A.M. No.
10-10-4-SC June 7, 2011
Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty
of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
Contempt Power
FACTS:
The case under consideration involves a motion for reconsideration filed by UP Law professors
Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C. Laforteza, along with a manifestation from Dean Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen and Professor Theodore O. Te, following the Supreme Court's decision dated March 8,
2011. The case originated from a controversy involving allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation against Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo in the earlier case of Vinuya
vs. Executive Secretary (April 28, 2010). This controversy prompted the UP Law Faculty to issue
a public statement titled "Restoring Integrity," criticizing the alleged plagiarism, which led to the
Supreme Court issuing a Show Cause Resolution on October 19, 2010, requiring the faculty to
explain why they should not be sanctioned.
The professors sought reconsideration on three main points: (A) the alleged mistake in classifying
their actions as an ethical violation without following the proper due process for indirect contempt,
(B) the incorrect connection made between the Vinuya case, the subsequent administrative
matter (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC), and the UP Law Faculty’s statement, and (C) the error in
concluding that issuing the "Restoring Integrity" statement breached their ethical duties. They
argued that these issues neglected important considerations of due process and misrepresented
their intentions and the link between their statement and the Vinuya case.
ISSUES:
Whether the administrative proceedings against the UP law professors amounted to an indirect
contempt case, requiring the observance of due process guarantees typical for such cases.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the administrative proceedings against the UP Law professors did
not constitute an indirect contempt case. It clarified that the same conduct could lead to either
contempt or administrative sanctions, depending on the discretion of the Court, and that the mere
discussion of principles common to both contempt and disciplinary proceedings does not
transform an administrative case into one of indirect contempt.
A charge of indirect contempt, if proven in due proceedings, carry with it penal sanctions such as
imprisonment or a fine or both.
The very same contumacious speech or conduct directed against a court or judicial officer, if
committed by a member of the Bar, may likewise subject the offender to disciplinary proceedings
under the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prescribes that lawyers observe and
promote due respect for the courts. In such disciplinary cases, the sanctions are not penal but
administrative such as, disbarment, suspension, reprimand or admonition. The lesson imparted
by the foregoing authorities is that, when the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers for intemperate and discourteous language and behavior
directed at the courts, the evil sought to be prevented is the same – the degradation of the courts
and the loss of trust in the administration of justice. For this reason, it is not unusual for the Court
to cite authorities on bar discipline (involving the duty to give due respect to the courts) in contempt
cases against lawyers and vice versa.
Thus, when the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a respondent lawyer,
the mere citation or discussion in the orders or decision in the administrative case of jurisprudence
involving contempt proceedings does not transform the action from a disciplinary proceeding to
one for contempt. Respondents’ contrary position in their motion for reconsideration is bereft of
any rational merit. Had this Court opted to cite respondents for contempt of court, which is
punishable by imprisonment or fine, this Court would have initiated contempt proceedings in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Clearly, the Court did not opt to do so. We cannot see why
respondents would stubbornly cling to the notion that they were being cited for indirect contempt
under the Show Cause Resolution when there is no basis for such belief other than their own
apparent misreading of the same.1avvphi1
