JARICK G.
CASTILLON
Elective Officials, Qualification and Election, Disqualifications
Moreno vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 168550. August 10, 2006
Statement of the Facts:
Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground
that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. Moreno
filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already
granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the
sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno
also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge
of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of
his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed.
However, the Comelec en banc affirmed initial decision citing Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code which provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any
elective local position. Since Moreno was released from probation on December 20, 2000,
disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2) years thence. The grant of
probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his
disqualification from running for an elective local office.
On his petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code
applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the
latter do not serve the adjudged sentence.
Statement of the Case:
This is a petition assailing the Resolution of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc
dated June 1, 2005, affirming the Resolution of the Comelec First Division dated November 15,
2002 which, in turn, disqualified Moreno from running for the elective office of Punong
Barangay in the July 2002 elections.
Issue:
Whether or not Moreno’s probation grants him the right to run in public office.
Ruling:
Yes. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall
operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to
fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was
granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the court's finding that he has
fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil
rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to
run for public office.
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also
covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective office.
Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. While the
Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to
probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and
not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of
such earlier statute.
Doctrine:
Principle of Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est optimus interpretand (to interpret and
to reconcile laws with laws is the best mode of interpretation). This means that every statute
must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a complete, coherent, and
a uniform system of jurisprudence.
The Comelec could have correctly resolved this case by simply applying the law to the letter.
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code unequivocally disqualifies only those who have been
sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or
more, within two (2) years after serving sentence.
Harmonizing Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law) to the said provision of the
LGC, those who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of probation which, we
reiterate, should not be equated with service of sentence, should not likewise be disqualified
from running for a local elective office because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even begin to run.
