Is China Becoming More Aggressive?

A Neoclassical Realist Analysis

Author(s): Camilla T. N. Sørensen
Source: Asian Perspective , July-Sept. 2013, Vol. 37, No. 3 (July-Sept. 2013), pp. 363-385
Published by: {lrp}

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Asian Perspective 37 (2013), 363-385

Is China Becoming More Aggressive?

A Neoclassical Realist Analysis

Camilla T. N. S0rensen

In this article I seek to improve the dominant neorealist analysis of

China's rise. I offer a neoclassical realist analytical framework in order
to identify the influence of certain Chinese domestic developments
and priorities on Chinese foreign and security policy behavior. Rather
than reflecting a more self-confident and aggressive China, devel-
opments in Chinese foreign and security policy in recent years reveal
an internally conflicted, inward-looking, and reactive China not yet
ready for its new international role. Beijing is uncertain how to man-
age the challenges and the inevitable tension, both domestically and
internationally, arising from China's rapid development. Keywords:
Chinese foreign and security policy, Sino-US security relations. East
Asian security, neorealism, neoclassical realism.

A GROWING NUMBER OF WESTERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SCHOLARS

argue that China is developing into a more self-confident and
aggressive great power that increasingly is pushing its own for-
eign policy interests and demands.1 These scholars specifically
refer to Chinese behavior toward smaller regional neighbors in
Southeast Asia and to territorial disputes in the South and East
China Seas. The ongoing modernization and transformation of the
Chinese military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) - including
testing of new, more technologically advanced equipment and
large-scale military exercises - are said to contribute to growing
international uncertainty about Chinese intentions. The dominant
expectation among these scholars is that as China becomes eco-
nomically and militarily stronger, the more assertive and nation-
alistic its foreign and security policies will be. This policy will be
characterized by growing Chinese international ambitions and less
willingness to compromise.2
However, due primarily to the neorealist theoretical approach
that these scholars apply, most of them tend to ignore domestic

363

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364 Is China Becoming More Aggressive?

Chinese developments, which in fact provide the main context for

decisions on foreign and security policy. If an analysis of Chinese
foreign and security policy behavior in recent years includes
domestic developments and priorities, and engages with debates
now going on among Chinese international relations scholars, a
more complex picture and a less predictable future scenario
emerge. Those debates play an important role in shaping China's
future course as a great power. A challenge currently facing West-
ern scholars who seek to understand and explain Chinese foreign
and security policy behavior, therefore, is to understand the
diverse Chinese visions and arguments.
Compared to just a few years back, Chinese foreign and secu-
rity policy strategy today confronts a new and more complex set
of international and domestic challenges, expectations, and
demands. As a result, the strategy is under increased pressure
(Wang Jisi 2011). Among Chinese international relations scholars
this has created an intensified and pluralized debate, with several
camps presenting future visions and arguing for different priori-
ties and instruments in the conduct of foreign and security policy
(Zhu 2010; Shambaugh 2011). Even though realism, with its deep
roots in China's intellectual worldview, remains a strong under-
current, Chinese international relations scholars are often very
eclectic thinkers, and their debate is neither strongly theoretical
nor structured with a clear separation between theoretical schools
(Johnston 1995; Shambaugh 2011). Rather, Chinese international
relations scholars are highly policy oriented, and the structure is
established on the basis of core issues or concepts such as nonin-
tervention and international responsibility. A strong focus exists
on how best to characterize and deal with the changing interna-
tional system or world order, with an emphasis on the importance
of certain domestic developments and priorities.
One such priority is the fundamental imperative to keep the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in power, which gives para-
mount importance to the Chinese leadership's effort to maintain
domestic social and political stability. As I elaborate further in the
analysis below, the link between keeping the CCP in power and
the demand on the party to continuously deliver on domestic sta-
bility, economic growth, and growing prosperity for the Chinese

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 Camilla T. N. Serensen 365

population is political legitimacy: the CCP's performance during

the economic reforms determines its legitimacy. This domestic
reality influences the analyses and policy recommendations of
Chinese international relations scholars.3 One common thread in
their debates revolves around the question of what international
role could and should China embrace as a result of its enhanced
power. Finding a balance between meeting the growing interna-
tional expectations of a more responsible China and meeting the
domestic expectations and demands of a more powerful China is
a central concern.4
In this article I present and apply a neoclassical realist analyt-
ical framework so as to identify the influence of certain domestic
developments and priorities on Chinese foreign and security pol-
icy behavior. My purpose is to improve the dominant neorealist
analysis of China's rise and thereby demonstrate the value of neo-
classical realism in the realist analysis of Chinese foreign and
security policy behavior. Neoclassical realism is still a rather new
theoretical approach within realist international relations theory,
and as such broadly defines a group of realist studies that share
the aim of wanting to develop a realist analysis of foreign policy
that includes both international and domestic factors. It is there-
fore important to emphasize that no single neoclassical realist the-
ory or analytical framework exists, and that neoclassical realist
studies examine a wide variety of domestic factors. I offer one
application with a focus on state-society relations. The ambition is
not to test neoclassical realism but merely to suggest a first cut of
how that framework analyzes the main factors and causal mecha-
nisms behind recent developments in Chinese foreign and security
policy. Arguably, neoclassical realism provides a strong theoreti-
cal basis for a realist analysis as well as an opening for deeper
engagement with Chinese international relations scholars.
Many China specialists point to their country's domestic pol-
itics as having great importance in explaining its foreign and
security policy behavior, so this in itself is neither new nor con-
troversial. My aim in this article is therefore not merely to argue
that domestic factors must be included in any explanation of that
behavior. I also want to start an examination of how certain inter-
national and domestic factors specifically influence Chinese for-

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366 Is China Becoming More Aggressive?

eign and security policy behavior. Put another way, I want to

answer in an analytically structured way this question: Which
international and domestic circumstances influence which kinds
of Chinese foreign and security policy behavior?
I begin by elucidating a neoclassical realist analytical frame-
work, discussing this school's points of departure from realist the-
ory and detailing current developments in and challenges to that
paradigm. In the second part of the article, I apply my framework
to recent developments in Chinese foreign and security policy
behavior. I focus first on how developments in the systemic con-
ditions that have facilitated China's rise have created new room
for Beijing to maneuver. I then further specify the room for
maneuvering by focusing on domestic constraints in China. In the
final part of the article I present perspectives on future develop-
ments in Chinese foreign and security policy and assess the value
of neoclassical realism for realist policy analysis. Throughout the
article I include perspectives and arguments from the debate
among Chinese international relations scholars.

Neoclassical Realism:
From Neorealism to Realist Foreign Policy Analysis

The Pathway from Neorealism

Western analyses of China's rise often apply a neorealist analyti-

cal framework (Goldstein 2005). China is a rising power in an
anarchic international system. Its increasing relative power capa-
bilities will result either in larger ambitions - the view of "offen-
sive" neorealists such as John J. Mearsheimer - or intensified
security dilemmas, as argued by "defensive" neorealists such as
Kenneth N. Waltz (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). Both of these
neorealist theories are based on the assumption that states, focus-
ing on their own survival, tend to balance against the strongest
state and develop their relative power capabilities either by inter-
nal means such as armament or by external means such as
alliances. Following the neorealist logic, the most important threat
to state survival in anarchic conditions is the power of other

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 Camilla T. N. S0rensen 367

states, and states therefore constantly strive to prevent other states

from achieving a dominant position.
Both offensive and defensive neorealism consequently present
rather pessimistic outlooks regarding the implications of China's
rise for international security. Their views often are used to sup-
port alarms about a China threat or a new cold war in Asia. But
in assigning primary explanatory power to systemic factors -
anarchy and polarity - neorealism does not leave much room for
domestic factors (Wivel 2005). In the anarchic international sys-
tem all states are "like units"; the structural pressure on them is
the same regardless of the specific characteristics of the individ-
ual states (Waltz 1979, 95-97). What matters are therefore the
systemic conditions shaping and constraining the development of
a rising power, and the implications of these conditions for inter-
national security.
Both Waltz and Mearsheimer focus on identifying and explain-
ing basic dynamics and developments over time in the interna-
tional system. Their chief concern relates to outcomes such as the
likelihood of major war, the prospects for international coopera-
tion, and aggregate alliance patterns among states. They argue that
neorealism is a theory of international politics, not a theory of for-
eign policy (Waltz 1979). When applying neorealism it neverthe-
less proves very difficult for them not to include analyses of
foreign policy behavior, among other factors.5
Neorealism has been subjected to frequent criticism, even
within its own ranks. Consequently, there have been intensified
efforts within the realist research program to develop neorealism
through a response to these critiques (Freyberg-Inan, Harrison,
and James 2009). Some of these efforts are often united under the
term "neoclassical realism," where the "black box" of the state is
opened up and there is an emphasis on combining neorealism 's
focus on systemic factors with unit-level factors in order to
explain the foreign and security policy behavior of states. Neo-
classical realists, while maintaining the neorealist focus on sys-
temic factors to allow for a certain amount of maneuvering room
for states, find inspiration in the richer and more inclusive under-
standing of realism found in classical realism. Neoclassical real-
ists share the overall argument that systemic factors are most

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368 Is China Becoming More Aggressive?

important for explaining international developments over time,

but believe that their effects on the foreign and security policies of
states vary (Wohlforth 2008).6
The state is hence the intervening variable between systemic
factors and actual foreign and security policy decisions: the
effects of the structural pressures created by systemic factors have
to be filtered through the state (Taliaferro 2006). Neoclassical
realists focus on a wide variety of these domestic factors, hence
neoclassical realist arguments arise over which domestic factors
are most important. A recurring focus, which can also be traced
back to classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau, is on the rela-
tionship between state leaders and the people. The contention here
is that state leaders need to secure public support in order to
mobilize necessary resources for their foreign and security poli-
cies as well as to safeguard their own positions and their ability to
govern (Schweller 2006; Taliaferro 2006).

Neoclassical Realism,
Systemic Factors, and the China Case

The attractiveness of neoclassical realism is that it opens the door

for integrating factors often considered non-realist into a realist
framework in an explicit and systematic manner in order to con-
struct coherent theoretical arguments with stronger explanatory
power. The primacy of systemic factors is recognized, but as the
focus shifts to understanding and explaining a state's specific for-
eign and security policy behavior, unit-level factors are included.
This reflects the neoclassical realist emphasis on specifying the
mechanisms through which structural incentives influence state
behavior (Wivel 2005; Wohlforth 2008). Going from neorealism
to neoclassical realism, a trade-off is obvious between the for-
mer's parsimony and the latter 's explanatory power. However, the
gain in explanatory power and the avoidance of ad hoc or context-
specific explanations compensates for this trade-off.7
Neoclassical realism holds high potential with regard both to
developing realist international relations theory, such as in foreign
policy analysis, and to improving the realist analysis of China's
rise. Following neoclassical realism, the point of departure for my

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 Camilla T. N. Sorensen 369

analysis is that China, despite being a rising power, does not nec-
essarily exhibit revisionist external behavior as the offensive real-
ists would have it. Rather, the character of China's external
policies depends on the specific conditions confronting Beijing. In
other words, rather than assume that rising powers such as China
are either revisionist or status quo, a neoclassical realist approach
examines which conditions lead to what might be termed revi-
sionist or status quo behavior.
When applying a neoclassical realist analytical framework,
our initial focus is on systemic factors. Of these, polarity is cen-
tral. Different polarities result in different dynamics in the inter-
national system and thus present states with different overall
systemic opportunities and constraints. Therefore, that China's
rise is taking place in a unipolar system dominated by one super-
power, the United States, and not in a bipolar or multipolar system
makes a difference. Multipolarity is seen as the most conflict-
prone system due to the many potential conflict dyads that exist
when many great powers coexist. The risks of miscalculation are
comparatively higher in relation to the relative power of states
and their shifting coalitions in multipolar systems (Waltz 1979).
Bipolarity is seen as more enduring and less conflict prone than
multipolarity, because the uncertainty and risks of miscalculation
and misperception among great powers are reduced compared to
multipolarity as each great power can concentrate its efforts on its
main adversary. This configuration entails the risk of overreac-
tion, however, due to the intense monitoring of the main adver-
sary's every move (Waltz 1988).
Contemporary realists debate whether to characterize the cur-
rent international system as unipolar, how to define unipolarity,
and what dynamics are derived from unipolarity (Wohlforth 1999;
Hansen, Toft, and Wivel 2009; Hansen 2011). In this article, I
employ William C. Wohlforth's definition of unipolarity - a sys-
tem that features a highly asymmetric distribution of relative
capabilities on a global scale, leaving one state significantly
stronger than the rest and too strong to be counterbalanced
(Wohlforth 1999). A unipolar system creates strong incentives for
states to balance the dominant pole, but on the other hand also
makes the potential cost of balancing - which entails challenging

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370 Is China Becoming More Aggressive?

the dominant pole - very high (Hansen, Toft, and Wivel 2009).8
Furthermore, in a unipolar as opposed to a bipolar or multipolar
world, the risks of miscalculation and misperception also decrease
at the global level because the balance of relative strength so
clearly favors the unipole.
However, a risk of misperception remains at the regional
level, where states risk misjudging the extent of attention that the
unipole devotes to security matters. In other words, under unipo-
larity, where no serious challenger exists to the position of the
dominant power, the risks of misperception and conflict decrease;
instead of balancing the unipole, the secondary powers adjust in
various ways depending on the strategy of the unipole. The uni-
pole assumes the primary responsibility for ensuring the stability
of the international system and delivering the international public
goods that make it possible for secondary powers to free ride.
The important question for the analysis of developments in
Chinese foreign and security policy behavior, which I address in
the next section, is whether these unipolar dynamics are currently
weakening and other dynamics are strengthening in the interna-
tional system, presenting different maneuvering room for Beijing.

The Critical Role of Domestic Factors

After analyzing the systemic factors at play and how they devel-
oped, the focus shifts to domestic factors and specifically to the
relationship between state and society. As mentioned above, sev-
eral neoclassical realists incorporate the complex model of state-
society relations implicit in classical realism. Twentieth-century
classical realists were primarily concerned with the sources and
uses of national power in international politics and the problems
that state leaders encountered in conducting foreign policy. These
issues led them to focus on power distributions among states as
well as the domestic character of states - specifically, state lead-
ers and their relations with society (Taliaferro 2006). In a discus-
sion of the constitutive elements of national power, Morgenthau
emphasized how the quality of state leadership and its link to
society are decisive factors for the national power of states and

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 Camilla T. N. Sorensen 371

the ability of state leaders to pursue a rational foreign policy

(Morgenthau [1948] 2006). A rational foreign policy, he wrote,
required that state leaders seek public support for foreign policy.
The implicit notion in such classical realist studies is that the
state is both distinct from and the agent of society. State leaders
therefore require public support or consent to conduct a rational
foreign and security policy. Clearly, most classical realists used a
top-down concept of the state, where state leaders define national
interests and conduct foreign and security policy based on their
assessments of developments in the external security environ-
ment. However, classical realists emphasized that when conduct-
ing foreign and security policy, state leaders must draw on
domestic society for material resources and support. Despite this
emphasis, most classical realists devoted only scant attention to
the more specific link between state leaders and society and on
what the character and degree of that support depends (Taliaferro
2006).
Several neoclassical realists seek to elaborate on the link
between state leaders and society and present more specific
expectations about its influence on foreign and security policy.
Among them are analysts who have developed the term "state
power," which refers to the relative ability of state leaders to
determine foreign and security policy free of domestic political
constraints (Rose 1998, 163; Zakaria 1998, 38-39). An example is
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro's "resource-extractive" model of the state,
where the degree of state power, defined as the relative ability of
states to extract and mobilize resources from domestic societies,
shapes the type of internal balancing strategies that states are
likely to pursue in light of high external vulnerability (Taliaferro
2006). In Taliaferro's model, the degree of state power depends on
the quality of political and military institutions of the state as well
as on the ability of state leaders to exploit nationalism and ideol-
ogy to mobilize society in support of the state.9
The neoclassical realist focus on "state power" engages with
the comparative politics literature on state autonomy and state
legitimacy.10 Arguably, especially in the case of a rising power
such as China, maintaining domestic legitimacy is a central prior-
ity for state leaders, because as the state experiences strong eco-

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372 Is China Becoming More Aggressive?

nomic growth and military modernization, its society is also under-

going major changes such as extensive urbanization and unequal
geographical and social development. Such major changes in soci-
ety have implications for the relationship between state and soci-
ety: they require attention and resources from state leaders and
raise important questions about their ability to continue to improve
the relative position of the state and maintain domestic political
control. Relying on coercion alone will not work (Hui 2005).
In this I address the influence of domestic political concerns
about maintaining political control and legitimacy by using the
term "state legitimacy." A specific question here is the expecta-
tions that state leaders face from their people. What do state lead-
ers have to deliver domestically to maintain legitimacy? The
concerns of state leaders about domestic expectations influence
the foreign and security policy of the state, but to what extent
depends on how free state leaders are from domestic concerns
when they have to deal with concrete international developments
(Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2009). Consequently, an impor-
tant question for analysis of Chinese foreign and security policy
behavior is whether the domestic demands and expectations fac-
ing Chinese leaders, which affect their legitimacy, are narrowing
their room for maneuver abroad.

The Impact of Unipolarity on Chinese Policy

Following the neoclassical realist analytical framework presented

above, unipolarity, which together with anarchy constitutes the
international order's systemic constraints, has provided Beijing
with a certain amount of maneuvering room. As argued below,
unipolarity is, however, currently weakening, presenting different
overall systemic opportunities and constraints for Chinese foreign
and security policymakers.
As Chinese leaders and the majority of Chinese international
relations scholars have acknowledged, the unipolar system has
benefited China's development (Goldstein 2005; Godement
2010). Unipolarity has allowed Beijing to direct its attention and
resources to domestic affairs and thereafter toward strengthening

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 Camilla T. N. Sorensen 373

China's role and influence in East Asia. Beijing has not had to
focus attention on an overall international great-power setting or
rivalry; it has accepted that the unipole undertakes the main bur-
den of delivering international public goods, from which China's
development greatly benefits. Other East Asian states, being con-
fident in the US regional security role and security guarantees,
have also been able to focus on the economic advantages of
China's rise. This has been the basis for Beijing's foreign and
security policy strategy since the mid-1990s - the so-called peace-
ful development strategy. The foreign and security policy guide-
lines following from the strategy imply that Chinese leaders give
highest priority to the development and maintenance of stable
relations with regional states and important trading partners, and
otherwise seek to maintain a low profile internationally. In doing
so, they avoid being drawn into the domestic affairs of other states
or using too many resources on international issues that do not
involve China's core interests. With this strategy, Beijing has
sought to secure and promote Chinese interests, influence, and
status within the unipolar system and in no direct way sought to
challenge the United States.
Another key aspect of China's strategy is to reassure regional
neighbors by preempting or counteracting fear of a strong China.
The strategy has worked well for Beijing, but in recent years it
has also started to show its limitations. The main reason is that
China's peaceful development strategy is designed to ensure
important Chinese priorities in the context of US unipolarity,
allowing China to free ride and lie low, focusing on immediate
regional security and economic issues.11 These conditions no
longer hold. In line with the realist arguments on polarity I pre-
sented above, the changing room to maneuver for Beijing is a
consequence of the relative decline of the US position and thus
the weakening of unipolarity. Confronting changing overall sys-
temic opportunities and constraints, it is difficult for Beijing to
continue the free riding and sustain a low profile. How China
adapts to these changing circumstances, and whether the Chinese
require adjusting or even abandoning their current foreign and
security policy strategy, is a core element in the ongoing debates
among Chinese international relations scholars. More voices are

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374 Is China Becoming More Aggressive?

calling for a rethinking of the strategy that urges greater Chinese

initiatives - a "tide-making" instead of a "tide-surfing" strategy
(Zhu 2010, 49-52).
Both domestically and internationally, Beijing faces growing
expectations and demands as to what China internationally could
and should do. Especially after the start of the global financial cri-
sis and the increased international attention to and recognition of
China's strong international economic, political, and security
position, international expectations and demands on China have
increased. China is being urged to take up more international
responsibilities. Chinese foreign and security policy leaders now
struggle with this situation - seeking to maintain a focus on
domestic developments and challenges and therefore avoid taking
on too many international obligations while also safeguarding
China's expanding global economic and security interests and
increasing China's international influence and status.
Throughout history, great powers have developed more dis-
tinct and multiple foreign and security policy interests than other
states as well as better abilities to defend those interests. China is
going through this process now. An example relates to the fast-
expanding number of Chinese citizens who, driven by dreams of
success or employed by big state-owned Chinese companies, live
and work outside China, often in unstable parts of the developing
world. Beijing's need to protect these citizens and Chinese invest-
ments challenges its traditional emphasis on nonintervention in
the domestic affairs of other states and the nonuse of force in
international affairs. How to deal with this challenge is strongly
debated among Chinese international relations scholars and is also
related to a bigger debate on the changing conceptions of Chinese
sovereignty (Zhu 2010).
These debates, which revolve around the difficult issue of
finding a balance between meeting growing international and
domestic expectations, have intensified since the crises in Libya
and Syria. Several Chinese scholars argue that the situation in
Syria represents the first major test of Chinese great-power diplo-
macy in a less unipolar and thus more complex international sys-
tem. Some have come up with concrete suggestions for how
China could and should act.12 One of the most thorough sugges-

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 Camilla T. N. Sorensen 375

tions comes from Professor Wang Yizhou of Peking University,

who promotes "creative involvement" as a new direction for Chi-
nese diplomacy. "Creative involvement" suggests that Beijing
confront changed opportunities and uncertainties in the interna-
tional system as well as a changed domestic situation by adopting
a more flexible involvement strategy. Wang argues that due to
China's size and expanding role in international affairs, Beijing is
already involved in an array of international issues. Involvement
is therefore not really a choice, and Beijing must acknowledge
that China can no longer maintain its free-riding strategy; it has to
become more active and creative (Wang 2011).
A number of neoclassical realist analyses of unipolarity also
highlight how the dynamics of unipolarity depend on the strategy
and foreign and security policy behavior of the unipole (Hansen
2011). Important changes in US foreign and security policy strat-
egy and behavior in recent years - particularly the so-called US
pivot or rebalancing strategy in East Asia - have impacted Bei-
jing's room to maneuver. The United States, determined to main-
tain its dominant position, has strengthened its presence in the
region by prioritizing its military capabilities and security rela-
tionships. Great-power rivalry between the United States and
China, especially in East Asia, is on the rise, seriously challenging
Beijing's ability to stay with its peaceful development strategy.
The changing position and role of the United States feeds into the
debate among Chinese international relations scholars on how to
characterize the overall tendency and power configuration of the
international system (Zhu 2010). Attention centers especially on
Sino-US relations, where disagreements have emerged over
whether the United States is still the dominant pole, whether
unipolarity still characterizes the international system, and what
changes in the US posture mean for China's room to maneuver.
Generally, however, a consensus seems to be developing
among Chinese international relations scholars that a geopolitical
shift is under way in the international system away from unipo-
larity or hegemony, but suggestions differ as to what kind of sys-
tem or polarity will eventually take over.13 Analyzing power
balances and geopolitical shifts is a long-standing Chinese disci-
pline. These days, however, more attention is being paid in Chi-

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376 Is China Becoming More Aggressive?

nese international relations circles to analysis of the overall inter-

national great-power setting, the changing conditions for states
and relations between states, and the ways that Chinese foreign
and security policy strategy might adapt to these changes.

The Constraints Posed by

Growing Domestic Demands and Expectations

Performance Legitimacy

In the analysis below, I argue that the Chinese leadership's legiti-

macy depends on performance. But Chinese leaders face growing
domestic demands and expectations, which further constrain their
room to maneuver in conducting foreign and security policy.
Since the start of the economic reforms, the ideological legit-
imacy of the Chinese leadership has gradually been undermined.
Performance legitimacy has replaced it; the leadership has to con-
tinuously deliver domestic stability, economic growth, and grow-
ing prosperity as well as meet people's growing expectations
about China's international influence and status, which is what the
leadership has promised to deliver in its social contract with the
Chinese population (Wang 2005). These expectations also entail
questions about how to tackle the many domestic socioeconomic
challenges and problems that have developed after the strong
focus in the last three decades on high economic growth and
development, such as high income inequality, corruption, and
environmental deterioration. Concerns among the Chinese lead-
ership about how to handle such domestic challenges have
increased in recent years, putting further pressure on the Chinese
foreign and security policy strategy (de Jonquieres 2012).
The most important constraints that Chinese domestic devel-
opments put on Chinese foreign and security policy strategy and
behavior stem first from the perception within China of the rela-
tive decline of the United States. This perception has increased
nationalist ambitions and expectations among people who believe
that China now, after "100 years of humiliation," should stand up
and take its rightful position as a great power. Consciousness of

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 Camilla T. N. Sorensen 377

those "100 years" has a strong influence on Chinese foreign and

security policy and behavior, because it creates a lens through
which international events are framed, especially with respect to
how other states treat China. This mind-set leads to a heightened
and even paranoid Chinese threat awareness. It also creates grow-
ing domestic pressures on the low-profile strategy, which is not
perceived as appropriate for a great power.

Nationalism

Nationalism in China is a complex issue. Several kinds of Chinese

nationalism exist, since it is powered both by feelings of histori-
cal humiliation as well as historical pride and pride over contem-
porary Chinese achievements. Both among the Chinese elite and
in the general Chinese population, the Chinese "weak-strong"
mentality or "dual identity" works as an undercurrent affecting
the perception of and the approach to developments in the inter-
national system and China's role in it (Nathan and Ross 1997, 32-
34). The Chinese leadership has long used nationalism to ensure
domestic social and political stability. The main argument in such
top-down Chinese nationalism is that only a strong China led by
the CCP can regain China's rightful international status and
respect and allow China to resist those outside forces or states that
seek to keep it down.14 Top-down Chinese nationalism is there-
fore part of the CCP's discourse, which holds that the historical
mission of the party is to lead the Chinese people out of poverty
and misery and fully realize the country's sovereignty. However,
top-down nationalism has become more and more difficult for the
Chinese leadership to control as it has also opened room for
activism and mobilization in Chinese society.
Nationalism has therefore developed into a two-edged sword
for the Chinese leadership. On the one hand, Chinese leaders can
use nationalism to mobilize the population with the aim of putting
pressure on other states and directing focus away from their own
weaknesses or mistakes. On the other hand, heightened national-
ist sentiment increases the ambitions of the leadership and the
expectations of the people that the leadership will act firmly in
conducting foreign and security policy. Nationalism thus puts

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378 Is China Becoming More Aggressive?

pressure on Chinese leaders in international negotiations and con-

flicts, where the Chinese leaders cannot appear weak or be seen as
giving in to external demands. Since the autumn of 2012, such
bottom-up nationalist pressure has been especially constraining
for the Chinese leadership in relation to a territorial dispute with
Japan in the East China Sea as well as in relation to territorial dis-
putes with several Southeast Asian states in the South China Sea.
In their analyses of Beijing's handling of these territorial disputes,
Chinese scholars specifically highlight how the Chinese leader-
ship is becoming more sensitive to public opinion, so that in such
disputes it does not risk being perceived domestically as soft and
passive.15 The dilemma, often framed as one between rationalism
and nationalism, is that in order to focus on its many domestic
challenges, the Chinese leadership needs stability in the region
and stable relations with important trading partners. However,
Chinese leadership also needs to meet rising domestic pressure to
demonstrate China's importance in the world by using growing
Chinese economic and military influence to ensure what are per-
ceived in China as legitimate rights and interests (de Jonquieres
2012).
The Chinese leadership also needs to ensure access to energy
and natural resources from abroad in order to deliver on the
domestic demands and expectations for a continuously high eco-
nomic growth rate in China, which also puts pressure on Chinese
foreign and security policy strategy. China is now active econom-
ically and politically in areas far beyond East Asia, notably in
Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East. This expanding global
Chinese presence creates interests that make it difficult to main-
tain a low-profile strategy.

New Political Forces

One argument against applying a neoclassical realist framework

that emphasizes domestic constraints on foreign and security pol-
icy behavior is that China is not a democracy; hence Chinese
leaders do not have to worry about domestic demands and expec-
tations. But my view is that Chinese leaders do need to worry for
reasons resulting from three decades of economic reforms and

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 Camilla T. N. Sorensen 379

consequent changes in Chinese society, including in the relation-

ship between the Chinese Communist Party and society. Over the
last three decades, a new kind of state-society contract has gradu-
ally emerged, but this contract is difficult to stabilize, especially
because ongoing developments in Chinese society are complex
and occurring rapidly. China is still an authoritarian political sys-
tem, where no opposition to the party is allowed. But in order to
continue the economic reform process, the Chinese political and
bureaucratic system has had to accommodate certain popular pres-
sures. For example, it allows more room for private economic ini-
tiatives and tolerates the emergence of a more vocal and active
civil society that often expresses disappointments and anger.
Whether the party and the Chinese political system can con-
tinue to control or even survive these developments, especially in
relation to maintaining unity at the top of the party and bureau-
cratic discipline, is a subject of much debate in China. The party
so far has been able to co-opt or suppress new groups and ten-
dencies in Chinese society, but this represents a continuous chal-
lenge to the party. As Nicholas Bequelin, a researcher affiliated
with Human Rights Watch in Hong Kong, has put it, for the Chi-
nese leadership, "Everyday politics is about how to handle social
demands - which ones to accept, which ones to channel, which
ones to suppress, which ones can be ignored" (Grant 2011). For
the foreseeable future the Chinese leadership will unquestionably
remain concerned about maintaining domestic legitimacy and its
monopoly on power.

Conclusion

Decisionmaking on Chinese foreign and security policy strategy

and behavior involves conflicting interests and pressures as well
as competing demands and difficult dilemmas. The Chinese lead-
ership has never before felt more pressured to respond to the com-
peting expectations and demands of the international system and
the diversified interests, expectations, and demands of a rapidly
changing society. Chinese foreign and security policy is currently
in a process of reconstruction to better fit the changing interna-

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380 Is China Becoming More Aggressive ?

tional system and China's role within it. In many ways, Beijing is
not yet ready to undertake a new international role and is uncer-
tain how to manage the challenges and inevitable tensions,
domestic and international, that may arise from China's rapid
development. China's external behavior is often seen by the inter-
national community as being irresponsible while also viewed by
the Chinese population as too weak. Consequently, China's exter-
nal behavior, rather than reflecting greater self-confidence and
aggressiveness, actually reveals an internally conflicted, inward-
looking, and reactive China.
Saying anything with certainty about how China will further
develop as a great power and the implications of that transforma-
tion for the international system is impossible. However, what can
be systematically analyzed and discussed are the main factors that
influence China's development as a great power. My purpose in
this article has been to present neoclassical realism as a useful
analytical framework to do such analysis in a structured way.
First, I analyzed China's development in relation to systemic fac-
tors: What kind of international system facilitated China's rise,
and within what kind of international system does it now act?
What are the derived dynamics of these systems? How is the uni-
pole, the United States, reacting to these changes in the interna-
tional system in general, and, more specifically, how is the United
States handling China's growing international role and influence?
The answers to these questions illuminate the primary constraints
on China's rise, but changes in Chinese foreign and security pol-
icy behavior are further influenced by certain domestic develop-
ments in China, the most important of which lie in state-society
relations and the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.
What does the Chinese leadership have to deliver domestically?
Which kind of Chinese foreign and security policy behavior will
satisfy domestic expectations?
To repeat, my article represents only one proposal for a neo-
classical realist analytical framework. I set out with an examina-
tion that could in an analytically structured way help answer the
question of under which conditions, international and domestic,
do we see different kinds of Chinese foreign and security policy
behavior. My analysis has highlighted some important conditions.

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 Camilla T. N. Sorensen 381

However, more work is needed, especially in specifying the extent

of the Chinese leadership's concerns about delivering on domestic
demands and expectations and the degree to which they influence
leadership decisions and behavior abroad. Hence, the neoclassical
realist analytical framework presented and applied in this article is
a first cut, for it does not yet present a clear formula for under-
standing the concrete constraints on Chinese foreign and security
policy that changing domestic and international expectations cre-
ate. Hopefully, however, I do point correctly to the main factors
with which a concrete analysis should start.
Neoclassical realism should still be characterized as a pre-
theory, because certain factors that are necessary to include in the
analysis are identified and argued for, but precise formulations of
hypotheses are not presented. The theory remains to be developed,
and as I aimed to show here, its further development as well as
closer study of the main factors and causal mechanisms behind
Chinese foreign and security policy could both benefit from
stronger integration. Doing so would also open the way to more
engagement with the debate among Chinese international relations
scholars.

Notes

Camilla T. N. S0rensen is assistant professor of political science at the Uni-

versity of Copenhagen, Denmark. She is also a visiting research fellow at
the School of International Studies, Peking University, where she is con-
ducting a research project under a grant from the Danish Research Council.
Her research focuses on international relations and East Asian security. She
has published articles in Asian Perspective, the Journal of China and Inter-
national Relations, and China Brief. She can be reached at CS@ifs.ku.dk.
1. See, for example, Mearsheimer (2010) and Friedberg (2011). In this
article "foreign and security policy behavior" refers to actual behavior, i.e.,
the policy outcome, whereas "foreign and security policy strategy" refers to
the official aim and position, i.e., the policy output.
2. For a detailed presentation and critical examination of such an expec-
tation see Swaine (2010).
3. Author's interviews with Chinese scholars, May 21-25, 2012, at the
School of International Studies, Peking University, and the China Foreign
Affairs University, Beijing; and in September 2012 at the School of Inter-
national Studies, the University of International Relations, and the Institute

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382 Is China Becoming More Aggressive?

of International Studies at Tsinghua University, Beijing. (Hereafter, author's

interviews.) See also Wang Jisi (2011).
4. See, for example, Wang Jisi (2011) and Wang Yizhou (2011). For an
overview of the debate among Chinese international relations scholars on
the Chinese taoguang yanghui (keeping a low profile) strategy, see Zhu
(2010).
5. For examples of how Waltz, in Theory of International Politics ,
includes foreign policy predictions even though strongly arguing against his
theory having this aim and ability, see Elman (1996).
6. Note that in this article I present neorealism and neoclassical realism
as complementary. This is in contrast to Rose (1998), for example, who
argues that neoclassical, offensive, and defensive realism must be under-
stood as competing theories of foreign policy. My argument is that neoclas-
sical realism maintains the causal primacy of structural variables. However,
neoclassical realists want to explain something different from what neoreal-
ists want to explain. Neoclassical realists share the aim of wanting to explain
the foreign and security policy behavior of states, and they develop more
specific expectations by setting up conditions that influence the effect of the
anarchic system on state behavior.
7. Regarding the willingness to sacnfice parsimony to increase explana-
tory power, see King, Keohane, and Verba (1994). For an interesting discus-
sion of how the inclusion of additional variables and setting up of more
specific behavioral predictions do not necessarily threaten the core of neo-
realism and therefore can be included in the same research program follow-
ing Lakatos's criteria, see Elman and Elman (1997).
8. Several contemporary realists have elaborated further on the concepts
of "balancing" and "bandwagoning" under unipolarity. They distinguish
between "hard balancing," meaning military buildups and alliances against
the unipole, and "soft balancing," referring to actions that do not directly
challenge the preponderance of the unipole but use nonmilitary means such
as territorial denial and entangling diplomacy to delay, frustrate, and under-
mine the policies of the unipole. They also distinguish between hard and soft
bandwagoning: the former is characterized by nonopposition to the unipole
but revision of key elements of one's own strategy to support the unipole
and establish military cooperation; in the latter, weaker and more ad hoc or
low-profile support to the unipole is present. Using these distinctions, the
prevailing argument is that in the context of unipolarity, soft balancing is the
most likely option if a secondary state seeks to balance the unipole. Hard
balancing is thus not to be expected because it requires a strong combination
of capabilities among the secondary powers, which is difficult to achieve not
least because of transaction costs and burden-sharing problems as well as
fear of punishment by the unipole. See Paul (2004).
9. For a similar neoclassical realist analytical framework emphasizing
the degree of state power, see Zakaria (1998). He highlights the degree of
autonomy from society as a key factor in the extent of state power. Auton-
omy from society depends in turn on whether there are strong and inde-
pendent societal actors with interests other than those of the state leaders.

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 Camilla T. N. Sorensen 383

10. See also the literature reviews and discussions in Hui (2005). For the
connection between state capacity and state legitimacy, see also Schweller
(2006). In particular, Schweller highlights the importance of "state coher-
ence" for the ability of states to respond to external threats, and more specif-
ically, the degree of "regime vulnerability." Schweller holds that in order to
balance an external threat effectively, a regime needs a high domestic polit-
ical capacity, i.e., the loyalty and compliance of the citizenry, the ability to
mobilize societal resources, and a pronounced ability to coordinate and
implement policies.
11. Along the same lines, Goldstein argues that the peaceful development
strategy is a transitional strategy with an "expiration date" (2005, 38-39),
because it is designed only for managing China's rise during the era of US
unipolarity.
12. Author's interviews.
13. Author's interviews. See also Godement (2010).
14. The political education of the Chinese population concerning China's
relations with the outside world is paradoxical. On the one hand, the Chinese
people are repeatedly told that mutual trust and respect are key components
in the "harmonious world" that China is intent on building. On the other
hand, they are regularly instructed never to forget the legacy of the 100
years of humiliation. This contributes to creating a kind of "national inse-
curity" (Jakobson and Knox (2010, 21).
15. Author's interviews.

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