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Common Induction Moot, 2017, Campus Law Centre: Before The Hon'ble High Court, Central Province

1) The secondary evidence (photocopy of receipt) submitted by the prosecution is inadmissible as the necessary conditions for submitting secondary evidence were not satisfied. 2) The circumstantial evidence does not conclusively prove the guilt of the appellants and leaves room for alternative hypotheses. 3) The evidence does not sufficiently establish a motive for the appellants to commit the crime.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
71 views16 pages

Common Induction Moot, 2017, Campus Law Centre: Before The Hon'ble High Court, Central Province

1) The secondary evidence (photocopy of receipt) submitted by the prosecution is inadmissible as the necessary conditions for submitting secondary evidence were not satisfied. 2) The circumstantial evidence does not conclusively prove the guilt of the appellants and leaves room for alternative hypotheses. 3) The evidence does not sufficiently establish a motive for the appellants to commit the crime.

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Ashish Khantwal
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COMMON INDUCTION

MOOT,2017, CAMPUS LAW


CENTRE

Before the Hon’ble High Court, Central province

Mr. Theon Greyjoy and Ors. (appellant)


v.
The state of Westeros (Respondent)

Memorial for the appellant – Mr. Theon Greyjoy and Ors.


Counsel appearing on behalf of – The appellant
Table of Contents
Table of Authorities .............................................................................................................. 2
Statement of Jurisdiction ....................................................................................................... 3
Statement of Facts ................................................................................................................. 4
Statement of Issues................................................................................................................ 5
Summary of Arguments ........................................................................................................ 6
Secondary evidence is inadmissible ................................................................................... 6
Circumstantial evidence does not prove guilt conclusively:................................................ 6
Evidence does not establish the motive: ............................................................................. 6
Arguments Advanced ............................................................................................................ 7
No foundation had been laid in leading secondary evidence making it inadmissible. .......... 7
Circumstantial evidence does not prove guilt conclusively............................................... 10
Panchsheel of circumstantial evidence.......................................................................... 10
Evidence not sufficient to prove the motive. .................................................................... 13
Prayer ................................................................................................................................. 15

1
Table of Authorities
Cases
Basant Singh v. Brij Raj singh, AIR 1935 PC 132. ................................................................ 9
Bobla Suramma v. Peddareddi, AIR 1959 AP 368................................................................. 9
C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193. ....................................................... 10
Hanumant v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343............................................................... 10, 11
Kusum Ankama Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 2008 SC 2819. .................................................. 10
Rai Baijnath (dead) by Kedarnath Goenka v. Maharaj Sir Pavaneshwar Prasad Singh, AIR
1922 Privy Council 54 ....................................................................................................... 9
Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri and Ors., MANU/SC/1293/2015 .......................................... 9
Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2012 SC 2435. ...................................................... 11
Sakharam v. State of M.P., AIR 1992 SC 758 ....................................................................... 6
Sakharam v. State of M.P., AIR 1992 SC 758. ................................................................ 6, 13
Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1682................................. 10
Shivaji Sahebrao Babade v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622 .......................... 10, 12
State of M.P. v. Dhirendra Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 318.......................................................... 13
Varun Chaudhary v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2011 SC 72.................................................... 13
Wakkar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2011 Cr LJ 1639. ............................................................ 11
Statutes
Code of Criminal Procedure Act, 1973 .................................................................................. 3
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 .................................................................................................... 6
Books
Batuk Lal ‘The Law of Evidence’, Central Law Agency Allahabad (2013), at pg. 81 .......... 11

2
Statement of Jurisdiction

The Petitioner humbly submits this memorandum for the petition filed before this honourable
court.
The petition invokes the court’s criminal appellate jurisdiction under Section 374(2) of Code
of Criminal Procedure Act, 1973, quoted herein below:
“Any person convicted on a trial held by Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions judge or on
a trial held by any other court in which a sentence of imprisonment for more than seven years
has been passed against him or against any other person convicted at same trial may appeal to
High Court.”

3
Statement of Facts

Facts of the case are presented below:


1. Little Birdies Pvt. Ltd., accompany registered under the Companies Act of Westeros,
2013, is a company dealing with real estate. Mr. Varys and MR. Joffrey Baratheon were
two directors of the company.

2. In year 2016, Mr. Varys offered Mr. Theon Greyjoy (appellant) a consideration of Rbs.
38,00,000 to purchase a chunk of land belonging to Mr. Theon Greyjoy. Mr Greyjoy
accepted the offer and took the money. Due to unforeseeable circumstances, the deal
could not be completed and Mr. Varys asked for his money back.

3. On 15th August, 2016, Mr. Varys was shot dead by two armed assailants on a
motorcycle.

4. After 2 months of investigation, night watchers, the investigating authority of Westeros,


were provided with a receipt signed by the appellant Mr. Theon Greyjoy, by Joffrey
Baratheon. The receipt established; the appellant had promised to pay back Rbs.
38,00,000 in case the deal with Mr. Varys fell through. The investigating agency took
the photocopy of the receipt and returned the original to Mr. Joffrey.

5. The investigating agency through call records, also established that (1) there were
phone calls between the deceased and the appellant on the day the deceased was shot;
(2) There were numerous calls between Mr. Theon and Mr. Clegane. It was also found
that there was a phone call of 40 seconds between them right before the shooting
happened and of around 110 seconds immediately after the shooting. It was also found
that Mr. Sandor Clegane was located within a 2-Km radius of the crime scene.

6. Based on these evidences charge-sheet was filed against Mr. Theon Greyjoy, Mr.
Sandor Clegane and Mr. Gregor Clegane. Under Section 302 read with section 32 of
the Westerosi Penal code, 1860 in the sessions court.

7. The investigating agency called upon Mr Joffrey to present the original document. Mr.
Joffrey claimed to have misplaced the original document. The investigating agency
submitted a photocopy of the document. The court held photo-copy to be substantive
proof of motive against Mr. Theon.

8. The sessions court awarded the Clegane’s with life imprisonment while Mr. Theon was
sentenced to death.

4
Statement of Issues

Issue 1: Is the secondary evidence admissible?


Issue 2: Does circumstantial evidence prove guilt conclusively, to the exclusion of other
hypotheses?
Issue 3: Is the evidence sufficient to prove motive?

5
Summary of Arguments

Secondary evidence is inadmissible: Section 65 (c) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 states
that secondary evidence can be produced, in lieu of, the original, if the original has been lost
or destroyed for reasons not arising out of the party’s own neglect or default. To satisfy the
conditions laid down under Section 65 (c) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the party leading
secondary evidence must full fill two conditions and prove them in court. (1) Proof of loss: In
order to claim the benefit of Section 65 (c), there should be credible evidence of the loss of the
original (2) Search: There must be credible proof of the search for the original to render
secondary evidence admissible. It must be established that the party has exhausted all the
sources and means, in search of the document which were available to him. The prosecution
has not established the proof of loss, neither, evidence for exhaustive search has been
presented, thus not satisfying the necessary pre-conditions for leading secondary evidence.
Making the secondary evidence inadmissible.

Circumstantial evidence does not prove guilt conclusively: The circumstances from which
the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The facts so established
should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. There must be a chain
of evidence so complete as to not leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent
with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability that the act must
have been done by the accused. The evidence presented by the prosecution does not fully
establish the chain of events and leaves glaring holes in the hypothesis of the appellants guilt.
The evidence presented does not conclusively prove the guilt of the appellants. The evidence
offers mere conjectures and leaves room for various alternative hypotheses.

Evidence does not establish the motive: In the Sakharam v. State of M.P.1. the honourable
supreme court observed, when a case is based entirely on circumstantial evidence absence of
motive helps the accused and negatives the proof. If a case is based only on circumstantial
evidence and there is no proof of motive the accused may not be found guilty of the charge.
The error in judgement, in considering the receipt as conclusive proof of motive, arises from
misinterpreting the semantics of the word motive. Motive is the state of mind, an emotional
state which induces a person to act or think in a particular manner. Motive is often confused
with the stimulus, the event or the object that may or may not excite the emotion. The receipt
in this case proves only the presence of a stimuli, the sum of 38,00,000, which may or may not
have led to the formation of the motive of crime. No doubt the amount of money involved is
significant but it is not a sufficient proof of motive.

1
Sakharam v. State of M.P., AIR 1992 SC 758.

6
Arguments Advanced

No foundation had been laid in leading secondary evidence making it inadmissible.

1. It is a generally held rule that documents have to be proved by leading primary


evidence. Section 64 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short, the ‘Act’) says that
documents must be proved by primary evidence except in cases mentioned in Section
65 of the Act. Section 63 of the Act tells us what does secondary evidence means and
includes. For better appreciation Section 63 of the Act is quoted herein below:

“63. Secondary evidence: Secondary evidence means and


includes-
(1) Certified copies given under the provisions
hereinafter contained;
(2) Copies made from the original by mechanical
process which in themselves insure the
accuracy of the copy, and copies compared
with such copies;
(3) Copies made from or compared with the
original;
(4) Counterparts of documents as against the
parties who did not execute them;
(5) Oral accounts of the contents of a document
given by some person who has himself seen
it.
Illustrations
(a) A photograph of an original is secondary
evidence of its contents, though the two have
not been compared, if it is proved that the thing
photographed was the original.
(b) A copy compared with a copy of letter made by
a copying machine is secondary evidence of
the contents of the letter, if it is shown that the
copy made by the copying machine was made
from the original.
(c) A copy transcribed from a copy, but afterwards
compared with the original, is secondary
evidence; but the copy not so compared is not
secondary evidence of the original, although
the copy from which it was transcribed was
compared with the original.
(d) Neither an oral account of a copy compared
with the original, nor an oral account of a
photograph or machine-copy of the original, is
secondary evidence7of the original.”
2. Illustration (b) under Section 63 of the Act states that a copy made by a copying
machine can be admitted as evidence, provided, it is proved that the copy was made
from the original. Section 64 of the Act says that documents must be proved by primary
evidence except for cases mentioned in Section 65 of the Act which read as under: -

“65. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents


may be given: Secondary evidence may be given of the existence,
condition, or contents of a document in the following cases-
(a) When the original is shown or appears to be in the
possession or power-
Of the person against whom the document is sought to
be proved, or of any person out of reach of, or not
subject to, the process of the court, or
Of any person legally bound to produce it;
(b) When the existence, condition or contents of the
original have been proved to be admitted in writing by
the person against whom it is proved or by his
representative in interest;
(c) When the original has been destroyed or lost, or when
the party offering evidence of its content cannot, for
any other reason not arising from his own default or
neglect, produce it in reasonable time;
(d) When the original is of such a nature as not to be easily
moveable;
(e) When the original is a public document within the
meaning of Section 74;
(f) When the original is a document of which a certified
copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other la in
force in [India] to be given in evidence;
(g) When the originals consist of numerous accounts or
other documents which cannot conveniently be
examined in court, and the fact to be proved is the
general result of the whole collection.
In cases (a), (c), and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents
of the document is admissible.
In case (b), the written admission is admissible.
In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other
kind of secondary evidence, is admissible.
In case (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the
documents by any person who has examined them, and who is
skilled in the examination of such documents.”

8
3. Section 65(c) of the Act states that secondary evidence can be produced, provided, the
original has been lost or destroyed, or when the party relying on the primary document
is not able to produce it, in spite of its best efforts. The destruction or loss should not
be the effect of the party’s own negligence or default.

4. The honourable Supreme Court in Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri and Ors. 2observed
that the pre- condition for leading secondary evidence is, the party, in spite of its best
efforts could not present the primary evidence because of factors beyond its control.
The party seeking to produce secondary evidence must establish for the non- production
of primary evidence. Unless it is proved that the primary document is lost, destroyed,
or is being deliberately held by the party against whom it is to be produced, secondary
evidence cannot be accepted in lieu of the primary evidence.

5. In the case of Rai Baijnath (dead) by Kedarnath Goenka v. Maharaja Sir Pavaneshwar
Prasad Singh3, a similar question, as to the admissibility of the secondary evidence in
case of loss arose. Lord Phillimore in the judgement observed: The witness in whose
custody the primary evidence should be, has to testify under oath that the document
was lost and that every effort has been made to recover the document. It must also be
proved that the said witness does not have any motive to be untruthful in court.

6. Before leading secondary evidence, in the form of photocopy of the original receipt,
the prosecution was bound by law, to prove that necessary efforts were made to locate
the document and it was not lost due to default and negligence, will full or otherwise,
of the witness bound to produce it. Section 65(c) of the Act says that a secondary
evidence is admissible, provided, it was not misplaced by the negligence and default of
the party seeking to present it. To satisfy the conditions laid down under Section 65 (c)
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the party leading secondary evidence must satisfy
two conditions and prove them in court. (1) Proof of loss: In order to claim the benefit
of Section 65 (c) of the Act, there should be credible evidence of the loss of the original
4
(2) Search: There must be credible proof of the search for the original to render
secondary evidence admissible. It must be established that the party has exhausted all
the sources and means, in search of the document which were available to him. 5

7. Mr. Joffrey, under whose custody the original was kept, had a duty to keep the original
safe. He was well aware of the importance of the document and the gravity of the case.
The investigation agency is also at fault. They did not present Mr. Joffrey in court. To
lead secondary evidence in lieu of the primary it was obligatory under law, as
established in preceding cases, for Mr. Joffrey to testify under oath and under the
scrutiny of the judges, that he made every possible effort to locate the original, and the
original was not lost due to his negligence and default. Secondary evidence in this case
is inadmissible because Mr. Joffrey never testified in front of the court that he made

2
Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri and Ors., MANU/SC/1293/2015
3
Rai Baijnath (dead) by Kedarnath Goenka v. Maharaj Sir Pavaneshwar Prasad Singh, AIR 1922 Privy Council
54
4
Basant Singh v. Brij Raj singh, AIR 1935 PC 132.
5
Bobla Suramma v. Peddareddi, AIR 1959 AP 368.

9
every possible effort to recover the lost receipt and that the receipt was not lost due to
his own negligence.

Circumstantial evidence does not prove guilt conclusively

8. In C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P.6., the Supreme court observed:


“In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances
from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn, should be fully proved and such
circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be
complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved
circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused and
totally inconsistent with his innocence.”
9. Panchsheel of circumstantial evidence
In Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra7, the Supreme Court described
five golden principles laid down in Hanumant v. State of M.P.8. These rules are as
follows:

(a) “The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established. The court noted that the circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and not
‘may be proved’. It was held by this court in Shivaji Sahebrao Babade v. State of
Maharashtra9 that, the mental distance between ‘must’ and ‘may’ is long and divides
vague conjectures from sure conclusions.
(b) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of
the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except
that the accused is guilty.
(c) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.
(d) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved.
(e) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as to not leave any reasonable ground
for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in
all human probability that the act must have been done by the accused”

10. It was held in Kusum Ankama Rao v. State of A.P.10 that the circumstances from which
the guilt has to be proved have to be fully established. It has to be conclusively proved
from the circumstances that the offence has been committed by the accused and there
exists no other alternate explanation for the circumstances.

11. The prosecution has presented two evidences as proof of the appellant’s guilt (1)
Receipt of Rbs. 38,00,000 signed by the appellant, Mr. Theon Greyjoy. (2) Call records

6
C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193.
7
Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1682
8
Hanumant v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343.
9
Shivaji Sahebrao Babade v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622
10
Kusum Ankama Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 2008 SC 2819.

10
of calls between (a) Mr. Theon Greyjoy and the deceased Mr. Varys, and (b) between
appellant Mr. Theon Greyjoy and Mr. Sandor Clegane.

12. It is based on only these two evidences that the prosecution is trying to establish the
guilt of the appellant. The evidence presented in front of the court does not satisfy the
criteria established in Hanumant v. State of M.P.11.

13. The receipt presented proves nothing, it is just a probable stimulus for the formation of
the motive. As has been presented in the previous argument, the very admissibility of
the photocopy of the receipt as secondary evidence is questionable. It does not
conclusively establish the motive, as is explained in the next argument. Even if it were
proving the motive, motive is just ancillary evidence. It does not illuminate upon the
circumstances leading up to the crime. Motive usually helps strengthen the case of the
prosecution, provided, there is enough circumstantial evidence available to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Motive in itself cannot be considered
circumstantial evidence, it is a mental construct which is unverifiable without the proof
of conduct and preparation. 12Section 8 of the Act defines motive, preparation and
conduct. These three constructs are interrelated. It is only through evidence of
preparation and external conduct of the accused or of the deceased that we can infer the
motive.

14. There is no evidence on record to show that the appellant made preparations for the
crime. The Murder weapon, the gun from which the shot was fired, was never found.
The motorcycle which the assailants were riding was never found. The evidence of
conduct on part of the accused or the deceased which may suggest a possible motive is
also missing. In absence of such evidence the motive can never be established, thus the
receipt in question does not aid in forming a clear picture of the circumstances leading
up to the crime, it rather offers a conjecture and provides us with inconclusive answers
and is useless as circumstantial evidence.

15. In case of circumstantial evidence, the onus lies upon the prosecution to prove the
complete chain of events which shall undoubtedly point towards the guilt of the
accused; Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu13. Further in Wakkar v. State of Uttar
Pradesh 14Supreme Court said; the principle for basing a conviction on the basis of
circumstantial evidence is that each and every incriminating circumstance must be
clearly established by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances so proved
must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt
of the accused can be safely drawn and no other hypothesis of guilt is possible. The
evidence presented by the prosecution in this case does not sufficiently establish a chain
of events. No evidence is presented to connect the appellant to the act of murder. Phone
call between the appellants Mr. Theon Greyjoy and Mr. Sandor Clegane is presented as
evidence for their involvement in the murder of the deceased. Call records establish that

11
Hanumant v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343.
12
Batuk Lal ‘The Law of Evidence’, Central Law Agency Allahabad (2013), at pg. 81
13
Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2012 SC 2435.
14
Wakkar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2011 Cr LJ 1639.

11
Mr. Theon Greyjoy and Mr. Clegane were on phone, talking to each other immediately
before the murder of the deceased and immediately after the execution of murder. It is
true that the appellants were on call for the said duration, but this fact does not connect
them to the scene of crime. Call records show that Mr. Sandor Clegane was located
within 2- Km. radius of the crime scene. It can be a mere co-incident that Mr. Sandor
Clegane was present near the crime scene. His presence in the vicinity of the crime does
not prove that he was involved in the crime. In a densely populated country like
Westeros there might be hundreds, if not thousands, of people within 12.56 sq. Km. of
the crime scene. Mere presence near the crime scene does not prove the guilt
conclusively.

16. Call records also establish that there was a phone call of 110 secs between Mr. Theon
and Mr. Sandor Clegane, immediately after the shooting. It is highly improbable for a
prudent man to call someone, immediately after committing a crime in a densely
crowded area. The basic instinct of the person who commits the crime is to escape from
the crime scene. Escaping from a crowded area will necessarily require, at the least, 10
to 15 minutes. It is only after reaching a safe distance away from the crime scene that a
person may think of calling another person. The very fact that Mr. Sandor Clegane
called Mr. Theon immediately after the crime, casts a reasonable doubt on his
involvement in the shooting of the deceased, Mr Varys. There is nothing to rule out the
possibility that the timing of the calls between Mr. Sandor Clegane and Mr. Theon
Greyjoy were co-incidental. Unless the prosecution presents more clinching evidence,
connecting the appellants to the act of shooting, no conclusive inference can be drawn.

17. Further, to establish the chain of events beyond reasonable doubt, it is pertinent to find
the murder weapon and the motorcycle which was used in the murder. The gun used in
shooting and the motorcycle on which the assailants were travelling have not been
found. Unless the court has information about the owner of the murder weapon and the
vehicle used by the shooter, the court cannot rule out other possibilities. Unless all other
hypothesis about the crime are eliminated, the guilt of the appellant is merely in the
realm of conjectures. It will be gross miscarriage of justice if the appellants are found
guilty on the basis of mere conjectures and incomplete evidence.

18. The deceased Mr. Varys was shot from a moving motorcycle. Three shots were fired,
and all three hit him on the chest. The person who shot at the deceased was surely a
person trained in arms and a steady shot. It is impossible for an untrained person to
shoot from a moving vehicle, in a crowded place, in a state of panic, and land all the
shots right at target. The prosecution did not submit any evidence to prove that Mr.
Sandor Clegane was well trained in arms. Nor was the murder weapon recovered from
him. The only evidence connecting him to the crime is his location, as established by
the call records. This piece of evidence does not in any manner connect him to the act
of shooting. The evidence is just hinting at a possibility of involvement of Mr. Clegane
in the act of shooting, it is not conclusively proving it. The evidence ‘must’ and not
‘might’ prove the guilt. 15

15
Shivaji Sahebrao Babade v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622

12
Evidence not sufficient to prove the motive.

19. The evidence provided by the investigating agency of Westeros does not prove the
motive on part of my client Mr. Theon Greyjoy. In Varun Chaudhary v. State of
Rajasthan 16it was established that in the absence of eye- witness or of any scientific
evidence that can connect the accused with the murder, the motive to commit the
murder must and absolutely be established.

20. In the Sakharam v. State of M.P.17 the honourable supreme court observed, when a case
is based entirely on circumstantial evidence absence of motive helps the accused and
negatives the proof. If a case is based only on circumstantial evidence and there is no
proof of motive the accused may not be found guilty of the charge.

21. The argument which forms the fulcrum of the prosecution, on the basis of which the
appellant has been convicted, is based on circumstantial evidence. A receipt signed by
my client has been produced as evidence to prove motive on part of my client. In
considering the receipt as conclusive evidence of motive to commit the crime the
sessions court has erred. The receipt proves nothing, it is a photocopy of the original,
it’s very admissibility is questionable.

22. The error in judgement, in considering the receipt as conclusive proof of motive, arises
from misinterpreting the semantics of the word motive. Motive is the state of mind, an
emotional state which induces a person to act or think in a particular manner. Motive is
often confused with the stimulus, the event or the object that may or may not excite the
emotion. The receipt in this case proves only the presence of a stimuli, the sum of
38,00,000, which may or may not have led to the formation of the motive of crime. No
doubt the amount of money involved is significant but it is not a sufficient proof of
motive.

23. Now the question arises, motive being a mental state, how do we infer it? Section 8 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with the relevancy of motive and conduct in
proving a crime. Motive is generally proved with two kinds of circumstantial evidence,
namely: (1) conduct of the person, and (2) by events around the person which could
excite the emotion in the person. Conduct is the expression of the motive. In State of
M.P. v. Dhirendra Kumar18, one Munnibai was killed. Respondent Dhirendra Kumar
had ‘evil eye’ on Munnibai. Respondent was a tenant in the house of the father- in- law
of the deceased. Munnibai reported the intentions of the respondent to her mother- in-
law who in turn informed Munnibai’s father-in- law who asked the respondent to vacate
the house. The conduct of the respondent prior to the commission of crime, and the
16
Varun Chaudhary v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2011 SC 72.
17
Sakharam v. State of M.P., AIR 1992 SC 758.
18
State of M.P. v. Dhirendra Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 318.

13
conduct of the deceased and her family were the events that lead to the formation of the
motive. The deceased Munnibai in the above referred case was just the stimuli, her
existence did not prove the motive. It was the conduct of the respondent and the conduct
of the deceased and her family, conduct corroborated by the accounts of eyewitnesses,
which helped in inferring the motive. It was the motive in the crime along with other
circumstantial evidences that lead to the conviction of Dhirendra Kumar.

24. The investigation agency has failed to produce evidence of conduct on part of the
appellant, or of conduct on part of the deceased Mr. Varys which may prove that there
were events that may have excited the motive to commit the crime in the appellant.
There is no evidence to prove that my client was unwilling to pay back the money. To
prove the motive sufficiently there must be something in the conduct, both preceding
and following the crime, of either the accused or the deceased, which might connect the
large sum of money that the appellant owed to the deceased to the motive of crime. As
has been mentioned before motive can only be inferred from the conduct of the parties
involved. Mere presence of a stimuli is not enough to establish the motive.

25. The circumstances leading to the formation of the motive to murder must be of such
nature that the person harbouring such motive should feel that murder is the last resort
available to him. If such were the case then Mr. Varys, the deceased, must have applied
significant amount of pressure on the appellant to return the money. Such pressure
could not have been applied by the deceased alone, certainly not through phone calls.
Pressure tactics of the deceased must have involved a third party, without who’s
involvement the appellant could not have been threatened to such an extent as to
commit the grave crime of murder.

26. If the appellant was not willing to pay back the money then Mr. Varys must have sent
his agents to recover the money. If my client had refused to pay back the money then
the recovery agents must have had the knowledge of such refusal. Why did the
investigating agency not interrogate the recovery agents? Why were they not presented
in front of the sessions court? Either such agents were never involved or the
investigating agency failed to contact them.

27. Mr. Joffrey, who provided the receipt which was presented in the court as evidence of
the appellant’s motive to commit the crime, held 40% of the shares of Little Birdies
Pvt. Ltd. He too had an interest in recovering the money from the appellant. If the
appellant was unwilling to pay back the money that he received from the deceased, Mr.
Joffrey must have been privy to such fact. The prosecution never produced Mr. Joffrey
as a witness to corroborate the charge that the appellant was unwilling to pay back the
money that he owed to Mr. Varys.

28. The only evidence that the prosecution has provided as proof of the appellant’s motive
is the receipt which bounds the appellant to return the 38,00,000 Rubels that he received
from the deceased. The receipt only proves the presence of the stimuli that may or may
not have led to the formation of the motive. The counsel concurs that the evidence on
record is insufficient of proving the motive.

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Prayer
In light of the arguments advanced and the authorities cited, the appellant humbly submits
that the Hon’ble court may be pleased to adjudge and declare:
1. The secondary evidence is inadmissible.
2. The circumstantial evidence does not prove the guilt conclusively and beyond
reasonable doubt.
3. The photocopy is not a substantive proof of motive of the crime.
4. Order of sessions court has been set aside.

Any other order that it deems fit in the interest of equity, justice, and good conscience.
For this act of kindness, the appellant shall be duty bound forever pray.

Place: Central Province, Westeros


Date: 2 September, 2017
Sd/-

Counsel for the appellant

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