EN BANC

[ AM No. RTJ-07-2076, Oct 12, 2010 ]

OCA v. JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA +

DECISION

647 Phil. 216

PER CURIAM:
Five (5) administrative cases were filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against
Judge Alberto L. Lerma (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 256,
Muntinlupa City, for violating Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, for making
untruthful statements in his certificates of service, for gross ignorance of the law and/or gross
negligence, for delay in rendering an order, for abusing judicial authority and discretion, and for
serious irregularity.

In a memorandum[1]  dated September 24, 2007, embodying the report and recommendation of
the OCA, then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock (Court Administrator Lock) referred to
then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (Chief Justice Puno) the five administrative cases filed
against respondent judge, to wit:  a) Administrative Matter No. 98-6-179-RTC (Re:  Request for
transfer of arraignment/trial of Criminal Case No. 3639-R); b) OCA IPI No. 07-2644-RTJ
([Ret.] General Meliton D. Goyena v. Judge Alberto L. Lerma); c) OCA IPI No. 07-2643-RTJ
(Jose Mari L. Duarte v. Judge Alberto L. Lerma); d) OCA IPI No. 07-2639-RTJ (Atty. Lourdes
A. Ona v. Judge Alberto L. Lerma); and e) OCA IPI No. 07-2654-RTJ (Office of the Court
Administrator v. Judge Alberto L. Lerma).

Per resolution[2] of the Supreme Court En Banc dated September 25, 2007, the foregoing cases
were respectively redocketed as regular administrative cases, as follows: A.M. Nos. RTJ-07-
2076, RTJ-07-2079, RTJ-07-2078, RTJ-07-2077, and RTJ-07-2080.

Thereafter, the cases were referred to an Investigating Justice[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) for
investigation and recommendation.

We shall discuss the cases individually, taking into account their peculiar factual surroundings
and the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Justice.

a.) A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076

On November 27, 1995, Ruperto Pizarro y Bruno (accused) was charged with Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 in an information filed with the RTC, Branch 53, Rosales,
Pangasinan and docketed as Criminal Case No. 3639-R.[4]  Since accused was already detained at
the Quezon City Jail due to the pendency of another criminal case (Criminal Case No. Q-95-
64130-31) filed against him.  The court ordered that all notices of hearings and proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 3639-R be forwarded to the Jail Warden of the Quezon City Jail. [5] 
Subsequently, in a letter dated March 25, 1998,[6] Officer-in-Charge/City Warden Arnold
Buenacosa of the Quezon City Jail informed Judge Teodorico Alfonzo B. Bauzon (Judge
Bauzon), RTC of Rosales, Pangasinan, that accused was transferred to the Bureau of Corrections
in Muntinlupa City on March 21, 1998 in compliance with the commitment order and decision
in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64130-31 of the RTC, Branch 82, Quezon City.

The Supreme Court, in a resolution[7] dated June 30, 1998, directed (1)  the Clerk of Court of the
RTC, Branch 53, Rosales, Pangasinan, to forward the records of Criminal Case No. 3639-R to the
Executive Judge, RTC, Muntinlupa City, for appropriate action; (2) the Executive Judge, RTC,
Muntinlupa City, to raffle the case among the judges to arraign the accused and consequently
take his testimony; and (3) the Clerk of Court, RTC, Muntinlupa City, to return the records to
the RTC, Branch 53, Rosales, Pangasinan, for the continuation of the proceedings.

Pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution, Criminal Case No. 3639-R[8] was raffled to RTC,
Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, presided by respondent judge. Accused was arraigned on
September 29, 1998. Thereafter, respondent judge proceeded to receive the evidence for the
prosecution.  On February 7, 2003, the prosecution formally offered its exhibits, but the firearm
subject of the information was not included in the formal offer.  On June 27, 2005, the accused,
through Atty. Abelardo D. Tomas of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), filed a motion for leave
of court to file demurrer to prosecution's evidence.[9]  Respondent judge granted the said motion
on July 26, 2005.[10]  On November 8, 2005, Atty. Rodney Magbanua of the PAO filed
a demurrer to prosecution's evidence,[11] contending that, without the subject firearm, the
prosecution failed to prove an essential element of the offense.  On February 28, 2007,
respondent judge issued an order, granting the demurrer to prosecution's evidence and
dismissing the case for insufficiency of evidence.[12]

In a memorandum[13] dated September 24, 2007, the OCA charged respondent judge with
exceeding his authority under the Supreme Court resolution dated June 30, 1998 in A.M. No.
98-6-179-RTC.  According to the OCA, the authority given to respondent judge under the
resolution was clearly limited to the arraignment of the accused and the taking of his testimony;
it did not authorize respondent judge to decide the merits of the case.  The OCA contended that
the act of respondent judge constituted violation of a Supreme Court directive, a less serious
offense, under Section 9(4), Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court.

In his comment dated November 16, 2007, respondent judge asserted that there was neither a
conscious nor a deliberate intent on his part to disobey any directive of the Supreme Court when
he granted the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused in Criminal Case No. 3639-R.  He
claimed that, through inadvertence, he was not able to recall the limits of the referral made to
him, and stressed that he ruled on the merits of the case in a way not tainted with fraud,
dishonesty, or corruption.  He emphasized that he acted on the demurrer to evidence because of
the inadequacy of the evidence for the prosecution and because of the failure of the latter to
object to the demurrer.  He maintained that it would have been wrong for him to add to the
penalty already being served by the accused when there was no evidence to warrant the
detention of the latter for the unproved offense.[14]

Under Section 9(4), Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court, failure to obey the Court's resolution is a
less serious offense that carries a penalty of suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) month or more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
The Investigating Justice recommends that a fine of P15,000.00 be imposed upon respondent,
based on the following findings:

In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is jurisdictional. The place where the
crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction.  Thus, a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
committed outside the limited territory.  Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. [15]

The demurrer to evidence filed by the accused cited the accusatory portion of the information
which charged him with unlawful possession of a caliber .30 U.S. carbine with two magazines
and twenty-five (25) rounds of ammunition. The information clearly stated that the accused
possessed the carbine, magazines, and ammunitions in Barangay Cabalaongan Sur, Municipality
of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan.  Had respondent judge exercised a moderate degree of
caution before resolving the demurrer to evidence, a mere perusal of the records would have
reminded him that his court was only authorized to arraign the accused, to receive the evidence
in the said case, and to return the records of the case to the RTC, Branch 53, Rosales,
Pangasinan for continuation of the proceedings.  In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently
to ascertain the facts.[16]

Respondent judge was found wanting in the diligence required of him.  We agree with the
Investigating Justice in finding respondent judge guilty of violating a Supreme Court directive,
and impose upon him a fine of P15,000.00.

b.)  A.M. No. RTJ-07-2080

In a letter[17] dated August 28, 2007, Godofredo R. Galindez, Jr., (Godofredo), president of the
Alabang Country Club, Inc. (Alabang Country Club), in response to the letter dated August 21,
2007 of Court Administrator Lock, stated that respondent judge played golf at the Alabang
Country Club on the following dates and tee-off time:

Date Tee off-time

April 8, 2000 12:00 P.M.
July 21, 2000 1:08 P.M.
August 4, 2000 1:20 P.M.
November 28, 2000 10:00 A.M.
May 17, 2001 3:05 P.M.
September 29, 2001 12:56 P.M.
March 5, 2002 1:00 P.M.
June 19, 2002 7:12 A.M.
February 12, 2004 1:35 P.M.
February 28, 2005 10:41 A.M.

With the exception of May 17, 2001, during which respondent judge allegedly played nine (9)
holes of golf, Godofredo stated in his letter that the former played eighteen (18) holes of golf on
all the aforestated dates.

In another letter[18] dated September 3, 2007, Hirofumi Hotta (Hirofumi), operations manager

of TAT Filipinas Golf Club (Tat Filipinas), in answer to an inquiry made by Court Administrator
Lock, stated that respondent judge visited the said golf club and appeared to have played golf
there on the following dates - all Thursdays - and time:

Date Time
April 14, 2005 1:30 P.M.
April 28, 2005 1:30 P.M.
August 18, 2005 1:30 P.M.
August 25, 2005 1:30 P.M.
November 17, 2005 1:30 P.M.
November 24, 2005 1:30 P.M.
December 15, 2005 1:30 P.M.
January 26, 2006 1:30 P.M.
February 9, 2006 1:30 P.M.
March 2, 2006 1:30 P.M.
March 23, 2006 1:30 P.M.
April 6, 2006 1:30 P.M.
April 27, 2006 1:30 P.M.
June 15, 2006 1:30 P.M.
December 14, 2006 1:30 P.M.

According to the OCA, its records in the Office of the Administrative Services show that
respondent judge did not declare his absences on July 21, 2000, August 4, 2000, March 5, 2002,
February 12, 2004, and February 28, 2005, during which he reportedly played golf at the
Alabang Country Club.  Further, in a certification[19] dated September 5, 2007, Hermogena F.
Bayani (Hermogena), Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Leave Division, OCA, stated
that respondent judge did not file any application for a leave of absence on all the dates
mentioned by Hirofumi in his letter dated September 3, 2007.  These constituted violations of
Supreme Court Memorandum Order dated November 19, 1973, Administrative Circular No. 3-
99 dated January 15, 1999, and Administrative Circular No. 5 dated October 4, 1988. [20]

The OCA asserted that on the days that respondent judge played golf, he was lost to the judiciary
for half the working/session hours on those days, positing that this is not merely truancy but
also dishonesty and falsification of certificates of service.

Respondent judge, in his comment, countered that contrary to the allegations of the OCA, he
only played golf thrice in 2000, once in 2001, twice in 2002, six (6) times in 2005, and five (5)
times in 2006 - a total of eighteen (18) times in six years, or at the average of three (3) times a
year.  He argued that his playing golf 18 times in six years, or thrice a year, could not be
reasonably characterized as habitual to the extent that it jeopardized the discharge of his
functions as a judge. He alleged that since he shared his courtroom with the other judges in
Muntinlupa, he only played golf on days when no other place was available for him to carry out
his official functions. Likewise, he explained that, in 1996, his physician advised him to exercise
more vigorously after he was diagnosed with diabetes and hypertension.  Respondent judge also
stressed that he had never missed a day in hearing cases pending in his sala. [21]

In the hearing conducted by the Investigating Justice on December 4, 2007, the OCA presented
Godofredo, Hirofumi, and Sheila Aquino as witnesses.

Godofredo testified that the dates and time when respondent judge played golf at the Alabang
Country Club, as mentioned in his letter, are based on the logbook entries made by the starter in
the country club.  A starter, explained Godofredo, is a person who records in the logbook the
names of the individuals who play in the golf course.  The starter may be the player himself or a
member who brings in guests to play golf.

On cross-examination, Godofredo admitted that he is not the custodian of the logbook; that he is
neither the starter nor the person who wrote the entries in the logbook; and that he does not
recognize in whose handwriting the entries were made.

Hirofumi, the operations manager of TAT Filipinas, testified that Aquino, the front desk
receptionist in the golf club, made the listing of the respective dates and time when respondent
judge played at TAT Filipinas based on the data stored in their office computer.

Aquino, who had been employed by the company for fifteen (15) years, and had been working as
its front desk receptionist for six (6) years, testified that she saw respondent judge sign the
registered member forms at the golf club prior to playing golf.

The Investigating Justice found as insufficient the evidence that the OCA presented to show that
respondent judge played golf at the Alabang Country Club on the dates alleged, but found
substantial evidence that respondent judge played golf at TAT Filipinas on the dates and time
indicated in Hirofumi's letter dated September 3, 2007.

The testimony of Aquino, along with the certification issued by Hermogena, that respondent
judge did not file any leave of absence on the dates indicated in Hirofumi's letter, indubitably
established that respondent judge violated Supreme Court Memorandum Order dated
November 19, 1973, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, and
Administrative Circular No. 5 dated October 4, 1988.

Supreme Court Memorandum Order dated November 19, 1973 provides for the observance by
judges, among other officials and employees in the judiciary, of a five-day forty-hour week
schedule which shall be from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. and from 12:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. from
Mondays to Fridays.

Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, and making untruthful statements in
the certificate of service are considered less serious charges under Section 9, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court.  Under Section 11(B) of Rule 140, these acts may be punished by suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month or more than three
(3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

On the basis of the foregoing findings, we adopt the recommendation of the Investigating
Justice that, in this administrative case, a fine of P15,000.00 be imposed upon respondent
judge.

c.)  A.M. No. RTJ-07-2077

On January 24, 1995, the RTC, Branch 142, Makati City, rendered a decision in Civil Case No.
90-659, entitled Alexander Van Twest v. Gloria A. Anacleto and/or International Corporate
Bank, ordering defendant bank (Interbank) or its successors-in-interest to release in favor of
plaintiff Alexander Van Twest (Van Twest) the entire proceeds of Interbank Foreign Currency
Trust Deposit (FCTD) No. 39156 in the amount of Deutsch Mark (DM) 260,000.00, including
accrued interest and other earnings. The decision also directed defendant Gloria Anacleto to
return to plaintiff the sum of DM 9,777.37 with interest thereon. The court ordered the
defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff P500,000.00 as moral damages, P250,000.00
as exemplary damages, P200,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. [22]  However, even
before the decision was rendered, Van Twest had disappeared and was believed to have been
kidnapped and killed.[23]

Subsequently, Atty. Ernesto V. Perez (Atty. Perez), representing Van Twest, filed a Motion for
Execution of Decision. In the motion, Atty. Perez informed the RTC of Makati City that, on
October 30, 2006, the RTC, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, with respondent judge presiding,
granted the petition to appoint the former as administrator of the properties or estate of
absentee Van Twest in Special Proceeding No. 97-045, entitled In the Matter of the Petition to
Appoint an Administrator for the Estate of Absentee Alexander Van Twest a.k.a. Eugene
Alexander Van West.[24]  On January 27, 2007, the RTC Branch 142, Makati City, granted the
motion for execution.[25]

Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) filed a Manifestation and Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion dated May 23, 2007 in Special Proceeding No. 97-045, praying that the exercise by Atty.
Perez of powers as administrator of absentee Van Twest be held in abeyance until the said
manifestation and motion is heard.  Because respondent judge was on official leave at the time
of the filing of the Manifestation and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion, Judge Philip A. Aguinaldo,
pairing judge of RTC Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, acted on the same, and, in an order dated
May 28, 2007, granted Union Bank's urgent ex-parte motion.

Union Bank thereafter filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution/Garnishment in Civil Case No. 90-659, citing, in support thereof, the order dated
May 28, 2007 issued by Judge Aguinaldo in Special Proceeding No. 97-045.

On June 1, 2007, Atty. Perez filed with the Muntinlupa RTC an Omnibus Motion: 1) To Lift or
Set Aside Pairing Judge's Order of May 28, 2007 for having been issued without jurisdiction,
grave abuse of discretion and/or violation of due process of law; 2) To Cite Union Bank of the
Philippines' counsel for Indirect Contempt.

At the hearing of the omnibus motion on June 6, 2007, respondent judge ordered Atty. Lourdes
A. Ona (Atty. Ona), counsel for Union Bank, to file her Opposition and/or Comment to the said
Motion within 10 days. Atty. Perez was given the same period from receipt of the Opposition
and/or Comment to file his Reply thereto, if necessary, and thereafter, the matter would be
deemed submitted for resolution.

On the same day, however, respondent judge issued another order bearing the same date, ruling
that the bank had not shown any legal basis to set aside the court's decision of October 30, 2006,
or to suspend the Letters of Administration issued to Atty. Perez pursuant thereto.  The order
then concluded that Atty. Perez may exercise all the powers granted to him as Administrator of
the absentee Van Twest until further orders of the court.

In a letter dated July 23, 2007, addressed to the OCA, complainant alleged that respondent
judge's issuance of the second order dated June 6, 2007 was irregular, in light of the following: 
1) At the hearing held on June 6, 2007, the omnibus motion filed by Atty. Perez was deemed
submitted for resolution only after the complainant shall have filed her comment/opposition
thereto or until the 10-day period shall have expired;  2)  The issuance of the second order dated
June 6, 2007 was secretly railroaded to give Atty. Perez a ground to oppose Union
Bank's Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Recall Writ of Execution/Garnishment filed with
the RTC, Branch 142, Makati City, in time for its hearing originally set on June 8, 2007;  3) Even
the staff of respondent judge did not become aware of the second June 6, 2007 order until much
later, since respondent judge never furnished complainant with a copy thereof until the latter
made inquiries regarding the same; and 4) The contents of the second order dated June 6,  2007
contradicted the first order and rendered the pending incident moot and academic.

Respondent judge, in his comment, denied the charge and argued that the same should be
dismissed.  The complainant, according to respondent judge, should instead be meted
disciplinary penalties as a member of the bar.

Notwithstanding the recommendation of the Investigating Justice, the Court finds that the
actions of respondent judge constitute gross negligence and/or gross ignorance of the law.

We have repeatedly held that to warrant a finding of gross ignorance of the law, it must be
shown that the error is "so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith." [26]  Gross
negligence refers to negligence characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally,
with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.  It is the
omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own
property.  In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is
flagrant and palpable.[27]

In the instant case, the issuance by respondent of divergent orders raises serious questions of
impropriety that taint respondent judge's credibility, probity, and integrity.  Coupled with the
clandestine issuance of the second order -- where the Union Bank counsel and even the judge's
own staff were left completely in the dark -- the action of respondent judge gives rise to an
inference of bad faith.  Indeed, we have ample reason to believe -- as Atty. Ona posits -- that the
secretly-issued second order was really intended to give Atty. Perez the ammunition to oppose
Union Bank's Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution/Garnishment which was to be heard by the RTC of Makati City.  Under the
circumstances, the breach committed by respondent can be characterized as flagrant and
palpable.

This action of respondent judge violates Section 8 of Rule 140, and carries the penalty of
dismissal from the service or suspension from office for more than three (3) months but not
exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

For this violation, we impose upon respondent judge the penalty of dismissal from the service,
with forfeiture of all benefits, except earned leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.

d) A.M. No. RTJ-07-2078

Jose Mari L. Duarte (complainant) is one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 2003-433, entitled
"Eugene T. Mateo v. The Board of Governors of Ayala Alabang Village Association: Paolo V.
Castano, Constantino A. Marcaida, Ruben P. Baes, Eric Yutuc, Roberto Santiago, Beatriz
"Bettina" H. Pou, Edilberto Uichanco, Salvador S. Arceo, Jr., Benjamin Narciso, Guy L.
Romualdez, and Jose Mari L. Duarte," for Declaration of the General Membership Meeting and
Election of the Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA) as void ab initio, with prayer for the
Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Status
Quo Order.  Eugene T. Mateo filed the case on July 29, 2003 with the RTC, Muntinlupa City,
and it was eventually raffled to the RTC, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, presided over by
respondent judge.[28]

On August 15, 2003, defendants Salvador S. Arceo, Jr. (Arceo) and Benjamin Narciso (Narciso)
filed their answer with affirmative defenses and counterclaims, while all the other defendants
filed a motion to dismiss.  In moving for the dismissal of the case, all defendants invoked the
trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the case and plaintiff's lack of cause of action.  On
September 2, 2003, plaintiff filed his opposition to motion to dismiss with motion to declare
defendants in default.  In an order dated September 12, 2003, respondent judge denied
defendants' motion to dismiss and plaintiff's motion to declare defendants in default, and set for
hearing plaintiff's application for the issuance of a TRO.  Respondent judge eventually denied
the prayer of plaintiff for the issuance of a TRO on September 26, 2003.

On November 25, 2003, respondent judge rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, declaring the
AAVA's general membership meeting held on June 15, 2003 void ab initio, and ordering that
the status quo of the board's composition prior to the proceedings of June 15, 2003 be
maintained. The respondent judge also enjoined defendants Arceo, Narciso, Guy L. Romualdez
(Romualdez) and Jose Mari L. Duarte from further exercising the functions of the office they
respectively hold.  He directed the holding of another election of the AAVA board, and ordered
the defendants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P100,000.00 as and by way of
attorney's fees.  The respondent judge dismissed the defendants' counterclaim.

The aggrieved complainant, together with all the other defendants, appealed to the CA from the
above-cited decision.  On December 10, 2003, plaintiff filed with the RTC a petition to direct
defendants to show cause why they should not be cited and thereafter punished for indirect
contempt of court (petition for indirect contempt) for their alleged defiance of respondent
judge's decision dated November 25, 2003, as shown by their continued performance of duties
as governors of Ayala Alabang Village, despite receipt of a copy of the said decision.

On July 1, 2004, respondent judge issued an order declaring complainant, Arceo and
Romualdez, guilty of indirect contempt, and ordering each of them to pay a fine in the amount of
P30,000.00.

Unperturbed, complainant and his co-defendants Arceo and Romualdez moved for
reconsideration of the July 1, 2004 order.  On September 24, 2004, respondent judge granted
their motion for reconsideration, and reversed and set aside his order dated July 1, 2004.

On June 29, 2007, the Special Sixteenth Division of the CA issued a resolution, ruling that the
lower court should have dismissed the plaintiff-appellee's Complaint for Declaration of the
General Membership Meeting and Election of the AAVA as void ab initio with prayer for the
Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO and Status Quo Order because it is the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board that has jurisdiction over the dispute.

On August 23, 2007, Mateo filed a complaint with the Supreme Court, contending that
respondent judge did not have the judicial authority to hear and decide the issues involved in
Civil Case No. 2003-433 for want of jurisdiction.  According to complainant, this was brought to
the attention of respondent judge, but the latter, being grossly ignorant of existing laws and
rules, if not completely insolent of the same, and with grave abuse of discretion, took cognizance
of the case.

In his comment, respondent judge argued that the error he allegedly committed could be
corrected by an available judicial remedy. He maintained that if he erroneously assumed
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 2003-433, the proper recourse available to complainant was not
an administrative complaint, but a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The Investigating Justice recommended that the instant administrative case against respondent
judge be dismissed. This Court takes the opposite view.

It is true that to constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision,
order, or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing
law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty,
or corruption.[29]

However, when the law is so elementary -- and the matter of jurisdiction is an elementary
principle that judges should be knowledgeable of -- not to be aware of it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.  Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules.  They are expected to keep abreast of our laws and the changes
therein as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court.  They owe it to the public to be
legally knowledgeable, for ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice.  Judicial
competence requires no less.  It is a truism that the life chosen by a judge as a dispenser of
justice is demanding. By virtue of the delicate position which he occupies in society, he is duty
bound to be the embodiment of competence and integrity. [30]

On the matter of the order finding complainant guilty of indirect contempt, we also find the
action of respondent judge sadly wanting.  Section 4, Rule 71 of the same Rules provides:

Sec. 4.  How proceedings commenced. - Proceedings for indirect contempt may be

initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or
any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the
court concerned.  If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall  allege  that  fact  but said petition  shall 
be  docketed, heard  and

decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. [31]

The Rules are unequivocal. Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways:
(1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon compliance with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings.  The procedural requirements are mandatory considering
that contempt proceedings against a person are treated as criminal in nature. [32]  Conviction
cannot be had merely on the basis of written pleadings. [33]

The records do not indicate that complainant was afforded an opportunity to rebut the charges
against him.  Respondent judge should have conducted a hearing in order to provide
complainant the opportunity to adduce before the court documentary or testimonial evidence in
his behalf.  The hearing also allows the court a more thorough evaluation of the circumstances
surrounding the case, including the chance to observe the accused present his side in open court
and subject his defense to interrogation from the complainants or from the court itself. [34]
It must be remembered that the power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly with
caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of the law and
the constitutional rights of the individual.[35]  In this respect, respondent judge failed to measure
up to the standards demanded of member of the judiciary.

As already mentioned above, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious
charge under Section 8(9), Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court, and a respondent found guilty of
serious charge may be punished by:  a) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations, provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;  b) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6)
months; or c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

In this case, we find respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law, and impose upon him
a fine of P40,000.00.

e.) A.M. No. RTJ-07-2079

On January 19, 2006, Bennie Cuason (Cuason) was charged before the RTC, Muntinlupa City,
with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, for defrauding
Brigadier General Meliton D. Goyena (Gen. Goyena) (Ret.) by convincing the latter to invest,
entrust, and/or deliver the amount of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) on the promise
that the former would return the investment with interest, plus two (2) Condominium
Certificates of Title over residential units on the 20 th floor  at Tower B of Diamond Bay Towers
Condominium, with a total value of Nine Million Five Hundred Ninety-Two Thousand Pesos
(P9,592,000.00). Gen. Goyena gave the amount of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) to
the accused and received two (2) condominium certificates of title with numbers 6893 and
6894. After verification, complainant found that the condominium units were non-existent, or
had not yet been constructed.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-179 and was raffled to RTC, Branch 204,
Muntinlupa City, presided over by Judge Juanita T. Guerrero (Judge Guerrero).

On February 14, 2006, accused Cuason, through counsel, filed with the RTC an entry of
appearance with a plea to determine whether or not probable cause exists for the purpose of
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Complainant, also through counsel, subsequently filed
a Motion to deny the application for judicial determination of probable cause and to cite
accused in contempt of this Honorable Court on the ground of forum shopping. On April 4,
2006, accused Cuason filed his comment and/or opposition thereto, and on April 10, 2006,
accused Cuason filed a supplemental comment and/or opposition to the motion.

With the designation of RTC, Branch 204, Muntinlupa City, as a special court for drug cases on
May 2, 2006, the case was re-raffled to the sala of respondent judge. After hearing the respective
arguments of the parties, respondent judge issued an omnibus order dated September 4, 2006,
dismissing Criminal Case No. 06-179. The pertinent portions of the omnibus order read as
follows:

On this first issue, this Court, after a careful scrutiny of the arguments and evidence of both
parties, believes that there was payment already made as to the principal obligation as admitted
by the complainant in his affidavit dated September 20, 2005 (page 3, par. 17) and what is being
left is the payment of interest which, under the premises, is in [the] form of condominium
certificates. So also, while the complainant questions the authenticity of those certificates as well
as the existence of [the] condominium units subject thereof, accused, indubitably, was able to
satisfy this Court as to the authenticity of the questioned certificates and the existence of the
units by showing proofs to that effect.

On September 6, 2006, Gen. Goyena filed with the RTC a very urgent manifestation with
motion for the court to conduct ocular inspection, and on September 22, 2006, he filed
an omnibus motion for reconsideration, ocular inspection and inhibition, anchored on the
following grounds: 1) as correctly found by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City,
the two (2) condominium units used in partly settling the liabilities of the accused to the private
complainant do not exist - a fact that should have been established by now, if only the court
allowed the ocular inspection prayed for; 2) the court overlooked the pronouncement in the very
case it has relied on, that "Allado and Salonga constitute exceptions to the general rule and may
be invoked only if similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist"; and 3) the order dismissing
the case was improperly or irregularly issued.

On September 18, 2006, complainant filed a letter-complaint addressed to then Supreme Court
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, charging respondent judge with abuse of judicial authority
and discretion, serious irregularity, and gross ignorance of the law, allegedly shown by the
latter's act of willfully and knowingly reversing the well-grounded finding of probable cause
made by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City.

Thereafter, respondent judge issued an order dated October 4, 2006, inhibiting himself from
sitting in Criminal Case No. 06-179, and directing that the records of the case be forwarded to
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC, Muntinlupa City, for appropriate re-raffling. The case
was eventually re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 206, Muntinlupa City, presided over by Judge
Patricia Manalastas-de Leon (Judge Manalastas-De Leon).

In his memorandum dated September 24, 2007, Court Administrator Lock found ample basis to
charge respondent judge with delay in rendering an order and for abuse of judicial discretion
and authority

The OCA stated that Criminal Case No. 06-179 was assigned to respondent judge on May 2,
2006, a fact which the latter did not dispute. More than a month later, or on June 19, 2006,
respondent judge set accused Cuason's motion to determine whether or not a probable cause
exists for the purpose of the issuance of a warrant of arrest and complainant's motion to deny
application for judicial determination of probable cause and to cite accused in contempt of this
Honorable Court on the ground of forum shopping for hearing on July 17, 2006. It must be
stressed that accused Cuason and complainant filed their respective motions on February 14,
2006 and on March 22, 2006, or while the case was still pending in the sala of Judge Guerrero.
After hearing the said motions on July 17, 2006, it took another forty-eight (48) days for
respondent judge to issue the omnibus order dated September 4, 2006, dismissing the case for
lack of probable cause.

In his comment dated November 23, 2007, respondent judge insists that the charge filed against
him should be dismissed.

This Court finds that respondent judge's delay in the determination of probable cause clearly
runs counter to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which provides:

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10)
days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when
the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rules. In case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty  (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.

While respondent judge could not have ascertained the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of an arrest warrant against Cuason within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information - Criminal Case No. 06-179 having been re-raffled to his sala only on
May 2, 2006 - prudence demanded that respondent judge should have determined the existence
of probable cause within ten (10) days from July 17, 2006, the date he heard the respective
arguments of the parties. This interpretation is in keeping with the provisions of Section 6, Rule
112.

By allowing forty-eight (48) days to lapse before issuing the two-page omnibus order dated
September 4, 2006, respondent judge should be held liable for undue delay in rendering an
order, which is classified as a less serious charge under Section 9(1), Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, punishable by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one (1) month or more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00.

Furthermore, the Court agrees with the OCA that the respondent judge is guilty of abuse of
judicial discretion and authority.

The information in Criminal Case No. 06-179 clearly accuses Cuason of falsely pretending that
he can return the investment of complainant by paying cash and two (2) condominium units
when in fact these units do not exist or have not yet been constructed.  The issue therefore boils
down to whether or not the condominium units exist, and the incontrovertible proof of this are
the condominium units themselves.  The logical thing to do would have been to order the
conduct of an ocular inspection.  Instead of an ocular inspection, respondent relied on the
certificate of registration, the development permit, the license to sell, the building permit, and
the Condominium Certificate of Title ― on the basis of which the judge ordered the dismissal
of the case.  It may be that an ocular inspection was premature at the time the respondent
dismissed the case because at that time the case was not yet set for the presentation of evidence
of the parties. Nevertheless, it now appears that the pieces of evidence relied upon by the
respondent do not fully support his conclusion.

Section 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that "evidence must have such a relation to
the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence."  "Relevancy is, therefore,
determinable by the rules of logic and human experience...Relevant evidence is any class of
evidence which has `rational probative value' to the issue in controversy."[36] Logic and human
experience teach us that the documents relied upon by respondent do not constitute the best
evidence to prove the existence or non-existence of the condominium units. To repeat, the best
evidence would have been adduced by an ocular inspection of the units themselves.
Judge Lerma should also have exercised caution in determining the existence of probable cause. 
At the very least, he should have asked the prosecutor to present additional evidence, in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or, in the
alternative, to show cause why the case should not be dismissed instead of precipitately ordering
the dismissal of the case.  The circumstances required the exercise of caution considering that
the case involved estafa in the considerable amount of P20 Million for which the complainant
paid P129,970.00 in docket fees before the Office of the City Prosecutor and later P167,114.60 as
docket fee for the filing of the Information before the RTC.

For this particular violation, we find respondent judge guilty and impose upon him a fine of
P21,000.00.

As an unflattering footnote to these administrative offenses, the OCA, upon the authority of the
Chief Justice, conducted a judicial audit from August 21-30, 2007 of the RTC, Branch 256,
Muntinlupa.  The initial result of the audit revealed that Judge Lerma failed to decide 30 civil
cases and 11 criminal cases within the 90-day reglementary period.  It also appears that 101 civil
cases and 137 criminal cases remained unacted despite the lapse of a considerable period.

Judge Lerma had previously been sanctioned by this Court.  In a resolution dated September 13,
2003 in A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799, entitled Ma. Cristina Olondriz Pertierra v. Judge Alberto L.
Lerma, this Court found him liable for conduct unbecoming a judge and imposed upon him the
penalty of reprimand.  In that case, Judge Lerma was found having lunch with a lawyer who has
a pending case in his sala.

The totality of all these findings underscore the fact that respondent judge's actions served to
erode the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. He has been remiss in the fulfillment of
the duty imposed on all members of the bench in order to avoid any impression of impropriety
to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.

To reiterate, officers of the court have the duty to see to it that justice is dispensed evenly and
fairly.  Not only must they be honest and impartial, but they must also appear to be honest and
impartial in the dispensation of justice. Judges should make sure that their acts are circumspect
and do not arouse suspicion in the minds of the public. When they fail to do so, such acts cast
doubt upon their integrity and ultimately on the judiciary in general. [37]  "Courts will only
succeed in their task and mission if the judges presiding over them are truly honorable men,
competent and independent, honest and dedicated." [38]

Respondent judge failed to live up to the judiciary's exacting standards, and this Court will not
withhold penalty when called for to uphold the people's faith in the Judiciary. [39]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court RULES, as follows:

1) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076, Judge Alberto Lerma is found GUILTY of violating a Supreme

Court directive, and we impose upon him a FINE in the total amount of FIFTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00);

2) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2080, Judge Alberto Lerma is FINED in the total amount of FIFTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) for violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and
circulars, and for making untruthful statements in his certificate of service;
3) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2077, Judge Alberto Lerma is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and
punished with the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits,
except earned leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any government agency or
instrumentality.

4) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2078, we find Judge Alberto Lerma GUILTY of gross ignorance of the
law, and impose upon him a FINE of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00); and

5)  In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2079, we find Judge Alberto Lerma GUILTY of grave abuse of authority
and undue delay in rendering an order, and impose upon him a FINE of TWENTY-ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P21,000.00).

This Decision is final and immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., 
Mendoza, and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Carpio and Abad, JJ., on official Leave.
Carpio Morales, J., certify that J. Morales voted to concur with the ponencia:
Velasco, Jr., and Perez, JJ., no part.
Peralta, J., on Leave.
G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015 - LUIS UY, SUBSTITUTED BY LYDIA UY VELASQUEZ
AND SHIRLEY UY MACARAIG, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND
ROSAURA* MENDOZA, SUBSTITUTED BY CORAZON BUENA, Respondents.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015

LUIS UY, SUBSTITUTED BY LYDIA UY VELASQUEZ AND SHIRLEY UY

MACARAIG, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND
ROSAURA* MENDOZA, SUBSTITUTED BY CORAZON BUENA, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Decision dated 14 September
20112 and Resolution dated 1 March 20133 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 93786.

The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of land known as Lot 5506 of the
Cadastral Survey of Batangas plan (LRC) SWO-2817, L.R. Case No. N-445, L.R.C.
Record No. N-22499. The land, situated in Barrio Alangilan, Batangas City, contains an
area of 484 square meters under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-24660. 4 The
land was previously owned by spouses Anastacio Manuel and Mariquita de Villa
(Spouses Manuel) under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-2840.

On 4 May 1979, petitioner Luis Uy (Uy) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pallocan West, Batangas City, Branch 4, a Complaint 5 for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents with Damages against respondents Petra Rosca (Rosca), and spouses Jose
Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana).

In the Complaint, Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that
they lived together as husband and wife from the time they were married in 1944 until
1973 when they separated and lived apart. Uy and Rosca had eight children.

Uy alleged that on 29 January 1964,6 he and his wife acquired a 484 square meter
residential land for a consideration of P1,936 evidenced by a Deed of Sale 7 from the
Spouses Manuel. The sellers' OCT No. 0-2840 was cancelled and TCT No. T-24660 was
issued in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy."

On 15 June 1964, Uy and Rosca allegedly purchased, as evidenced by a Deed of

Absolute Sale,8 another residential land adjacent to the 484 square meter land from the
spouses Felix Contreras and Maxima de Guzman (Spouses Contreras). The second
purchase consisted of 215 square meters, as declared under Tax Declaration No.
61724, for a consideration of P700. Thereafter, a split level house with a floor area of
208.50 square meters was constructed on the 484 square meter land.

Uy further alleged that Rosca, in gross and evident bad faith, executed and signed a
false and simulated Deed of Sale9 dated 18 April 1979 on the 484 square meter land,
together with the house erected thereon, for a consideration of P80,000 in favor of
Spouses Lacsamana.

Uy prayed that (1) the Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979 executed by Rosca in favor of
Spouses Lacsamana be declared null and void with respect to his rights, interest, and
ownership; (2) that defendants be directed to pay, jointly and severally, to Uy the
amounts of P100,000 as moral damages, P10,000 as attorney's fees, P2,000 as
expenses incident to litigation, plus costs of suit; (3) upon declaration of the nullity of
the Deed of Sale, the Register of Deeds of Batangas City and the City Assessor be
directed to register Uy as the sole owner of the real properties; (4) if defendant
Spouses Lacsamana are found by the court to be buyers in good faith, Rosca be
ordered to turn over to Uy the entire proceeds of sale of the properties and be
adjudged to pay the damages; and (5) that the sum of P600,000 taken by Rosca from
Uy be collated into the mass of the conjugal partnership properties.

In her Answer with Counterclaim dated 22 May 1979, Rosca denied the allegations of
Uy and claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject real properties using her
paraphernal funds. Rosca added that she was never married to Uy and prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. In her Counterclaim, Rosca prayed that the
court award her (1) P200,000 as moral damages; (2) P100,000 as exemplary damages;
(3) P12,000 as attorney's fees; (4) P3,000 as incidental litigation expenses; and (5)
costs of suit. Spouses Lacsamana also filed their Answer with Counterclaim dated 21
May 1979 claiming that they were buyers in good faith and for value and that they
relied on the Torrens title which stated that Rosca was the owner of the subject
property.

In the meantime, Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of Sale before the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Batangas City. The Register of Deeds elevated the matter,
on consulta,10 with the Land Registration Commission (LRC) because of an affidavit
subsequently filed by Uy contesting the sale and alleging, among others, that the
property was conjugal in nature and sold without his marital consent.

In a Resolution11 dated 7 November 1979, the LRC decided in favor of registration

stating that since the property in question was registered in Rosca's name, such
circumstance indicated that the property belonged to Rosca, as her paraphernal
property. The LRC added that litigious matters, such as a protest from the other party
based on justifiable and legal grounds, were to be decided not by the Register of Deeds
but by a court of competent jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the Resolution
states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

WHEREFORE, this Commission is of the opinion that the subject document should be
admitted for registration.
SO ORDERED.12

On 18 February 1981, Uy died.13 His two daughters, Lydia Uy Velasquez (Lydia) and

Shirley Uy Macaraig (Shirley) substituted him in the case. Fifteen years later or on 10
May 1996, Rosca also died.14 Earlier, respondent Jose Lacsamana died on 20 March
1991.15redarclaw

Meanwhile, on 24 December 1982, Spouses Lacsamana sold the property to Corazon

Buena (Buena) through a Deed of Absolute Sale.16 Thus, both Rosca and the Spouses
Lacsamana were substituted by Buena as respondent in this case.

During the trial, Uy presented the testimonies of his two daughters, Lydia and Shirley,
as his own witnesses, as well as Rosca, as an adverse witness.

Lydia testified that the Uy family lived in the house built on the land acquired by Uy and
Rosca. She alleged that the house existed until it was demolished by Buena's agent
sometime in 2006. Lydia also stated that the funds used to construct the family
dwelling came from Uy's business. Shirley corroborated the testimony of Lydia on all
material points.

Rosca, on the other hand, testified that sometime before or during World War II, she
and Uy cohabited and settled in Batangas. The couple attempted to formalize their
marital union with a marriage ceremony. However, the celebration was not
consummated because of the bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony.
Likewise, they were unable to secure a marriage contract.

Rosca stated that on 29 January 1964, she alone purchased, as sole vendee, with
money coming from her own personal and paraphernal funds, the land covered by OCT
No. 0-2840 and owned by Spouses Manuel. Thereafter, on 15 June 1964, she again
purchased, using her own personal and paraphernal funds, the land adjacent to the first
purchased property owned by Spouses Contreras and covered by Tax Declaration No.
61724. Immediately after, she caused the construction of a split level house on the land
using her own paraphernal funds which became their family dwelling.

Rosca alleged that Uy had an affair with another woman and sired children with her
which led to their physical separation before the year 1973. On 17 September 1976,
Rosca obtained a real estate loan in the amount of P50,000 from Philippine Banking
Corporation (PBC) using the house and lot as collateral. In support of this loan, Rosca
executed an Affidavit of Ownership17 dated 27 September 1976, stating that (1) she
was the lawful and sole owner of the 484 square meter land, together with the building
erected thereon, and (2) the land was registered under her name and that the phrase
"Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" in TCT No. T-24660 was merely a description of
her status.

Defendants offered the testimony of Rosca, Atty. Teodulfo Dequito, Jr., Rosaura
Mendoza, and Buena.

Atty. Teodulfo Dequito, Jr. testified that Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of
Sale before the Office of the Register of Deeds of Batangas City. The Register of Deeds
elevated the matter on consulta with the LRC, which issued a Resolution dated 7
November 1979 recognizing Rosca as the sole registered owner of the property.

Rosaura Mendoza testified that she and her husband purchased, in the amount of
P80,000, the 484 square meter property of Rosca on 18 April 1979 through a Deed of
Absolute Sale of House and Lot.18 The Registry of Deeds of Batangas City cancelled TCT
No. T-24660 and issued TCT No. T-3519 in favor of the spouses. Then, Spouses
Lacsamana mortgaged the property to PBC for P48,000. Upon full payment of the
mortgage debt on 15 April 1982, PBC issued a Release of Real Estate Mortgage.

Buena testified that she purchased the same property under TCT No. T-35 from
Spouses Lacsamana on 24 December 1982 for a consideration of P80,000.
Consequently, the Registry of Deeds of Batangas City cancelled TCT No. T-35 and
issued TCT No. T-324420 in her name. Likewise, the Assessor's Office of Batangas City
issued Tax Declaration No. 90210.21 redarclaw

Before the resolution of the case, Shirley and Lydia filed a Motion for Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. They claimed that Buena
entered the property and caused the construction of structures without any court order.
Consequently, the RTC issued an Order dated 21 September 2007 granting the
preliminary injunction. Thereafter, the case was submitted for resolution.

In a Decision22 dated 21 April 2009, the RTC decided the case in favor of respondents.
The lower court found that (1) there was no valid marriage between Uy and Rosca; (2)
the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca over the house and lot in favor of Spouses
Lacsamana was valid; and (3) both parties were not entitled to their respective claims
for damages. The dispositive portion of the Decision states: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the instant Complaint filed by plaintiff Uy is

hereby DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction and bond are cancelled and are
rendered of no force and effect. The claims for damages of both parties are hereby
DENIED. Cost against both parties.

SO ORDERED.23

Uy filed an appeal24 with the CA. In a Decision25 dated 14 September 2011, the CA

affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court found that respondents were
able to overthrow the presumption of marriage and that the subject property was
Rosca's paraphernal property. The appellate court also upheld the validity of the sale.
The dispositive portion of the Decision states: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 21, 2009 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.26

Uy then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the appellate court in a
Resolution27 dated 1 March 2013.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue
The main issue for our resolution is whether the Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979,
executed by Rosca alone, without Uy's consent, in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is
valid.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Uy contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for being simulated or
fictitious for lack of consideration and consent. Uy states that no proof was presented
by Spouses Lacsamana to show that they actually paid P80,000 to Rosca for the
purchase of the property. Uy also insists that he did not give his consent to the sale
which prejudiced his rights and interest. Uy argues that Rosca did not give physical
possession of the house and lot to the alleged buyers. Further, Uy adds, without
admitting that the sale is valid, that the consideration paid was unreasonably low and
unconscionable such that it constitutes an equitable mortgage. Uy insists that Spouses
Lacsamana and Buena cannot be considered buyers in good faith.

Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the contentions of Uy rely on the re-
examination and re-evaluation of the evidence of the parties which had previously been
passed upon exhaustively by both the trial and appellate courts. Respondents added
that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45. Since the findings of fact of the
trial and appellate courts were supported by substantial evidence and none of the
recognized exceptions allowing this Court to exercise its power to review is present,
then the petition should be dismissed.

We agree with respondents.

The issues raised by Uy had been thoroughly passed upon by the trial and appellate
courts. We find no reason to disturb their factual findings. In petitions for review on
certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45, like in the present case, a petitioner can
raise only questions of law. Here, Uy would like us to review again the factual
circumstances surrounding the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca with the Spouses
Lacsamana and to declare the Deed of Sale invalid for being simulated due to lack of
consideration and consent. Clearly, these are questions of fact which are within the
purview of the trial and appellate courts to determine. Also, the issues raised do not
come within the purview of the recognized exceptions 28 for this Court to take
cognizance of the case. We have reiterated time and again that this Court is not the
proper venue to consider factual issues as it is not a trier of facts.

Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca
alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a
presumption established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." 29Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.30 However, this presumption
may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.

Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v.

Trias,31 we held that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the
witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of
the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.

Documentary evidence may also be shown. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,32 we held

that the best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself. Under
Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law of 1929,33 as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
114,34 which is applicable to the present case being the marriage law in effect at the
time Uy and Rosca cohabited, the marriage certificate, where the contracting parties
state that they take each other as husband and wife, must be furnished by the person
solemnizing the marriage to (1) either of the contracting parties, and (2) the clerk of
the Municipal Court of Manila or the municipal secretary of the municipality where the
marriage was solemnized. The third copy of the marriage contract, the marriage license
and the affidavit of the interested party regarding the solemnization of the marriage
other than those mentioned in Section 5 of the same Act shall be kept by the official,
priest, or minister who solemnized the marriage.

Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could
have sourced from his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal
office where the marriage allegedly took place. Even the findings of the RTC revealed
that Uy did not show a single relevant evidence that he was actually married to Rosca.
On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he and Rosca were not
legally married to each other. The pertinent portions of the RTC Decision state: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

x x x In the case under consideration, the presumption of marriage, on which plaintiff

Uy anchored his allegations, has been sufficiently offset. Records reveal that there is
plethora of evidence showing that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca were never actually
married to each other, to wit: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

First. In his Petition for Naturalization as a Filipino citizen filed before the then Court of
First Instance of Batangas on 12 November 1953, plaintiff Uy himself stated in the fifth
paragraph of his Petition, to quote: "I am married (not legally)."

Second. The Sworn Statement of no less than the Governor of the Province of
Batangas executed in support of the plaintiff Uy's Petition for Naturalization
categorically states, in Nos. 2 and 4 thereof, that plaintiff Uy was married (not legally).

Third. The Immigrant Certificate of Residence shows that as late as 9 October 1951,
plaintiff Uy also known by his Chinese name of Uy Suan Tee, regarded himself as
"single" when filling up his civil status therein.

Fourth. The Alien Certificate of Registration No. 83758 establishes that plaintiff Uy was
an alien duly registered with the Bureau of Immigration of the Philippines and that his
civil status was single.

Fifth. The Affidavit of Vicente J. Caedo, a prominent citizen of Batangas, establishes in

Nos. 2 and 4 thereof that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to defendant Rosca.

Sixth. The testimony of defendant Rosca as an adverse witness reveals that plaintiff Uy
was not legally married to her because their marriage was not consummated.
For his part, plaintiff Uy tried to justify the non-presentation of their marriage certificate
by presenting public documents, namely: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

First. Decision in the case entitled: "In the matter of the Petition of Uy Suan Tee alias
Luis G. Uy, to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines";

Second. Certificate of Live Birth of Violeta Uy, daughter of plaintiff Uy and defendant
Rosca and the descriptive word "legitimate" showing that Violeta Uy was legitimate;

Third. Death Claim under SSS Employee Compensation executed and signed by
defendant Rosca, stating that she is the wife of plaintiff Uy;

Fourth. Various pictures of the plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca with their children;

Fifth. Special Power of Attorney executed by defendant Rosca dated 19 July 1985
wherein she admitted being the wife of plaintiff Uy;

Sixth. Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3 August 1982 executed by defendant Rosca

admitting she is the widow of plaintiff Uy which was not testified to nor identified by
Rosca;

Seventh. Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 signed by defendant Rosca

admitting her status as married;

to establish the fact of his marriage with defendant Rosca. Likewise, plaintiff Uy
presented defendant Rosca as an adverse witness purportedly to elicit from her the fact
of his marriage with the latter. However, this presumption had been debunked by
plaintiff Uy's own evidence and most importantly, by the more superior evidence
presented by the defendants.

While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and wife,
defendant Rosca's testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her
because their marriage was not consummated. In People vs. Borromeo, this Court held
that persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.  Consequently, with
the presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant
Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he
and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy
therefore to submit additional proof to show that they were legally married. He,
however, dismally failed to do so.35

Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their
property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies
when a couple living together were not incapacitated from getting married. Article 147
provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of
the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party
in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In
case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants,
each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence
of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-
owned unless there is proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and appellate
courts that Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is not co-owned but is
paraphernal.

First, in the Resolution dated 7 November 1979 of the LRC in LRC Consulta No. 1194,
Rosca was recognized as the sole registered owner of the property. 36 redarclaw

Second, in the Deed of Sale dated 29 January 1964 between Spouses Manuel and
Rosca covering the 484 square meter land, Uy served as a mere witness to Rosca's
purchase of the land as evidenced by his signature under "signed in the presence
of."37 This could only mean that Uy admitted the paraphernal nature of Rosca's
ownership over the property.

Third, in the Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 executed by Rosca in

support of her real estate loan application with PBC in the amount of P5 0,000, Rosca
stated that she was the sole and lawful owner of the subject property and that the land
was registered under her name and that the phrase "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G.
Uy" in TCT No. T-24660 was merely a description of her status. 38 redarclaw

Last, the title to the property in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" was
notice to the world, including her heirs and successors-in-interest, that such belonged
to Rosca as her paraphernal property.39 The words "married to" were merely descriptive
of Rosca's status at the time the property was registered in her name. 40 Otherwise, if
the property was conjugal, the title to the property should have been in the names of
Luis Uy and Petra Rosca.41 redarclaw

In Ruiz v. Court of Appeals,42 the property subject of the mortgage was registered in

the name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos." This
Court ruled that the title is registered in the name of Corazon alone because the phrase
"married to Rogelio Ruiz" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Corazon and should
not be construed to mean that her husband is also a registered owner.

Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to sufficiently overcome the
presumption that any property acquired while living together shall be owned by the
couple in equal shares. The house and lot were clearly Rosca's paraphernal properties
and she had every right to sell the same even without Uy's consent.

Uy further contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for being
simulated or fictitious for lack of consideration. Uy states that no proof was presented
by Spouses Lacsamana to show that they actually paid P80,000 to Rosca for the
purchase of the property or even if there was consideration, such was unreasonably low
and unconscionable. Thus, Spouses Lacsamana and Buena cannot be considered as
buyers in good faith.

We disagree.

Uy did not present any proof to show that Rosca did not receive any consideration for
the sale. Neither did he submit any evidence, whether documentary or testimonial,
showing the fair market value of the property at the time of the sale to prove that the
purchase price was unreasonably low or unconscionable. It was even mentioned by the
appellate court that "appellants failed to prove that on April 18, 1979, the property
might have been worth millions of pesos." Thus, Uy's allegations lack sufficient
substantiation.

Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court carry great weight and are binding
on this Court when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court
will not weigh the evidence all over again since payment of the purchase price and the
consideration for the sale are factual issues which cannot be raised in this petition.

In sum, we find that the Deed of Sale, executed by Rosca on her paraphernal property
in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14 September

2011 and Resolution dated 1 March 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
93786.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

Brion, Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

 FIRST DIVISION

November 22, 2017

G.R. No. 204289

FERNANDO MANCOL, JR., Petitioner

vs.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari  is the Decision  dated February 22, 2012 and
1 2

Resolution  dated September 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Visayas Station in CA-G.R.
3

CEB-CV No. 03030, affirming the Orders dated June 13, 2008,  November 4, 2008  and April 17,
4 5

2009  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City, Branch 31 in Civil Case No. 923.
6

Factual Antecedents

Respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), scheduled an Invitation to Bid for
Negotiated Sale on October 13, 2004 at the Mezzanine Floor, over a residential lot with a two-storey
building (subject property) covered by TCT No. 2041 located at Navarro Street, Calbayog City, and
with Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 990100600931  and 990100600479  with a purchase price of
7 8

₱l,326,000. 9

In line with this, Fernando Mancol, Jr. (petitioner) executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA)  appointing his father, Fernando Mancol, Sr. (Mancol, Sr.), to represent and negotiate, on his
10

behalf, the sale of the subject property. Pursuant to the SPA, Mancol, Sr. signed the Negotiated
Offer to Purchase  and Negotiated Sale Rules and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-
11

Come First Served Basis.  DBP then issued an Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 3440018  dated October
12 13

13, 2004, in the name of Fernando R. Mancol, Jr., paid by Fernando M. Mancol, Sr., in the amount
of ₱265,200, as initial payment for the purchase price of the subject property. During the
negotiations, DBP officials allegedly agreed, albeit verbally, to: (1) arrange and effect the transfer of
title of the lot in petitioner's name, including the payment of capital gains tax (CGT); and (2) to get rid
of the occupants of the subject property. 14

Petitioner paid the balance in the amount of ₱1,060,800, as evidenced by O.R. No. 3440451  dated 15

December 10, 2004. Thereafter, DBP, through its Branch Manager Jorge B. Albarillo, executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale,  in petitioner's favor.
16

On December 21, 2004, petitioner made a deposit with DBP for the payment of the CGT and
documentary stamp tax (DST) in the amount of ₱99,450. DBP acknowledged the deposit and issued
O.R. No. 3440537. 17

Sometime in 2006, DBP reneged on its undertaking based on the oral agreement. DBP returned to
the petitioner all the pertinent documents of the sale and issued a Manager's Check (MC) No.
0000956475  in the amount of ₱99,450.
18 19
In a Letter  dated February 21, 2006, petitioner through its counsel demanded from DBP to comply
20

with its verbal undertaking. He returned the MC and all pertinent documents affecting the sale of the
subject property to DBP.

DBP, through its Letter  dated April 22, 2006, disregarded the subsequent oral agreement and
21

reminded petitioner that DBP has no obligation to eject the occupants and to cause the transfer of
title of the lot in petitioner's name.

Meanwhile, Mancol, Sr. wrote a Letter  dated May 15, 2006 to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
22

requesting for a detailed computation of the CGT and DST with penalties and surcharges thereof
affecting the sale of the subject property. The BIR, through its Letter  dated May 24, 2006 came out
23

with a detailed computation in the total of ₱160,700.88.

In a Letter  dated June 2, 2006, petitioner proposed to DBP that he will facilitate the payment of the
24

CGT and DST but DBP should shoulder the penalties and surcharges. The proposal, however, was
turned down. As of March 7, 2007, the total amount to be paid which is necessary for the transfer of
the title in petitioner's name ballooned to ₱183,553.61 and counting. 25

On August 24, 2006, petitioner filed a Complaint  for damages for breach of contract against DBP
26

before the RTC of Calbayog City, Branch 31. He prayed that DBP be found to have breached its
obligation with petitioner; that DBP be held liable to pay the aggregate amount of ₱160,700.88 and
surcharges which may be imposed by the BIR at the time of payment; that DBP be ordered to pay
damages and attorney's fees; and that DBP be ordered to return the MC dated February 8, 2006 for
₱99,450.

In its Answer with Counter-Claim,  DBP alleged that the terms of the
27

Deed of Absolute Sale stated no condition that DBP will work on the document of transfer and to
eject the occupants thereon.  Assuming that DBP's officials made such a promise, DBP alleged that
28

the same would not be possible since the petitioner did not give any money to DBP for other
expenses in going to and from Calbayog City. DBP likewise alleged that it is not the bank's policy to
work for the registration of the instrument of sale of properties.  DBP further claimed that petitioner's
29

unilateral act in issuing a check to DBP does not constitute as evidence to prove that DBP assumed
the responsibility of registering the instrument of sale. By way of counterclaim, DBP averred that
petitioner grossly violated the terms and conditions of the agreement of sale.  Petitioner failed to
30

pay, reimburse or assume the financial obligation consequent to the initiation and filing of the writ of
possession by DBP against the occupants. Petitioner's failure was contrary to his promise and
assurance that he will pay. Petitioner did not comply with the clear and express provisions of the
Deed of Absolute Sale and of the rules and procedures of sale on negotiation. DBP, thus, prayed
that the complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and that petitioner be ordered to assume the
burden of initiating the ejectment suit and to pay DBP damages, attorney's fees and cost of suit
amounting to ₱200,000.

On February 20, 2007, the RTC issued an Order  declaring DBP in default by reason of its counsel's
31

failure to appear during the pre-trial and to file its pre-trial brief.

Trial ensued.

During the trial, Rodel Villanueva testified  that he was the one commissioned or ordered by a
32

certain Atty. Mar De Asis (Atty. De Asis) of DBP, to go to BIR-Catbalogan, and to bring the following
documents: a check worth PhP99,450.00, the amount for the CGT, the title, the TD, and the deed of
sale.33
Mancol, Sr. testified  that he signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase and Negotiated Sale Rules
34

and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-Come First Served Basis on behalf of his son, by
virtue of the SPA.  He stated that after the execution and delivery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, DBP
35

verbally agreed to facilitate the transfer of the title, the payment of the CGT, and to cause the
vacation of the occupants of the house and lot. Although he admitted that the verbal agreement
contradicted the negotiated rules and agreement.  He stated that DBP undertook to get rid of the
36

occupants, when its lawyer filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Possession  dated
37

January 11, 2005, which is pending in the RTC. 38

On April 14, 2008, the R TC Decision  ruled in favor of the petitioner, and ordered DBP to return to
39

petitioner the amount of ₱99,450 deposited to it for payment of the CGT and DST; to pay the
surcharges and/or interests on the CGT and DST as may be determined by the BIR from June 12,
2005 up to the date of payment; and to pay the petitioner attorney's fees in the amount of ₱l5,000.
The RTC likewise dismissed DBP's counterclaim. 40

Thereafter, DBP moved for the reconsideration  of the RTC's Decision. DBP alleged, among others,
41

that the testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr. were hearsay because their statements were
based on facts relayed to them by other people and not based on their personal knowledge.

On June 13, 2008, the RTC Order  granted DBP's motion and dismissed petitioner's complaint.
42

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration  of the June 13, 2008 Order. For the first time, petitioner
43

alleged that through his father, Mancol, Sr., he entered into a contemporaneous verbal agreement
with DBP. He argued that since his father was his attorney-in-fact, then his father had personal
knowledge of all transactions involving the sale of the subject property. The motion, however, was
denied in the RTC Order  dated November 4, 2008. The RTC affirmed with modification its June 13,
44

2008 Order, to read thus:

WHEREFORE, this court finds no reason to disturb its order dated June 13, 2008, subject only to a
modification that [DBP] is directed to return to the [petitioner], the total amount of ₱99,450.00
deposited to it for the payment of the [CGT] and [DST], with interest of six percent (6%) per
annum from December 21, 2004 until its return to the [petitioner].

SO ORDERED. 45

DBP sought reconsideration  of the RTC Order dated November 4, 2008, which however, was
46

denied by the RTC in its Order  dated April 17, 2009. The RTC ruled that DBP has waived its right to
47

question the return of ₱99,450 to the petitioner since DBP failed to refute such an issue in the RTC
Decision dated April 14, 2008.

Both petitioner  and DBP  appealed the RTC Order dated June 13, 2008 and November 4, 2008,
48 49

respectively, with the CA.

On February 22, 2012, the CA in its Decision,  denied both appeals, the dispositive portion of which
50

reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the appeals filed in this case are hereby DENIED.
The assailed Orders dated June 13, 2008, November 4, 2008 and April 17, 2009 of the [RTC],
Branch 31 of Calbayog City in Civil Case No. 923 are AFFIRMED. Costs to be shouldered equally by
both parties.
SO ORDERED. 51

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,  while DBP filed a Motion for
52

Reconsideration,  seeking the reversal of the CA Decision dated February 22, 2012. Both motions,
53

however, were denied in the CA Resolution  dated September 27, 2012.

54

Henceforth, only the petitioner filed the instant appeal anchored on the following arguments:

I. THE TESTIMONIES OF [PETITIONER'S] WITNESSES, [VILLANUEVA] AND [MANCOL, SR.]

ARE BASED ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND NOT HEARSAY EVIDENCE, AND THAT THEY
SUFFICIENTI.JY ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF A SUBSEQUENT ORAL
AGREEMENT BETWEEN [PETITIONER] AND DBP TO (1) ARRANGE AND EFFECT THE
TRANSFER OF THE TORRENS TITLE IN THE NAME OF [PETITIONER], INCLUDING PAYMENT
OF [CGT] AND [DSTs], AND (2) TO GET RID OF THE OCCUPANTS IN THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY[;]

II. UNDISPUTED RELEVANT AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD ESTABLISHED THE

EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF THE SUBSEQUENT ORAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN MANCOL,
JR. AND DBP, AND THAT TO IGNORE THEM IS TO SANCTION VIOLATION OF MANCOL. JR.'S
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS[; AND]

III. [PETITIONER] IS ENTITLED TO THE PAYMENT OF' MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES,
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT. 55

The petition/ails.

The above assignment of errors make it evident that the only issue involved in this appeal is one of
fact: whether or not the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses, Villanueva and Mancol, Sr., should be
given probative value to establish the alleged contemporaneous verbal agreement in the sale
contract, i.e., that DBP bound itself to arrange and effect the transfer of title of the lot in petitioner's
name; and, get rid of the occupants of the subject property.

We answer in the negative.

"The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement
by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the
parties, varying the purport of the written contract." 56

This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a party puts in issue in its pleading any of the
exceptions in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9  of the Revised Rules on Evidence, a
57

party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement. "Moreover, as
with all possible objections to the admission of evidence, a party's failure to timely object is deemed
a waiver, and parol evidence may then be entertained. 58

In the case of Maunlad Savings & Loan Assoc., Inc. v. CA,  the Court held that:
59

The rule is that objections to evidence must be made as soon as the grounds therefor become
reasonably apparent. In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the
objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable features become
apparent only by reason of such answer, otherwise the objection is waived and such evidence will
form part of the records of the case as competent and complete evidence and all parties are thus
amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence.  (Citations omitted)
60

Here, in order to prove the verbal agreement allegedly made by DBP, petitioner invoked the fourth
exception under the parol evidence rule, i.e., the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or
their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement, by offering the testimonies
of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr.

The bank, however, failed to make a timely objection against the said testimonies during the trial
since DBP was declared in default. Thus, DBP waived the protection of the parol evidence rule.

This notwithstanding, We stress that the admissibility of the testimonial evidence as an exception to
the parol evidence rule does not necessarily mean that it has weight. Admissibility of evidence
should not be confounded with its probative value.

"The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of
evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade."  The 61

admissibility of a particular item of evidence has to do with whether it meets various tests by which
its reliability is to be determined, so as to be considered with other evidence admitted in the case in
arriving at a decision as to the truth.  The weight of evidence is not determined mathematically by
62

the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact, but depends upon its practical
effect in inducing belief on the part of the judge trying the case.  "Admissibility refers to the question
63

of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the
question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue."  "Thus, a particular item of evidence
64

may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided by the rules of evidence." 65

It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of his own
personal knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own perception.  A witness may not
66

testify on what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or
heard.  Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of what he has
67

heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies to written
statements. 68

The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence
that establishes the truth of a disputed fact.  A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed
69

fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because his testimony derives its value not from the
credit accorded to him as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the
extrajudicial source of his information. 70

Guided by these precepts, Villanueva's testimony falls within the category of hearsay evidence.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, Villanueva had no personal inkling as to the contemporaneous verbal
agreement between petitioner and DBP. In fact, there was no such verbal agreement. As admitted
by the petitioner, the alleged verbal agreement was entered into between DBP and Mancol, Sr., by
virtue of the SP A. Villanueva has no personal knowledge of such fact. His testimony related only to
the fact that Atty. De Asis ordered him to go to BIR-Catbalogan, and bring the following documents:
a check worth ₱99,450, the amount for the CGT, title, TD, and the deed of sale. None of Villanueva's
acts would suggest, even remotely, that he personally knew about the verbal agreement.

As correctly pointed out by the CA:

[Villanueva] did not personally witness the perfection of the alleged contemporaneous agreement
between Mancol, Jr. and DBP. Furthermore, he had no personal knowledge of its existence. His
testimony merely touched on the alleged denial by the Revenue Office of the payment of the [CGT]
on the subject property and the subsequent execution of a new deed of conveyance by the DBP. It is
clear then that his testimony did not bolster [petitioner's] allegation to any degree.
71

The same conclusion can be drawn from Mancol, Sr.'s testimony. Although the records show that by
virtue of an SP A executed by the petitioner, Mancol, Sr. signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase,
including the Negotiated Sale Rules and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-Come First
Served Basis, and that he made the initial payment for the sale, there is dearth of evidence to prove
that indeed, he personally entered into a verbal agreement with DBP. Upon being asked what
transpired after the delivery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, Mancol, Sr. simply answered that DBP
agreed to undertake the transfer of title of the lot, and to oust the occupants. There was no mention
as to who actually and personally appeared before DBP or any of its officials in order to forge the
alleged verbal agreement. Thus:

(DIRECT EXAMINATION by Atty. Elino Chin, counsel for

Witness: [Mancol, Sr.])

xxxx

ATTY. CHIN

Q After the delivery of this Exh. "H'', what transpired?

A The bank agreed to facilitate the transfer of the title and the payment of the [CGT] to get rid of the
present occupants of the house and lot.

Q You said that the bank agreed, is that in writing?

A Only verbal.

Q That does not contradict the negotiated rules and agreement?

A Yes, but there was a verbal undertaking for them to do what was agreed upon.

x x x x. 72

Additionally, the RTC aptly observed that:

[N]owhere in the records would also reveal that the agreement to arrange and effect the transfer of
title over the subject lot was entered into between [DBP] and [Mancol, Sr.], for and on behalf of the
[petitioner].

x x x The [SPA] authorizes [Mancol, Sr.] to represent the [petitioner] and negotiate before the DBP,
Catarman Branch on the invitation to bid on he sale of the lot covered by TCT No. 2041 scheduled
on October 13, 2004, as well as to sign or execute and receive any paper or document necessary for
said purposes. This explains why it was Mancol, Sr. who signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase
and the Negotiated Sale Rules and Procedure, and who paid to DBP the initial payment of the
purchase price on October 13, 2004 in [petitioner's] behalf. It was not established however whether
the subsequent payments and other transactions, including the act of entering into an oral
agreement with [DBP] that it will effect the transfer of the subject title, were also carried out by
Fernando Mancol, Sr. in behalf of [petitioner].

The [petitioner] fails [sic] to show with whom the [DBP] agreed to arrange and effect the transfer of
the title in his name.  Thus, as there is no showing that it was [Mancol, Sr.] who entered into such
1âwphi1

agreement with [DBP] or that he was personally present during the perfection of the agreement and
witnessed the same, any statement from the latter as to the circumstances relative to the perfection
of such oral agreement would indeed be hearsay. 73

Assuming for argument's sake that Mancol, Sr., on behalf of petitioner, entered into a verbal
agreement with DBP, such agreement would remain unenforceable. Despite petitioner's insistence,
the act of entering into a verbal agreement was not stipulated in the SPA. The authority given to
Mancol, Sr. was limited to representing and negotiating, on petitioner's behalf, the invitation to bid on
the sale of the subject lot, which is specifically worded as follows:

I, FERNANDO R. MANCOL, JR., xxx by these presents do hereby name, constitute and appoint my
father Fernando M. Manco, Sr., as true and lawful attorney-in-fact, for me, in my name, place and to
do and perform the following:

1. To represent and negotiate before the DBP Catarman Branch regarding the INVITATION TO BID
FOR NEGOTIATED SALE scheduled on October 13, 2004 at the Mezzanine Floor, the subject
Residential Lot with two storey building (TCT No. 2041) located at Navarro Street, Calbayog City;
and

2. To sign, or execute and receive any paper or document necessary for the above purpose.

x x x x.
74

There is nothing in the language of the SP A from which We could deduce the intention of petitioner
to authorize Mancol, Sr. to enter into a verbal agreement with DBP. Indeed, it has been held that
"[w]here powers and duties are specified and defined in an instrument, all such powers and duties
are limited and are confined to those which are specified and defined, and all other powers and
duties are excluded."  Clearly, the power to enter into a verbal agreement with DBP is conspicuously
75

inexistent in the SPA.

To adopt the intent theory advanced by petitioner, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence
to that effect, would run afoul of the express tenor of the SPA. It would likewise be contrary to "the
rule that a power of attorney must be strictly construed and pursued. The instrument will be held to
grant only those powers which are specified therein, and the agent may neither go beyond nor
deviate from the power of attorney." 76

It is axiomatic that this Court will not review, much less reverse, the factual findings of the CA,
especially where, as in this case, such findings coincide with those of the trial court, since this Court
is not a trier of facts.

All told, therefore, the Court finds no reason or basis to grant the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 22, 2012 and Resolution dated
September 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 03030
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182356               December 4, 2013

DRA, LEILA A DELA LLANO, Petitioner,

vs.
REBECCA BIONG, doing business under the name and style of Pongkay
Trading, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Very case essentially turns on two basic questions: questions of fact and questions of law.
Questions of fact are the parties and their counsel to respond to, based on what supporting facts the
legal questions require; the court can only draw conclusion from the facts or evidence adduced.
When the facts are lacking because of the deficiency of presented evidence, then the court can only
draw one conclusion: that the cause must fail for lack of evidentiary support.

The present case is one such case as Dra. Leila A dela Llana’s(petitioner) petition for review on
certorari  challenging the February 11, 2008 Decision  and the March 31, 2008 resolution  of the
1 2 3

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89163.

The Factual Antecedents

On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car
along North Avenue, Quezon City. 4

His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at
the backseat. 5

Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few
seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car’s
rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and its
rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these
minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible physical
injuries.
6

The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel Primero. It
stated that Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck.7

Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the
name and style of "Pongkay Trading" and was engaged in a gravel and sand business. 8

In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of
her neck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more
severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. On June 9,
2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to examine her
condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the
compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo
physical therapy to alleviate her condition. Dra. dela Llana’s condition did not improve despite three
months of extensive physical therapy. 9

She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs. Willie Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric Flores, in
search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a cervical spine
surgery to release the compression of her nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her
spine and neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae. 10

The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the
practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the surgery. 11

Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but
Rebecca refused to pay. 12

Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City (RTC). She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular
accident and claimed ₱150,000.00 for her medical expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and
an average monthly income of ₱30,000.00 since June 2000. She further prayed for actual, moral,
and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees. 13

In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against her as no
reasonable relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury. She pointed
out that Dra. dela Llana’s illness became manifest one month and one week from the date of the
vehicular accident. As a counterclaim, she demanded the payment of attorney’s fees and costs of
the suit.
14

At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness  and Joel as a hostile witness.
15 16

Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident. To
prove her claim, she identified and authenticated a medical certificate dated November 20, 2000
issued by Dr. Milla. The medical certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash
injury. It also chronicled her clinical history and physical examinations. 17

Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck hit the car because the truck’s brakes got stuck. 18

In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when they met
several days after the vehicular accident. She also asserted that she observed the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel. She pointed out that she required
Joel to submit a certification of good moral character as well as barangay, police, and NBI
clearances prior to his employment. She also stressed that she only hired Primero after he
successfully passed the driving skills test conducted by Alberto Marcelo, a licensed driver-
mechanic. 19

Alberto also took the witness stand. He testified that he checked the truck in the morning of March
30, 2000. He affirmed that the truck was in good condition prior to the vehicular accident. He opined
that the cause of the vehicular accident was a damaged compressor. According to him, the absence
of air inside the tank damaged the compressor. 20
 RTC Ruling

The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s
whiplash injury to be Joel’s reckless driving.21

It found that a whiplash injury is an injury caused by the sudden jerking of the spine in the neck area.
It pointed out that the massive damage the car suffered only meant that the truck was over-
speeding. It maintained that Joel should have driven at a slower pace because road visibility
diminishes at night. He should have blown his horn and warned the car that his brake was stuck and
could have prevented the collision by swerving the truck off the road. It also concluded that Joel was
probably sleeping when the collision occurred as Joel had been driving for fifteen hours on that
fateful day. The RTC further declared that Joel’s negligence gave rise to the presumption that
Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in Joel's selection and
supervision of Joel. Rebecca was vicariously liable because she was the employer and she
personally chose him to drive the truck. On the day of the collision, she ordered him to deliver gravel
and sand to Muñoz Market, Quezon City. The Court concluded that the three elements necessary to
establish Rebecca’s liability were present: (1) that the employee was chosen by the employer,
personally or through another; (2) that the services were to be rendered in accordance with orders
which the employer had the authority to give at all times; and (3) that the illicit act of the employee
was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him. The RTC thus awarded Dra.
dela Llana the amounts of ₱570,000.00 as actual damages, ₱250,000.00 as moral damages, and
the cost of the suit. 22

CA Ruling

In a decision dated February 11, 2008, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana
failed to establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury
by preponderance of evidence. Citing Nutrimix Feeds Corp. v. Court of Appeals,  it declared that
23

courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of the other party if there is no evidence or the evidence is too
slight to warrant an inference establishing the fact in issue. It noted that the interval between the
date of the collision and the date when Dra. dela Llana began to suffer the symptoms of her illness
was lengthy. It concluded that this interval raised doubts on whether Joel’s reckless driving and the
resulting collision in fact caused Dra. dela Llana’s injury. It also declared that courts cannot take
judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. It observed that Dra. dela Llana did
not immediately visit a hospital to check if she sustained internal injuries after the accident.
Moreover, her failure to present expert witnesses was fatal to her claim. It also gave no weight to the
medical certificate. The medical certificate did not explain how and why the vehicular accident
caused the injury.24

The Petition

Dra. dela Llana points out in her petition before this Court that Nutrimix is inapplicable in the present
case. She stresses that Nutrimix involved the application of Article 1561 and 1566 of the Civil Code,
provisions governing hidden defects. Furthermore, there was absolutely no evidence in Nutrimix that
showed that poisonous animal feeds were sold to the respondents in that case. As opposed to the
respondents in Nutrimix, Dra. dela Llana asserts that she has established by preponderance of
evidence that Joel’s egligent act was the proximate cause of her whiplash injury. First, pictures of
her damaged car show that the collision was strong. She posits that it can be reasonably inferred
from these pictures that the massive impact resulted in her whiplash injury. Second, Dr. Milla
categorically stated in the medical certificate that Dra. dela Llana suffered from whiplash
injury. Third, her testimony that the vehicular accident caused the injury is credible because she was
a surgeon.
Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the medical certificate has probative value. Citing several cases,
she posits that an uncorroborated medical certificate is credible if uncontroverted. 25

She points out that expert opinion is unnecessary if the opinion merely relates to matters of common
knowledge. She maintains that a judge is qualified as an expert to determine the causation between
Joel’s reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Trial judges are aware of the fact that whiplash
injuries are common in vehicular collisions.

The Respondent’s Position

In her Comment,  Rebecca points out that Dra. dela Llana raises a factual issue which is beyond the
26

scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She maintains that
the CA’s findings of fact are final and conclusive. Moreover, she stresses that Dra. dela Llana’s
arguments are not substantial to merit this Court’s consideration.

The Issue

The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate
cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury.

Our Ruling We find the petition unmeritorious.

The Supreme Court may review questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari when the
findings of fact by the lower courts are conflicting

The issue before us involves a question of fact and this Court is not a trier of facts. As a general rule,
the CA’s findings of fact are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal. It is
not the function of this Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We can only review the presented evidence, by
way of exception, when the conflict exists in findings of the RTC and the CA. 27

We see this exceptional situation here and thus accordingly examine the relevant evidence
presented before the trial court.

Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict."
Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are:

(1) damages to the plaintiff;

(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the
defendant must respond, was guilty; and

(3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. 28

These elements show that the source of obligation in a quasi-delict case is the breach or omission of
mutual duties that civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from non-contractual
relations of certain members of society to others. 29
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the
three elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebecca’s liability as Joel’s employer.

She should show the chain of causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her whiplash injury.

Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel - arise.
30

Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this Court can then
proceed with the application and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. 31

Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, "an action
predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held
liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee." 32

The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the wrongful or negligent
act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations. 33

In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.

He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater
weight of credible evidence. 34

The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof.

In short, mere allegations are not evidence. 35

In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and
Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of
evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not
have occurred. 36

Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence:

(1) the pictures of her damaged car,

(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and

(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal
relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other words,

Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the
factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established, as fully discussed below. 37

A.
 The pictures of the damaged
car only demonstrate the
impact of the collision

Dra. dela Llana contends that the pictures of the damaged car show that the massive impact of the
collision caused her whiplash injury. We are not persuaded by this bare claim. Her insistence that
these pictures show the causation grossly belies common logic. These pictures indeed demonstrate
the impact of the collision. However, it is a far-fetched assumption that the whiplash injury can also
be inferred from these pictures.

B.

The medical certificate cannot be

considered because it was
not admitted in evidence

Furthermore, the medical certificate, marked as Exhibit "H" during trial, should not be considered in
resolving this case for the reason that it was not admitted in evidence by the RTC in an order dated
September 23, 2004. 38

Thus, the CA erred in even considering this documentary evidence in its resolution of the case. It is
a basic rule that evidence which has not been admitted cannot be validly considered by the courts in
arriving at their judgments.

However, even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the medical
certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness
but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. 39

Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence  except in very unusual
40

circumstance that is not found in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not
be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to
convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary
weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court. 41

During trial, Dra. dela Llana testified:

"Q: Did your physician tell you, more or less, what was the reason why you were feeling that pain in
your left arm?

A: Well, I got a certificate from her and in that certificate, she stated that my condition was due to a
compression of the nerve, which supplied my left arm and my left hand.

Court: By the way, what is the name of this physician, Dra.?

Witness: Her name is Dra. Rosalinda Milla. She is a Rehabilitation Medicine Specialist. Atty.
Yusingco: You mentioned that this Dra. Rosalinda Milla made or issued a medical certificate. What
relation does this medical certificate, marked as Exhibit H have to do with that certificate, you said
was made by Dra. Milla?
Witness: This is the medical certificate that Dra. Milla made out for me.

Atty. Yusingco: Your Honor, this has been marked as Exhibit H.

Atty. Yusingco: What other medical services were done on you, Dra. dela Llana, as a result of that
feeling, that pain that you felt in your left arm?

Witness: Well, aside from the medications and physical therapy, a re-evaluation of my condition after
three months indicated that I needed surgery.

Atty. Yusingco: Did you undergo this surgery?

Witness: So, on October 19, I underwent surgery on my neck, on my spine.

Atty. Yusingco: And, what was the result of that surgical operation?

Witness: Well, the operation was to relieve the compression on my nerve, which did not resolve by
the extensive and prolonged physical therapy that I underwent for more than three
months." (emphasis ours)
42

Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of the contents of the medical
certificate.  However, she was not presented to testify in court and was not even able to identify and
1âwphi1

affirm the contents of the medical certificate. Furthermore, Rebecca was deprived of the opportunity
to cross-examine Dr. Milla on the accuracy and veracity of her findings. We also point out in this
respect that the medical certificate nonetheless did not explain the chain of causation in fact
between Joel’s reckless driving and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury. It did not categorically state
that the whiplash injury was a result of the vehicular accident. A perusal of the medical certificate
shows that it only attested to her medical condition, i.e., that she was suffering from whiplash injury.
However, the medical certificate failed to substantially relate the vehicular accident to Dra. dela
Llana’s whiplash injury. Rather, the medical certificate only chronicled her medical history and
physical examinations.

C.

Dra. dela Llana’s opinion that

Joel’s negligence caused her
whiplash injury has no probative value

Interestingly, the present case is peculiar in the sense that Dra. dela Llana, as the plaintiff in this
quasi-delict case, was the lone physician-witness during trial. Significantly, she merely testified as an
ordinary witness before the trial court. Dra. dela Llana essentially claimed in her testimony that Joel’s
reckless driving caused her whiplash injury. Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and
even assuming that she is an expert in neurology, we cannot give weight to her opinion that Joel’s
reckless driving caused her whiplash injury without violating the rules on evidence. Under the Rules
of Court, there is a substantial difference between an ordinary witness and an expert witness. The
opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in evidence regarding:

(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;

(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and

 (c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.  Furthermore, the
1âwphi1

witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or
appearance of a person. 43

On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to possess. 44

However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an admitted expert testimony, much
less to an unobjected ordinary testimony respecting special knowledge. The reason is that the
probative value of an expert testimony does not lie in a simple exposition of the expert's opinion.
Rather, its weight lies in the assistance that the expert witness may afford the courts by
demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and the reasons on which the logic of
his conclusions is founded. 45

In the present case, Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the
reason that she was not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not
competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury. Furthermore, we
emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during trial, nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation on
the nature as well as the cause and effects of whiplash injury in her testimony.

The Supreme Court cannot take

judicial notice that vehicular
accidents cause whiplash injuries.

Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before the trial court shows
that Dra. Dela Llana did not present any testimonial or documentary evidence that directly
shows the causal relation between the vehicular accident and Dra. Dela Llana’s injury. Her
claim that Joel’s negligence causes her whiplash injury was not established because of the
deficiency of the presented evidence during trial. We point out in this respect that courts cannot take
judicial notice that vehicular ccidents cause whiplash injuries. This proportion is not public
knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions.  We have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices and judges are
46

only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the basis of the parties’ pieces of evidence and their
corresponding legal arguments.

In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her cause by preponderance of evidence. While
we commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of the
case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llana’s favor. Her claim, unsupported by prepondernace of
evidence, is merely a bare assertion and has no leg to stand on.

WHEREFORE, presmises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated March 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELLA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that he conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 163210             August 13, 2008

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
MORENO DUMAPIS, ELMO TUNDAGUI and FRANCIS LIAGAO, respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
November 7, 2003 Decision1 and April 15, 2004 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 75860.

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation (petitioner), a domestic juridical entity engaged in mining,
employed Moreno Dumapis and Elmo Tundagui as lead miners; and Francis Liagao, as load, haul and
dump (LHD) machine operator (respondents).3 All three were assigned at the 850 level, underground,
Victoria Area in Lepanto, Mankayan, Benguet. This is a known "highgrade" area where most of the ores
mined are considered of high grade content.4

In the afternoon of September 15, 2000, at 2:00 p.m., Dwayne Chambers (Chambers), one of its foreign
consultants who was then acting as Assistant Resident Manager of the Mine, went underground at the
850 level to conduct a routinary inspection of the workers and the working conditions therein. When he
went to the various stopes of the said level, he was surprised to see that nobody was there. However,
when he went to the 8k stope, he noticed a group of workers sitting, sorting, and washing ores believed to
be "highgrade." Realizing that "highgrading"5 was being committed, Chambers shouted. Upon hearing his
angry voice, the workers scampered in different directions of the stope.6 Chambers then reported the
incident to the security investigation office.7

After investigating, Security Investigators Paul Pespes, Jr. and Felimon Ringor (Security Investigators)
executed a Joint Affidavit, which reads as follows:

xxxx

At about 3:40 PM of September 15, 2000, while we were at the Lepanto Security Investigation
office, we received a report that the LMD Asst. Resident Manager, Mr. Dwayne Chambers saw
and surprised several unidentified miners at 8K Stope, 850 level committing Highgrading activities
therein;

Consequently, all miners assigned to work therein including their supervisor and SG Ceasarion
Damoslog, an element of the Mine Security Patrol posted therein as stationary guard were called
to this office for interrogation regarding this effect;

In the course of the investigation, we eventually learned that the highgrading event really
transpired somewhere at the roadway of 8K Stope, 850 level at about 2:00 o’clock PM of
 September 15, 2000. That the involved participants were all miners assigned to work at 7K Stope,
8K Stope, 240 E, Cross Cut South level drive, all located at 850 mine level. Likewise, the detailed
stationary guard assigned thereat and some mine supervisors were also directly involved in this
activity;

Security Guard Ceasarion Damoslog honestly confessed his direct participation then claimed that
he was allegedly convinced by Mr. Joel Gumatin, one of the miners assigned at Panel No.1-est-
North, 8K Stope, 850 level to cooperate with them to commit Highgrading. He revealed his
companions to be all the miners assigned at 8K stope, namely, Joel Gumatin, Brent Suyam,
Maximo Madao, Elmo Tundagui and Daniel Fegsar. He also included those who were assigned to
work at 240 E, XCS, namely: Thomas Garcia (immediate supervisor), John Kitoyan, Moreno
Dumapis, and Marolito Cativo. He enumerated also messrs. Benedict Arocod, Samson Damian,
and Dionisio Bandoc, 7K Stope, 850 level assigned miners and shiftboss, respectively;

Mr. Pablo Daguio, the shiftboss of 240 E, XCS, 850 level also positively confirmed the
Highgrading activity. He added that actually he came upon the group and even dispersed them
when he went therein prior to the arrival of Mr. Chambers;

Furthermore, we also learned from the confession of Mr. Maximo Madao that its was messrs. Joel
Gumatin and Brent Suyam who took their issued rock drilling machine then drilled holes and
blasted the same at the 8K Stope roadway with the assistance of Thomas Garcia, John Kitoyan,
Benedict Arocod, Samsom Damian, Daniel Fegsar and Francisco Liagao. That SG Ceasarion
Damoslog was present on the area standing and watching the group during the incident;

That we are executing this joint affidavit to establish the foregoing facts and to support any
complaint that may be filed against respondents;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands and affix our signature this 28th day of
September 2000, at Lepanto, Mankayan, Benguet.8

(Emphasis supplied)

On October 24, 2000, petitioner issued a resolution finding respondents and their co-accused guilty of the
offense of highgrading and dismissing them from their employment.9

On November 14, 2000, respondents together with the nine other miners, filed a Complaint for illegal
dismissal with the Labor Arbiter (LA), docketed as NLRC Case No. 11-0607-00 against petitioner.10 On
August 21, 2001, the LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

On September 22, 2001, the miners appealed the decision of the LA to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). On August 30, 2002, the NLRC rendered a Decision, declaring the dismissal of
herein respondents as illegal, but affirming the dismissal of the nine other complainant miners. The
dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision insofar as respondents are concerned, reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DECISION dated August 21, 2001 is hereby MODIFIED
declaring the dismissal of complainants [herein respondents] Moreno Dumapis, Elmo Tundagui
and Francis Liagao illegal and ordering respondent to pay them backwages in the total amount of
four hundred eighty thousand one hundred eighty two pesos and 63/100 (P480, 182.63) and
separation pay in the total amount of four hundred seventeen thousand two hundred thirty pesos
and 32/100 (P417,230.32) as computed in the body of the decision.

xxxx
 SO ORDERED.11

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit by the NLRC in its
Resolution dated on November 22, 2002.12

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA assailing the
aforementioned decision and resolution of the NLRC. The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC13 and
denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, herein petition on the following grounds:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR

IN AFFIRMING THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION’S DECISION DATED
AUGUST 30, 2002 WHICH DECLARED AS ILLEGAL THE DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE OF
HEREIN RESPONDENTS.14

A. The Court of Appeal’s strict application of the hearsay rule under Section 36, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court to the present case is uncalled for.

B. In cases of dismissal for breach of trust and confidence, proof beyond doubt is not
required, it being sufficient that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the
employees are responsible for the misconduct which renders them unworthy of the trust
and confidence demanded by their position.15

The petition is devoid of merit.

In finding the dismissal of respondents illegal, the CA upheld the NLRC in considering the Joint Affidavit
of the Security Investigators (Joint Affidavit) as hearsay and therefore inadmissible, to wit:

We subscribed to the conclusion of the NLRC that the Joint Affidavit of Security Investigators
Paul D. Pespes, Jr. and Felimon Ringor is hearsay and thus, inadmissible. Their narration of
factual events was not based on their personal knowledge but on disclosures made by Chambers
and Daguio. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court defined the nature of hearsay:

Witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which
are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.16

Arguing for the admissibility of the Joint Affidavit, petitioner cites Article 221 of the Labor Code, as
amended, which provides:

Article 221. Technical rules not binding and prior resort to amicable settlement. In any
proceeding before the Commission or any Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing
in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the Code
that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to the
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

We agree with the petitioner.

Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the
rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be
given only stringent application, i.e.,  by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.17
In a number of cases,18 this Court has construed Article 221 of the Labor Code as permitting the NLRC or
the LA to decide a case on the basis of position papers and other documents submitted without
necessarily resorting to technical rules of evidence as observed in the regular courts of justice. Rules of
evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC.19

In Bantolino v. Coca-Coca Bottlers Phils., Inc.20 the Court ruled that although the affiants had not been
presented to affirm the contents of their affidavits and be cross-examined, their affidavits may be given
evidentiary value; the argument that such affidavits were hearsay was not persuasive. Likewise, in Rase
v. National Labor Relations Commission,21 this Court ruled that it was not necessary for the affiants to
appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would
be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules
and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.

Thus, the CA and the NLRC erred in ruling that the Joint Affidavit is inadmissible for being hearsay. The
Joint Affidavit of the Security Investigators is admissible for what it is, an investigation report.

However, the admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility
refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative
value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue.22 Thus, a particular item of
evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.23 The distinction is clearly laid out in Skippers United Pacific,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission.24 In finding that the Report of the Chief Engineer did not
constitute substantial evidence to warrant the dismissal of Rosaroso, this Court ruled:

According to petitioner, the foregoing Report established that respondent was dismissed for just
cause. The CA, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, however, refused to give credence to the
Report. They are one in ruling that the Report cannot be given any probative value as it is
uncorroborated by other evidence and that it is merely hearsay, having come from a source, the
Chief Engineer, who did not have any personal knowledge of the events reported therein.

xxxx

The CA upheld these findings, succinctly stating as follows:

Verily, the report of Chief Engineer Retardo is utterly bereft of probative value. It is not verified by
an oath and, therefore, lacks any guarantee of trusthworthiness. It is furthermore, and this is
crucial, not sourced from the personal knowledge of Chief Engineer Retardo. It is rather based on
the perception of "ATTENDING SUPT. ENGINEERS CONSTANTLY OBSERVING ALL
PERSONNELS ABILITY AND ATTITUDE WITH REGARDS TO OUR TECHNICAL CAPABILITY
AND BEHAVIOURS WITH EMPHASY [sic] ON DISCIPLINE" who " NOTICED 3/E ROSAROSO
AS BEING SLACK AND NOT CARING OF HIS JOB AND DUTIES x x x." Accordingly, the report
is plain hearsay. It is not backed up by the affidavit of any of the "Supt." Engineers who
purportedly had first-hand knowledge of private respondents supposed "lack of discipline,"
"irresponsibility" and "lack of diligence" which caused him to lose his job. x x x

The Courts finds no reason to reverse the foregoing findings.25 (Emphasis supplied)

While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical
rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural rule should not be construed as a license
to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. The evidence presented must at least have a modicum
of admissibility for it to have probative value.26 Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding
or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla.27 It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.28 Thus, even though technical rules of evidence are not strictly complied with before the LA
and the NLRC, their decision must be based on evidence that must, at the very least, be substantial.29

Pursuant to the aforementioned doctrines, we now look into the probative weight of the Joint Affidavit.

An examination of the Joint Affidavit reveals that the facts alleged therein by the Security Investigators are
not of their own personal knowledge. They simply referred to the facts allegedly relayed to them by
Chambers, Damoslog, Daguio, and Madao. Thus, there is a need to individually scrutinize the statements
and testimonies of the four sources of the Joint Affidavit in order to determine the latter’s probative weight.

The Joint Affidavit states that, "Mr. Dwayne Chambers saw and surprised several unidentified miners x x
x."30 Chambers simply narrated to the Security Investigators what he saw but did not indicate herein
respondents.

Also stated in the Joint Affidavit is the alleged confession of Damoslog wherein he named respondents
Tundagui and Dumapis as his companions in the act of highgrading .31

Records show that Damoslog submitted two sworn statements. In his first statement,32 Damoslog claimed
that he was unaware of the act of highrading, and denied any involvement therein. However, in his
second statement,33 Damoslog claimed to have personally witnessed the act of highgrading and named
the miners involved to wit:

07. Ques - Could you narrate briefly how it transpired then?

Ans - On the first hour of this specific dated and shift at about 0800hrs, while we were at the 8K
stope, 850 level, Mr. Joel Gumatin approached me that he could not procure some needed
amount of money and if possible we will commit highgrading for that effect to settle his problem.
That because I pity him, I just answered that if they could manage to do it then they could do it.

08. Ques - Who was the companion of Mr. Gumatin when he approached you?

Ans - He was alone.

09. Ques - Did Gumatin specifically informed [sic] you his problem?

Ans - I did not asked him honestly but he only insisted that he needed an amount of money badly
as I earlier said.

10. Ques - So just after telling his purpose did he started [sic] the highgrading activity?

Ans - No, the highgrading scheme started at past 1300 Hrs.

11. Ques - How did it started [sic]?

Ans - They started after they all finished their respective drilling assignment. That while I was
near the panel 2-West located at the inner portion of 8K Stope, I observed the LHD unit coming
from the roadway near the 8K Eating station which was previously parked thereat proceeded to
the roadway of panel 1-West then started cleaning and scraping said roadway. That after
cleaning he parked it at the inner portion of the roadway. Then afterwhich one among the miner
who was not assigned therein and I failed to identify his name shove two shovels on the roadway
recently cleaned by the LHD then handed it to us with another man whom I don’t know his name
but could recognize and identify him if I will meet him again then we washed the same in the inner
area of panel 2-West which is adjacent. That after washing and sorting the same, we placed it
 atop of an spread cartoon [sic] sheet. That while we were busy washing and sorting, Mr. Gumatin
also was fixing and spreading the airhose for rockdrilling machine. That few moments thereafter, I
heard the running engine of the drilling machine but I can not identify the operator as my line of
view was obstructed by the curbed angle of the panel where we are washing the ores. That
afterwhich I heard somebody that they are now going to blast the drilled holes but we remained in
our place continuing washing the stones. That after the blast Mr. Garcia and one other
companion whom I failed to identify due to foggy condition caused by the explosive blasting then
handed us the additional newly unearth ores for washing. That while were still busy washing,
Gumatin approached us then told us that he will collect what was already washed and sorted and
start to process the same. That Gumatin took the items then started to pound the ores atop of an
LHD unit parked near the entrance of panel 2-East which was not used during the shift. That after
that, I stood up then subsequently proceeded to panel 2-West then observed messrs. Maximo
Madao, Benedict Arocod, Brent Suyam, Daniel Fegsar, Thomas Garcia, Mariolito Cativo,
John Kitoyna and Samson Damian who acted as the look out at the junction of 240 E, XCS and
8K Stope. The enumerated miners except Damian were in squatting position in scattered
adjacent places busy sorting ores. Moments later Shift boss Dionisio Bandoc arrived then went
to the place of Gumatin then told us that he will get a portion of the already proceeded ores for
the operator to handcarry so that he will not need to come to 8K Stope, 850 level then after taking
some of the loot he proceeded out simultaneously uttering that he will check the look out at the
outer area of the mainline posted away from the 7K Stope.34 (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, Damoslog does not name respondents Dumapis and Tundagui as among the miners involved
in the act of highgrading; neither does he mention respondent Liagao.

The Joint Affidavit also states that Daguio positively confirmed the act of highgrading. However, in his
sworn statement,35 Daguio claims that he did not recognize nor did he identify any of the miners, to wit:

11. Ques - In your own honest observation, what could be the estimate [sic] number of this group
of miners doing highgrading activities?

Ans - I don’t know but obviously they were several as manifested by their number of cap
lamplights. I also speculated that some of them were hidden at the curved inner access of the
roadway enroute to the inner area.

12. Ques - Did you recognize nor [sic] identify any of them?

Ans - Honestly, no.36 (Emphasis supplied)

Lastly, the Joint Affidavit also points to the confession of Madao wherein he particularly named
respondent Liagao as one of the miners involved in the act of highgrading.

Madao submitted two sworn statements. In his first sworn statement37 dated September 16, 2000, Madao
claimed his innocence. He did not incriminate any of the respondents. However, in his second sworn
statement38 dated September 20, 2000, Madao claimed to have knowledge of the act of highgrading and
specifically named respondent Liagao as one of the miners involved, to wit:

09. Ques - Do I understand that Mr. Suyam has companions and had drilled first the flooring of
that roadway before blasting it?

Ans - Yes, that is true I saw Suyam and Gumatin transferred [sic] their assigned drilling machine
at the said roadway and drilled the area with the company of Garcia, Kitoyan, Arocod, Damian,
Fegsar and Liagao.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, the second sworn statement of Madao is not sufficient to find Liagao guilty of highgrading.
In a Joint Affidavit40 which he executed with respondent Tundagui, Madao made the following
declarations:

When I, MAXIMO MADAO reported for work on September 16, 2000, I am being required to
appear at the security investigation office. After quitting time I went to the security office and was
surprised to learn that my name is among those listed persons who were seen by Mr. Chambers
committing acts of highgrading on September 15, 2000. However, when I quit work on September
20, 2000 I was again called through telephone to appear at the security office. Investigator
Felimon Ringor told me that I will give another statement and convinced to tell me all the names
of the persons assigned thereat with the promise that I will report for work. With my limited
education having not finished grade 1, I was made to give my statement on questions and
answers which are self-incriminating and knowingly mentioned names of persons who are
innocent. Worst, when I got my copy and the contents were fully explained to me by our legal
counsel I was surprised that it was duly notarized when in fact and in truth after I gave my
statement I did not appear before Atty. Nina Fe Lazaga-Raffols for swearing. With this
circumstances, I hereby RETRACT my statement dated September 20, 2000 for being self
incriminatory unassisted by my counsel or union representative and hereby ADAPTS [sic] and
RETAINS my sworn statement dated September 16, 2000.41 (Emphasis supplied)

In labor cases, in which technical rules of procedure are not to be strictly applied if the result would be
detrimental to the workingman, an affidavit of desistance gains added importance in the absence of any
evidence on record explicitly showing that the dismissed employee committed the act which caused the
dismissal.42 Accordingly, the Court cannot turn a blind eye and disregard Madao’s recantation, as it
serves to cast doubt as to the guilt of respondent Liagao.

Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the Joint Affidavit, being sourced from Chambers,
Damoslog, Daguio and Madao, has no probative value to support evidence to warrant the dismissal of the
respondents. Chambers and Daguio did not identify the miners involved in the act of highgrading. In
addition, Damoslog’s first and second sworn statements did not implicate respondents, and Madao
recanted his statement implicating respondent Liagao. As earlier discussed, the sworn statements and
joint affidavits of the sources do not corroborate but actually cast doubt as to the veracity of the
statements in the Joint Affidavit.

The second ground is not plausible.

While the Court agrees that the job of the respondents, as miners, although generally described as
menial, is nevertheless of such nature as to require a substantial amount of trust and confidence on the
part of petitioner,43 the rule that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required to terminate an employee
on the charge of loss of confidence, and that it is sufficient that there be some basis for such loss of
confidence, is not absolute.44

The right of an employer to dismiss an employee on the ground that it has lost its trust and confidence in
him must not be exercised arbitrarily and without just cause.45 In order that loss of trust and confidence
may be considered as a valid ground for an employee’s dismissal, it must be substantial and not arbitrary,
and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the employee’s separation from
work.46

In the present case, the Court reiterates that the evidence is not substantial to hold respondents guilty of
highgrading so as to warrant the dismissal of respondents.

Moreover, it is a well-settled doctrine that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer
and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. It is a time-honored rule that in
controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the
interpretation of agreements and writing, should be resolved in the former’s favor. The policy is to extend
the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail themselves of the benefits under the law,
which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor.47

Lastly, respondents’ prayer in their Comment48 and Memorandum,49 that the CA Decision be modified by

ordering their reinstatement to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and with payment of
full backwages from their alleged dismissal up to date of reinstatement, deserves scant consideration.
Respondents are estopped from claiming their right to reinstatement. Records show that respondents
along with their co-accused, filed an appeal with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75457 questioning
the decision of the NLRC. The said appeal was denied by the CA. The case was then elevated to this
Court through a petition for review, entitled Thomas Garcia v. Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. No.
162554. However, the same was denied with finality for having been filed out of time.50 In effect, it serves
to estop the respondents from praying for their reinstatement in the present case. Under the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment, which is also known as "reclusion of issues" or "collateral estoppel," issues
actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same
parties involving a different cause of action.51 Applied to the present case, the "former suit" refers to CA-
G.R. SP No. 75457 wherein the CA ordered separation pay instead of reinstatement and G.R. No.
162554 wherein this Court denied the petition for review filed by respondents together with other
dismissed workers. The "future case" is the present case in which the petitioner is Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Company assailing the validity of the CA Decision declaring the dismissal of respondents to be
illegal. Reinstatement was not an issue raised by herein petitioner. Respondents cannot now be allowed
to raise the same in the petition filed by petitioner, for that would circumvent the finality of judgment as to
separation pay insofar as respondents are concerned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 7, 2003
and its Resolution dated April 15, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 75860 are AFFIRMED.

Double costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 188072               October 19, 2011

EMERITA M. DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO M. TUMOLVA, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the
February 24, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its May 26, 2009 Resolution2 in CA-
G.R. SP. No. 104945 entitled "Antonio M. Tumolva v. Emerita M. De Guzman."

The Facts

On September 6, 2004, petitioner Emerita M. De Guzman (De Guzman), represented by her

attorneys-in-fact, Lourdes Rivera and Dhonna Chan, and respondent Antonio Tumolva, doing
business under the name and style A.M. Tumolva Engineering Works (the Contractor), entered into
a Construction Agreement3 (Agreement) for the construction of an orphanage consisting of an
administration building, directors/guests house, dining and service building, children’s dormitory,
male staff house, and covered walkways in Brgy. Pulong Bunga, Purok 4, Silang, Cavite, for a
contract price of ₱ 15,982,150.39. Incorporated in the Agreement was the plan and specifications of
the perimeter fence. The Contractor, however, made deviations from the agreed plan4 with respect to
the perimeter fence of the orphanage.

On September 6, 2005, after the completion of the project, De Guzman issued a Certificate of
Acceptance. For his part, the Contractor issued a quitclaim acknowledging the termination of the
contract and the full compliance therewith by De Guzman.

In November 2006, during typhoon "Milenyo," a portion of the perimeter fence collapsed and other
portions tilted. In her Letter dated December 5, 2006, De Guzman, through counsel, demanded the
repair of the fence in accordance with the plan. In response, the Contractor claimed that the
destruction of the fence was an act of God and expressed willingness to discuss the matter to avoid
unnecessary litigation. De Guzman, however, reiterated her demand for the restoration of the wall
without additional cost on her part, or in the alternative, for the Contractor to make an offer of a
certain amount by way of compensation for the damages she sustained. Her demand was not
heeded.

On February 14, 2008, De Guzman filed a Request for Arbitration5 of the dispute before the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). She alleged that the Contractor deliberately
defrauded her in the construction of the perimeter fence by "under sizing the required column rebars
from 12mm. based on the plan to only 10mm., the required concrete hollow blocks from #6 to #5,
and the distance between columns from 3.0m to 4.3m."6 Further, the Contractor neither anchored the
lenten beams to the columns nor placed drains or weepholes along the lower walls. She prayed for
an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation, and for the inspection and technical assessment of the construction project and the
rectification of any defect.

In his Answer with Counterclaim, the Contractor denied liability for the damaged fence claiming,
among others, that its destruction was an act of God. He admitted making deviations from the plan,
but pointed out that the same were made with the knowledge and consent of De Guzman through
her representatives, Architect Quin Baterna and Project Engineer Rodello Santos (Engineer
Santos), who were present during the construction of the fence. He further argued that pursuant to
the Agreement, the claim for damages was already barred by the 12-month period from the issuance
of the Certificate of Acceptance of the project within which to file the claim. He, thus, prayed for the
dismissal of the action and interposed a counterclaim for actual and compensatory damages for the
additional work/change orders made on the project in the amount of ₱ 2,046,500.00, attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses.

After due proceedings, the CIAC issued the Award dated July 17, 2008 in favor of De Guzman, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered and AWARD is made on the monetary claims of

Claimant EMERITA M. DE GUZMAN, directing Respondent Contractor ANTONIO M. TUMOLVA,
to pay her the following amounts:

₱ 187,509.00 as actual damages for reconstructing the collapsed and damaged perimeter fence.

Interest is awarded on the foregoing amount at the legal rate of 6% per annum computed from the
date of this Award. After finality thereof, interest at the rate of 12% per annum shall be paid thereon
until full payment of the awarded amount shall have been made, "this interim period being deemed
to be at that time already a forbearance of credit" (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals (243 SCRA 78 [1994])

₱ 100,000.00 as moral damages.

₱ 100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

₱ 50,000.00 for attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.

₱ 437,509.00 – TOTAL AMOUNT DUE THE CLAIMANT

The CIAC staff is hereby directed to make the necessary computation of how much has been paid
by Claimant as its proportionate share of the arbitration costs totaling ₱ 110,910.44, which computed
amount shall be reimbursed by Respondent to the Claimant.

SO ORDERED.7

Aggrieved, the Contractor filed before the CA a Petition for Review with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, challenging the CIAC’s award of damages in favor of De Guzman.

On February 24, 2009, the CA modified the Award rendered by CIAC. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED. The assailed Award dated July 17, 2008
rendered by the CIAC in CIAC Case No. 03-2008 is hereby MODIFIED, deleting the award of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, but awarding temperate damages in the amount of ₱ 100,000.00 for
reconstructing the collapsed and damaged perimeter fence. The rest of the Award stands.

SO ORDERED.8

The CA held that although the Contractor deviated from the plan, CIAC’s award of actual damages
was not proper inasmuch as De Guzman failed to establish its extent with reasonable certainty. The
CA, however, found it appropriate to award temperate damages considering that De Guzman
suffered pecuniary loss as a result of the collapse of the perimeter fence due to the Contractor’s
negligence and violation of his undertakings in the Agreement. It further ruled that there was no
basis for awarding moral damages reasoning out that De Guzman’s worry for the safety of the
children in the orphanage was insufficient to justify the award. Likewise, it could not sustain the
award of exemplary damages as there was no showing that the Contractor acted in wanton,
reckless, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

De Guzman filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, but it was denied for lack of merit
by the CA in its Resolution dated May 26, 2009.

Hence, De Guzman interposed the present petition before this Court anchored on the following

GROUNDS

(I)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO
SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH THE AMOUNT OF ACTUAL DAMAGES THAT PETITIONER DE
GUZMAN CAN RECOVER FROM THE RESPONDENT.

(II)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER DE GUZMAN IS NOT

ENTITLED TO AWARDS OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.9

De Guzman argues inter alia that the Contractor is liable for the actual damages that she suffered
from the collapse of the perimeter fence. He failed to put weep holes on the collapsed portion of the
said fence, which could have relieved the pressure from the wet soil of the adjoining higher ground.

De Guzman adds that the computation of the cost of rebuilding the collapsed portion of the perimeter
fence by Engineer Santos constituted substantial evidence warranting an award of actual damages.
His affidavit served as his direct testimony in the case even if he did not appear during the hearing.
Having been notarized, it must be admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity.

Further, De Guzman questions the CA’s deletion of the award for moral and exemplary damages.
She insists that her anxiety and suffering over the safety of the children in the orphanage entitled her
to an award of moral damages. It is likewise her position that the Contractor’s wanton acts of
deliberately cheating the benefactors of the orphanage by making deviations on the approved plan
through the use of construction materials of inferior quality warranted the imposition of exemplary
damages against the Contractor.
The Court’s ruling

There is no doubt that De Guzman incurred damages as a result of the collapse of the perimeter
fence. The Contractor is clearly guilty of negligence and, therefore, liable for the damages caused.
As correctly found by the CA:

Nonetheless, the Court sustains the CIAC’s conclusion that the CONTRACTOR was negligent in
failing to place weepholes on the collapsed portion of the perimeter fence. Fault or negligence of the
obligor consists in his failure to exercise due care and prudence in the performance of the obligation
as the nature of the obligation so demands, taking into account the particulars of each case. It
should be emphasized that even if not provided for in the plan, the CONTRACTOR himself admitted
the necessity of putting weepholes and claimed to have actually placed them in view of the higher
ground elevation of the adjacent lot vis-à-vis the level ground of the construction site. Since he was
the one who levelled the ground and was, thus, aware that the lowest portion of the adjoining land
was nearest the perimeter fence, he should have ensured that sufficient weepholes were placed
because water would naturally flow towards the fence.

However, the CONTRACTOR failed to refute Mr. Ramos’ claim that the collapsed portion of the
perimeter fence lacked weepholes. Records also show that the omission of such weepholes and/or
their being plastered over resulted from his failure to exercise the requisite degree of supervision
over the work, which is the same reason he was unable to discover the deviations from the plan until
the fence collapsed. Hence, the CONTRACTOR cannot be relieved from liability therefor.10

The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from this factual finding by the CIAC, as affirmed by
the CA. It is settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but
also finality, especially when affirmed by the CA. In particular, factual findings of construction
arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal.11

CIAC’s award of actual damages, however, is indeed not proper under the circumstances as there is
no concrete evidence to support the plea. In determining actual damages, one cannot rely on mere
assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend on competent proof and on the
best evidence obtainable regarding specific facts that could afford some basis for measuring
compensatory or actual damages.12 Article 2199 of the New Civil Code defines actual or
compensatory damages as follows:

Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred
to as actual or compensatory damages.

Unfortunately, De Guzman failed to adduce evidence to satisfactorily prove the amount of actual
damage incurred. Contrary to her assertion, the handwritten calculation of reconstruction costs made
by Engineer Santos and attached to his affidavit cannot be given any probative value because he
never took the witness stand to affirm the veracity of his allegations in his affidavit and be cross-
examined on them. In this regard, it is well to quote the ruling of the Court in the case of Tating v.
Marcella,13 to wit:

There is no issue on the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on
its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted
and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible,
but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules
of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not
generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s
statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover,
the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. For this reason,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the
witness stand to testify thereon.

Neither is there any evidence presented to substantiate Engineer Santos’ computation of the
reconstruction costs. For such computation to be considered, there must be some other relevant
evidence to corroborate the same.14 Thus, the CA was correct in disregarding the affidavit of
Engineer Santos for being hearsay and in not giving probative weight to it. There being no tangible
document or concrete evidence to support the award of actual damages, the same cannot be
sustained.

Nevertheless, De Guzman is indeed entitled to temperate damages as provided under Article 2224
of the Civil Code for the loss she suffered. When pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty, temperate damages may be
recovered. Temperate damages may be allowed in cases where from the nature of the case, definite
proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party
suffered some pecuniary loss.15 Undoubtedly, De Guzman suffered pecuniary loss brought about by
the collapse of the perimeter fence by reason of the Contractor’s negligence and failure to comply
with the specifications. As she failed to prove the exact amount of damage with certainty as required
by law, the CA was correct in awarding temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages. However,
after weighing carefully the attendant circumstances and taking into account the cost of rebuilding
the damaged portions of the perimeter fence, the amount of ₱ 100,000.00 awarded to De Guzman
should be increased. This Court, in recognition of the pecuniary loss suffered, finds the award of ₱
150,000.00 by way of temperate damages as reasonable and just under the premises.

As to the CIAC’s award of ₱ 100,000.00 as moral damages, this Court is one with the CA that De
Guzman is not entitled to such an award. The record is bereft of any proof that she actually suffered
moral damages as contemplated in Article 2217 of the Code, which provides:

Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.

Certainly, the award of moral damages must be anchored on a clear showing that she actually
experienced mental anguish, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights, wounded feelings, or similar
injury. There could not have been a better witness to this experience than De Guzman herself.16 Her
testimony, however, did not provide specific details of the suffering she allegedly went through after
the fence collapsed while she was miles away in the United States. As the CA aptly observed, "the
testimony of the OWNER as to her worry for the safety of the children in the orphanage is insufficient
to establish entitlement thereto."17 Since an award of moral damages is predicated on a categorical
showing by the claimant that she actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings, it must be
disallowed absent any evidence thereon.18

Moreover, under the aforequoted provision, moral damages cannot be recovered as the perimeter
fence collapsed in the midst of the strong typhoon "Milenyo." It was not clearly established that the
destruction was the proximate result of the Contractor’s act of making deviation from the plan. As
correctly concluded by the CA, viz:
However, while it cannot be denied that the Contractor deviated from the plan, there was no clear
showing whether the same caused or contributed to the collapse/tilting of the subject perimeter
fence. No competent evidence was presented to establish such fact. As the CIAC itself
acknowledged, "(t)here is no way by which to accurately resolve this issue by the evidence
submitted by the parties." The statement of Edwin B. Ramos, Engineering Aide at the Office of the
Municipal Engineer of Silang, Cavite, who conducted an ocular inspection of the collapsed perimeter
fence, that the observed deviations from the plan "affected the strength of the fence and made it
weaker, such that its chance of withstanding the pressure of water from the other side thereof was
greatly diminished or affected" was merely an expression of opinion. As he himself admitted, he is
not qualified to render an expert opinion.19

Further, De Guzman was not able to show that her situation fell within any of the cases enumerated
in Article 221920 of the Civil Code upon which to base her demand for the award of moral damages.

Neither does the breach of contract committed by the Contractor, not being fraudulent or made in
bad faith, warrant the grant of moral damages under Article 2220 which provides that:

Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

De Guzman cannot be awarded exemplary damages either, in the absence of any evidence showing
that the Contractor acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner as
provided in Article 2232 of the Civil Code. The ruling in the case of Nakpil and Sons v. Court of
Appeals,21 relied upon by De Guzman, where it was emphasized that the wanton negligence in
effecting the plans, designs, specifications, and construction of a building is equivalent to bad faith in
the performance of the assigned task, finds no application in the case at bench. As already pointed
out, there is negligence on the part of Contractor, but it is neither wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, nor malevolent.

The award of exemplary damages cannot be made merely on the allegation of De Guzman that the
Contractor’s deviations from the plans and specifications without her written consent was deplorable
and condemnable. The Court regards the deviations as excusable due to the unavailability of the
approved construction materials. Besides, these were made known to De Guzman’s project
manager who was present all the time during the construction. Indeed, no deliberate intent on the
part of the Contractor to defraud the orphanage’s benefactors was ever shown, much less proved.
As may be gleaned from his testimony:

xxx

2.2.0 : What can you say to the claim that the column rebars were reduced in size from 12mm to
10mm?

A : That is untrue.

2.2.1 : Why did you say that it was untrue?

A : Because the column rebars that we used is 12mm and not 10mm contrary to the claim of the
claimant. The column rebars that claimant and his engineers claimed to have been undersized
[were] those already subjected to stretching. Due to the lateral load on the perimeter fence coming
from the water that accumulated thereon, the strength of the column bars was subjected to such kind
of force beyond its capacity thereby resulting them to yield or "mapatid." As a result of such
stretching, the column rebars were deformed thereby causing it [to] change its width but the length
was extended. You can compare it to a candy like "tira-tira" which if you stretch it becomes longer
but its width is reduced. The other column rebars on the perimeter fence which [were] not subjected
to stretching will prove what I am stating.

2.2.2 : Also, in the said request for arbitration, it was claimed that the required hollow blocks (CHB)
was reduced also from #6 to #5, how would you explain this?

A : It is true but such deviation was known to them in view of the fact that there was no available
CHB #6 in Silang, Cavite and so to save on the travel cost in bringing materials from Manila to the
site, it was agreed that such CHB #5 shall be used instead.

2.2.3 : What was the effect of such deviation in using CHB #5 instead of CHB #6?

A : No effect, madam.

2.2.4 : Why did you state so, Mr. Witness?

A : Because the entire area of the land which is being secured by the perimeter fence was fully
covered with the fence which is made of CHB. This simply implies that even though we used a much
lesser size of CHB, but we increased the compressive strength of the mortar and filler used in the
premises. This has really no effect because we cover the entire place with fence.

2.2.5 : It was also claimed that the distance between columns was deviated from 3.0 m. to 4.0 m, will
you please explain this matter.

A : The computation of the distance between the columns of the perimeter fence as appearing on
the plan was 3.0 m inside to inside. However, the computation made by the engineer of the claimant
as alleged in their Request for Arbitration was 4.0 m. outside to outside which should be 3.6 m.
outside to outside as correct distance.

2.2.6 : It now appears from your statement that there was a deviation as between the 3.0 m. inside
to inside computation in the plan and the actual 3.6 m. outside to outside computation made by the
engineers of the claimant. My question Mr. Witness is, what would be the effect of such deviation on
the columns?

A : It is true that there was such a deviation on the distance of the column but it will have no effect
because still the factor of safety was well provided for. Even the existing law on building construction
supports this matter. I even sought Engineer Rommel Amante on the matter and his report supports
my allegation.

2.2.7 : Was such deviation approved by the claimant or the representatives of the claimant?

A : Yes because during all the time the construction of the perimeter fence was done, the project
manager of the claimant was present and observing the works. Further, they have executed a
Certificate of Final Acceptance of the project.22

xxx
As regards the award of attorney’s fees, the Court upholds De Guzman’s entitlement to reasonable
attorney’s fees, although it recognizes that it is a sound policy not to set a premium on the right to
litigate.23 It must be recalled that De Guzman’s repeated demands for the repair of the fence or the
payment of damages by way of compensation, were not heeded by the Contractor. The latter’s
unjust refusal to satisfy De Guzman’s valid, just and demandable claim constrained her to litigate
and incur expenses to protect her interest. Article 2208 of the Civil Code, thus, provides:

Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, cannot be recovered, except:

xxx

(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or
to incur expenses to protect his interest;

xxx

Finally, the dismissal of the Contractor’s counterclaim is sustained for lack of merit.  In his
1avvphi1

Comment24 and Memorandum,25 the Contractor pleaded that damages should have been awarded to
him. This deserves scant consideration. A perusal of the record reveals that the matter as regards
the return of what he had donated by reason of De Guzman’s ingratitude was not among the issues
raised in this petition. Thus, the same cannot be taken cognizance by the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24,
2009 and its Resolution dated May 26, 2009 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
award of ₱ 100,000.00 as temperate damages is increased to ₱ 150,000.00. The award shall earn
interest at the rate of 12% per annum reckoned from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES**
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 166259               November 12, 2012

LAND BANK OFTHE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HONEYCOMB FARMS CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, filed by the petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines
1 

(LBP), assailing the Court of Appeals' (CAs) Amended Decision and Resolution in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
2  3 

69661. The CA amended Decision reinstated with modification the Judgment of the Regional Trial
4 

Court (RTC) of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 48, acting as a Special Agrarian Cow1 (SAC) in Special
Civil Case No. 4637 for Determination and Payment of Just Compensation under Republic Act No.
(RA) 6657.

The Factual Antecedents

Respondent Honeycomb Farms Corporation (HFC) was the registered owner of a parcel of
agricultural land under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2550, with an area of 29.0966 hectares,
situated in "Curvada, Caintagan, Masbate." Through a letter dated February 5, 1988, HFC voluntarily
5 

offered its land to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for coverage under RA 6657, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), for P581,932.00 or at P20,000.00 per
hectare. Pursuant to the rules and regulations governing the CARL, the government, through the
6 

DAR and the LBP, determined an acquirable and compensable area of 27.5871 hectares, while
1.5095 hectares were excluded for being hilly and underdeveloped. 7

Subsequently, the LBP, as the agency with the authority to determine land valuation and
compensation under the CARL, and using the guidelines set forth in DAR Administrative Order No.
6, series of 1992, fixed the value of the land in the amount of P165,739.44 and sent a Notice of
8 

Valuation to HFC. 9

HFC rejected the LBP’s valuation and it filed, on January 15, 1996, a petition with the DAR
10 

Adjudication Board (DARAB) for a summary administrative determination of just compensation. In its
petition, HFC claimed that the just compensation for the land should be in the amount of P25,000.00
per hectare, considering its location and productivity, or for an aggregate amount of P725,000.00. 11

While the DARAB proceedings were still pending, HFC filed a Complaint for Determination and
Payment of Just Compensation with the RTC, praying for a just compensation of P725,000.00, plus
attorney’s fees of ten percent (10%) of the just compensation. HFC justified the direct filing with the
12 

SAC by what it saw as unreasonable delay or official inaction. HFC claimed that the DARAB
disregarded Section 16 of RA 6657 which mandates that the "DAR shall decide the case within thirty
(30) days after it is submitted for decision." The LBP meanwhile countered that HFC’s petition was
13 

"premature and lacks a cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies." 14
Meanwhile, on May 14, 1998, the DARAB issued a Decision affirming the LBP’s valuation. The
15 

dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, conformably to the foregoing consideration, this Board hereby AFFIRMS the
valuation of P165,739.44 fixed by the Land Bank of the Philippines on the subject 27.5871-hectare
agricultural landholding.

The Petition dated October 7, 1995 for determination and payment of Just Compensation filed by the
landowner with this forum is hereby DENIED or ordered dismissed without prejudice for want of
jurisdiction over the same on the part of this forum. 16

The RTC Decision

On July 27, 2000, the RTC rendered a Judgment whose dispositive portion reads:
17 

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by:

1.) Fixing the just compensation of the parcel of land owned by plaintiff Honeycomb Farms
Corp. under TCT No. T-2550 which is covered by agrarian reform for an area of 27.5871
hectares at P931,109.20 subject to the lien for the docket fee of the amount in excess of
P725,000.00 as pleaded for by herein plaintiff in its complaint;

2.) Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff an attorney’s fee
equivalent to 10% of the total just compensation. 18

Owing to the parties’ conflicting valuations, the SAC made its own valuation and briefly concluded
that:

A judicious evaluation of the evidence on record shows that the subject area is sporadically planted
to (sic) coconut and corn as is not fully develop (sic) when the government conducted its ocular
inspection and thereafter took over possession of the same although majority of it is a fertile grass
land and undisputedly deemed suitable to agriculture. However, the parcel of land under
consideration is located in the side of the road. It is likewise of judicial notice that it is situated near
the commercial district of Curvada, Cataingan, Masbate. In the light of the foregoing premises, the
Court is of the opinion and so holds that the just compensation for the land of herein plaintiff
corporation under TCT No. T-2550 covered by agrarian reform is P32,000.00 per hectare or
P882,787.20 for the area of 27.58571 hectares plus consequential damages at the same value
(P32,000.00) per hectare for the remaining 1.5095 hectares of the plaintiff’s property left and
rendered useless by the compulsory coverage or for the total sum of P931,109.20. (emphasis ours)
19 

Both parties appealed to the CA.

HFC argued that the RTC erred in its determination of just compensation; the amount of
P931,109.20 is not supported by the evidence on record while its presented evidence correctly
shows that the market value of the land at the time of taking was P113,000.00 per hectare. 20

The LBP raised the threshold issue of whether the SAC had jurisdiction to hear HFC’s complaint
because of the pending DARAB proceedings, emphasizing that the completion of the administrative
proceedings before the DARAB is a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint for the
determination of just compensation before the SAC. The LBP also argued that the RTC committed a
serious error when it took judicial notice of the property’s roadside location, its proximity to a
commercial district, its incomplete development as coconut and corn land, and its condition as
grassland, to determine just compensation; thereby, it effectively eschewed the formula for fixing just
compensation, provided under DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992. Lastly, the LBP
21 

questioned the award of consequential damages and attorney’s fees for lack of legal and factual
basis.22

The CA Decision

The CA, in its January 28, 2004 Decision, reversed the RTC Judgment and dismissed HFC’s
complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies that Section 16(f) of RA 6657 requires. The
CA ruled that the LBP "made a procedural shortcut" when it filed the complaint with the SAC without
waiting for the DARAB’s decision. 23

On the LBP’s motion for reconsideration (to which a copy of the May 14, 1998 DARAB Decision was
attached), the CA, in its Amended Decision of September 16, 2004, proceeded to decide the case
24 

on the merits and recalled its January 28, 2004 Decision. The dispositive portion of the Amended
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Our January 28, 2004 Decision is hereby RECALLED and
SET ASIDE and a new one entered. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate,
Branch 48 in Civil Case No. 4637 is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that the award of
attorney’s fees in favor of herein plaintiff-appellant is hereby deleted. No costs.
25

The CA ruled that in expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of the
condemned property is entitled to is the market value. It noted that in order to arrive at the proper
market value, several factors such as the current value of like properties, their actual or potential
uses and their size, shape and location must be considered. The CA thus concluded that the
valuation made by the RTC was based on the evidence on record since the latter considered the
sketch plan of the property, the testimonies of the witnesses and the field reports of both parties. In
addition, the CA also deleted the award of attorney’s fees for lack of factual and legal basis.26

The Petition

The LBP’s petition for review on certiorari raised the following errors:

First, the CA erred in reinstating the decision of the SAC since it had no jurisdiction to hear HFC’s
complaint while the DARAB proceedings were pending. It stressed that the SAC could not acquire
jurisdiction over the complaint since the DARAB continued to retain jurisdiction over the
determination of just compensation.

Second, the CA failed to dismiss the complaint on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies and forum shopping on the part of HFC. It notes that the HFC’s complaint was premature
and violative of the forum shopping prohibition since the complaint was filed with the SAC despite
the pendency of the DARAB proceedings.

Lastly, the CA erred when it failed to apply the "basic formula" for determining just compensation
prescribed by DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative
Order No. 11, series of 1994. It emphasizes that by adopting the values fixed by the SAC, the CA’s
determination is contrary to: (1) Section 17 of RA 6657 and (2) the rulings of the Court bearing on
the determination of just compensation, in particular, Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps.
Banal where the Court categorically held that the formula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative
27 

Order No. 6, series of 1992, shall be used in the valuation of the land.28

HFC prays for the dismissal of the LBP’s petition on the following grounds:

First, it submits that the pendency of the DARAB proceedings has no bearing on the jurisdiction of
the SAC since Section 57 of RA 6657 provides that the SAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over petitions for the determination of just compensation. Conformably with the dictates of Section
57, litigants can file a case for the determination of just compensation without the necessity of a
DARAB determination. Second, it argues that jurisprudence allows resort to judicial intervention
without completing administrative remedies when there has been unreasonable delay or official
inaction, as in this case, on the part of the administrative agency. Third, for the same reason, it
contends that it cannot be charged with forum shopping. Finally, it argues that strict adherence to the
formula prescribed by DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1994, unduly "ties the hands of the SAC" in the determination
of just compensation. 29

The Court’s Ruling

We find the LBP’s petition meritorious.

The SAC properly acquired jurisdiction
over HFC’s complaint for the determination
of just compensation despite the pendency
of the DARAB proceedings

At the core of the LBP’s lack of jurisdiction theory is the premise that SAC could not acquire
jurisdiction over the complaint since the DARAB continued to retain jurisdiction over the matter of
determination of just compensation.

The premise is erroneous because the DARAB does not "exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the
SAC in just compensation cases. The determination of just compensation is judicial in nature." 30

"The original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC xxx is not a novel issue" and is in fact,well-
31 

settled. In Republic of the Philippines v. CA, we first ruled that it would subvert the original and
32 

exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in
administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative
decisions, viz:

Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of
determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their
taking. Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to § 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes
an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and
afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the
case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the
landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special
Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under
R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private respondent’s case was properly brought by it in the
RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of § 57, the
RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for
the determination of just compensation to landowners." It would subvert this "original and exclusive"
jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in
administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative
decisions. (citations omitted)
33 

In the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Belista, we extensively discussed the reasons
34 

why the SAC can properly assume jurisdiction over petitions for the determination of just
compensation despite the pendency of administrative proceedings, thus:

Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:

Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction
to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) x x x

Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. x x x

The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within
thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.

Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR. Further
exception to the DAR’s original and exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which
are within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just
compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts.

In Republic v. CA G.R. No. 122256, October 30, 1996, 263 SCRA 758, the Court explained:

Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657."
The provisions of §50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering cases
involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657
as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this
distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of
eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. Thus, in EPZA
v. Dulay and Sumulong v. Guerrero - we held that the valuation of property in eminent domain is
essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies, while in Scoty’s
Department Store v. Micaller, we struck down a law granting the then Court of Industrial Relations
jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of the Industrial Peace Act.

In a number of cases, the Court has upheld the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting
as SAC, over all petitions for determination of just compensation to landowners in accordance with
Section 57 of RA No. 6657. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco G.R. Nos. 140160 and
146733, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 67, the Court upheld the RTC’s jurisdiction over Wycoco’s
petition for determination of just compensation even where no summary administrative proceedings
was held before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction over the determination of land valuation.
The Court held:
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for determination
of just compensation without waiting for the completion of DARAB’s re-evaluation of the land. This,
notwithstanding, the Court held that the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction because of its
exclusive and original jurisdiction over determination of just compensation, thus –

… It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners."
This "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in
administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate
court for the review of administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly
appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from
Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort
to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs
into an appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and, therefore, would be void. Thus, direct
resort to the SAC Special Agrarian Court by private respondent is valid.

xxxx

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad G.R. No. 127198, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 441,
wherein Land Bank questioned the alleged failure of private respondents to seek reconsideration of
the DAR’s valuation, but instead filed a petition to fix just compensation with the RTC, the Court said:

At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA, we held that there is nothing contradictory between
the DAR’s primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes
the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers to
administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.

In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR
to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian
reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of
just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a
judicial function.

Thus, the trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just
compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada [G.R. No. 164876, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 495,
where the issue was whether the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over respondent’s petition for
determination of just compensation despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings before
the DARAB, the Court stated that:

It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the
power of eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just
compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with
the courts and not with administrative agencies. Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of
respondent’s petition for determination of just compensation. (Italicization supplied; citations
35 

omitted)

Similarly, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, whose factual circumstances mirror
36 

that of the present case, we pointedly ruled that the SAC acquired jurisdiction over the action for the
determination of just compensation even during the pendency of the DARAB proceedings, for the
following reason:

It is clear from Sec. 57 x x x that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners."
This "original and excusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in
administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate
court for the review of administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly
appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from
Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort
to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs
into an appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus, direct
resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid. (emphasis ours)
37 

To reiterate, the taking of property under RA 6657 is an exercise of the State’s power of eminent
domain. "The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain
proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with
administrative agencies." Specifically, "when the parties cannot agree on the amount of just
38 

compensation, only the exercise of judicial power can settle the dispute with binding effect on the
winning and losing parties." 39

Thus, in the present case, HFC correctly filed a petition for the determination of just compensation
with the SAC, which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction in just compensation cases under RA
6657. The DARAB’s valuation, being preliminary in nature, could not have attained finality, as only
the courts can resolve the issue of just compensation. Consequently, the SAC properly took
cognizance of HFC’s petition for determination of just compensation.

We also find no merit in the LBP’s argument that the HFC failed to exhaust administrative remedies
when it directly filed a petition for the determination of just compensation with the SAC even before
the DARAB case could be resolved. In Land Bank of the Phils. v. Wycoco, we held that the doctrine
40 

of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue has been rendered moot
and academic. In the present case, the issue is now moot considering that the valuation made by
41 

the LBP had long been affirmed in toto by the DARAB in its May 14, 1998 Decision.

HFC is not guilty of forum shopping

We do not agree with the LBP’s view that HFC committed forum shopping.

Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of multiple judicial remedies
in different fora, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances; and raising substantially similar issues either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court; or for the purpose of increasing their
chances of obtaining a favorable decision, if not in one court, then in another. The rationale against
forum-shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two
different courts, for to do so would constitute abuse of court processes which tends to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion
of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. 42

To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to
ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is
whether, in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action,
and reliefs sought. 43

In Yu v. Lim, we enumerated the requisites of forum shopping, as follows:  

44 

Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same
interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party
is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.

In the present case, HFC did not commit forum shopping because the third element of litis pendentia
is lacking. As previously mentioned, the DARAB’s land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by
any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party. The courts, in this
case, the SAC, will still have to review with finality the determination, in the exercise of what is
admittedly a judicial function. Thus, it becomes clear that there is no identity between the two cases
45 

such that a judgment by the DARAB, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the case before the SAC.

It has been held that "what is essential in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the
vexation caused the courts and litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative
agencies to rule on similar or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially similar reliefs, in
the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered upon the same
issues." In the present case, the evil sought to be prevented by the prohibition on forum shopping,
46 

i.e., the possibility of conflicting decisions, is lacking since the DARAB determination is merely
preliminary and is not binding on the parties; such determination is subject to challenge before the
courts. The law, in fact, allows the landowner to file a case for the determination of just
compensation with the SAC without the necessity of first filing the same with the DARAB. Based on
these considerations, it is clear that the HFC cannot be charged with forum shopping.

To determine just compensation, the SAC

must take into consideration the factors
prescribed by Section 17 of RA 6657 and is
obliged to apply the DAR formula

The CA, in affirming the SAC’s valuation and disregarding that of the LBP, briefly held:

In the instant case, the trial court based its valuation of the property at P32,000.00 per hectare on
the evidence submitted by the parties, such as the sketch plan of the property, the testimonies of
witnesses, and the field investigation reports of both parties. Hence, herein litigants cannot claim that
the valuation made by the court was not based on the evidence on record. 47

The LBP maintains that the SAC committed serious error when it failed to apply the "basic formula"
for determining just compensation, prescribed by DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994. It emphasizes that by adopting the
values fixed by the SAC, the CA’s determination is contrary to Section 17 of RA 6657 and the
applicable rulings of the Court bearing on the determination of just compensation, which require that
the basic formula prescribed by the DAR shall be used in the valuation of the land.
We agree with the LBP. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, a recent
48 

case with substantially the same factual antecedents and the same respondent company, we
categorically ruled that the CA and the RTC grievously erred when they disregarded the formula laid
down by the DAR, and chose instead to come up with their own basis for the valuation of the land in
question, viz.:

That it is the RTC, sitting as a SAC, which has the power to determine just compensation for parcels
of land acquired by the State, pursuant to the agrarian reform program, is made clear in Section 57
of RA 6657, which reads:

Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. - The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts unless modified by this Act.

The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within
thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.

To guide the RTC in this function, Section 17 of RA 6657 enumerates the factors that have to be
taken into consideration to accurately determine just compensation. This provision states:

Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors, shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farm workers and by the Government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, we recognized that the DAR, as the administrative
agency tasked with the implementation of the agrarian reform program, already came up with a
formula to determine just compensation which incorporated the factors enumerated in Section 17 of
RA 6657. We said:

These factors enumerated in Section 17 have been translated into a basic formula in DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11,
Series of 1994, issued pursuant to the DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object and
purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended.

In Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada, we emphasized the duty of the RTC to apply the formula
provided in the applicable DAR AO to determine just compensation, stating that:

While the RTC is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration
and the assessments made by the government assessors to determine just compensation, it is
equally true that these factors have been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its
rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. As the government agency principally tasked
to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR's duty to issue rules and regulations to carry
out the object of the law. The DAR Administrative Orderprecisely "filled in the details" of Section 17,
R.A. No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein may be taken
into account. The RTCwas at no liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to implement the
said provision.
It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which
they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative
issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As
such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was
not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to
apply the same.

We reiterated the mandatory application of the formula in the applicable DAR administrative
regulations in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lim, Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Eleuterio
Cruz, and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Barrido. In Barrido, we were explicit in stating that:

While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function vested in the RTC
acting as a Special Agrarian Court, the judge cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full
consideration the factors specifically identified by law and implementing rules. Special Agrarian
Courts are not at liberty to disregard the formula laid down in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998,
because unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply it. The
courts cannot ignore, without violating the agrarian law, the formula provided by the DAR for the
determination of just compensation.

These rulings plainly impose on the RTC the duty to apply the formula laid down in the pertinent
DAR administrative regulations to determine just compensation. Clearly, the CA and the RTC acted
with grievous error when they disregarded the formula laid down by the DAR, and chose instead to
come up with their own basis for the valuation of the subject land. [Italicization supplied; emphases
ours]

As the law now stands, it is clear that the SAC is duty bound to take into consideration the factors
fixed by Section 17 of RA 6657 and apply the basic formula prescribed and laid down in the pertinent
administrative regulations, in this case, DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended
by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994, to determine just compensation. In the present
case, we thus find no difficulty in concluding that the CA and the RTC, acting as a SAC, seriously
erred when they effectively eschewed the basic formula prescribed by the DAR regulations and
chose instead to come up with their own basis for the valuation of the land in question.

The SAC cannot take judicial notice of the

nature of land in question without the
requisite hearing

Separately from disregarding the basic formula prescribed by the DAR, it has also not escaped our
notice that the SAC also erred in concluding that the subject land consisting of 29.0966 hectares is
commercial in nature, after taking judicial notice that it is "situated near the commercial district of
Curvada, Cataingan, Masbate." In Land Bank of the Philippines v.
49 

Honeycomb Farms Corporation, we categorically ruled that the parties must be given the
50 

opportunity to present evidence on the nature of the property before the court a quo can take judicial
notice of the commercial nature of a portion of the subject landholding, thus:

While the lower court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of certain facts, it must exercise this
right within the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.

– During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention
to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on request
of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such
matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

The classification of the land is obviously essential to the valuation of the subject property, which is
the very issue in the present case. The parties should thus have been given the opportunity to
present evidence on the nature of the property before the lower court took judicial notice of the
commercial nature of a portion of the subject landholdings. As we said in Land Bank of the Phils. v.
Wycoco 464 Phil. 83, 97-98 (2004):

The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution especially where the case
involves a vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. To say that a court will
take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be
dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court
assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and
he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally
known, the basis of his action. [Italicization supplied]

The present case must be remanded to the

court of origin for the determination of just
compensation in accordance Section 17 of
RA 6657 and applicable DAR regulations

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, we remanded the case to the SAC for further
51 

reception of evidence because the trial court based its valuation upon a different formula and did not
conduct any hearing for the reception of evidence. 52

The mandatory application of the aforementioned guidelines in determining just compensation has
been reiterated recently in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lim,  53

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz, and Land Bank qf the Philippines v.
54 

Honeycomb Farms Corporation, where we also ordered the remand of the cases to the SAC for the
55 

determination of just compensation, strictly in accordance with the applicable DAR regulations. 56

As we are not a trier of facts, we thus find that a remand of this case is necessary in order for the
SAC to determine just compensation, strictly in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657 and
applicable DAR regulations, in particular, DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition Is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Amended
Decision dated September 16, 2004 and Resolution dated November 25, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 69661 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Special Civil Case No. 4637
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 48, for the determination of
just compensation, based on Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and the applicable administrative
orders of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
G.R. No. 218902, October 17, 2016 - HELEN EDITH LEE TAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 218902, October 17, 2016

HELEN EDITH LEE TAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the Decision1 and the Resolution2 dated 7 November 2013 and 30 June 2015,
respectively, of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25674. The questioned
Decision found herein petitioner Helen Edith Lee Tan (Tan), President/Proprietor of
International Builders Corporation (IBC),3 together with her co-accused therein,
namely: Rene Mondejar (Mondejar), Municipal Mayor; Francisco Tolentino
(Tolentino), Sangguniang Bayan Secretary; Ildefonso Espejo (Espejo), Sangguniang
Bayan Member; Margarita Gumapas (Gumapas), Sangguniang Bayan Member; Manuel
Piolo (Piolo), Sangguniang Bayan  Member; and Roberto Velasco
(Velasco), Sangguniang Bayan Member; all of Maasin, Iloilo City, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, 4 as
amended. Each of them was meted with the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years
and one (1) month, as minimum, to 10 years, as maximum, as well as perpetual
disqualification to hold public office.5 The questioned Resolution, on the other hand,
denied for lack of merit the separate Motions for Reconsideration of petitioner and
Mondejar, as well as the joint Motion for Reconsideration of Tolentino, Gumapas,
Velasco and Espejo.6

The antecedents of this case are: cralawlawlibrary

To protect Barangay Naslo in Maasin, Iloilo City, from the dangers posed by the Tigum
River, which usually overflows during the rainy season, its Sangguniang
Barangay  enacted on 16 June 1996 Resolution No. 97 requesting the IBC to rechannel
the path of the Tigum River and, after the temporary river control is replenished, to
extract whatever surplus of sand and gravel supply, as payment for its services. 8 A day
after, or on 17 June 1996, the Municipal Development Council (MDC) of Maasin, Iloilo
City, adopted a similar resolution, i.e., Resolution No. 9,9 also requesting the IBC to
perform the rechanneling of the Tigum River path because it has the necessary
equipment for that kind of work, as well as the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) to issue the Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) in connection
with the implementation of the project.10 With these in view, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Maasin, Iloilo City, enacted on 21 June 1996 the questioned (1) Resolution No. 30-
A11 strongly endorsing the resolutions of Barangay Naslo and MDC; and (2) Resolution
No. 30-B12 authorizing Mondejar to exercise his emergency powers to negotiate with the
IBC for the rechanneling of the Tigum River path. 13

On 27 June 1996, pursuant to the aforesaid Sangguniang Bayan  resolutions, the

Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo City, through Mondejar, entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA)14 with the IBC, through petitioner Tan, for the rechanneling of the
Tigum River path. Per the said MOA, the parties agreed that the IBC will do the
rechanneling for no monetary considerations whatsoever, except that it can get the
surplus supply of sand and gravel taken out therefrom after the necessary dike has
been established, as what has been provided for in the alleged Resolution No. 30-A, on
account of financial constraints since the municipality has already exhausted all its
resources due to a series of calamities.15

Soon thereafter, Criminal Complaints for Falsification under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) and for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 were filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (OMB-Visayas) against the local officials involved in
the project of rechanneling the Tigum River path, including petitioner Tan. 16 The case
was docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-0372.

The alleged Falsification was committed by Mondejar, Arnaldo Partisala

(Partisala),17 Tolentino, Espejo, Gumapas, Piolo, and Velasco when they made it appear
in the Minutes of the Regular Session of the Sangguniang Bayan  of Maasin, Iloilo City,
held on 21 June 1996, that Resolution No. 30-A and Resolution No. 30-B were
deliberated, approved and/or enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan  on the said date.
Allegedly, no such resolutions were passed and/or enacted by the said body on that
date. It was argued that this was done to give Mondejar legal basis or authority to
enter into a MOA with the IBC, through petitioner Tan, for the supposed rechanneling of
the Tigum River path. In reality, however, such MOA is a grant of an authority for the
IBC to engage into massive quarrying activities in the area even without the required
permit. As the argument ran, all the local officials involved in the project of
rechanneling the Tigum River path, in conspiracy with petitioner Tan, indubitably
committed also a Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 inasmuch as they gave
unwarranted benefits, advantage and displayed manifest partiality in favor of the IBC.
They entered into a contract that is grossly disadvantageous to the government,
particularly to the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo City, as it has been deprived of the
revenues, which could have been collected from the IBC out of the hauling activities of
the latter for sand and gravel if there was no such MOA. 18

On 31 May 1999, the OMB-Visayas, through Special Prosecution Officer II Raul V.

Cristoria, issued a Resolution19 recommending the (1) dismissal of the charge against
the local officials involved in the project of rechanneling the Tigum River path, except
for Mondejar, Partisala, Tolentino, Espejo, Gumapas, Piolo and Velasco, for insufficiency
of evidence; (2) filing of separate Informations for Falsification under Article 171 of the
RPC and for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 against the afore-named public
officials before the Sandiganbayan; and (3) inclusion of petitioner Tan as one of the
accused in the Information for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. 20

Upon review, the OMB, through Graft Investigation Officer II Julita M. Calderon, issued
a Memorandum dated 16 September 199921 approving the Resolution dated 31 May
1999 of the OMB-Visayas, thus, approving the filing of the Informations against the
mentioned individuals. The said OMB Memorandum was later approved by the Acting
Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. on 17 September 1999. 22

Accordingly, two separate Informations were filed against Mondejar, Partisala,

Tolentino, Espejo, Gumapas, Piolo and Velasco, before the Sandiganbayan, to wit: (1)
for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 docketed as Criminal Case No.
25674, 23where petitioner Tan was included as one of the accused; and (2) for
Falsification under Article 171 of the RPC docketed as Criminal Case No. 25675. 24

The Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 25674 charging Mondejar, Partisala,
Tolentino, Espejo, Gumapas, Piolo, Velasco and petitioner Tan with Violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019, by giving the latter unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference,
to the damage and prejudice of the government,  reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That on or about the 27th day of June 1996, and for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of Maasin, Province of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused [Mondejar, Partisala,
Tolentino, Espejo, Gumapas, Piolo and Velasco], public officers, having been duly
elected, appointed and qualified to such public positions above-mentioned, in such
capacity and committing the offense in relation to Office, and while in the
performance of their official functions, conniving, confederating and mutually
helping with each other and with [herein petitioner Tan], a private individual
and President/Proprietor of [IBC] Iloilo City with deliberate intent, with
manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make it appear that Resolution No. 30-B, series of
1996, was validly enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan  of Maasin, Iloilo,
authorizing Mayor [Mondejar] to exercise his emergency powers as in fact
accused [Mondejar], entered into a [MOA] with [petitioner Tan] of IBC
authorizing the said IBC to engage in massive quarrying in the guise of
rechan[n]eling the Tigum River in Maasin, Iloilo, thus accused in the
performance of their official functions had given unwarranted benefits,
advantage and preference to [petitioner Tan] and themselves, to the damage and
prejudice of the government, particularly the Municipality of Maasin.

CONTRARY TO LAW.25 (Emphasis and italics supplied)

chanrobleslaw

Criminal Case No. 25674 and Criminal Case No. 25675 26 were eventually consolidated.

Upon arraignment, petitioner Tan and her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 25674,
except for Partisala, who still remains at large, pleaded NOT GUILTY to the
charge.27 The parties then entered into a Joint Stipulation of Facts, which states, among
others: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 1. That at the time material in the Information, accused were public officials holding
the following official positions in the government:cralawlawlibrary

a. [MONDEJAR] - Municipal Mayor, Maasin, Iloilo;

b. [TOLENTINO] - S. B. Member, Maasin, Iloilo;
c. [ESPEJO] - S. B. Member, Maasin, Iloilo;
d. [GUMAPAS] - S. B. Member, Maasin, Iloilo;
e. [PIOLO] - S. B. Member, Maasin, Iloilo;
f. [VELASCO] - S. B. Member, Maasin, Iloilo; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

While [herein petitioner Tan] was the President of [IBC].

2. That on 27 June 1996 a [MOA] was entered into between the

Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo represented by Mayor [Mondejar] as the
First Party and [IBC] represented by [petitioner Tan] as the Second
Party, for the Rechanneling of the Tigum River path at Barangay Naslo,
Maasin, Iloilo.
3. That Resolution No. 9 Series of 1996 was passed by Barangay Naslo, Maasin,
Iloilo, relative to the rechanneling of the Tigum River Path at Barangay Naslo.
4. That Resolution No. 9 was also passed by the Members of the [MDC] of Maasin,
Iloilo endorsing the rechanneling of the said River Path. 28 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)

chanrobleslaw
xxx         xxx         xxx
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan jointly tried Criminal Case No. 25674 and Criminal Case
No. 25675.

The prosecution presented eight witnesses, namely, Jose S. Navarra

(Navarra),29 Imelda Maderada (Maderada),30 Soledad R. Sucaldito (Sucaldito),31 Rogelio
T. Trinidad (Trinidad),32 Elisa L. Trojillo (Trojillo),33 Darell A. Cabanero (Cabanero),34 Dr.
Vicente Albacete (Dr. Albacete)35 and Ernie Jesus Lee Malaga (Malaga).36 All together,
their testimonies tend to establish that (1) the accused public officials falsified the
Minutes of the Regular Session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin, Iloilo City, held on
21 June 1996 by making it appear that the body enacted on that date Resolution No.
30-A and Resolution No. 30-B, which resolutions led to the signing of the MOA between
Mondejar and petitioner Tan for the alleged rechanneling of the Tigum River path; and
(2) the quarrying activities of petitioner Tan's IBC at the Tigum River in the guise of
rechanneling the same.37

After the prosecution's formal offer of documentary evidence was admitted by the
Sandiganbayan in its Order dated 23 May 2006 over the objection of petitioner Tan and
her co-accused,38 the latter separately filed Demurrers to Evidence (with prior leave of
court), which were denied in a Resolution dated 16 March 2007. They moved for its
reconsideration but it was again denied in a Resolution dated 22 January 2008. 39

Petitioner Tan and her co-accused then proceeded in presenting themselves as

witnesses, together with Rolando B. Sison (Sison), 40 Engineer Juan Rentoy, Jr. (Engr.
Rentoy, Jr.)41 and Abner Tudela (Tudela).42 Their testimonies as a whole tend to prove,
among others, that (1) the old flood control system of Barangay Naslo, Maasin, Iloilo
City, was almost destroyed by the previous typhoons that hit the community; thus,
there is a great need to construct or build another flood control system and, that is, the
rechanneling of the Tigum River path since that river always inundated Barangay Naslo
during the rainy season; (2) resolutions were passed by both the Sangguniang
Barangay  of Barangay Naslo and the MDC requesting the IBC to do the rechanneling
since the latter has the necessary equipment for that kind of work; (3) the resolutions
of Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Naslo and the MDC were endorsed by
the Sangguniang Bayan  of Maasin, Iloilo City, via Resolution No. 30-A; and Resolution
No. 30-B authorized Mondejar to exercise his emergency powers to negotiate with the
IBC for the rechanneling of the Tigum River path, which resolutions were validly
enacted by the body on 21 June 1996; (4) pursuant thereto, the Municipality of Maasin,
Iloilo City, through Mondejar, and the IBC, through petitioner Tan, entered into a MOA
for the rechanneling of the Tigum River path; and (5) the IBC was able to rechannel the
Tigum River path.43

Petitioner Tan and her co-accused subsequently made a formal offer of evidence, which
was admitted by the Sandiganbayan in its Order dated 13 January 2011 despite the
objection of the prosecution.44

Thereafter, the prosecution presented Shirlito A. Reyes (Reyes) 45 and Sucaldito as

rebuttal witnesses. On 20 July 2012, the prosecution submitted its supplemental offer
of evidence, which the Sandiganbayan admitted in its Order dated 21 September 2012
over the objection of petitioner Tan.46

Once the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the Sandiganbayan accordingly
rendered a joint Decision on 7 November 2013 in Criminal Case No. 25674 and in
Criminal Case No. 25675, which dispositive portion reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby rules as follows: cralawlawlibrary

1. In Criminal Case No. 25674, the Court finds the accused [MONDEJAR],

[TOLENTINO], [ESPEJO], [GUMAPAS], [PIOLO], [VELASCO] and [HEREIN PETITIONER
TAN] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of [Violation of Section 3 (e) of
[RA 3019], as amended, and sentences each of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of six (6) years and one (1) month[,] as minimum[,] to ten (10) years[,] as maximum;
and to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office. Insofar as [PARTISALA] is
concerned, since he is still at large up to the present, let the case be ARCHIVED and
let an alias warrant of arrest issue against him.

2. In Criminal Case No. 25675, the Court finds the accused [MONDEJAR],
[TOLENTINO], [ESPEJO], [GUMAPAS], [PIOLO] and [VELASCO] GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Falsification defined under Article 171 of the [RPC] and sentences
each of them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months [and] one (1) day
of prision correccional[,] as minimumf,] to eight (8) years and one (1) day ofprision
mayor[,] as maximum in the absence of any mitigating and aggravating circumstance
in accordance with the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law; to pay a fine of
Five Thousand Pesos ([P]5,000.00); and to further suffer temporary absolute
disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage.
Insofar as [PARTISALA] is concerned, since he is still at large up to the present, let the
case be ARCHIVED and let an alias warrant of arrest issue against him.47 (Emphasis
partly in the original and partly supplied; italics supplied)

In arriving at such conclusion (in Criminal Case No. 25674), the Sandiganbayan
elucidated, thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

To be convicted of [Violation of Section 3 (e) of [RA 3019], the prosecution must prove
the following: cralawlawlibrary

1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official

functions; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence; and

3) That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions.
chanrobleslaw

The first element has been established as the accused public officials have stipulated on
their public functions. [Herein petitioner Tan], on the other hand, is charged in
conspiracy with the public officials.

The second element is likewise present x x x It was established by the prosecution that
the SB never passed Resolution No. 30-B authorizing accused Mondejar to exercise his
emergency powers and for him to carry out emergency measures relative to the
rechanneling of the Tigum River. This means that accused Mondejar did not have the
authority to enter into a MOA with the IBC for the rechanneling of the Tigum River.
Knowing this, the accused public officials falsified Exh. "F" [Minutes of the 21 June
1996 Sangguniang Bayan Session] thereby making it appear that the SB gave such
authority to accused Mondejar. This act was done in evident bad faith as they
deliberately covered-up an illegal act thus justifying the extraction of sand and gravel
by the IBC at the Tigum River. Without such act by the accused, IBC would not have
any right to haul any and all "excess" sand and gravel from the said site x x x

As to third element, it was shown by the prosecution that the only way for the IBC to
legally extract sand and gravel from the Tigum River was if it could secure a quarrying
permit from the provincial government of Iloilo. This is stated clearly in Provincial
Ordinance No. 11 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan  of Iloilo dated [14 August 1995] x x
x

The municipality of Maasin, through its Mayor and the SB, did not have the authority to
issue quarrying permit. What the accused were able to accomplish through the MOA
was to allow IBC to engage in quarrying activities without having to go through the
trouble of securing a quarrying permit on the justification that IBC was performing a
service for the townspeople by constructing a temporary dike and by rechanneling the
Tigum River and that the extraction of sand and gravel as its compensation for services
rendered.

In effect, the accused public officers and the IBC owner [petitioner] Tan effectively
bypassed the provincial government and circumvented the requirement for a quarrying
permit, with all its conditions and limitations. By so doing, the accused gave
unwarranted favor or unwarranted benefit to [petitioner] Tan, the owner of the IBC, in
the exercise of their official functions x x x

x x x Worse the MOA did not put in necessary safeguards to prevent any abuses by the
IBC. It did not require the municipality to supervise the construction of the dike and the
rechanneling of the river nor did it require monitoring of the sand and gravel being
extracted by the IBC thereby giving IBC unfettered discretion in its implementation of
the MOA and allowing indiscriminate quarrying in the area. 48
chanrobleslaw

Aggrieved, petitioner Tan moved for its reconsideration 49 but it was denied for lack of
merit in the questioned Resolution dated 30 June 2015.

The Sandiganbayan held that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Contrary to [herein petitioner] Tan's argument, the prosecution has proven her

complicity by her act of signing the MOA ostensibly dated 28 June 1996 but
was actually executed sometime after September 1997 which act indicates a
common purpose to make it appear that accused Mondejar had the authority
to enter into said MOA with [petitioner] Tan's IBC. While such finding had not
been expressly stated in the assailed Decision, such is necessarily implied
from the finding that the falsified Minutes was executed only sometime in
1997.

x x x x         x x x x         x x x x

The Information states that unwarranted benefit was given [petitioner] Tan by the act
of the accused public officers in making it appear that Resolution No. 30-B series of
1996 was passed authorizing accused Mondejar to exercise his emergency powers and
that, in fact, Mondejar did enter into a MOA with [petitioner] Tan of IBC authorizing it to
engage in massive quarrying in the guise of rechanneling the Tigum River. These are
the ultimate facts that go into the sufficiency of the Information and which the
prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt. The discussion by the Court that the
acts of the accused had the effect of circumventing the rules on securing a quarry
permit and that the MOA unduly benefited [petitioner] Tan's IBC are mere details that
go into the whys and the hows of the authority granted [petitioner] Tan's IBC. Verily,
an Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the
finer details of why and how the illegal acts alleged amounted to undue injury or
damage or unwarranted benefit.50 (Emphasis supplied.)
chanrobleslaw

Hence, this Petition by petitioner Tan raising the following grounds: (1) the

Sandiganbayan Decision is void on its face for non-compliance with Section 14, Article
VTII of the Constitution; (2) the Information in Criminal Case No. 25674, in regard
petitioner Tan, is void as it does not conform to the OMB-Visayas Resolution finding no
probable cause to charge the latter with Falsification of Resolution No. 30-B of
the Sangguniang Bayan  of Maasin, Iloilo City; (3) the Information does not allege an
offense constitutive of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 with regard to petitioner
Tan who is a private individual; (4) The Sandiganbayan Decision imputes to the
accused public officials in Criminal Case No. 25674, including petitioner Tan, the grant
of unwarranted benefits to the IBC as the latter was able to quarry in the Tigum River
without any permit from the provincial government of Iloilo, which fact is not alleged in
the Information, much less supported by any evidence, thus, in violation of petitioner
Tan's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations
against her, making the entire proceedings void; (5) the Sandiganbayan Decision
violated petitioner Tan's right to due process and even the fundamental rules of
evidence as it appreciated the evidence presented in Criminal Case No. 25675 (for
Falsification) in convicting the latter in Criminal Case No. 25674 (for Violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019) even though such evidence was never offered in the latter
case; (6) both the Sandiganbayan Decision and Resolution contain no finding of the
commission of any act by petitioner Tan, either by herself or in conspiracy with her co-
accused in Criminal Case No. 25674, that established beyond reasonable doubt the
violation of each and every element of the offense punishable under Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019 in relation to Section 4(b) of the same law; and (7) the Sandiganbayan
Decision and Resolution were rendered in violation of the Constitution, thus, merits
reversal and the petitioner deserves an acquittal. 51

With the foregoing arguments, the main issue to be resolved in the present recourse is
whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding petitioner Tan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in conspiracy with the accused public
officials of Maasin, Iloilo City.

The Petition is meritorious.

Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, under which petitioner Tan is charged, provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.  In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.
chanrobleslaw

In Rivera v. People,52 this Court held that to justify an indictment under this section;,
the existence of the following elements must be established: (1) the accused must be a
public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) that the
accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and (3) the action of the accused caused undue injury to any
party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of the functions of the accused. 53

There are two ways by which a public official violates Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in the
performance of his functions, to wit: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including
the Government; or (2) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference. The accused may be charged under either mode or both. The
disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019.54

Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if
found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019,
including (e) thereof. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law
to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft
or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.55

Thus, for a private person to be charged with and convicted of Violation of certain
offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, which in this case (e), it must be satisfactorily
proven that he/she has acted in conspiracy with the public officers in committing the
offense; otherwise, he/she cannot be so charged and convicted thereof.

In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all; thus, it is never presumed. Like the
physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.56 To establish conspiracy, direct proof of an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to commit it is not necessary. It
may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of
the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of
criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of
circumstances.57While direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, it
must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. And conviction must
be founded on facts, not on mere inferences and presumptions. 58

In this case, petitioner Tan was charged with and convicted of Violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. 3019 because of the alleged conspiracy between her and her co-accused public
officials of Maasin, Iloilo City, in committing the said offense. But, a perusal of the
Sandiganbayan Decision showed no instance how petitioner Tan could have conspired
with her co-accused public officials. Petitioner Tan, thus, raised this point in her Motion
for Reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan, however, in disposing the same, simply
stated: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x the prosecution has proven her complicity by her act of signing the MOA
ostensibly dated 28 June 1996 but was actually executed sometime after
September 1997 which act indicates a common purpose to make it appear that
accused Mondejar had the authority to enter into said MOA with [petitioner]
Tan's IBC. While such finding had not been expressly stated in the assailed Decision,
such is necessarily implied from the finding that the falsified Minutes was executed only
sometime in 1997.
chanrobleslaw

It can be gleaned from the aforesaid Sandiganbayan disposition that their only basis in
declaring that the MOA was actually executed sometime after September 1997 was
their finding that the falsified Minutes of the Regular Session of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Maasin, Iloilo City, was executed only sometime in 1997. To the mind of this
Court, this is a patently erroneous conclusion.

There was no iota of evidence ever presented by the prosecution in Criminal Case No.
25674 that would prove that the MOA entered into between Mondejar and petitioner
Tan was actually executed on a date other than 27 January 1996. There was also
nothing on the face of the MOA that would show any irregularity in its execution. To
note, the MOA signed by petitioner Tan dated 27 June 1996 was duly notarized on 28
June 1996. Section 30 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECTION 30. Proof of notarial document. - Every instrument duly acknowledged or

proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further
proof, the certificate of acknowledgement being prima facie evidence of the execution
of the instrument or document involved. (Italics supplied)
chanrobleslaw

The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a

private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. 59 With that notarial
act, the MOA became a public document. As such, it is a perfect evidence of the fact
which gives rise to its execution and of its date so long as the act which the officer
witnessed and certified to or the date written by him is not shown to be false. 60 To
overcome the presumption, the rules require not just a preponderance of evidence, but
evidence that is "clear and convincing" as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to
the falsity of the certificate. In the absence of such proof, the document must be
upheld.61

Further, in the parties' Joint Stipulation of Facts before the Sandiganbayan, one of facts
they agreed on was: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

2. That on 27 June 1996 a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between

the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo represented by Mayor Rene Mondejar as the
First Party, International Builders Corporation (IBC) represented by Helen Edith
Lee Tan as the Second Party, for the Rechanneling of the Tigum River path at
Barangay Naslo, Maasin, Iloilo.

As the aforesaid Joint Stipulation of Facts was reduced into writing and signed by the
parties and their counsels, thus, they are bound by it and the same becomes judicial
admissions of the facts stipulated. 62 Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court states: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 4. Judicial Admissions.  An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the

course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may
be contradicted only by showing that, it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made.
chanrobleslaw

A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial, either
by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the
judicial proceeding. It is well-settled that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by
the admitter who is the party himself and binds the person who makes the same, and
absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, as in this case, no
amount of rationalization can offset it.63 Also, in Republic of the Philippines v. D
Guzman64 citing Alfelor v. Halasan,65 this Court held that "a party who judicially admits
a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of
proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes
an admitted fact from the field of controversy."

With the foregoing, the Sandiganbayan is precluded from ruling that the MOA was
actually executed sometime in September 1997 as it would run counter to the
stipulated fact of the parties that it was entered into on 27 June 1996, which stipulation
was not shown to have been made through palpable mistake.

Having established that the MOA was entered into on 27 June 1996 and not in
September 1997 as what the Sandiganbayan would make it appear, petitioner Tan's act
of signing the same did not in anyway prove that she had conspired with her co-
accused public officials in committing the offense charged. To repeat, there is nothing in
the MOA that would apprise petitioner Tan of any irregularity or illegality that led to its
execution. More so, the prosecution did not even present evidence in Criminal Case No.
25674 to prove that petitioner Tan (1) has knowledge that Resolution No. 30-B was a
product of a falsified document, i.e., Minutes of the Regular Session of
the Sangguniang Bayan  of Maasin, Iloilo City, and that Mondejar has no authority to
enter into a MOA with her; and that (2) despite knowledge thereof, still entered into a
MOA with Mondejar. It also bears stressing that none of those who testified for the
prosecution ever linked petitioner Tan to the alleged falsification committed by the
accused public officials of Maasin, Iloilo City. In fact, petitioner Tan was not among
those charged with Falsification.

Since petitioner Tan's conviction was based on the presence of conspiracy, which the
prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt, her conviction of the
offense charged must be reversed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition is hereby GRANTED. The

Sandiganbayan Decision and Resolution dated 7 November 2013 and 30 June 2015,
respectively, in Criminal Case No. 25674 insofar as petitioner Tan is concerned are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Tan is ACQUITTED from
the charge of Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

SO ORDERED. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 194129               June 15, 2015

PO1 CRISPIN OCAMPO y SANTOS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Before this Court is an appeal from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision  in CA-G.R. CR No. 30957
1

dated 23 April 2010 and Resolution  dated 13 October 2010. The CA affirmed the Decision of the
2

Regional Trial Court (RTC) dated 10 May 2006 in Criminal Case No. 00-183183, finding accused-
appellant Police Officer 1 (PO 1) Crispin Ocampo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide.

On 01 June 2001, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of homicide under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The Information reads:

That on or about May 27, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused, with intent to kill, did
[then] and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon
one MARIO DE LUNA y HALLARE, by then and there firing his service firearm, .9 mm Barreta Pistol
with Serial No. M19498Z, hitting the said Mario De Luna y Hallare on the chest and other parts of the
body thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wounds which were necessarily fatal and mortal and which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

Contrary to law. 3

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 4

The prosecution’s version of the events as narrated by the CA is as follows:

On May 27, 2000, at about seven o’clock in the evening, Mario De Luna, Emil Hipolito and Florentino
Magante were having a drinking session at Mario’s house located at Panday Pira Street, Tondo,
Manila.

At about 8:30 in the evening, the three, together with Edwin Hipolito and Jaime Mabugat continued
their drinking session at the house of Edwin, also at Panday Pira Street, Tondo, Manila. While
drinking thereat, they noticed that another group, with appellant (accused-appellant), was also
having a drinking session along Panday Pira Street which was about three to four arms length from
Edwin’s place.

Emil, Mario, Jaime and Florante joined the group in their drinking session. While drinking, appellant
(accused-appellant) poked a gun at Jaime and told him "wag kang magulo, babarilin kita." Jaime
retorted, "san, bakit," and was then approached by her sister who asked him to go home to which he
acceded. Thereafter, appellant (accused-appellant) called on Mario De Luna and fired several shots
at him. Mario de Luna fell down to the ground. He was then immediately brought to the hospital by
his mother and sister where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Dr. Emmanuel Arenas, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, conducted a post-mortem examination of the body of Mario De Luna and found that the victim
died as a result of the gunshot wounds on the chest and different parts of his body. 5

For his part, accused-appellant admitted to having shot the victim to death, but claimed to have done
so in self-defense.  In support of this claim, defense witness Marita averred that the shooting incident
6

was precipitated by the victim’s unprovoked knife attack upon accused-appellant. The latter was
allegedly left with no other recourse but to use his service firearm to neutralize the aggressor.  As
7

testified to by witness Marita:

On May 27, 2000, at about 10:00 p.m., she was in front of their house at 1663 Interior 24, F. Varona,
Tondo, Manila, when she saw Ferdie Tapang, her nephew, and four othershaving a drinking spree
beside a lighted electric post. Shortly thereafter, she noticed appellant (accused-appellant) pass by.
Then Jaime together with Mario arrived at the scene and approached the group of Ferdie Tapang,
uttering the words: "Gusto nyo itaob ko tong lamesang ito." Sensing trouble upon seeing two of
Ferdie Tapang’s drinking buddies rise from the bench where they were seated, Marita rushed to the
house of appellant (accused-appellant) to ask for his help in preventing a confrontation between the
two groups.

Appellant (accused-appellant) had just arrived from his duty as police officer at the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Unit of the Western Police District and was changing into civilian clothes
when Marita came and apprised him of the situation. Together with Marita, he proceeded to the site
of the drinking spree. Noticing the group was becoming rowdy, appellant (accused-appellant)
approached Mario and asked if the latter knew him. When Mario replied yes, appellant (accused-
appellant) went on to tell the group to put an end to their drinking session. Mario and Jaime
immediately left the scene while the others voluntarily dispersed.

Minutes later, Mario and Jaime went back to the locus. While standing beside appellant (accused-
appellant), Marita heard Mario shout towards their direction the words: "Walang pulis-pulis sa
akin!"Appellant (accused-appellant) likewise heard Mario’s utterances: "Walang pulis pulis sa amin!
Anong akala mo sa amin, basta-basta mo na lang pauuwiin." Mario then pulled out a knifeand
lunged at appellant (accused-appellant) who evaded the first thrust. Mario tried to stab appellant
(accused-appellant) a second time but the latter dodged the knife, drew his pistol and fired two
successive shots at Mario. Appellant (accused-appellant) was leaning backwards when he fired at
Mario. Fatally hit, the latters lumped to the ground.

Having immediately left the crime scene after hearing the first gunshot, Marita failed to witness what
transpired thereafter.8

On 28 May 2008, accused-appellant, accompanied by Police Senior Inspector (PS/Insp.) Rosauro

Dalisay, arrived at the Western Police District and surrendered his service firearm.  On 10 May 2006,
9
the RTC convicted accused-appellant of homicide. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime of Homicide
and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the
heirs of Mario De Luna the amount of Php1, 600,000.00 as loss of earning capacity; Php50,000.00
as civil indemnity; Php2,577.00 as hospital expenses; and Php300.00 as funeral expenses; and
Php250,000 as attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED. 10

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant, but modified some of the monetary
damages awarded. It affirmed the ₱50,000 civil indemnity in favor of the victim’s heirs.  But instead
11

of the actual damages in the total amount of ₱2,877 (₱2,577 for hospital expense plus ₱300 for
funeral expenses), temperate damages of ₱25,000 were awarded in their favor.  The appellate court
12

deleted the award of ₱1,600,000 for loss of earning capacity on the ground of lack of competent
proof to substantiate the claim and reduced the attorney’s fees from ₱250,000 to ₱100,000.  It 13

affirmed the factual findings of the RTC and the latter’s assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses.  The CA likewise found that the trial court did not err in overruling accused-appellant’s
14

plea of self-defense. 15

Hence, this appeal.

The sole issue for resolution is whether the prosecution was able to prove accused-appellant’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court has carefully reviewed the case records and finds accused-appellant’s conviction proper.

It is a well-settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high
degree of respect.  Having observed their deportment in court, the trial judge is in a better position to
16

determine the issue of credibility.  For this reason, the findings of trial judges will not be disturbed on
17

appeal in the absence of any clear showing that they have overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could have altered the conviction of
appellants.  In the case at bar, the circumstances pointed out by accused-appellant are too trivial to
18

affect the assessment and the eventual findings of the trial court that he indeed committed the crime.
The Court therefore finds that the courts a quo have correctly appreciated the facts.

Their Decisions are fully supported by evidence on record including the transcript of stenographic
notes, which are extant and complete.

We are convinced that accused-appellant is guilty of homicide. We note that he admitted to having
killed the victim albeit in self-defense.  The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that
1âwphi1

when the accused admit that they are the authors of the death of the victim, and their defense is
anchored on self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon them to prove the justifying circumstance to
the satisfaction of the court. 19

Self-defense is a time-worn excuse resorted to by assailants in criminal cases.  We have held in a
20

host of instances that for self-defense to prosper, the following requisites must be met: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the attack; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person engaged in self-
defense. 21

In this case, accused-appellant has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the first
element of self-defense: unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.  Appellant showed no attack
22

or assault that had placed his life in imminent or actual danger.  As aptly ruled by the CA:
23

[A]ppellant’s tale of self-defense is negated by the physical evidence, specifically the trajectory of the
bullets that penetrated the victim’s body. Medico-Legal Report No. W-359-2000, the autopsy report,
showed that the victim sustained two gunshot wounds, one at the base of his neck and another in
the chest area. In both injuries, after penetrating the victim’s body, the bullets traveled from left side
downward to the right portion of his body. Xxx

xxxx

The graphic representation of the travel path of the bullets from the entry to the exit points is shown
in prosecution’s Exhibit "B-5." On the basis of the bullet’s trajectory, Dr. Aranas concluded that the
shooter must have been positioned higher than the victim when the shots were fired. Thus, the trial
court concluded that the results of the autopsy disproves appellant’s claim that he fired the shots
while leaning backward after the victim tried to stab him a second time.  (Emphasis supplied)
24

Indeed, physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks higher in our
hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.  In criminal cases such as murder/homicide or rape, in which the
25

accused stand to lose their liberty if found guilty, this Court has, on many occasions, relied
principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth.  Where the physical evidence on record
26

runs counter to the testimonies of witnesses, the primacy of the physical evidence must be upheld. 27

Ineluctably, the victim in this case cannot be considered as the aggressor. For one, an eyewitness
attested that accused-appellant shot the victim without any provocation.  Also, as correctly noted by
28

the trial court, there was failure to impute ill motive on the part of the eyewitness who had implicated
accused-appellant in the fatal shooting of the victim.  Jurisprudence holds that when there is no
29

evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the witness to testify falsely against the
accused or to pervert the truth, the logical conclusion is that no such motive exists, and that the
former’s testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.  With regard to the second element of self-
30

defense, the Court finds that the means employed by accused-appellant was grossly
disproportionate to the victim's alleged unlawful aggression. The victim suffered multiple gunshot
wounds in his chest and different parts of his body.  Besides, the Advance Information prepared by
31

Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Virgo Villareal, the investigator of the case, reveals that there was no
mention of either a stabbing incident that happened or a knife that was recovered from the crime
scene.  Suffice it to say that a plea of self-defense is belied by the "nature, number, and location of
32

the wounds" inflicted on the victim, "since the gravity of said wounds is indicative of a determined
effort to kill and not just to defend."  Here, the wounds sustained by the victim clearly show the intent
33

of accused-appellant to kill and not merely to prevent or repel an attack. Verily, since the means
employed by the latter were unreasonable and excessive, his plea of self-defense is unacceptable.

We, therefore, find no reversible error in the Decisions of the CA and the RTC as to the guilt of
accused-appellant.

Anent the appropriate penalty, we affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA: an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum  to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum for the crime of
34

homicide.
The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal.  Considering that there is one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and no
35

aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty,
pursuant to Article 64 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal in its minimum
period.  This being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law  is applicable. Accordingly,
36 37

accused-appellant can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum  of which shall be
38

within the range of prision mayor and the maximum  of which shall be within the range of reclusion
39

temporal in its minimum period, there being one ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and no aggravating circumstance.

With regard to the appropriate indemnity and damages, the CA retained the award of ₱50,000 as
civil indemnity and modified other monetary damages as follows: (a) ₱25,000 as temperate
damages; (b) ₱50,000 as moral damages; and (c) ₱100,000 as attorney’s fees. 40

As correctly ruled by the CA, an award for civil indemnity in favor of the heirs of the victim must be
automatically imposed against the accused without need of proof other than the fact of the
commission of murder or homicide.  Based on recent jurisprudence,  however, the award of civil
41 42

indemnity ex delicto of ₱75,000 for the heirs of Mario de Luna is in order.

With respect to other compensatory damages, the Court in People v. Agudez  declared that
43

competent evidence must likewise be presented to support the claim for those damages. In this
case, the heirs of Mario de Luna claimed that they spent ₱2,577 for hospital expense and ₱300 for
funeral expenses. However, when actual damages substantiated by receipts presented during trial
amount to less than ₱25,000, the award of ₱25,000 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual
damages for a lesser amount, is justified.44

The award for moral damages by the CA shall be adjusted from ₱50,000 to ₱75,000 to conform to
the prevailing jurisprudence.45

We also depart from the CA and the RTC rulings awarding the heirs of the victim attorney's fees, as
none of the grounds therefor under Article 2208  of the Civil Code is present in this case. Finally, the
46

Court also imposes interest on all the monetary awards for damages at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.  WHEREFORE, the appeal
47

is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Manila in CA-G.R. CR No. 30957 dated 23
April 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant PO1 CRISPIN
OCAMPO y SANTOS is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is further ordered to pay
the heirs of Mario de Luna the amounts of ₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000 as moral damages,
and ₱25,000 as temperate damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the
legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 131516            March 5, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RONNIE RULLEPA Y GUINTO, accused-appellant.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe, accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto was
charged with Rape before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City allegedly committed as
follows:

That on or about the 17th day of November, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously removing her parity, kissing her lips and vagina and thereafter rubbing his penis
and inserting the same to the inner portion of the vagina of the undersigned complainant, 3
years of age, a minor, against her will and without her consent.1

Arraigned on January 15, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.2

From the testimonies of its witnesses, namely Cyra May,3 her mother Gloria Francisco Buenafe, Dr.
Cristina V. Preyra, and SPO4 Catherine Borda, the prosecution established the following facts:

On November 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to set the table for dinner at her house in Quezon City,
Cyra May, then only three and a half years old, told her, "Mama, si kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at
sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko."

"Kuya Ronnie" is accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa, the Buenafes' house boy, who was sometimes
left with Cyra May at home.

Gloria asked Cyra May how many times accused-appellant did those things to her, to which she
answered many times. Pursuing, Gloria asked Cyra May what else he did to her, and Cyra May
indicated the room where accused-appellant slept and pointed at his pillow.

As on the night of November 20, 1995 accused-appellant was out with Gloria's husband Col.
Buenafe,4 she waited until their arrival at past 11:00 p.m. Gloria then sent accused-appellant out on
an errand and informed her husband about their daughter's plaint. Buenafe thereupon talked to Cyra
May who repeated what she had earlier told her mother Gloria.

When accused-appellant returned, Buenafe and Gloria verified from him whether what Cyra May
had told them was true. Ronnie readily admitted doing those things but only once, at 4:00 p.m. of
November 17, 1995 or three days earlier. Unable to contain her anger, Gloria slapped accused-
appellant several times.

Since it was already midnight, the spouses waited until the following morning to bring accused-
appellant to Camp Karingal where he admitted the imputations against him, on account of which he
was detained. Gloria's sworn statement5 was then taken.6

Recalling what accused-appellant did to her, Cyra May declared at the witness stand: "Sinaksak nya
ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga," thus causing her pain and drawing her to cry. She
added that accused-appellant did these to her twice in his bedroom.

Dr. Ma. Cristina V. Preyra, the Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the Biological Science Branch of
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory who examined Cyra May, came up with her report
dated November 21, 1995,7 containing the following findings and conclusions:

FINDINGS:

GENERAL AND EXTRA GENITAL:

Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child subject. Breasts are
undeveloped. Abdomen is flat and soft.

GENITAL:

There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with congested
and abraded labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same is disclosed an
abraded posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type intact hymen. External vaginal orifice
does not admit the tip of the examining index finger.

xxx           xxx           xxx

CONCLUSION:

Subject is in virgin state physically.

There are no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time of examination.
(Emphasis supplied.)

By Dr. Preyra's explanation, the abrasions on the labia minora could have been caused by friction
with an object, perhaps an erect penis. She doubted if riding on a bicycle had caused the injuries.8

The defense's sole witness was accused-appellant, who was 28 and single at the time he took the
witness stand on June 9, 1997. He denied having anything to do with the abrasions found in Cyra
May's genitalia, and claimed that prior to the alleged incident, he used to be ordered to buy medicine
for Cyra May who had difficulty urinating. He further alleged that after he refused to answer Gloria's
queries if her husband Buenafe, whom he usually accompanied whenever he went out of the house,
was womanizing, Gloria would always find fault in him. He suggested that Gloria was behind the
filing of the complaint. Thus:

q         According to them you caused the abrasions found in her genital?

 a That is not true, sir,

q         If that is not true, what is the truth?

a As I have mentioned earlier that before I started working with the family I was sent to
Crame to buy medicine for the daughter because she had difficulty in urinating.

q         Did you know why the child has difficulty in urinating?

a No, I do not know, sir.

q         And how about the present complaint filed against you, the complaint filed by the
mother of the victim?

a I did not do it, sir.

q         What is the truth, what can you say about this present complaint filed against you?

a As I said Mrs. Buenafe got mad at me because after I explained to her that I was going
with her gusband (sic) to the children of the husband with a former marriage.9

Finding for the prosecution, Branch 96 of the Quezon City RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, and he is accordingly sentenced to death.

The accused is ordered to pay CYRA MAE BUENAFE the amount of P40,000.00 as civil
indemnity.

Costs to be paid by the accused.10 (Italics in the original.)

Hence, this automatic review, accused-appellant assigning the following errors to the trial court:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S ADMISSION.

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED ON (sic) RULING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S

SILENCE DURING TRIAL AMOUNTED TO AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF GUILT.

III

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
 IV

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF

DEATH UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.11 (Emphasis supplied.)

Accused-appellant assails the crediting by the trial court, as the following portion of its decision
shows, of his admission to Gloria of having sexually assaulted Cyra May:

In addition, the mother asserted that Rullepa had admitted Cyra Ma[y]'s complaint during the
confrontation in the house. Indeed, according to the mother, the admission was even
expressly qualified by Rullepa's insistence that he had committed the sexual assault only
once, specifying the time thereof as 4:00 pm of November 17, 1995. That qualification
proved that the admission was voluntary and true. An uncoerced and truthful admission like
this should be absolutely admissible and competent.

xxx           xxx           xxx

Remarkably, the admission was not denied by the accused during trial despite his freedom to
deny it if untrue. Hence, the admission became conclusive upon him.12 (Emphasis supplied.)

To accused-appellant, the statements attributed to him are inadmissible since they were made out of
fear, having been elicited only after Cyra May's parents "bullied and questioned him." He thus
submits that it was error for the trial court to take his failure to deny the statements during the trial as
an admission of guilt.

Accused-appellant's submission does not persuade. The trial court considered his admission merely
as an additional ground to convince itself of his culpability. Even if such admission, as well as the
implication of his failure to deny the same, were disregarded, the evidence suffices to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The plain, matter-of-fact manner by which Cyra May described her abuse in the hands of
her Kuya Ronnie is an eloquent testament to the truth of her accusations. Thus she testified on
direct examination:

q         Do you recall if Ronnie Rullepa did anything to you?

a         Yes, sir.

q         What did he do to you?

a         "Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga"

q         How many times did he do that to you?

a         Twice, sir.

xxx           xxx           xxx

q         Do you remember when he did these things to you?

 a         Opo.

q         When was that?

a         When my mother was asleep, he put — he removed my panty and inserted his penis
inside my vagina, my anus and my mouth, sir.

xxx           xxx           xxx

q         After your Kuya Ronnie did those things to you what did you feel?

a         "Sabi nya ganito (Witness putting her finger in her lips) Nasaktan po ako at umiyak po
ako".

q         Did you cry because of hurt?

a         Yes.

q         What part of your body hurt?

a         "Pepe ko po." When I went to the bathroom to urinate, I felt pain in my organ, sir.13

Cyra May reiterated her testimony during cross-examination, providing more revolting details of her
ordeal:

q         So, you said that Kuya Ronnie did something to you what did he do to you on
November 17, 1995?

a         "Sinaksak nga yong titi nya". He inserted his penis to my organ and to my mouth, sir.

xxx           xxx           xxx

q         When you said that your kuya Ronnie inserted his penis into your organ, into your
mouth, and into your anus, would you describe what — his penis?

a         It is a round object, sir.

Court:

Is this titi of your kuya Ronnie a part of his body?

a         Opo.

q         Was that in the head of kuya Ronnie?

a         No, sir.

q         Which part of his body that titi located?

(Witness pointing to her groin area)

 Court:

Continue

xxx           xxx           xxx

q         Why were you in that room?

a         Gusto nya po matulog ako sa kuwarto niya.

q         When you were in that room, what did Kuya Ronnie do to you?

a         "Hinubo po niya ang panty ko."

q         And after he remove your panty, what did Kuya Ronnie do, what did he do to you?

a         He inserted his penis to my organ, sir.

q         Why did kuya Ronnie, was kuya Ronnie already naked or he was already wearing any
clothing?

a         Still had his clothing on, sir.

q         So, where did his penis, saan lumabas ang penis ni Kuya Ronnie?

a         Dito po, (Witness referring or pointing to her groin area)

xxx           xxx           xxx

q         So, that's the — and at the time, you did not cry and you did not shout for help?

a         Sabi nya po, not to make any noise because my mother might be roused from sleep.

q         How long was kuya Ronnie did that to you?

a         Matagal po.

q         After kuya Ronnie scrub his penis to your vagina, what other things did he do?

a         After that he inserted his penis to my mouth, and to my anus, sir.

q         You did not complain and you did not shout?

a         I cried, sir.14

Accused-appellant draws attention to the statement of Cyra May that he was not in the house on
November 17 (1995), as reflected in the following transcript of her testimony:
 q         Is it not a fact that you said a while ago that when your father leaves the house, he
[was] usually accompanied by your kuya Ronnie?

a         Opo.

q         Why is it that Kuya Ronnie was in the house when your father left the house at that
time, on November 17?

a         He was with Kuya Ronnie, sir.

q         So, it is not correct that kuya Ronnie did something to you because your kuya Ronnie
[was] always with your Papa?

a         Yes, sir.15

The above-quoted testimony of Cyra May does not indicate the time when her father Col. Buenafe
left their house on November 17, 1995 with accused-appellant and, thus, does not preclude
accused-appellant's commission of rape on the same date. In any event, a young child is vulnerable
to suggestion, hence, her affirmative response to the defense counsel's above-
quoted leading questions.

As for the variance in the claim regarding when Gloria was informed of the rape, Gloria having
testified that she learned of it on November 20, 199516 while Cyra May said that immediately after the
incident, she awakened her mother who was in the adjacent room and reported it:17 This is a minor
matter that does not detract from Cyra May's categorical, material testimony that accused-appellant
inserted his penis into her vagina.

Accused-appellant goes on to contend that Cyra May was coached, citing the following portion of her
testimony:

q         "Yong sinabi mong sinira nya ang buhay mo," where did you get that phrase?

a         It was the word of my Mama, sir.18

On the contrary, the foregoing testimony indicates that Cyra May was really narrating the truth, that
of hearing her mother utter "sinira niya ang buhay mo."

Accused-appellant's suggestion that Cyra May merely imagined the things of which he is accused,
perhaps getting the idea from television programs, is preposterous. It is true that "the ordinary child
is a `great weaver of romances,"' and her "imagination may induce (her) to relate something she has
heard or read in a story as personal experience."19 But Cyra May's account is hardly the stuff of
romance or fairy tales. Neither is it normal TV fare, if at all.

This Court cannot believe that a victim of Cyra May's age could concoct a tale of defloration, allow
the examination of her private parts, and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to
mention the trauma of public trial."20

Besides, her testimony is corroborated by the findings of Dr. Preyra that there were abrasions in
her labia minora, which she opined, could have been caused by friction with an erect penis.
This Court thus accords great weight to the following assessment of the trial court regarding the
competency and credibility of Cyra May as a witness:

Her very tender age notwithstanding, Cyra Ma(y) nonetheless appeared to possess the
necessary intelligence and perceptiveness sufficient to invest her with the competence to
testify about her experience. She might have been an impressionable child — as all others of
her age are — but her narration of Kuya Ronnie's placing his "titi" in her "pepe" was certainly
one which could not be considered as a common child's tale. Her responses during the
examination of counsel and of the Court established her consciousness of
the distinction between good and bad, which rendered inconceivable for her to describe a
"bad" act of the accused unless it really happened to her. Needless to state, she described
the act of the accused as bad. Her demeanor as a witness — manifested during trial by her
unhesitant, spontaneous, and plain responses to questions — further enhanced her claim to
credit and trustworthiness.21 (Italics in the original.)

In a futile attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant claims that even before the alleged incident
Cyra May was already suffering from pain in urinating. He surmises that she could have scratched
herself which caused the abrasions. Dr. Preyra, however, was quick to rule out this possibility. She
stated categorically that that part of the female organ is very sensitive and rubbing or scratching it is
painful.22 The abrasions could not, therefore, have been self-inflicted.

That the Medical-Legal Officer found "no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at
the time of the examination" does not preclude accused-appellant's conviction since the infliction of
force is immaterial in statutory rape.23

More. That Cyra May suffered pain in her vagina but not in her anus despite her testimony that
accused-appellant inserted his penis in both orifices does not diminish her credibility. It is possible
that accused-appellant's penis failed to penetrate her anus as deeply as it did her vagina, the former
being more resistant to extreme forces than the latter.

Accused-appellant's imputation of ill motive on the part of Gloria is puerile. No mother in her right
mind would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a prosecution for
rape if she were not motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the person responsible for the
child's defilement.24 Courts are seldom, if at all, convinced that a mother would stoop so low as to
subject her daughter to physical hardship and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution just to
assuage her own hurt feelings.25

Alternatively, accused-appellant prays that he be held liable for acts of lasciviousness instead of
rape, apparently on the basis of the following testimony of Cyra May, quoted verbatim, that he
merely "scrubbed" his penis against her vagina:

q         Is it not a fact that kuya Ronnie just made some scrubbed his penis into your vagina?

a         Yes, Sir.

q         And when — he did not actually penetrated your vagina?

a         Yes, sir.26
Dr. Preyra, however, found abrasions in the labia minora, which is "directly beneath the labia
majora,"27 proving that there was indeed penetration of the vagina, not just a mere rubbing or
"scrubbing" of the penis against its surface.

In fine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is not merely acts of lasciviousness but statutory
rape.

The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman, and
(2) that the woman is below twelve years of age.28 As shown in the previous discussion, the first
element, carnal knowledge, had been established beyond reasonable doubt. The same is true with
respect to the second element.

The victim's age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute an element of the offense. Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,29 provides:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

xxx           xxx           xxx.

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age . . .

xxx           xxx           xxx.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxx           xxx           xxx.

Furthermore, the victim's age may constitute a qualifying circumstance, warranting the imposition
of the death sentence. The same Article states:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity with the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim:

xxx           xxx           xxx.

4. when the victim is . . . a child below seven (7) years old.

xxx           xxx           xxx.

Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the victim's
age in rape cases, this Court, in the recently decided case of People v. Pruna,30 established a set of
guidelines in appreciating age as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, to wit:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to
prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed
or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken
against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

Applying the foregoing guidelines, this Court in the Pruna case held that the therein accused-
appellant could only be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua since:

. . . no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a baptismal certificate of

LIZETTE, was presented to prove her age. . . . .

xxx           xxx           xxx.

However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does not in any way prove
the age of LIZETTE, for there is nothing therein which even mentions her age. Only
testimonial evidence was presented to establish LIZETTE's age. Her mother, Jacqueline,
testified (that the victim was three years old at the time of the commission of the crime).

xxx           xxx           xxx

Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two years after the incident,
that she was 5 years old. However, when the defense counsel asked her how old she was
on 3 January 1995, or at the time of the rape, she replied that she was 5 years old. Upon
further question as to the date she was born, she could not answer.
 For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the supreme penalty of
death, it must be established with certainty that LIZETTE was below 7 years old at the time
of the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that the severity of the death penalty,
especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making
process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and
evidence.

In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTE's exact age, corroborative evidence such as her birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other authentic document should be introduced in
evidence in order that the qualifying circumstance of "below seven (7) years old" is
appreciated against the appellant. The lack of objection on the part of the defense as to her
age did not excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden. That the defense invoked
LIZETTE's tender age for purposes of questioning her competency to testify is not
necessarily an admission that she was below 7 years of age when PRUNA raped her on 3
January 1995. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot be convicted of qualified rape, and
hence the death penalty cannot be imposed on him.

However, conformably with no. 3 (b) of the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of LIZETTE's
mother that she was 3 years old at the time of the commission of the crime is sufficient for
purposes of holding PRUNA liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of age.
Under the second paragraph of Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no.
3 of the first paragraph thereof, having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age
is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA should
be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty. (Italics in the original.)

Several cases31 suggest that courts may take "judicial notice" of the appearance of the victim in
determining her age. For example, the Court, in People v. Tipay,32 qualified the ruling in People v.
Javier,33 which required the presentation of the birth certificate to prove the rape victim's age, with
the following pronouncement:

This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the certificate of birth is at all times
necessary to prove minority. The minority of a victim of tender age who may be below the
age of ten is quite manifest and the court can take judicial notice thereof. The crucial years
pertain to the ages of fifteen to seventeen where minority may seem to be dubitable due to
one's physical appearance. In this situation, the prosecution has the burden of proving with
certainty the fact that the victim was under 18 years of age when the rape was committed in
order to justify the imposition of the death penalty under the above-cited provision.
(Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand, a handful of cases34 holds that courts, without the requisite hearing prescribed by
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,35 cannot take judicial notice of the victim's age.

Judicial notice signifies that there are certain "facta probanda," or propositions in a party's case, as
to which he will not be required to offer evidence; these will be taken for true by the tribunal without
the need of evidence.36 Judicial notice, however, is a phrase sometimes used in a loose way to cover
some other judicial action. Certain rules of Evidence, usually known under other names, are
frequently referred to in terms of judicial notice.37

The process by which the trier of facts judges a person's age from his or her appearance cannot be
categorized as judicial notice. Judicial notice is based upon convenience and expediency for it would
certainly be superfluous, inconvenient, and expensive both to parties and the court to require proof,
in the ordinary way, of facts which are already known to courts.38 As Tundag puts it, it "is the
cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they
already know them." Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, where the provisions governing judicial notice
are found, is entitled "What Need Not Be Proved." When the trier of facts observes the appearance
of a person to ascertain his or her age, he is not taking judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is
conducting an examination of the evidence, the evidence being the appearance of the person.
Such a process militates against the very concept of judicial notice, the object of which is to do away
with the presentation of evidence.

This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court; on the contrary, it does. A
person's appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed
to the senses of the court. Section 1, Rule 130 provides:

SECTION 1. Object as evidence. — Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses
of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined
or viewed by the court.

"To be sure," one author writes, "this practice of inspection by the court of objects, things
or persons relevant to the fact in dispute, has its roots in ancient judicial procedure."39 The author
proceeds to quote from another authority:

"Nothing is older or commoner in the administration of law in all countries than the
submission to the senses of the tribunal itself, whether judge or jury, of objects which furnish
evidence. The view of the land by the jury, in real actions, of a wound by the judge where
mayhem was alleged, and of the person of one alleged to be an infant, in order to fix his
age, the inspection and comparison of seals, the examination of writings, to determine,
whether they are (`)blemished,(') the implements with which a crime was committed or of a
person alleged, in a bastardy proceeding, to be the child of another, are few illustrations of
what may be found abundantly in our own legal records and textbooks for seven centuries
past."40 (Emphasis supplied.)

A person's appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of infancy, or of being under the age of
consent to intercourse), is usually regarded as relevant; and, if so, the tribunal may properly
observe the person brought before it.41 Experience teaches that corporal appearances are
approximately an index of the age of their bearer, particularly for the marked extremes of old age
and youth. In every case such evidence should be accepted and weighed for what it may be in each
case worth. In particular, the outward physical appearance of an alleged minor may be considered in
judging his age; a contrary rule would for such an inference be pedantically over-
cautious.42 Consequently, the jury or the court trying an issue of fact may be allowed to judge the age
of persons in court by observation of such persons.43 The formal offer of the person as evidence is
not necessary. The examination and cross-examination of a party before the jury are equivalent to
exhibiting him before the jury and an offer of such person as an exhibit is properly refused.44

This Court itself has sanctioned the determination of an alien's age from his appearance. In Braca v.
Collector of Customs,45 this Court ruled that:

The customs authorities may also determine from the personal appearance of the immigrant what
his age is. The person of a Chinese alien seeking admission into the Philippine Islands is evidence
in an investigation by the board of special inquiry to determine his right to enter; and such body may
take into consideration his appearance to determine or assist in determining his age and a finding
that the applicant is not a minor based upon such appearance is not without evidence to support it.
This Court has also implicitly recognized the same process in a criminal case. Thus, in United States
v. Agadas,46 this Court held:

Rosario Sabacahan testified that he was 17 years of age; that he had never purchased a
cedula; and that he was going to purchase a cedula the following January. Thereupon the
court asked this defendant these questions: "You are a pretty big boy for seventeen."
Answer: "I cannot tell exactly because I do not remember when I was born, but 17 years is
my guess." Court: "If you are going to take advantage of that excuse, you had better get
some positive evidence to that effect." Answer: "I do not remember, as I already stated on
what date and in what year I was born." The court, in determining the question of the age of
the defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, said:

"The defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, testified that he thought that he was about 17
years of age, but judging by his appearance he is a youth 18 or 19 years old. He
has shown that he has no positive information on the subject and no effort was made
by the defense to prove the fact that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
article 9, paragraph 2, of the Penal code, which fact it is held to be incumbent upon
the defense to establish by satisfactory evidence in order to enable the court to give
an accused person the benefit of the mitigating circumstance."

In United States vs. Estavillo and Perez (10 Off. Gaz., 1984) Estavillo testified, when the
case was tried in the court below, that he then was only 16 years of age. There was no other
testimony in the record with reference to his age. But the trial judge said: "The accused
Estavillo, notwithstanding his testimony giving his age as 16 years, is, as a matter of fact, not
less than 20." This court, in passing upon the age of Estavillo, held:

"We presume that the trial court reached this conclusion with reference to the age of
Estavillo from the latter's personal appearance. There is no proof in the record, as we
have said, which even tends to establish the assertion that this appellant understated
his age. . . . It is true that the trial court had an opportunity to note the personal
appearance of Estavillo for the purpose of determining his age, and by so doing
reached the conclusion that he was at least 20, just two years over 18. This appellant
testified that he was only 16, and this testimony stands uncontradicted. Taking into
consideration the marked difference in the penalties to be imposed upon that age, we
must, therefore, conclude (resolving all doubts in favor of the appellants) that the
appellants' ages were 16 and 14 respectively."

While it is true that in the instant case Rosario testified that he was 17 years of age, yet the
trial court reached the conclusion, judging from the personal appearance of Rosario, that "he
is a youth 18 or 19 years old." Applying the rule enunciated in the case just cited, we must
conclude that there exists a reasonable doubt, at least, with reference to the question
whether Rosario was, in fact 18 years of age at the time the robbery was committed. This
doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant, and he is, therefore, sentenced to six
months of arresto mayor in lieu of six years ten months and one day of presidio mayor. . . . .

There can be no question, therefore, as to the admissibility of a person's appearance in

determining his or her age. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape
cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which is again reproduced hereunder:

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed
or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
 respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.

Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is
sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c) above. In such cases,
the disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can easily
determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance
corroborates the relative's testimony.

As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person's appearance, as object
evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and,
following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.

This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the victim's mere physical
appearance is not enough to gauge her exact age. For the extreme penalty of death to be
upheld, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime must be substantiated. Verily, the minority of the victim should be not only alleged but
likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Be it remembered that
the proof of the victim's age in the present case spells the difference between life and
death.47

In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victim's certificate of live birth or similar
authentic documents in evidence. The victim and her mother, however, testified that she was only
three years old at the time of the rape. Cyra May's testimony goes:

q         Your name is Cyra Mae is that correct?

a         Yes, sir.

q         And you are 3 years old?

a         Yes, sir.48

That of her mother goes:

Q         How old was your daughter when there things happened?

A         3 and ½ years old.

Q         When was she born?

 A         In Manila, May 10, 1992.49

Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be
proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victim's age
from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second element of statutory
rape, i.e., that the victim was below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the offense,
is present.

Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable doubt
exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year
old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and,
following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.

As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below seven years old at the
time of the commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer the death
penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.

In line with settled jurisprudence, the civil indemnity awarded by the trial court is increased to
P50,000.00. In addition, Cyra May is entitled to an award of moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00.50

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto is
found GUILTY of Statutory Rape, defined and punished by Article 335 (3) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to
pay private complainant, Cyra May Buenafe y Francisco, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago and Corona, JJ ., are on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995

ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO
TAMAYO, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 114931-33 November 16, 1995

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANNIE FERRER, accused, ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS
SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, accused-appellants.

PUNO, J.:

The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the aftermath of the 1986
EDSA Revolution. This was the time when the newly-installed government of President Corazon C.
Aquino was being openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by "Marcos
loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension and animosity between
the two (2) groups sometimes broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of
Stephen Salcedo, a known "Coryista."

From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court against eleven persons
identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo. Criminal Case No. 86-
47322 was filed against Raul Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon; Criminal Case No. 86-
47617 against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan y Mostero; Criminal Case No.
86-47790 against Richard de los Santos y Arambulo; Criminal Case No. 86-48538 against Joselito
Tamayo y Ortia; and Criminal Case No. 86-48931 against Rolando Fernandez y Mandapat. Also
filed were Criminal Cases Nos. 86-49007 and 86-49008 against Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega
as well as Annie Ferrer charging them as accomplices to the murder of Salcedo.

The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX, Manila. All of the
accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued accordingly. The prosecution presented
twelve witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and the
police officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their testimonies, the
prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the
incident and various photographs taken during the mauling.

The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by
the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a permit to hold the rally but their application was
denied by the authorities. Despite this setback, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal
Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Led by Oliver Lozano and
Benjamin Nuega, both members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the loyalists started an
impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches in between. Colonel Edgar Dula
Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived and asked the leaders for
their permit. No permit could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres thereupon gave them ten minutes to
disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for thirty minutes but this was refused. Atty. Lozano turned
towards his group and said "Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty. Nuega added
"Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the crowd, and used tear gas and truncheons to
disperse them. The loyalists scampered away but some of them fought back and threw stones at the
police. Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa Street and the situation later stabilized. 1

At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the
Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos,
jogging around the fountain. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and Annie
Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then she continued jogging
around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si
Marcos, Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie
Ferrer was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang gumanti, tayo ngayon!" A
commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in
yellow, the color of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt.  He then saw a man wearing a
2

yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!" The man
in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught
Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but
they again pounced on him and pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts
of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid.
Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers
pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave Sumilang a
loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. They backed off for a while and
Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind
Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed
Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was already fallen.  Salcedo tried to stand but
3

accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of his head and ear.  Accused Nilo Pacadar punched
4

Salcedo on his nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan. Patayin!"  Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the
5

latter lunged at the victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked
him as he once more fell. Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the
head, and when he tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed him.  Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri
6

approach the victim but did not notice what he did. 7

Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the blood from his face. He
sat on some cement steps  and then tried to flee towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the
8

Rizal Monument but accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the
process. Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin. Tulungan ninyo ako." He
cried: "Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis?" 9

The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo
collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help of a traffic officer,
brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him to
the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.

Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various contusions, abrasions,

lacerated wounds and skull fractures as revealed in the following post-mortem findings:

Cyanosis, lips, and nailbeds.

Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm., frontal region, right side; 6.8 x
4.2 cm., frontal region, left side; 5.0 x 4.0 cm., right cheek; 5.0 x 3.5 cm., face, left
side; 3.5 x 2.0 cm., nose; 4.0 x 2.1 cm., left ear, pinna; 5.0 x 4.0 cm. left
suprascapular region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm., right elbow.

Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right knee.

Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0 cm., upper lip.

Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal region; right temporal
region; occipital region, right side.

Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior cranial fossa; right anterior
cranial fossa.

Hemorrhage, subdural, extensive.

Other visceral organs, congested.

Stomach, about 1/2 filled with grayish brown food materials and fluid. 10

The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both local and
foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the event which became front-page news the
following day, capturing national and international attention. This prompted President Aquino to
order the Capital Regional Command and the Western Police District to investigate the incident. A
reward of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) was put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then
Police Chief, for persons who could give information leading to the arrest of the killers.  Several
11

persons, including Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, cooperated with the police, and on the
basis of their identification, several persons, including the accused, were apprehended and
investigated.

For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the victim and
offered their respective alibis. Accused Joselito Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the
photographs presented by the prosecution  because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house in
12

Quezon City.  Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of the
13
incident.   Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his office near the Luneta
14

waiting for some pictures to be developed at that time.   He claimed to be afflicted with hernia
15

impairing his mobility; he cannot run normally nor do things forcefully.   Richard de los Santos
16

admits he was at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting Salcedo.   He said that he
17

merely watched the mauling which explains why his face appeared in some of the
photographs.   Unlike the other accused, Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a
18

member of the Ako'y Pilipino Movement and that he attended the rally on that fateful day. According
to him, he saw Salcedo being mauled and like Richard de los Santos, merely viewed the
incident.   His face was in the pictures because he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting
19

Salcedo.   Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the maulers because he pitied Salcedo. The
20

maulers however ignored him.  21

The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer opted not to testify in
their defense.

On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel
Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified
by treachery and sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was likewise convicted as an
accomplice. The court, however, found that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other
accused and thus acquitted Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and
Benjamin Nuega. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered in the aforementioned cases as

follows:

1. In "People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery," Criminal Case No. 86-47322, the
Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the two (2) Accused
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits them of said
charge;

2. In "People versus Romeo Sison, et al.," Criminal Case No. 86-47617, the Court
finds the Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principals for the crime of Murder, defined in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and, there being no other mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, hereby imposes on each of them an indeterminate penalty of from
FOURTEEN (14)YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS,
of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion
Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal, as
Maximum;

3. In "People versus Richard de los Santos," Criminal Case No. 86-47790, the Court
finds the Accused Richard de los Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal
for the crime of Murder defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and, there
being no other extenuating circumstances, the Court hereby imposes on him an
indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and
TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS
of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum;

4. In "People versus Joselito Tamayo," Criminal Case No. 86-48538 the Court finds
the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, for the crime of "Murder"
defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes on him an
 indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and
TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS
of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;

5. In "People versus Rolando Fernandez," Criminal Case No. 86-4893l, the Court
finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Accused for the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of said charge;

6. In "People versus Oliver Lozano, et al.," Criminal Case No. 86-49007, the Court
finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits them of said charge;

7. In "People versus Annie Ferrer," Criminal Case No. 86-49008, the Court finds the
said Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as accomplice to the crime of Murder
under Article 18 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
imposes on her an indeterminate penalty of NINE (9) YEARS and FOUR (4)
MONTHS of Prision Mayor, as Minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS, FIVE (5)
MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum.

The Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Richard de los Santos, Joel Tan, Joselito
Tamayo and Annie Ferrer are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the
heirs of Stephen Salcedo the total amount of P74,000.00 as actual damages and the
amount of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one-half (1/2) of the
costs of suit.

The period during which the Accused Nilo Pacadar, Romeo Sison, Joel Tan, Richard
de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo had been under detention during the pendency of
these cases shall be credited to them provided that they agreed in writing to abide by
and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail.

The Warden of the City Jail of Manila is hereby ordered to release the Accused Gerry
Nery, Raul Billosos and Rolando Fernandez from the City Jail unless they are being
detained for another cause or charge.

The Petition for Bail of the Accused Rolando Fernandez has become moot and
academic. The Petition for Bail of the Accused Joel Tan, Romeo Sison and Joselito
Tamayo is denied for lack of merit.

The bail bonds posted by the Accused Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega are
hereby cancelled. 22

On appeal, the Court of Appeals   on December 28, 1992, modified the decision of the trial court by
23

acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito
Tamayo, to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of
superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because the information against him
did not allege the said qualifying circumstance. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as

follows:
 1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe, Joel Tan y
Mostero and Richard de los Santos are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua;

2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo y Oria is hereby found GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with the generic aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength and, as a consequence, an indeterminate
penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as Minimum to TWENTY (20)
YEARS of reclusion temporal as Maximum is hereby imposed upon him;

3. Accused-appellant Annie Ferrer is hereby ACQUITTED of being an accomplice to

the crime of Murder.

CONSIDERING that the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua has been imposed in the

instant consolidated cases, the said cases are now hereby certified to the Honorable
Supreme Court for review.  24

Petitioners filed G.R. Nos. 108280-83 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court inasmuch as
Joselito Tamayo was not sentenced to reclusion perpetua. G.R. Nos. 114931-33 was certified to us
for automatic review of the decision of the Court of Appeals against the four accused-appellants
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Before this court, accused-appellants assign the following errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT NOTED

THAT THE ACCUSED FAILED TO CITE ANYTHING ON RECORD TO SUPPORT
THEIR AVERMENT THAT THERE WERE NO WITNESSES WHO HAVE COME
FORWARD TO IDENTIFY THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF
STEPHEN SALCEDO.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING

CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE, DOUBTFUL, SUSPICIOUS AND
INCONCLUSIVE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESS RANULFO
SUMILANG.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING THE

ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT ANY
OF THE ACCUSED CARRIED A HARD AND BLUNT INSTRUMENT, THE
ADMITTED CAUSE OF THE HEMORRHAGE RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF THE
DECEASED.

IV
 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THERE EXISTS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

THE CRIME COMMITTED IS MURDER AND NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) CAUSED
IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY.  25

In their additional brief, appellants contend that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REACHING A

CONCLUSION OF FACT UTILIZING SPECULATIONS, SURMISES, NON-
SEQUITUR CONCLUSIONS, AND EVEN THE DISPUTED DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT, TO UPHOLD THE VALIDITY OF THE VERY SAME JUDGMENT,
ALL CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS "D",

"G", "O", "P", "V", TO "V-48", "W" TO "W-13", ALL OF WHICH WERE NOT
PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING

THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR DISREGARDING
ALTOGETHER THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT

THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS MURDER, NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) IN
TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY SIDESTEPPING IN THE PROCESS THE FACTUAL
GROUNDS SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT.  26

Appellants mainly claim that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the testimonies of the
two in prosecution eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, because they are
unreliable, doubtful and do not deserve any credence. According to them, the testimonies of
these two witnesses are suspect because they surfaced only after a reward was announced
by General Lim. Renato Banculo even submitted three sworn statements to the police
geared at providing a new or improved version of the incident. On the witness stand, he
mistakenly identified a detention prisoner in another case as accused Rolando
Fernandez.   Ranulfo Sumilang was evasive and unresponsive prompting the trial court to
27

reprimand him several times.  28

There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward announced by General
Lim, much less that both or either of them ever received such reward from the government. On the
contrary, the evidence shows that Sumilang reported the incident to the police and submitted his
sworn statement immediately two hours after the mauling, even before announcement of any
reward.   He informed the police that he would cooperate with them and identify Salcedo's assailants
29

if he saw them again.  30

The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make them and his testimony
incredible. The sworn statements were made to identify more suspects who were apprehended
during the investigation of Salcedo's death. 31

The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial court on the witness
stand for being argumentative and evasive.   This is not enough reason to reject Sumilang's
32

testimony for he did not exhibit this undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On the whole,
his testimony was correctly given credence by the trial court despite his evasiveness at some
instances. Except for compelling reasons, we cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate the
credence of witnesses considering their visual view of the demeanor of witnesses when on the
witness stand. As trial courts, they can best appreciate the verbal and non-verbal dimensions of a
witness' testimony.

Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does not make him an entirely
untrustworthy witness.   It does not make his whole testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not
33

inconsistent with a truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with
imperfect senses. In the court's discretion, therefore, the testimony of a witness can be believed as
to some facts but disbelieved with respect to the others.  34

We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses' testimonies corroborate each
other on all important and relevant details of the principal occurrence. Their positive identification of
all petitioners jibe with each other and their narration of the events are supported by the medical and
documentary evidence on record.

Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that the
victim had various wounds on his body which could have been inflicted by pressure from more than
one hard object.   The contusions and abrasions found could have been caused by punches, kicks
35

and blows from rough stones.   The fatal injury of intracranial hemorrhage was a result of fractures in
36

Salcedo's skull which may have been caused by contact with a hard and blunt object such as
fistblows, kicks and a blunt wooden instrument.  37

Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched. Sumilang in fact testified that
Salcedo was pummeled by his assailants with stones in their hands.  38

Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly disregarded Exhibits "D," "G," and
"P," it erroneously gave evidentiary weight to Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W-1" to "W-
13."   Exhibit "O" is the Joint Affidavit of Pat. Flores and Pat. Bautista, the police intelligence-
39

operatives who witnessed the rally and subsequent dispersal operation. Pat. Flores properly
identified Exhibit "O" as his sworn statement and in fact gave testimony corroborating the contents
thereof.   Besides, the Joint Affidavit merely reiterates what the other prosecution witnesses testified
40

to. Identification by Pat. Bautista is a surplusage. If appellants wanted to impeach the said affidavit,
they should have placed Pat. Flores on the witness stand.

Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was being mauled at the
Luneta — starting from a grassy portion to the pavement at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas
Boulevard,   — as he was being chased by his assailants   and as he sat pleading with his
41 42

assailants.   Exhibits "W", "W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and the mauling published in
43

local newspapers and magazines such as the Philippine Star,   Mr. and Ms. Magazine,   Philippine
44 45
Daily Inquirer,   and the Malaya.   The admissibility of these photographs is being questioned by
46 47

appellants for lack of proper identification by the person or persons who took the same.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by
the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were
produced.   The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or
48

reproduction of the original,   and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the
49

scene at the time of the crime.   The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify
50

the pictures he has taken.   The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the
51

object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by
other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its
accuracy.   Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent
52

witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.  53

This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence,
appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of proper
identification.   However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas,
54

counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48" to prove that
his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of
the victim.   The photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri
55

as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other accused
per understanding with their respective counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At
subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who
took the witness stand.   No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty.
56

Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility.  57

The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the
person who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these
photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an
admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations
of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel
Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat.  58

An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only three of the
appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in
various belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over the victim.   Appellant Romeo Sison
59

appears only once and he, although afflicted with hernia is shown merely running after the
victim.  Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. The absence of the two
60

appellants in the photographs does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire
sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison
and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang and
Banculo Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification.
61

Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the existence of conspiracy among the
principal accused and in convicting them of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, not death
in tumultuous affray.

Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal code as follows:

Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. — When, while several persons, not
composing groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking
each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous
 manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be
ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted
serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished
by prison mayor.

If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased,
the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon all those who shall have used violence upon the person of the victim.

For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that
they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking
each other reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a
confused and tumultuous manner; (4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it
cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or persons
who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified. 62

A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in
a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the
author thereof cannot be ascertained. 63

The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one
individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this
confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later
after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless individual
and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There was
no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of
the incident. 64

As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were numerous by as much as fifty in number  and 65

were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage of their superior strength
and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. They
followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument several meters away and hit him
mercilessly even when he was already fallen on the ground. There was a time when Salcedo was
able to get up, prop himself against the pavement and wipe off the blood from his face. But his
attackers continued to pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend himself nor could he find
means to defend himself. Sumilang tried to save him from his assailants but they continued beating
him, hitting Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he
finally lost consciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless
victim qualifies the killing to murder.

Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the instant case. There is no proof
that the attack on Salcedo was deliberately and consciously chosen to ensure the assailants' safety
from any defense the victim could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo was sudden and
unexpected but it was apparently because of the fact that he was wearing a yellow t-shirt or because
he allegedly flashed the "Laban" sign against the rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the
appellate court well found, Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the temper of the rallyists and run
away from them but he, unfortunately, was overtaken by them. The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being
attacked. 66

The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the information against Joselito
Tamayo. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case because the attack against
Salcedo was sudden and spontaneous, spurred by the raging animosity against the so-called
"Coryistas." It was not preceded by cool thought and reflection.

We find however the existence of a conspiracy among appellants. At the time they were committing
the crime, their actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring
about the death of Salcedo. Where a conspiracy existed and is proved, a showing as to who among
the conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a conviction.   Each of the
67

conspirators is liable for all acts of the others regardless of the intent and character of their
participation, because the act of one is the act of all.  68

The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages, and one half of the costs of the suit. At the time he died on July 27, 1986,
Salcedo was twenty three years old and was set to leave on August 4, 1986 for employment in
Saudi Arabia.   The reckless disregard for such a young person's life and the anguish wrought on his
69

widow and three small children,   warrant an increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to
70

P100,000.00. The indemnity of P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the death of the victim. 71

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and modified as follows:

1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan and Richard de los
Santos are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder without any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua;

2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of

the crime of Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength and, as a consequence, he is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to TWENTY (20)
YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum;

3. All accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Stephen Salcedo the following amounts:

(a) P74,000.00 as actual damages;

(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and

(c) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim.

Costs against accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Francisco, J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 155604             November 22, 2007

COLLEGE ASSURANCE PLAN and COMPREHENSIVE ANNUITY PLAN and PENSION

CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
BELFRANLT DEVELOPMENT INC., respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the February 28, 2002 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63283, which
modified the April 14, 1999 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 221), Quezon City (RTC) in
Civil Case No. Q-95-23118.

The antecedent facts are as summarized by the RTC.

Belfranlt Development, Inc. (respondent) is the owner of Belfranlt Building in Angeles City,
Pampanga. It leased to petitioners College Assurance Plan Phil., Inc. (CAP) and Comprehensive
Annuity Plans and Pension Corporation (CAPP) several units on the second and third floors of the
building.3

On October 8, 1994, fire destroyed portions of the building, including the third floor units being
occupied by petitioners. An October 20, 1994 field investigation report by an unnamed arson
investigator assigned to the case disclosed:

0.5 Origin of Fire: Store room occupied by CAP, located at the 3rd floor of the bldg.
 0.6 Cause of Fire: Accidental (overheated coffee percolator).4

These findings are reiterated in the October 21, 1994 certification which the BFP City Fire Marshal,
Insp. Teodoro D. del Rosario issued to petitioners as supporting document for the latter's insurance
claim.5

Citing the foregoing findings, respondent sent petitioners on November 3, 1994 a notice to vacate
the leased premises to make way for repairs, and to pay reparation estimated at P1.5 million.

On November 11, 1994, petitioners vacated the leased premises, including the units on the second
floor,6 but they did not act on the demand for reparation.

Respondent wrote petitioners another letter, reiterating its claim for reparation, this time estimated by
professionals to be no less than P2 million.7 It also clarified that, as the leased units on the second
floor were not affected by the fire, petitioners had no reason to vacate the same; hence, their lease
on said units is deemed still subsisting, along with their obligation to pay for the rent.8

In reply, petitioners explained that they could no longer re-occupy the units on the second floor of the
building for they had already moved to a new location and entered into a binding contract with a new
lessor. Petitioners also disclaimed liability for reparation, pointing out that the fire was a fortuitous
event for which they could not be held responsible.9

After its third demand10 went unheeded, respondent filed with the RTC a complaint against petitioners
for damages. The RTC rendered a Decision dated April 14, 1999, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff

[respondent] and against the herein defendants [petitioners]. Defendants are ordered to pay
the plaintiff joint[sic] and severally the following amounts:

1) P2.2 Million Pesos cost of rehabilitation (repairs, replacements and renovations) of

the Belfranlt building by way of Actual and Compensatory damages;

2) P14,000.00 per month of unpaid rentals on the third floor of the Belfranlt building
for the period from October 1994 until the end of the two year lease contract on May
10, 1996 by way of Actual and Compensatory damages;

3) P18,000.00 per month of unpaid rentals on the second floor of the Belfanlt building
for the period from October 1994 until the end of the two year lease contract on May
10, 1996 by way of Actual or Compensatory damages;

4) P8,400.00 per month as reimbursement of unpaid rentals on the other leased

areas occupied by other tenants for the period from October 1994 until the time the
vacated leased areas were occupied by new tenants;

5) P200,000.00 as moral damages;

6) P200,000.00 as exemplary damages;

7) P50,000.00 plus 20% of Actual damages awarded as reasonable Attorney's fees;

and
 8) Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.11

Petitioners appealed to the CA which, in its February 28, 2002 Decision, modified the RTC Decision,
thus:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that the award of (i) actual and
compensatory damages in the amounts of P2.2 Million as cost of rehabilitation of Belfranlt
Building and P8,400.00 per month as reimbursement of unpaid rentals on the areas leased
by other tenants, (ii) moral damages, (iii) exemplary damages and (iv) attorney's fees is
DELETED, while defendants-appellants are ordered to pay to plaintiff-appellee, jointly and
severally, the amount of P500,000.00 as temperate damages. The appealed judgment is
AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.12

Respondent did not appeal from the CA decision.13

Petitioners filed the present petition, questioning the CA decision on the following grounds:

The honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the fire that partially burned
respondent's building was a fortuitous event.

II

The honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to observe the due
diligence of a good father of a family.

III

The honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioners liable for certain actual damages
despite plaintiffs' failure to prove the damage as alleged.

IV

The honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioners liable for temperate damages.14

The petition lacks merit.

Article 1667 of the Civil Code, which provides:

The lessee is responsible for the deterioration or loss of the thing leased, unless he proves
that it took place without his fault. This burden of proof on the lessee does not apply when
the destruction is due to earthquake, flood, storm or other natural calamity.
creates the presumption that the lessee is liable for the deterioration or loss of a thing leased. To
overcome such legal presumption, the lessee must prove that the deterioration or loss was due to a
fortuitous event which took place without his fault or negligence.15

Article 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as that which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, was inevitable. Whether an act of god16 or an act of man,17 to constitute a
fortuitous event, it must be shown that: a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence
or of the failure of the obligor to comply with its obligations was independent of human will; b) it was
impossible to foresee the event or, if it could have been foreseen, to avoid it; c) the occurrence
rendered it impossible for the obligor to fulfill its obligations in a normal manner; and d) said obligor
was free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss.18 If the negligence or fault of
the obligor coincided with the occurrence of the fortuitous event, and caused the loss or damage or
the aggravation thereof, the fortuitous event cannot shield the obligor from liability for his
negligence.19

In the present case, it was fire that caused the damage to the units being occupied by petitioners.
The legal presumption therefore is that petitioners were responsible for the damage. Petitioners
insist, however, that they are exempt from liability for the fire was a fortuitous event that took place
without their fault or negligence.20

The RTC saw differently, holding that the proximate cause of the fire was the fault and negligence of
petitioners in using a coffee percolator in the office stockroom on the third floor of the building and in
allowing the electrical device to overheat:

Plaintiff has presented credible and preponderant evidence that the fire was not due to a
fortuitous event but rather was due to an overheated coffee percolator found in the leased
premises occupied by the defendants. The certification issued by the Bureau of Fire
Protection Region 3 dated October 21, 1994 clearly indicated that the cause of the fire was
an overheated coffee percolator. This documentary evidence is credible because it was
issued by a government office which conducted an investigation of the cause and
circumstances surrounding the fire of October 8, 1994. Under Section 4, Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court, there is a legal presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed. The defendants have failed to present countervailing evidence to rebut or dispute
this presumption. The defendants did not present any credible evidence to impute any
wrongdoing or false motives on the part of Fire Department Officials and Arson investigators
in the preparation and finalization of this certification. This Court is convinced that the
Certification is genuine, authentic, valid and issued in the proper exercise and regular
performance of the issuing authority's official duties. The written certification cannot be
considered self-serving to the plaintiff because as clearly indicated on its face the same was
issued not to the plaintiff but to the defendant's representative Mr. Jesus V. Roig for
purposes of filing their insurance claim. This certification was issued by a government office
upon the request of the defendant's authorized representative. The plaintiff also presented
preponderant evidence that the fire was caused by an overheated coffee percolator when
plaintiff submitted in evidence not only photographs of the remnants of a coffee percolator
found in the burned premises but the object evidence itself. Defendants did not dispute the
authenticity or veracity of these evidence. Defendants merely presented negative evidence
in the form of denials that defendants maintained a coffee percolator in the premises testified
to by employees of defendants who cannot be considered totally disinterested.21(Citations
omitted)

The CA concurred with the RTC and noted additional evidence of the negligence of petitioners:
 The records disclose that the metal base of a heating device which the lower court found to
be the base of a coffee percolator, was retrieved from the stockroom where the fire
originated. The metal base contains the inscription "CAUTION DO NOT OPERATE WHEN
EMPTY", which is a warning against the use of such electrical device when empty and an
indication that it is a water-heating appliance. Its being an instrument for preparing coffee is
demonstrated by its retrieval from the stockroom, particularly beside broken drinking glasses,
Nescafe bottle, metal dish rack and utensils.

Appellants assert that it had an airpot – not a coffee percolator - near the Administration
Office on the third floor. For unexplained reasons, however, they did not present the airpot to
disprove the existence of the coffee percolator. The fire did not raze the entire third floor and
the objects therein. Even the stack of highly combustible paper on the third floor was not
totally gutted by the fire. Consequently, it is not farfetched that the burnt airpot, if any, could
have been recovered by appellants from the area where it was supposedly being kept.

xxxx

The defense that the fire was a fortuitous event is untenable. It is undisputed that the fire
originated from appellants' stockroom located on the third floor leased premises. Said
stockroom was under the control of appellants which, on that fateful day (a Saturday),
conducted a seminar in the training room which was adjoining the stockroom. Absent an
explanation from appellants on the cause of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applies.22

Petitioners impugn both findings. They claim that the BFP field investigation report (Exh. "P-2") and
the BFP certification (Exh. "P-3") are hearsay evidence because these were presented during the
testimony of Fireman Gerardo Sitchon (Fireman Sitchon) of the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP),
Angeles City, who admitted to having no participation in the investigation of the fire incident or
personal knowledge about said incident,23 making him incompetent to testify thereon. Petitioners
argue that, with Exh. "P-2" and Exh. "P-3" and the testimony of Fireman Sitchon that are flawed,
there is virtually no evidence left that the cause of the fire was an overheated coffee percolator.
Petitioners insist that they own no such percolator.24

We find no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the RTC and CA.

The finding that the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the fire that destroyed
portions of the leased units is a purely factual matter which we cannot pass upon,25 lest we overstep
the restriction that review by certiorari under Rule 45 be limited to errors of law only.26

Moreover, the established rule is that the factual findings of the CA affirming those of the RTC are
conclusive and binding on us.27 We are not wont to review them, save under exceptional
circumstances as: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (7) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (8) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record.28
The exceptions do not obtain in the present case. In fact, the findings of the RTC and CA are fully
supported by the evidence.

Contrary to petitioners' claim, Fireman Sitchon is competent to identify and testify on Exh. "P-2" and
Exh. "P-3" because, although he did not sign said documents, he personally prepared the
same.29 What Fireman Sitchon did not prepare were the documents which his investigation
witnesses presented.30 However, Fireman Sitchon emphasized that he interviewed said investigation
witnesses namely, Ronald Estanislao, the security guard on duty at the time of fire; and Dr. Zenaida
Arcilla, manager of CAPP, before he prepared Exh. "P-2" and Exh. "P-3."31 Hence, while Fireman
Sitchon may have had no personal knowledge of the fire incident, Exh. "P-2" and Exh. "P-3," which
he prepared based on the statements of his investigation witnesses, especially that of Ronald
Estanislao whose official duty it was to report on the incident, are exceptions to the hearsay rule
because these are entries in official records.32 Consequently, his testimony on said documents are
competent evidence of the contents thereof. 33

Furthermore, the petitioners are estopped from contesting the veracity of Exh. "P-3" because, as the
CA correctly pointed out, "the aforesaid certification was used by appellants [petitioners] in claiming
insurance for their office equipment which were destroyed by the fire."34

Even without the testimony of Fireman Sitchon and the documents he prepared, the finding of the
RTC and CA on the negligence of petitioners cannot be overturned by petitioners' bare denial. The
CA correctly applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under which expert testimony may be
dispensed with35 to sustain an allegation of negligence if the following requisites obtain: a) the
accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; b) the cause of the
injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and c) the injury suffered must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.36 The fire that
damaged Belfranlt Building was not a spontaneous natural occurrence but the outcome of a human
act or omission. It originated in the store room which petitioners had possession and control of.
Respondent had no hand in the incident. Hence, the convergence of these facts and circumstances
speaks for itself: petitioners alone having knowledge of the cause of the fire or the best opportunity
to ascertain it, and respondent having no means to find out for itself, it is sufficient for the latter to
merely allege that the cause of the fire was the negligence of the former and to rely on the
occurrence of the fire as proof of such negligence.37 It was all up to petitioners to dispel such
inference of negligence, but their bare denial only left the matter unanswered.

The CA therefore correctly affirmed the RTC in holding petitioners liable to respondent for actual
damages consisting of unpaid rentals for the units they leased.

The CA deleted the award of actual damages of P2.2 million which the RTC had granted respondent
to cover costs of building repairs. In lieu of actual damages, temperate damages in the amount
of P500,000.00 were awarded by the CA. We find this in order.38

Temperate or moderate damages may be availed when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but
its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.39 The amount thereof is
usually left to the discretion of the courts but the same should be reasonable, bearing in mind that
temperate damages should be more than nominal but less than compensatory.40 Without a doubt,
respondent suffered some form of pecuniary loss for the impairment of the structural integrity of its
building as a result of the fire. However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, because of respondent's
inability to present proof of the exact amount of such pecuniary loss, it may only be entitled to
temperate damages in the amount of P500,000.00,41 which we find reasonable and just.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 178541               March 27, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ANGELO ZETA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For review is the Decision dated 30 June 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02054,1 affirming in toto the Decision2 dated 29 November 2002 of the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 88, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-63787, finding accused-appellant Angelo Zeta
and his wife, Petronilla Zeta (Petronilla), guilty of murder.

The facts are as follows:

On 6 November 1995, an Information3 was filed before the RTC charging appellant and Petronilla of
Murder, thus:

That on or about the 28th day of October 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with evident premeditation, treachery, assault, attack
and employ personal violence upon the person of RAMON GARCIA y LOPEZ by then and there
shooting the latter with the use of a .45 cal. pistol hitting him on the different parts of his body,
thereby causing the instant and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of said RAMON GARCIA Y LOPEZ.

When arraigned on 20 December 1995, appellant and Petronilla, assisted by their respective
counsels de parte, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge of murder.4 Trial on the merits thereafter
ensued.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Aleine Mercado (Aleine), Dr. Maria Cristina Freyra (Dr.
Freyra), Police Inspector Solomon Segundo (Inspector Segundo), Rey Jude Naverra (Rey), Edwin
Ronk (Edwin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco), SPO1 Carlos Villarin (SPO1 Villarin), and SPO2 Wakab
Magundacan (SPO2 Magundacan). Their testimonies, taken together, bear the following:

On 28 October 1995, at around 12:00 midnight, Edwin, Rey and a certain Melvin Castillo (Melvin)
had a drinking spree outside the house of Rey located at No. 30-B Tacio Street, La Loma, Quezon
City. At about 2:00 in the morning of the same date, a car stopped in front of the three. Appellant
was driving the car while Petronilla was seated beside him. Petronilla opened the car’s window and
asked Edwin if he knows Ramon and the latter’s address at No. 25-C General Tinio Street, La Loma,
Quezon City. Edwin replied that he did not know Ramon or his address. Thereafter, appellant and
Petronilla left on board the car and proceeded to General Tinio Street, La Loma, Quezon City.5

At about 2:15 in the morning of the same date, the car boarded by appellant and Petronilla stopped
in front of Ramon’s house at No. 25-C General Tinio Street, La Loma, Quezon City. After parking
nearby, appellant and Petronilla alighted from the car and proceeded to Ramon’s house. Petronilla
repeatedly called Ramon. Aleine (niece of Cristina Mercado, Ramon’s common-law wife) was
awakened by the repeated calls and opened the door. Petronilla requested Aleine to call Ramon.
Aleine told Petronilla that she would wake up Ramon who was then sleeping with Cristina at the
second floor of the house. Aleine invited appellant and Petronilla inside the house but the two replied
that they would just wait for Ramon outside. Aleine proceeded to the second floor of the house and
knocked at the door of Ramon’s room. Ramon woke up. Subsequently, Aleine went downstairs and
proceeded to the dining table. While Ramon was walking down the stairs, appellant suddenly
entered the house and shot Ramon several times on different parts of the body with a caliber .45
Llama pistol. Upon seeing appellant shooting Ramon, Aleine hid inside the restroom. When the
gunshots ceased, Aleine went out of the restroom and saw Ramon sprawled and bloodied on the
ground floor.6

Edwin, Rey and Melvin were still drinking when they heard the gunshots. They rushed to the
direction of Ramon’s house. When they were nearing Ramon’s house, Petronilla suddenly stepped
out of the main door of Ramon’s house followed by appellant. Melvin uttered, "Mamamatay
tao." Petronilla merely looked at them and entered the car. Appellant also proceeded inside the car
and thereafter the car sped away.7

Subsequently, Aleine went out of the house and called for help. Edwin, Rey and Melvin approached
her. They carried Ramon and placed him inside a vehicle owned by a neighbor. While they were on
their way to the Chinese General Hospital, Ramon told Aleine that the one who shot him
was "asawa ni Nellie na kapitbahay namin sa Las Piñas." Ramon died due to gunshot wounds while
being operated on at the Chinese General Hospital. Thereafter, the police arrived at the crime scene
and recovered several empty bullet shells and slugs.8

At about 10:55 the following morning, SPO2 Magundacan received a report that a carnapped vehicle
was parked along Lakandula Street, P. Tuazon Blvd., Quezon City. SPO2 Magundacan proceeded
thereat and saw appellant about to board a car armed with a gun visibly tucked in his waist. SPO2
Magundacan approached appellant and asked him for a license and/or registration papers of the gun
but appellant did not show any. SP02 Magundacan also inquired from Petronilla, who was inside the
car also armed with a gun tucked in her waist, if she had a license but Petronilla likewise failed to
show any. Thus, SPO2 Magundacan brought appellant and Petronilla to Police Precinct 8, Project 4,
Quezon City, for investigation. Subsequently, appellant and Petronilla, upon the request of the La
Loma police, were turned over to the police station for investigation as regards the killing of Ramon.
Appellant and Petronilla were thereafter charged with murder.9

The prosecution also adduced documentary and object evidence to buttress the testimonies of its
witnesses, to wit: (1) death certificate of Ramon;10 (2) sworn statement of Aleine;11 (3) request for
autopsy examination of Ramon’s body;12 (4) medico-legal report issued and signed by Dr. Freyra
stating that Ramon died due to gunshot wounds;13 (5) anatomical sketch of a human body signed by
Dr. Freyra indicating the location of the gunshot wounds on Ramon’s body;14 (6) physical science
report stating that a paraffin test was conducted on both hands of Ramon and they were found
negative for gunpowder nitrates;15 (7) handwritten sketch made by Edwin depicting the streets of
Tacio and General Tinio;16 (8) request for ballistic examination of the object evidence recovered from
the crime scene;17 (9) ballistic report issued and signed by Inspector Segundo stating that the bullet
extracted from Ramon’s body and other bullets recovered from the crime scene were similar to the
bullets of the caliber .45 Llama pistol seized from appellant;18 (10) certification from the Personnel
Division of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) affirming that Ramon was its
regular employee from 14 February 1981 up to 27 October 1995 and that he was receiving a
monthly salary of ₱13,687.00 plus other benefits;19 (11) summary of expenses and receipts for the
wake of Ramon;20 (12) joint affidavit of SPO2 Magundacan and a certain PO2 Ronald Zamora;21 (13)
photographs showing the spot where appellant and Petronilla stood while waiting for Ramon, the
stairs where Ramon walked down shortly before he was shot several times by appellant, the area
inside Ramon’s house where appellant positioned himself while shooting at Ramon, and the location
where Ramon fell down after he was shot several times by appellant;22 (14) nine empty shells and
seven deformed slugs fired from a caliber .45 pistol which were recovered by SPO1 Villarin from the
crime scene;23 (15) a deformed slug fired from a caliber .45 pistol which was extracted from Ramon’s
body; (16) test bullets fired from the caliber .45 Llama pistol seized from appellant;24 (17) the caliber .
45 Llama pistol with Serial Number C-27854 seized from appellant;25 and (18) a calling card
recovered from Ramon with the print label "Cristine Rent A Car," "Angelo D. Zeta" and with
telephone numbers and addresses.26

For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellant, Petronilla, and Annabelle Vergara
(Annabelle) to refute the foregoing allegations. Their version of the incident is as follows:

On 27 October 1995, at about 10:00 in the evening, appellant, Petronilla and Annabelle (housemaid
of the couple) were in the couple’s house at Cainta, Rizal.27 Later, appellant took Petronilla’s caliber .
38 pistol and went to his brother’s (Jose Zeta, Jr.) house in Marikina arriving therein at around 12:00
midnight. Jose was out of the house so appellant waited for him. At about 2:30 in the morning of 28
October 1995, Jose arrived. Thereafter, appellant demanded from Jose the return of his three
firearms, one of which is a caliber .45 pistol. Jose, however, handed only the caliber .45 pistol to
appellant. Appellant berated Jose for refusing to return the two other firearms. Irked, Jose drew a
gun. Appellant also drew the caliber .45 pistol and shot Jose four times. Jose fell down on the
ground. Afterwards, appellant left the house, took Jose’s car which was parked near the house, and
proceeded to Police Precinct 8, Project 4, Quezon City, where he waited for a certain Tony Tolentino
whom he claims to be a policeman assigned at the Southern Police District. At about 9:00 in the
morning of 28 October 1995, the policeman on duty at Precinct 8 informed appellant that the latter’s
car parked inside the precinct was a carnapped vehicle. The policemen searched the car and found
several guns including the caliber .45 and the caliber .38. Appellant was thereupon detained and
charged with illegal possession of firearms and carnapping.28
At about 10:00 in the morning of 28 October 1995, Petronilla received a telephone call informing her
that appellant was at Police Precinct 8, Project 4, Quezon City. She immediately proceeded thereat
and presented documents relative to her ownership and license of the caliber .38 seized from
appellant. Thereafter, she went home at about 11:00 in the evening.29

On 2 November 1995, Petronilla visited appellant at Precinct 8. During the visit, Aleine arrived at
Precinct 8 and pointed to appellant and Petronilla. Subsequently, appellant and Petronilla were
informed by the police that they were suspects in the killing of Ramon. Thereafter, they were
charged with murder.30

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 29 November 2002 convicting appellant and Petronilla of
murder. It held that appellant and Petronilla conspired in killing Ramon. It also ruled that Ramon’s
killing was attended by the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and nocturnity. In
conclusion, it imposed the death penalty on appellant while Petronilla was merely sentenced
to reclusion perpetua "owing to her being a mother and her lesser degree of participation in the
killing of Ramon." The fallo of the decision reads:

Accordingly, based on the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense and finding both
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER attended by the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and nocturnity without being offset by any mitigating
circumstances, the accused Angelo Zeta is hereby sentenced to death by lethal injection. The wife
and co-accused Petronilla Zeta, although a co-conspirator in the commission of the offense charged,
is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA owing to her being a mother and her lesser degree
of participation in the act of murder.

The accused Angelo Zeta and Petronilla Zeta are also sentenced to indemnify in SOLIDUM the heirs
of the victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for the death of Ramon Garcia; ₱146,000.00 for the
hospital and burial expenses; and ₱1,642,440.00 for the lost income of the deceased reckoned at 10
years of productive life, plus costs.

The .45 caliber Llama pistol with Serial Number C-27854 is confiscated in favor of the Government
to be kept by the Philippine National Police as mandated by law.31

On 9 December 2002, the RTC issued an Order forwarding the records of the instant case to Us for
automatic review because of the death penalty imposed on appellant.32

On 24 December 2002, Petronilla filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC stating that she would
appeal her conviction to this Court.33

On 28 April 2004, Petronilla, through counsel, filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal before us34 stating
that:

After a thorough review of the available stenographic notes obtained by the close relatives of the
accused-appellant from the Regional Trial Court, the undersigned counsel found out that there are
no testimonial and/or documentary evidence presented before the lower Trial Court that could
sufficiently serve as justifiable basis to warrant the reversal of the appealed decision rendered
insofar as PETRONILLA ZETA is concerned.

Moreover, the undersigned counsel sustained serious physical injuries that render difficult to further
handle the appeal that will require lengthy preparation of appellant’s brief and other legal pleadings
as may be required under the Rules of Court.
Consequently, after discussion with accused-appellant PETRONILLA ZETA, the undersigned
counsel informed her that he is now constrained to withdraw his appearance in the above-entitled
appealed case.

Upon being informed of the health predicament of the undersigned counsel and after being
enlightened about the weakness of the appeal, accused-appellant PETRONILLA ZETA willfully and
voluntarily decided to WITHDRAW the appeal and do hereby signify to the Honorable Court that she
is no longer interested in the further prosecution of her appeal. She, likewise, has no objection to the
withdrawal of the appearance of Atty. Alfredo E. Anasco, as her counsel in the above-entitled case.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the above-entitled appeal be ordered withdrawn and the
MOTION TO WITHDRAW APPEAL be GRANTED, and the withdrawal of appearance of counsel be
given due course.

On 28 September 2004, we issued a Resolution granting Petronilla’s motion to withdraw appeal.35

On 22 November 2005, we issued a Resolution remanding the instant case to the Court of Appeals
for proper disposition pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.36 On 30 June 2006, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC. Thus:

Thus, after finding that the trial court’s conclusions are supported by the evidence presented and in
full accord with existing law and jurisprudence, We find no reason to set it aside.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The November
29, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88 in Criminal Case No. Q-95-
63787 is AFFIRMED.37

Appellant elevated the present case before us on the following grounds:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES DID NOT POSITIVELY
IDENTIFY HIM;

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF DENIAL AND ALIBI
INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT;

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE

FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS UNDER A SHADOW OF DOUBT.38

Apropos the first issue, appellant claims that although Edwin and Rey positively identified Petronilla
as the one who asked them about Ramon and his address shortly before the incident occurred, the
two, nevertheless, failed to identify appellant as Petronilla’s companion during the said questioning.
He also argues that Aleine’s testimony identifying him as the one who shot Ramon during the
incident is not morally certain because Aleine narrated that she saw only the side portion of his face
and the color of the shirt he wore during the incident.39
It appears that Edwin and Rey did not actually see appellant shoot Ramon during the incident.
Nonetheless, Aleine saw appellant shoot Ramon on that fateful night. Her positive identification of
appellant and direct account of the shooting incident is clear, thus:

ATTY. A. OLIVETTI (DIRECT EXAMINATION)

Q. Aleine Mercado, are you the same Aleine Mercado who is listed as one of the witnesses
in this case?

WITNESS

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know the accused in this case?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If they are inside the courtroom, will you identify them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you please look around and point before the Honorable Court the person of the
accused in this case?

A. Yes, sir. That man wearing yellow T-shirt and that lady who is also wearing yellow shirt.
(witness pointing to a man who when asked of his name identified himself as Angelo Zeta
and to a lady beside Angelo Zeta who when asked of her name identified herself as
Petronilla Zeta.)

xxx

Q. On October 28, 1995, at about 2:15 in the morning, do you remember if there was an
unusual incident that happened?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you please tell the Court briefly what that unusual incident was?

A. Tito Ramon Garcia was shot, Sir.

Q. And who is this Tito Ramon Garcia that you are talking about?

A. He is the live-in partner of my aunt Cristy.

Q. A while ago you mentioned that you have been living with your auntie and Tito Ramon
Garcia in Gen. Tinio, La Loma, Quezon City. Will you please describe before the Honorable
Court the residence or your house at that time where you were living with your auntie and
Tito Ramon Garcia?

A. It is a small house we were living in. It has a mezzanine and it measures 4 x 3 meters, sir.
xxxx

Q. Do you know the person who shot your Tito Ramon Garcia?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you please tell the Honorable Court the name of the person who shot Ramon Garcia?

A. Angelo Zeta.

Q. Where in particular did Mr. Angelo Zeta shot Mr. Ramon Garcia?

A. Inside our house, sir.

Q. And how was he able to enter your house?

A. Our door then was opened, sir.

Q. Why was your door opened at that time?

A. I heard a woman calling for my Tito Ramon and so I opened the door, sir.

Q. What time was this Madam Witness?

A. 2:15.

Q. 2:15 in the afternoon?

A. 2:15 in the morning, your honor.

xxxx

ATTY. A. OLIVETTI

Q. And who was that woman that you saw was outside calling Mr. Ramon Garcia?

A. Petronilla Zeta, sir.

Q. When you opened the door and you saw this woman, what happened between you and
her?

A. She asked me if a certain Ramon Garcia was there.

Q. What was your reply?

A. I told her he was sleeping. He was upstairs.

Q. And what did the woman do after that if she did anything?
A. She told me to call for my Tito Ramon.

Q. What did you do after she asked you to call Mr. Ramon Garcia?

A. I told her to enter before I call my Tito Ramon but they answered that they will remain
outside.

Q. And so after they refused to enter the house, what did you do as they were asking you to
call Mr. Ramon Garcia?

A. I told them to wait and then I went upstairs.

Q. What did you do upstairs?

A. I knocked at the door to wake up my Tito Ramon.

xxxx

Q. And was your Tito Ramon able to wake up?

A. When I felt that they were awakened, I went downstairs.

Q. Where in particular downstairs did you go?

A. Near our dining table, sir.

Q. How long was it from the door? How far was it from the door?

A. Two-arms-length, sir, or "dalawang dipa," sir.

Q. And what happened as you stood by downstairs?

A. While Tito Ramon was going down, sir, Angelo Zeta suddenly entered our house and
immediately shot him several times.

Q. How far were you from Mr. Angelo Zeta when you saw him?

I withdraw that.

How far were you from Mr. Angelo Zeta when you saw him suddenly entered the house and
shot Mr. Ramon Garcia?

A. Less than one meter, sir.

x x x x.

Q. Where was Petronilla Zeta at that time that the shooting occurred?

A. She was outside the door, sir.

 xxxx

Q. What did you do as you were standing and while Mr. Angelo Zeta was shooting Mr.
Ramon Garcia inside the house?

A. When I heard two shots, I run to the C.R. or comfort room.

Q. As you were in the C.R., what happened?

A. I heard successive shots, sir.

Q. How long did you stay in the C.R.?

A. Until the shots had stopped . . . Until the firing had stopped, sir.

Q. And you sensed that the firing had stopped, what did you do?

A. I slowly opened the door to take a look if Angelo Zeta and companion were still there.

Q. And what did you see?

A. They were no longer there, sir.

Q. And you saw that they have guns, what did you do?

A. I went out of the C.R. and I returned to the place where I was before where I was
previously standing.

Q. And what did you see when you reached that portion that you are talking about?

A. I saw Tito Ramon lying frustrate and blooded.

Q And what did you do when you see (sic) him on that particular condition?

A. I peeped at the door to find out if Angelo Zeta and companion were still there.

Q. And what did you see?

A. They were no longer there.

Q. And what did you do after that?

A. I knocked at the door of the owner of the house to ask for help.40

It should be emphasized that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, as in the
case of Aleine, is sufficient to support a conviction even in the charge of murder.41

Appellant’s argument that Aleine’s testimony identifying him as the one who shot Ramon is not
morally certain because she saw only the side portion of his face and the color of the shirt he wore
during the incident, deserves scant consideration. A person can still be properly identified and
recognized even by merely looking at the side portion of his face. To be sure, Aleine recognized and
identified appellant in the police line-up and during trial as the one who shot Ramon. Experience
dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes,
witnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals at any given
time.42 A startling or frightful experience creates an indelible impression in the mind that can be
recalled vividly.43 It bears stressing that Aleine was less than one meter away from appellant when
the latter shot Ramon. The crime scene was also well-lighted during the incident because there was
a fluorescent bulb inside the house.44

The testimonies of Aleine and of the other prosecution witnesses are in harmony with the
documentary and object evidence submitted by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals
found their testimonies to be credible and trustworthy. The rule is that the findings of the trial court,
its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof,
as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect.
This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court’s findings
have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.45

Anent the second and third issues, appellant contends that his conviction is unwarranted based on
the following reasons: (1) the prosecution failed to establish any possible motive for the appellant to
kill Ramon; (2) there is an inconsistency in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses regarding the
type and color of the car boarded by appellant and Petronilla before and after the incident. Edwin
testified that appellant and Petronilla left the scene on board a gold-colored Mitsubishi Lancer;
while SPO2 Magundacan narrated that he apprehended appellant while the latter was about to
board a blue Toyota Corona Macho; (3) Jose could have been the one who fatally shot Ramon and
appellant could have been mistakenly identified as Jose because they have the same physical
appearance and facial features; (4) if appellant was indeed the one who shot Ramon, he could have
immediately confessed such crime to the police just like what he did after killing Jose; and (5) there
is no proof that appellant is the husband of a certain "Mely." Ramon’s dying declaration to Aleine
was that it was the husband of "Mely," his former neighbor in Las Pinas, who shot him. Further,
Petronilla’s nickname could either be "Nellie" or "Nelia" and not "Mely" as referred to by Ramon.46

Lack of motive does not preclude conviction when the crime and the participation of the accused in
the crime are definitely shown, particularly when we consider that it is a matter of judicial knowledge
that persons have killed or committed serious offenses for no reason at all. Motive gains importance
only when the identity of the culprit is doubtful.47 Where a reliable eyewitness has fully and
satisfactorily identified the accused as the perpetrator of the felony, motive becomes immaterial to
the successful prosecution of a criminal case.48 It is obvious from the records that Aleine positively
and categorically identified appellant as the person who shot Ramon during the incident. Her
testimony was corroborated on relevant points by Edwin and Rey.

There is no inconsistency in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding the car boarded
by appellant and Petronilla in leaving the crime scene and, subsequently, at the time they were
apprehended. Edwin testified that appellant and Petronilla left the scene after the incident which was
between 2:15 and 2:30 in the morning on board a gold-colored Mitsubishi Lancer.49 SPO2
Magundacan told the court that he apprehended appellant at around 10:55 in the morning of the
same day while the latter was about to board a blue Toyota Corona Macho.50 In his affidavit
attached to the records, Jan Ryan Zeta, son of Jose, narrated that Jose was shot by appellant at
about 4:00 in the morning of the same date.51 Appellant admitted that after shooting Jose on the
early morning of 28 October 1995, he took the latter’s Toyota Corona Macho and left.52 Thus, it is
probable that after leaving the crime scene at La Loma on board a gold Mitsubishi Lancer at about
2:15 or 2:30 in the morning, appellant and Petronilla then proceeded to Marikina and took Jose’s
blue Toyota Corona Macho. This explains why the car of appellant and Petronilla used in leaving the
crime scene was different from that which they used at the time of their apprehension.

Appellant’s theory of alibi that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene in La
Loma when the incident occurred because he was in Marikina, and that Jose could have been the
one who fatally shot Ramon is flimsy and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of
Aleine. Appellant was mistakenly identified as Jose because they have the same physical
appearance and facial feature. In addition, the empty bullet shells and slugs recovered from the
crime scene were found to have the same characteristics as those of the bullets of appellant’s
caliber .45 Llama pistol. Further, there is no testimonial or documentary proof showing that it was
Jose who shot Ramon. Appellant himself testified that he met Jose in the latter’s house in Marikina
at about 2:30 in the morning of 28 October 1995. On the other hand, the shooting of Ramon at La
Loma, Quezon City occurred at about 2:15 in the morning of the same date. Hence, it was
impossible for Jose to be at La Loma, Quezon City and to have shot Ramon at such time and place.

It is insignificant whether Petronilla was referred to by Ramon in his dying declaration as "Mely" or
"Nellie." As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, Ramon sustained twelve gunshot wounds
and was catching his breath when he uttered the name or nickname of Petronilla as the wife of
appellant. Thus, understandably, he could not have spoken clearly in such a difficult situation.
Moreover, Ramon referred to "Nellie" or "Mely" as his former neighbor in Las Piñas. Likewise,
appellant and Petronilla admitted that Ramon was their former neighbor in Las Piñas.53

We now go to the propriety of the penalty imposed and the damages awarded by the RTC which the
Court of Appeals affirmed.

The RTC held that the killing of Ramon qualifies as murder because of the presence of the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and nighttime or nocturnity. It is a rule of
evidence that aggravating circumstances must be proven as clearly as the crime itself.54

Evident premeditation qualifies the killing of a person to murder if the following elements are present:
(1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that
the culprit clung to his resolve; and (3) a sufficient interval of time between the determination or
conception and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequence of his act
and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will if he desired to hearken to its
warning.55

The first two elements of evident premeditation are present in the case at bar.

The time manifesting Petronilla and appellant’s determination to kill Ramon was when they, at about
2:00 in the morning of 28 October 1995, repeatedly asked Edwin about Ramon and the latter’s
address, and when they subsequently proceeded to the house of Ramon.

The fact that appellant and Petronilla waited for Ramon, and appellant’s subsequent act of shooting
him at around 2:15-2:30 in the morning of 28 October 1995 indicate that they had clung to their
determination to kill Ramon.

The third element of evident premeditation, however, is lacking in the instant case. The span of thirty
minutes or half an hour from the time appellant and Petronilla showed their determination to kill
Ramon (2:00 in the morning of 28 October 1995) up to the time appellant shot to death Ramon
(2:15-2:30 in the morning of 28 October 1995) could not have afforded them full opportunity for
meditation and reflection on the consequences of the crime they committed.56 We have held that the
lapse of thirty minutes between the determination to commit a crime and the execution thereof is
insufficient for a full meditation on the consequences of the act.57

The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool
thought and reflection on the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. To justify the inference of deliberate premeditation, there
must be a period sufficient in a judicial sense to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection
and to allow the conscience of the actor to overcome the resolution of his will if he desires to
hearken to its warning. Where no sufficient lapse of time is appreciable from the determination to
commit the crime until its execution, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated.58

Nonetheless, we find that treachery attended the killing of Ramon.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against a person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might
make.59 The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack that renders the victim unable
and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. Two
essential elements are required in order that treachery can be appreciated: (1) the employment of
means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender’s safety from any retaliatory
act on the part of the offended party who has, thus, no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and
(2) a deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods or manner of execution. Further, this
aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information and duly proven.60

In the case at bar, treachery was alleged in the information and all its elements were duly
established by the prosecution.

It has been established that Ramon, still groggy after having been awakened by Aleine, was walking
down the stairs when appellant suddenly shot him. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the
appellant’s attack rendered Ramon defenseless and without means of escape. Appellant admitted
that he was a member of a gun club and was proficient in using his caliber .45 Llama pistol.61 In fact,
he was good at shooting a moving target during his practice.62 He also stated that he owned five
firearms.63 Evidently, appellant took advantage of his experience and skill in practice shooting and in
guns to exact the death of Ramon. There is no doubt that appellant’s use of a caliber .45 Llama
pistol, as well as his act of positioning himself in a shooting stance and of shooting Ramon several
times on the chest area and on other parts of body, were obviously adopted by him to prevent
Ramon from retaliating or escaping. Considering that Ramon was unarmed, groggy from sleep, and
was casually walking down narrow stairs unmindful of the danger that lurked behind, there was
absolutely no way for him to defend himself or escape.

As regards the appreciation by the RTC of the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, it should be
underscored that nocturnity or nighttime is, by and of itself, not an aggravating circumstance. It
becomes so only when (1) it was especially sought by the offender; or (2) it was taken advantage of
by him; or (3) it facilitated the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender’s immunity from
capture.64

Although the crime in the instant case was committed between 2:15 and 2:30 in the morning, no
evidence was presented showing that nighttime was especially and purposely sought by appellant to
facilitate the commission of the crime, or that it was availed of for the purpose of impunity. Moreover,
the crime scene was well-lighted by a fluorescent bulb. We have held that nocturnity is not
aggravating where the place of the commission of the crime was well-illuminated.65
Even if we were to assume that nocturnity was present in the case at bar, this cannot still be
appreciated in view of the presence of treachery that attended the killing of Ramon. Nighttime cannot
be considered an aggravating circumstance separate from treachery, since nighttime is absorbed in
treachery.66

Accordingly, the death penalty imposed by the RTC on appellant should be modified. Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code states that murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63
of the same Code provides that if the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, as in the
instant case, and there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be
applied. Since there is no mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the instant case, and treachery
cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance as it was already considered as a qualifying
circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.67

The award of damages and its corresponding amount rendered by the RTC should also be modified
in line with current jurisprudence.

In addition to the civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 for Ramon’s death, the award of moral damages
amounting to ₱50,000.00 is also proper since it is mandatory in murder cases, without need of proof
and allegation other than the death of the victim.68

The heirs of Ramon are also entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00, since the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was firmly established.69

The amount of actual damages should be reduced from ₱146,000.00 to ₱115,473.00 per
computation of the official receipts attached to the records.70
1avvphi1

The heirs of Ramon should also be indemnified for loss of earning capacity pursuant to Article 2206
of the New Civil Code.71 Consistent with our previous decisions,72 the formula for the indemnification
of loss of earning capacity is:

Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x Gross Annual Income (GAI) - Living Expenses
= 2/3 (80 - age of deceased) x (GAI - 50% of GAI).

Ramon’s death certificate states that he was 37 years old at the time of his demise.73 A certification
from Ramon’s employer, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, shows that Ramon was
earning an annual gross income of ₱164,244.00.74

Applying the above-stated formula, the indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of Ramon is
₱2,354,163.99, computed as follows:

Net Earning Capacity = 2/3 (43) x (₱164,244.00 - ₱82,122.00)

= 28.66 x ₱82,122.00
= ₱2,354,163.99

WHEREFORE, after due deliberation, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 June 2006 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02054 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the
penalty of death imposed on appellant is lowered to reclusion perpetua; (2) appellant is ordered to
pay the heirs of Ramon Garcia the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages; (3) the award of actual damages is reduced to ₱115,473.00; and (4) the
indemnity for Ramon’s loss of earning capacity is increased to ₱2,354,163.99. The award of civil
indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00 is maintained.

Appellant’s caliber .45 Llama pistol with Serial Number C-27854 is hereby confiscated in favor of the
Government.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
On Official Leave

(On Official Leave)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 SECOND DIVISION

January 11, 2016

G.R. No. 174673

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B. GIMENEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Rules of procedure are not ends in themselves. The object of these rules is to assist and facilitate a
trial court's function to be able to receive all the evidence of the parties, and evaluate their
admissibility and probative value in the context of the issues presented by the parties' pleadings in
order to arrive at a conclusion as to the facts that transpired. Having been able to establish the facts,
the trial court will then be able to apply the law and determine whether a complainant is deserving of
the reliefs prayed for in the pleading.

Dismissal on the basis of a very strict interpretation of procedural rules without a clear demonstration
of the injury to a substantive right of the defendant weighed against 19 years of litigation actively
participated in by both parties should not be encouraged.

There is likewise serious reversible error, even grave abuse of discretion, when the Sandiganbayan
dismisses a case on demurrer to evidence without a full statement of its evaluation of the evidence
presented and offered and the interpretation of the relevant law. After all, dismissal on the basis of
demurrer to evidence is similar to a judgment. It is a final order ruling on the merits of a case.

This is a Petition  for Review on Certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated May 25,
1

2006  and September 13, 2006.  The Sandiganbayan deemed petitioner Republic of the Philippines
2 3

(Republic) to have waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence  and granted the Motion to
4

Dismiss of respondents Spouses Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez (Gimenez Spouses) based
on demurrer to evidence. 5

The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), instituted a
Complaint  for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the
6

Gimenez Spouses before the Sandiganbayan.  "The Complaint seeks to recover . . . ill-gotten wealth
7

. . . acquired by [the Gimenez Spouses] as dummies, agents[,] or nominees of former President

Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos[.]" 8

During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held, business
interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses.  The Republic presented the
9

testimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and of
Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG.  Witnesses
10

testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses. 11

On February 27, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied a motion to recall Danilo R.V. Daniel’s
testimony.  The Republic then manifested that it was "no longer presenting further
12

evidence."  Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 "to
13

file its formal offer of evidence."

14

On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30) days or until April 28, 2006,
within which to file [its] formal offer of evidence."  This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in
15

a Resolution of the same date. 16

On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until May 13, 2006 within which
to file its Formal Offer of Evidence.  This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution
17

dated May 8, 2006.  Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by the Republic.
18

In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic
failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75
days from the date it terminated its presentation of evidence.  Thus, it declared that the Republic
19

waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence. 20

The first assailed Resolution provides:

It appearing that the plaintiff has long terminated the presentation of its evidence on February 27,
2006, and it appearing further that it failed or otherwise neglected to file its written formal offer of
evidence for an unreasonable period of time consisting of 75 days (i.e., 30 days original period plus
two extension periods totaling 45 days), the filing of said written formal offer of evidence is hereby
deemed WAIVED.

WHEREFORE, the reception of the defendants’ evidence shall proceed on June 22 and 23, 2006,
both at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning as previously scheduled. 21
Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated May 30, 2006.  He 22

argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of
action.  Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of failure to
23

prosecute.  Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio Gimenez’s demurrer to
24

evidence. 25

Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez’s filing of the Motion to Dismiss or on June 15, 2006, the Republic
filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal
Offer of Evidence.  The pertinent portions of the Republic’s offer of documentary exhibits attached to
26

the Motion are summarized as follows:

Exhibits A to G and series consist of the Income Tax Returns, Certificate of Income Tax Withheld
On Compensation, Statement of Tax Withheld At Source, Schedule of Interest Income, Royalties
and Withholding Tax, Statement of Assets, Liabilities & Net Worth of Ignacio B. Gimenez from 1980-
1986 proving his legitimate income during said period. Exhibits H -J and series refer to the Deeds of
Sale and Transfer Certificates of Title proving that spouses Gimenezes acquired several real
properties.

Exhibits K and series (K-1-K-4) pertain to Checking Statements Summary issued by the Bankers
Trust Company (BTC) proving that Fe Roa Gimenez maintained a current account under Account
Number 34-714-415 with BTC. Exhibits L and series (L1-L-114) are several BTC checks, proving
that from June 1982 to April 1984, Fe Roa Gimenez issued several checks against her BTC Current
Account No. 34-714-415 payable to some individuals and entities such as Erlinda Oledan, Vilma
Bautista, The Waldorf Towers, Cartier, Gliceria Tantoco, Bulgari, Hammer Galleries and Renato
Balestra, involving substantial amount of money in US Dollars. Exhibits M and series (M1-M-
25) are several The Chase Manhattan Bank (TCMB) checks drawn against the account of Fe Roa
Gimenez under Account Number 021000021, proving that she issued several checks drawn against
her TCMB account, payable to individuals and entities such as Gliceria Tantoco, Vilma Bautista and
The Waldorf Towers, involving substantial sums in US Dollars. Exhibit N is the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), New York Branch Office Charge Ticket No. FT 56880 dated December 9, 1982 in the
amount of US$30,000.00 for Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she received said enormous amount
from the PNB, New York Branch Office, with clearance from the Central Bank, which amount was
charged against PNB Manila. Exhibit N-1 is the PNB New York Branch Advice to Payee No. FT
56535 dated November 12, 1982 in the amount of US$10,990.00 for Fe Roa Gimenez proving her
receipt of such amount as remitted from California Overseas Bank, Los Angeles. Exhibits O and
series (O1-O-8) refer to several Advices made by Bankers Trust AG Zurich-Geneve Bank in
Switzerland to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she maintained a current account with said
bank under Account Number 107094.50 and that from July 30, 1984 to August 30, 1984, she placed
a substantial amount on time deposit in several banks, namely, Hypobank, Luzemburg, Luxemburg,
Societe Generale, Paris and Bank of Nova Scotia, London.

Exhibit P is the Certification dated March 19, 2002 issued by Director Florino O. Ibanez of the Office
of the President proving that Fe Roa Gimenez, from January 1, 1966 to April 1, 1986, worked with
the Office of the President under different positions, the last of which as Presidential Staff Director
with a salary of P87,072.00 per annum.

Exhibit Q and series (Q-1-Q-18) is the Affirmation of Ralph Shapiro filed with the United States
Court of Appeals in the case entitled, "The Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et
al." which discussed certain acts of Fe Roa Gimenez and Vilma Bautista, among others, in relation
to the funds of the Marcoses.
Exhibits R and S and series (R-1, R-9; S-1-S-10) refer to the Certificate of Filing of Amended
Articles of Incorporation of GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., the Amended Articles of Incorporation of
GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., the Treasurer’s Affidavit executed by Ignacio Gimenez and the
Director’s Certificate executed by Roberto B. Olanday, Ignacio Gimenez and Roberto Coyuto, Jr.
proving Ignacio Gimenez and Roberto Olanday’s interests in GEl Guaranteed Education, Inc.

Exhibits T and series (T-1-T-8) are the Advices made by the Bankers Trust AG Zurich-Geneve
Bank in Switzerland to Ignacio Gimenez proving that he maintained a current account with said bank
under Account Number 101045.50 and that from March to June, 1984, he placed a substantial
amount on time deposit in several banks, namely, Credit Lyonnais, Brussels, Societe Generale,
Paris, Credit Commercial De France, Paris and Bank of Nova Scotia, London.

Exhibits U and V and series (U-1-U-5; V1-V-18) consist of the Affidavit dated April 25, 1986 and
the Declaration dated June 23, 1987 including the attachments, of Oscar Carino, Vice-President and
Manager of the PNB New York Branch, narrating in detail how the funds of the PNB New York
Branch were disbursed outside regular banking business upon the instructions of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos using Fe Roa Gimenez and others as conduit.

Exhibits W and series (W-1-W-4) are the Debit memos from the PNB to Fe Roa Gimenez
while Exhibits X and X-1 are the Acknowledgments of said respondent, proving that she received
substantial amounts of money which were coursed through the PNB to be used by the Marcos
spouses for state visits and foreign trips.

Exhibit Y and series (Y-1-Y-2) is the Letter dated August 25, 1986 of Juan C. Gatmaitan, Assistant
Chief Legal Counsel of PNB to Charles G. LaBella, Assistant United States Attorney regarding the
ongoing investigation of irregular transactions at the PNB, New York Branch proving that PNB
cooperated with the United States government in connection with the investigation on the irregular
transactions of Oscar Carino at PNB New York Branch.

Exhibit Z is the service record of Fe Roa Gimenez issued by Florino O. Ibanez of the Office of the
President which proves that she worked with the Office of the President from 1966-1986 holding
different positions, the last of which was Presidential Staff Director.
1âwphi1

Exhibits AA and series (AA-1 –AA-2) are the several Traders Royal Bank checks drawn against
Account No. 74-702836-9 under the account name of Fe Roa Gimenez which prove that she issued
said checks payable to individuals and entities involving substantial amount of money.

Exhibits BB and CC and series (BB-1–BB-17; CC-1-CC-3) are the several Transfer of Funds
Advice from Traders Royal Bank Statements of Account of Fe Roa Gimenez, proving that she
maintained a current account under Account No. 74-7028369 at Traders Royal Bank.

Exhibits HH and series (HH-1-HH-3) are the Certification dated October 3, 2002 of Lamberto R.
Barbin, Officer-in-Charge, Malacanang Records Office, that the Statement of Assets and Liabilities
of spouses Marcoses for the years 1965 up to 1986 are not among the records on file in said Office
except 1965, 1967 and 1969; the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of December 31, 1969 and
December 31, 1967 of former President Ferdinand Marcos; and the Sworn Statement of Financial
Condition, Assets, Income and Liabilities as of December 31, 1965 of former President Ferdinand
Marcos. These documentary exhibits prove the assets and liabilities of former President Marcos for
the years 1965,1967 and 1969.
Exhibit II and series is [sic] the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of December 31,1969
submitted by Fe Roa Gimenez which prove that her assets on that period amounted only to
P39,500.00.

Exhibit KK is the Table of Contents of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the Sandiganbayan entitled
"Republic of the Philippines vs. Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, et. al.", including its
Annexes which prove the assets and liabilities of spouses Gimenezes.

Exhibits KK-1 up to KK-12 are several transfer certificates of title and tax declarations in the names
of spouses Gimenezes, proving their acquisition of several real properties.

Exhibits KK-15, KK-18, KK-20 up to KK-27, KK-30, KK-32 up to KK-38 and KK-40 are the
General Information Sheet, Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation, and Amended
Articles of Incorporation of various corporations. These prove the corporations in which Ignacio B.
Gimenez has substantial interests.

Exhibits KK-41 up to KK-44 are the Writs and Letters of Sequestration issued by the PCGG which
prove that the shares of stocks of Ignacio Gimenez in Ignacio B. Gimenez, Securities, Inc. and the
real properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 137638, 132807, 126693 and 126694
located in San Fabian, Pangasinan, were sequestered by the PCGG.

Exhibit KK-45 is the Memorandum dated August 1, 1988 of Atty. Ralph S. Lee and Alexander M.
Berces, Team Supervisor and Investiogator, [sic] respectively, of IRD, PCGG, proving that the
PCGG conducted an investigation on New City Builders, Inc., Transnational Construction
Corporation, and OTO Construction and Development Corporation in relation to Ignacio B. Gimenez
and Roberto O. Olanday.

Exhibits KK-48, KK-49 and KK-50 are certain Lis Pendens from the PCGG addressed to the
concerned Register of Deeds informing that the real properties mentioned therein had been
sequestered and are the subject of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the Sandiganbayan.

Exhibits KK-51, KK-51-A, KK-52 and KK-52-A are the Letter and Writ of Sequestration issued by
the PCGG on Allied Banking Corporation and Guaranteed Education Inc. pursuant to its mandate to
go after ill-gotten wealth.

Exhibits NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 refer to the Memorandum To All Commercial Banks dated
March 14, 1986 issued by then Central Bank Governor Jose B. Fernandez and the Letter dated
March 13, 1986 of Mary Concepcion Bautista, PCGG Commissioner addressed to then Central Bank
Governor Fernandez requesting that names be added to the earlier request of PCGG Chairman
Jovito Salonga to instruct all commercial banks not to allow any withdrawal or transfer of funds from
the market placements under the names of said persons, to include spouses Gimenezes, without
authority from PCGG.

Exhibits KK and series, NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 which prove the various real properties,
business interests and bank accounts owned by spouses Gimenezes were part of the testimony of
Atty. Tereso Javier.

Exhibit RR and series (RR-1-RR-23) are the Affidavit dated July 24, 1987 of Dominador Pangilinan,
Acting President and President of Trader’s Royal Bank, and the attached Recapitulation, Status of
Banker’s Acceptances, Status of Funds and Savings Account Ledger wherein he mentioned that
Malacanang maintained trust accounts at Trader’s Royal Bank, the balance of which is
approximately 150-175 million Pesos, and that he was informed by Mr. Rivera that the funds were
given to him (Rivera) by Fe Roa Gimenez for deposit to said accounts.

Exhibits SS and series (SS-1-SS-29) are the Affidavit dated July 23, 1987 of Apolinario K. Medina,
Executive Vice President of Traders Royal Bank and attachments, which include Recapitulation,
Status of Funds, and Messages from Traders Royal Bank Manila to various foreign banks. In his
Affidavit, Medina divulged certain numbered confidential trust accounts maintained by Malacanang
with the Trader’s Royal Bank. He further stated that the deposits were so substantial that he
suspected that they had been made by President Marcos or his family.

Exhibit TT and series (TT-1-TT-3) is [sic] the Memorandum dated July 19, 2005 of Danilo R.V.
Daniel, then Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG regarding the
investigation conducted on the ill-gotten wealth of spouses Gimenezes, the subject matter of Civil
Case No. [0]007. He revealed that during the investigation on the ill-gotten wealth of spouses
Gimenezes, it was found out that from 1977 to 1982, several withdrawals, in the total amount of
P75,090,306.42 were made from Trust Account No. 128 (A/C 76-128) in favor of I.B. Gimenez, I.B.
Gimenez Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez.

Exhibits RR, SS, TT and their series prove that spouses Gimenez maintained bank accounts of
substantial amounts and gained control of various corporations.  These are also being offered as
1âwphi1

part of the testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel.  (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
27

In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the
Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to
Dismiss.  According to the Sandiganbayan:
28

While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the higher ends of substantial
justice militate against dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds, the circumstances of this
case show that the ends of justice will not be served if this Court allows the wanton disregard of the
Rules of Court and of the Court’s orders. Rules of procedure are designed for the proper and prompt
disposition of cases. . . .

The reasons invoked by the plaintiff to justify its failure to timely file the formal offer of evidence fail
to persuade this Court. The missing exhibits mentioned by the plaintiff’s counsel appear to be the
same missing documents since 2004, or almost two (2) years ago. The plaintiff had more than ample
time to locate them for its purpose. . . . Since they remain missing after lapse of the period indicated
by the Court, there is no reason why the search for these documents should delay the filing of the
formal offer of evidence.

[Petitioner’s] counsel . . . admits that faced with other pressing matters, he lost track of the time. We
cannot just turn a blind eye on the negligence of the parties and in their failure to observe the orders
of this Court. The carelessness of [petitioner’s] counsel in keeping track of the deadlines is an
unacceptable reason for the Court to set aside its Order and relax the observance of the period set
for filing the formal offer of evidence.  (Citation omitted)
29

The Sandiganbayan also found that the Republic failed to prosecute its case for an unreasonable
length of time and to comply with the court’s rules.  The court also noted that the documentary
30

evidence presented by the Republic consisted mostly of certified true copies.  However, the persons
31

who certified the documents as copies of the original were not presented.  Hence, the evidence
32

lacked probative value.  The dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution reads:
33
ACCORDINGLY, there being no valid and cogent justification shown by the plaintiff for the Court to
Grant its Motion for Reconsideration and admit its Formal Offer of Evidence, the plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence is DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss
on Demurrer to Evidence filed by the defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez and adopted by defendant Fe
Roa Gimenez is GRANTED. The case is then DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.  (Emphasis in the original)

34

The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 3, 2006 before this court. 35

The Gimenez Spouses were required to comment on the Petition.  This court noted the separate
36

Comments  filed by the Gimenez Spouses.  The Republic responded to the Comments through a
37 38

Consolidated Reply  dated June 22, 2007.

39

In the Resolution  dated August 29, 2007, this court required the parties to submit their
40

memoranda. 41

On February 18, 2008, this court resolved to require the parties to "move in the premises[.]" 42

On March 2, 2012, the Republic filed a Motion for Leave to Re-open Proceedings, to File and Admit
Attached Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari.  In this Supplement, the Republic argued that the
43

second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006 was void for failing to state the facts and the
law on which it was based.  This Motion was granted, and the Gimenez Spouses were required to
44

file their Comment on the Supplement to the Petition.  Thereafter, the Republic filed its Reply.
45 46

Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Rejoinder  dated December 19, 2012 which was expunged by this court in a
47

Resolution  dated January 23, 2013. Ignacio Gimenez’s Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached
48

Rejoinder  was denied.

49 50

The Republic raised the following issues:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in dismissing the case in the light of the allegations
in the Complaint which were substantiated by overwhelming evidence presented vis-a-vis the
material admissions of spouses Gimenezes as their answer failed to specifically deny that they were
dummies of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and that they acquired illegal wealth grossly
disproportionate to their lawful income in a manner prohibited under the Constitution and Anti-Graft
Statutes.

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in denying petitioner’s Motion to Admit Formal
Offer of Evidence on the basis of mere technicalities, depriving petitioner of its right to due process.

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in making a sweeping pronouncement that
petitioner’s evidence do not bear any probative value. 51

The issues for consideration of this court are:

First, whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari was the proper remedy to assail the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions; and
Second, whether the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that petitioner Republic of the Philippines
waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence and in granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez and
Fe Roa Gimenez’s Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.

We grant the Petition.

Respondent Ignacio Gimenez pictures petitioner as being confused as to the proper mode of review
of the Sandiganbayan Resolutions. According to him, petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion.  Hence, petitioner should have filed a petition for certiorari
52

under Rule 65 and not a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.  Nevertheless, the
53

Sandiganbayan did not commit any error, and petitioner has to show that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. 54

Observance of the proper procedure before courts, especially before the Sandiganbayan, cannot be
stressed enough. Due process is enshrined in the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights.  "Due
55

process [in criminal cases] guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is
proved[.]"  "Mere suspicion of guilt should not sway judgment."
56 57

To determine whether a petition for review is the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions, we review the nature of actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and
damages.

Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages for ill-gotten wealth are
also called civil forfeiture proceedings.

Republic Act No. 1379  provides for the procedure by which forfeiture proceedings may be instituted
58

against public officers or employees who "[have] acquired during his [or her] incumbency an amount
of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his [or her] salary as such public officer or
employee and to his [or her] other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property,
[which] property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired." 59

This court has already settled the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over civil forfeiture cases:

. . . violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though
the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a
penalty.60

In Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,  this court re-affirmed the doctrine that forfeiture proceedings
61

under Republic Act No. 1379 are civil in nature.  Civil forfeiture proceedings were also differentiated
62

from plunder cases:

. . . a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a
plunder case. . . . In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of
the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. . . . On the other hand, all that
the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of
respondent’s properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said
properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the properties
under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act
committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.  (Citation
63

omitted)

To stress, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379
is the same with other civil cases — preponderance of evidence. 64

When a criminal case based on demurrer to evidence is dismissed, the dismissal is equivalent to an
acquittal.
65

As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further
prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. 66

Hence, the Republic may only assail an acquittal through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court:

Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accused’s demurrer to

evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the narrow
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.  (Citation omitted)
67

In this case, a civil forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, petitioner correctly filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of the Rule provides the mode of
appeal from judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.— A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth.

II

Petitioner argues that substantial justice requires doing away with the procedural
technicalities.  Loss of vital documentary proof warranted extensions to file the Formal Offer of
68

Evidence.  Honest efforts to locate several missing documents resulted in petitioner’s inability to file
69

the pleading within the period granted by the Sandiganbayan. 70

Respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner cannot fault the Sandiganbayan for its
incompetence during trial.  Even if the evidence were formally offered within the prescribed period,
71

PCGG’s evidence still had no probative value.  It is solely petitioner’s fault "that the persons who
72

certified to the photocopies of the originals were not presented to testify[.]"  It is also misleading to
73

argue that the pieces of documentary evidence presented are public documents.  "The documents
74

are not public in the sense that these are official issuances of the Philippine government."  "The bulk
75

consists mainly of notarized, private documents that have simply been certified true and faithful." 76

According to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez, petitioner tries to excuse its non-filing of the Formal Offer
of Evidence within the prescribed period by raising its efforts to locate the 66 missing
documents.  However, the issue of the missing documents was laid to rest during the hearing on
77

November 16, 2004.  The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until March 2005 to produce the
78

documents; otherwise, these would be excluded.  The testimonies of the witnesses related to the
79

missing documents would also be expunged from the case records. 80

Moreover, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that "[t]he Sandiganbayan did not err when it ruled
that the great bulk of the documentary evidence offered by the PCGG have no probative
value."  Aside from the 66 missing documents it failed to present, almost all of petitioner’s pieces of
81

documentary evidence were mere photocopies.  The few that were certified true copies were not
82

testified on by the persons who certified these documents. 83

Our Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the formal offer of evidence. Testimonial evidence is
offered "at the time [a] witness is called to testify."  Documentary and object evidence, on the other
84

hand, are offered "after the presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence."  Offer of documentary or
85

object evidence is generally done orally unless permission is given by the trial court for a written
offer of evidence.86

More importantly, the Rules specifically provides that evidence must be formally offered to be
considered by the court. Evidence not offered is excluded in the determination of the case.  "Failure
87

to make a formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it." 88

Rule 132, Section 34 provides:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.— The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Parties must be given the opportunity to review the evidence submitted against them and take the
necessary actions to secure their case.  Hence, any document or object that was marked for
89

identification is not evidence unless it was "formally offered and the opposing counsel [was] given an
opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it."90

This court explained further the reason for the rule:

The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered." A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and
their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to
enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the
evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review
documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.  (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
91

To consider a party’s evidence which was not formally offered during trial would deprive the other
party of due process. Evidence not formally offered has no probative value and must be excluded by
the court. 92

Petitioner’s failure to file its written Formal Offer of Evidence of the numerous documentary evidence
presented within the prescribed period is a non-issue. In its first assailed Resolution dated May 25,
2006, the Sandiganbayan declared that petitioner waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence
when it failed to file the pleading on May 13, 2006, the deadline based on the extended period
granted by the court. Petitioner was granted several extensions of time by the Sandiganbayan
totalling 75 days from the date petitioner terminated its presentation of evidence. Notably, this 75-
day period included the original 30-day period. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence, and the Formal Offer of Evidence.
In resolving petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence,
the Sandiganbayan found the carelessness of petitioner’s counsel unacceptable. According to the
Sandiganbayan, it could not countenance the non-observance of the court’s orders.

This court has long acknowledged the policy of the government to recover the assets and properties
illegally acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his wife Mrs. Imelda
R. Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or
nominees.  Hence, this court has adopted a liberal approach regarding technical rules of procedure
93

in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth:

In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court
prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to
the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now
be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated
its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the
merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation,
fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets
be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and
annoying procedural sidetracks.  (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
94

To be clear, petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, albeit, belatedly. Petitioner
hurdled 19 years of trial before the Sandiganbayan to present its evidence as shown in its extensive
Formal Offer of Evidence. As petitioner argues:

Undeniable from the records of the case is that petitioner was vigorous in prosecuting the case. The
most tedious and crucial stage of the litigation and presentation of evidence has been accomplished.
Petitioner completed its presentation of evidence proving the ill-gotten nature and character of the
funds and assets sought to be recovered in the present case. It presented vital testimonial and
documentary evidence consisting of voluminous record proving the gross disparity of the subject
funds to spouses Gimenezes’ combined declared income which must be reconveyed to the Republic
for being acquired in blatant violation of the Constitution and the Anti-Graft statutes. 95

This court is not unmindful of the difficulty in gathering voluminous documentary evidence in cases
of forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth acquired throughout the years. It is never easy to prosecute
corruption and take back what rightfully belongs to the government and the people of the Republic.

This is not the first time that this court relaxed the rule on formal offer of evidence.

Tan v. Lim  arose from two civil Complaints: one for injunction and another for legal redemption,
96

which were heard jointly before the trial court.  The defendant did not file a Formal Offer of Evidence
97

in the injunction case  and merely adopted the evidence offered in the legal redemption case.  The
98 99

trial court held that the defendant’s failure to file his Formal Offer of Evidence in the injunction case
rendered the plaintiff’s evidence therein as uncontroverted.  The Court of Appeals reversed the
100

Decision and was affirmed by this court.  This court ruled that while the trial court’s reasoning in its
101

Decision was technically sound, a liberal interpretation was more appropriate and in line with
substantial justice:

It may be true that Section 34, Rule 132 of the rules directs the court to consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered and that under Section 35, documentary evidence is offered after
presentation of testimonial evidence. However, a liberal interpretation of these Rules would have
convinced the trial court that a separate formal offer of evidence in Civil Case No. 6518 was
superfluous because not only was an offer of evidence made in Civil Case No. 6521 that was being
jointly heard by the trial court, counsel for Jose Renato Lim had already declared he was adopting
these evidences for Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court itself stated that it would freely utilize in one
case evidence adduced in the other only to later abandon this posture. Jose Renato Lim testified in
Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court should have at least considered his testimony since at the time it
was made, the rules provided that testimonial evidence is deemed offered at the time the witness is
called to testify. Rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid, technical case as they are
devised chiefly to secure and not defeat substantial justice.

....

The logic of the Court of Appeals is highly persuasive. Indeed, apparently, the trial court was being
overly technical about the nonsubmission of Jose Renato Lim’s formal offer of evidence. This
posture not only goes against Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure decreeing a liberal
construction of the rules to promote a just, speedy and inexpensive litigation but ignores the
consistent rulings of the Court against utilizing the rules to defeat the ends of substantial justice.
Despite the intervening years, the language of the Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-
General, still remains relevant:

"x x x. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application
of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts
are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain that
thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the court are
made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the
other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to
grave criticism."  (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
102

Furthermore, "subsequent and substantial compliance . . . may call for the relaxation of the rules of
procedure." 103

Weighing the amount of time spent in litigating the case against the number of delays petitioner
incurred in submitting its Formal Offer of Evidence and the state’s policy on recovering ill-gotten
wealth, this court is of the belief that it is but only just that the Rules be relaxed and petitioner be
allowed to submit its written Formal Offer of Evidence. The Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions should be
reversed.

III

According to petitioner, the Sandiganbayan erred when it granted the demurrer to evidence filed by
respondents and dismissed the case despite a "prima facie foundation [based on the pleadings and
documents on record] that spouses Gimenezes amassed enormous wealth grossly disproportionate
to their lawful income or declared lawful assets." 104

Similarly, the Complaint alleged specific acts committed by respondent Ignacio Gimenez:

[T]aking undue advantage of his relationship, influence, and connection, by himself and/or in
unlawful concert and active collaboration with former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos for the purpose of mutually enriching themselves and preventing the disclosure and recovery
of assets illegally obtained: (a) acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos in several corporations such as, the Allied Banking
Corporation, Acoje Mining Corporation, Baguio Gold Mining, Multi National Resources, Philippine
Oversees, Inc. and Pioneer Natural Resources; (b) unlawfully obtained, through corporations
organized by them such as the New City Builders, Inc. (NCBI), multi-million peso contracts with the
government buildings, such as the University of Life Sports Complex and Dining Hall as well as
projects of the National Manpower Corporation, Human Settlements, GSIS, and Maharlika
Livelihood, to the gross and manifest disadvantage of the Government and the Filipino people; and
(c) in furtherance of the above stated illegal purposes, organized several establishments engaged in
food, mining and other businesses such as the Transnational Construction Corporation, Total
Systems Technology, Inc., Pyro Control Technology Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc., A & T
Development Corporation, RBO Agro Forestry Farm Development Corporation, Bathala Coal Mining
Corporation, Coal Basis Mining Corporation, Titan Coal Mining Corporation, GEI Guaranteed
Education, Inc., and I.B. Gimenez Securities, Inc.105

Despite the specific allegations in the Complaint, petitioner contends that respondents merely gave
general denials to the allegations in the Complaint.  "[N]o specific denial [was] made on the material
106

allegations [in] the [C]omplaint."

107

Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the Sandiganbayan was correct in granting the Motion
to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.

Respondent Ignacio Gimenez claims that petitioner cannot be excused from filing its Formal Offer of
Evidence considering the numerous extensions given by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner had all the
resources and time to gather, collate, and secure the necessary evidence to build its
case.  Petitioner’s presentation of evidence took 19 years to complete, and yet it failed to submit the
108

necessary documents and pleading. 109

Similarly, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez argues that petitioner was negligent in failing to comply with
the Sandiganbayan’s orders considering the inordinate amount of time given to petitioner to present
evidence, which resulted in only five witnesses in 19 years. 110

To determine the propriety of granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss based on Demurrer to

Evidence, we review the nature of demurrer.

Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.— After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

In Oropesa v. Oropesa  where this court affirmed the dismissal of the case on demurrer to evidence
111

due to petitioner’s non-submission of the Formal Offer of Evidence,  demurrer to evidence was
112

defined as:

. . . "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain
the issue." We have also held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes a judgment on the merits of
the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to
do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought."  (Citations omitted)
113

This court has laid down the guidelines in resolving a demurrer to evidence:
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may
reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to
evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every
proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably
inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his
case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be
sustained where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery. 114

Furthermore, this court already clarified what the trial court determines when acting on a motion to
dismiss based on demurrer to evidence:

What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule
on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such as
capacity to sue. . . .  (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
115

Petitioner, in its Supplement to the Petition, argued that the testimonial evidence it had presented
and offered during trial warranted consideration and analysis.  The Sandiganbayan erroneously
116

excluded these testimonies in determining whether to grant the motion to dismiss or not, hence:

. . . even assuming that the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s formal offer of evidence, petitioner
still had testimonial evidence in its favor which should [have] been considered. It behoved then upon
the Sandiganbayan to discuss or include in its discussion, at the very least, an analysis of
petitioner’s testimonial evidence.117

With our ruling reversing the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions on petitioner’s Formal Offer of Evidence,
what should be determined now by the Sandiganbayan is whether petitioner’s evidence is sufficient
to entitle it to the relief it seeks after the Sandiganbayan rested its case. Petitioner is required to
establish preponderance of evidence.

In the second assailed Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted respondents’ Motion to Dismiss
based on the lack of Formal Offer of Evidence of petitioner. At the same time, it observed that the
pieces of documentary evidence presented by petitioner were mostly certified true copies of the
original. In passing upon the probative value of petitioner’s evidence, the Sandiganbayan held:

On another note, the evidence presented by the plaintiff consisted mainly of certified true copies of
the original. These certified copies of documentary evidence presented by the plaintiff were not
testified on by the person who certified them to be photocopies of the original. Hence, these
evidence do not appear to have significant substantial probative value. 118

Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for making "a general and sweeping statement that the evidence
presented by petitioner lacked probative value for the reason that they are mainly certified true
copies which had not been testified on by the person who certified [them]."  Thus, its right to due
119

process was violated when the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner’s documentary evidence in the
same Resolution which dismissed the case. 120

Petitioner argues that: a) respondents unqualifiedly admitted the identity and authenticity of the
documentary evidence presented by petitioner;  and b) the documents it presented were public
121

documents, and there was no need for the identification and authentication of the original
documentary exhibits.  Petitioner relies on the Sandiganbayan Order  dated August 6, 2002. The
122 123

Order reads:
Considering the manifestation of Atty. Reno Gonzales, counsel for plaintiff/PCGG, that
the defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, through counsel, is willing to stipulate that the documents to be
presented and identified by the witness are in her custody as Records Officer of the PCGG, the
parties agreed to dispense with the testimony of Ma. Lourdes Magno.

WHEREFORE, and as prayed for, the continuation of the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence is set
on October 9 and 10, 2002, both at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning.

SO ORDERED.  (Emphasis supplied)

124

Petitioner claims that the following exhibits were acquired in relation to the PCGG’s functions
prescribed under Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(b),  and form part of the official records of the
125

PCGG:  "Certifications as to the various positions held in Government by Fe Roa-Gimenez, her

126

salaries and compensation during her stint as a public officer, the BIR Income Tax Returns and
Statement of Assets and Liabilities showing the declared income of spouses Gimenezes; the Articles
of Incorporation of various corporations showing spouses Gimenezes’ interests on various
corporations; and several transactions involving huge amounts of money which prove that they acted
as conduit in the disbursement of government funds." 127

On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner’s documents are not "official
issuances of the Philippine government."  They are mostly notarized private
128

documents.  Petitioner’s evidence has no probative value; hence, a dismissal on demurrer to

129

evidence is only proper.  Respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that the Sandiganbayan did not err in
130

holding that the majority of petitioner’s documentary evidence has no probative value, considering
that most of these documents are only photocopies. 131

The evidence presented by petitioner before the Sandiganbayan deserves better treatment.

For instance, the nature and classification of the documents should have been ruled upon. Save for
certain cases, the original document must be presented during trial when the subject of the inquiry is
the contents of the document.  This is the Best Evidence Rule provided under Rule 130, Section 3
132

of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.— When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.
In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may be presented  as 133

provided for under Sections 5 to 7 of the same Rule:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable.— When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.

SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. — If the document is in the
custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after
such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary
evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss. (5a)

SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.— When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

In Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano,  citing Estrada v. Hon. Desierto,  this court clarified the applicability
134 135

of the Best Evidence Rule:

As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies only when the subject of the
inquiry is the contents of the document. The scope of the rule is more extensively explained thus —

But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when the
content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such
document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible (5 Moran,
op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible
without need for accounting for the original.

Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is offered not as
documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is
allowed (Hernaez, et al. vs. McGrath, etc., et al., 91 Phil[.] 565). x x x

In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court had occasion to rule that —

It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only [a] copy of the Angara Diary as published
in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however,
violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:

"Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the case
in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful
purpose will be served by requiring production.

"x x x x x x x x x

"In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for certain
documents in which ordinarily no real dispute arised [sic]. This measure is a sensible and
progressive one and deserves universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a
copy may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it."
This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and weighed in evidence the
photocopies and microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters submitted by the petitioners to
establish the existence of respondent’s loans. The terms or contents of these documents were never
the point of contention in the Petition at bar. It was respondent’s position that the PNs in the first set
(with the exception of PN No. 34534) never existed, while the PNs in the second set (again,
excluding PN No. 34534) were merely executed to cover simulated loan transactions. As for the
MCs representing the proceeds of the loans, the respondent either denied receipt of certain MCs or
admitted receipt of the other MCs but for another purpose. Respondent further admitted the letters
she wrote personally or through her representatives to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank acknowledging
the loans, except that she claimed that these letters were just meant to keep up the ruse of the
simulated loans. Thus, respondent questioned the documents as to their existence or execution, or
when the former is admitted, as to the purpose for which the documents were executed, matters
which are, undoubtedly, external to the documents, and which had nothing to do with the contents
thereof.

Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply to the evidence presented
by petitioners regarding the existence of respondent’s loans, it should be borne in mind that the rule
admits of the following exceptions under Rule 130, Section 5 of the revised Rules of
Court[.]  (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
136

Furthermore, for purposes of presenting these as evidence before courts, documents are classified
as either public or private. Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 19. Classes of Documents.— For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.

All other writings are private.

The same Rule provides for the effect of public documents as evidence and the manner of proof for
public documents:

SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence.— Documents consisting of entries in public records made
in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to
their execution and of the date of the latter.

SEC. 24. Proof of official record.— The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.— Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a
seal, under the seal of such court.

....

SEC. 27. Public record of a private document.— An authorized public record of a private document
may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the
record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.

....

SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents.— Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and
certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document
involved. (Emphasis supplied)

Emphasizing the importance of the correct classification of documents, this court pronounced:

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or
because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent
public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing
authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be
presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or
instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally
authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or
sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document
requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as
evidence in court.  (Emphasis supplied)
137

The distinction as to the kind of public document under Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court is
material with regard to the fact the evidence proves. In Philippine Trust Company v. Hon. Court of
Appeals, et al.,  this court ruled that:
138

. . . not all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated:

....

"Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer" include those specified as
public documents under Section 19(a), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the acknowledgement,
affirmation or oath, or jurat portion of public documents under Section 19(c). Hence, under Section
23, notarized documents are merely proof of the fact which gave rise to their execution (e.g., the
notarized Answer to Interrogatories . . . is proof that Philtrust had been served with Written
Interrogatories), and of the date of the latter (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories is proof
that the same was executed on October 12, 1992, the date stated thereon), but is not prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. Additionally, under Section 30 of the same Rule, the
acknowledgement in notarized documents is prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument
or document involved (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories is prima facie proof that
petitioner executed the same).

The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties attending the execution of the
different kinds of public instruments. Official duties are disputably presumed to have been regularly
performed. As regards affidavits, including Answers to Interrogatories which are required to be
sworn to by the person making them, the only portion thereof executed by the person authorized to
take oaths is the jurat. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed therefore
applies only to the latter portion, wherein the notary public merely attests that the affidavit was
subscribed and sworn to before him or her, on the date mentioned thereon. Thus, even though
affidavits are notarized documents, we have ruled that affidavits, being self-serving, must be
received with caution.  (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
139

In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corporation,  this court discussed the difference between mere copies
140

of audited financial statements submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and certified true copies of audited financial statements obtained
or secured from the BIR or the SEC which are public documents under Rule 132, Section 19(c) of
the Revised Rules of Evidence:

The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited financial statements of SMMC.
Financial statements (which include the balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash
flow) show the fiscal condition of a particular entity within a specified period. The financial
statements prepared by external auditors who are certified public accountants (like those presented
by petitioner) are audited financial statements. Financial statements, whether audited or not, are, as
[a] general rule, private documents. However, once financial statements are filed with a government
office pursuant to a provision of law, they become public documents.

Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility as evidence.

Public documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and
genuineness. On the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they are
properly authenticated. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

....

Petitioner and respondents agree that the documents presented as evidence were mere copies of
the audited financial statements submitted to the BIR and SEC. Neither party claimed that copies
presented were certified true copies of audited financial statements obtained or secured from the
BIR or the SEC which under Section 19(c), Rule 132 would have been public documents. Thus, the
statements presented were private documents. Consequently, authentication was a precondition to
their admissibility in evidence.

During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a document presented as evidence
is genuine and has been duly executed or that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor
executed by mistake or under duress. In this case, petitioner merely presented a memorandum
attesting to the increase in the corporation’s monthly market revenue, prepared by a member of his
management team. While there is no fixed criterion as to what constitutes competent evidence to
establish the authenticity of a private document, the best proof available must be presented. The
best proof available, in this instance, would have been the testimony of a representative of SMMC’s
external auditor who prepared the audited financial statements. Inasmuch as there was none, the
audited financial statements were never authenticated.  (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
141

Indeed, in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc,  this court held that mere collection of documents by the
142

PCGG does not make such documents public documents per se under Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court:

The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations does
not make them per se public records referred to in the quoted rule.

Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these
public and private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the
course of the Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. However,
given the purposes for which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a credible witness
who could testify as to their contents. To reiterate, "[i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to
them, they must be proved by those witnesses." Witnesses can testify only to those facts which are
of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their own perception. Thus, Magno could
only testify as to how she obtained custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the
documents themselves.

Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda submitted
to the court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are
acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay evidence. The
reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by the affiant, but by another one who
uses his or her own language in writing the affiant’s statements, parts of which may thus be either
omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being
hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon.  (Citations omitted)
143

Notably, the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner was cursory. Its
main reason for granting the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence was that there was no
evidence to consider due to petitioner’s failure to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. It brushed off the
totality of evidence on which petitioner built its case.

Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this court finds it clear from the
second assailed Resolution that the Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence presented
by petitioner during the 19 years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring petitioner’s testimonial
evidence without any basis or justification. Numerous exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies
of petitioner’s witnesses.

Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended to establish a
presumption that respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez’s
incumbency as public officer and which total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion to her
and her husband’s salaries and to their other lawful income or properties.

Petitioner presented five (5) witnesses, two (2) of which were Atty. Tereso Javier and Director Danilo
R.V. Daniel, both from the PCGG:

Petitioner presented as witnesses Atty. Tereso Javier, then Head of the Sequestered Assets
Department of PCGG, and Danilo R.V. Daniel, then Director of the Research and Development
Department of PCGG, who testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned and/ or under the
control of spouses Gimenezes. 144

Several exhibits excluded by the Sandiganbayan were offered as part of petitioner’s testimonial
evidence:

1) Exhibit "KK"  was offered "for the purpose of proving the assets or properties of the
145

spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, and as part of the testimony of Tereso
Javier." 146

2) Exhibits "KK-1" to "KK-12"  inclusive of sub-markings, were offered "for the purpose of
147

proving the real properties acquired by the spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa
Gimenez, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier." 148

3) Exhibits "KK-15," "KK-18," "KK-20," "KK-27," "KK-30," "KK-32" to "KK-38" and "KK-
40"  were offered "for the purpose of proving the corporations in which Ignacio B. Gimenez
149

has interest, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier." 150

4) Exhibit "KK-45"  was offered "for the purpose of proving that the PCGG conducted an
151

investigation of New City Builders, Inc., Transnational Construction Corporation, and OTO
Construction and Development Corporation in relation to Ignacio B. Gimenez and Roberto O.
Olanday, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier." 152

5) Exhibits "KK-48" to "KK-50"  were offered "for the purpose of proving that the PCGG
153

formally filed notices of lis pendens with the Registers of Deeds of Taytay, Rizal, Lucena
City, Quezon and San Fabian, Pangasinan over the properties mentioned in said notices in
connection with Civil Case No. [0]007 pending with the Sandiganbayan, and as part of the
testimony of Tereso Javier." 154

6) Exhibits "KK-51" to "KK-52"  and their sub-markings were offered "for the purpose of
155

proving that the PCGG sequestered the shares of stock in Allied Banking Corporation and
Guaranteed Education, Inc. as stated in the said writ/letter of sequestration, and as part of
the testimony of Tereso Javier." 156

7) Exhibits "NN" to "QQ"  and their sub-markings were offered "for the purpose of proving
157

that the PCGG formally requested the Central Bank to freeze the bank accounts of the
spouses Igancio [sic] B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez and that the Central Bank, acting on
said request, issued a memorandum to all commercial banks relative thereto. They are also
being offered as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier." 158

8) Exhibits "RR" to "RR-23"  were offered "for the purpose of proving that Dominador
159

Pangilinan, former Acting President and President of Traders Royal Bank, executed an
affidavit on July 24, 1987 wherein he mentioned Malacanang trust accounts maintained with
the Traders Royal Bank the balance of which was very high, approximately 150-175 million
pesos, as indicated in the monthly statements attached to his affidavit. They are also being
offered as part of the testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel." 160

9) Exhibits "SS" to "SS-29"  were offered "for the purpose of proving that Apolinario K.
161

Medina, Executive Vice President of Traders Royal Bank, executed an Affidavit on July 23,
1987 wherein he mentioned about certain numbered (confidential) trust accounts maintained
with the Traders Royal Bank, the deposits to which ‘were so substantial in amount that (he)
 suspected that they had been made by President Marcos or his family. They are also being
offered as part of the testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel." 162

10) Exhibits "TT" to "TT-3"  were offered "for the purpose of proving that Director Danilo
163

R.V. Daniel of the Research and Development Department of the PCGG conducted an
investigation on the ill-gotten wealth of the spouses Ignacio and Fe Roa Gimenez and found
that from 1977 to 1982, the total sum of P75,090,306.42 was withdrawn from the account
No. 128 (A/C 76-128) in favor of I.B Gimenez, I.B. Gimenez Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez.
They are also being offered as part of the testimony of Director Danilo R.V. Daniel." 164

The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving a demurrer to evidence
which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence.

The difference between the admissibility of evidence and the determination of its probative weight is
canonical.165

Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to
[be] considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of
whether or not it proves an issue. Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as such
but its evidentiary weight depends upon the observance of the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the
author of the letter should be presented as witness to provide the other party to the litigation the
opportunity to question him on the contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to
present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence,
whether objected to or not, has no probative value.  (Citations omitted)
166

The Sandiganbayan should have considered Atienza v. Board of Medicine, et al.  where this court
167

held that it is better to admit and consider evidence for determination of its probative value than to
outright reject it based on very rigid and technical grounds. 168

Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in
connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or
admissibility, we have held that:

[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting
them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places
them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on
the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be
remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.  (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
169

A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state’s policy to recover ill-gotten wealth. In case
of doubt, courts should proceed with caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to
evidence. An order granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits.  This is because
170

while a demurrer "is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action,"  it specifically
171

"pertains to the merits of the case." 172

In Cabreza, Jr., et al. v. Cabreza,  this court defined a judgment rendered on the merits:
173

A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and
liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
objections"; or when the judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as
distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical
point."  (Citations omitted)
174

To reiterate, "[d]emurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the
defendant having to submit evidence on his [or her] part, as he [or she] would ordinarily have to do, if
plaintiff’s evidence shows that he [or she] is not entitled to the relief sought."  The order of dismissal
175

must be clearly supported by facts and law since an order granting demurrer is a judgment on the
merits:

As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, it
is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law
on which it is based.  (Citation omitted)
176

To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer documentary evidence
essentially deprives one party of due process.

IV

Respondents did not fail to specifically deny material averments in the Complaint.

Under Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the "defendant must specify each material allegation
of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance
of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial."  There are three modes of specific denial
177

provided for under the Rules:

1) by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which the defendant
does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which he will
rely upon to support his denial; (2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true
and material and denying only the remainder; (3) by stating that the defendant is without knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint, which
has the effect of a denial.178

In paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the PCGG, through the Office of the Solicitor General, averred
that:

14. Defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, by herself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue advantage of her position, influence and connection
and with grave abuse of power and authority, in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of assets
illegally obtained:

(a) actively participated in the unlawful transfer of millions of dollars of government funds into
several accounts in her name in foreign countries;

(b) disbursed such funds from her various personal accounts for Defendants’ own use[,]
benefit and enrichment;

(c) acted as conduit of the Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos in
purchasing the New York properties, particularly, the Crown Building, Herald Center, 40 Wall
Street, 200 Wall Street, Lindenmere Estate and expensive works of arts; 179

In their Answer, respondents claimed that;

9. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the allegations contained in
paragraphs 14(a), 14(b) and 14(c), the truth being that defendant Fe Roa never took advantage of
her position or alleged connection and influence to allegedly prevent disclosure and recovery of
alleged illegally obtained assets, in the manner alleged in said paragraphs.180

Similarly, the PCGG made material allegations in paragraph 16 of the Complaint:

16. Defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez, taking undue advantage of his relationship, influence, and
connection, by himself and/or in unlawful concert and active collaboration with Defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, for the purpose of mutually enriching themselves and
preventing the disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained, among others:

(a) acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
R. Marcos, in several corporations such as, the Allied Banking Corporation, Acoje Mining
Corporation, Baguio Gold Mining, Multi National Resources, Philippine Overseas, Inc. and
Pioneer Natural Resources;

(b) unlawfully obtained, through corporations organized by them such as the the [sic] New
City Builders, Inc. (NCBI), multimillion peso contracts with the government for the
construction of government buildings, such as the University of Life Sports Complex and
Dining Hall as well as projects of the National Manpower Corporation, Human Settlements,
GSIS, and Maharlika Livelihood, to the gross and manifest disadvantage to Plaintiff and the
Filipino people.

(c) in furtherance of the above stated illegal purposes, organized several establishments
engaged in food, mining and other businesses such as the Transnational Construction
Corporation, Total Systems Technology, Inc., Pyro Control Technology Corporation, Asian
Alliance, Inc., A & T Development Corporation, RBO Agro Forestry Farm Development
Corporation, Bathala Coal Mining Corporation, Coal Basis Mining Corporation, Titan Coal
Mining Corporation, GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., and I.B. Gimenez Securities, Inc. 181

To which respondents specifically denied through the following paragraph:

11. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the allegations contained in
paragraphs 16, 16(a), 16(b) and 16(c) that defendant Gimenez allegedly took advantage of his
alleged relationship, influence and connection, and that by himself or in alleged unlawful concert with
defendants Marcos and Imelda, for the alleged purpose of enriching themselves and preventing the
discovery of alleged illegally obtained assets: (1) allegedly acted as dummy, nominee or agent of
defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) allegedly obtained multi-million peso projects unlawfully; and (3)
allegedly organized several establishments, the truth being: (1) that defendant Gimenez never acted
as dummy, nominee or agent of defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) that defendant Gimen[e]z never
once obtained any contract unlawfully; and (3) that defendant Gimenez is a legitimate businessman
and organized business establishments legally and as he saw fit, all in accordance with his own
plans and for his own purposes. 182

In Aquintey v. Spouses Tibong,  this court held that using "specifically" in a general denial does not
183

automatically convert that general denial to a specific one.  The denial in the answer must be so
184

definite as to what is admitted and what is denied:

A denial is not made specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. A general denial
does not become specific by the use of the word "specifically." When matters of whether the
defendant alleges having no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and
necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge, an alleged "ignorance or lack of information" will not
be considered as a specific denial. Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules also provides that material
averments in the complaint other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages shall be
deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Thus, the answer should be so definite and certain in
its allegations that the pleader’s adversary should not be left in doubt as to what is admitted, what is
denied, and what is covered by denials of knowledge as sufficient to form a belief.  (Emphasis
185

supplied, citations omitted)

However, the allegations in the pleadings "must be contextualized and interpreted in relation to the
rest of the statements in the pleading."  The denials in respondents’ Answer comply with the modes
186

provided for under the Rules. We have held that the purpose of requiring specific denials from the
defendant is to make the defendant disclose the "matters alleged in the complaint which he [or she]
succinctly intends to disprove at the trial, together with the matter which he [or she] relied upon to
support the denial."  The denials proffered by respondents sufficiently disclosed the matters they
187

wished to disprove and those they would rely upon in making their denials.

To summarize, the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.
It erred in making a sweeping declaration on the probative value of the documentary evidence
offered by petitioner and in excluding other evidence offered during trial without full evaluation based
on reasons grounded in law and/or jurisprudence.

The third part of Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "[i]f the motion [to dismiss] is
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed [the movant] shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence." As this court held:

[I]f a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, the movant
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. The movant who presents a demurrer
to the plaintiff’s evidence retains the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees
with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both
of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their own
evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the merits,
inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations.  (Citations omitted)
188

This procedure, however, does not apply.

In this case, we principally nullify the assailed Resolutions that denied the admission of the Formal
Offer of Evidence. It only follows that the Order granting demurrer should be denied. This is not the
situation contemplated in Rule 33, Section 1.  Respondents were not able to even comment on the
189

Formal Offer of Evidence. Due process now requires that we remand the case to the
Sandiganbayan. Respondents may, at their option and through proper motion, submit their
Comment. The Sandiganbayan should then rule on the admissibility of the documentary and object
evidence covered by the Formal Offer submitted by petitioner. Respondents then may avail
themselves of any remedy thereafter allowed by the Rules.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated May 25, 2006 and
September 13, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division in Civil Case No. 0007
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the. Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings with due and deliberate dispatch in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN *
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 205879               April 23, 2014

SKUNAC CORPORATION and ALFONSO F. ENRIQUEZ, Petitioners,

vs.
ROBERTO S. SYLIANTENG and CAESAR S. SYLIANTENG, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This treats of the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision  and Resolution  of the Court
1 2

of Appeals (CA), dated August 10, 2012 and February 18, 2013, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
92022.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:

The civil cases before the [Regional Trial Court of Pasig City) involved two (2) parcels of land
identified as Lot 1, with an area of 1,250 square meters (Civil Case No. 63987) and Lot 2, with an
area of 990 square meters (Civil Case No. 63988), both found in Block 2 of the Pujalte Subdivision
situated along Wilson Street, Greenhills, San Juan City which are portions of a parcel of land
previously registered in the name of Luis A. Pujalte on October 29, 1945 and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. (-78865) (-2668) -93165 ("Mother Title") of the Register of Deeds for
the City of Manila.

Plaintiffs-appellants Roberto S. Sylianteng and Caesar S. Sylianteng ("appellants") base their claim
of ownership over the subject lots a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in their favor by their mother,
Emerenciana Sylianteng ("Emerenciana"), on June 27, 1983. Appellants further allege that
Emerenciana acquired the lots from the late Luis Pujalte [Luis] through a Deed of Sale dated June
20, 1958 as reflected in Entry No. P.E. 4023, annotated on the covering TCT, by virtue of which she
was issued TCT No. 42369. Then, when she sold the lots to appellants, TCT No. 39488, covering
the same, was issued in their names.

[Herein petitioners] Skunac Corporation ("Skunac") and Alfonso F. Enriquez ("Enriquez"), on the
other hand, claim that a certain Romeo Pujalte who was declared by the RTC of Pasig City, Branch
151 in Special Proceedings No. 3366 as the sole heir of Luis Pujalte, caused the reconstitution of the
Mother Title resulting to its cancellation and the issuance of TCT No. 5760-R in his favor. Romeo
Pujalte then allegedly sold the lots to Skunac and Enriquez in 1992. Thus, from TCT No. 5760-R,
TCT No. 5888-R, for Lot 1 was issued in the name of Skunac, while TCT No. 5889-R for Lot 2 was
issued in the name of Enriquez.

[Respondents] contend that they have a better right to the lots in question because the transactions
conveying the same to them preceded those claimed by [petitioners] as source of the latter's titles.
[Respondents] further assert that [petitioners] could not be considered as innocent purchasers in
good faith and for value because they had prior notice of the previous transactions as stated in the
memorandum of encumbrances annotated on the titles covering the subject lots. [Petitioners], for
their part, maintain that [respondents] acquired the lots under questionable circumstances it
appearing that there was no copy of the Deed of Sale, between Emerenciana and Luis Pujalte, on
file with the Office of the Register of Deeds.
3

On November 16, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (RTC) rendered judgment in favor of
herein petitioners. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiffs:

1. Declaring as null and void TCT No. 42369 in the name of Emerciana (sic) Sylianteng and
TCT No. 39488 in the name of plaintiffs herein and ordering the cancellation thereof;

2. Declaring the herein defendants as buyers in good faith and for value; and

3. Declaring TCT No. 5888-R in the name of SKUNAC Corporation and TCT No. 5889-R in
the name of Alfonso Enriquez as valid.

The complaint-in-intervention is ordered dismissed.

With costs against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED. 4

Herein respondents then filed an appeal with the CA.

On August 10, 2012, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appeal is GRANTED. The decision dated November
16, 2007 of Branch 160, Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 63987 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-appellants Roberto S. Sylianteng and Caesar S.

Sylianteng and against defendants-appellees Skunac Corporation and Alfonso F. Enriquez, and
intervenor-appellee Romeo N. Pujalte:

1. Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5760-R in the name of Romeo
N. Pujalte, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5888-R in the name of Skunac Corporation, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5889-R in the name of Alfonso F. Enriquez;

2. Upholding the validity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42369 in the name of
Emerenciana Sylianteng, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 39488 in the names of Roberto
S. Sylianteng and Caesar S. Sylianteng; and

3. Ordering defendants-appellees Skunac Corporation and Alfonso F. Enriquez, and

intervenor-appellee Romeo N. Pujalte, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs-appellants
Roberto S. Sylianteng and Caesar S. Sylianteng:

a. Moral damages in the amount of ₱500,000.00,

b. Exemplary damages in the amount of ₱500,000.00,

c. Attorney's fees in the amount of ₱250,000.00, and

d. The costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 5

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated February
18, 2013.

Hence, the instant petition with the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING IN THE CASE THE

PROVISION OF THE CIVIL CODE ON DOUBLE SALE OF A REGISTERED LAND.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT

RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF SALE BETWEEN LUIS
PUJALTE AND THEIR PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST, EMERENCIANA SYLIANTENG.
 III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING NULL AND
VOID TCT NO. 42369 PURPORTED TO HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO EMERENCIANA
SYLIANTENG BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY.

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT

PETITIONERS ARE THE LAWFUL OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT LOTS SINCE THEY
HAVE VALIDLY ACQUIRED THE SAME FROM ROMEO PUJALTE, THE SOLE HEIR OF
LUIS PUJALTE.

V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL AND

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COST OF SUIT TO
RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS WERE NOT IN BAD FAITH IN
PURCHASING THE SUBJECT LOTS. 6

The petition lacks merit.

At the outset, the Court observes that the main issues raised in the instant petition are essentially
questions of fact. It is settled that, as a rule, in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, only questions of law may be put in issue.  Questions of fact cannot be entertained.
7

There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule, to wit:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;

(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent;

(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; or

(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 8

In the instant case, the findings of the CA and the RTC are conflicting. It, thus, behooves this Court
to entertain the questions of fact raised by petitioners and review the records of this case to resolve
these conflicting findings. Thus, this Court held in the case of Manongsong v. Estimo  that:9
We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general rules of evidence and the
burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by this Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals:

x x x Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the
plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case,
once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to
defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of
plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s. The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers
to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at
bottom, it means probability of truth.10

Coming to the merits of the case, the abovementioned assignment of errors boils down to two basic
questions: (1) whether or not respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Emerenciana, validly acquired
the subject lots from Luis, and (2) whether or not respondents, in turn, validly acquired the same lots
from Emerenciana.

The Court rules in the affirmative, but takes exception to the CA's and RTC's application of Article
1544 of the Civil Code.

Reliance by the trial and appellate courts on Article 1544 of the Civil Code is misplaced. The
requisites that must concur for Article 1544 to apply are:

(a) The two (or more sales) transactions must constitute valid sales;

(b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to exactly the same subject matter;

(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must
each represent conflicting interests; and

(d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must
each have bought from the very same seller. 11

Obviously, said provision has no application in cases where the sales involved were initiated not by
just one but two vendors.  In the present case, the subject lots were sold to petitioners and
12

respondents by two different vendors – Emerenciana and Romeo Pujalte (Romeo). Hence, Article
1544 of the Civil Code is not applicable.

Nonetheless, the Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the CA that Emerenciana's
acquisition of the subject lots from Luis and her subsequent sale of the same to respondents are
valid and lawful. Petitioners dispute such finding. To prove their contention, they assail the
authenticity and due execution of the deed of sale between Luis and Emerenciana.

Petitioners contend that respondents' presentation of the "duplicate/carbon" original of the Deed of
Sale  dated June 20, 1958 is in violation of the best evidence rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the
13

Rules of Court.  The Court does not agree.

14

The best evidence rule is inapplicable to the present case. The said rule applies only when the
content of such document is the subject of the inquiry.  Where the issue is only as to whether such
15

document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.  Any other16

substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to account for the original.  In the
17

instant case, what is being questioned is the authenticity and due execution of the subject deed of
sale. There is no real issue as to its contents.

In any case, going to the matter of authenticity and due execution of the assailed document,
petitioners do not dispute that the copy of the deed of sale that respondents submitted as part of
their evidence is a duplicate of the original deed of sale dated June 20, 1958. It is settled that a
signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original is known
as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-production
of the original.
18

Moreover, Section 4 (b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "[w]hen a document is in two
or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are
equally regarded as originals."

In addition, evidence of the authenticity and due execution of the subject deed is the fact that it was
notarized. The notarization of a private document converts it into a public document.  Moreover, a
19

notarized instrument is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution, is
conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, and has in its favor the presumption of
regularity.  This presumption is affirmed if it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular.  To
20 21

assail the authenticity and due execution of a notarized document, the evidence must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant. 22

In the present case, petitioners failed to present convincing evidence to prove that the notarization of
the subject deed was irregular as to strip it of its public character. On the contrary, a certified copy of
page 26 of the notarial register of the notary public who notarized the subject deed of sale, which
was issued by the Records Management and Archives Office of Manila, shows that the sale of the
subject lots by Luis to Emerenciana was indeed regularly notarized. 23

Petitioners further argue that the deed of sale between Emerenciana and Luis was not registered
with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The Court, however, agrees with the CA that the said
deed was, in fact, registered as evidenced by official receipts  issued to this effect. Petitioners,
24

again, did not present any evidence to assail the authenticity of these documents.

Petitioners also question the authenticity of the subject deed of sale (Exhibit "B-1-C") by arguing that
only one copy of such deed was prepared as only one document number was assigned by the
notary to the said deed. Petitioners claim that this is contrary to the claim of respondents that the
said deed of sale was prepared, executed and notarized in several copies. The Court is not
persuaded.

It is true that Section 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative Code provides
that "[t]he notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a
number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or
pages of his register on which the same is recorded." In this regard, the Court agrees with
respondents' contention that the "instrument" being referred to in the abovequoted provision is the
deed or contract which is notarized. It does not pertain to the number of copies of such deed or
contract. Hence, one number is assigned to a deed or contract regardless of the number of copies
prepared and notarized. Each and every copy of such contract is given the same document number.
It is, thus, wrong for petitioners to argue that only one copy of the June 20, 1958 deed of sale was
prepared and notarized, because only one document number appears on the notarial book of the
notary public who notarized the said deed. On the contrary, evidence shows that at least two copies
of the subject deed of sale was prepared and notarized – one was submitted for registration with the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City and the other was retained by Emerenciana, which is the copy
presented in evidence by respondents.

As to petitioners' contention that the copy of the deed of sale presented by respondents in evidence
is of dubious origin because it does not bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, suffice it to state that the Court finds no cogent reason to disagree with respondents'
contention that the duplicate original of the subject deed of sale which they presented as evidence in
court could not have been received by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City because only the
original copy, and not the duplicate original, was submitted to the Register of Deeds for registration.

Petitioners also question the authenticity of and the entries appearing on the copy of the title
covering the subject properties in the name of Luis. However, the Court finds no cogent reason to
doubt the authenticity of the document as well as the entries appearing therein, considering that the
parties (herein petitioners and respondents) stipulated  that the machine copy of TCT No. 78865 in
25

the name of Luis, marked as Exhibit "DDD" for respondents, is a faithful reproduction of the original
copy of the said title, including the memorandum of encumbrances annotated therein. Included in the
memorandum of encumbrances is Entry No. P.E. 4023, which states, thus:

This certificate of title is hereby cancelled (sic) partially with respect to Lots 1 and 2, Blk. 2 by virtue
of a Deed of Sale ratified on June 20, 1958 before Armenio P. Engracia of Notary for the City of
Manila and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42369 is issued in the name of Vendee, Emerenciana
A.S. de Sylianteng, filing the aforesaid Deed under T-No. 42369. 26

The same entry appears in Exhibit "11" for petitioners. 27

P.E. No. 4023 has been entered on TCT No. 78865 by the then Acting Register of Deeds of San
Juan.  Petitioners assail the regularity of such entry. However, one of the disputable presumptions
1âwphi1

provided under Section 3 (m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court is that official duty has been regularly
performed. Under the said Rule, this presumption shall be considered satisfactory unless
contradicted and overcome by other evidence. In the present case, petitioners failed to present
sufficient evidence to contradict the presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of
then Acting Register of Deeds of San Juan.

Petitioners, nonetheless, insist that they have valid title over the subject properties. They trace their
respective titles from that of Romeo. Romeo, in turn, derives his supposed ownership of and title
over the subject lots from his claim that he is the sole heir of the estate of his alleged predecessor-
in-interest, Luis. Evidence, however, shows that Romeo never became the owner of the subject
properties for two reasons.

First, as shown above, the disputed lots were already sold by Luis during his lifetime. Thus, these
parcels of land no longer formed part of his estate when he died. As a consequence, Romeo's sale
of the disputed lots to petitioners was not affirmed by the estate court, because the subject parcels
of land were not among those included in the said estate at the time that Romeo was appointed as
the administrator thereof. As shown in its October 11, 1993 Order,  the RTC of Pasig, acting as an
28

estate court, denied Romeo's motion for approval of the sale of the subject lots, because these
properties were already sold to respondents per report submitted by the Register of Deeds of San
Juan.

In fact, as early as July 14, 1960, prior to Romeo's appointment as administrator of the estate of
Luis, Paz L. Vda. de Pujalte (Paz), the mother of Luis, who was then appointed administratrix of the
estate of the latter, in her Inventory and Appraisal  which was submitted to the estate court, already
29
excluded the subject properties among those which comprise the estate of Luis. Subsequently, in
the Project of Partition  of the residual estate of Luis, dated March 22, 1963, Paz again did not
30

include the disputed lots as part of such residual estate. Hence, Romeo's sale of the subject lots to
petitioners is invalid as it is settled that any unauthorized disposition of property under administration
is null and void and title does not pass to the purchasers. 31

Second, even granting that the subject lots formed part of the estate of Luis, it was subsequently
proven in a separate case that Romeo is not his heir. In a criminal case for use of falsified
documents filed against Romeo, it was proven that his claim of heirship is spurious. In the said
criminal case, his birth certificate and the marriage certificate of his supposed parents, which he
presented before the estate court, to prove his claim that he is the sole heir of Luis, were found by
the criminal court to be falsified.  In this regard, it bears to note the disquisition of the CA as to the
32

legitimacy of Romeo's claim, and its subsequent effect on petitioners' rights to the disputed
properties, to wit:

Appellees' [herein petitioners'] predicament is further compounded by Romeo Pujalte's conviction on

November 18, 2005 of the offense of Use of Falsified Documents, for falsifying the documents that
enabled him to deceive the estate court and have himself named as Luis Pujalte's sole heir. He did
not appeal his conviction and, instead, applied for probation. It goes without saying that the
documents purportedly conveying the lots in question to appellees and which are founded on Romeo
Pujalte's alleged rights over the estate of the late Luis Pujalte do not deserve any consideration at
all. x x x 33

Indeed, not being an heir of Luis, Romeo never acquired any right whatsoever over the subject lots,
even if he was able to subsequently obtain a title in his name. It is a well-settled principle that no one
can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non habet.  One can sell only what one owns or is
34

authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right than what the seller can transfer
legally.  Since Romeo has no right to the subject lots, petitioners, who simply stepped into the shoes
35

of Romeo, in turn, acquired no rights to the same.

In addition, and as correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioners' position is neither helped by the fact
that, in the present case, Romeo filed a Verified Complaint-in-Intervention  with the RTC, denying
36

that he sold the subject lots to petitioners and claiming that the same properties still form part of the
estate of Luis.

Stretching petitioners' contention a bit further, granting that both petitioners and respondents bought
the disputed lots in good faith by simply relying on the certificates of the sellers, and subsequently,
acquiring titles in their own names, respondents' title shall still prevail. It is a settled rule that when
two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the
earlier in date must prevail, and, in case of successive registrations where more than one certificate
is issued over the land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a
person who relies on a subsequent certificate.  The titles of respondents, having emanated from an
37

older title, should thus be upheld.

Anent petitioners' bad faith, this Court finds no persuasive reason to depart from the findings of the
CA that petitioners had prior knowledge of the estate proceedings involving the subject lots and that
they have notice of the defect in the title of Romeo.

It is true that a person dealing with registered land need not go beyond the title. However, it is
equally true that such person is charged with notice of the burdens and claims which are annotated
on the title.  In the instant case, The Torrens Certificate of Title (TCT No. 5760-R) in the name of
38

Romeo, which was the title relied upon by petitioners, also contained Entry No. P.E. 4023, quoted
above, which essentially informs petitioners that the lots which they were about to buy and which
they in fact bought, were already sold to Emerenciana.  This entry should have alerted petitioners
39

and should have prodded them to conduct further investigation. Simple prudence would have
impelled them as honest persons to make deeper inquiries to clear the suspiciousness haunting
Romeo's title. On the contrary, rather than taking caution in dealing with Romeo, petitioners, instead,
subsequently executed deeds of sale  over the same properties but all of which were, nonetheless,
40

disallowed by the estate court in its Order  dated October 11, 1993 on the ground that the said lots
41

were already sold, this time, by Emerenciana to respondents. In this regard, petitioners acted in bad
faith.

Thus, as correctly held by the CA, respondents are entitled to moral damages. Moral damages are
treated as compensation to alleviate physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury resulting
from a wrong.  In the instant case, respondents satisfactorily established their claim for moral
42

damages. They endured suffering brought about by Romeo's bad faith in using falsified documents
to enable himself to acquire title to and sell the subject lots to petitioners to the prejudice of
respondents. Respondents also suffered by reason of petitioners' stubborn insistence in buying the
said properties despite their knowledge of the defect in the title of Romeo.  Though moral damages
43

are not capable of pecuniary estimation, the amount should be proportional to and in approximation
of the suffering inflicted.  Respondents sought the award of ₱1,000,000.00 as moral damages from
44

each of the petitioners, but the Court agrees with the CA that the total amount of ₱500,000.00 is
sufficient for both respondents.

As to exemplary damages, these are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good,
in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.  They are imposed not to
45

enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive
to curb socially deleterious actions.  While respondents were again seeking the amount of
46

₱1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages from each of the petitioners, the CA correctly reduced it to a
total of ₱500,000.00.

Respondents are also entitled to attorney's fees, as awarded by the CA, on the strength of the
provisions of Article 2208 of the Civil Code which provides, among others, that such fees may be
recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, when the defendant's act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons, or in any other case where the court deems it just
and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
August 10, 2012 and February 18, 2013, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 92022, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 170604               September 2, 2013

HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON, PETITIONERS,

vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE, REPRESENTED BY REV. MAXIMO
ALVAREZ, JR., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the subject of the
inquiry. In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to
repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule
does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other than the original
document.
 The Case

This appeal seeks the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on August 18,
2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment rendered on November 5, 1997 by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, in Manila in Civil Case No. 96-78481 entitled Heirs of
Maximo S Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina
Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita Prodon and the Register of Deeds of
the City of Manila dismissing the respondents’ action for quieting of title.2

Antecedents

In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita Prodon,3 the respondents
averred as the plaintiffs that their parents, the late spouses Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina
Clave, were the registered owners of that parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 84797 of the Register of Deeds of Manila; that their parents had been in possession of the
property during their lifetime; that upon their parents’ deaths, they had continued the possession of
the property as heirs, paying the real property taxes due thereon; that they could not locate the
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but the original copy of TCT No. 84797 on file with the
Register of Deeds of Manila was intact; that the original copy contained an entry stating that the
property had been sold to defendant Prodon subject to the right of repurchase; and that the entry
had been maliciously done by Prodon because the deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the
property did not exist. Consequently, they prayed that the entry be cancelled, and that Prodon be
adjudged liable for damages.

The entry sought to be cancelled reads:

ENTRY NO. 3816/T-84797 – SALE W/ RIGHT TO REPURCHASE IN FAVOR OF: MARGARITA

PRODON, SINGLE, FOR THE SUM OF ₱120,000.00, THE HEREIN REGISTERED OWNER
RESERVING FOR HIMSELF THE RIGHTS TO REPURCHASE SAID PROPERTY FOR THE SAME
AMOUNT WITHIN THE PERIOD OF SIX MONTH (sic) FROM EXECUTION THEREOF. OTHER
CONDITION SET FORTH IN (DOC. NO. 321, PAGE 66, BOOK NO. VIII OF LISEO A. RAZON,
NOT.PUB. OF MANILA)

DATE OF INSTRUMENT – SEPT. 9, 1975

DATE OF INSCRIPTION – SEPT. 10, 1975,

AT 3:42 P.M.4

In her answer,5 Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed on September 9,
1975 the deed of sale with right to repurchase; that the deed had been registered with the Register
of Deeds and duly annotated on the title; that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been granted six
months from September 9, 1975 within which to repurchase the property; and that she had then
become the absolute owner of the property due to its non-repurchase within the given 6-month
period.

During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the deed of sale
with right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila.

On November 5, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment,6 finding untenable the plaintiffs’ contention that
the deed of sale with right to repurchase did not exist. It opined that although the deed itself could
not be presented as evidence in court, its contents could nevertheless be proved by secondary
evidence in accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, upon proof of its execution or
existence and of the cause of its unavailability being without bad faith. It found that the defendant
had established the execution and existence of the deed, to wit:

In the case under consideration, the execution and existence of the disputed deed of sale with right
to repurchase accomplished by the late Maximo Alvarez in favor of defendant Margarita Prodon has
been adequately established by reliable and trustworthy evidences (sic). Defendant Prodon swore
that on September 9, 1975 she purchased the land covered by TCT No. 84747 (Exhibit 1) from its
registered owners Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave (TSN, Aug. 1, 1997, pp.5-7); that the
deed of sale with right to repurchase was drawn and prepared by Notary Public Eliseo Razon (Ibid.,
p. 9); and that on September 10, 1975, she registered the document in the Register of Deeds of
Manila (Ibid., pp.18-19).

The testimony of Margarita Prodon has been confirmed by the Notarial Register of Notary Public
Eliseo Razon dated September 10, 1975 (Exhibit 2), and by the Primary Entry Book of the Register
of Deeds of Manila (Exhibit 4).

Page 66 of Exhibit 2 discloses, among others, the following entries, to wit: "No. 321; Nature of
Instrument: Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase; Name of Persons: Maximo S. Alvarez and
Valentina Alvarez (ack.); Date and Month: 9 Sept." (Exhibit 2-a).

Exhibit 4, on the other hand, also reveals the following data, to wit: ‘Number of Entry: 3816; Month,
Day and Year: Sept. 10, 1975; Hour and Minute: 3:42 p.m.; Nature of Contract: Sale with Right to
Repurchase; Executed by: Maximo S. Alvarez; In favor: Margarita Prodon; Date of Document: 9-9-
75; Contract value: 120,000.’ (Exhibit 4-a). Under these premises the Court entertains no doubt
about the execution and existence of the controverted deed of sale with right to repurchase.7

The RTC rejected the plaintiffs’ submission that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. could not have
executed the deed of sale with right to repurchase because of illness and poor eyesight from
cataract. It held that there was no proof that the illness had rendered him bedridden and immobile;
and that his poor eyesight could be corrected by wearing lenses.

The RTC concluded that the original copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase had been lost,
and that earnest efforts had been exerted to produce it before the court. It believed Jose Camilon’s
testimony that he had handed the original to one Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he could not
anymore retrieve such original from Atty. Lacanilao because the latter had meanwhile suffered from
a heart ailment and had been recuperating.

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the respondents assigned the following errors, namely:

A.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DUE EXECUTION AND
EXISTENCE OF THE QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE HAS BEEN
DULY PROVED BY THE DEFENDANT.

B.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED
BY THE DEFENDANTS AS PROOFS OF THE DUE EXECUTION AND EXISTENCE OF THE
QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE.

C.

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE
WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE HAS BEEN LOST OR OTHERWISE COULD NOT BE
PRODUCED IN COURT WITHOUT THE FAULT OF THE DEFENDANT.

D.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM THAT THEIR
FATHER COULD NOT HAVE EXECUTED THE QUESTIONED DOCUMENT AT THE TIME OF ITS
ALLEGED EXECUTION.8

On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, reversing the RTC, and ruling as
follows:

The case of the Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS) v. Del Rosario in GR No.
146586 (January 26, 2005) is instructive in resolving this issue. The said case held:

"Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence other than the original
document itself. A party may introduce secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument
not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it cannot be produced in court,
provided there is no bad faith on the part of the offeror. However, a party must first satisfactorily
explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party
must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the
original instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents,
although the court in its discretion may change this order if necessary."

It is clear, therefore, that before secondary evidence as to the contents of a document may be
admitted in evidence, the existence of [the] document must first be proved, likewise, its execution
and its subsequent loss.

In the present case, the trial court found all three (3) prerequisites ha[ve] been established by
Margarita Prodon. This Court, however, after going through the records of the case, believes
otherwise. The Court finds that the following circumstances put doubt on the very existence of the
alleged deed of sale. Evidence on record showed that Maximo Alvarez was hospitalized between
August 23, 1975 to September 3, 1975 (Exhibit "K"). It was also established by said Exhibit "L" that
Maximo Alvarez suffered from paralysis of half of his body and blindness due to cataract. It should
further be noted that barely 6 days later, on September 15, 1975, Maximo Alvarez was again
hospitalized for the last time because he died on October of 1975 without having left the hospital.
This lends credence to plaintiffs-appellants’ assertion that their father, Maximo Alvarez, was not
physically able to personally execute the deed of sale and puts to serious doubt [on] Jose Camilion’s
testimony that Maximo Alvarez, with his wife, went to his residence on September 5, 1975 to sell the
property and that again they met on September 9, 1975 to sign the alleged deed of sale (Exhibits "A"
and "1"). The Court also notes that from the sale in 1975 to 1996 when the case was finally filed,
defendant-appellee never tried to recover possession of the property nor had she shown that she
ever paid Real Property Tax thereon. Additionally, the Transfer Certificate of Title had not been
transferred in the name of the alleged present owner. These actions put to doubt the validity of the
claim of ownership because their actions are contrary to that expected of legitimate owners of
property.

Moreover, granting, in arguendo, that the deed of sale did exist, the fact of its loss had not been duly
established. In De Vera, et al. v Sps. Aguilar (218 SCRA 602 1993), the Supreme Court held that after
proof of the execution of the Deed it must also be established that the said document had been lost
or destroyed, thus:

"After the due execution of the document has been established, it must next be proved that said
document has been lost or destroyed. The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any
person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by
anyone who had made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places
where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody
the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation
which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.

However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using copies. For, since all the
duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of
the writing itself can be regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable
(i.e. lost, retained by the opponent or by a third person or the like).

In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who notarized the document testified that
the alleged deed of sale has about four or five original copies. Hence, all originals must be
accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one. This[,] petitioners failed to do.
Records show that petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or five original copies." (218
SCRA at 607-608)

In the case at bar, Jose Camilion’s testimony showed that a copy was given to Atty. Anacleto
Lacanilao but he could not recover said copy. A perusal of the testimony does not convince this
Court that Jose Camilion had exerted sufficient effort to recover said copy. x x x

xxxx

The foregoing testimony does not convince this Court that Jose Camilion had exerted sufficient effort
to obtain the copy which he said was with Atty. Lacanilao. It should be noted that he never claimed
that Atty. Lacanilao was already too sick to even try looking for the copy he had. But even assuming
this is to be so, Jose Camilion did not testify that Atty. Lacanilao had no one in his office to help him
find said copy. In fine, this Court believes that the trial court erred in admitting the secondary
evidence because Margarita Prodon failed to prove the loss or destruction of the deed.

In fine, the Court finds that the secondary evidence should not have been admitted because
Margarita Prodon failed to prove the existence of the original deed of sale and to establish its loss.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
35 in Civil Case No. 96-78481 is hereby REVERSED and a new one entered ordering the
cancellation of Entry No. 3816/T-84797 inscribed at the back of TCT No. 84797 in order to remove
the cloud over plaintiff-appellants’ title.

SO ORDERED.9
The heirs of Margarita Prodon (who meanwhile died on March 3, 2002) filed an Omnibus Motion for
Substitution of Defendant and for Reconsideration of the Decision,10 wherein they alleged that the
CA erred: (a) in finding that the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had not been
complied with; (b) in concluding that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been physically incapable of
personally executing the deed of sale with right to repurchase; and (c) in blaming them for not
recovering the property, for not paying the realty taxes thereon, and for not transferring the title in
their names.

On November 22, 2005, the CA issued itsresolution,11 allowing the substitution of the heirs of
Margarita Prodon, and denying their motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit.

Hence, the heirs of Margarita Prodon (petitioners) have appealed to the Court through petition for
review on certiorari.

Issues

In this appeal, the petitioners submit the following as issues, namely: (a) whether the pre-requisites
for the admission of secondary evidence had been complied with; (b) whether the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. had been physically incapable of personally executing the deed of sale with right to
repurchase;and (c) whether Prodon’s claim of ownership was already barred by laches.12

Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

1.

Best Evidence Rulewas not applicable herein

We focus first on an unseemly error on the part of the CA that, albeit a harmless one, requires us to
re-examine and rectify in order to carry out our essential responsibility of educating the Bench and
the Bar on the admissibility of evidence. An analysis leads us to conclude that the CA and the RTC
both misapplied the Best Evidence Rule to this case, and their misapplication diverted the attention
from the decisive issue in this action for quieting of title. We shall endeavor to correct the error in
order to turn the case to the right track.

Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court embodies the Best Evidence

Rule, to wit:

Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
 (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.

The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written document the original of the
document must be produced in court. The rule excludes any evidence other than the original writing
to prove the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the
original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and
(c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed.13

The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are
brought before the court,14 considering that (a) the precision in presenting to the court the exact
words of the writing is of more than average importance, particularly as respects operative or
dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a slight variation in words may
mean a great difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human
process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting; and (c) as respects oral testimony
purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in
the case of attempts at describing other situations generally.15 The rule further acts as an insurance
against fraud.16 Verily, if a party is in the possession of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks
to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is
withheld for fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and defeat.17 Lastly, the rule
protects against misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or unintentional introduction of
selected portions of a larger set of writings.18

But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading inferences arise only when the
issue relates to the terms of the writing. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms
of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such
as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best
Evidence Rule cannot be invoked.19 In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even
without accounting for the original.

This case involves an action for quieting of title, a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud
or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. In such an action, the
competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants
to place things in their proper place and to make the one who has no rights to said immovable
respect and not disturb the other. The action is for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right
would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly
introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property. For an action to
quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (a) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action;
and (b) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.20

The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a deed is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may not be material to an action for quieting of title,
depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. For instance, when an action for quieting of title is
based on the unenforceability of a contract for not complying with the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403
of the Civil Code specifically provides that evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the
writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents. There is then no doubt that the Best Evidence Rule
will come into play.

It is not denied that this action does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase. The principal issue raised by the respondents as the plaintiffs, which Prodon challenged
head on, was whether or not the deed of sale with right to repurchase, duly executed by the late
Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed. They alleged in the complaint that:

xxxx

9. Such entry which could have been maliciously and deliberately done by the defendant Margarita
Prodon created cloud and [is] prejudicial to the title of the property subject matter of this case, since
while it is apparently valid or effective, but in truth and in fact it is invalid, ineffective or unenforceable
inasmuch that the instrument purporting to be a Deed of Sale with right of repurchase mentioned in
the said entry does not exist.21

xxxx

On her part, Prodon specifically denied the allegation, averring in her answer that "sometime [o]n
September 9, 1975, deceased Maximo S. Alvarez lawfully entered into a Contract of Sale with Right
to Repurchase, object of which is the titled lot located at Endaya Street, Tondo, Manila, in favor of
defendant."22 In the pre-trial order, the RTC defined the issue to be tried as "[w]hether or not the
alleged document mentioned in the said entry is existing, valid or unenforceable,"23 and did not
include the terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase among the issues.

Apparently, the parties were fully cognizant of the issues as defined, for none of them thereafter
ventured to present evidence to establish the terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase. In
the course of the trial, however, a question was propounded to Prodon as to who had signed or
executed the deed, and the question was objected to based on the Best Evidence Rule. The RTC
then sustained the objection.24 At that point began the diversion of the focus in the case. The RTC
should have outrightly overruled the objection because the fact sought to be established by the
requested testimony was the execution of the deed, not its terms.25 Despite the fact that the terms of
the writing were not in issue, the RTC inexplicably applied the Best Evidence Rule to the case and
proceeded to determine whether the requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had been
complied with, without being clear as to what secondary evidence was sought to be excluded. In the
end, the RTC found in its judgment that Prodon had complied with the requisites for the introduction
of secondary evidence, and gave full credence to the testimony of Jose Camilon explaining the non-
production of the original. On appeal, the CA seconded the RTC’s mistake by likewise applying the
Best Evidence Rule, except that the CA concluded differently, in that it held that Prodon had not
established the existence, execution, and loss of the original document as the pre-requisites for the
presentation of secondary evidence. Its application of the Best Evidence Rule naturally led the CA to
rule that secondary evidence should not have been admitted, but like the RTC the CA did not state
what excluded secondary evidence it was referring to.

Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the deed of sale
with right to repurchase were not the issue, the CA did not have to address and determine whether
the existence, execution, and loss, as pre-requisites for the presentation of secondary evidence, had
been established by Prodon’s evidence. It should have simply addressed and determined whether or
not the "existence" and "execution" of the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by
preponderance of evidence.

Indeed, for Prodon who had the burden to prove the existence and due execution of the deed of sale
with right to repurchase, the presentation of evidence other than the original document, like the
testimonies of Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary Eliseo Razon, and the
Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, would have sufficed even without first proving the loss
or unavailability of the original of the deed.

2.

Prodon did not preponderantly establish the existence and due execution of the deed of sale with
right to repurchase

The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to establish and explain the
loss of the original of the deed of sale with right to repurchase to establish the genuineness and due
execution of the deed.26 This was because the deed, although a collateral document, was the
foundation of her defense in this action for quieting of title.27 Her inability to produce the original
logically gave rise to the need for her to prove its existence and due execution by other means that
could only be secondary under the rules on evidence. Towards that end, however, it was not
required to subject the proof of the loss of the original to the same strict standard to which it would
be subjected had the loss or unavailability been a precondition for presenting secondary evidence to
prove the terms of a writing.

A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof sufficient to show the lossor
explain the unavailability of the original as to justify the presentation of secondary evidence.
Camilon, one of her witnesses, testified that he had given the original to her lawyer, Atty. Anacleto
Lacanilao, but that he (Camilon) could not anymore retrieve the original because Atty. Lacanilao had
been recuperating from his heart ailment. Such evidence without showing the inability to locate the
original from among Atty. Lacanilao’s belongings by himself or by any of his assistants or
representatives was inadequate. Moreover, a duplicate original could have been secured from
Notary Public Razon, but no effort was shown to have been exerted in that direction.

In contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the improbability of the existence of the deed.
Camilon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had twice gone to his residence in Meycauayan,
Bulacan, the first on September 5, 1975, to negotiate the sale of the property in question, and the
second on September 9, 1975, to execute the deed of sale with right to repurchase, viz:

Do you also know the deceased plaintiff in this case, Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and his wife Valentina
Clave, Mr. Witness?

Yes, sir.

A
Q

Under what circumstance were you able to know the deceased plaintiff Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and his
wife?

When they went to our house, sir.

When was this specifically?

Sometime the first week of September or about September 5, 1975, sir.

What was the purpose of the spouses Maximo and Valentina in meeting you on that date?

They were selling a piece of land, sir.

xxxx

At the time when the spouses Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave approached you to sell their
piece of land located at Endaya, Tondo, Manila, what document, if any, did they show you?

The title of the land, sir.

xxxx

You said that on the first week of September or September 5, 1975 spouses Maximo and Valentina
approached you at the time, what did you tell the spouses, if any?

I asked them to come back telling them that I was going to look for a buyer, sir.

xxxx

You said that you told the spouse[s] Alvarez to just come back later and that you will look for a
buyer, what happened next, if any?
A

I went to see my aunt Margarita Prodon, sir.

What did you tell your aunt Margarita Prodon?

I convinced her to buy the lot.

ATTY. REAL

What was the reply of Margarita Prodon, if any?

She agreed, provided that she should meet the spouses, sir.

After Margarita Prodon told you that[,] what happened next, if any?

I waited for the spouses Alvarez to bring them to my aunt, sir.

Were you able to finally bring the spouses before Margarita Prodon?

Valentina Clave returned to our house and asked me if they can now sell the piece of land, sir.

What did you tell Valentina Clave?

We went to the house of my aunt so she can meet her personally, sir.

And did the meeting occur?

WITNESS

Yes, sir.

ATTY. REAL

What happened at the meeting?

I told Valentina Clave in front of the aunt of my wife that they, the spouses, wanted to sell the land,
sir.

What was the reply of your aunt Margarita Prodon at the time?

That Valentina Clave should come back with her husband because she was going to buy the lot,
sir.28

The foregoing testimony could not be credible for the purpose of proving the due execution of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase for three reasons. 1âwphi1

The first is that the respondents preponderantly established that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had
been in and out of the hospital around the time that the deed of sale with right to repurchase had
been supposedly executed on September 9, 1975. The records manifested that he had been
admitted to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City on several occasions, and had then been
diagnosed with the serious ailments or conditions, as follows:

Period of confinement Diagnosis

March 31 – May 19, 1975 • Prostatitis, chronic
• Arteriosclerotic heart disease
• Atrial fibrillation
• Congestive heart failure
• CFC III29
June 2- June 6, 1975 • Chest pains (Atrial Flutter)
• Painful urination (Chronic
prostatitis)30
August 23-September 3, 1975 • Arteriosclerotic heart disease
• Congestive heart failure, mild
• Atrial fibrillation
• Cardiac functional capacity III-B31
 September 15-October 2, 1975 • Arteriosclerotic heart disease
• Atrial fibrillation
• Congestive heart failure
• Pneumonia
• Urinary tract infection
• Cerebrovascular accident, old
• Upper GI bleeding probably
secondary to stress ulcers32

The medical history showing the number of very serious ailments the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had
been suffering from rendered it highly improbable for him to travel from Manila all the way to
Meycauayan, Bulacan, where Prodon and Camilon were then residing in order only to negotiate and
consummate the sale of the property. This high improbability was fully confirmed by his son,
Maximo, Jr., who attested that his father had been seriously ill, and had been in and out of the
hospital in 1975.33 The medical records revealed, too, that on September 12, 1975, or three days
prior to his final admission to the hospital, the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had suffered from "[h]igh
grade fever, accompanied by chills, vomiting and cough productive of whitish sticky sputum;"had
been observed to be "conscious" but "weak" and "bedridden" with his heart having "faint" sounds,
irregular rhythm, but no murmurs; and his left upper extremity and left lower extremity had suffered
90% motor loss.34 Truly, Prodon’s allegation that the deed of sale with right to repurchase had been
executed on September 9, 1975 could not command belief.

The second is that the annotation on TCT No. 84797 of the deed of sale with right to repurchase and
the entry in the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds did not themselves establish the
existence of the deed. They proved at best that a document purporting to be a deed of sale with right
to repurchase had been registered with the Register of Deeds. Verily, the registration alone of the
deed was not conclusive proof of its authenticity or its due execution by the registered owner of the
property, which was precisely the issue in this case. The explanation for this is that registration,
being a specie of notice, is simply a ministerial act by which an instrument is inscribed in the records
of the Register of Deeds and annotated on the dorsal side of the certificate of title covering the land
subject of the instrument.35 It is relevant to mention that the law on land registration does not require
that only valid instruments be registered, because the purpose of registration is only to give notice.36

By the same token, the entry in the notarial register of Notary Public Razon could only be proof that
a deed of sale with right to repurchase had been notarized by him, but did not establish the due
execution of the deed.

The third is that the respondents’ remaining in the peaceful possession of the property was further
convincing evidence demonstrating that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not execute the deed of
sale with right to repurchase. Otherwise, Prodon would have herself asserted and exercised her right
to take over the property, legally and physically speaking, upon the expiration in 1976 of the
repurchase period stipulated under the deed, including transferring the TCT in her name and paying
the real property taxes due on the properly. Her inaction was an index of the falsity of her claim
against the respondents.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, we concur with the CA that the respondents preponderantly,
proved that the deed of sale with right to repurchase executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did
not exist in fact.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 18, 2005 by the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 58624 entitled Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Clave,
represented by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita Prodon and the Register of Deeds of the City
Manila; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 200065               September 24, 2014

CAPITAL SHOES FACTORY, LTD., Petitioner,

vs.
TRAVELER KIDS, INC., Respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Questioned in this petition is the October 5, 2011 Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its
1

January 16, 2012 Resolution,  in CA-G.R. SP No. 120413, which affirmed with modification the May
2

13, 2011  and June 23, 2011  Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City (RTC),
3 4

regarding the admissibility of duplicate originals as evidence in an action for sum of money and
damages.

The Facts

Sometime in 2000, petitioner Capital Shoes Factory Ltd., (CSFL),a foreign corporation engaged in
the manufacturing and trading of children's shoes and similar products, and respondent Traveller
Kids, Inc. (TKI),a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing, importing and
distributing shoes, sandals and other footware entered into an agreement, wherein they agreed that
TKI would import the shoes and sandals made by CSFL from its China factory. After TKI placed
numerous purchase orders, CSFL began manufacturing the goods pursuant to the special designs
and specifications of TKI. CSFL then shipped the goods to TKI. It was their arrangement that TKI
would pay thirty (30%) percent of the purchase price of the goods by way of letters of credit, and the
balance of seventy (70%) percent by way of telegraphic transfer, thirty (30) days from the date of
delivery of the goods.

For the first three years, TKI was able to pay its purchase orders and the shipments made by CSFL.
In 2004, however, TKI started to default in its payments. CSFL granted numerous concessions and
extensions to TKI. Thereafter, TKI was able to make a partial payment on its unpaid accounts.

As of July 10, 2005, the total unpaid accounts of TKI amounted to U.S. $325,451.39, exclusive of the
interest accruing thereto. In addition, CSFL also manufactured $92,000.00 worth of children's shoes
and sandals pursuant to the design and specifications of TKI in its purchase orders.

Both verbal and written demand letters were made by CSFL to TKI for the payment of its unpaid
accounts, but to no avail.

To protect its interest, CSFL filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages against
TKI beforethe RTC. During the trial, CSFL, through its witness, identified several sales invoices and
order slips it issued as evidence of its transactions withTKI. The latter objected to the identification
pointing out that the documents being presented were mere photocopies. TKI also objected to the
evidence presented by CSFL to prove the amount of attorney’s fees on the ground that it was not an
issue raised during the pre-trial. The RTC noted the objections.

After the presentation of its last witness, CSFL filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits  seeking the
5

admission of, among others, the sales invoices and order slips earlier objected to by TKI. The latter
objected to the admission of the documents offered, contending thatseveral of the sales invoices and
order slips should not be admitted because they were merely photocopies. TKI also objected to the
admission ofdocuments by which CSFL sought to prove its claim for attorney’s fees. 6

On May 13, 2011, the RTC issued the Order  admitting all the exhibits offered by CFSL. The Order
7

reads:

ORDER
 Acting on Plaintiff’s Formal Offer of Exhibits as well as Defendant’s Comment/Opposition
on/thereto and finding the said offer to be well-taken and in order – despite the objections
made to the admission of said exhibits by defendant, Exhibits "A" to ZZZ-1-A," inclusive, are
all admittedfor the purposes for which the same are offered and as part of the testimony of
the witness who testified thereon.

Let the presentation of defendant’s evidence commence on May 25, 2011 at 8:30 o’clock
inthe morning, as previously scheduled.

SO ORDERED. [Emphasis supplied]

Not in conformity, TKI filed a motion for reconsideration  arguing that the exhibits formally offered by
8

CSFL were inadmissible in evidence for being mere photocopies. TKI also argued that the evidence
relating to the claimed "legal fees" were erroneously admitted because the matter was not raised as
an issue during the pre-trial.

On June 23, 2011, the RTC issued the order  denying TKI’s motion for reconsideration, ruling that
9

the sales invoices and order slips could be admitted because the duplicate originals of the invoices
were already sufficiently established by the testimony of CSFL’s officer and principal witness, Ms.
Susan Chiu (Chiu). Regarding the documents offered by CSFL to prove its claim for attorney’s fees,
the RTC stated that the demand for attorney’s fees was impliedly included in the issue of whether or
not TKI was liable to CSFL for the entire amount claimed.

Instead of presenting evidence, TKI opted to file a petition for certiorariwith prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the CAin which it reiterated its
argument regarding the inadmissibility of the photocopied evidence and the erroneous inclusion of
those documents proving entitlement to attorney’s fees which matter was not raised during the pre-
trial.

As there was no injunction order issued by the CA, the RTC continued the proceedings and directed
TKI to present evidence. TKI refused, citing the petition for certiorari it filed with the CA. Because of
its refusal, the RTC considered TKI’s right to adduce countervailing evidence as waived and ordered
CSFLto submit its memorandum. 10

On October 5, 2011, the CA rendered a decision partially granting TKI’s petition. The dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

Accordingly, the assailed Orders dated May 13, 2011 and June23, 2011 of public respondent judge
are hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that Exhibits "D" to "GG-1" and "HH" to "KK-1" should
be denied admission for being merely photocopies. As such, they are inadmissible for failure of
private respondent to prove any of the exceptions provided under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.

SO ORDERED. 11

[Underscoring supplied]

Applying Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,  the CA explained that while it was true that the
12

original copies of the sales invoices were the best evidence to prove TKI’sobligation, CSFL merely
presented photocopies of the questioned exhibits. It stated that Chiu’s testimony merely established
the existence or due execution of the original invoices. CSFL, however, did not present the original
invoices, only the photocopies, contrary to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.  Nonetheless,
13

the CA agreed with the RTC’s admission of CSFL’s evidence proving attorney’s fees, quoting
verbatim its logic and reasoning.

CSFL filed a motion for partial reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution, dated
January 16, 2012.

Hence, this petition.

GROUND

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DELVING INTO THE LOWER COURT’S
EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE AND FACTUAL FINDINGS SINCE IT IS BEYOND THE VERY
LIMITED JURISDICTIONAL PARAMETERS OF A CERTIORARI PROCEEDING, THATIS, THE
CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF JURISDICTION. 14

Stripped of non-essentials, the only issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA correctly modified
the RTC order admitting the exhibits offered by CSFL. 15

CSFL basically argues that the excluded documents are admissible in evidence because it was duly
established during the trial that the said documents were duplicate originals, and not mere
photocopies, considering that they were prepared at the same time as the originals.

On the other hand, TKI counters that CSFL’s claim that the photocopied documents were duplicate
originals was just a unilateral and self-serving statement without any supportive evidence.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petition.

After a review of the RTC and the CA records, which were ordered elevated, the Court is ofthe
considered view that the CA erred in not admitting the invoices and order slips denominated as
Exhibits "D" to "GG-1" and "HH" to "KK-1," which were duplicate originals. Section 4(b), Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 4 . Original of document. —

xxxx

(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical
contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.

xxxx

In Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies v. The Court of Appeals and Associated Bank,  it was stressed
16

that duplicate originals were admissible as evidence. Pertinent portions of the said decision read:

Respondent court is of the viewthat the above provision must be construed to mean the original copy
of the document evidencing the credit and not its duplicate, thus:
. . . [W]hen the law speaksof the delivery of the private document evidencing a credit, it must be
construed as referring to the original. In this case, appellees (Trans-Pacific) presented, not the
originals but the duplicates of the three promissory notes." (Rollo, p. 42)

The above pronouncement of respondent court is manifestly groundless.It is undisputed that the
documents presented were duplicate originals and are therefore admissible as evidence. Further, it
must be noted that respondent bank itself did not bother to challenge the authenticity of the duplicate
copies submitted by petitioner. In People vs. Tan, (105 Phil. 1242 [1959]),we said:

When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of
a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby,
produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same
stroke of pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are
regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without
accounting for the nonproduction of the others.

[Emphases supplied]

Records reveal that Chiu, CSFL’s principal witness, was able to satisfactorily explain that Exhibits
"D" to "GG-1" and "HH" to "KK-1" were duplicate originals of invoicesand order slips, and not mere
photocopies. She testified as follows:

Atty. Fernandez:

Q The documents that you have brought today, to what records do they belong?

A Those originals are from our company because one copy was sent to the customer and one we
keep in our company, Sir.

Q When you prepare a particular invoice pertaining to a particular transaction Miss Witness, how
many copies do you prepare for that invoice? How many copies of the invoice will you prepare?

A Two sets of invoice, one to the customer and one for our office sir.

Q And the copies that you brought today, are those the ones that were retained to you inyour office,
the copies you brought to court?

A Yes sir. 17

[Emphases supplied]

The transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) clearly show that Chiu convincingly explained that
CSFL usually prepared two (2) copies of invoices for a particular transaction, giving one copy to a
client and retaining the other copy. The Court combed through her testimony and found nothing that
would indicate that the documentsoffered were mere photocopies. She remained firm and consistent
with her statement that the subject invoices were duplicate originals as they were prepared at the
same time. The Court sees no reason why Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court should not
apply. At any rate, those exhibits can be admitted as part of the testimony of Chiu.

The Court went over the RTC records and the TSNs and found that, contrary to the assertion of TKI,
the duplicate originals were produced in court and compared with their photocopies during the
hearing before the trial court. The transcripts bare all of these but were missed by the appellate
court, which believed the assertion of TKI that what were produced in court and offered in evidence
were mere photocopies. The TSNs further reveal that after the comparison, the photocopies were
the ones retained in the records. 18

The Court notes that this case involves a foreign entity and has been pending since October 6,
2005.  It is about time that this case be decided on the merits. At this juncture, the Court reminds
19

counsel for TKI of his duty, as an officer of the court, to see to it that the orderly administration of
justice be not unduly impeded.

After the admission of CSFL’s exhibits as evidence, TKI should have let trial proceed in due course
instead of immediately resorting to certiorari, by presenting its own testimonial and documentary
evidence and in case of an unfavorable decision, appeal the same in accordance with law. After all,
the RTC stated that, granting that the questioned exhibits were not admissible, "there still remained
enough evidence to substantiate plaintiff’s claim on which the Court can validly render judgment
upon application of the pertinent law and/or jurisprudence."  In the case of Johnson Lee v. People of
20

the Philippines,  it was written:

21

In this case, there is no dispute that the RTC had jurisdiction over the cases filed by the public
respondent against the petitioner for estafa. The Order admitting in evidence the photocopies of the
charge invoices and checks was issued by the RTC in the exercise of its "jurisdiction. Even if
erroneous, the same is a mere error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Additionally, the admission
of secondary evidence in lieu of the original copies predicated on proof of the offeror of the
conditions sine qua non to the admission of the said evidence is a factual issue addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court.  Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
1âwphi1

jurisdiction is shown to have been committed by the trial court, the resolution of the trial court
admitting secondary evidence must be sustained. The remedy of the petitioner, after the admission
of the photocopies of the charge invoices and the checks, was to adduce his evidence, and if after
trial, he is convicted, to appeal the decision to the appropriate appellate court. Moreover, under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, only questions of law may be properly raised.

[Emphases supplied]

WHERE FORE, the October 5, 2011 Decision and the January 16, 20 i 2 Resoiution of the Court of
Appeais in CA-G.R. SP No. i 204 i 3, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the
exclusion of Exhibits ''D" to "GG-1" and "HH'' to "KK-1 '' are concerned. The May 13, 2011 Order of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, is REINSTATED.

The pertinent records of the case are hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
170, Malabon City, for appropriate proceedings.

The trial court is directed to give priority to this case and act on it with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, A1iicle VII I of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice