Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]). Furthermore, it would seem
absurd to allow the Justices to use the name of the Supreme Court as a shield for
their UNLAWFUL act.’ (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.

Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of

the bar from making such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked
the fires of public dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the
administration of justice. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED, and the Court hereby orders Attorney Alan Paguia, counsel for
petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to SHOW CAUSE, within ten days from notice
hereof, why he should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an
officer of the Court."

ISSUE
Whether or not atty paguia should be suspended for violating the code of professional
responsibility for making public statements on a pending case?

RULING

The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by
anyone against the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the
task of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of
our people’s faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged
by it to practice law in the Philippines.1âwphi1

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer

should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and,
indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and
devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the
members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede,
obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
 The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule
13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from
making such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for
or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Court’s well-
meant admonition. Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public
statements of like nature. The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of
disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and
as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.

WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended

from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt hereof, for conduct
unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

GABRIELA CORONEL v. ATTY. NELSON A. CUNANAN

A.C. No. 6738, August 12, 2015

TOPIC: Legal Ethics; A lawyer should not recommend to his client any recourse or
remedy that is contrary to law, public policy, public order, and public morals.

FACTS:
In October 2003, Coronel engaged the services of respondent to transfer to her
name and her co-heirs the parcels of land whose certificates of title are both
registered under the name of Coronel’s deceased grandparents.

Atty. Cunanan advised Coronel that for the registration of the TCTs, the transfer
may be effected by two means:
 Ordinary procedure - transfer by way of execution of Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement. It will cost Coronel an estimate of Php56,000.00 with the amount of
Php50,000.00 more or less to be spent for the payment of taxes. Transfer by
this means may take a period of at least five (5) months.
 Direct registration - preparing documents upon advise of the Register of
Deeds and will involve an estimated cost to be negotiated with the officials or
employees of the Register of Deeds to a flat amount of Php50,000.00. Transfer
by this means will take only one (1) month or less.

Coronel and Atty. Cunanan agreed to go for direct registration. Atty. Cunanan
billed Coronel for P110,000 representing fees for the registration of the TCT and
OCT, as well as litigation expenses and professional fees.

Atty. Cunanan sent to Coronel an Extra-Judicial Settlement Agreement. Coronel

had it signed and sent back to Atty. Cunanan. Thereafter, Atty. Cunanan asked
Coronel for the owner's duplicate copy of TCT. No. T-72074, which Coronel, likewise,
sent to Respondent.

Afterwards, Coronel heard nothing from Atty. Cunanan. When her request for a
call from Atty. Cunanan was not heeded, she wrote to Atty. Cunanan demanding that
the amount of Php70,000 which she paid be returned to her as well as the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT. No. 72074. When Atty. Cunanan refused, Coronel filed the
instant disbarment case charging the former with deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct.

The Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. The IBP Board of Governors found Atty. Cunanan guilty of
malpractice and negligence; recommending his suspension from the practice of law
for six months; and requiring his return of the P70,000.00.

Atty. Cunanan then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, citing the affidavit of
desistance executed by the complainant and their Joint Motion to Dismiss, but the
IBP Board of Governors denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the actions of Atty. Cunanan constituted malpractice, deceit or
gross misconduct.
2. Whether or not Coronel’s filing of affidavit of desistance and the Join Motion to
Dismiss would warrant would set aside the administrative proceedings.

HELD:
Yes, the actions of Atty. Cunanan constituted malpractice, deceit or gross
misconduct. He proposed the option of "direct registration" despite being fully aware
that such option was actually a shortcut intended to circumvent the law was patently
contrary to law.

The transfer under the said option would bypass the immediate heirs of their
grandparents and consequently deprive the Government of the corresponding estate
taxes and transfer fees aside from requiring the falsification of the transfer
documents. Atty. Cunanan further assured that he could enable the direct transfer
with the help of his contacts in the Office of the Register of Deeds and other relevant
agencies of the Government, which meant that he would be bribing some officials and
employees of those offices. The proposal of "direct registration" was unquestionably
unlawful, immoral and deceitful all at once.

The fact that Coronel subsequently executed the affidavit of desistance, and
later on the Joint Motion to Dismiss is unworthy of consideration. The desistance by
the complainant was a matter that was the concern only of the parties, and was non-
binding on the Court. What will be decisive in this administrative proceeding are the
facts borne out by the evidence competently adduced herein.

CASE DOCTRINE:
 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes. He shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct; or counsel or abet activities aimed at a defiance of
the law or at a lessening of confidence in the legal system. He should advise his
client to uphold the law, not to violate or disobey it. Conversely, he should not
recommend to his client any recourse or remedy that is contrary to law, public
policy, public order, and public morals.

 An administrative case proceeds independently from the interest, or lack thereof,

of the complainant, who only sets the case in motion through the filing of the
complaint. Upon her doing so, she becomes a witness to testify against the
respondent lawyer. The disciplinary proceedings against the lawyer do not involve
private interests, but only how the lawyer conducts himself in his public and private
lives. Accordingly, neither the affidavit of desistance nor the Joint Motion to
Dismiss should bear any weight, or be relevant in determining whether or not the
respondent was fit to remain as a member of the Law Profession. The desistance
by the complainant was a matter that was the concern only of the parties, and was
nonbinding on the Court. What will be decisive in this administrative proceeding
are the facts borne out by the evidence competently adduced herein.

Nestle Philippines V Augusto Sanchez

Facts:

During the period July 8-10. 1987, Union of Filipro Employees, and petitioner,
Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia
intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17, 1987 in
front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets'
quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing
access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and
employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a
kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of
proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with
slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud
speakers. These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by
Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where
their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro
Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the
demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of
court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets
were maintained.
Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw
graciously and requiring union leaders of respondent Union of Filipro Employees in
the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and union leaders
of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court and then and
there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose
C. Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be
administratively dealt with. Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders
concerned, apologized to the Court for the above-described acts, together with an
assurance that they will not be repeated.

ISSUE:

WON the respondents should be held in contempt and Atty. Espinas be

administratively dealth with

RULING:

Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through
appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to
the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition
of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its
functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not
knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not
aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the
Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the
exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of
constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the
course of justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising
them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of
record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best
to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. Let this
incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is
their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of
decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the
importance of a continuing educational program for their members.

JERRY M. PALENCIA, Complainant vs. Atty. PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Atty.

GERARD M. LINSANGAN, and Atty. GLENDA M. LINSANGAN-BINOYA,
Respondents

FACTS:
Complainant was an overseas Filipino worker seafarer who was seriously injured
during work when he fell into the elevator shaft of the vessel M/T "Panos G" flying a
Cyprus flag. After initial treatment in Singapore, complainant was discharged and
flown to the Philippines to continue his medical treatment and rehabilitation.

While confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital, certain paralegals in respondents' law
office, approached complainant. They convinced him to engage the services of
respondents' law office in order to file a suit against his employers for indemnity. After
several visits from the paralegals and respondent Atty. Pedro Linsangan, complainant
engaged the legal services of respondents and Gurbani & Co., a law firm based in
Singapore, and agreed to pay attorney's fees of 35% of any recovery or settlement
obtained for both.

After execution of the contract, complainant, through the efforts of respondents, was
paid by his employer the following amounts: US$60,000.00 as indemnity and
US$20,000.00 under their collective bargaining agreement. From these amounts,
respondents charged complainant attorney's fees of 35%.

Respondents and Gurbani & Co. also filed a tort case against the owners of "Panos
G" before the High Court of Singapore (Singapore case). Thereafter, negotiations led
to a settlement award in favor of complainant in the amount of US$95,000.00.

Gurbani & Co. remitted to respondents the amount of US$59,608.40. From this
amount, respondents deducted: (1) US$5,000.00 as payment to Justice Gancayco’s
legal advice; (2) their attorney's fees equivalent to 35%; and (3) other expenses,
leaving the net amount of US$ l 8, 132.43 for complainant.

Respondents tendered the amount of US$20,756.05 (representing the US$18,132.43)

to complainant, which the latter refused. As complainant contested the amount
comprised of the expenses and attorney's fees deducted, the following civil actions
ensued between complainant and respondents:

1. Respondents filed an action for preliminary mandatory injunction (Civil Case No.
05113475) before the Regional Trial Court (R TC) of Manila to compel complainant to
receive the amount tendered. This case was dismissed.

2. Complainant filed with the RTC of Ligao City an action for accounting, remittance of
settlement amounts and damages. The RTC ruled in favor of complainant and
ordered respondents to make proper accounting, among others.

3. Complainant also filed the subject letter-complaint with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). He requested that an
investigation be conducted and the corresponding disciplinary action be imposed
upon respondents for committing the following unethical acts: (1) refusing to remit the
amount collected in the Singapore case worth US$95,000.00, and in offering only
US$20,756.05; (2) depositing complainant's money into their own account; and (3)
engaging in "ambulance chasing" by deploying their agents to convince complainant
to hire respondents' services while the former was still bedridden in the hospital.

ISSUE:
1. Whether respondents are guilty of ambulance chasing.
2. Whether respondents violated Canon 16 of the CPR.
HELD:

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondents Attys.
Pedro L. Linsangan and, Gerard M. Linsangan. We, however, absolve respondent
Atty. Glenda M. Linsangan-Binoya for lack of any evidence as to her
participation in the acts complained of.

1. .YES. The practice of law is a profession and not a business. A lawyer in

making known his legal services must do so in a dignified manner. They are
prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers. The CPR explicitly states that "[a] lawyer shall not do or
permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business." Corollary
to this duty is for lawyers not to encourage any suit or proceeding for any corrupt
motive or interest. Thus, "ambulance chasing," or the solicitation of almost any kind of
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent, in order to gain employment,
is proscribed.

Here, there is sufficient evidence to show that respondents violated these rules. No
less than their paralegals admitted that respondent Atty. Pedro Linsangan came with
them to Manila Doctors Hospital several times to convince complainant to hire their
services. This is a far cry from respondents' claim that they were merely providing free
legal advice to the public. Moreover, while respondents deny the paralegal's
connection with their law firm, this was sufficiently rebutted by complainant when he
presented that certain paralegal’s resignation letter as received by respondents'
firm. In employing paralegals to encourage complainant to file a lawsuit against his
employers, respondents indirectly solicited legal business and encouraged the filing of
suit. These constitute malpractice which calls for the exercise of the court's
disciplinary powers and warrants serious sanctions.

2. YES. The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary.   This
relationship holds a lawyer to a great degree of fidelity and good faith especially in
handling money or property of his clients. Thus, Canon 16 and its rules remind a
lawyer to: (1) hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession; (2) deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand subject to his retaining lien; and (3) account for all money or
property collected or received for or from his client.

Money collected by a lawyer on a judgment rendered in favor of his client constitutes

trust funds and must be immediately paid over to the client. As he holds such funds
as agent or trustee, his failure to pay or deliver the same to the client after demand
constitutes conversion. Thus, whenever a lawyer collects money as a result of a
favorable judgment, he must promptly report and account the money collected to his
client.

While respondents gave prompt notice to complainant of their receipt of money

collected in the latter's favor, they were amiss in their duties to give accurate
accounting of the amounts due to complainant, and to return the money due to client
upon demand.

The Attorney-Client Contract between the parties states: "We/I hereby voluntarily
agree and bind ourselves, our heirs and assigns to pay Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan and
his collaborating Singapore counsels, the sum equivalent to thirty-five [35%] percent
of any recovery or settlement obtained." 57 Clearly, the stipulated rate referred to the
combined professional fees of both respondents and their collaborating Singapore
counsel, Gurbani & Co. Nevertheless, respondents proceeded to deduct separate
fees on top of the amount already deducted by Gurbani & Co. Complainant contested
this deduction and refused to accept the amount being tendered by respondents.
Since a claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the
services of a lawyer had been rendered, or in a separate action, respondents, instead
of forcibly deducting their share, should have moved for the judicial determination and
collection of their attorney's fees. The fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for his
attorney's fees on money in his hands collected for his client does not entitle
him to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself.

Worse, respondents allegedly kept the money inside the firm's vault for two years until
they were made aware of the disciplinary complaint against them before the IBP-
CBD. It is improper for the lawyer to put his client's funds in his personal safe deposit
vault. Funds belonging to the client should be deposited in a separate trust account in
a bank or trust company of good repute for safekeeping. 

It is apparent from the foregoing that respondents failed to handle their client's money
with great degree of fidelity. Respondents also showed their lack of good faith when
they appropriated for themselves more than what is allowed under their contract.

More, they also failed to observe proper safekeeping of their client's money.
Respondents violated the trust reposed in them, and demonstrated their lack of
integrity and moral soundness. Respondents' flagrant and malicious refusal to comply
with the CPR amounts to gross misconduct. This warrants the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions.

MUNICIPALITY OF PILILA VS. MORAVE, ET AL., G.R. 105909, 28 JUNE 1994, 233
SCRA 484

TOPIC:

Private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits.

The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to
situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.

FACTS:

The RTC of Tanay, Rizal rendered a judgment in a civil case in favor of the Municipality of
Pilila and against Philippine Petroleum Corporation, ordering PPC to pay the assessed
business taxes and other fees. The SC affirmed the judgment of the RTC, with some
modifications regarding business taxes accruing prior to 1976 to not be paid by PPC. The
judgment became final and executory on July 13,1991, with the records remanded to the RTC
for execution.

In connection with the execution of the judgment of the SC, Atty. Felix Mendiola filed a
motion in behalf of the Municipality for the examination of PPC’s gross sales for the
years 1976 – 1978 and 1984 – 1991 for the purpose of computing its business
taxes. Meanwhile, PPC filed a manifestation that it had already paid the sum of P11.45
million to Mayor Patenia in full satisfaction of the judgment of the SC. As evidence, it
presented release and quitclaim documents signed by the Mayor. Accordingly, the RTC denied
Atty. Mendiola’s motion.

Atty. Mendiola filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the total liability amounted to
P24.2 million while the amount received by the Mayor was only P12.7 million. He asserted
that the mayor could not waive the balance which represents taxes due under the judgment to
the municipality. It must be noted that the law firm of Atty. Mendiola had registered two liens
over the judgment for alleged consultancy services of 25% and attorneys' fees of 25% which,
when quantified and added, amount to more than P12 million. The RTC, however, denied the
MR.

A petition for certiorari was filed by Atty. Mendiola which was referred to the CA for
appropriate action. However, PPC filed a motion questioning the authority of Atty. Mendiola
to represent the Municipality. The CA subsequently dismissed the petition of Atty. Mendiola
for having been filed by a private counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence, but without
prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the Municipality of Pililla through the proper
provincial or municipal legal officer.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Mendiola, a private counsel, has the authority to file an action for and on
behalf of the Municipality of Pilila.

HELD:
No.

The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file a
petition on behalf of and in the name of the Municipality of Pililla. The matter of
representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled in Ramos vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
where it was ruled that private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in
lawsuits.

Section 1683 of the RAC, complemented by Section 3 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Law)
provides that only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a
province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's
authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the
provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. For the exception to apply, the fact that
the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality’s case must appear on
record.

As applied to the case at hand, there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial
fiscal was disqualified to act as counsel for Pililla on appeal, therefore the appearance of Atty.
Mendiola was without authority of law.
The submission of Atty. Mendiola that the exception is broad enough to include situations
wherein the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case cannot be sustained. The fiscal's refusal
to represent the municipality is not a legal justification for employing the services of private
counsel. Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a fiscal cannot
refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath
of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should
request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial
fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to Section 1679 of
the Revised Administrative Code.

Furthermore, even assuming that the representation of the municipality by Atty. Mendiola was
duly authorized, said authority is deemed to have been revoked by the municipality when the
latter, through the municipal mayor and without said counsel's participation, entered into a
compromise agreement with herein private respondent with regard to the execution of the
judgment in its favor and thereafter filed personally with the court below two pleadings
entitled and constitutive of a "Satisfaction of Judgment" and a "Release and Quitclaim".

Ledesma vs. Climaco, G.R. 23815, 28 June 1974, 57 SCRA 473

FACTS:
Adelino Ledesma, a counsel de parte for one of the parties in a case pending before
the sala of Judge Rafael Climaco, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel de parte in
light of his appointment as an election registrar.  Judge Climaco, instead of granting
his withdrawal, appointed him as counsel de oficio of the two defendants in the
criminal case. Ledesma then filed a motion to withdraw as counsel de oficio but it was
denied,. Hence, he instituted this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Ledesma should be allowed to withdraw as counsel de officio
considering his appointment as Election Registrar.

RULING:
No. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, the welfare of the
accused could be prejudiced as stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado
in these words: ” Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to
have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an
attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so
desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own.”

Membership in the Bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting

standards. Law is a profession and not a trade or craft. Those enrolled in its ranks aid
the courts in the administration of justice. As such, an attorney may be called or
appointed as counsel de oficio to aid indigents for the realization of their constitutional
right to counsel especially in criminal cases like this where a person may be convicted
not because of his or her guilt but because he or she lacks competent legal
representation.
Assuming Ledesma's good faith, his appointment as an election registrar cannot be
availed of now when granting his withdrawal will result to the delay in the
administration of justice. It is to be noted that the proceedings has been delayed at
least eight times at the defense's instance, resulting to undue inconvenience to the
parties involved.
What is easily discernible in this case is the petitioner's reluctance to comply with the
responsibilities incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio. Petitioner is admonished for
not being mindful of his obligation where he is expected to exercise due diligence, not
mere perfunctory representation, to the case of his clients. He must be reminded that
a member of the bar is a vanguard in the bastion of justice and is therefore expected
to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less self-interest.

SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALGURA and LORENCITA S.J. ALGURA,  petitioners,

vs.
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF THE CITY OF NAGA, ATTY. MANUEL TEOXON, ENGR.
LEON PALMIANO, NATHAN SERGIO and BENJAMIN NAVARRO, SR.,  respondents.

Facts: On September 1, 1999, spouses Algura filed a Verified Complaint dated August 30, 1999 for
damages against the Naga City Government and its officers, arising from the alleged illegal demolition
of their residence and boarding house and for payment of lost income derived from fees paid by their
boarders.

Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants, to which

Antonio Algura's Pay Slip was appended, showing a gross monthly income of Php 10,474.00 and a net
pay of Php 3,616.99 for July 1999. Also attached as Annex was a Certification issued by the Office of
the City Assessor of Naga City, which stated that petitioners had no property declared in their name for
taxation purposes. The Executive Judge Jose T. Atienza of the Naga City RTC, in the September 1,
1999 Order, granted petitioners' plea for exemption from filing fees.

The Naga City Government issued an Order disqualifying petitioners from being recognized as
indigent litigants. They had allegedly failed to substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of
legal fees and from compliance with the third paragraph of Section 18 of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules
of Court, directing them to pay the requisite filing fees. On April 14, 2000, the Naga City RTC issued an
Order disqualifying petitioners as indigent litigants on the ground that they failed to substantiate their
claim for exemption from payment of legal fees and to comply with the third paragraph of Rule 141,
Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Court—directing them to pay the requisite filing fees.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and the trial court issued an Order  giving
petitioners the opportunity to comply with the requisites laid down in Section 18, Rule 141, for them to
qualify as indigent litigants.

Thereafter, Naga City RTC Acting Presiding Judge Andres B. Barsaga, Jr. issued his July 17,
2000 Order denying the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Judge Barsaga ratiocinated that the
pay slip of Antonio F. Algura showed that the "GROSS INCOME or TOTAL EARNINGS of plaintiff
Algura was10,474.00 which amount was over and above the amount mentioned in the first paragraph
of Rule 141, Section 18 for pauper litigants residing outside Metro Manila." Said rule provides that the
gross income of the litigant should not exceed Php 3,000.00 a month and shall not own real estate with
an assessed value of Php 50,000.00. The trial court found that, in Lorencita S.J. Algura's May 13, 2000
Affidavit, nowhere was it stated that she and her immediate family did not earn a gross income of Php
3,000.00.

Issue: Whether petitioners should be considered as indigent litigants who qualify for exemption from
paying filing fees.

Ruling: The Naga City RTC is ordered to set the "Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants" for
hearing and apply Rule 3, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether
petitioners can qualify as indigent litigants.

Access to justice by the impoverished is held sacrosanct under Article III, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution. The Action Program for Judicial Reforms (APJR) itself, initiated by former Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., placed prime importance on 'easy access to justice by the poor' as one of its six
major components. Likewise, the judicial philosophy of Liberty and Prosperity of Chief Justice Artemio
V. Panganiban makes it imperative that the courts shall not only safeguard but also enhance the rights
of individuals—which are considered sacred under the 1987 Constitution. Without doubt, one of the
most precious rights which must be shielded and secured is the unhampered access to the justice
system by the poor, the underprivileged, and the marginalized.

The rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the salary and
property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On
the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application
should not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the "indigency test" under Section 21 of
Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.

Amendments to Rule 141 (including the amendment to Rule 141, Section 18) were made to
implement RA 9227 which brought about new increases in filing fees. Specifically, in the August 16,
2004 amendment, the ceiling for the gross income of litigants applying for exemption and that of their
immediate family was increased from Php 4,000.00 a month in Metro Manila and Php 3,000.00 a
month outside Metro Manila, to double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the maximum
value of the property owned by the applicant was increased from an assessed value of Php 50,000.00
to a maximum market value of PhPp300,000.00, to be able to accommodate more indigent litigants
and promote easier access to justice by the poor and the marginalized in the wake of these new
increases in filing fees.

Even if there was an amendment to Rule 141 on August 16, 2004, there was still no amendment or
recall of Rule 3, Section 21 on indigent litigants.

It is undisputed that the Complaint (Civil Case No. 99-4403) was filed on September 1, 1999.
However, the Naga City RTC, in its April 14, 2000 and July 17, 2000 Orders, incorrectly applied Rule
141, Section 18 on Legal Fees when the applicable rules at that time were Rule 3, Section 21 on
Indigent Party which took effect on July 1, 1997 and Rule 141, Section 16 on Pauper
Litigants which became effective on July 19, 1984 up to February 28, 2000.

The old Section 16, Rule 141 requires applicants to file an ex-parte motion to litigate as a
pauper litigant by submitting an affidavit. There are two requirements: a) income requirement—the
applicants should not have a gross monthly income of more than Php 1,500.00, and b) property
requirement––they should not own property with an assessed value of not more than Php 18,000.00.

In the case at bar, Antonio’s pay slip shows a gross monthly income of Php10,474.00, and a
Certification of the Naga City assessor stating that petitioners do not have property declared in their
names for taxation. However with respect to the income requirement, it is clear that the gross monthly
income of Php 10,474.00 of petitioner Antonio F. Algura and the Php 3,000.00 income of Lorencita
Algura when combined, were above the Php 1,500.00 monthly income threshold prescribed by then
Rule 141, Section 16 and therefore, the income requirement was not satisfied. The trial court was
therefore correct in disqualifying petitioners Alguras as indigent litigants although the court should have
applied Rule 141, Section 16 which was in effect at the time of the filing of the application on
September 1, 1999. Even if Rule 141, Section 18 (which superseded Rule 141, Section 16 on March 1,
2000) were applied, still the application could not have been granted as the combined Php 13,474.00
income of petitioners was beyond the Php 3,000.00 monthly income threshold.

The Court rules that Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 16 (later amended as Rule 141,
Section 18 on March 1, 2000 and subsequently amended by Rule 141, Section 19 on August 16, 2003,
which is now the present rule) are still valid and enforceable rules on indigent litigants.

Furthermore, Rule 141 on indigent litigants was amended twice: first on March 1, 2000 and
the second on August 16, 2004; and yet, despite these two amendments, there was no attempt to
delete Section 21 from said Rule 3. This clearly evinces the desire of the Court to maintain the two (2)
rules on indigent litigants to cover applications to litigate as an indigent litigant.
 Instead of declaring that Rule 3, Section 21 has been superseded and impliedly amended by
Section 18 and later Section 19 of Rule 141, the Court finds that the two rules can and should be
harmonized.

The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19 because it is a settled
principle that when conflicts are seen between two provisions, all efforts must be made to harmonize
them. Hence, "every statute [or rule] must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes [or
rules] as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence."

However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it would
set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has "no money or property sufficient
and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family." Thus, the trial court
should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the Alguras after their affidavits and
supporting documents showed that petitioners did not satisfy the twin requirements on gross monthly
income and ownership of real property under Rule 141. Instead of disqualifying the Alguras as indigent
litigants, the trial court should have called a hearing as required by Rule 3, Section 21 to enable the
petitioners to adduce evidence to show that they didn't have property and money sufficient and
available for food, shelter, and basic necessities for them and their family.