THE lLlAKING OF

PAKISTAN
A Study in Nationalism
BY

K. K. AZIZ

Aghazetaleem.c
om

1967
CHATTO & WINDUS
LONDON
J/
/--':,f'
 Published by
Chatto and Windus Ltd
42 William IV Street
London W.C.2
*
Clarke, Irwin & Co. Ltd To
Toronto
The Memory of My Mother
for whom the heart aches with a sense
above all language

Aghazetaleem.c
CNDIANA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY.

om

© K. K. Aziz, 1967
Printed in Great Britain by
Cox and Wyman Ltd
London, Fakenham and Reading
 PREFACE
THIS book deals with Muslim nationalism in Imperial India
in jts four aspects. The first stage in the growth of a national­
ism is the evolution of a group into a nation. This is mainly an
historical development and occurs on the time-leyel. Chapters
1, 2, and 3 describe how the Indian Muslims came to look upon

Aghazetaleem.c
themselves as a separate national group,· how this affected
'Indian' nationalism and how it was consummated by the es­
I I tablishment of an· independent Muslim state. In brief, they
deal with the Muslim nationalist movement in its historical
and political aspects. The second stage (which, in terms of
time, may sometimes coincide with the first stage) arrives
when the national group begins to enunciate the principles and
ideals on which it claims a separate existence. The nation
I
I : justifies its nationhood on the philosophical plane. This may
take two shapes: r�ligion and culture. These two arguments
,,'' are the theme of Chapters 4 and 5, which deal, respectively,
' with the religious element and the cultural background of
Muslim nationalism. The last aspect chosen for study is the
om psychological factor in nationalism. How the Indian Muslims
took pride in being one nation, how they invented symbols to
represent their nationalism and created myths to reflect their
aspirations, how-they persuaded themselves of their own solid­
arity: this is the subject of Chapter 6. Chapter 7 examines the
two-nation theory on which the creation of Pakistan was
professedly based.
The Introduction describes the subject of the book and de­
fines its terms of reference. The Epilogue sums up the argu­
ment and raises some questions.
My wife has helped me in the writing of this book by checking
the references, reading the proofs and in sundry other ways.
I am very grateful to her.
I should like to thank my literary agents, Messrs. A. P.
8 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN
Watt & Son, and in particular Mr. J. H. McLaughlin of
the firm, for their valuable help in the publication of this
work.
K. K. Aziz.
The University,
Khartoum
April 1966 CONTENTS
I'
Ii Preface page 7
Introduction 11
Chapter
1. The Historical Factor: I

Aghazetaleem.c
17
2. The Historical Factor: II 89
3. The Political Factor 70
4. The Religious Factor 96
5. The Cultural Factor 122
6. The Psychological Factor 144
7. The Two-Nation Theory 168
8. The Epilogue 196
Bibliography 211
I'
om Index 219
I,1,

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 INTRODUCTION

'NATION', 'nationality', 'nationalism'-there is no more ex­

plosive set of words in modern political vocabulary, nor more
polemical. Whether you are a political philosopher in search of
a definition of 'nation' or a mere agitator claiming nationhood
for your people, ,the concept eludes you. But elusiveness is one

Aghazetaleem.c
thing, inertness quite another. When nationalism is on the
rampage no semantic defences will hold the storm; people
make their own definitions and die for them. No other word is
so heavily charged with emotional overtones; the discussion of
no other· concept attracts so many loaded phrases. To define
any controversial term is notoriously difficult, to try to do so i,n
such a disputatious field is to court disaster. For the curious
there is a vast literature on the subject in which he can wallow
to his heart's content.
To illustrate this confusion as well as to indicate the diffi­
culties of precise definition let us briefly see how at different
times different,people have played games with this triad.
'Nation' is essentially a European concept, and it is interest­
om ing to recall that during the Middle Ages groups of students
from one country working in the European universities were
called nations. The University of Prague, for example, was di­
vided into four nations: Bavarians, Bohemians, Poles and
Saxons. Medieval Oxford made the Trent a national barrier:
students belonged to different nations according as they came
from north or south of the river. Then people also spoke of a na­
tion of physicians, of smiths, of lawyers, and so on; we know
Ben Jonson's line, 'You are a subtile nation, you physicians.'
A day came when the raw facts of power eclipsed the narrow
importance of the profession, and Martin Luther was quick
to distinguish between folk and nation: the common people,
the lowly mortals, were the folk; the princes, the knights and
the bishops, the patricians who wielded political power, were
12 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN INTRODUCTION· 13
the nation. Henceforth political power and nationhood were and remade modern history, whicli. has drawn lines across
to keep company. The modern age had arrived. maps upon its own responsibility, which has killed millions in
Medieval Prague or Oxford might have had 'nations' amid national wars, and which has also made millions free? A study
their students, but they certainly had no 'nationalities'. The of modern nationalism points to thirteen conditions or beliefs
new word itself came into use in the second half of the nine­ which seem to make up its creed.
teenth century. But youth did not save it from multiplicity of The first and the most pre-eminent is the common group
meaning. Some people used it in the sense of a group of people feeling whicli-inspires the members of a nation. 'We all belong
who have certain things in common: you are.a nationality if to one nation' expresses this sentiment. The second, flowing
you have national aspirations, if you are a group potentially from the first, is the love for fellow nationals. This certainly
but not actually a nation. Others made it a spiritual or abs­ does not mean that, say, every Pakistani loves or likes every
tract or subjective aspect of nationhood: you have nationality other Pakistani; but it does mean that in a foreign country
if you feel that yo'"-i.i are one of a separate group. This subtle dis­ Pakistanis will tend to get together, or, on a personal level, in
tinction between 'being' and 'having' makes for ambiguity, and a quarrel with a Pakistani and a foreigner, other Pakistanis

Aghazetaleem.c
we need not go any further with nationality. will normally side with their compatriot. The third, which is a
We may be deceiving ourselves, but 'nationalism' seems to consequence of the first two, is common hostility to other like
lend itself to better handling. We may not be able to agree on a groups. Before 1947 the Muslims of India, who considered
definition acceptable to all. But there is substantial agree­ themselves a nation, looked with hostility upon the Hindus and
ment on the point that it is a sentiment, a consciousness, a the Sikhs. This hostility is in proportion to the threat which
sympathy, which binds a group of people together. It is the de­ one national group poses to the existence of the other. This
sire of a group of individuals, who are already united by cer­ feeling is inevitable in a country or geographical area occupied
tain ties, to live together and, if necessary, to die together. It by more than one nation, particularly if one national group
is the wish of a people, who feel that they are one, to go on feels tliat its existence is denied or opposed or threatened or
living as one. Admittedly this is not very illuminating. Rigor­ even criticized by the other, for example, in the pre-1947 Im-
ous reasoning can pick many holes in it. But must we define . perial India or in the pre-1919 Ottoman Empire.
before we can know? We know what toothache is without sit­ The fourth is a common territory possessed or coveted by a
ting down to define it. We can know something even without nation. Once the emotion of nationalism has been aroused,
understanding it. If understanding must come first, who om territory is the first and an indispensable step towards the es­
among us dare say that he ever loved a woman! Who among us tablishment of a State. In India the Muslims claimed the
will pause to define the ecstasy of love, the personal tragedy of Muslim-majority provinces as their homeland. The Jews have
death, the smell of a rose, or the glow of a star! similarly claimed and won Israel as their historical and national
This is not a flight of fancy. The argument presented here is home. The fifth is the existence of a common sovereign govern­
that nationalism, like so many other human experiences, is a ment or the desire for it.. This is the second step after a territory
state of mind. We know that we are a nation, therefore we are has been mentally demarcated and the claim to it staked.
a nation. It is not logic, it is intuition. It is not dialectics, it is Sovereignty, or politically speaking independence, is usually
instinct. It is not a thought process approved by the laws of the final goal of all nationalist movements. Freedom is the
reasoning. It is a conviction born of insight. It is a vision, an open sesame which has been invoked by all colonial peoples
awareness, which comes to us in the flash of a moment. That is struggling to be their own masters. The sixth is the existence of
what makes it irresistible. People die for their faith; they common moral, social or economic institutions or ideas. Medi­
rarely die in defence of reason. eval history provides some examples of nationalism (though
What are the articles of this strange faith which has made this word was then not used to describe the movement) based
14 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN INTRODUCTION 15
on the Christian religion. In our age nationalism has had such nationals, and hostility to other groups) which make up the
formidable inspirations as Communism, National Socialism emotional basis of nationalism. The second mentions the three
and Fascism. On a less powerful scale radicalism and reform­ factors (territory, sovereignty, and social ideas) which form its
ism have been the ingredients of.many nationalist movements. political and social apparatus. The third lists the four beliefs
The seventh is the possession of some common cultural (culture, religion, history, and character) which constitute its
characteristics, such as language, customs, manners, literature, spiritual equipment. The fourth portrays the sentiment of
art, music and folk-lore. If a person shares these with others nationalism on three. time-levels: pride in historical achieve­
and wants to go on sharing them he is a member of that nation. ments relates to the past, devotion to the national cause con­
Culture, in its broader sense, is the most lasting foundation of cerns the present, the wish to ·achieve greatness is a hope of the
nationalism. The eighth is common religion. In the secularism future.
of the twentieth�century religion has lost much of its force, Nationalism can be a sentiment, or a policy, or a myth, or a
yet it has produced the two most controversial nation-states dogma, or a doctrine. It is a sentiment when it is the love of a
of the post-war period-Pakistan and Israel. The ninth is common soil, race, language or culture. It is a policy when it is

Aghazetaleem.c
common history or common origin. Whether this history is a desire for independence, security or prestige. It is a myth
real or invented is pointless so long as the members of a nation when it is a mystical devotion to a vague social whole, the
believe in it and look upon certain common historical figures nation, which is more than the sum of its parts. It is a dogma
as national heroes. Similarly, though modern science rejects when it is a belief that the nation is an end in itself and that the
both the theory and the purity of races, the feeling of common individual lives exclusively for the nation. It is a doctrine when
racial origin may lead to solidarity of sorts, as the modern Arab a nation considers itself dominant among other nations or ag­
movements and the idea of pan-Africanism illustrate. The gressively strives to be supreme among them (the German
tenth is a common character shared by the national group. Nationalismus).
Geography, history, religion and culture combine to mould the These are different aspects of nationalism, not its defini­
contours of national character. tions. As a description each of them is narrow, inadequate and
The eleventh is a common pride in national achievements misleading. As an aspect each represents one facet and concen­
and a common sorrow in national tragedies. Traditionally this trates attention on it. Every nationalism is sui generis and
pride attached to feats of arms and this sorrow to military re­ takes on its character and shape from its context and environ­
verses. But in our technological age, scientific competition, om ment. Each is a mixture of all these ingredients-but never in
economic rivalry and even educational jealousy are largely equal proportions. It is a compound of all these in varying
replacing the race for armaments. The twelfth is simple devo­ combinations. One nation�lism will emphasize the element of
tion to the nation. 'My country, right or wrong' is one expres­ dogma, another that of sentiment, still another that of policy.
sion, an extreme one perhaps, of this feeling. The last is the The same nationalism may appear sometimes to underline its
hope that the nation will one day be great, or, if it is already doctrinal foundation and sometimes to over-accentuate its
that, the greatest in the world. This aspiration may work in mythical coqtent. However, it is unwise to underestimate or
many directions, depending on the nation's mood and back­ ignore the role of myths in nationalism, They are liable to ob­
ground: territorial expansion, military power, scientific ad­ sess the minds of their creators and thus to become not true but
vance or, in rare cases, academic glory. real. And a real myth is a sword which few know how to
The order in which these conditions have been given reflects sheath.
the riature and composition of nationalism. Each of the four
preceding paragraphs describes one stage in its evolution. The
first enumerates the three feelings (oneness, love for fellow
 .I
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I Chapter 1

THE HISTORICAL FACTOR: I

THE first Muslim conqueror to invade India was Muhammad

bin Qasim, who entered the sub-continent through the sands
of Sind in the eighth century, and opened the way to waves of
subsequent Muslim incursions. But it was not till the end of
the twelfth century that Qutbuddin Aibak established the first
proper Muslim Empire in India when he founded the Slave

Aghazetaleem.c
Dynasty. His successors ruled for a hundred years before giv-
ing way to the Khaljis, who occupied the seat of imperial au-
thority for another hundred years. The fourteenth and fifteenth
. I centuries were a period of uncertainty in Indian history and of
II decline in the prestige and power of the Delhi Sultanate. It is
quite possible that had the Sultanate completely collapsed and
left a vacuum behind it, a Hindu revival might have taken
heart and either driven the alien conqueror out of India or
absorbed him within its expansive fold.
India was rescued from this suspense and the Muslims from
this threat to their supremacy by the adventurous exploits of a
descendant of Tamurlane and Chingiz Khan. A hardy Chagh-tai
Turk by the name of Babur crashed through the north-west
frontier and swept everything before his courage and zeal.

om
After a convincing victory over Ibrahim Lodhi, the last
representative of the tottering Delhi Sultanate, at Panipat in
1526, he met the Rajputs, a foe worthy of his steel, at Khanua
in 1527 and crushed them in a decisive combat. With the two
most dangerous enemies thus 'disposed of, he proceeded
to found the so-called Mughul Empire -one of the greatest
and the most brilliant imperial pageants of all history. Babur
the lion-hearted Humayun the wanderer, Akbar the great, Jahan-
gir the just, ShahJahan the magnificent, Aurangzeb the puri­
tan-the world has nothing to match Babur and his five lineal
descendants who gave India peace and glory and fame for
nearly two centuries.

B
18 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE ALIGARH MOVEMENT 19
For the first time Muslim culture flooded the Hindu land of India. the Muslim began to have a glimmering of his nationh_ood
Persian became the language of the court and, in con- have been sketched in the last paragraph. The man who
junction with the Hindu languages, gave pith and point to moulded the circumstances, or acted with the tide of events
Urdu. Islamic forms of architecture mingled with the Hindu (for in fact both are the same things), was Sir Sayyid Ahmad
tradition and flowered into the glorious Indo-Islamic art of the Khan. Born in 1817 in a highly respectable family of Delhi, he
builder. The Taj Mahal was born to regale the art lovers of entered the service of the East India Company and rose to be
posterity.- Under the inspiration of the Persians miniature a judge. During the Mutiny he. did yeoman service for the
painting reached the acme of its perfection. In every sphere, English by saving many British lives, by refusing to lend
from revenue administration to culinary taste, the Mughuls set a his,ears to the blandishments and threats of Muslim 'rebels',
standard and bequeathed traditions and systems from which the and by per-suading many petty chieftains to give up their
later rulers were not chary of borrowing on a large scale. refractory attitude. In 1858 he wrote a pamphlet, Essay on the
Causes of the Indian Revolt (English translation 1860, 1873), in
THE ALIGARH MOVEMENT which he attributed the Mutiny to British ignorance of the
Indian mind. This was a brave thing to do in that dark hour of
The Mughuls were succeeded by the British and one imperialist sat

Aghazetaleem.c
bias and vindictiveness. In a well-argued narrative he tried to
in the seat of another. With the advent of the British, and
show that there might have been no revolt had the British
particularly after the Mutiny of 1857, the Muslims-awoke to the
rulers been less isolated from their Indian subjects and had
realization of their true position in India. So far they had either ruled
they kept in touch with Indian opinion and sentiment through
the country or 'enjoyed' the illusion of doing so. The exit of some sort of representative institutions, however rudimentary
the last Mughul monarch from the throne of Delhi was not only a
in character. In his next work, The L()yal Muhammadans of
symbol of their downfall (which'in effect had begun much earlier) India, he defended the Muslims against t4e British charge of
but also an end to their existence as a separate and dominant disloyalty. Retiring from service in 1876, he sat as a member
group in Indian political life. The British be-lieved that the 1857 of the Governor-General's Legislative Council from 1878 to
uprising had been staged by the Muslims, and this added the
1883. He died in 18!;)8.1
discomfiture of retaliation to the humilia-tion of defeat. For many Sayyid's services to his community may be summarized
years the Indian Muslim community floated in the minatory in three terse phrases: loyalty to the British, devotion to
atmosphere of suspicion, suffering and impotence. They had not educa-tion, aloofness from politics. He preached and
yet reconciled themselves to the changed political conditions, practised loyalty to the British rule. From his speeches,
not yet convinced that their in- writings and letters it is not difficult to read his mind. He
nings was played out. They were not very friendly wit;h the

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based his pro-British attitude on three strong foundations.
Hindus, whom they considered beneath equal privilege. They First, the only way of wiping off the stigma of Muslim
were distrusted by the new masters, secretly and at times instigation of the Mutiny was to make friends with the British
openly humiliated by the Hindus, and disowned by both. They and thus to make them disabuse their minds of the idea that
Muslims were their traditional enemies. He was sagacious
lost their moorings, their confidence, their hope. And, for the enough to realize that British control would not cease in any
first time, they realized with the anguish of bitterness that they foreseeable future. It was ordinary common sense to be on
were nothing but a weak, powerless, supine minority. This was good terms with the rulers. In the second place, his
the first casting of the seeds of nationalism, the first kindling of a sense of loyalty sprang from his
feeling of loneliness and prostration, the first awakening to the 1 For a contemporary and sympathetic account of Sayyid's life
need of solidarity.
see G. F. I. Graham, The Life and Work of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan,
Every political phenomenon is caused by two agents: cir­ London, first ed. 1885, rev. ed. 1909.
cumstances and personalities. The pircumstances under which
 I'. :
1'11 ', - -

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20 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE ALIGARH MOVEMENT 21
reading of the Hindu-Muslim problem. Hindus and Muslims longed to the Muslims. They were poorly equipped for political
,
:
were two unequal 'nations', and the latter would ever remain a adventure. Educationally and economically they had reached
I
minority in India. Every advance towards democracy would their nadir. With such crippling handicaps how could they
mean the depression of the Muslims under the rule of the dream of political agitation? They _must keep themselves
Hindu majority. Therefore he opposed the introduction of completely aloof from all political movements and devote
ii
parliamentary institutions as well as the increase in the re­ themselves to educational uplift. When the Indian National
1i
cruitment of Indians to public service by open competition. Congress was founded in 1885 Sayyid used every ounce of his
Such political principles, he said, could only be applied to a influence, prestige and reputation in keeping the Muslims
iii country inhabited by one nation. In India every step towards away from it. Unless the Muslims had freed themselves of the
I a representative goal would be one more rivet in Muslim suspicion of disloyalty and had educated themselves to the
chains. In the third place, he was sincerely convinced of the Hindu level, it was suicidal to join the Congress or any other
infinite superiority of the British (and European) way of life political organization. Sayyid was so uncompromisingly i'
to the Indian or Oriental. In his letters written from London critical of the Congress and its objectives as to declare that

Aghazetaleem.c
he paid magnificent, almost cringing, tributes to the English even if he heard that the Viceroy, the Secretary of State and
and went so far as to declare that in his opinion Indians were the whole House of Commons had declared for the Congress,
no better than animals and brutes. Such sentiments, expressed he would remain firmly opposed to it. 'It is my definite belief,'
with frank vehemence, dispose of the suspicion that he advo­ he said, 'that should the resolutions of the native Congress be
cated a Muslim-British rapprochement for purely political and carried into effect, it would be impossible for the British
strategic reasons. His call to the Muslims to cultivate the Government to preserve the peace, or control in any degree the 1:
British and to be faithful to them was not just a matter of violence and civil war which would ensue.'1 I,

I.
making amends for the Mutiny or of protecting the Muslim Converting the people to such a creed was an immense
minority against Hindu domination, but a genuine conviction undertaking. For his pro-British attitude Sayyid was dubbed
that it was only from and through the British that Muslims a sycophant and dismissed as a toady. His enlightened views
could learn to improve their status and to stand on their own on education earned him the wrath of many a Muslim who
feet. passedfatwas (religious doctrinal decisions) declaring that his
His second slogan was: 'devote yourself to education; this is innovations were corrupting the Muslim youth. For his criti­

om
your only salvation.' He saw that now that the Muslims had cism of the Congress ardent Indian politicians poured contempt
lost their imperial sway over India they must compete with on him and charged him with harbouring anti-democratic,
other Indians for jobs and preferments. Good education was anti-nationalist and pro-imperialist sentiments. But he per­ '
the only key to political and economic progress. Education severed and continued to preach according to his convictions. I
/

was an obsession with him, and records show that he went Slowly but steadily he gained converts to his cause, and be­ ,,
1,

about his self-imposed task of providing avenues of education fore his death in 1898 he could, with satisfaction, look back
to his people with almost insane perseverance. In 1875 he es­ along the lengthening track of life.
tablished the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Ali­ Muslim India was yet not. a nation by he:rself. Nor did she
garh with money collected through mendicant tours, begging claim-sucn a fitle.Ifo.tthe - Muslfini had b�gun to Took upon
letters and supplicant speeches. _th���elves as a separate eritity, ·a diffefe1ff community, a·
For Sayyid politics was an unnecessary and undesirable groupapart. This -feeling of separateness from others and of
f
encumbrance. The Muslims were under a cloud. The British ---- onenesi
- -among themselves was the first foundation and the
frowned upon t);iem. The Hindus were fast inheriting the in­ first · symptom of Muslim nationalism in India. In future,
tellectual and material superiority which not so long ago be- 1 Quoted
in The Times, 12 November 1888.
22 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE INTERREGNUM 23
whatever course the political developments took, there was of the head. They were catching up in education. The Aligarh
only a remote possibility of a complete fusion of the Muslims College was producing graduates who could fill the vacancies
and· others. in government offices reserved for Muslims. They had begun to
The work of Sayyid Ahmad Khan was carried forward by take an interest in trade and commerce and industry. Sayyid's
his colleagues and junior partners at Aligarh. Their combined policy was bearing fruit. Hope sprang in the hearts of mer,t and
efforts produced what is commonJ.y known as the Aligarh some leaders even began to think political thoughts.
Movement. It was fundamentally a cultural movement aiming
at a regeneration of liberal values in literature, social life, edu­ THE INTERREGNUM
cation arid religion. By the turn of the century the Muslim community was .pul­
In literature it stood for simplicity of diction, purity of sating with new ideas. Much had been achieved, though much
ideas and an imitation of nature. Hali, the poet and literary remained undone. The old generation, which had tasted the
critic, occupies in this respect the position enjoyed by Words­ bitter fruit of defeat and disgrace, was succeeded by a new
worth in the Romantic Revival of English poetry. In social generation, young in heart, fresh to the opportunities of life,

Aghazetaleem.c
matters the Aligarians strove for honesty in daily intercourse, aware of its solidarity and hopeful of the future. For them the
communal sympathy and the cultivation of unaffected habits. old injunction of aloofness from politics was losing its topical
In education, the Aligarh College aspired to be a university and, utility. Events no longer justified it. The Hindus had organized
in the meantime, upheld Sayyid's ideal of a balance between the a Congress, formulated their demands and made the British
learning of the West and the mores of the East. In religion the aware of their existence and their aspirations. Seeds of repres­
movement represented a shift towards reason and anti-fanati­ entative institutions, sown by the Indian Councils Act of
cism. The unhealthy influence of the half-educated mulla 1892, might at any moment sprout into more far-reaching re­
(priest) was counteracted by explaining, in simple but elegant forms. It was unwise to depend entirely upon the good opinion
language, the fundamental principles of Islam and by relating of the rulers, though _it was a cause of much gratification. The
them to the sanction of human reason. age of political action was dawning and those who did not see
The Aligarh Movement was not short of human resources, the signs of the time would be left behind. Muslims must
and distinguished writers like Hali, Shibli and Nazir Ahmad organize themselves into a political movement, not only to
put their shoulders to its wheel. Sayyid Ameer Ali was, strictly consolidate what had been achieved but also to make further
speaking, not of the movement, but he shared its ideals and in om advances and win new concessions from the powers that were.
his own way furthered them. His Spirit of Islam was a new But traditions die hard. Some leaders, bred in the stable of
interpretation of Islam and Islamic history written with erudi­ Sayyid; still hesitated to take the plunge. The Sage of Aligarh
tion and enthusiasm. His biography of the Prophet wielded had -qttered a ban on politics, and the ban must stand. The
gTeat.influence on the new generation of Indian Muslims, while Oracle had spoken, and his word was final. Events had yet to
his advocacy of such matters as female emancipation and the prove the invalidity of his admonition, and unless new portents
reform of Muhammadan personal law affected the community's appeared on the political horizon no rash decision should be
thinking. taken.
The impact of this reformism was revolutionary. The Events in Bengal soon took the decision out of their hands.
Muslims developed a confidence in themselves and in their. In· October 1905 Lord Curzon, the masterful Viceroy, an­
traditions. They came to respect themselves. The pessimism nounced and implemented a partition of Bengal with the divid­
of the post-Mutiny days gave way to what was almost a feeling ing line between the Hindu west and the Muslim east. This
of buoyancy. No longer was their loyalty questioned in British harmless-looking administrative act and its consequences made
quarters. No longer did the Hindu dismiss them with a shake the decision for the Muslims.
 24 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE INTERREGNUM 25
Curzon's chief argument was that Bengal was too unwieldy Eastern Bengal and Assam f ormally came into being on 16
to be administered efficiently by one Li�utenant-Governor; To October 1905.
those who wanted Bengal to be put under a Governor and an The Hindus, particularly those of West Bengal, did not take
Executive Council he replied in ·a letter to the Secretary of kindly to this change. They charged the Government with
State for India: 'Government by 'one man is infinitely better having favoured the Muslims by giving them a province in
than Government by three men if it can be so managed. What which they formed a majority, having 'vivisected' the Bengali
we want in India is personal knowledge of localities and per­ homeland, having disrupted the Bengali 'nationality'. and
sonal touch with the people. This can only be gained by the having injured the 'nationalis,t' and 'patriotic' movement and
familiarity of the Head of the Administration with the places spirit of the people of India. The Bengali-speaking people were
and people under his charge. With a triumvirate as a ruling cut asunder. A deadly blow had been struck at the culture of
power this is quite impossible, and Bombay and Madras are Bengal.
both, in my view, illustrations that the weak points are in ex­ But contemporary evidence suggests that the Hindu opposi­
cess of the merit of the system. ' 1 His original plan had been to tion was not without ulterior motives. The partition was re­

Aghazetaleem.c
take away one or two districts of Bengal and put them into the sented because the high caste Hindus desired to have the state
charge of the Assam Chief Commissionership. Later he ap­ of things which existed before the advent of the Muslims and
preciated the force of the opposition to this scheme and, reply­ of the low castes for jobs. The educated Hindu feared that the
ing to the addresses presented to him during his Bengal tour of creation of a Muslim-majority province would tend to deprive
1903-4, he clearly laid it down that he would consider the him of his existing monopoly of influence and office. The new
larger project of increasing the size of the territory to be cut change had led to the development of Chittagong as a port, and
away from Bengal and of creating a new province, large and the Hindus of Calcutta feared it as a possible rival. 1 In brief,
i 1
I
I important enough to have a Lieutenant-Governor with a the Hindus, first of Bengal and later also of other provinces,
Legislative Council. obj<?cted to the creation of a Muslim-majority province.
1

The Secretary of State for India sanctioned this scheme in The Muslims, on the other hand, rejoiced at the partition.
June 1905. Large territories were transferred from Bengal to Six days after the partition was enforced, on 22 October 1905,
the new province, which was given the official title of Eastern a large Muslim meeting was held at Dacca at which the speaker
Bengal and Assam. It contained a population of 31 million, of impressed on the assembly the boon conferred on them by the

om
whom 18 million were Muslims and 12 million Hindus. Bengal change. On 24 October another big gathering offered thanks to
was now left with 54 million inhabitants, of whom 42 million God that the partition had been carried into effect. Speeches '
I
I

were Hindus and 9 million Muslims. 'In short,' said the White dwelt on the many advantages to the Muslims, who 'through
Paper, 'the territories now comprising Bengal and Assam will the division of Bengal would be spared many oppressions
be divided into two compact and self-contained provinces, the which they had hitherto had to endure from the Hindus'. On
largest constituents of each �f which will be homogeneous in the first anniversary of the partition in 1906, Muslims met
character, and which will possess clearly defined boundaries throughout Eastern Bengal to adopt a memorial to the Secre­
and be equipped with the complete resources of an advanced tary of State for India expressing gratification that he had de­
administration'. 2 The Proclamation of the formation of the clared the partition to be a 'settled.fact'. The Muslim League,
new province was issued in September and the province of , which had been formed in 1906, passed a resolution in Septem-
•
1 Quoted in Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon, 1928, Vol. II, 1 See Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, April 1907, pp. 298-4;
p.824. Quarterly Review, July 1907, p. 215; H. E. M. James, 'Ambition and
a East India (Reconstruction of the Provinces of Bengal and Assam), Sedition in India', National Review, June 1907, pp. 686-9; and The Times,
1905, Cd. 6258. 14 April 1906.
111:,·
,1,, ;I

ii
I i
26 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE INTERREGNUM 27'
ber 1908, hoping that the Government would 'adhere to this Muslim areas.1 Thus the Muslims interpreted the Hindu
settled fact'. The higher arose the crescendo of the anti-parti­ agitation against the partition as nothing less than an attempt
tion agitation the greater was the apprehension of the Muslims to · maintain Hindu superiority over them in, among other
lest the British Government might surrender to the Hindu de­ things, public services.
mand for a repeal of the partition. Therefore, not content with To the Hindu assertion that the partition cut at the root of
mere resolutions, the Muslim League sent a letter to the Under Bengali 'nationality', it was pointed out that the word 'Bengal'
Secretary of State on 11 November 1908, in which it expressed had no definite historical or geographical meaning before it was
the grateful acknowledgement of the Muslims for the Secre­ adopted by the British as a designation for a large administra­
tary of State's (Morley) intention not' to interfere with the tive unit. The partition still kept 'Anga Banga' together and
partition, and warned that any change would cause serious segregated from them the trans-Gangetic Divisions of Bengal.2
dissatisfaction among the Muslims. 1 Then there were precedents for divisions and mergers of
One of the most effective weapons in the agitators' hands Indian provinces when the populations affected by them had
was the swadeshi movement, or the boycott of all British• registered no protest. In 1892 Sir Charles Elliott, as the Lieu­

Aghazetaleem.c
made goods. Hindus insisted that Muslims should also boycott tenant-Governor of Bengal, had advocated the· cession of a
foreign goods and refuse to sell them. This was distasteful and part of the province of Assam. 3 The Delhi Divisfon had been :I
unacceptable to the Muslims, who had little sympathy with the transferred to the Punjab. The Saugar and Narbada territories
agitation of which the boycott was one weapon and had no had been taken away from the North-Western Provinces and
quarrel with the British or their textile manufacturers. More­ added to the Central Provinces. Oudh had been abolished as a
over, it was detrimental to their livelihood in so far as they separate unit and merged with the North-Western Provinces.
lived on the trade in foreign cloth. When Hindus, in their zeal The . small province of Khandesh had been twice partitioned
on behalf of the agitation, used physical coercion or intense between 1870 and 1899. In none of these cases had the people
social pressure on reluctant Muslim shopkeepers. and traders, made any 'serious issue of the matter.
some sort of communal trouble was inevitable. As the swade­ This convinced the Muslims that the Hindu agitation for the
shi, or India-made, article was often inferior to the foreign modification. of the partition was in its aims as much anti­
article in quality, and higher in price, the poor Muslim natur­ Muslim as anti-British. An innocuous administrative decision :l
ally resented 'the sacrifice he has been compelled to make in the had been made into something connected with the revolting 'I

om
interests of an agitation that he has no sympathy with'.2 ideas of matricide and deicide. It appeared that the Hindus I
Further, the Muslims contended that, under the old regime were not prepared to countenance the creation of a Muslim­
when they were governed from Calcutta, they had no fair majority province. This, in the Muslim eyes, was very signifi­
chance of progress. The Hindus, a minority in the total popula· cant, for it exposed the hollowness of the Congress claim that
tion, held ten times as many appointments as the Muslims. it stood for Hindu..,.Muslim unity and did not distinguish be­
Five times as many Hindus held judicial posts and they practi­ tween a Hindu Indian and a Muslim Indian. It reinforced the
cally monopolized the Bar. An unusually small proportion of Muslim feeling that their interests were not safe in Congress
European officials was appointed to the eastern districts, with hands, that they would never be treated fairly and justly by
the result that Hindu officials ruled over overwhelmingly the Indian 'nationalists', and that any broad-based Indian
1 See Renter's messages, Manchester Guardian, 25 and 27 October 1 'The "Partition"
of Bengal: In the New Province I', The Times, 2
1905; The Times, 6 November 1906; ibid., 7 September 1908; ibid., 26 April 1906.
December 1908. 2 Sir George
Birdwood, letter to The Times, 17 August 1905:
2 India correspondent's dispatch of 16 May 1907 from Calcutta, Man­ 3 A. C. Elliott,
'The Unrest in India', Empire Review, June 1907, pp.
chester Guardian, 3 June 1907. 383-4.
 28 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE BEGINNING OF POLITICS 29.
nationalism was bound to be Hindu (or at least not Muslim) in Hindus. A contemporary Hindu observer noted that it was
character. from the end of 1906 that the Hindus became conscious of a
The era of politics had set in and it was no longer possible to new kind of hatred for the Muslims. 'We began to hear angry
shut one's eyes to political changes and keep travelling on the comment in the mouths of the elders that the Muslims were
apolitical path mapped out by Sayyid Ahmad Khan. This led coming out quite openly in favour of partition and on the side
straight to the idea of the establishment of a Muslim political of the English.... A cold dislike for the Muslim settled down
organization. in our hearts, putting an end to all real intimacy of relation­
Another important factor contributed to this change in the ship.' 1
climate of opinion. The principle of representation had been Between 1902 and 1905 Muslim leaders had made some
established in the provinces by the Indian Councils Act of attempts to negotiate with Hindu politicians. The Aga Khan
I 1892. Now rumour ran that this principle was to be extended to had remonstrated with Sir Pherozeshah Mehta about the
I a wider field. Therefore to safeguard their future interests the necessity of persuading the Congress to gain Muslim confidence.
1. Muslims drafted a plan of separate electorates and laid it before When these efforts failed, it was felt that the only hope lay in

Aghazetaleem.c
the Viceroy at Simla on 1 October 1906 through a representa­ the establishment of a Muslim political body to secure 'inde­
tive deputation headed by the Aga Khan. The Simla Deputa­ pendent political recognition from the British Government as
tion, as it is generally called, argued for two points of policy. a nation within a nation'.2 The All India Muslim League was
First, in all elections in the provinces and in local areas Mus­ accordingly established in December 1906 at a meeting of Mus­
lims should be represented by Muslims alone, and these re­ lim leaders in Dacca.
presentatives should be elected by purely Muslim electorates. The Muslim League was thus the child of four factors. First,
Secondly, Muslims must have more seats and greater represen­ the old belief uttered by Sayyid Ahmad Khan that the Mus­
tation than their numerical strength warranted because of lims were somehow a separate entity. Secondly, the Hindu
their 'political importance' and their greater contribution to character of the Indian National Congress which did nqt allow
the 'defence of the Empire'. The Viceroy, in his reply, agreed the Muslims to associate themselves with other Indians.
with the substance of the Address and promised to recommend Thirdly, the agitation against the partition of Bengal which
it to the India Office. The gulf between the Hindus and Mus­ conveyed to the Muslims the Hindu designs of domination.
lims, already widened by the Bengali agitation and its Hindu And, finally, the Muslim desire to have their own exclusive

om
undercurrents, was now to manifest itself on the constitutional electorates for all representative institutions.
plane. The communal rift was becoming irrevocable. The years 1906-11 constitute a period in which the Hindu-:-­
Muslim rift continued to widen and deepen almost beyond re­
THE BEGINNING OF POLITICS pair. On the Hindu side, these years were big with the anti­
This long swing of events brought the Muslims face to face British and anti-Muslim agitation in Bengal and other parts of I

with the issue of political action. It was no longer possible to India. Tilak was the most prominent leader who, by his ortho­ /

avoid politics, for the march of events had already pushed dox religious views an� belligerent political action, alienated
them into the arms of constitutional agitation. They could not the Muslims from the mainstream of Indian nationalism
join the Congress because, in the words of a Muslim leader of and renewed their faith in the British. On the Muslim side,
the time, 'tied to the wheels of the Juggernauth of majority these years saw the foundation of the Muslim League, the
they would in the end be crushed out of the semblance of 1 Nirad C. Chaudhuri, The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian,
nationality'.1 They espied a new aggressive attitude among the 1951, pp. 238-7.
1 Ameer Ali, 'India and the New Parliament', Nineteenth Century, Aug­ 2 The Memoirs of Aga Khan: World
Enough and Time, 1954, p. 76. My
ust 1906, p. 257. italics.

I,
i 80 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE BREAK WITH THE BRITISH 81
I
I establishment of separate Muslim electorates and the begin­
ning of the feeling that Muslim interest lay in continued co­ THE BREAK WITH THE BRITISH
operation with the British and in severe aloofness from the These halcyon days were brought to an abrupt end by the re­
Congress. peal of the partition of Bengal. The new province of Eastern
The pith of Muslim policy during these turbulent years is Bengal and Assam had been making good progress. Its ad­
well delineated in the Aga Khan's letter of September. 1908 ministration was firmly established and its economy was show­
addressed to the Deccan Provincial Muslim League. 'British ing steady improvement. The agitation was admitted by the
rule-not only a titular sovereignty, but a vigorous force per� Government to be dead.The general condition of law and order
meating every branch of the administration-is an absolute was gratifying. Political crime had greatly diminished, the
necessity. Therefore I put it to you that it is the duty of all vernacular press no longer reeked of sedition, and outrages
true Indian patri0ts to make that rule strong. . . . This is a were more infrequent than at any time during the previous
duty which lies not only upon Muslims, but equally upon the five years.1 The authorities were said to be too firmly con­
Parsees, the Sikhs, upon all who are convinced of the bene­ vinced of the administrative value of the division to attempt

Aghazetaleem.c
volence of British rule. . . . These are the patriotic ideals any modification. Any reversal of policy was liable to bring
which, I think, should animate the Muslim community at the dangerous results.2 Nevertheless, in December 1911 the parti­
present juncture....Ours must be not a luk;ewarm patriotism, tion was annulled.
no passive unemotional ·acquiesence in the established order. Lord Hardinge, who had succeeded Minto as Viceroy on 23
It must be a living, controlling, vitalizing force, guiding all November 1910, wrote to the Secretary of State for India on
our actions, shaping all our ideals....Rather should it be our 25 August 1911 that the partition was resented by the Ben­
task to persuade by precept and example those Hindus who galis, though he confessed that the Muslims had benefited by
have strayed from the path of true progress to return to it.'1 it and were loyal and contented.He suggested a 'modification'
By and large this advice was followed by Muslim India. of the partition based on two conditions. First, it should
Only a .few Muslims·joined the Congress and they did not re­ duly safeguard the interests of eastern Bengal and generally.
present the mainstream of Muslim feeling. British rule was conciliate Muslim sentiment. Secondly, it should be so clearly
stoutly defended and bravely supported. The continuance of based on broad grounds of political and administrative ex­
the partition of Bengal and the grant of separate electorates pediency as to negative any presumption that it had been

om
were made the central issues on which the Muslims tested the extorted by clamour or agitation. Muslim interests were to
British recognition of their loyalty. Muslim leadership of be safeguarded by the special representation they enjoyed in
the time was of a high order and succeeded in influencing the Legislative Councils. His scheme was to reunite the five
the British Government in Muslim favour. In Britain' the Aga Bengali-speaking divisions (an administrative area into which
Khan and Ameer Ali did yeoman service to the Muslim cause provinces were divided) into a presidency administered by a
and it was mostly due to their efforts· that the partition· of Governor in Council; to create a Lieutenant-Governorship in
: '
I Bengal was allowed to stand and Muslim prayer for separate Council of Behar, Chota Nagpur and Orissa; and to restore
I representation was answered by the Morley-Minto reforms of the Chief Commissionership of Assam. Simultaneously the
I
.1909. In India the Muslims were trusted and respected by the capital of India was to be shifted from Calcutta to Delhi.
i imperial rulers. It was a comforting. thought that their as­ Action on these lines, he claimed, would be a 'bold stroke of
pirations were not disregarded and that their loyalty was ap­ 1 Asiaticus, 'India: Lord Minto's Viceroyalty', National Review,
preciated. The Anglo-Muslim amity was as mutual as it was November 1910, p. 526.
deep. 11 Special Correspondent's dispatch from India, The Times, 8 February

text in The Times, 7 September 1908. 1909.

I'
1 Full

I,
I,
I
 32 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN
·, THE BREAK WITH THE BRITISH 33
statesmanship' and would 'open a new era in the history of l This amendment in the constitution of the League seems to
India'. have conveyed, at least to some minds in Britain, the impres­
The Marquess of Crewe's reply was phrased in equally en­ sion that Muslims were no longer loyal. To answer such re­
thusiastic terms. Giving his immediate sanction to the Vicer­ flections cast on their attitude, 1 and to clarify the situation
oy's scheme, he wrote on 1 November 1911, 'I cannot recall in ai-ising out of their new: ai�s and ideals, a Muslim deputation
history, nor can I picture in any portion of the civilized world went to England towards the end of 1913, to apprize the
as it exists,, a series of administrative changes of so wide a Ministers and other officials of the essential feeling of the
scope ....'1 The decision was announced by the King in person community. But the Secretary of State refused to receive it on
at the Coronation Durbar at Delhi on 12 December 1911 the ground · that an interview would be misunderstood by
Muslim reaction to this change was dumbfounded astonish­ other Muslims who claimed equally with the Muslim League to
ment and bitter s..oreness. It gave rise to a feeling of distrust in represent the political temper of Muslim India.2 Obviously
the future promises and actions of the Government. It irri­ Crewe was thinking of such 'loyalists' as the Aga Khan, whose
tated the Muslims, who believed that they had been sacrificed traditional loyalty to Britain did not permit them to co-oper­

Aghazetaleem.c
to appease the Hindus. It alienated them and weakened their ate with the League after 1911 aiid who shortly afterwards
trust in British stability of purpose.It was a lesson that loyalty left its fold, giving place to others better equipped to lead the
paid no dividends, that the Government listened only to agita­ community in changed circumstances.
tion and sedition, and that the Muslims had been foolishly From 1858 to 1905 the Muslims had been cultivating the
wrong in believing in British sincerity. Bombs alone led to British. From 1906 to i911 this amity blossomed into friend­
boons.The failure of the Muslim policy of loyalty was proved ship. From 1911 to 1922 their relations may be described as
to be as signal as the triumph of the Hindu policy of contu- ranging from an armed truce to open warfare.This evolution .
. macy. may also be expressed in another way.From 1858 to 1905 the
Hardinge was right-though unwittingly-in telling Crewe Muslims stood outside the political arena; from 1906 to 1911
that his scheme would open a new era in Indian history. For they were schooling themselves in constitutional politics;
the Muslims it heralded a new age of intense political cons­ from 1911 onwards they,.or at least most of them, were agi­
ciousness and activity. A marked change came over their tators preaching'with full-throated ease the gospel of disorder
politics.They began to feel deeply that the Government was and sedition. There is still another way of describing this de­

om
unable or unprepared to protect their rights. Official promises velopment. From 1858 to 1905 the Muslims were in a state of
could no longer be trusted. The policy of 'sturdy loyalty', neutrality vis a vis the Hindus; from 1906 to 1911 the Hindu­
practised in the face of Hindu jeers, had brought no reward. Muslim rift was first marked and later ominous; from 1911 to
Their first gesture of challenge was a resolution, passed by the · 1922 the two communities co-operated against what they
Muslim League at its annual session held in December 1912-' considered a common enemy-Britain.
January 1913, changing the League's aim from 'loyalty' to a This entente produced quick results. The Muslim League and
'form of self-government suitable to India'. Suitable is the the Congress met in a joint session in 1916 at Lucknow and
operative word, for the Muslims still refused to identify them­ formulated common , reform proposals to be put before t�e
selves with the Congress demand for unqualified self-govern­ 1 This is very significant. Even in the flush of their anti-British emotion
ment.They retained the right to modify self-rule in accordance they were careful to maintain at least the appearance of a loyal ,attitude.
with their needs and aspirations. The concept and history of Muslim ,loyalty in Imperial India_ should
1 Text of letters in Announcements by and on behaif
of His Majesty the form a fascinating subject of study for a modern psychologist.
King-Emperor at the Coronation Durbar held at Delhi on the 12th December, 2 See Muhammad Ali's interview in the Manchester Guardian, 2

1911, with correspondence relating thereto, 1911, Cd. 5979. December 1918. ,
C
 34 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE BREAK WITH THE BRITISH 35
Government for immediate implementation. By the terms of Lucknow agreement was contained in the famous Montagu
this Lucknow Pact the League, besides endorsing the Con­ announcement of 20 August 1917, the pith and substance of
gress demands, resolved to send a deputation to England which was the sentence: 'The policy of His Majesty's Govern­
immediately after the war to present the Indian claims in co­ ment, with which the Government of India are in complete
operation with a similar deputation from the Congress.1 In its accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every
next session at Calcutta, on 31 December 1917, the League branch of the administration, and the gradual development of
endorsed the Congress resolution urging the necessity of a self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive
Parliamentary Statute containing complete responsible govern; realization of responsible government in India as an integral
ment; but it stipulated three conditions: (a) adequate Muslim part of the British Empire.'
representation in Councils, public· services and universities; This sentiment was soon given a practical shape when
(b) no displacement of Persian characters from the Urdu Montagu visited India from November 1917 to April 1918 and,
language; and (c) no interference with the Id-uz-Zuha and in co-operation with the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, held dis­
Muharram festivals.2 cussions 'with Indian leaders of all opinions. The result of these

Aghazetaleem.c
The Lucknow Pact is of outstanding importance in the de­ conversations and the Viceroy-Secretary of State deliberations
velopment of Indian Muslim nationalism for two reasons. It was the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, which was published on
was the first Hindu-Muslim compact in modern Indian history 8 July 1918.1 The proposals of the Report were supported by
and, in the hopes of several leaders on both sides, was expected all the members of the Council of the Secretary of State and of
to lay the foundation of a permanent united action against the the Viceroy's Executive Council, and were welcomed by the
British. It was also the first and the only occasion when the non-official members of the Imperial Legislative Council,2 but
Hindus not only conceded separate electorates to the Muslims were severely criticized by the Muslim League and the Con­
but agreed to the quantum of Muslim representation in differ­ gress. The Report's plan was so far removed from that of the
ent provincial legislatures and at the centre. Though some Congress-League scheme that no attempt was made to ar­
prominent figures in both camps criticized the nature and range a compromise, and the official recommendations were
terms of the concordat, yet there is no doubt that for the nas­ drafted into a Government of India Bill, which passed through
cent Muslim nationalism it was for the moment a victory Parliament in 1919 and received the Royal Assent on 23 De­
without qualifications-though, as will be seen later, a victory cember. The Act gave separate representation to the Muslims

om
of doubtful ultimate advantage. To bring round the Congress, and also extended it to one other minority, the Sikhs.
which had been bitterly condemning separate electorates Here we must break our chronological order and go back a
since 1906, to their point of view was no mean achievement for little to take notice of another important development. Be-
the Muslims. But, as we will see in the next chapter, it was not . sides the repeal of the partition of Bengal there was another
so much the genius of Muslim leadership as a fortuitous con­ factor equally, or perhaps even more deeply, responsible for the
stellation of circumstances which brought forth this unique anti-British feeling of the Muslims from 1912 onwards. This
turn of events. was the Khilafat issue. It is studied in greater detail in the
The Congress-League scheme of reforms was, however, not chapter on the religious factor, but here a short reference to it
I',,
only far ahead of the times but in fact did not aim at realizing is in order to make the story clear.
responsible government. It contented itself with leaving an Briefly, the Indian Khilafat movement was a purely Muslim
irremovable executive at the mercy of a legislature which campaign in favour of Turkey and her Sultan. The Muslims
could paralyse it without directing it.. The official reply to the felt that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the only
1 Manchester Guardian, 2 January 1917. 1 Cd. 9109 of 1918.
2 Ibid., 8 January 1918. 2 V. Lovett, India, 1923, p. 194.
 I,

36 THE MAKING OF PAKI STAN THE BREAK WITH THE BRITISH 37

surviving Muslim independent country, must be maintained at 1919-21..The spirit of Lucknowwas yet strong and theBritishre­
all costs. This was predominantly a political feeling, though with jection of the Congress-League scheme of reforms strengthened
a not inconsiderable religious basis. But added to this was a the strands of unity. Hindu-Muslim fraternity manifested it­ i
purely religious sentiment which looked at the Turkish Sultan
as the Khalifa of the Muslims of the world, and which therefore
self on all levels. Politically, .the two communities had practi­
cally coalesced and for the first time forged. a united front
I.
I,
interpreted any dimunition of his authority as an assault upon against the British., Religiously, the Hindus had shown great I:
I,
the sovereignty of the supreme Islamic personality. The Turco­ tactical skill in espousing the alien and purely Islamic cause
Italian War of 1912, the Balkan Wars of 1912-14, the Turkish ofKhilafat. Socially, the Hindus and Muslims were now 'breth­
participation in the Great War on the side of the Central ren unto each other', and all sorrows and triumphs were equally
Powers, and the defeat of Turkey in 1918-these develop­ shared. So solid and strong was the new friendship that some
ments were acutely embarrassing to Muslim India. Circum­ Hindu religious leaders, who had a little earlier been castigated I'
''
stances seemed to conspire to doom the tradition of loyalty. as unpardonable enemies of Islam, were now invited by the
The Muslims, on the strength of their friendship with Britain, Muslims to preach from the pulpit of the Royal Mosque of

Aghazetaleem.c
expected in 1912 that Whitehall would help Turkey. When Delhi. Solidarity, born of expediency; could go no further.
they were disappointed in this hope they related it to the Delhi Moral: my enemy's enemy is my friend.
Durbar decision, put two and two together, and concluded that But those who had let themselves be dazzled by this show
Britain was deliberately trying to crush the Muslims in India of unity and had predicted a long life for it were proved false
as well as elsewhere. The Balkan and the Great Wars streng­ prophets. Even when the Lucknow compact was yet quite
thened this belief, and at the end of the hostilities when the fresh Hindu-Muslim riots reared their ugly head. Patna passed
Allies forced the Treaty of Sevres on the tottering Ottoman into the hands of Hindu mobs and heads were broken with
edifice Muslims got wild with anger. Treason was openly lethal avidity. The Government resolution on these disturb­
preached and the anti-British sentiment reached a· pitch of ances minced no words and declared that for the like of such
extremity unmatched in the history of British rule in India bloodshed, one had to go back to 1857. Innumerable minor
(the Mutiny fell under the regime of the East India Company). riots followed, but the limit was reached in 1921 when there
The pressure was so intense that the British Government had was a communal explosion in Malabar. The Moplas of that
to revise its attitude and to give in to Indian feeling. The Treaty area, mostly primitive Muslims of mixed Arab descent, fell
of Lausanne, which replaced the severe and stern Treaty of
Sevres, satisfied the Indian Muslims, though this satisfaction om upon the Hindus who lived amongst them and tore them to
pieces. So fierce and widespread was the onslaught that the
was short-lived. When Mustafa Kamal abolished the institu­ army had to be called in and for many months Malabar lived
tion of Khilafat and a little later the Sultanate (monarchy) under martial law. At one fell stroke the carefully nurtured
itself, there was disappointment among the Indian Muslims and unity was shot to ribbons. Never again were the two 'nations'
panic among the orthodox. But of this more later. to come together in any sphere of life. The spirit of Lucknow
From our point of view the importance of the Khilafat lay was irrevocably dead.
in two things. It was anti-British and it was, at least tempor­ Was this orgy of religious strife connected with the 1919
arily and on the surface, a further bond between the Hindus reforms? Some thought so and their main argument was that
and the Muslims. It had to be anti-British, for Turkey had the provision of separate electorates was responsible for the
fought Britain and Britain was on the dictating side in the aggravation. But this provision was not new and had dated
peace negotiations. What is interesting is that the bulk of from 1909. It could also be argued that the abrogation of com­
the Hindus, led by Gandhi, made a common cause with the munal representation would provoke still more violent friction.
Muslims and fully participated in the extremist agitation of On the larger question whether any future reforms were at all
 38 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN
possible in view of Indian disunity, The Times' comment1 was
both wise and prescient. The next instalment of reforms should
continue to safeguard the rights of the religious and political
minorities and to maintain the reserved powers of the pro­ Chapter 2
vincial governments. To those who took this to be a reaction­
ary thought, the journal addressed the pertinent question: will
Indian nationhood be advanced by presenting powerful minori­ THE HISTORICAL FACTOR: II
ties with potent grievances or by seeking to deprive the
executive of the authority necessary to preserve Indian THE Montagu-Chelmsford reforms came into operation in
political unity until Indian national union became a plain and 1921. In the provincial field they erected the system of 'Dy­
irrefutable fact? - archy', i.e., a division of powers between the responsible
1 The Times (leader), 19 June 1926. ministers and the irresponsible executive councillors. Some
subjects were made popular and given into the charge of

Aghazetaleem.c
popularly elected ministers who were responsible to the pro­ 1,
I
,,
:i : vincial legislatures. And some subjects were reserved to the
Governor, who administered them through appointed execu­
tive councillors who were not accountable to the provincial I'.
assemblies. The idea was to train Indian politicians in re­ I
ti,
presentative government before trusting them with full powers ,.
I:
in all fields.
THE SIMON COMMISSION
The essentially transitional character of the 1919 reforms was
so well known .to the Indian leaders that they began to cla­
mour for the next instalment of reforms even before Dyarchy
had worked for a year. The 1919 constitution had stipulated

om
that after ten years the Government would again go into the
question of constitutional progress. The terms of reference of
this inquiry were to be to investigate the working of the system
of government, the growth of education and the development
of representative institutions. It was finally to report on the
extent to which it was desirable to establish the principle of
representative government, or to extend, modify or restrict the
degree of responsible government already in existence. But the
Indian demand for a revision of the constitution became so in­
sistent that in 1927 the Government of India Act of 1919 was
amended so as to enable the Government to hold a fresh in­
quiry before the expiry of the ten-year period.
Accordingly, on 26 November 1927, the appointment of a
Statutory Commission was announced. With Sir John (later

I"
 !i!t.,
.

:JII
,. .I

THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE NEHRU REPORT

40 41
!I
,I

Lord) Simon as chairman the Commission was charged with mendations of an all-White investigating body. Britain had
1/ the duty of investigating the Indian constitutional problem in not heeded the Congress-League scheme of 1917 and would
i
1
:!
all its implications and to draw up recommendations for future again disregard whatever the Indians proposed. Anyway, there

If
action. In India the appointment of this body was received was no point in negotiating with unsympathetic, arrogant, re­
ii
with acute disappointment because it contained no Indian on actionary rulers.
its panel. Indian critics of its personnel took it as a slight on The co-operators had different views. They pointed out that
, 'I their ability that an all-British body would determine their many Hindus had expressed their disapproval of the Lucknow
,: 1j: future. What they forgot was that, in the first place, it was a Paet. The Congress now was in principle once again opposed to
1ri ,, 1 parliamentary commission appointed by Parliament and re.:. separate electorates, and was carrying on an energetic propa­
: 11
quired to report back to Parliament, and, in the second place, ganda to this effect in Britain. It was therefore all the more
jll
11

that Indian disunity practically excluded the possibility of important that they acquainted the Commission of their stand.
any two Indians agreeing on their recommendations. Indian Communal representation was essential to Indian order and ''''
1

.1 ;.
I,

participation in the Commission would )lave· created serious progress. The Hindus could not be trusted to the extent of sur­

Aghazetaleem.c
problems. Was it to contain some Indians or more Indians rendering the safeguard of separate electorates. Hindu domina­
I than British? Were all Indian parties to be represented on it
I
tion was the real danger and Muslim security could only be
I or only the major ones? And, in what proportion? Would the assured by co-operating with the British and putting their
I Indian members reach unanimous conclusions? Would their views before the Commission.
i recommendations be acceptable to Parliament or even to all
, I
Indians? THE NEHRU REPORT
:
The Indian Legislative Assembly resolved by a majority of In his speech in the House of Lords announcing the appoint­

f!
six votes to boycott the Commission, while the Indian Council ment of the Statutory Commission, Lord Birkenhead, the
of State (the upper chamber) decided to eo-9perate. 1 The Con­ Secretary of State for India, had explained why no Indian had
iJlj! gress was uncompromisingly opposed to it and called for a been put on the panel and had asserted that no unanimous re­
·l,''1. complete boycott. Small minorities favoured co-operation. port could be expected from a body with Indian representa­
I'
Muslims were split. One section, led by Sir Muhammad Shafi, tion. A Hindu Report or a Muslim Report or a Sikh Report was
I I
✓ proclaimed support, while the other, led by Jinnah, shared the possible, but not an Indian Report. This was resented by the

om
''

iJI'
Congress view. In sphe of the Manchester Guardian's appeal not Congress leaders, who immediately decided to draft a consti­
!
to class the British investigators among the Untouchables but tution to confound the India Office. An All Parties Conference
to admit them to society and to attend to their education, the had already been convened to bring together all the non-co­ i
q
'I

iljl:,I
Congress and the 'Jinnah League' persisted in their opposition. operating groups. Now this Conference appointed a committee
The non-co-operating Muslims got a good press-as non-co­ to draw up a constitution for a free India. Motilal Nehru pre­

l
f
I

,I .t

i1r1ilI
operators always did-but it is wrong to think that they re­ sided over these deliberations and gave his name to the.
presented a majority o f the Muslims. Exact figures are not Committee as well as to the Report. There were two Muslim�
available, but it is safe to say that the Muslims were almost among its seven members-Ali Imam and Shoaib Qureshi.
1
equally divided between the· co-operators and the non-co­ Both were unrepresentative of their community and had long
1.:i
I'
1
1
I operators. The arguments of the non-co-operators were the ago been repudiated by the great majority of the Muslims.
11'i j,j
Iii I same as the Congress's. India was not represented on the Shortly afterwards the Sikh member of the Committee was
Commission; this was a deliberate insult. Britain had no disowned by the Sikh League. The Indian Christian Conf erenee
right to impose a constitution on India through the reeom- also dissociated itself from the principles adopted by the Re­
1 Resolutions of 18 and 28 February 1928, respectively. port on the protection of minorities.
 j
42 'l'Hlt MAKING OF PAklSTAN THE COMING OF FEDERATION 48
✓ The Nehru Report, published in August i928, made the days of the Khilafat were fled, never to return. The unity of
Hindu-Muslim rift final and irrevocable. It recommended a · the Congress-League scheme was buried deep under the debris
fully responsible system of government in which the majority of communal riots. Gandhi's emphasis on Hindu-Muslim unity
would be sovereign. Muslim electorates were to be imII1:ediately sounded unreal in juxtaposition to his ultimatum to Britain
abolished. that the non-implementation of the Report would lead to
Muslims were shocked into unity. Members of the Central chaos. The fundamental Muslim demand for separate represen­
and provincial Assemblies found it impossible to agree with tation-conceded in 1909 by the British and in 1916 by the
the Report.1 The Aga Khan doubted if any serious-minded Hindus-was rejected by the Report and by the Congress in
person could imagine the Muslims accepting such 'degrading' unqualified terms. The Muslims were completely disillusioned,
proposals.2 The United Provinces All Parties Muslim Con­ and from 1928 onwards the Congress became all but in name a v'
ference repudiated.the Muslim members of the Committee. 3 In Hindu body. The Muslims would henceforth look upon it as·
March 1929 the two groups into which the Muslim League had the arch-enemy of their claims and interests.
been split came together in opposition to the Report. When, In retrospect it is now apparent that the Nehru Report was

Aghazetaleem.c
on 12 March 1929, the Report was debated in the Indian Legis­ a blessing in disguise to Muslim natio�alism. It united the
lative Assembly all the Muslim members, including Jinnah, · Muslims as nothing else could have done at that time. All
who had sided with the Congress in boycotting the Simon Com- political differences and personal rivalries were hushed. From
mission, rejected it in such · strong terms that The. Times this moment onwards there was nothing that could be called
correspondent reported: 'The solidity of Muslim feeling in the 'Indian nationalism'. A separate Muslim national feeling had
Assembly was. not unexpected, but certainly disturbing to by now grown almost to maturity, though it was not given a
those trying to represent the Nehru Report as a demand of a name for another ten years.
united India. Henceforth such a ciaim must be manifestly
absurd.'4 THE COMING OF FEDERATION
On the other side the Congress made the rift irrevocable by In the meantime the Statutory Commission had finished its
not only adopting the Report in its entirety and congratulating labours and the Simon Report was finally published in May
the Committee on 'their patriotism and their far-sightedness', 1980.1 The first volume surveyed the entire Indian problem
but also by giving notice that if the British Government did and the second, published after an interval of a fortnight, set

om
I
not accept it by December 1929 the Congress would launch a forth the Commission's recommendations for constitutional
I ! non-co-operation movement.5 advance. Historians have lavished much praise on Simon's
There is little doubt' that the Nehru Report conferred the handiwork and, though sometimes overrated, it is certainly an
real power upon the Hindu majority and envisaged a Hindu impressive treatment of an exceedingly complicated problem.
raj. At least that was the impression it conveyed to the Muslim In the fullness of its study, the depth of some of its observa­
mind. The Lucknow Pact had been forgotten. The good old tions, the lucidity of its argument, the realism and reasonable­
1 Resolutions of 7 and IO September 1928, The Times, 8 and 11 Sep­
ness of its approach, it is a commendable essay at constitution
tember 1928. making. Few vVhite Papers have surpassed it in comprehen­
2 Aga Khan, 'A Constitution for India: The Nehru Scheme', ibid., 12 siveness, authority and practicability. In the first volume may
October 1928. be found one of the most ably reasoned refutations of the claim
a The Times, 7 November 1928. that India was a 'nation' in the sense in which France or Swe­
4 Ibid., 18 March 1929. den were nations.
0 Resolutions of 3 November and 31 December 1928, respectively; The publication of the Simon Report was followed by. three
texts in Thf:! Times, 5 November 1928 and 1 January 1929. 1 Cmd. 3568 and 3569 of 1930.
44 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN I THE COMING. OF.,.. FEDERATION 45
Round Table. Conferences convened in London by the British •
II The second Conference opened in the autumn of 1931. The
Government to determine the contents of the future constitu­ communalissue was seriously tackled and the Aga·Khan, acting
tion on the basis of the Report's proposals. The first met in the as the spokesman of all the minorities, negotiated with Gandhi.
winter of 1930--31. The Congress was absent because it insisted But Gandhi, the sole Congress delegate to the Conference, refused
that the Conference must not discuss whether India should or to consider any compromise. until the Muslims accepted the
should not receive responsible self-government' but must Nehru Report in its totality. Upon this all the minorities ex­
shape a constitution on the assumed basis of a free India. All cept the Sikhs drafted a joint demand of claims and presented
other parties attended and the Aga Khan was elected the head it to t�e British Government as their irreducible minimum.
of the total Indian delegation. Most of the work was done This was not only a 'Bill of Minority Rights' but also furnished
through the Federal Structure Sub-Committee and. gradually the Prime Minister and his colleagues with an extremely
the federal plan t0ok shape and substance. valuable guidance for their own future procedure if the settle­
Muslims went away from the first Conference with the ment of the outstanding principles between the Hindu minority
impression that the British Government was more interested and five .out of six chief minorities was to be left in their

Aghazetaleem.c
in Hindu aspirations than in Muslim apprehensions and that hands.1
iµsufficient attention had been paid 'to their wishes and to Muslim demands at the Conference were based on the reso­
their power to make these wishes effective\ Ramsay Mac­ lutions passed by the All India Muslim Conference at Delhi on
donald's speech at the close of the session, delivered on 19 4 and 5 April 1931. In summary they were: residual powers
January 1931, was particularly resented by them as a tactless .with the provinces; separation of Sind from Bombay; full
slight upon their community. They took exception to the autonomy for the North-West Frontier Province; reforms in
Prime Minister's remark that the question of Muslim safe­ Baluchistan; transfer of power direct to the provinces; separ­
guards was the kind of thing which had better be settled by ate 'electorates; .special. Muslim weightage in all political
Hindus and Muslims together.1 Such attempts had not taken bodies; constitutional sanction for· the enforcement of basic
anyone far in the last quarter of a century. In the last resort rights; safeguards against communal legislation; adequate
the British Government would have to intervene, 'to settle, Muslim representation in Ministries; proportionate representa­
and to stand by some allocation of power and representation' tion in public services; and amendment of the constitution
between the two peoples. Muslims were reluctant to make only with the concurrence of the 'provinces. The real signifi­
material reductions in their demands in order to support the
Hindus in their demand of Home Rule, because they believed om cance of these demands must be realized. The aim was to gain
complete control over north and north-west India and then
that the real aim of the 'old, orthodox Hinduism' was to gain to feel secure and confident that the Muslim's culture and
full mastery of the new India. The absence of the Congress religion would develop and expand and that 'he would protect
had given an air of unreality to the proceedings of the first the scattered minorities of his co-religionists in other parts of
Conference, and early in 1931 the Labour Secretary of State India'.2 Read with Sir Muhammad Iqbal's address to the Mus­
(Wedgwood Benn) asked the Viceroy, Lord Irwin (later Earl lim League in December 1930 (tQ which we will refer later) this
Halifax), to open peace negotiations with the Congress leaders. interpretation of.Muslim demands came very near the heart of
This was· done in February and in March the so-called Gandhi-' the matter. Muslim nationalism was coming to the point of de­
Irwin Pact was signed which smoothed the way to Congress manding a territory for its consummation.
entry in the second Conference. However, the second Conference ended at a dismal note. No
1 The Times (leader), 13 November 1931. Text of the joint claims in
1 Resolutions of the All India Muslim Conference Working Committee
of 7 February 1931, The Times, 9 February 1981. See also Empire Re­ Cmd.3997,pp.68-73..
view, February 1931, pp. 83-84. 2 Raund Table, March 1932, pp. 287-8.
46 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE COMING OF FEDERATION 47
agreement was reached on the Hindu-Muslim issue and it was seven from the States were appointed as assessors to the
clear to all that the British Government would have to assume Committee. The five Muslim co-optees were the Aga Khan, Sir
the difficult task of arbitration. There were three obvious Zafrullah Khan, Sir Abdur Rahim, Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan
and Sir A. H. Ghuznavi. The Committee was at work from
reasons for the Government to give the final verdict.First, they
were morally bound to attempt by unilateral action to resolve April 1933 to November 1934, and finally reported to Parlia­
ment on 22 November 1934.1 The Report was debated in the
L I
the deadlock.Secondly, they were politically committed to see
that the process of transfer of power was not arrested by com­ House of Commons on 10-12 December 1934, and in the House
munal bitterness. Thirdly, they were bound by the explicit of Lords on 18 December. The second reading took place in
warning of the Prime Minister himself, given on 1 December February 1935, and after the third reading the India Bill
1931, that in case ,of a deadlock the Government would have finally reached the statute book on 24 July 1935.
to give its own award.1 The fact was that it was impossible to Never before had the British Parliament taken so long and
make any progress in constitution making without ,first de­ worked so hard on a colonial constitution. Never before had
termining the proportion of Hindu and Muslim shares in the India figured so prominently and so consistently in Hansard.

Aghazetaleem.c
proposed legislatures. Never again was Britain to lavish so much care and ability on
The last, and the least important, Conference was held in India.For those who had a hand in the making of the 1935
II 1'
November-December 1933. The Congress was again absent reforms it must have been heart-rending to see in later years ''
their handiwork torn to pieces in India and the pieces cruelly
j

and most Indians had by now lost all interest in the London
deliberations. The broad lines of the coming constitution were thrown into their faces. History provides no instance of a
now common knowledge and only details remained to be filled in. constitution prepared so studiously and tried so partially and I:
I:
The results of the long labours of the three Conferences were perfunctorily. i'

collected, sifted and summarized in a White Paper issued in The federation set up by the Act of 1935 was the closer
March 1933.2 It faithfully translated the measure of agreement rather than the looser type. Hindu unitarianism had pre­
reached at the Conferences. But the chief Muslim objection vailed, particularly in the composition of the federal legisla­
was that it created a strong centre. The Muslims urged that the ture.2 The Muslims objected to it because, to them, a strong
provinces should be granted maximum fiscal, administrative centre meant an increase of Hindu strength.They were also I >
I'

and legislative autonomy.Further, they demanded a slightly opposed to the central government having the power of inter­ I

om
increased proportion of the British Indian seats in the federal ference in the criminal administration of the provinces, as this
upper chamber over the one-third they had originally asked would have enabled a Congress Cabinet in the centre to para­ ''
for, as no effective means were available for securing the lyse the administration of a Muslim province.3
necessary seats among the States to make up the proportion. The Muslim League found the federal scheme to be 'funda­
They also wanted the provincial governments to control the mentally bad', 'most reactionary, retrograde, injurious and
public services adequately. 3 fatal .. .', and rejected it. However, it undertook to work the
A Joint Committee of both houses of Parliament was provincial part of the constitution 'for what it is worth'.4 The
appointed to consider the White Paper. Constitutionally this 1 Parliamentary Paper, H.L.6 (I Part I) and H.C.5 (I Part I) of 1984.
body was exclusively composed of members of Parliament, 2 R. Coupland, India: A Re-Statement, 194.'i, p. 144.
but twenty representative Indians from British India and 3 William Barton, 'The State and the White Paper', Empire Review,

See Economist, 26 March 1982.

1 January 1984, p. 21.
4 Resolution No. 8 of the All India Muslim League of 11-12 April
Cmd. 4268 of 1988.
2

3 Resolutions of the All India Muslim Conference Executive Board of 1986, Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from May 1924 to De•
26 March 1983, The Times, 27 l\:larch 1938. cember 1936, Delhi, n.d., pp. 66-67.
 48 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE CONGRESS RULE 49
Congress turned down both the parts of the Act, but decided because they had faith in its moderation. As this postulate
to contest elections and to wreck the constitution from the in­ was absent in India, these powers had been given to the
side. Governors to protect the minorities from oppressive majori­
ties. As Hindus were in a majority in most provinces, it was
THE CONGRESS RULE natural that they disliked the safeguards. It was equally
Elections to provincial assemblies were held early in- 1937 and natural for the Muslims to •insist on them as they formed a
the Congress won majorities in eight provinces. But it refused minority in most provinces. No Governor could lawfully con­
to form governments unless the safeguards incorporated in the tract himself out of statutory provisions: the demand was thus.
Act were suspended and the Governors undertook not to inter­ unconstitutional. The reserve powers were an integral part of
fere with provincial administrations. This started a controversy the constitution and could not be abrogated except by Parlia­
as to whether the�Congress was or was not justified in making ment itself. The Governors could not treat the Congress as a
this demand, and as to how far the Governors were right in re­ privileged body exempt from the provisions by which all
fusing to exercise a responsibility placed on them by the provi­ other parties were bound. The precautions so carefully inserted

Aghazetaleem.c
sions of the constitution and by the Instrument of Instructions were not meaningless formalities which could be tossed aside
issued to them on their appointment. For our- purpose this under pressure. The Muslim ministries of the Punjab and Ben­
controversy, though one formally between the Congress and gal had not made any such demand. Why should the Congress
the Government, has much significance partly because the be made an exception?
Muslims had accepted the 1935 Act only because it contained A little later, however, the controversy was sUenced by a
certain safeguards and partly because this demand • made statement of the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, assuring the Con­
them suspicious that the Congress wanted to impose a gress that the Governors would not use their special powers
Hindu raj on Ind�a without any constitutional restrictions unnecessarily. The Congress accepted this assurance and took
on its freedom of action. Already, in March 1937, Edward office. But the fact that such a demand had been formulated
I, Thompson, who knew the Congress mind well, had predicted and pressed by the Congress was, to the Muslims, full of omen.
'I that the Congress would work the constitution so that when, Already, at the Round Table Conference, they had been alarmed
in the summer of 1939, Germany declared war and Britain by Gandhi's insistence.on the Nehru Report. The Congress atti­
I I
withdrew her forces from India, it could take charge of the tude to the Communal Award was another straw in.the wind.

om
whole country. 1 Now the demand for doing away with the safeguards was
This demand was not received kindly by either the Muslims indicative of the Congress's growing ambition to rule India on
or the British. The Congress was repudiating the authority of the principle of majority rule without its essential ingredient
the Parliament and jeopardizing the whole edifice of the con­ of the voluntary acquiescence of minorities.
stitution. Its demand amounted to the plea that the Governors The advent of the Congress to power opened a new chapter
should bargain away the powers with which they had been ex­ in modern Indian history in more ways than one. For the first
plicitly entrusted against the contingency of political defeat. time responsible governments were installed in the provinces.
The minorities, and especially the Muslims, had accept�d the For the first time the Congress tasted the heady · wine of
constitution only on the strength of these safeguards and to power. And for the first time the Muslims realized what this
demand their scrapping at the very opening of the. new regime meant to them. Some salient features of Congress rule must be
I
I would only increase their apprehensions. Pure democra(?y mentioned here.
I:,
:',: postulated that minorities bowed to the will of the majodty One was that the Congress ministries were acc�untable, not
'i 1 Thomas Jones's letter to Lady Grigg of 19 March 1937, see Thomas to the legislatures which had elected them or to the electorates
Jones, A Diary with Letters, 1931-1950, _1954, pp. 325-6. which had given them the mandate, but to the High Command
,ii
I D
 I
I

50 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE CONGRESS RULE 51

of the party. Strict control was exercised and even in minor administrations was recorded, verified and published. Sir 1
matters ministers were obliged to take orders from the Con­ Reginald Coupland admitted that there was some truth in
gress Committee. This rigid application of party discipline was these charges, and in 1939 The Times India correspondent re­
aimed at maintaining at all costs the unity of the Hindu na­ ported that authority in the United Provinces was disinte­ ,,
',
tionalist movement. 1 Some likened it to the Nazi machine in grating, that law and order were not being maintained, that I
Germany 2 and noted how provincial assemblies wilted under administration of justice was being tampered with, that the ,,
'·

local bosses as parliaments in Europe wilted before a Nazi services and police were losing confidence, that agrarian dis­ ,I
✓ protector. 3 Though the Congress leaders justified this ,innova­ content was spreading widely and that communalism was
tion on the ground that the Congress was a nationalist move­ more rampant than ever. Petty Congress officials were inter­
ment fighting for freedom rather than an ordinary political fering with the police, and the Government had issued a circu­
party forming a government, yet this practice was certainly lar asking the district authorities to consult local Congress
at variance with democratic principles. The 'first true attempt leaders. 2 A shocking example of Hindu into,lerance was given
to apply British parliamentary democracy to India at once by Sir Michael O'Dwyer, when he quoted a directive issued by

Aghazetaleem.c
produced a system which was not recognizably British'.4 What the Congress chairman of a Local Board in the Central Pro­
is even more important, this practice was not in accordance vinces to the headmasters of all Urdu schools, which were
with the underlying assumptions of the ·1935 constitution, attended by Muslim boys, to order the students to worship
which had envisaged provincial autonomy as a training (the words puja ki jawe were used) Gandhi's portrait. 3 In
ground for self-government rather than as a testing ground for short, 'there was every sign that the new constitution signified
nationalist totalitarianism. a Hindu raj, pure and simple'.4
Another feature was the Congress refusal to share power By now it is a commonplace to connect the Congress rule
with the Muslims. The Muslim League and the Congress mani­ with the emergence of the idea of Pakistan. Such an authority
festoes issued for the 1936-7 elections were so close to each as a former Secretary of State for India, L. S. Amery, believed
other that most observers looked forward to co-operative coali­ that it was the conduct of the Congress ministries that had
tion ministries. But the Congress was not prepared to abandon driven the Muslims to separation. 5 What the Congress rule had
its claim to speak for the whole of India and insisted that the taught the Muslims without a shadow of doubt was that
handful of its Muslim members were the only authentic re­ administrative guarantees, the Governors' Instruments of

om
presentatives of Muslim India. 5 When the Muslims asked for Instructions and constitutional safeguards were not effective
coalitions, the Congress refused unless the Muslim League 1 See Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the Council of the All
merged itself in the Congress machine and ceased to exist as an India Muslim League to inquire into Muslim Grievances in Congress
independent body. Provinces (Pirpur Report), Delhi, published at the end of 1938; Report of
Muslims were quick to recognize the extent and depth of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the Working Committee of the Bihaf'
Hindu hostility, and each atrocity perpetrated by Congress Provincial Muslim League to inquire into some Grievances of Muslims in
Bihar (Shareef Report), Patna, March 1939; and A. K. Fazlul Huq,
1 L. F. Rushbrook Williams, 'The Indian Constitutional Problem', Muslim Sufferings under Congress Rule, Calcutta, 1939.
Nineteenth Century, March 1939, p. 285. 2 The Times, 27 .June 1939.
2 T. K. .Johnston (I.C.S. retired), letter to Manchester Guardian, 9 3 M. F. O'Dwyer, 'India under the Congress', National Review, .July

October 1938. 1939, p. 47.

3 George Schuster and Guy Wint, India and Democracy, 1941, p. 171.
4 H. G. Rawlison, The British Achievement in India: A Survey, 1947,
4 C. H. Philips, India, 1948, p. 133. p. 214.
6
R. Coupland, Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, Part II, 5 L. S. Amery in Asiatic Review, .January 1941, p. 85, and in My

1943, p: 15. Political Life, Vol. III (1955), p. 109.

52 THE MAKING 'OF PAKISTAN TOWARDS SEPARATION 53
protection against the coming of a Hindu raj in which they contemplated unless the Congress had rid itself of its Fascist
would be relegated to the unenviable position of a permanent aspiration to dominate lndia. 1 The significance of the Congress
minority. One historian of Indian nationalism has concluded demand was that it would have given the Hindu majority the
that the unexpected accession to power had warped the judge­ power to impose a constitution on the minorities. What the
ment of Hindu leaders. 1 But this observation does hot take Hindu leaders did not realize was that any imposition of a
into account the fact that the Congress ambition to rule over constitution that was not voluntarily accepted by the Muslims
India singlehanded was at least as old as the Nehru Report, if would lead to disruption and an irretrievable split in the
not older, and till his death Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru justified his country. But such considerations did not weigh with the
1937 decision to refuse coalition with the Muslim League. Any­ Congress which continued to pass a resolution pressing this
way, the Congress rejection of the idea of co-operative living demand at every annual session. Thus by the end of 1939 'it was
with the Muslims was a fatal mistake which wrecked all widely believed that, if the Congress Government had lasted
chances of a united India and practically ensured a partition much longer, communal fighting would have broken out on an
on religious lines. unprecedented scale. The idea of a "civil war" had been an al­

Aghazetaleem.c
Muslim reaction to the end of Congress rule was indicative most inconceivable idea so long as British rule was still unques­
of their feeling of extreme disquiet. When the Congress minis­ tioned, but now many Indians were saying that it was coming'. 2
tries resigned en bloc in October 1939, Jinnah called upon his
people to observe a Deliverance Day on 22 December to mark TOWARDS SEPARATION
the end of tyranny and oppression. This daY was widely cele­ As was said above, the Muslim reactioff to Congress rule may
brated, not only by the Muslims but also by those Hindus and be said to have led directly to the idea of Pakistan. The more
Parsees who were displeased with the way the Congress had used the Congress insisted on a strong centre and a constituent
its power. 2 Christians and hundreds of thousands of untouch­ assembly the more it raised Muslim apprehensions. Jn 1935-7
ables joined in the demonstrations. 3 This showed most clearly Jinnah had opposed the 1935 constitution because it did not
the depth of communal feeling, and even those4 who termed it concede responsible government at the centre. After the ex­
an 'unwise action' which postponed the hopes of India's attain­ perience of Congress rule in . the provinces he had to revise
ment of full nationhood conceded that it was a retort invited his views. Provincial autonomy was a substantial concession
by the action of the Congress itself. towards resp�msible government, and he had seen how the Con­
The Congress had been voicing a new demand since 1934.
This was for the establishment of a constituent assembly elec­ om gress had used this power. If similar responsibility was ex­
tended to the centre, Congress rule over the whole of India
ted by Indians to determine and draft the future constitution would be unavoidable. And a Congress-dominated central
of the country. Obviously such a body would be predominantly government would n�ify the autonomy of Muslim provinces.
Hindu and therefore incapable of safeguarding Muslim in­ What was the remedy? A very weak centre might have satis­
terests. The Muslims were not prepared to see the communal fied the Muslims, but the Congress was adamant on a strong
problem solved on a simple majority basis, and the idea of an federal government. In the face of these possibilities the Mus­
assembly amounted to just this. No such proposal could be lims r·efused to have any centre at all. If the Hindus wanted to
1 Sir Verney Lovett in Quarterly Review, October 1941, pp. 264-5. ·
have a strong centre, let them have it. But then let the Muslims
2 The Times, 27 December 1939.
have their own separate centre. This was partition: the Muslim
3 S. Srinivasan, 'Communal Problem in India', Empire Review, reply to Hindu unitarianism. This was Pakistan: the Muslim
January 1941, p. 25. retort to Hindu hegemony.
'For example, Sir Alfred Watson, Asiatic Review, January 1940,
1 Observer, 25 November 1939.
p. 65. 2 R. Coupland, India: A Re-Statement, 1945, p. 187.
 54 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN TOWARDS SEPARATION 55
It was in December 1930-that Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the Middle East. The word 'Pakistan', coined by Rahmat Ali
poet, delivered his presidential address to the Muslim League himself, was formed from the initials of the component un_its -
annual session at Allahabad. In this speech he said that the P for the Punjab, A for the Afghan Province (North-West
principle of European democracy could not be applied to Frontier. Province), K for Kashmir, S for Sind, and TAN for
India. Communalism was indispensable to the formation of a Baluchistan�and meant literally, 'the land of the· pure'
harmonious whole in a country like India. The Muslims of (pak=pure+stan=land). Iqbal's idea of a Muslim federation
India were the only Indian people who could fitly be described within a larger Indian federation might or might not have in­
as a nation in the modern sense of the word. And then he spired Rahmat Ali, but the latter was at pains to emphasize
came to the famous sentence which has· earned him the title that his scheme was essentially different from Iqbal's, since it
of the father of the Pakistan idea: 'I would like to see the involved the creation of an entirely separate Muslim Indian
Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan federation. It is interesting to recall that when the Muslim
amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the League representatives appeared to give evidence before the
British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation Joint Committee, and were asked if any .such scheme existed,

Aghazetaleem.c
, of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to they vehemently denied that any responsible Muslim had put
I,:'
,1

I me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North­ forward such a plan and, in so far as the League had considered
111
1

,, ': West lndia.' 1 it, they thought the idea was 'chimerical and impracticable'. 1
It must be remembered that Iqbal did not argue for a Mus­ In India itself the Pakistan idea did not make any progress at
lim State, but only for a Muslim bloc in an Indian federation. all until after the Muslims had gone through the crisis of Con­
Moreover, Bengal and Assam (the present East Pakistan) did gress rule. ,,'
not enter into his calculations. It is grossly misleading to call In 1938-9 three other schemes appeared, each trying in its
him the originator of the idea of Pakistan or the poet who _ own way to appease the demands of Muslim nationalism. Ab­
i1
dul Latif of Hyderabad presented his 'zonal'' scheme; Sir I
dreamed of partition. He never talked of partition and his
· ideal was that of a getting together of the Muslim provinces in Sikandar Hayat Khan, the Punjab premier, proposed the divi­
the north-west so as to bargain more advantageously with the sion of India into seven regional zones; and 'A Punjabi' advo­
projected Hindu centre. It is one of the myths of Pakistani cated the formation of five regional federations. None of these
,j nationalism to saddle Iqbal with the parentage of Pakistan. , favoured a complete separation between the Muslim and non­
In 1932-3, during the sittings of the Round Table Confer­
ences and the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Re­ om Muslim areas.
None of these plans, however, met the approval of the Mus­
form, a group of Muslim students in England were evolving lim League or captured the imagination of the Muslim masses.
another scheme for India. Led by Chaudhari Rahmat Ali, a The partition of India-clean and complete-was officially
Punjabi studying at Cambridge, they formed the Pakistan adopted for the first time in March 1940, when the Muslim
National Movement, which issued its first pamphlet on 'Pakis­ League, fresh from its freedom from the Congress rule, met in
tan' in 1933, entitled Now or Never. The essence of the plan its annual session at Lahore and passed the famous Lahore or
was the formation of an independent Muslim State comprising Pakistan Resolution on 24 March. After reiterating that the
the. Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Kashmir,
Sind and Baluchistan, in complete independence of the rest of
i, scheme of federation embodied in the 1935 Act was 'totally
unsuited to and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this
India and in close alliance with the Muslim States of the country and is altog�ther unacceptable to Muslim India', and
1 Long extracts from this address are available in M. Gwyer and A
that the constitutional plan should be reconsidered de novo, the
1 Joint Committee on Indian
Appadorai (eds.), Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, Constitutional Reform: Minutes of Evi­
1921-1947, 1957, Vol. II, pp. 435-40. This sentence js on p. 437. dence, Vol. 2C, p. 1496.,
56 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN TOWARDS SEPARATION 57
following important paragraph summarized the Pakistan de­ bloc from Peshawar to the mouth of the Indus. His own com­
mand: 'Resolved that it is the considered view of this session ments on this were: 'It does not seem logical, however, or
of the All India Muslini League that no constitutional plan compatible with our avowed intentions towards India to dis­
would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Mus­ countenance out of hand a plan which is constructive and
lims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, c°intains many elements of a practicable structure.' 1 In Decem­
viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into ber 1928, the Empire Review favourably considered the sug­
regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial gestion of breaking up Indian provinces into small units in
readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the accordance with ethnic and local sentiment, and thus to allay
Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western communal fears. The implication was that at some future date
and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute it might be practicable or necessary to merge the Muslim and
"Independent States" in which the constituent units shall be Hindu areas into some sort of separate blocs.2
autonomous and sovereign.'1 In March 1981, the Round Table thought it 'certainly pos­
At long last the Muslims had taken the final plunge and sible' that India might break up, first into a Muslim and a

Aghazetaleem.c
committed themselves to complete separation. Muslim nation­ Hindu India, and later into a number of national States, as
alism had come to full maturity and now demanded a territory Europe did after the Renaissance and the Reformation.3 In
of its own. June, Sir Theodore Morison, a former principal of the Aligarh
But to imagine that Muslims had never thought-how­ College, declared that Hindus and Muslims were not two com­
ever vaguely-of having a State of their own before 1940 is to munities but two nationalities, and envisaged a Muslim na­
misread Indian history. For at least fifteen years prior to the tional State in the north of India, though h� felt that this could
Lahore Resolution the notion, however nebulous, of a separate not make for peace.4 In July, the l\farquess of Zetland. appre­
Muslim bloc or alliance or federation had been present in the ciated that a chain of predominantly Muslim provinces stretch­
minds of men. A remarkably large number of British students' ing across the north-west of India would be 'a basis of great
of Indian affairs noticed these rumblings and recorded them strength and influence' to the Muslims generally.5 In November,
for us. Starting from 1925 and working down to 1989, we find the Economist saw the Muslims manceuvring for an effective
a long line of such observers pointing to the coming of Pakis­ control of the entire Indus basin, Eastern Bengal and a corri­
tan. dor between the two. With these territories in their hands, it
In July 1925, William Archbold, one-time Principal of the om said, the Muslims would hold a large Hindu population in
M.A.O. College, Aligarh, foresaw a 'powerful Muhammadan pawn as pledges for the safety of the scattered Muslim minority
combination in the north-west in alliance with Afghanistan'.2 in other parts of India.6 In December, similar sentiments were
In March 1928, The, Times correspondent in India reported a voiced in a debate in the House of Commons when Colonel
vision of effective Muslim rule in north India and prophesied Goodman thought that the mutual suspicion of Hindus and
a division of the Punjab and the creation of a solid Muslim Muslims was so deeply rooted that it would be generations
1 Full text of the resolution is included in most collections of documents before either would have any confidence in the other; Sir
on Indian constitutional development, but the authoritative original 1 The Times, 14 March 1928.
source, from which the above extract is taken, is the Resolution No. 1
passed at the twenty-seventh session of All India Muslim League held
2 Empire Review, December 1928, pp. 369-70.
3 Round Table, !\'larch 1931, p. 346.
at Lahore on 22, 23 and 24 March 1940, Resolutions of the All India Mus­
lim League from Dece:mher 1938 to March 1940 (published by the Hon. "T. Morison, 'The Hindu-Muslim Problem of India', Contemporary
Secretary, All India Muslim League, Delhi, n.d.), pp. 47--48. Review, June 1931, pp. 710-14.
2 W. A. J. Archbold, 'Some Indian Problems', Contemporary _Review, 6 In Asiatic Review, July 1931, p. 428.

July 1925, p. 46. 6 Ec<momist, 7 November 1931.

 58 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN TOWARDS SEPARATION 59
Alfred Knox saw no hope of the Hindus and Muslims coming opined that the creation of a feeling of national union between
into one organic whole; and Sir Henry Page Croft likened Hindus and Muslims was likely to be a 'matter of a century's
India to the whole of Europe, the Indian nation to a 'Russo­ duration'. 1 In 1987, when the results of provincial elections
European nation' and an Indian mind to a 'Chinese-American had been published, the Economist remarked that the pro­
mind'. 1 vinces could be divided into two simple groups: Muslim India
In 1982 appeared two books by Englishmen of life-long and Congress lndia. 2 And in 1988 The Times added tlJ,at the
Indian experience, both refuting the arguments of those who differences between the Muslim and Hindu provinces were 'at
pleaded for the existence and future of an Indian nationalism. least as great in fact though not in form as those between the
Sir Reginald Craddock asked that if Norway and Sweden could Provinces and the States'. 3 In March 1989, Professor Rush­
not keep together, if Ulster and the Irish Free State c9uld not brook Williams realized the significance of the new Muslim
be got to unite, 'how can it be expected that the infinitely opinion demanding a separate zone and said that it testified
greater diversities and divergent racial elements to be found to the degree of alarm characteristic of Muslim uncertainty.4
in India could be welded into one self-governing and democratic Simultaneously the Round Table recorded that a fresh impetus

Aghazetaleem.c
'whole?' 2 John Coatman was even more dogmatic (and pro- had been given to the movement for creating 'a so-called
phetic in the bargain): 'it may be that Muslim India in the "Pakistan"' of the Muslim provinces in the north.5 At the
north and north-west is destined to become a separate Muslim same time, Sir William Barton tried to scare the Hindus into
State or part of a Muslim Empire'.3 In April of the same year, co-operation with the idea that the alliance of north India
Sir Walter Lawrence acknowledged the existence of many with Afghanistan would recreate the old Muslim menace and
great and well-defined nationalities in India and saw the only that Britain alone stood between Hinduism and their present
hope of natural and healthy g:r;owth in their recognition.4 In danger. 6 In June, the Marquess of Zetland, the Secretary of
August, even the Manchester Guardian, an enthusiastic sup­ State for India, wrote to the Viceroy of the possibility that
porter of the Congress creed, realized how utterly opposed to Muslim provinces might declare that the safeguards for their
each other were the Hindu and Muslim attitudes to life and how community in the federation were wholly unsatisfactory a:p.d
useless were such, remedies as Pax Britannica, education and tp.at they were not prepared to enter the federation. 'I do not
self-government. 'What is there to hope for,' it asked despair­ see,' he concluded, 'how we could force the Governments of the
ingly, 'except that in time the sense of communal allegiance Punjab or of Bengal to enter the Federation if they were de­

om
may be translated into a sense of allegiance to India as a whole termined not to dd so.' 7 Thus by 1989 a partitioned India had
and the growth of scepticism make democracy practicable?'5 come 'into the realm of practical politics'. 8
In February 1988, G. T. Garratt, a retired Indian Civilian,
foresaw as well as feared that within a short period the pro­
1 E.G. Colvin, 'India-The Longer View', ibid., May 1933, pp. 545-6.
jected federal government would be faced with a 'strong separ­
2 Economist, 23 February 1937.
3 The Times (leader), 20 December 1938.
i, I atist movement'. 6 In May, Sir Elliott Colvin, another Civilian,
4 R. Williams, 'Indian Constitutional Problems', Nineteenth Century,
1 H. C. 260, 5S, 3 December 1931, Cols. 1354, 1370-71, 1380__:_81.' March 1939, pp. 292-3.
LI 1
R. Craddock, The Dilemma in India (1932), pp. 7-8.
2 5 Round Table, March 1939, p. 362.

i1' .J. Coatman, Years of Destiny: India 1926-1932, 1932, p. 376.

3 6
W. Barton, India's North-Western Frontier, 1939, pp. 297-8; re­
I 4 Speech at the opening of the Indian Durbar Hall at Hastings on 29 peated in Asiatic Review, .July 1942, page 257.
April 1932, The Times, 30 April 1932. · 7 Letter of 27 .June 1939, 'Essayez': Memoirs of Lawrence,'Second Mar­
5
Manchester Guardian (leader), 8 August 1932. quess of Zetland, 1956, p. 251.
6 G. T. Garratt, 'The Third Round Table Conference', Nineteenth Cen­ 8 N. Mansergh; Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of

tury, February 1933, p. 137. Ewternal Policy, 1931-1939, 1952, p. 356.

"1·
II
 60 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN . THE CRIPPS OFFER 61
In India, as we have seen, Iqbal had broadcast in 1980 the volt in 1857, friendship with Britain, opposition to the Con­
germs of what could be developed into the idea of a Muslim gress, extremist agitation, co-operation with the Congress,
. block. In 1988 Rahmat Ali spoke from Cambridge and gave 1 belligerent neutrality, negotiations, appeals and threats.
the world a new name to a State yet in the womb of time. In First, as dethroned rulers, they resented the overlordship of
1988-9 Latif, Sikandar Hayat and others were seriously talk­ )y the British. Then, as a weak minority, they sought friendship
ing of zones and regions. with the governing power. Then, for a time, they made com­
This shows that public opinion, both in India and in Britain, mon cause with the Hindus and led the Khilafat agitation. 11
was by 1989 acquainted with this widening schism in the Then, once again, their separatism came to the surface and
Indian body politic and that the Lahore Resolution, when it they fought for communal safeguards. When these safeguards
came in March 1940, could not have been such an unexpected failed to give them the protection they needed or expected the
shock as it is generally made out to be. latent nationalism triumphed. The march of history had made
Why did the Muslims demand Pakistan? And, why was the a nation of a community. No longer did they eat out their
demand made in 1940? The Pakistan scheme was a proof of heart in sullen impotence, trusting in the beneficence of the

Aghazetaleem.c
the desperate apprehension with which Muslims regarded the British or the goodwill of the Hindus. To the Congress claim
prospect of Hindu domination. Had the Congress formed coali.;. that India was a national State, that it was neither plural nor
tions in the provinces the already existing fissiparous ten­ multi-national, the Muslims answered with the brand-new
dencies might have been prevented from spreading. The policy idea of a separate Muslim nationalism. It was difficult to stage
of the Muslim League in asking for a division of the country a battle between a minority and a majority; the principle of
was a direct answer to the Congress policy of persisting in a democracy would ensure the victory of the big battallions.
unitary nationalism and in the rule of the majority. All the But it was possible to elevate the conflict to the plane of
assumptions on which the Muslim acceptance of the 1985 nationalism. India, said Jinnah, was not a national problem
constitution had been based were destroyed by the working at all; it was an international problem and must be solved as
of provincial autonomy in the Hindu provinces. The Hindu such.
demand for a constituent assembly to draw up a constitution
for a� India proved the last straw. If the Hindus wanted a THE CRIPPS OFFER
strong centre and were not prepared to compromise on it, the The greatest victory-all the greater because the least ex­
Muslims did not want a centre at all. If the Hindus believed
in the rule of the majority, the Muslims denied that they were om pected-of Muslim nationalism came in 1942, when the British
War Cabinet accepted in principle the idea of Pakistan. The
a minority. We are a nation apart, they proclaimed, and there­ Draft Declaration,1 • brought by Sir Stafford Cripps. to India
fore entitled to rule ourselv�. To the objection that the crea­ and published on 80 March 1942, contained a provision where­
tion of Pakistan would not solve the minority problem, as a by any province could stay out of the proposed Indian Union
substantial Muslim population would still be left in India, they with the right of forming its own independent government.
replied that Pakistan- would not only safeguard the Muslims This 'non-accession clause' was a major, if not a complete,
left behind in India (on the principle of 'mutual retaliation') concession to the Muslim demand for Pakistan. Though the
but also give self-respect to those who lived within the boun­ Muslim League rejected the offer on the ground that the non­
daries of Pakistan. accession clause did not go far enough to produce the Pakistan
With the adoption of the Pakistan ideal by the Muslim of their dreams, and though Lord Hailey thought that this
League in 1940, Muslim nationalism had. come into its own., clause was designed not with a view to creating Pakistan but to
It had taken the Muslims three-quarters of a century finally impressing on the Hindus the necessity of coming to some
to decide what they wanted. They had tried·everything: a re-
I·
1 Cmd. 6850 of 1942. I,
62 THE MAKING OF.PAKISTAN THE MOVEMENT FOR PAKISTAN 68
form of terms with the Muslims,1 the fact remains that within lim India. It might still have been a bargaining counter, but at
two years of the Lahore Resolution the British Government had least people had begun to take serious notice of it. Its realiza­
officially and publicly accepted the spirit of Muslim national­ tion did not now depend on whether the British looked favour­
ism and agreed to its political manifestation-Pakistan. This ably on it or not. 'It depends solely on what military power the
must have gratified even Jinnah, who was generally a man of Muslims really possess. If they have enough to hold Pakistan
incredible optimism. To the .Muslims it gave confidence and against Hindu opposition, then, even should the British pre­
courage. If the Hindus and the British were cast in the role of vent its appearing in the paper constitution, it will be estab­
enemies to be vanquished before the achievement of Pakistan lished by the Muslims as soon as the British are gone. On the
was possible, one of them had surrendered or at least promised other hand, if they have not enough military power to hold
to lay down arms. Pakistan against Hindu opposition, even should the• British
Why did the British Government concede the Muslim get it put into the constitution. it would be swept out of exis­
demand, though British public opinion was overwhelmingly tence by the Hindus when the British are gone.'1
opposed to the idea of partition and called it by such dis­ So the Muslims began to strengthen themselves. They could

Aghazetaleem.c
agreeable terms as disruption, a breach in Indian unity, a not have any military power because they were.not free. But the
barren folly, and so on? Many explanations come to mind. One Muslim League's organization was improved, its publicity
is that in 1942 the British were fighting with their back to the streamlined, its discipline tightened, and its message carried to
wall and dared not alienate. the Muslims who provided the all parts of India. Gradually it built up its power, prestige and
flower of the Indian Army. Another is that, as Lord Hailey popularity. Jinnah was no longer a Muslim leader. He ,was
said, the concession was not meant seriously; it was aimed at now the leader, the symbol of Muslim nationalism. As the
threatening the Hindus into a compromise with the Muslims. League grew in stature, Jinnah gained in a�thority. His name
Stil l another is that the Cabinet decision, which was genuine, was now bracketed with Gandhi, even by the Hindus. The
was the result of influence exerted by a section of the Cabinet's Viceroy, conscious of Jinnah's strength and his following, now
India Committee which was sympathetic to the Muslim cause consulted him in all important matters. No longer was Gandhi
and consisted of such persons as Sir P. J. Grigg and Sir John the sole spokesman for India. No longer was Congress the sole
Anderson. Churchill himself might have been favourable to repository of patriotism and nationalism. In practical terms,
the idea. Still another explanation may be that this clause was though without confessing it in so many words, everyone knew
inserted to ensure that the Congress (which was violently op­ om that within the bosom of India pulsated two nationalisms­
posed to Pakistan) would reject the entire plan, thus provid­ one Muslim, the other Hindu. Some even realized that a con­
ing the British with the excuse that India's largest party had flict between the two was coming and would rip the continent
turned down their generous offer made in all sincerity in the from top to bottom.
middle of a grave war. All this, however, is pure conjecture, Jinnah's task of rallying the Muslims around him and
and we must wait the real reason till official papers are made strengthening the League was greatly facilitated by certain
public or one of tlte. participants in the act is guilty of a re­ Congress miscalculations. After the failure of Cripps's mission
vealing indiscretion. the Congress was frustrated. Its bid at contro;Iling India had
come to naught, leaving it impatient and bitter. The result
THE MO.VEMENT FOR P AKI ST AN was the disturbances of August-September 1942 which Gandhi
One outstanding fact emerges from this uncertainty. Pakistan called an 'open rebellion'. Widespread riots ensued aimed at
was now within the realm of possibility. It was no longer the disorganizing the war effort. The revolt failed but it sent all the
dream of one •stubborn' leader, but the declared goal of Mus- 1 Edwyn Bevan, 'The Congress Enigma', Spectator, 21 August 1942, p.
1 H.L. 122. 5S, 29 April 1942, Cols. 771-2. 1�.
64 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE MOVEMENT FOR .PAKISTAN 65
Congress leaders to prison, thus giving Jinnah a rare oppor­ trust the Hindus and refused to accept Gandhi's word that
tunity of consolidating the League. He stoutly opposed the partition would be effected when the British had departed.
'Quit India' demand and considered it an attempt by the Jinnah wanted his Pakistan then and there, before the British
Congress to win India for the Hindus: the revolt was as much went, and had serious doubts if the Hindus would keep their
anti-Muslim as anti-Britj.sh. 1 At this time some people charged word when once India was free and Congress sat in the seat of
Jinnah with being obsessed with the fear of Congress domina­ authority.
tion, but the Congress president himself has since confessed The talks failed but brought some solid advantages to the
that his programme was that as soon as the Japanese invaders Muslims. By the simple fact of agreeing to meet Jinnah as the
reached Bengal and the British withdrew towards Bihar, the representative of the Muslims, the Congress had tacitly aban­
'Congress should step iµ and take over the control of the doned its claim to speak for _all India. It now acknowledged
country'. 2 the Muslim League as a power with which terms must be
For two years, from 1942 to 1944, when the Congress leader­ made. Further, the sharpness and depth of the differences
ship was in prison, the Muslim League was building itself into between the two peoples were revealed. No longer could the

Aghazetaleem.c
a powerful party. An overwhelming majority of the Muslims Congress take shelter behind the pretence that no communal
had by now declared themselves for Pakistan, so that when problem gnawed at India's vital .parts and that all was well.
Gandhi secured his release in the late summer of 1944 he saw Jinnah had won a clear victory by getting Gandhi to recog­
no alternative to negotiating with the Muslim League. The way nize Pakistan. This also gave wide publicity to his two-nation
to these talks had been prepared by C. Rajagopalacharia, a theory.
front rank Congress leader who alone among the Hindus was Next year another attempt at reconciliation was made, this
advocating a rapprochement with the League on the basis of time by the Government, when all political leaders were sum­
partition. He had argued in a pamphlet, entitled The Way Out, moned to a conference at Simla by the Viceroy, Lord Wavell.
that the Cripps offer was a bona fide scheme and a genuine The idea was to discuss the formation of an Executive Council
gesture, not a mere attempt at expediency or appeasement, (entirely Indian except for the Commander-in-Chief) from
and had made a plea for its revival. But he was ignored in the amongst the Indian parties 'in proportion which would give a
Congress· circles. Later he argued with the leaders, and es­ balanced representation of the main communities, including
pecially Gandhi, that they should accept the Pakistan pro­ equal proportion of Muslims and Caste Hindus'.1 The attempt

om
posal and try to reach some agreement with the Muslims. In failed because Jinnah not only wanted parity between the
furtherance of this he prepared a formula in July 1944, known Muslims and the Hindus (which was conceded) but also in­
as the C. R. Formula after his initials, which conceded the sisted on the Muslim League .nominating all Muslim Council­
principle of Pakistan under two conditions: partition would lors (which was not conceded).
come after the British withdrawal and it would be contingent Two significant features of the Simla Conference deserve
upon the favourable outcome of a plebiscite of all inhabitants emphasis. The Congress accepted the principle of parity be­
of the areas claimed by the Muslim League. The crucial tween Hindus and Muslims. This was a remarkable develop­
Jinnah-Gandhi talks took place at Bombay in September ment, for it implied Hindu acquiescence in the two-nation
I
1944, but failed to reconcile the differences between the two theory. Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations coming
leaders. The heart of the matter was that the Muslims did not together for the time being in the Viceroy's Council. The Mus­
1 See Jinnah's statement of 9 August 1942, J. D. Ahmad (ed.), Some lims were.not a minority to be fobbed off with a meagre repre­
Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (1952 ed.), Vol. I, pp. 443-5. sentation. They were a nation entitled to equality with the
a A. K. Azad, India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative, other nation, the Hindus: It may be, as the Congress later
1959, p. 73. 1 Cmd. 6652 of 1945.
E
 66 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE MOVEMENT FOR PAKISTAN 67
argued, that it agreed to parity as a political expedient; but to doubt that the clash at the Simla Conference was essentially
Muslims as to many others the Congress gesture conveyed the between the irreconcilable claims of two nationalisms. The
impression that at last the Hindus had accepted the existence quarrel over the number of seats to be allotted was a. sham
of a separate Muslim nationalism in India. battle fought over phantom issues. The real point in question
Jinnah's demand that all Muslims appointed to the Council was: who would succeed Britain when foreign rule was gone.
should be from among the Muslim League was in logical con­ The issues were not really as small as they seemed. They
sistency with his claim that he represented Muslim India. The turned fundamentally on two conflicting claims-'that of
Congress rejected this claim on the ground that its acceptance Congress to be a national party representing all Indians
would reduce it to the position of a sectarian organization re­ throughout the country, irrespective of sect, and that of the
presenting the Hindus alone. Though, as we will see later, the Muslim League, which demands Pakistan and the government
Congress then did�not represent more than 1 or 2 per cent. of of the predominantly Muslim regions by a Muslim Government.
Indian Muslims, yet it was loath to give up its appearance of It is the difference between an India united, in spite of. internal
speaking for all communities and creeds. divisions, and partition.'1

Aghazetaleem.c
Jinnah had another objection to the procedure adopted for The Simla parleys had failed, at least in part, because both
the formation of the Council. He contended that the principle the Congress and the Muslim League had made claims about
,,
of Pakistan should be recognized first, because if the League their representative standing unsupported by electoral evi­
once accepted the Wavell plan 'the Pakistan issue will be dence. No general election had been held since 1934 to the I
•'

shelved and put in cold storage indefinitely'. central legislature and since 1937 to the provincial assemblies.
For the Muslims the all-important question was whether the The balance of political power had shifted so much in ten years
acquisition of a few seats on the transitional Council would or that new elections were imperative. In August 1945, therefore,
would not bring them any nearer to their final goal-Pakistan. the Viceroy announced that elections to all legislatures would
Jinnah did not think so and therefore attached more import­ be held in the following winter.
ance to the ultimate solution than to the quota of Councillors. These elections were fought on the simplest conceivable pro­
And, even if all Muslim Councillors were his nominees, they grammes. The Muslim League contested to vindicate two ele­
would still be in a minority of one-third in the entire Council. mentary points: that it represented all Indian Muslims and
For, in addition to the Congress, the Council would also con­ that Pakistan was the only solution of the Indian problem. The

om
tain the Sikhs, the Christians, the Parsees, and the Scheduled Congress was equally clear-headed and uncompromising. It
Castes. And all these non-Muslim minorities shared at least stood for independence without partition and claimed to
one common sentiment with the Hindus-independence with speak for all India, including Muslims. In short, the election
unity and not with partition. Fundamentally, therefore, the was fought on the crystal-clear issue of Pakistan versus Akhand
Muslims would always be in a minority, in spite of the parity. (united) Hindustan.
Thus mere parity was not enough. When once Hindu-Muslim The outcome was illuminating as well as confusing. ,,The ✓
parity had been conceded, Jinnah raised his price. He wanted, _.Muslim Leagued won every �j�g!� M,us_lhr_1 seat in tp.e ..�entral
by implication, a parity not between Muslims and Hindus but e legislature an -428- oiif-ofthe po��iJ:ile �92 in the provinces.
]
between Muslims and all others put together. •' 'flieT�ongress iad similar-success in the 'general' (non-Muslim)
On the face of it, this was an absurd claim; but not really so constituencies. The voters had given their unmistakable ver­
. if we remember that he was claiming to speak for a nation, dict and this was illuminating. But the deadlock deepened.
not for one of the many communities. If the first premiss of his One party had stood for united India and received strong
argument was granted-that Muslims were a nation-the con� support. The other had called for a divided India and had also
clusion followed with the certainty of truth. And there is no 1 Spectator, 6 July 1945.

I:!
I'.'
iii1
·1 ,11
1
('II
1,,11
"' !
•11
\,
'lll
!,i 1
68 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN· THE MOVEMENT FOR PAKISTAN 69
1 received strong support. The cleavage was as deep as ever, and the feelings of Muslim India. 'It seemed to him that this was
,i,,,:!11
'!'i' this was confusing. done simply to placate the Hindus.1
1
,!1
In a final effort to reconcile the irreconcilables the British Sonie of the arguments given by the Mission were sound;

'li
1
·1:! ✓ G"o'vernment sent a Cabinet Mission, headed by the Secretary some were not. But the important thing to remember is that
of State himself, to India in March 1946. After a round of un­ the Mission's plan fell short of the separate State which had i
I
'>1
;J!(, fruitful .conversations with politicians of all schools, the Mis­ become the main plank of the Muslim League platform and had
1i:1 •sion set forth its own scheme on 16 May. 1 The Mission plan secured 85 per cent. of Muslim votes in the elections. Perhaps,
:I\ l
·:11
'
. .i:uled ..out.. Paki.1>t�n-�-�- .prnctiQa.,l_ possip_i]tty �11d�·insteacf�sug::-· Cripps, the author of the plan, tended to over-rationalize prob­

l1 1
:ge_steq a loose Indian Uniqn_l;!J:T.�,!!g�d in three tiers -provinces, lems and to underestimate emotional forces. In this he had
sections and the federal centre. much in common with the Congress leaders. The strength of
11 11 ·· · ·The Mission was· 'greatly impressed by the very genuine Muslim nationalism was grossly underrated by both. Because
I'll1
I
i,i and keen anxiety of the Muslims lest they should find them­ Pakistan was logically indefensible, therefore the Muslim de­

: ll selves subjected to a perpetual Hindu majority', and found this mand for it was not in-esistible.

Aghazetaleem.c
:,;; 'i
1!•1

•1:lq
·J, feeling too strong and widespread to be allayed by 'mere It is not a part of our story to narrate the complicated and

if j paper safeguards', yet proceeded to argue against the Pakistan bewildering events of 1946-7, when each of the parties first
plan. It would not solve the minority problem as it would in­ accepted, then rejected, then again accepted (with vital reser­
"ii II clude in the Punjab and Bengal large Hindu minorities, and vations) the Mission plan. Suffice it to say that the plan failed
'I to divide these provinces would be 'contrary to the wishes either to win honest acceptance in India or to solve the consti­
and interests of a very large proportion' of their populations. tutional problem to the satisfaction of anyone.
,:: Transport, postal and telegraphic systems were established on With the coming of the year 1947 the turn of events reached
'I I
i i; the basis of a united India and to disintegrate them would a new tempo. In April and May the new Viceroy, Lord Mount­
1::1!J!
'gravely injure' both parts of India. The case for a united de­ batten, seemed to have come to the conclusion that partition
'i
1
l,':, 1 I
fence was even stronger. The Indian States would also find it was unavoidable. Widespread Hindu-Muslim fightii+g, the
difficult to associate themselves with a divided India. Finally, Congress-League rift within the rickety interim Government,
:::: :1 Hindu claims about the sovereignty of the Constituent As­
the geographical fact that the two halves of the proposed
ii l
1
i1

11
Pakistan State were separated by hundreds of miles was an sembly, and Muslim insistence on Pakistan, combined to per­
1
additional factor, i.e., in favour of one India.2
Jinnah reacted sharply to these arguments and regretted om suade him of the necessity of a surgical operation. Towards the
end of May he conveyed to the British Government his opinion
'I'

Ir
'I' that some form of division was inevitable. Whitehall at once
:,11
I
that the Mission had rejected Pakistan which was 'the only
11
i concurred. The partition plan2 was finally made public on 8
I
solution of the constitutional problem'. He found it even more
:1 1
I J\ 1 regrettable that it had thought fit to advance 'commonplace June and was immediately accepted by all parties.
::
I ,:,1,, and exploded' arguments and to resort to special pleading The British Government had now recognized the inevit­
I,,:,
jil
11 couched in deplorable language, which was calculated to hurt ability of partition. The Hindus were ready to accept it �nder
protest. The Muslims were not displeased, though they did not
1 1 Cmd. 6821 ofl946. like the consequent operation by which the two major prov­
11
11 Ibid. It was said that the decisive consideration that led the Mission inces, the Punjab and Bengal, were divided. The Sikhs were
to reject the Muslim claim was military, and that Field-Marshal Sir resolutely opposed to . the creation of Pakistan but found it
Claude_�J!,,Q@lleck had given his opinion that, from the point of view of
:;
strategy, Pakistag was an impossfble qoneeption; see New Statesman,
politically wise to acquiesce.
1 Quoted in Cmd. 6885 of 1946.
� 25 May 1946, p: 872. Sir Claude confirmed this in a conversation with the
author in London in 1960. • 2 Cmd. 7186 of 1947.
 LOYALTY 71
grounds; as an Indian Muslim he advocated it as a political
necessity.
In this mission of bringing the two peoples together Sayyid
Chapter 3 Ahmad was helped by certain British writers who shared his
views without necessarily sharing his motives. Sir William
Baker, for example, brought out the close affinity between the
THE POLITICAL FACTOR two religions. 'Believing in the same God, and yielding nothing
in respect for Christ, the Muslim among all oriental races is the
IN the last two chapters we saw how the idea of a Muslim nearest to what a Protestant terms 'Christianity.' He went
nationalism in India took birth and gradually developed into further and suggested a close alliance between the English and
a force which could only be appeased by a division of the sub­ the head of the Muslim religion which would arouse the entire
continent into two national States. This chapter is intended to Muslim world to a pitch of enthusiasm that could hardly be
put flesh on the dry bones of the narrative so that the story of understood by the English phlegmatic nature. 1' Similarly, an

Aghazetaleem.c
the growth of a national spirit comes alive. The historical re­ English journalist found the spectacle of an Englishwoman­
cital will become meaningful if we take up for analysis some of she was referring to Mrs. Annie Besant-allying herself with
the factors which played a prominent part in this develop­ Brahmanism as curiously unpleasant, and discovered in
ment. Hinduism much that was revolting to a refined and fastidious
taste.2 There were not many who held such strong views or ex­
LOYALTY pressed them in such virile language. But these sentiments
The role of Muslim loyalty to the British in the formative strengthened the hands of those among the British who wanted
phase of nationalism cannot be over-emphasized. During the to be kind to the Muslims and heartened the Muslims who were
testing years which followed the Mutiny Muslims were con­ soliciting such attention.
vinced that their only salvation lay in practising loyalty. With the foundation of the Congress in 1885 the Muslims
Sayyid Ahmed Khan foresaw that the Muslim minority was no redoubled their efforts to prove their loyalty in the fear lest the
match for the progressive Hindus and that if it also alienated Congress might be accepted as representative of all educated
the sympathies of the rulers its ruin would be complete. He Indian opinion. They were alarmed by the Congress and what

om
brought forth many arguments from his religious study and it stood for, for any advance towards self-government would
social experience in justification of his pro-British attitude. imply their relegation to the position of an insubstantial
Was Islam not nearer to Christianity than to any other reli­ minority. During the Hindu unrest of 1905-11 they supported
gion? Did the Quran not call the Christians the 'people of the the Government unstintedly. Such deeds of faithfulness did
Book' and sanction marriage with them? Did the Muslims not not go unnoticed in Britain, and in 1906 The Times wrote a
have more in common with the monotheism of Christianity long leader commending their policy and sharing their appre­
than with the polytheism of Hinduism? In the social field, too, hensions. 'If the forces of disaffection are active in India,' it
the two God-worshipping creeds shared common ideals and said, 'then it would be folly to estrange a great people who are
practices. Both abhorred the caste system. Both preached the on many grounds our natural supporters. It would be dangerous
brotherhood of man. This might have been a conscious or un­ 1 W. Baker, 'Reflections on India, 1880-1888', Fortnightly Review,

conscious rationalization of his political views, but there is no August 1888, p. 225.
doubt that Sayyid Ahmad passionately believed in the desir­ 2 Lilian de Gruyther, 'An Important Indian Institution', Empire Re­

ability, the practicability and the necessity of a Muslim­ view, November 1904, p. 369. See also Henry Crossfield, England and
British understanding. As a Muslim he defended it on religious Islam, London, 1900.
72 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN LOYALTY 73
to us, because of the hostile influence which may react on After the 'disloyal' interlude of the Khilafat agitation the
India from the outside world....Our only course is to show old habit reasserted itself and at the Round Table Conference
them plainly that they have not lost our sympathy, and that Muslims were. by and large so co-operative as to evoke from
we value their loyalty and intelligent co-operation as much as the Congress the charge of being reactionaries and toadies. In
ever....If the Indian Government does not retain the confi• 1981, just before the opening of the second Conference, a strik­
dence of loyal -minorities by a steady. and consistent policy, ing article appeared in the Empire Review which, along with
then, in words recently quoted in our columns, we may expect the Aga Khan's letter to the Deccan Muslim League quoted
to see the Muslims "either join the Congress or set up a second above,1 stands as a faultless testament of Muslim loyalty.
agitation of their own" .'1 What made it even more remarkable than the Aga Khan's
Printing House Square was not the only quarter where letter were .the antecedents of the author. It was written by
Muslim fidelity was-appreciated.It was then generally realized Maulana Shaukat.Ali, one of the famous Ali brothers who had
that Muslim policy had obvious benefits for England and her - ·i
,i led the Indian Khilafatists into a most virulent campaign
future.Gertrude Bell, the famous. 'Arab', reported from India I against the British. Now as a delegate to the Conference, he

Aghazetaleem.c
that the loyalty of Islam had not wavered in spite of a ten� made a stirring appeal for Muslim-British friendship. 'We
dency among the British, resulting from the indifference born both need each other,' he said.'We would grasp that hand and
of security, to regard it with less than favour; in spite, more­ Islam would stand with Britain, a good and honourable friend,
over, of a growing anti�foreign spirit which had been visible in ·,a brave fighter and a staunch ally.... Should Hindus and
other parts of the Muslim world.2 Another writer was in favour Muslims live together a thousand years, there is no chance of
of encouraging the Muslims 'who are loyal to us lest they the two cultures merging into one.This is adamant, bedrock
should be disgusted at our partiality and also turn against us'. fact, which cannot be glossed over.No settlement that ignores
'Minorities. deserve honour, and loyal , minorities deserve this can be of any valut!.Wise administration requires know­
double honour.' 3 ledge of the psychology of races .... At the back of every
The greatest test of Muslim constancy came i.n 1911 when the f ,i Muslim mind, based on our experience of the last fifteen or
!,
partition of Bengal was annulled. Muslim India was shocked twenty years, is the fear that Great Britain had lost something
and some leaders talked of extreme measures in retaliation. of her old virility, and that she may let us down....We want
But even in this crisis the tradition of years prevailed and the no handicaps against anybody, including the British.'2

om
leading Muslims, though irate and indignant, instructed their What lay behind such expressions of loyalty? What was the
followers not to agitate against the decision.4 The Aga Khan philosophy of loyalty, if there was at all a coherent thought be­
· issued a similar appeal. It is true that shortly afterwards the hind it? In the preceding pages we have referred to some of the
entire course of Muslim politics was changed by circumstances, motives that underlay this line of action.To recapitulate and
of which the 1911 de.cision was one, but prominent 'loyalists' add some· more:
like the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali continued to tread the path Item. It was the safest course of action for a minority which
of co-operation. was backward and helpless.Either it could co-operate with the
Hindus, which it would not, or it could keep on good terms
, 1 The Times (leader), 26 September 1906.
with the. rulers. To alienate both the present and the future i'
11 G. Bell, 'Islam in India-A Study at Aligarh', Nineteenth Century,
December 1906, pp. 900-901.
rulers would have been. folly without any mitigation.
3 J. A. Sharrock, 'Some Misconceptions about the Unrest in India', Item. It may be a paradox but the fact is that the Muslims,
ibid., September 1909, p. 875. 1 See supra, Chapter 1.
'For example, Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk in the Aligarh Institute Gazette, 2 Shaukat Ali, 'An Appeal from the Muslim World to the British
· 20 December 1911. People', Empire Review,,November 1981, pp. 807-9.
 iI I
74 'l'HE_MAKING OF PAKISTAN IMPERIAL PRIDE 75 I
universally characterized in the West as a militant body of suggested. The argument runs thus: The Muslims had an aloof­
ness and a grave, stern dignity which safeguarded them against I:
persons, were the only constitutional-minded group in India.
"'
I
Without trying to resolve this paradox (which may have been the insulting treatment of the British. Insults to them did not I,
I

a reaction to the unsuccessful Mutiny), we must notice that the rankle as they did in other cases with effects which recoiled on
Congress was, except in the first few years of its existence, an British heads. They either retaliated or held aloof, and in any
agitational organization. Satyagraha was often made out to be case they refused to be humiliated or to surrender their pride
a peaceful movement, but to break the laws of a country is un­ or self-respect. They were remarkably free from servility, in
constitutional, whether the deed is done by making women contrast with the Hindus; and they entered scarcely at all into
volunteers lie down on the road or byJeading a band of mutin­ rivalry with other Englishmen or Hindus. Their conservatism
ous riflemen. In fact, Satyagraha is more deadly, for it is kept them from it, and it appeared that they regarded English­
planned and cold-blooded, than open agitation which may be men and Hindus as fitted by Providence for the discharge of
due to the heat of the moment. Muslims were not fond of functions with which they themselves did not care to meddle I'

agitating, first under the influence of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, and while they pursued the even tenor of their own way.1 Interest­
I

Aghazetaleem.c
later under that of Jinnah, both of whom were, for different ing and very intriguing indeed, but,.alas, only partially true.
reasons, almost constitutional martinets. Item. The educated among the Muslim community were
Item. The Muslims were sceptical both of the genuineness of greatly influenced by English literature, history, philosophy
the Hindu agitation and of the likelihood of its successful and art. This intellectual and academic deference paved the
outcome. The agitation was for greater democracy, which to way to political loyalty.
the Muslims meant greater oppression. The agitation was also Item. The British ruled the country and held power and
unlikely to achieve its end because the rulers were strong and patronage in their hands. The Muslims, as a minority, wanted
because all India was not on the side of the agitators. It was safeguards, and the British alone could grant them.
thus both unwise and useless to stand with the agitators and Item. The Islamic injunction of obeying the ruler of the time
incur the displeasure of the Government. may have weighed with a section of the Muslims. Disobedience
Item. Most Muslims appreciated the fairness with which to those in authority is not permitted unless the ruler inter­
they had been, or were being, treated by the British. Between feres with the religious rites of the Muslims.
the Hindus and the British they chose to trust the latter, and Item. Britain was the greatest 'Muslim' Empire in the world
on the whole found that this policy paid dividends.
Item. In terms of religion, the Christian rulers were closer om and had intimate relations with all independent and semi­
independent Muslim States. As the Indian Muslims formed a
to the Muslims than were the idol-worshipping Hindus. As re­ part of the world Muslim community it was in the fitness- of
ligion was a vital factor in the awakening of their nationalism, things that they remained on good terms with Britain.
this affinity tended to throw the _Muslims on the side of the
British. IMPERIAL PRIDE
Item. In social matters, again, the Muslim found himself in The Muslims had come to India as conquerors and had estab­
more congenial company among the British. The two could, lished an empire which lasted for hundreds of years. This factor
and did, intermarry, interdine and intermix in society without moulded their outlook in many ways.
disagreeable taboos. With the Hindu one was always on one's If we compare the Muslim invaders of India with the British
guard against breaking some caste restriction or polluting a invaders we find one momentous difference. The Muslims I
I

Brahmin household. Social mixing is as essential an ingredient came as alien conquerors but permanently settled down in
of friendship as aloofness is a creator of misunderstanding.
Itern. One ingenious explanation of Muslim loyalty has been
1 W. B.Oldham, Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Re-oiew, July 1911, pp.
64-65, He was a retired member of the Indian Civil Service.
I,
76 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN -IMPERIAL PRIDE 77
India. Unlike the British, they did not come from a 'mother a British Viceroy governed the country they learned English
country' to which they could. look back or return. after doing with equal · diligence and entered Government service with
their spell of duty. They made India their home and this alacrity. For them the change was not revolution: one alien
revolutionized their outlook. They became a part of Jndia invader had succeeded another. For the Muslim the change was
just as India made them a part of herself. The interaction had v)' cataclysmic. He had been dethroned and he did not find it
good results as well as bad. It precluded the possibility of a easy to reconcile himself with the new times. He retracted into
Muslim withdrawal, and this distinguished Muslim rule in his shell and brooded and brooded, and this did not help. It
India from such recent phenomena as the behaviour ..of the was perhaps a natural result of the disaster that had overtaken
British community in India or the French colons in Algeria or him, but it was also very stupid and played havoc with his
the Belgian miners in Congo. It also made the Hindus realize future. He never made up for what he had lost in those years
that they could not get rid of the Muslims, for by the passage and later paid a terrible price for this shortsightedness.
of time the latter had ceased to be an alien element of the The Muslim pride vis a vis the British thus led to insularity.
Indian population. But at the same time they remained a dis­ This pride vis a vis the Hindus led to an anti-democratic

Aghazetaleem.c
tinct group and refused to become a part of the Hindu tradi­ movement. The Hindus were the subject race. The Muslims
tion of the country. were, or had been, the ruling race. How could the quondam
Imperialism and pride go hand in hand. In India their im­ masters now allow themselves to be ruled by ci-devant slaves?
perial past produced among the Muslims a pride bordering on The Hindus were in_ the majority, but that did not mean that
vainglory. Pride is not altogether a bad thing, but when it sur­ they should be the sole rulers of the country. The principle of
vives the actual loss of power it creates an unhappy state of the rule by majority did _not, could not, apply to India. Demo­
mind both in the individual and in the community. When Mus­ cracy was therefore rejected, completely, finally, irrevocably.
lim hegemony .was gone and real power lay with the British, No matter what happened the majority shall Iiot rule the
the Muslims would not, could not, forget that they had once country. If a choice had to be made British imperialism was
ruled over the land. Their reaction was bitter and truculent. preferable to native 'democracy'. Gradually this line of
The bitterness led to the 1857 revolt which was an unsuccessful thought led to the concept of nationalism. If democracy was a
attempt at regaining the past glory. It failed and this added good thing-as all the world said it was -and if India also
frustration and humiliation to the bitterness. The truculence was one day going to get it, well! then, India was not a nation.
gave birth to an anti-British and anti-Western feeling, which om It was a continent and contained many nations. Anyway, the
kept the Muslims away from everything associated with the Muslims were a nation by themselves and would rather live in
mainstream of progress. They were reluctant to learn the Eng­ a poor, small, Muslim country than in a rich, large, Hindu sub­
lish language, to send their children to Government schools and continent.
to prepare themselves for public services under the British. Another result of the imperial pride was that Muslims re­
They clung to their old ways of life and lost a golden oppor­ fused to be absorbed by Hindu polity. Brahmanism had a
tunity of advancement. The Hindus, on the contrary, made magnificent record of accepting into its fold diverse races and
the best use of the chance offered and captured the public ser­ creeds which had travelled to Indi� in search of food or fame.
vices which a little before had belonged to the Muslims. Islam was the first foreign element which refused to be merged
During this period the Hindu and Muslim mentalities ex­ with the Brahmanical polity. It was too individualistic, too
hibit a strong contrast. The Hindus had been a subject race stern, too personal a religion to be so treated. It was a way of
for centuries. They were trained in the art of honouring the life, not a mere set of spiritual principles. Further, it had come
rulers. When a Muslim sat on the throne of Delhi they learned to India primarily to spread its own creed, not to compromise
Persian and cultivated the graces of a Mughul court life. When · with the heathen. This prevented a merger or even a concord.
 78 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN EXTRA•TERRITORIAL ATTACHMENT 79
It was the first failure of Hinduism and the first fundamental resp�ct. Th?ugh they could do little for their co-religionists
breach in the Indian spiritual tradition. Islam established it­ outside India they never made a secret of their sympathy for
self as a distinct entity and retained this separateness till the them. On one occasion, at least, their sympathy went beyond
end. A nation could not be born when two opposing forces of formal expression and achieved a signal success. The Khila­
such magnitude confronted each other like desperate gladia­ fat agitation in India and the endeavours of the Aga Khan
tor.s. and Ameer Ali ( of course combined with the success of Turkish
One by-product of Hinduism-Islam conflict was that the arms) forced the British Government to replace the Treaty of
Brahmanieal polity was saved from dissolution, or at least Sevres with that of Lausanne.
from adulteration. 1 Had the two religions come together and In contrast to this extra-territorial affinity of the Muslims
borrowed from each other, both would have lost something the Hindus had no problem of divided loyalties. They had
of their uncompr0mising purity. But the lack of such contact their roots in India. Their religion, their traditions, their his­
safeguarded Brahmanism from what the orthodox might have tory, their philosophy, their literature-all were Indian in
considered pollution. origin, mould and character. There were no Hindu States out­

Aghazetaleem.c
side India to divert their attention from their nationalist
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL �TTACHMENT struggle. They did not derive their political sustenance from
Though the Muslims had made India their home and had no Hindu sovereignty in foreign lands. They never quarrelled with
intention of leaving it, yet they 'looked out of India to recover British foreign policy since no Hindu interests were involved
their Arab, Turkish or Persian roots and retain their pride as in international diplomacy. And therefore they were justified
former conquerors'. 2 Their origin was alien and so, were many in taunting the Muslims with extra-territorial loyalty, though
of their associations and attachments. The future of the Otto­ there was only a modicum of truth in the charge that the
man Empire was an important determinant of Indian Muslim Muslims' lukewarm interest in 'Indian nationalism' was trace­
politics from the last quarter of the nineteenth century .right able to their pre-occupation with Muslim interests outside
up to 1928. European ambitions of controlling Muslim coun- India.
, tries like Persia and Egypt agitated Muslim India and condi­ But the strength of Muslim concern for the welfare of the
tioned her attitude to Britain, the only European country . Islamic world community cannot be denied.' It had serious re­
they knew at first hand. As we will see in a later chapter, percussions on their political activities in India and was, at
events in Turkey, Persia, Egypt, Morocco and Palestine have om times, an additional reason for their alienation from the
at times decisively influenced the course of Muslim politics Hindus. Some Hindu leaders successfully persuaded their
in India. followers to believe that the Muslims of northern India might
Religion was the most obvious-in fact the only-bond one day join forces with the Afghans in overrunning parts of
between Muslim India and the outside Islamic world. After India and founding another Muslim empire in the country.
losing their hold over their own country, the Indian Muslims There is no evidence to show that this was ever contemplated,
derived a vicarious satisfaction from the existence of other but it is apparent that some Hindus suspected the Muslims of
Muslim States in the world. It gave them confidence and a harbouring such designs, and this misunderstanding did not
feeling of security. They felt that they were not alone and encourage communal amity.
friendless in a hostile world. Every addition to the community
INDIAN NATIONALISM AND HINDUISM
of Islamic nations was an accretion to their strength. Every
Muslim country which went under was a blow to their self- Indian nationalism has long been a Hindu nationalism in es­
1 S. Dutt, Problem af Indian Nmianality, 1926, pp. 72-73. sence. The Marhatta Empire, the earliest manifestation of this
2 A. de Reineourt, The Saul af India, 1960, p. 296. spirit, was 'a revival of Hindu nationalism against Muslim
80 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN INDIAN NATIONALISM AND HINDUISM 81
domination'.1 The. earliest political bodies were Hindu even kali puja (worship of the Hindu goddess of destruction, kali)
in their designation, e.g. the Sarvajanik Sabha of Poona and and to have a swadeshi katha or jatha (a boycott meeting).
the Mahajana Sabha of Madras. In 1882 Dyananda founded 'Give a religious turn to the movement,' he said, 'and as for the
the Cow Protection Society which was an overt anti-Muslim Muslims, if you can get them to your side, why not have a waz
gesture. In the beginning the Arya Samaj was more religious (an Islamic sermon) followed by swadeshi preaching.' 1 A
than political, and it was one of its foremost leaders, Lala Bengali Hindu, who was a young man when Bengal was parti­
Lajpat Rai, who frightened the Hindus of the Punjab with tioned, confirms that swadeshi was essentially a movement of
the bogey of an Afghan invasion to be staged in connivance Hindu revival. 2
with the Indian Muslims. Swadeshi, the chief instrument Apart from the general trend of the age, the one person who
of the Indian National Congress, was essentially a Hindu was responsible f or the inoculation of Hindu orthodoxy into
concept. 2 the nationalist movement was B. G. Tilak. Very early in his
Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, the Bengali Hindu novelis.t, career he discovered that a religious feryour must be induced
who is generally claimed as one of the fathers of Indian nation­ into politics if a missionary enthusiasm was to be created. 'He

Aghazetaleem.c
alism, assiduously propagated anti-Muslim ideas in his popu­ knew that once the spiritual and religious springs of India's
lar stories. He consistently treated the terms 'Hindu' and great past were revitalized the greatness and glory of her fu­
'Indian' as synonymous; there is no 'context in which "In­ ture were assured.' 3 He idolized Shivaji, the 1\farhatta chief­
dians" can be interpreted to include "Muslims"'. Muslims tain who had murdered the Muslim general, Afzal Khan,
were not Indians, they were aliens. They are always cast in through deceit. He. established anti-cow killing societies to
the roles of oppressors and tyrants. The references made to stop Muslims from sacrificing cows on Eid-uz-Zuha. He ap­
them are 'frequently sneers of contempt'. And 'there are no pealed to the people to turn out all foreigners from India, and
grounds for supporting this attitude to be other than the re­ he included the British as well as the Muslims in that cate­
sult of a deliberate choice'. The nationalism founded and nur­ gory.4 He certainly succeeded in making the nationalist move­
tured by such writers could only be Hindu in character and ment strong and potent, but at the same time alienated all
content. This brought a new unity and national pride to the Muslims.
Hindus, but it 'instilled in the minds of the Muslims suspicion When the Dacca Anushilan Samiti was first proscribed in
and fear, which subsequent events did not eradicate'.8 1908 for its seditious activities, more than a dozen copies of the
Nothing illustrates the Hindu character of Indian national­ om Gita (the Hindu Bible) were found among its effects, and it was
ism more faithfully than the agitation carried on against the found that regular Gita classes were held there. Members of
partition of Bengal between 1905 and 1911. Religion and the Society were required to take oaths with a sword and a
politics were combined in a good measure. Surendranath Ban­ copy of the Gita on the head.5 At the height of the agitation
erjea, the foremost Congress leader of the time, wrote to one of Sir Valentine Chirol visited India and found, in every Govern­
the leaders of the agitation to organize a religious ceremony, ment office and in every profession; that Hindus were banding
such as shakti puja (worship of the Hindu goddess shakti) and themselves together against their few Muslim colleagues. On
Muslim refusal to join the swadeshi movement, words had
1 John Cumll).ing (ed.), Modern India, 1931, p. 22.
1 Quoted by V. Chirol, Indian Unrest, 1910, p. 341.
2 For a description of the religious meaning and implications of 2 Nirad C. Chaudhuri, The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian,
swadeshi see C. F. Andrews, Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas (1930 ed.), pp. 118- 1951, p. 226.
80. 3 D. V. Thamankar, Lokamanya Tilak, 1956, pp. 815-16.
3 T. W. Clark, 'The Role of Bankim CJ;iandra in the Development of
4 G. T. Garratt, An Indian Commentary, 1928, p. 129.
Nationalism', in C.H. Philips (ed.), Historians ofIndia, Pakistan and Cey­
5 Lord Ronaldshay, The Heart of Aryavarta, 1925, pp. 125-126.
lon, 1961, pp. 439-40.
F
 ill,
I',

'I I

82 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN INDIAN NATIONALISM AND HINDUISM 83

been passed round in all big cities among the Hindus not to out of the Congress the moment they insisted on social reform
deal with Muslim shops and not to trade with Muslim mer- and the abolition of untouchability. 1
chants. Where Muslims were excitable the Hindus challenged Well-known Hindu writers have admitted that Hinduism
them so that intervention by British troops should lead to the was the bedrock of the nationalist movement. From the end of
shedding of Muslim blood and thus drive the Muslims them- the nineteenth century onwards, says K. M. Panikkar, Indian
selves into the agitation. 1 nationalism had two aspects -the one political, the other re-
The Bande Mataram song was a Hindu revolution!J,ry poem, ligious.2 The nationalist movement was 'religionized' and was
occurring in Bankim Chandra Chatterjee's novel Ananda treated as a 'transcendental philosophy' rather than a 'mere
Math (The Abbey of Bliss), which invoked divine assistance political programme'. The basis of this philosophy was that
against the Muslims and the British and roused the people to 'there is a great Power at work to help India' and that the
drive both out of J;,ndia. 2 This song, obviously distasteful to the nationalist leaders were only acting on its bidding. In the
Muslims, was made a sort of a national anthem by the Con- words of a historian of nationalism, this politico-religious
gress and was sung not only at all its meetings but also at the philosophy was 'meant to give the nation clear ideas about the

Aghazetaleem.c
; I
opening of legislative assembly sessions in the Hindu pro- conception of freedom'. 3 It stressed Hinduism and defended it
vinces when the Congress was in power during 1937-9. Des- as 'the symbol of Indian nationality'. 4
pite Muslim protests it continued to be the Congress song till Evidently such a nationalism, because of its Hindu roots
I

:ii 1947. and Hindu outlook, could not appeal to the Muslims. Of
1111
,: Many impartial observers can be quoted in evidence of the course, there were a few Muslims. in the Congress and, for a
!!I
Hindu character of the Congress. A former Governor of the time, it also attracted large Muslim groups. But that was owing
United Provinces called it the political organ of orthodox , to peculiar circumstances, which we will discuss later. Most of
Hinduism. 3 It made its appeal to Hinduism and worked for a the groups which acted in liaison with the Congress or shared
Hindu India. 4 Muslims rejected Gandhi's ideas because he its ideals took care to retain their individuality. For instance,
based the development of India on the cultural background of the Red Shirts, the Ahrars, the Momins, and the Jamiat-ul-
Hinduism and Hindu ideology. He took some of the religious Ulama, were independent political parties, existing in their
terms of Hinduism and gave them a political meaning, so that own right, and never merged with the Congress. It is necessary
'political doctrines were clothed in the phraseology of spiritual to emphasize that they shared only the Congress's political

om
conceptions'. Nationalism was presented in a Hindu garb when objective, i.e. independence from the British, and not the
the ultimate gaol was named Ram Raj, the golden age of underlying nationalist philosophy. To the masses of the Mus-
11
Hinduism. 5 The hold of orthodox Hinduism over the Congress lims the Congress never presented a programme which could
was brought out when Mrs. Besant and Gandhi were turned win their allegiance. The presence and influence of a handful of
Hindu liberals did not suffice even to enable it to save appear-
1 V. Chirol, Indian Unrest, 1910, p. 121.
ances. Altogether, Hinduism was far too deeply imbedded _in
: An ex-Civilian characterized it as 'an appeal to the lower instincts · the Congress either to be explained away by its leaders or to be
and ideals of Hinduism in its most demoralizing aspects', Sir J, D. Rees,
The Real India, 1908, p. 175. .ignored by the Muslims.
3 Lord Meston, 'India Today and Tomorrow', N~neteenth Century,
1 See Lord Mes:ton, Nationhood for India, 1981, p. 80.
'"
11
:,I March 1932, p. 310.
2 K. M. Panikkar, Indian Nationalism, 1920, pp. 15-17.
''I,, 4 E.G. Colvin, 'Trial and Error in fodia', Fortnightly Review, February
3 I. N. Topa, The Growth and Development of National Thought in
1932, p. 214.
5 India, 1930, pp. 160-61.
L. S. S. O'Malley (ed.), Modern India and the West, 1941, pp. 97-98,
106. 4 Frederick Hertz, Nationality in History and Politics, 1944, p. 189.
84 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN HINDU-MUSLIM RIFT 85
Principally, there were three ways in which the Hindus, or responsible for the creation of Muslim nationalism and,, ulti­
the Congress, could have dealt with the Muslim problem: mately, of Pakistan.
toleration, discrimination, coercion. The Congress might have To express the same thing in a different way, we may say
treated the Muslims on an equal footing, tolerated their exis­ that the Congress was too Westernized. It was not true to the
tence, acknowledged their separate status and honestly tried spirit of Indian culture which has always striven to absorb,
to meet their wishes. This is how Britain and, to some extent, I'
rather than alienate, foreign elements. In the long course of
the United States have dealt with their minorities. But the Indian history many streams of race and sect have flown in
Congress refused to adopt this method. Again and again its from outside and gradually found a place in the waters of the
leading figures denied the very existence of the Muslim prob­ Ganges and the Jumna. The Huns, the Sakas, the Parsees and
lem, blamed the British for creating this rift, and right up to many others became a part of India and lost their cultural and
the end ignored or grossly underestimated the strength of Mus- political identity. But not so the Muslims. One reason for this
lim feeling. was their large number. Another was the nature of their creed
Discrimination is another method of dealing with minorities. -militant, stern and individualistic-of which India had no

Aghazetaleem.c
They are tolerated, but only as an undesirable nuisance. They precedent. Still another was their membership of the world
are permitted to carry on their functions, but only under community of Islam. But above all the failure was due to the
handicaps. In political terms, they are not given full rights. Hindu determination that the rule of the majority must pre­
Socially ·they are made to labour under serious disadvantages, vail. The separate personality of the Muslim community was
like inferior schools, special institutions, separate working not respected. Nor was a modus vivendi fashioned whereby it
rights and segregated quarters. This is characteristic · of the could be led into co�operation and ultimately perhaps into
South African Government in relation to the black population. absorption. Instead, the Congress altogether denied its exis­
This was also characteristic of the Ottoman Empire in relation tence and at times tried to destroy its individuality. But the
to its European and Arab minorities. The Congress practised result was the opposite of what was expected. The community
discrimination, particularly when it was in ·office in the pro­ became a nation and an affected nationalism burst into two
vinces. opposing nationalisms. A policy of toleration, even of amiable
The third method is plain coercion, whereby the will of the neutrality, might have achieved different results.
majority is imposed on the minority. The Congress used this
method when, for example, it ordered the use of Hindi in place om HINDU-MUSLIM RIFT
of Urdu, or opened the legislative proceedings by the singing Though the Congress and most Hindus denied the existence of
of Bande Mataram, or obliged the Muslim students to wor­ the communal problem in India, the problem remained and, in
ship Gandhi's portrait, or lay down the Wardha scheme of the end, created an unbreakable deadlock. Unpleasant reali­
education. Politically, it tried to override the wishes of Muslim
ties could not be wished away by verbal denials.
legislators by ignoring the opposition and by getting its will Hindus and Muslims were only kept together by the bayon­
imposed on the provinces through laws passed on the strength ets of the Pax Britannica. So deep-rooted and universal was
of brute majority. the alienation that in Ludhiana, in the Punjab, Muslims peti­
The Muslims feared that in a united India they would be tioned the Lieutenant-Governor for Englishmen to replace the
confronted with discrimination and coercion, and this was the Hindu personnel of the administration, and in another town
principal factor behind their demand for a separate State. They they erected an arch for His Honour with the inscription: 'For
did not trust the Hindus, and where there is no trust there is God's sake save us from the rule of our fellow-countrymen !' 1
no co-operation, and where there is no co-operation there is no
national spirit. It is in this sense that the Congress is to be held 1 J. D. Rees, The Real India, 1908, p. 198.
86 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN HINDU-MUSLIM RIFT 87
No more impartial witness can be called than Ramsay Mac­ brighter the hopes of the Hindus and the deeper the fears of
Donald, who was not only a friend of the Congress but was the Muslims. The more sanguine became the hopes of the
actually invited to preside over one of its annual sessions. He Hindus and the more freely they quoted the Hindu philosophy
found Indian nationalism shot through and through with as the basis of swaraj, the greater the apprehension of the
Hinduism. 'No Muslim can enter its Holy of Holies, where poli­ Muslims that independence would 'end in merely exalting the
tics are transfigured by the presence of gods into religious horn of Hinduism'. 1
faith, and where the struggle for civic-freedom is transformed The distance which separated the Hindus and the Muslims
into the worship of the Hindu genius.' 1 An American visitor of from each other in politics came out in full gravity at the
the same period found the Hindus and Muslims locked in a ,Round Table Conference. All delegates were united on one de­
'deathless antagonism', and the equilibrium maintained only :mand, that lndi� be given her ind_ep�_ndence. ijJ!.t_heyond.that
by the virile, fightipg qualities of the Muslims. 'It is a far dis­ ;not a single item of agreement wa§ visibl�. Each delegate had,
tant day,' he wrote wistfully, 'that will witness the final unifi­ :,as.the ·Manchester Guardian nic�ly p:ut it, a· dual role. 'He is a
cation of the jarring elements of the Indian population. India ':i'or
Nationalist longing the time when India has self-gover:rt­

Aghazetaleem.c
as a nation is as yet the most shadowy of dreams.'2 It was, in m�nt, believing that the time has now come for her to have it;
fact, widely realized that the continuance of British rule in and }:t�j�_J!Jiind11g_r.a Mu,slim eag�r to g.o_t_!i� b�st he can for
India was owing to the fact that the Hindus and Muslims were _ _hl�QWn r_eligion. As Nationalists the delegates are at one; as
disunited. 3 Hindus and M;_usE:rp.s_ they are rivals, s_uspicious and afraid of
In 1908 G. K. Gokhale, the Congress leader, told Wilfred 'bne-ario't11er.' 2 The Conference failed, not because the· British
Scawen Blunt that Muslims were all against the Congress and -;,;;:e wicked imperialists who wanted to keep India always
would constitute a danger in any reconstruction of India on a /' ;\ under the yoke, but because, as_�L�rd 1-Jirkenhead once re­
national basis, because, though much less numerous and less .I\ marked, 'all _!l_i� �QI!_ferences in tne· world cannot bridge the
:( unbridgeabk'. 3
- ---- · ·-- ---
rich,�y_}Y_er_ � 1:1:11�ed. Blunt asked him if his (Blunt's) appeal­ .
· - --- ·- --

ing to the Muslims to join the Congress would do any good, but .J---- The spirit' of Muslim separateness was admitted by the
was told that it would not. 4 Congress itself in a curious provision in its constitution which,
Sometimes it is said that the Hindu-Muslim problem was of while allocating the seats for the All India Congress Committee
late growth and that the two peoples had been peaceably living prescribed that 'as far as possible one-fifth of the total number
side by side for a thousand years. But this overlooks the fact om of representatives shall be Muhammadans'.4 In as late as 1946
that Muslims had come to India as conquerors and that as long a semi-official history of the Congress confessed that Hindu-
as they occupied that position the Hindus dared not show their Muslim uhity was as yet a dream.5
enmity. When they ceased to be the rulers the antagonism I It seems that the Hindus and Muslims of Indian origin
burst out. And with the passage of time, as the immortality �; carry their differences with them even after leaving their
,
of British rule came to be doubted and the prospects for self­ 1, country behind. in South Africa, for example, even today
government became brighter, the Hindu-Muslim rivalry in­ 1 V. Chirol, India, 1926, p. 293.
creased. The greater the advance towards democracy the 2 Manchester Guardian (leader), 18 December 1930.
1 .J. R. MacDonald, 1'he Awakening of India, 1910, p. 105. 3 Quoted in Birkenhead, Frederick, The Earl of Birkenhead: The Last
2 Theodore H. Boggs, 'England's Problem in India', Yale Review,
Phase, 1935, p. 246.
February 1909, p. 402. 4 See R. Coupland, Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, Part
3 Edward Dicey, 'Islam in Fermentation', Empire Review, August I, 1942, p. 46.
1906, pp. 22-23. 5 Satyapal and P. Chandra, Sixty Years of Congress: India Lost, India
4 W. S. Blunt, My Diaries (1932 ed.), p. 635. Regained, 1946, p. 381.
88 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN WHO REPRESENTED THE MUSLIMS? 89
Hindus and Muslims do not belong to one party. Hindus belong Congress, but were contemplating the formation of a Muslim
to the Congress party (no relation to the Indian National Con­ organization which would, among other things, hold aloof from
gress) and Muslims to the Indian Organization.1 Similarly be­ the Congress.1 One contemporary observer noted that all Mus­
fore 1947 in Britain there was the London Muslim League lims stood contemptuously aloof from this Hindu organiza­
which was affiliated to the All India Muslim League, and there tion.2 Still another found that Muslims did not support the
was the British Congress Committee which acted under the Congress but identified themselves with the British rather than
supervision of the Indian National Congress. In the United the Hindus.3 A large number of Muslim organizations, the
States also there used to be an India League which was chief among whom was the Central National Muhammadan
materially a Congress organ in the new world. Association, publicly denounced the Congress and refused its
invitation to send delegates to its annual meetings.4
WHO REPRESENTED THE MUSLIMS? Some of these reports may have been biased or exaggerated.
In logical consistency with th�ir claim that there were no And some Muslims were undoubtedly with the Congress and
Hindu-Muslim differences the Congress leaders continued, al­ even contributed their quota to its presidentship, viz., Bad­

Aghazetaleem.c
most to the end, to insist that the Muslim League did not re­ ruddin Tyabji and M. R. Syani.In fairness it must be said that
present the Muslims of India.The Congress, they said, was the the Congress was not exclusively a Hindu body; and it certainly
spokesman of all that was vocal in India, and the few Muslims represented a vast majority of the politically minded educated
who opposed it were reactionaries and hangers-on of imperial­ Indians. But the point is that it was predominantly a Hindu
ism. Even in its early years, Allan Hume, the founder of the body and therefore failed to win Muslim support. On purely
Congress, was severely critical of all those who doubted the all­ democratic grounds, therefore, it could not. be said to speak
inclusive character of the organization, and called them 'fossils', for India. Take India and Europe-less-Russia as close approxi­
'wanting in understanding' and 'time servers' who hoped to be mations, and then: 'Now, let us suppose that there came to Mar­
paid for their opposition to the Congress. He did not believe seilles from various parts of Europe some hu_ndreds of persons
that the Muslim opposition represented genuine feeling: it was answering to the description the Indian delegates give of them­
inspired by mischievous bureaucrats who wanted to create an selves, i.e., "appointed either by open public meetings or by a
artificial counter-agitation.2 This line of argument became the political or trade association".Let us suppose further that
standard pattern of Congress reaction to Muslim politics. these people, though strongly opposed by large numbers of
But facts told a different tale. Only a handful of Muslims om their countrymen, called themselves the representatives of
chose to join the Congress, and on the whole Sayyid Ahmad various peoples of Europe and entitled themselves "Euro­
Khan's advice was heeded.3 Between 1885 (when the Congress pean-National Congress", and then let us ask if the title
was founded) and 1894 the number of Muslim delegates to its would be considered a legitimate one. . ..Would not an
annual sessions indicated the extent of Muslim participation. assemblage so constituted be more properly termed a debating
In 1885 there were 2 Muslims among a total of 72; in 1886, 33 society than either a National Congress or a spontaneous
out of 436; in 1887, 81 out of 607; in 1888, 221 out of 1248; in Parliament ?' 5
1889, 254 out of 1889; in 1892, 87 out of 625; in 1893, 63 out of 1 'Current Events in India', Empire Review, February 1902, p. 54.
867; and in 1894, 20 out of 1163.In 1902 it was reported that 2 W. S. Lilly, India and its Problems, 1902, p. 242.
Muslims were not only abstaining from countenancing the 3 John Morrison, New Ideas in India during the Nineteenth Century,

1 G. H. Calpin (ed.), The South African Way of Life: Values and Ideals 1907, p. 144.
of a Multi-Racial Society, 1953, p. 85. 4 For a list of such bodies see Leslie Smith, 'The Congress and Modern
2 W. Wedderburn, Allan Octavian Hume, 1913, pp. 71-73. India', National Review, April 1889, p. 207.
3 See, for example, The Times, 19 and 26 December 1887. 5 Robert H. Elliot, letter to The Times, 28 September 1888.
90 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN WHO REPRESENTED THE l\'.IUSLll\'.IS? 91
With the partition of Bengal and the ensuing agitation the The Muslim League had done poorly because of bad
Congress became even more unrepresentative of the Muslims, organization and lack of unity among the Muslims. But nearly
and it was not till the Khilafat period that it could, with justifi­ all Muslim seats had gone to Muslim parties. The Congress had
cation, claim the allegiance of a majority of Muslims. But here so little confidence in its appeal to the Muslims that it contested
we must recall the fact that during these years of violent anti­ only 58 out of 482 Muslim seats and won only 26 of these. 1 It is
British feeling it was not a question of belonging to the Con­ hard to understand how, in light of these figures, the Congress
gress or to the Muslim League but of fighting out the Khilafat still claimed to represent the Muslims.
issue with Britain. Both the Congress and the League stood The Congress was said to have polled about 15,000,000 out
squarely for greater self-government and for Khilafat. But still of a total of 85,000,000 votes, and thus was a minority party in
the Indian Khilafat Committee was an independent body, India. 2 It had come up against difficulties in finding Muslim
though it was giv.en full support by both the nationalist candidates. In the United Provinces, the home of the Congress
organizations. The Muslims were then with the Congress in and the Nehrus, only one Muslim was elected on the Congress
the same sense in which the British were with the French in ticket, and he was returned from the special university con­

Aghazetaleem.c
the Second World War. The Congress did not represent the stituency under joint electorate. The Muslim president of the
Muslims; it supported them so completely that for a time all United Provinces provincial Congress Committee was de­
differences were sunk in united opposition to the British. feated. With the exception of the North-West Frontier Pro­
With the passing of the Khilafat agitation the brief honey­ vince the Congress had performed badly in all Muslim pro­
moon was over and antagonism burst out once again-this time vinces. The election results confirmed that the Congress 'held
with redoubled fury and with no prospeets for another re­ Hindustan only, with an unfortunate stress on the first two
union. The Nehru Report put a seal on this unfortunate dis­ syllables'. 3
cord and peace never returned to India. The Congress civil The election result was a rude shock to the Muslim League.
disobedience movement of 1930-81 was a purely Hindu cam­ The satisfaction that the Congress had won only twenty-six
paign, which the All India Muslim Conference declared to be Muslim seats was soured with the thought that the Muslim
an attempt by the Hindu majority to acquire dominanee over community was a house divided against itself. The League
the minority communities in India. 1 The Round Table Con­ now concentrated on remedying this and on building up its
ference only deepened the gulf and the scene was set for the strength. So successful was this determined effort that in
incubation of separatism. om February 1938 the �lanches-ter Guardian correspondent in
In the 1987 elections, the first held under the 1935 constitu­ India was able to report that the Muslims 'have rallied
tion, the Muslim League won only 108 out of a total of 482 round Mr. Jinnah in such numbers that the Congress has
Muslim seats. But the remaining seats were not won by the been compelled, much against its inclinations, to recognize
Congress but by other Muslim parties or groups. Out of a the necessity of dealing with him as their accredited
grand total of 1,711 seats the Congress won only 762; which leader'. 4
means that the Congress eould speak for less than half the total There was no looking back now and the League continued
number of voters. Further, out of a total of 1,289 non-Muslim to win nearly every by-eleetion with monotonous regularity.
or 'general' seats the Congress won only 786; in other words Between 1987 and 1945, there were 77 by-eleetions in the
the Congress did not represent more than a bare majority of provinces, out of which the League won 55, Independent
even the non-Muslims. 2 1 R. Coupland, India: A Re-Statement, 1945, p. 154.
India in 1930-1931, 1981, p. 77.
1
2 A. R. Barbour, letter to Manchester Guardian, 28 September 1942.
3 P. Lacey, 'Deadloek in India', Nineteenth Century, July 1987, p. 105.
Figures taken from Return Showing the Results of the Elections in
2
4 11-fanehester Guardian, 19 February 1988.
India, 1937 (November 1987), Cmd. 5589.
92 THE MAKING 01!.. PAKISTAN 'DIVIDE AND RULE' 93
Muslims 18, and the Congress only 4. Between 1984 and 1945, unto each other. ·There were no differences among them. In
there were 18 by-elections in the centre, out of which the particular Hindus and Muslims were good to each other and
League won 11, Independent Muslims 5 and the Congress only had only occasional, minor tiffs. But a rift had been created
2. If in 1987 the Congress had, on its electoral reckoning, re­ between them. The British were the villains of the piece. To
presented about 5 per cent Muslims, by 1945 it did not speak achieve their selfish, sordid end they had divided the Indians
for more than 1 or 2 per cent of Muslim India. into religious groups and sided sometimes with the one and
In light of these figures it is difficult to sustain the assertion sometimes with the other. This helped to prolong the tenure
that the Congress represented the Muslims or that Pakistan of British rule and kept the Indians quarrelling among them­
was the demand of only a minority of Musalmans. Those who selves rather than fighting for independence.
argued, under Congress pressure, that the Congress should be From this proposition flowed many lines of thought. One
accepted as the m9uth-piece of India and its demands should was that the British usually favoured the Muslims against the
be conceded, were shutting their eyes to the situation that Hindus and instigated the former to oppose every advance to­
would have developed if Muslim opinion had been ignored. wards self-government. An extension of this allegation was

Aghazetaleem.c
They mocked the two-nation theory, overlooking the fact that that the Simla Deputation had been inspired by the British
it was the declared belief of the Muslim League. They abused and that the Muslim League had come into being through
Jinnah, forgetting that he held a mandate from the largest official machinations.
Muslim party to act on its behalf. They protested against the Another was that Hindu-Muslim rivalry could not cease
Mt1slim veto on constitutional advance, without :realizing unless the British withdrew. Gandhi was fond of tracing
that there were 90 million Muslims in India. They persisted in the origin of the communal problem to the presence of the
the demand that Muslims must accept democracy as under­ 'third party' and of declaring that as soon as the British left
stood in the West, without foreseeing that this would lead to p�ace would prevail and amity would return to this stricken
political strife and civil war. 1 land.
By reiterating again and again that it represented all India It was also said that the 'divide-and-rule' policy was useful
the Congress made it harder for the Muslims to share its ideals. to Britain in so far as it enabled her to plead, in the interna­
By declaring repeatedly that there was only one brand of tional field, for the necessity of her presence in India-not
nationalism in India, the Congress brand, it forced the Muslims in British interest but in the interest of India. If the British
to proclaim themselves as a separate nation. Such claims om left India would be riven by a deadly civil war. Therefore
created fear and hatred in the Muslim mind. And hate and fear they must stay until the advance of education and the train­
are potent ingredients of militant nationalism. To break the ing in self government had created at least a semblance of
monopoly of the Congress the Muslim League proffered its own unity.
brand of nationalism. To start with, this might have been done All Hindu and several British writers and politicians argued
to spite the Congress. But pretence becomes conviction as its in this fashion, and millions of words have been written and
roots go deeper. spoken to prove the validity of the argument. But some sub­
stantial facts were ignored in this partisan disputation. Britain
'DIVIDE AND RULE' did not put the Muslims into India, and therefore did not create
One of the stock arguments used by the Congress and all other the minority problem. And there is no evidence to prove that
parties in support of their thesis that Hindu-Muslim rift was separate electorates were imposed upon the Muslims against
.unimportant and superficial was that of 'divide-and-rule'. The their will or without their asking for them. Nor can anything
argument was short and sharp. All Indians were like brothers be brought forth in support of the charge that Lord Minto ·
1 See India correspondent's dispatch, The Times; 22 January 1941. or other British officials stage-managed the establishment of
 94 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN 'DIVIDE AND RULE' 95
the Muslim League. It is true that the Hindus condemned' not the creation of the British. It may be that on occasions
1

separate electorates in unmistakable terms during 1906-12; the British profited by this immense breach in Indian unity;
but it is also true that they voluntarily agreed to them in they would have been more than human if they had not. But
1916. It is true that the Congress was opposed to the Muslim that does not amount to the assertion that they divided and
League and its general policy; but it is also true that it par� ruled. Indians divided themselves and let the British rule over
leyed, negotiated and co-operated with it when it suited it to them.
�� .
1 I have been able to find at least one Congress confession on this
There might have been-in fact, there were-some among point; there may be more. Delivering his presidential address to the
the British bureaucracy in India who looked amiably at the Calcutta Congress session on 29 December 1928, Pandit Motilal Nehru
Hindu-Muslim schism and saw in it an additional prop to their said, �J;.b�-�rl!lll� solel accountable comm_!lllaL�-
differences which have contrip . th�;r��_thJstory_of
imperial position. It may also be that on some occasions the C
-ourtiinei:•·K:-M�Panikkar and1 '-:E•ers a e s. ;-Tiii-Voiceof Freedom:
British official machinery was more kind to the Muslim League -seteclea."Speechesof Pandit Motilal Nekru, 1961, p. 52. l\fotilal Nehru was
than to the Congress. But by no stretch of imagination does the chairman of the committee which drafted the Nehru Report, in

Aghazetaleem.c
that prove the indictment of 'divide-and-rule'. We saw, when w�!Lt!1eJ1!1�ediate abolition of separate Muslim representation was
strongly recom mended:-.--·· --- ·-·- · ··-·--·---.. •·- · · · · ·· --··
• - • •• •

we were discussing the nature of Muslim loyalty, that it was

0 0

•-a.•• .
�=.,��-"-"'"""c:,.- c:;� ·-=-

in the Muslim interest to be in the good books of the rulers.

The Muslims rarely made a nuisance of themselves. On the
whole they were 'good' subjects-co-operative, loyal, law­
abiding. On the contrary, the Congress thrived on non-co­
operation and agitation. If, in these circumstances, the Govern­
ment tended to lean a little towards those whom it could
trust, this could hardly be called a calculated satanic scheme
to divide the Indians.
Let us keep before our eyes the elementary fact that the
British were in India as imperialists. Foreign rulers are not
generally pleased with refractory subjects, and when their
supremacy is in jeopardy they are apt to use a heavy hand. om
By the same logic, it heartens them to find that a section of the
subjugated people is, so to say, on their side or at least not on
the side of the rebels. The· Muslims.. were in a minority, and
minorities always find it wise to maintain good relations with
the rulin:g power. Thus the Muslim was thrown into the arms
of the British by' circumstances, and the Hindu did not like it
and attributed it to British devilry or to Muslim reaction or to
both. He did not realize that it was at least in part his own
fault if the Muslim chose to ally himself with the foreign ruler
rather than with fellow-Indians.
Hindu-Muslim antagonism was not merely religious · or
olitical, but was a clash of two separate and distinct civiliza­
(ions. The incompatibility of the two peoples was certainly
 RELIGION AND NATIONALISM 97
such unity. In many cases a reference to Divinity has been a
potent instrument in welding a heterogeneous people into a
nationality.
Chapter 4 Religion is also serviceable as a symbol, apart from being
a sanction, of unity.I It provides an additional source of pride
to the national group. It vouchsafes confidence and courage,
THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR particularly when other national bonds lack strength.
Numerous examples can be given to illustrate how often re�
RELIGION has been, since time began, a powerful nexus be­ ligion has-moulded nationalism and served as a foundation for
tween· individuals and groups. Communal solidarity and a nation. Modern Greek nationalism is largely a product of the
national unity have often sprung from religious roots. There is Greek Church. It was the Orthodox Church which saved the
no civilization today which does not bear the impress of some Greeks during the Middle Ages and the early part of the modern
religion. The life of the modern 'secular' man is moulded by his age, and finally enabled them to become an independent na­

Aghazetaleem.c
religious beliefs in more ways than he consciously realizes. In tion. 2 It was the Kirk which made Scotland a nationality and it
the Orient religion plays a paramount role and the following is Calvinism which has 'made the genius and the character of
pages will, after some general remarks, describe the impact of Scottish nationality'. 3 The Roman Catholic Church played an
religion on the problem of nationalism in India. important part in the Spanish Civil War. In Italy Mussolini
could not have succeeded without the friendship of the Church.
RELIGION AND NATIONALISM In the colonization of the New Hebrides Islands the mission­
History proves that religion is an essential element of national­ aries of France and England have been potent rivals for the
ism and exerts a decisive influence on the national life of a control of the islands. The close tie between religion and
people. One student of nationalism has gone to the extent of nationalism may also be seen in Japanese Shintoism, Jewish
laying down that national States are 'political church organ­ Zionism, Irish Catholicism, Indian Hinduism, and Burmese
izations', that national consciousness is a religious concept, and Buddhism.
that one is a German or an Italian, just as one is a Catholic, a National churches have frequently aroused nationalism,
Protestant or a Jew.I This is obviously an extreme view and and in a country where different nationalities live side by side,
few political scientists will accept it, even if he is taken to have om the weaker national group often uses its religion as a 'defence
used the word 'religion' in its widest and most catholic sense mechanism', 4 like Islam in India, Buddhism in Ceylon and
of general belief or philosophy of life. Catholicism in Prussian Poland.
But it is no exaggeration to say that many a nascent nation­ Mazzini is a very good example of a leader arousing national
alism has thriven on a religious background, just as many a ·fervour through a religious appeal. His soul was permeated
religious struggle has won the day by clothing itself in national with a mixture of religious ethics and national-political aspira­
drapery. In Europe it was the Reformation, essentially a tions. 'God and the People' was his slogan, for to him the
spiritual stirring of the mind, which ushered. in the era of 1 See Frederick Hertz, Nationality in History and Politics, 1944 (3rd
modern national States. One important way in which religion imp. 1951), p. 122.
helps nationalism is the supernatural authority that it imparts 2 Ernest Barker, National Character and the Factors in Its Formation
to the necessity of solidarity. All people must come together, for _
(rev. ed. 1948); pp. 151-2.
God wills it and His mission cannot be accomplished without 3
Ibid., p. 152
1 Rudolf Rocker, Nationalism and Culture, trans. R. E. Chase, 1937, 4 The phrase is Hans Kohn's, see his The Idea of Nationalism, 1944,
p. 202 p. 15
G
 I

98 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN HINDUISM AND INDIAN NATIONALISM 99

nation was 'a religious concept which he strove to confine with­ with Catholic shops, if you subscribe to Catholic charities, if
in the frame of a political church'.1 you entrust your children to Catholic teachers, you are help­
Religion also affects national character and habits. Catholic ing to sustain a hostile campaign against the candid life.'1
nations exhibit traits different .from those of Protestant ones. Inge's ideas may be slurred over as the cynicism of the
The impact of Calvinism is different from that of Lutheranism. 'Gloomy Dean' and Wells's diatribe may be dismissed as mis­
The Scottish Kirk united the Scots and separated them from placed orthodoxy. Anyway, it is open to doubt if such views
the English.Similarly, religion can be a unifying or a dividing really reflected English opinion. But what is important, in
factor, depending upon a nations's historical development. our context, is to remember that if such thoughts could be ex­
Where the authority of the national State was firm and strong, pressed, even by a small minority, in one of the most homo­
as in Holland, England and Scotland, the religion of the geneous and sophisticated countries of the world, it is nai:ve
majority of the p�ople became a part of the Establishment, to be surprised by the acerbity existing between the Hindus
thus adding to the unity of the country.Where, on the' con­ and Muslims in India, particularly if we recall that Hinduism
trary, political authority was weak and wavering, as in and Islam are, unlike Catholicism and Protestantism, not two

Aghazetaleem.c
Germany, no religion attained the privileged position of a species of the same religion but two distinct creeds with not a
national institution, and this heterogeneity worked as a divi­ single attribute in common.
sive force.
Religion also buil(Js up civilizations and moulds cultures. HINDUISM AND INDIAN NATIONALISM
French nationalists, like Charles Maurras, have emphasized The history of India is 'fundamentally the history of the
and appreciated the role of the Catholic Church in giving to Hindu people.' 2 The earliest Hindu chroniclers of Rajputana
France the glory of which they are justly proud. Some French­ referred to their enemies as Asuras, the traditional foes of the
men regard only a Catholic as a true compatriot. Similarly, Aryan gods, thus indicating the depth of their hatred. 3 The
German nationalists extolled Protestantism and attributed to idea of Hindu patriotism was mystical in its conception.The
it the greatness of the German nation.Even England, the fatherhood was not important. The mother-earth was deified.
renowned home of toleration, has not been free of such dis­ Patriotism was a duty towards God, and was subordinated to
criminatory bias. Not many years ago, Dean Inge could write: 'immutable spiritual laws and to the religious ideals'.4
'It is impossible to converse long with a Catholic without being, Early Indian nationalism was both religious (Hindu) and
conscious of an insurmountable barrier; and if we consider om racial (anti-British). It was made a religious personification
what this barrier is, we find that we cannot confidently appeal and an incarnation of Krishna. 'The Lord Krishna,' wrote a
to those instincts and moral traditions which are the common nation,alist paper, 'is our nationality. .. . Nationalism is a
heritage of all English people.' 2 Fifteen years later H. G. divinely appointed shakti (i.e. power) of the Eternal.'5 Arya
Wells, that disappointed prophet of a new age, rendered this Samaj, one of the earliest modern movements in Hinduism,
judgement: 'You can no more trust a devout Catholic in your
household and in your confidence than you can risk frankness 1 H. G.,Wells, Guide to the New World, 1941, p. 35.
or association with a Nazi spy.Never will the devout Cathclic 2 Michael Edwardes, A History of India from the Earliest Times to the

be really frank with you.Always there will be a reservation; Present Day;_ 1961, p. 13.
always the priest will be lurking in the background....To 3 S. Dutt, Problem of Indian Nationality, 1926, p. 72.
marry a Catholic is only half a marriage, and your children 4I. N. Topa, The Growth and Development of National Thought in
will be only half your own.And manifestly if you do business India, 1930, p. ).3.
1 Rudolf Rocker, op. cit., pp. 59-60. • Quoted jn L. S. S. O'Malley (ed.), Modern India and the West, 1941,
2 William Inge, England, 1926, p. 68. p. 750.
100 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN HINDUISM AND INDIAN NATIONALISM 101
which soon became a force in politics, 'opposed Islam with alive and India undivided'.1 And he proceeded, 'mass singing
. bitterness and Christianity with vigour'. 1 of Ramadhun [a Hindu hymn] and the beating of tal [cymbal]
The Bengali revolutionary movement of the first decade of ... are as much a part of discipline in non-violence as physical
the present century had a 'renascent Hindu ideology' as its drill and training in the use of the arms are that of military
motive and inspiration and held up a 'purified Hindu idealism discipline'. 2 The theory of satyagraha is an old Hindu concept
as a shield against the steady flow of Western influence'. 2 It and was enunciated and elaborated long ago by Patanjali. 3
aimed at the expulsion of the British from India and the re- Ahimsa, which Gandhi made a potent political weapon, was
placement of the British raj by a Hindu raj.3 At Poona 'rilak such an integral part of Hinduism that he himself once de­
founded a 'Society for the Removal of Obstacles to the Hindu clared that if it 'disappears, Hindu religion disappears'. 4
Religion', 4 and in his list of such obstacles the Muslims and the Similarly, Gandhi described cow-protection as 'the dearest
British came on tQp. possession of the Hindu heart', the 'central fact of Hinduism'
'fhe entire outlook of the Congress was Hindu. Swaraj, the and the 'gift of Hinduism to the world'. 5 Bande Mataram was,
Hindu and Congress term for self-government, meant Hindu as was said above, a rabidly anti-Muslim song which Indian

Aghazetaleem.c
rule. 5 In a book which carried a foreword by Jawaharlal Nehru nationalism had owned. To Gandhi it had 'wonderful associa­
a Hindu author wrote, 'Because of this story [the Ramayana] tions' and expressed 'the one national wish' of India. 'And I
the whole country has one idea, one inspiration, one personifi- should prefer Bande l\fataram to Bharat mata ki Jai,' he said.6
cation of manly virtue.'6 The Hindu character of Indian In 1945, one Shriman Narayan Agarwal published his
nationalism is well brought out in S. C. Bose's My Mission of Gandhian Constitution for Free India, which urged that the
Life (Calcutta, 1953), which is a collection of his writings and Indian constitution should be framed with the background of
speeches for the period 1921 to 1929. Throughout this book he Indian political thought and tradition, which were mainly
uses Hindu words, invokes Hindu gods, quotes Hindu shiris contained in the Ramayana, the Mahabharata, Kautallya's
(saints) and thinkers, and in general appeals to Hindu instinct. Artha Shasthra and Shunkracharya's Nitisara. Drawing upon
And all the time he is discoursing on Indian politics, not on these purely Hindu sources Agarwal suggested an outline
Hindu religion or philosophy. scheme of constitution. To this book Gandhi ,note a foreword
But it is the father of Indian nationalism whose pronounce­ saying, 'I regard Principal Agarwal's to be a thoughtful con­
ments and ideas conclusively prove the Hindu nature of tribution to the many attempts at presenting India with
Congress politics. Gandhi's greatest contribution to modernanti­ om constitutions. The merit of his attempt consists in the fact
colonial political technique was non-violence or satyagraha. He that he has done what for want of time I have failed to do.'
believed it to be an expression of the Hindu philosophy of Nationalism and religion were thus allied in Gandhi's teach-
life.7 It was, in his own words, 'the only way to keep Hinduism ings. He found the substance of India's life in Hinduism. Like
1 T. G. P. Spear, The Oreford History of India (1958 ed.), p. 731.
1 :M. K. Gandhi, in Harijan, 6 October 1946, p. 838,
2 Hirendranath :Mukerji, India Struggles for Freedom, 1946, p. 84. 2 Ibid., 3 :March 1946, p. 26.
3 Sir Basil Blackett, 'The Economics of Indian Unrest', Foreign Affairs, 3 Rajendra Prasad's 'Introduction' to Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: '/.'he

October 1929, p. 44. Last Phase, 1956, Vol. I, p. vii.

4 R. P. Masani, Britain in India, 1960, p. 83. 4 Quoted in Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Pha,ye, 1956, Vol. I,

5 See J. E. Ellam, Swaraj: The Problem of India, 1930, pp. 246-52. p. 886.
6 R. S. Dinkar, 'Rama as a Figure in Synthesis', Samskriti ke Char 5 :M. K. Gandhi in Young India, 8 June 1921, p. 182, and 6 October

Aohyaya (Four Phases of Culture), Delhi, 1956, p. 70, quoted in Selig S. 1921, p. 318.
Harrison, India: The J11ost Dangerous Decades, 1960, p. 97. 6 Quoted in Hirendranath :Mukerj1, India Struggles Jot· Freedom, 1946,
7 S. Abid Husain, The National Culture of India (1961 ed.), p. 188. p. 115.
102 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN . HINDUISM, ISLAM AND NATIONALISM 103
Tilak before him he felt that nationalism needed a spiritual base an 'Indian' leading other Indians (of all religions) and that se­
and provided it from the Hindu dogma. Moral teaching of the cularism was the basis of his nationalism. Of the two, Jinnah
Hindu variety went hand in hand with political propaganda, might have been, in Western eyes, a 'sectarian', but he was
and nationalism was presented in religious raiment. In the true to his political creed and made no false claims. Gandhi, by
political education of the masses he fully utilized his and their claiming to lead all Indians1 and by condemning the Muslim
religious background, and therefore 'to the majority of Hindus leadership for uniting religion with politics, exposed himself to
Hinduism meant Gandhi'1 By using Hindu terms, rather than the charge of insincerity. On the record of their writings and
their rough Western equivalents, he gave a religious colour to speeches, Jinnah comes out to be far more liberal and secular
his political opinions. It was swaraj, not self-government, that than Gandhi.
he wanted for India. It was satyagraha, not non-co-operation, The religious basis of Muslim nationalism will be discussed
that he commendep. to the people. It was ram rajya, not a later when we come to analyse the two-nation theory.
golden age, which he set as the goal of Indian nationalism. It
was Bharat-mata, not the motherland, to which he bore obedi­ H INDUISM, ISLAM AND NATIONALISM

Aghazetaleem.c
ence. It was ahimsa, not self-control, that he sought to popular­ Both Hindu and Muslim nationalisms were avowedly based on
ize. So he 'sanctified politics', 2 but made it a social version of religion. But it is interesting to find that both Hinduism and
the Hindu faith. The masses followed him because he was a Islam are, in theory as well as in practice, incompatible with
saint, not because he was a nationalist, 'though it may be that the philosophy of nationalism.
persistent Congress propaganda had indeed spread the first Hinduism, with its emphasis on caste, encouraged class
article of the Congress creed,that an Indian is first a national­ consciousness rather than national unity. That explains why in
ist and only secondly a communalist'. 3 In the words of a Siam and other South-East Asian countries it served as a
Professor of Social Anthropology, Gandhi was a 'Hindu meta­ check against the growth of a national idea. 2 In fact, caste
physician'.4 system not only deferred the creation of a national spirit but was
And still it was the Congress claim that it stood for Hindu­ so anti-national in essence that it could be justly said that the
Muslim unity and the Congress regret that Muslims neither unity of India had not gone 'beyond that of the unity of
joined its ranks nor shared its ideals. When the Muslims re­ caste'. 3
fused to have truck with such a nationalism, they were con­ A caste system does not make for that spiritual unity,
demned for proclaiming their separateness on the basis of om liberty, equality and fraternity, which are prerequisites of a
religion. They were said to be a backward, primitive people who healthy national growth. To an orthodox Hindu the caste is
still took religion seriously and refused to be modern and (or at least was) far more than the nation is to other peoples.
secular. Enough evidence has been given above to show that Under the system the Brahman enjoyed more privileges as a
Indian nationalism was as much grounded in Hinduism as was matter of course than had been arrogated to itself by any
Muslim nationalism in Islam. In fact, the latter was more hon­
est, for it did not pretend to be what it was not. Jinnah made it 1 'The Congress represents the whole of India', Gandhi's speech before
plain that he was a Muslim leading only Muslims and that Is­ the All India Congress Committee at Bombay on 7 August 1942, quoted
in Sampurnanda, op. cit., p. HS. Cf. Jawaharlal Nehru's confession that
lam was the basis of his nationalism. Gandhi said that he was Congress was in the main a Hindu body, Glimpses of World History,
1935, Vol. II, pp. 689-90.
1 T. G. P. Spear, The Oxford History of India (1958 ed.), p. 836. 2 Htin Aung in Philip W. Thayer (ed.), Nationalism and Progress in
2 Sampurnanda, Memories and Reflections, 1962, p. 149.
Free Asia, 1956, p. 85.
3 Sir Ivor Jennings, Problems of the New Commonwealth, 1958, p. 17. 3 Bernard Joseph, Nationality; Its Nature and Problems, ?1929, pp.
4 Professor T. C. Hodson, letter to The Times, 24 January 1941. 226--7.
104 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN" HINDUISM, ISLAM AND NATIONALISM 105
race of conquerors, feudal nobility or a dynasty ruling by For many years during the last quarter of the nineteenth
Divine Right. It was not easy for the high-caste nationalist century and the first of the twentieth the Hindus believed in
leaders to talk of liberty and equality without renouncing their territorial nationalism. They had their roots in India which was
own privileges defended by sacerdotal sanctions. It was diffi­ their own country. Nationalism, a Western concept, was bor­
cult for the masses to appreciate or comprehend the concepts rowed and quickly made the basis of their struggle for in­
of freedom and independence without enjoying fraternity dependence. The Muslims, however, tenaciously clung to
within their religious circle. their traditional idea and refused to face the problem of nation­
Hinduism was inconsistent with either national unity or alism posed by special Indian conditions. Iqbal still sang
political democracy. 'A ruling caste, retaining power by force of Hindustan hamara (India is our land) and few Muslim
or fraud, holding authority over the masses without consulting . leaders or thinkers referred to the Muslims as a national
them, oppressing them without compunction, and treating group. It was much later, during the 1930s, that territorial
them at best as mere means to its own ends, appears to be the nationalism began to intrude into their political thinking. Geo­
political system which alone corresponds to the religion of graphy entered into :their political calculations for the first time

Aghazetaleem.c
Hinduism.' 1 and the idea of a separate State began to take shape in their
Historically Brahmanism had a germ out of which a nation­ mind.
ality could take birth, but such hopes had been disappointed. Even then the orthodox or ulama class denied the validity
Hindus failed to exploit this reservoir of spiritual leadership .I of the concept of territorial nationalism. They said it was
which might have, in the course of time, laid the foundations un-Islamic, and by the logic of traditional dogma they were
of a semblance of national unity. Muslim invasion was not right. Their opposition to the idea of an Indian Muslim
sl,].ccessfully resisted and.for many centuries the Hindus eked nationalism was, and could be, interpreted as their alliance
out a far from happy existence as a subject people. The rise of with the Congress and the Hindus. In political terms this
the Marhatta power in the eighteenth century was the last interpretation was justified by the maxim that anyone who
opportunity when the Hindu force might have assured the rise is not with 'us' is with 'them'. But it is quite possible that the
of a national spirit, but 'Brahmanism did not pass into patriot­ 'nationalist' (or pro-Congress) Muslims decried the Pakistan
ism' and Shivaji's movement remained as 'an organization of idea, not because they were anti-Muslim, but because they
plunder. ' 2 It was only in the beginning of the present century were orthodox Muslims for whom the ,association of terri­
that Hinduism experienced a stirring in its body politic and om tory with nationalism went counter to Islamic beliefs and
began to dream the dreams of an Indian nation. By then, how­ traditions.
ever, it was too late, for the Muslims too had awakened to their Abul Ala Maudoodi's writings furnish the best modern
plight. In consequence when national regeneration finally argument against the concept of nationalism in Islam. His
came to India it produced two nationalisms, instead of one. chief objection to the policy of the Muslim League and to the
Curiously enough, Islam, too, is anti-national in theory. In idea of Pakistan was that they were based on the theory of
the traditional Islamic view States are not based on nation­ nationalism, which he held to be incompatible with Islam. He
hood. All the Muslims in the world are supposed to belong to argued thus: Nationalism is not only a wrong way of thinking
one big society-call it nation or millat or what you will. Till but is the real cause of all those disasters which have over­
the present century many 'national gr01.1ps' lived in one State whelmed the world. Nationalism means selfishness, blind
and, in modern parlance, we may say that most Muslim States prejudice and cruel pride. To believe in modern nationalism is
were multi-national. to turn our backs on the Quran. To demand a State on. this
1 Ramsay MacDonald, The Awakening of India, 1910, p. 101. basis is to rebel against the teachings of Islam. 'The spirit of
2
J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England, 1883, pp. 221-7. Islam, which you profess to believe and from which you derive
106 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN HINDUISM, ISLAM AND NATIONALISM 107
the name Muslim, is in conflict with the spirit of this dirty and obvious and immediate need of preparing Muslims for public
rotten system.' 'Muslim nationalism is as contradictory a term services his educational policy also helped to spread education
as "chaste prostitute''.' 1 Till 1947 he maintained that he would among the masses and thus to facilitate the work of the leaders
not fight for Pakistan, that he did not believe in Pakistan, and who came after him.
that the demand for it was un-Islamic. 2 Another factor of equal consequence was the low status of
Maudoodi was not ploughing a lonely furrow. Most of the women in Muslim society. The orthodox section appealed to
ulama and nearly all the orthodox Islamic parties were with Islam as an argument against female emancipation: Maudoodi
him rather than with Jinnah. Appeal to Islam was an instru­ still denies the franchise to women. The moderately educated
ment of extraordinary potency, and this vastly increased the section was also reluctant to raise the position of women. Most
difficulties of the exponents of Muslim nationalism. They had parents did not send their daughters to school. To let the
to fight on three forniidable fronts: to persuade the British of women enter a profession was a revolutionary step which few
their separate entity, to convince the Hindus of their determin­ dared to .take. With nearly half the total population thus dis­
ation to live apart, and, above all, to nullify the efforts of the qualified and immobilized the spread of the national message

Aghazetaleem.c
anti-nationalist forces within themselves. inevitably suffered.
So far we have been discussing the theoretical position. But One undesirable result of Hindu impact on Indian Islam was
in practice, too, there were strong factors which retarded the that many Muslims borrowed the caste system and practised
growth of nationalism and impeded the work of Muslim na­ it almost as severely as the Hindus. Islam which had brought
tionalists. the message of equality and fraternity to India became itself a
One was the lack of education among the Muslim com­ divided house. Castes and sub-castes maintained their separ­
munity. It is a commonpl9:ce that democracy cannot work ate status. Inter-caste marriages were uncommon:. In politics
without education. But we are prone to underrate the impor­ and in the pursuit of national unity this proved a crippling
tance of education in the growth of a national spirit. The handicap.
national creed cannot be propagated without a minimal level Finally, the Muslim community in India was a very con­
of education among the people. Muslims lagged far behind the servative body of opinion. The influence of orthodox Islamic
Hindus in this field. They lacked schools and universities. teaching killed the spirit of free inquiry. The ulama did not
They had practically no journals and publishing houses. To hesitate to invoke the sanction of religion in favour of the
preach nationalism is to put across facts and arguments -a om status qua. In 1934, for example, opinion in Multan ruled that
process well-nigh impossible without well-informed leaders compulsory primary education was 'an interference with re­
and educated masses. The fact of the rapid growth of Hindu ligion and contrary to skariat'. 1 Some of the most highly
nationalism is largely due to the advance made by Hindus in educated persons were biased against independent resea11!h
the sphere of education. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's emphasis on and inquiry. Sir Muhammad Iqbal thought that Sir T. W.
education appears, in retrospect, in a new light. Besides the Arnold's The Preaching af Islam was not a reliable book, be­
cause Arnold had nothing to do with Islam and because all his
1 This is a summary of his ideas propounded in Musalman aur scholarly work had been done in the interest of England. Simi­
Maujooda Biasi Kashmakash (The Muslims and the Present Political larly he believed that Professor Brown's A Literary History
Struggle), Lahore, ?1937-8, 3 Vols; Nationalism in India, Pathankot, af Persia was written to advance the English interest, so that
1947; The Process of Islamic Revolution, Pathankot, 1947, and The
Message of Jamaat-i-lslami: A Contribution towards Islamic Consti­ by emphasizing Persian nationalism the unity of Islamic
tution-Making, Lahore, 1955 ed. 1 Letter of Sir Fazl-i-Husain, a former Minister of Education in the
2 Freeland Abbot, 'The Jarnaat-i-Islami of Pakistan', The Middle Punjab, to Sayy:id Rajan Bakhsh, of 12 September 1934, quoted in
East Journal, Winter 1957, pp. 40-41. Azim Husain, Fazl-i-Husain: A Political Biography, 1946, p. 187.
 108 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT 109

millat could be broken. 1 Islam was interpreted in the narrowest Britain was now more interested in the future of Armenia.
possible terms, and religion was made a dogma and a ritual Turkey was no longer a country to be wooed and won but an
rather than a pathway to God. Free thinking was discouraged. Asiatic intruder in Europe to be kept in its place. How could a
Feudalism was rampant, and the landlord class provided the Muslim power maintain itself in Europe? The Ottoman Em­
bulk of the leadership. Jinnah was the first front-rank leader pire was an outdated theocracy which had no further use for
who did not belong to the landed aristocracy. British diplomacy. The earlier it was liquidated the better it
- --Tliuifthe spirit of conservatism was strong and those who would be for Europe and Christendom.
spoke of a wind of change spoke in vain. Muslim India produced Here it is relevant to recall that this anti-Turkish feeling
no philosopher and no social thinker who could, by sheer force coincided with (and was aggravated by)the then current theory
of his ideas, change the course of Muslim thought. The society that the Indian Mutiny was the handiwork of the Muslims.
was static, intellectually and mentally, and the- deadening This added a bitter edge to British opinion. Had Britain come
'hand-of reaction held all progressive forces in check. This was to the defence of the Turks and saved them from the Russian
hardly congenial soil for the seed of nationalism, and the seed, invader so that their co-religionists in India could rise against

Aghazetaleem.c
sown by earlier leaders, might probably never have sprouted the British in revolt? Was this the reward of her traditional
'
.h�d_politicaLevents of the 1930s not shocked the Muslims into pro-Turkish policy?
a realization that any further inaction would spell certain dis- Still another complication arose in the already tangled web.
- -astcr. The Sultan of Turkey was not only the head of the Ottoman
Empire but also the Khalifa of the world community of Islam.
THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT It is true that Khilafat was a purely Sunni institution and the
Nothing illustrates the play of religious feeling in politics Shias did not aclmowledge the supreme religious status of the
better than the short-lived but fervent Indian Khilafat move- Khalifa. But he was also the head of the only surviving Muslim
m.ent. Empire, and this aspect of his position appealed equally to the
The Ottoman Empire has figured prominently in British Sunnis and the Shias. On the Khilafat question, therefore, all
foreign policy. On what has gone do'\\-'TI in British history as the the Indian Muslims were combined against the British. The
Eastern Question, English· sympathies were first given to Khalifa's powers must be maintained. The Ottoman Empire
Turkey for two politico-strategic reasons. Russia posed a must be retained. European (and particularly British) designs
threat to British imperial stakes in Asia, and therefore a om aimed at the dismemberment of Turkish territories were re­
friendly Turkish Empire was a British interest. The safeguard­ sented in India and gave birth to what came to be called the
ing of the Indian Empire became another element in 'the Khilafat movement.
formation of British attitude towards Turkey. Palmerston ,vas This movement had obvious religious basis. The Muslim con­
notoriously pro-Turkish and anti-Russian, and the Crimean War cern for the Khalifa was apparently an Islamic sentiment. To
was fought to protect the integrity of Turkey and to hedge in this was added the general feeling that European powers were
the expansion of Russia in the East. With Disraeli this policy fastening upon Muslim States in North Africa and the Middle
did not change, for he too thought it to be in the British im� East. Russian advance in Turkestan, French control of north­
perial interest that Turkey should be strong. ern Africa, British intervention in the Persian and Afghan
With the coming of Gladstone this policy was forsaken. affairs, Italian occupation of Tripoli-all this was in Muslim
1 Iqbal's conversation with Sayyid Nazir Niazi on 17 March 1933, S.
eyes an unmistakable and deliberate plan to destroy Islam in
Nazir Niazi Maktubat-i-Iqbal (Letters of Iqbal), 1957, pp. 96-97. Iqbal is
the world. Then came the Turco-Italian conflict and the Bal­
generally considered to be one of the fathers of Muslim nationalism in kan Wars in which Britain did not come to the rescue of Turkey
India. as Muslim India had expected it to do.
110 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT Ill
With the coming of the Great War matters were made infi­ Turkey were revised. One Muslim leader bitterly remarked
1

nitely worse by Turkey joining the Central Powers against that Muslims now considered the British as the enemy of Islam
Britain and her Allies. When Turkey fought against Britain, since they had seen how, for the sake of Greek imperialism,
the Indian Army f ought for Britain and therefore against Jewish capitalism and the oilfields of Mesopotamia, their
Turkey. As the Indian Army counted a great number of Mus­ cherished sentiments had been deliberately assaulted. This
lims in its ranks, the situatiori was indeed grave; But the old had shattered their faith in constitutional methods and created
habit of loyalty reasserted itself. Confidence in the British the danger of India becoming Ireland on a huge scale. 2
sense of fairness overcame Muslim suspicions and doubts. And Lord Northcliffe, while on a world tour in January 1922,
ther�fore Muslim India took her full share in the war effort. was deeply struck by the depth of the anti-British sentiment
The explosion came at the end of the hostilities when a peace among the Muslims of all countries he visited. He found the
treaty with the vanquished Ottoman Empire was being ne­ Indian situation much uglier than the British Press appeared
gotiated. to make out, and warned that peace could not be assured until
Muslims were beginning to take a roseate view of the future the Muslim question was 'adjusted'. 3 His paper told the British

Aghazetaleem.c
of Turkey. They had close affinity with Turkey on religious to stop thinking of the Khilafat agitation as engineered and
grounds. They were also, mentally speaking, not far removed fictitious and to accept the fact that Indian Muslims suspected
from Britain. They looked forward to an amicable settlement the Lloyd George administration of an anti-Islamic bias. 4
of the problem with matters turning out in favour of Turkey. Lord Reading, the new Viceroy, was sympathetic to the Muslim.
Lloyd George's declaration that Britain was not fighting to de­ feeling and early in 1922 he sent a telegram to Ed win Montagu,
prive Turkey of its territorial integrity held out a hopeful the Secretary of State for India, urging the Government to
chance. concede the basic Muslim demands. Montagu sanctioned the
But the Treaty of Sevres, which the Allies signed with Tur­ publication of this dispatch without consulting the Prime
key on 10 August 1920, dashed the hopes of Muslim India. The Minister, and for this was asked to resign. In India, of course,
Treaty took away large slices of Ottoman territory-Eastern this enforced departure of a friendly Secretary of State was
Thrace, Gallipoli, Smyrna, the Straits and the Dardanelles, the interpreted as another proof of Lloyd George's perfidy. Muslim
Aegean Islands -and distributed them among the victors of leaders appreciated Montagu's friendliness and condemned the
war. Muslims reminded Lloyd George of his promises and of Prime Minister's action.5 Twenty Muslim members of the
Muslim loyalty, but to no effect. They were rapidly losing om Indian Legislative Assembly wired to Lloyd George their em­
their patience as well as their trust in British pledges. They phatic protest against his 'deplorable action', their appreciation
believed that the Peace Conference was bent on the destruc­ of Montagu's efforts in the cause of Khilafat, and their con­
tion of Islam. Much excitement prevailed and a seething rest­ viction that he was 'sacrificed in the anti-Khilafat cause'. 6
lessness took hold of Muslim politics. The Muslim belief hardened that the Government of India
An All India Khilafat Committee had been f ormed a little was favourable to Turkish claims but it was · the British
earlier, and one of its first actions was a call to the people, 1 'Lord Chelmsford's Viceroyalty', Quarterly Review, July 1921, p. 57.
issued on 23 November 1919 as a religious edict, to abstain 2 M. H. Kidwai in Manchester Guardian, 27 August 1920.
from participation in victory celebrations, to boycott British 3
Statement at Bombay on 21 January 1922, 'l.'he Time.�, 25 January
goods and to non-co-operate with the Government. 1 On 24 June 1922.
1920 ninety prominent Muslims wrote to the Viceroy that they 4 The Times, 11 September 1922.
would refuse to co-operate with the Government from 1 Aug­ 5 See Ameer Ali, letter to The Times, 14 March 1922, and the Aga

ust unless in the meantime the terms of the Peace Treaty with Khan's statement of 9 April 1922, at Bombay, ibid., 10 April 1922.
1 See Manchester Guardian, 20 December 1919. 6
The Ti=, rn March 1922.
112 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE KHILAFAT MOVE1\IENT 118
Goyernment which was the protagonist of the anti-Turkish progress and would not let Islam revive. Islam was being looked.
campaign. upon as a dying religion and the agitation was being branded
In Turkey, in the meantime, important developments were as a silly and insincere pretext. To prove that this was wrong,
taking place. By diplomatic skill supported by the might pf Muslims of all shades of opinion joined together in support of
arms Mustafa Kamal beat the Greeks out of Turkey, shot the the movement.
unity of the Allies to ribbons, and forced Britain to draft a re­ The movement was fundamentally religious, thougl:J, it had
:ised treaty. The Treaty of Lausanne was accordingly signed a strong political. undercurrent. The Muslims were not pre­
m July 1928. pared to see any diminution of the powers of the Khalifa, nor
In India the most remarkable development ·was the Hindu­ were they ready to countenance even the shade of a British
Muslim entente on the question of the Khilafat. Gandhi, on or European control Qver the holy places in Arabia. Altogether,
behalf of the Hindµs, had pledged his support to the Muslims it was religion which determined the shape and content of the
in their anti-British and pro-Turkish movement. The formid­ movement and which, for the first time, brought all the
able Hindu-Muslim alliance had two immediate results. One Muslims of India on one platform.

Aghazetaleem.c
was the final victory of the Khilafat agitation, clinched by the Whether the movement was a mere interlude-brief and
signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. Another was the joint front pointless-in the history of Muslim India or an important
fo rmed by the Congress and the Muslim League during the milestone in the train of events is a moot question.
making of the 1919 reforms. But, in the long run, as we will On the credit side several things can be mentioned. It
see, this marriage of convenience was unproductive of any per­ trained the l\fuslims in political action and agitation. For the
manent results. In 1921 a correspondent of The Times had first time a definite plan of action was drawn up and executed.
lamented that Muslims were joining hands with the hereditary It also brought the extr_emists and the moderates on one plat­
enemies of British raj, the Hindus, 'through the misdoings of form, or at least brought a unity to their outlook and taught
our own Government'. 1 In 1928 the same journal was publishing them how to work in unison. There was nothing in common
gory details of widespread Hindu-Muslim riots. between, say, the Aga Khan and Maulana Muhammad Ali
Two final questions remain to be answered. What lay behind or between Sayyid Ameer Ali and Dr. M. A. Ansari. But the
the Khilafat movement? What permanent impress did it 'loyalists' and the 'agitators' worked to the same end. Whether
leave on Indian politics and especially on the growth of Mus­ the 'rebels' were bringing out processions in India or the 'con­
lim nationalism? om stitutionalists' were writing to The :L'imes in Britain, _the
aim was identical. Never again was this .synchronization of
The Muslims looked at the maintenance of the Sultan as a
great honour to Islam and keenly resented the process of cutting political action in India with publicity in Britain to be
up the only great Muslim power and dividing it into nations or achieved.
petty republics. They felt that, by their sentimental sympathy The Khilafat movement also destroyed the myth of Muslim
with the Oriental Christians and the Greeks, the British were loya�ty. The spectacle of the agitating Muslim was such· a
forgetting the history of Muslim loyalty in India. They pointed break with their traditional conduct that at first the British
out that Turkey had been, unlike Germany and Austria­ rubbed their eyes and refused to believe what they s�w. The
Hungary, denied the right of self-determination. They looked friends of yesterday had become the enemies of today. Whether.
unkindly at British encouragement to the Arabs to rise against this metamorphosis was caused by the exigencies of British
Turkey and at British support to Zionism in Palestine. In foreign policy or by an inherent British enmity of Islam is
their eyes the British, by their treatment of the Turks, had irrelevant. The net result was that the mutual trust, carefully
made it eyident that they refused to Muslims a fair chance of nurtured by the efforts of forty years, was gone and with it the
1 The Times (Empire Day Number SuppleIQent), 24 May 1921. old method of conducting politics. This change was also due
B
114 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN PAN-ISLAMISM 115
to Hindu-Muslim unity, which lasted just as long as the Khila­ end to what the masses were ready to do at their bidding. But
fat issue was in the forefront. Gandhi had thrown himself when the emergency passed away a calm resembling death
wholeheartedly into the fray because, as he confessed, it was settled upon Muslim India. New problems arose which the old
an opportunity of uniting the two peoples which might never leadership had not anticipated and for which they had no solu­
recur. The Muslims welcomed this reinforcement, for it tion. For a time, in fact for the next eight years, politics were
swelled the ranks of the agitators and brightened the chances static and the masses confounded. It is in this sense that the
of success. This alliance was a new phenomenon in Indian his­ Khilafat leadership was a failure and the movement itself a
tory and created false hopes in countless breasts. pointless interlude.
However, this unity did not last long. Even before the final One would have thought that the success of the Khilafat
battle was won cracks had begun to appear in the entente. For movement would teach the Muslims one elementary lesson:
the discerning observer there were signs of the things to come that in unity lies strength. A joint effort had led them to vic­
in this rift. Many Muslims learnt one important lesson: that tory and in future too they should seek their appointed goal in
Hindu-Muslim differences were too deep to be bridged over by unity. But no sooner had the movement come to an end than

Aghazetaleem.c
passionate professions of friendship and even by united action the Muslims were once again divided into 'nationalists' and
in the political field. The movement, in effect, underlined the Leaguers, extremists and moderates, pro-separate electorate
basic Hindu-Muslim schism which nothing could heal. Never and anti-separate electorate. It seems that it is only in moments
again were the two communities to combine forces against the of dire danger that Muslims can stand shoulder to shoulder and
British. defy the common foe. This has been proved again and again in
The movement also threw up some effective leaders among Muslim political history all over the world.
the Muslims. Effective, but not really of the first class. As the Religion was the raison d'etre of the Khilafat movement, and
movement was highly emotional it was easier for the fire­ this had one important result for the subsequent growth of
eating demagogue to get himself lionized than for the cautious Muslim nationalism. By emphasizing Islam the movement
constitutionalist to catch the public eye. There was no Fazl-i­ made the Muslims conscious of their being Muslims. Of course,
Husain or Jinnah among its leaders; only the Ali brothers, the feeling of being a separate religious group was at least as
Azad and Ansari. By definition the movement was religious old as the time of Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Later the demand for
and anti-British. Therefore by definition it excluded the separate representation was also based on the claim that their
Westernized and co-operative public men from its ranks. The
need of the moment was to rouse popular emotions to snapping
om religion set them apart from other Indians. But it was only
now that they felt, with unprecedented intensity, that they
point, to make fighting speeches to scare the British, to preach were Muslims first and Indians afterwards. This was a triumph
sedition even to the soldiers, to i�sue threatening statements for Muslim nationalism, for it provided a base on which other
promising dire consequences and, if necessary, to go to jail to unities could be built. And this, as far as we can see, was the
prove one's love for Islam. Only a special kind of leadership was only permanent contribution of the Khilafat movement to the
capable of this, and it ruled the roost. larger problem of nationalism. It was a contribution, however,
Within these limitations and in their own province of which no historian can afford to underestimate or ignore.
activity, the Khilafat leaders were good tacticians and compe­
tent politicians. They rarely looked beyond the movement and PAN-ISLAMISM
had no vision of the future. But they were all sincere men, pas­ It was Jamaluddin Afghani who first preached the doctrine of
sionately attached to their religion and fanatically devoted to pan-lslamism. Broadly, the doctrine was that Muslims all over
the welfare of Turkey. As long as the campaign lasted they the world were brothers to one another and should unite in
rode on the crest of the wave of popular acclaim. There was no defence against the influences working against Islam. Later
116 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN PAN-ISLAMISM 117
Sultan Abdul Ham1d of Turkey propagated the theory, partly to humanity. 1 There was also the apprehension that, IslaI)l
out of genuine conviction, but largely out of the necessity of being a conquering creed, a strong Muslim military power
bolstering up his position as the Khalifa of the Islamic world. might make pan-Islamism a dangerous reality. 2 This misgiving
In his mouth it took the shape of an appeal (almost an injunc� was also behind the Manchester Guardian's opposition to the
tion) to the faithful to rally round the Ottoman throne. Still entry of Turkey into Thrace, for it 'would mean the re-entry
later the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress took up of the effective military power of Turkey into Europe'. 3
the cause of pan-Islamism and spread its message to all Mus­ On the other hand, it could be argued that pan-Islamism had
lim.lands. been reawakened and regenerated from its long dormancy by
Pan-Islamism was in the I)lain a sentiment, a slogan, and it the Christians themselves and not by Muslim thinkers and
is extremely doubtful if it ever inspired the various Muslim rulers. Egypt was held by Britain. Algiers and Tunis were
countries or people![l to 'gang up' (to use a modern American­ ruled by France, Morocco was next on the French list of her
ism) against what they considered to be the enemies of Islam. cqlonial possessions, Tripoli had been earmarked for Italy, and
Under its influence the Muslim League passed resolutions the Ottoman Turks were being slowly but resolutely rolled out

Aghazetaleem.c
against the British policy of leaving Turkey to its fate during of Europe. It looked like a 'relentless Christian crusade against
and after the Balkan Wars and of instigating the Arab revolt the Muslim world'. Was it then surprising if Muslims all over
against Turkish rule. A modicum of pan-Islamic feeling was the world were closing their ranks f or common defence ,against
certainly behind the Khilafat movement. But it never became Christian aggression ? 4
a plan of action. At the most it signified a desire to see the Pan-Islamism might or might not have affected the Muslim
Muslims of the world standing shoulder to shoulder and shar­ nationalist movement in India, but on the whole it appeared to
ing one another's adversities and triumphs. be more of a liability than an asset. It earned the Muslims
In India the doctrine had a slightly stronger appeal than in considerable European hostility without receiving any succour
other countries because the Muslims were in a minority. They from Muslim countries. It alienated many British commenta­
insisted on the international aspect of Islam, but in this their tors of weight and created an unnecessary barrier between
motive force was a defensive attitude in the face of Hindu them and their understanding of Muslim India's problems. It
na tionalism. 1 To them the need for unity was greater because also frightened some Hindus and made them suspect the Mus­
their security was in greater danger. They needed help from lims of imperialist designs. Many Hindus, who should have
their co-religionists in their flight from the peril of Hindu om known better, sincerely believed that Muslims were planning,
in co-operation with their co-religionists from across the border,
domination.
But many in Britain refused to see pan-Islamism in this to crush Hindu India and to re-found a Muslim Empire, at
light. They espied in it a potent danger to British world least in the north. The Modern Review, an influential Hindu
interests. Sir Ronald Storrs, who, with Sir Henry MacMahon, journal ably edited by B. C. Chatterjee, propagated for many
had played a major part in negotiations with the Arabs, la­ 1 J.C. Hardwick, letter to Ne:w Statesman, 17 April 1920, pp. 87-88.
mented that the Treaty of Lausanne had been in part dictated 2J. Ellis Barker, 'The Future of Asiatic Turkey', Nineteenth Century,
by the British Foreign Office's fear of 'this well-known and June 1916, p. 1227. For similar views see also II. A. Wilson, 'The Muslim
discredited pan-Islamic bluff'. 2 Islam was a creed of narrow Menace', ibid., September 1907: A. Vambery, 'Pan-Islamism', ibid.,
dogmatism and fanaticism, and pan-Islamism boded no good October 1906; and Henry Whitehead, Indian Problems in Religion,
Education, Politics, 1924, pp. 291-2.
1 H. A. R. Gibb (ed.), Whither Islam? A Survey of Modern Movements

in the :Muslim World, 1982, p. 78. For a different view see W.W. Cash,
3 Manchester Guardian (leader), 25 September 1922.
The Muslim World in Revolution, 1925, pp. 25-29. 4 See the remarkable article byChedo Mijatovich, a Serbian diplomat,
2 Ronald Storrs, Orientations (1948 ed.), p. 192. on 'The Problems of the Near East', Fortnightly Review, October 1906.
118 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN CHRISTIAN VIEW OF MUSLIM NATIONALISM 119
years the idea that a Muslim attack from the north was an Christianity and by imparting secular education, the Govern­
inevitability in case of British withdrawal. 1 Even a liberal ment was creating among the Indian students a 'tendency to
politician like Sir Albion Rajkumar Banerji gave currency to general infidelity' and bringing about 'a negation of God in his
the idea that Indian Muslim nationalism would one day result practical life'. This was 'mo:rally poisonous' and 'politically
in pan-Islamism and an Islamic Empire. 2 This fear was genu­ dangerous'. The British should teach 'dogmatically and firmly
inely held in some responsible quarters and is said to have in all Government schools the great fact of God's existence,
played a considerable part behind the scenes at the Round and his supreme moral gov�rnmcnt of the world, implying the
Table Conference. 3 In later years the Pakistan demand was ultimate and absolute responsibility of every human being to
opposed by the Hindus for, among other things, its alleged His omnpotent jurisdiction'. 1 The fact that Christianity had
pan-Islamic tendencies. Once Pakistan came into being, the made no impression on Islam was regretted. 2
argument ran, India would be confronted with a hostile and Some British teachers and priests openly favoured Chris­
aggressive Muslim bloc extending from Lahore· to Constantin­ tianity and, when the conflict was between Hinduism and Is­
ople. 4 lam, sided with Hinduism. Professor Monier Williams, for

Aghazetaleem.c
example, regarded Hinduism as 'the natural religion of hu­
THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF MUSLIM manity' q,nd Islam as 'an illegitimate child of Judaism'. The
NA'rIONALIS� teachings of the Quran tended to make the Muslims more in­
It must not be forgotten that some in Britain looked at British tolerant, more sensual and inferior in moral tone to the Hindus.
imperialism as a convenient instrument for advancing Chris­ To him Christianity had more points of contact with Hinduism
tianity. This was particularly true of India, which some British than with Jainism, Buddhism or even Islam. 3 Sir William
administrators and their friends in England took to be a Muir, the biographer of the Prophet, held that the sword of
battleground for the rivalry of Christianity and Islam. Even Muhammad and the Quran were the most stubborn enemies of
Muslim loyalty could not, specially in the earlier years, drive civilization, liberty and truth which the world had yet known. 4
out this impression. Islam was a 'strange travesty of Christianity'. 5 It was far more
Herbei·t Edwardes wanted to have nothing to do with hostile to Britain than was Hinduism. 6 Keir Hardie warned the
Islam or Hinduism and to teach from the Bible in all schools. English people against the day when all the Muslims of the
He was convinced that the only way to keep the Indian Empire world 'take it into their heads to try once again to win supreme
and defer the danger of internal rebellion was to 'open the om 1 R.l\fachonacie, 'The Desirability of a Definite Recognition of the Re­
ligious Element in Government Education in India',Imperial and Asiatic
Bible wide' and teach the Indians the Christian view of life. 5
Quarterly Review, October 1900, pp.225-45.
In 1860, 2,049 petitions were presented to Parliament for the
2 Dr. Congreve quoted in H. Cotton, New India (1907 ed.), p. 269.
admission of the Bible into all schools and colleges in India. 6
3 M. Williams, 'Progress of Indian Religious Thought', Contemporary
It was believed that, by refusing to proselytize in favour of
Review, December 1878, p. 19, and his Modern India and the Indian8,
1 See Rene Fulop-Miller, Lenin and Gandhi (1927 ed.), p. 290. 1879,pp.162,165-6,257.
2 A. R. Banerji, The Indian Tangle, ?1988, pp. 284-44. 4 Quoted in S. M. Zwemer, et. al., The Muhammadan World of Today
3 J.M. Kenworthy,India: A Warning, 1981. p. 57. (1906 ed.), p.12.
4 See S. K. Ratcliffe, The Resurgence of Asia, 1946, p. 12, Stanley 5 H. G. Keene, 'Women of Indian History', National Review, October

Rice, 'India: Partition or Unity', Asiatic Review, January 1948, p. 81, 1886, p. 157.
and Mrs.Middleton,H.C. 431, 5S, 13 December 1946, Cols. 1502-1504. 6
A. C. Lyall, quoted in Mortimer Durand, Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir
• H. B. Edwardes, Our Indian Empire: Its Beginnings and End, 1861, Alfred Comyn Lyall, 1913, pp. 68-86. Another bitter critic was the Rev.
pp. 25-26. · Malcolm l\facColl, Canon of • Ripon. See bis articles in ContemporartJ
6 A. C. Lyall, Asiatic Studie,s, 1882, p. 277 fn. Review, April 1888, February 1897 and October 1897.
120 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN CHRISTIAN VIEW OF MUSLIM NATIONALISM 121
I
power for Allah in the East'. 1 It was unpardonable for Britain tended to throw the Muslims even farther apart from the
to allow the Turks to kill Greeks and Armenians to please the Hindus than they actually were.
Muslims of India; 2 this only gained her a reputation among On the whole, the role of the missionaries and their friends at
Christian nations for gerrymandering European frontiers in home put the Muslims on the defensive and made them more
response to Asiatic Muslim opinion. 3 conservative than they ought to have been. It also quickened
It is a curious fact that, in the context of Indian politics, their nationalism by making them close their ranks.
nearly all Christian missionaries and others in holy orders were
partial to the Hindus and the Congress. Many names spring
to mind: Malcolm MacColl, John Morison, Murray Titus, C. F.
· Andrews, J. Z. Hodge, W. W. Cash, G. E. Hickman Johnson,
and others. Even the Quakers, actually professing a priest­
less religion, always sided with the Congress, vide Horace
Alexander and Reginald Reynolds. What explains this? One

Aghazetaleem.c
answer may be that both Christianity and Islam were pro­
selytizing religions, while Hinduism was not. So in the purely
religious field the conflict was between the two imported
creeds, not between Christianity and Hinduism. Another
reason may have been, as has been described above, the·
usual Christian hostility to pan-Islamism which was some­
times made out to be the inspiration of all Indian Muslim
political moves.
It was even suggested that the only effective remedy of the
perennial Hindu-Muslim conflict was the Christian church. 4
If all India was converted to Christianity there would be no
communal problem in the country.
This Christian attitude, which was by no means typical of
British opinion, had three consequences for Muslim national­
ism. First, this unsolicited hostility sometimes adversely
om
affected the spirit of Muslim loyalty and came in handy to the
extremists in enlisting fresh recruits to their ranks. Sec9ndly,
by sheer reaction, it consolidated the Muslim community;
if some Englishmen were thinking of the problem in religious
terms, Muslims must be Muslims and, in self-defence, even
fanatics. Thirdly, it furnished a minor and vicarious example
of divide-and-rule; Christians distinguished between Hindus
and Muslims and supported one of the parties. This might have
1 K. Hardie, India: Impression.� and Suggestions, 1909, p. xvi.
2 O'Connor, H.C. 152, 58, 27 March 1922, Cols. 1018-19.
3 Lord Eustace Percy, H.C. 150, 58, 14 February 1922, Col. 944.

4 W.W. Cash, The Muslim World in Revolution, 1925, pp. 78-77.

 CULTURE AND NATIONALISM 123
Byzantine Empire later became it� outward symbol. Rome too
was a culture long before it was a nation, if a nation it ever
was.
The point of the argument is that culture is a concept which
Cir-apter 5
belongs to the sphere of the mind. When a man thinks that he
belongs to a culture-group, one cannot argue with him, as one
can when religion or language or race is in question. When
THE CULTURAL FACTOR many people begin to feel that they have a common culture,
they are already on their way to becoming a nation. Generally
IN the judgement of a well-known Muslim Congressman the there is nothing which serves as a nation-nexus more effectively
partition of India was 'due mainly to �he forces_ of cultural than culture. In India, however, religion had precedence over
separatism'.1 The th'eme of this chapt�r 1s to consider the role culture. But.here, too, the culture itself was based on religion.
_ _
of culture in the making of Mushm nationalism and to see how The Indian Muslims claimed that their culture was different
. far it contributed to the feeling of separatism among Indian

Aghazetaleem.c
because it was a Muslim culture. This is no place to distinguish
Muslims. between Muslim . culture and Islamic culture or to argue
CULTURE AND NATIONALISM whether there ever has existed, or exists today, a thing called
'Islamic culture'. What is asserted here is that Indian Muslims
A culture in the words of Sir Ernest Barker, is a 'mental had, broadly speaking, one culture. and they chose to call it
construction'. It lives in the minds of men and moulds their 'Muslim culture', because its distinctive character was based
way of thinking, their way of life and their char�cter. It may on Islam. One stro:0:g argument in favour of this is the fact that
· not always be possible to define what a culture 1s or even to when an Indian changed his religion and was converted to
portray the lineaments of a particular culture. But we all know Islam he immediately changed his cultural allegiance. Hindu
what it means to belorig to a particular cultural group and how or Christian converts to Islam then belonged to a distinct
this 'belonging' distinguishes us from those who live in a cultural .group which they found to be as different from other
different cultural milieu. In this sense, cult�e is probably the cultures as was Islam from other religions.
greatest determinant of a nation. A nation may hav� t ':o ?r In India there was no Christian culture or Sikh culture or
more religions. Many languages °:ay be curren� within it. om Parsee culture. But there was definitely a Hindu culture­
.
There may be no racial homogeneity m the national group. ancient and well established-with which the invading Muslims
But sooner or later a nation is bound to evolve a culture had clashed. As the background, content and contours of the
of its own, which will be distinct and definite even if it is no­ two cultures were so different, their adherents never evolved a
thing but a mixture of cultural traits borrowed from other ,common society. The cultural differences were, in fact, at the
cultures. The United States and Canada are good examples of · root of separatism. The gulf was too deep to be bridged and·
this. too wide to be crossed. The two cultures stood side by side,
Culture has a respectable antiquity and we �nd fully grown­ adamant, exigent and inexorable. They met only on the field of
up cultures at times when the concept of nation had entered battle. In the event, cultural separatism divided the country
neither the mind nor the vocabulary of man. In the fourth cen­ so that each of the two cultures, which could not live together
tury B.c. Hellas was already a culture; at least �socrates in harmony, may flourish in its own dwelling-place. This is one
.
thought so. Within a hundred years a common Hell�mstic cul­ way, the cultural way, of interpreting the genesis of Muslim
ture flourished throughout Egypt and Western Asia, and the nationalism. The following pages are meant to examine the
1 s. Abid Husain, The National Culture of India (1961 ed.), P· :x. validity or otherwise of this interpretation.
124 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN LANGUAGE 125
directed towards the development of education, language,
CUL'fURAL BODIES PRECEDE POLITICAL BODIES
literature and social uplift. The idea was that when once the
In India cultural bodies were established long before political Muslims had adequately advanced in the realm of mind a
organizations came to life. In Muslim India the Muslim League national feeling would follow as surely as day follows the
was preceded by the Muhammadan Educational Conference. night.
In Hindu India the National Congress came much later than. Subsequent history showed that this was the right course, and
the Brahmo Samaj. had the Muslim League been formed in, say, 1870 or 1880, it
This is a .phenomenon common to many countries. In South would have been built on sand, for political unity is but a de­
Africa, the Broederbond was primarily a cultural organization lusive hope without prior cultural homogeneity. Moreover, the
and it was only in 1933 that it began to widen its sphere and Aligarh Movement, in the sphere of education, not only pro­
gradually embraceq. the Nationalist Party's creed. In Ghana, duced public men who later took to politics but also inculcated
the Convention People's Party was preceded by the West some discipline in the mass of men.
African National Congress. In Nigeria, the Action Group was

Aghazetaleem.c
the child of Egbe Omo Oduduwo, a Yoruba cultural organiza­ LANGUAGE
tion; and the Northern People's Congress was an offspring of J
It is_pot_::i. �ays possible to identify a nation with a language
the J amia, a Hausa cultural society. group. The examples-ofCanada, Switzerland and Belgium are ·
One of the earliest actions of Sayyid Ahmad Khan in the �welr"liiiown. When_ !p.e_Pe.ace Treaties of 1919. were being
way of educational regeneration was the establishment of a ·framed and the Wilsonian principle- of self-determination was
Translation Society and a Scientific Society. The former aimed l>�*1g translated into reality, it was generally taken for granted
at acquainting the non-English-knowing Muslims with works that fai\guage_ w�s sufficient.basis for common nationality and
of European, and particularly English, literature and philo­ §eve�l States were create_d 9n thi�_premiss. But this assump·­
sophy by translating them into Urdu. The latter was meant to tion was proved false in some cases when plebiscites were held
encourage the study of pure science and other technical sub­ to ascei:tain the popular will. Some Shivs like the Mastiriaris-in
jects. Later the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College was East Prussia and some Slovenes in Carinthia were opposed to
founded at Aligarh to impart enlightened education to the their inclusion in Slav States and wanted to be parts of the
Muslims -enlightened because it was a nice balance of Eastern German-speaking Germany or Austria. The German-speaking
culture and Western learning.
The foundation of the Aligarh College turned out to be more
om people of Oedenburg, on the other hand, voted in favour of
joining Hungary. In some cases the creators of the Peace
than just the establishment of an educational institution. It •rreaties themselves did not take language as their test of
gave birth to the famous Aligarh Movement, which was partly nationality: the German-speaking population of Austria and
educational, partly literary, partly religious, and wholly cul­ 0
1 Northern Bohemia were not permitted to join Germany.
tural. It set new targets in education, new standards in literary Language, therefore, is not a fundamental characteristic of
composition and criticism, new ideals in social thinking, and \a nation. It is not the essence of the nation, as some people
new norms in Islamic exegesis. It was a social movement and claim it to be.
preached the gospel of the 'good' life in the Aristotelian sense. But_ language _still remains one of the features by which a
It is impossible to exaggerate the role of this 'movement in the nation may be distinguished or one of the grounds on which
cultural regeneration of Muslim India. Sayyid Ahmad's saga­ nationalism may be f ounded. There is always an affinity be­
city saw that a strong cultural base must be built before an tween people speaking the same language. Language affects
enduring political fabric could be erected upon it. Politics · literature and literature affects national life. A language is
were for the time being forgotten and all energies were made up of words, and words which we habitually use often
 126 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN LANGUAGE 127

mould our mode of thinking. Common words make for common The Muslim League 'adopted' Urdu as its 'national' language,
thoughts and feelings. Language is primarily a vehicle of and among its demands for safeguards there always appeared
communication, and thoughts and feelings, when com- a reference to the protection ·of this language. The Congress, on
\ municated through the same medium, tend to be stamped the other hand, attached itself to Hindi with equal resolution.
, \ with a characteristitic unity. This affinity easily leads to Later, when the Hindus discovered that Hindi was not accept­
\ national unity because a nation is a tradition of thought and able to all as the lingua franca of India, they 'tried to cut the
. \sentiment. ��y__py_ayQ!Qing the v:ery names of irI°:di aiid Urdu ·and by
_. adopt,ing_�h_e word ��industani'. But this was a very perfunc­
1
India has traditionally been a paradise for philologists. Its
several major languages, in addition to hundreds. of diale�t�, tory way of dealing with the question.:� Literally 'Hindustani'
have fascinated the foreigner as much as they have cqnfu.��c! means 'the language of Hindustan (India)'. fu.:_fact there_wa,s___
the native. In fact, one of the most potent arguments against _g<?���-h language in existen�e. People either spoke and wrote
- there being one Indian nation was the bewildering variety of or'
Hindi they spoke and wrote Urdu: none spoke or wrote 'Hin­
,its languages. dustani'. �f was an imaginary la,nguage which did not exist

Aghazetaleem.c
i Urdu was, by general consent, considered to be the langu- . and l1�d never existed. �ut instead of saying so in clear terms
1 age of the Muslims. Born under the Mughuls by a combination they invented a new language which no one used. �The_game
'of Persian, the court language, and some indigenous Hindu chosen for it was itself unfortunate, for it could also be tr'a:ns-=-· ·--- ··
\dialects, it grew up in times of political and cultural stress. lated- as 'the 1anguage of the Hindus', and ·m�st·-Muslims
· chose·
'Many Hindus used it and some fine Urdu poetry has been t? i_nterpret it in .this way.
written by them; but Cll!otionally they always distriistt:dJt. · When the Congress ministries were in power in the pro­
For this there was a simple reason. The Hindus had their own vinces one of the major Muslim accusations against them was
' ' language, Hindi, which leaned heavily on Sanskrit for its that Hindi was patronized, promoted and extended at the
vocabulary. Urdu, on the other hand, borrowed more .freely expense of Urdu. 3 The association of the Vidya Mandir educa­
from Persian and Arabic, though some of its sweetest phrases tion scheme with the teaching of Hindi was one of the reasons
came from Hindi. As political and cultural rivalry increased for Muslim oppositi<m to it. The Congress insistence on the use
the two languages began to fall apart. The supporters of Hindi of Hindi was also behind the fierce controversy about text­
'·.. books in Bombay.4 In Madras the Congress Chief Minister
claimed for it a national status; the Muslims hotly denied it. \ ordered that the teaching of Hindi should be made compulsory.
As the controversy spread, the two languages became more and om
more exclusive. Hindi was made 'pure' by the progressive , This was bitterly opposed by the Tamil- and Telugu-speaking
· incorporation of Sanskrit words. The Urdu enthusiasts ,went
. \ more often to Persian and Arabie for vocabulary as well as
1 Sampurnananda, Memories and Reflections, 1960, p. 89.
'syntax. Though Urdu was in its origin neither the language of 2 In fact the Congress policy was not at all clear on the language
the Muslims nor a Muslim language, it gradually became so. issue. In 1985, in his presidential address at the Nagpur session of the
Hindi Sahitya Sammelan (Hindi literary conference), Rajendra Prasad,
Soon it assumed a place in their tradition 'second only to their the well-known Congress leader and later the first President of the Indian
religion". 1 Thus linguistic conflict added to Indian disunity Union, 'reiterated his faith in one language 'for the whole country, and
and helped the formation of more than one nationalism. this could only be Hindi'; Kewal L. Punjabi, Rajendra Prasad, 1960,
The more the Hindus laid stress on Hindi the greater em­ p. 98. Gandhi himself many times pleaded the ease for Hindi.
phasis the Muslims put on Urdu. The Hindi-Urdu controversy 3 See the Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the Council of

was by now an integral part of the Hindu-Muslim question. the All India Muslim League to inquire into 1Yluslim Grievances in Congress
Provinces (Pirpur Report) (1988), p. 54.
1 M. L. Ferrar, in H. A. R. Gibb (ed.), Whither Islam? A Survey of
4 See The Times of India, 11 and 26 J'uly, and 14 December 1989.
Modern Moi.-ements in the Muslim World, 1982, p. 182.
 128 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN EDUCATION 129
population who started a regular agitation leading to the ar­ with Hindi. This was enough for many Muslims to rally to the
rest of nearly one thousand persons.1 cause of Urdu:-Posit1vely, Urdu was.the most developed lan­
The Congress policy of imposing Hindi on the whole of - ,--•-guage· among all the tongues spoken in Muslim areas. It pos::_
India was, however, not unprecedented in modern history. .,.-sessed.a.nobnconsiderable literature; in _poetry_it _was.specially
Europe provides some comparable examples. A similar atti­ · -�rJj;ip.guisJied. Moreover, it_ was generally understclOd_ over
tude was adopted by the Germans in Schleswig, Prussian Po­ ·;_ vast areas. A ���in�Jti,!llight not speak Urdu, but if
land and Alsace-Lorraine, and by the Magyars i11. Transylvania. "'·there was a language other than his own which he could com­
After 1918 it was followed by some of the new Central Euro­ prehend J! �as Urdu. It i� not far from the truth to say that
pean natioris. ,..Urdu_i�s_at least undcrstoodI:riiU-towp.s ariq cities.of Muslim
But this did not stop the Muslims from reacting adversely .· Ifilli,�. Thus if a choice ):i.ad to be-��de a�ong the 'Muslim''
to the policy of the Congress. They now made the language languages, 'Q�d_q_!asily came first. ..
issue paramount, and shortly afterwards, when the demand \
' ' / E�na!�Y }��r� _was_tJ:ie nationa� need for �-s�parat€::�ang�age.
for Pakistan was formulated, it_ was categorically lai_d down \ , The Muslims _,
cl�Jmed to be a nation. A nation was usually sup:
! :'pos�d to haye a ianguage.ofjts 9.wn. 'fherefore: the Muslims

Aghazetaleem.c
that Urd:u would be its nationailanguage. But even long before
'this they had ·made Urdu 'one of the elements of Muslim cul­
I
l must ·have a language, too. Without it there would be no
ture in India' and had called it 'the Muslim national language Muslim nationalism. In_.this sen_s_e_ TJrclu :was .�ken up, not
of India'. 2 only as a language but also· as a- sentiment, for cementing
But this claim cannot be accepted uncritically. If we go by national unity and as a slogan with which to win a new
figures more people spoke Bengali than Urdu. As a mother country.
tongue even fewer adherents could be claimed by Urdu. It was
not the mother tongue, nor was it spoken generally, in the EDUCATION
Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluch- Religion and education are the two most important parts of
\ istan -in fact, in all the Muslim-majority areas which lat�r that spiritual superstructure which is the essence of national­
formed Pakistan. Each of these areas had its own regional ism. An integrated system of education influences social idea�
language· which, though not so well developed as Urdu, had and develops national character. It is trite but true to say that
some impressive literary achievements to its credit. ):,anguages those who control the schools command the destinies of the
which . had. produc�Q. poets_ .nL the rank of Khushha! _ J9ia�
! Khatak; Waris Shah and Shah Abdul Latif could not be dis-
om people. In this respect, education is the mother of politics and
precedes, or should precede, it. It is a proof of Sayyid Ahmad
, �-missed �s mere dialects. Nor was Urdu understood, let 'alo�e Khan's wisdom that he saw the truth of this principle and in­
spoken, in the rural areas of the Punjab and Sind. ��!'.ic_tlY-,-­ sisted on a sound educational foundation before entering the
therefore, Urdu could not rightfully claim the status of the whirlpool of politics.
'national language' of the Indian Muslims. As in other fields so in education, Muslim ideals differed
There seem to have be�Il _three facj;9rs which propelled from those of the Hindus. Generalizations are notoriously
Urdu-- to ·the -forefront and made it, despite what was said fragile, but it can be affirmed that on the whole Muslims were
above, tl:ie national, language. O:p.e w,as _a Pl!_re_ iy _!J:egat� less quick than the Hindus to pick up new ideas and more op­
_Jeason. The Hindus disliked Urdu and wanted to replace it posed to Western methods and content of education. During
1 R. Coupland, Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, Part the post-Mutiny period Muslim conservatism kept them away
II, 1943, p. 103. from Government schools and colleges. Muslim parents dis­
2 M. T. Titus, Indian Islam: A Religious History of Islam in 'India, trusted the 'newfangled' theories of education and were con­
1930, pp. 192, 198. tent to send their children to the traditional maktab and
 180 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN EDUCATION 131
madrassah where the eurrieulum was rigidly confined to religi­ knowledge on their own lines. This Aligarh did for many years
ous teaching and, at some plaees, rudimentary arithmetie and and the debt of Muslim nationalism to it is great and deep.
history and geography. The Muslims did not take to the Eng­ Aligarh was the symbol of Muslim nationalism in the fields
lish language, and thus denied themselves opportunities of of education and learning; but it was not the only symbol,
material as well as intellectual progress. Material, because though it was the most important. In Hyderabad Deccan was
Government jobs were open only to English-knowing persons; established the Osmania University,:: whose contribution to
intelleetual, because the entire eorpus of Western knowledge Muslim awakening was of a different kind. It was the only
and learning was shut out from them. It is usually said that centre of higher learning in India whieh imparted knowledge
Indian nationalism was brought up on the writings of Burke, in Urdu. Not only was the medium of instruction Urdu on all
Mill and Paine. But this was not true of Muslim nationalism in levels, but the university had also a large and well-staffed
its earlier stages, l:!:nd that is partly why the latter did not translation bureau which made available in Urdu a great
appear till quite late-not till the Western-oriented edueation number of Western classics in literature, philosophy, science,
imparted at Aligarh had permeated through the Muslim history, politics and economics. Many of the greatest Euro­

Aghazetaleem.c
mind. pean thinkers from Plato to T. H. Green were presented to the
The role of what we may call 'educational nationalism' in Urdu-knowing publie in faithful translations. Philosophic and
Muslim India can best be studied in the history of the Aligarh scientific technical terms current in the West were given Urdu
University. One of the functions of a modern university is to equivalents, and thus an impressive scientific vocabulary was
raise the level of participation of the educated people in the built up which enabled the teachers to teach the natural and
creation and growth of the nationality. It aims at promoting physical seiences in their own language up to the highest level.
the development of knowledge within its own national cul­ Besides the universities, all over India were found Muslim
ture-soeiety. These are the 'nationalistic' functions of a uni­ colleges, called varyingly Islamia colleges, Muslim colleges,
versity, and historically they are exemplified by French and M.A-0. colleges or Anglo-Arabic colleges. The Hindus had
German universities at the beginning of the twentieth century. their own set of such institutions, named Dyanand Anglo­
In India they are exemplified by the creation and functions of Vernacular eolleges, Hindu colleges, Sanatan Dharam colleges,
the Muslim university at Aligarh and the Hindu university at or colleges named after individual patrons. Basically these
Benares. The former was a development of the Muhammadan colleges had the same eurrieula and courses of study, for all of
Anglo-Oriental College founded by Sayyid Ahmad Khan, as om them were affiliated to undenominational universities. But
the latter was an extension of the Central Hindu College pro- · their teaehing staff and the student body were almost exclus­
,1 rooted by Mrs. Annie Besant. ively Muslim or Hindu.
/ ', It took the Muslims nearly fifty years to get the Aligarh In some cities Muslims formed societies or associations to
1 ' College elevated to the status of a university; The struggle was establish and run .sehools and colleges, e.g. the Anjuman-i­
\ hard and long, partly because of monetary difficulties and Himayat-i-Islam in Lahore and the Anjuman-i-Islamia in
partly because of a conflict with the Government on the issue Bombay. They ran chains of schools and colleges (sometimes
of academic autonomy. This is not the place to deseribe the also orphanages and women's homes).
history of the growth of the university, but the point we want As was said earlier, Muslims were slow in taking a<:lvantage
to make is that the Muslim community felt insecure, educa­ of educational opportunities. This can be accounted for on three
tionally naked, without a university of their own. They real­ grounds. In the first place, there was the inertia of the post­
ized the importance of having their own educational centre, Mutiny period when attachment to traditional modes had
under their own control, which could enshrine their educational kept them away from the new enlightenment which came with
and spiritual ideals, and whieh could raise the level of their Macaulay's theories and ideas. In the second place, they were
132 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN EDUCATION 133
a poor people and could neither afford to build their own schools quality. Schools and colleges were neither adequate to the
nor bear the expense of sending their children to Government needs of the Muslims nor good enough for the standards de­
institutions. In the third place, their ideas of education, based manded of them. Some Muslim areas suffered badly. When
on Islamic foundations, clashed with the then-prevailing con­ Pakistan was created there was no university in the Frontier
ception of a secular system of instruction. This needs some Province or in Sind or in Baluchistan. Sind and Baluchistan
elaboration. had a negligible number of colleges. The University of Dacca
British official policy in India was one of complete impar­ was not established till after 1912. Such lack of opportunity
tiality in religious matters. The Government gave full religious as well as of interest was a stumbling block in the way of
freedom to all creeds in consistence with public order. In the national solidarity. Political awakening follows educational
educational sphere this attitude excluded religious instruction awakening, and national unity is difficult, if not impossible, in
in schools and colleges.I The Hindus did not much object to it, the absence of a well-spread education.
but the Muslims did. In consequence the Government schools This handicap was, however, partly compensated by one
were felt to be inadequate or downright unsuitable for the negative factor. Hindu opposition to Muslim educational as­

Aghazetaleem.c
Muslim youth. They insisted on a course of Islamic teachings pirations and plans and Hindu insistence on implementing
as one of the essential ingredients of the education of a Mus­ their own schemes throughout India were instrumental in
lim boy. When this was not forthcoming they resented a uniting the Muslims to an extent unwarranted by their dis­
foreign system of education which was secular and therefore union and dissensions.
un-Islamic. The Hindus were against the establishll)-ent of a Muslim
Another source of dissatisfaction to the Muslims was that the university at Aligarh, professedly on the ground of national
British-imposed system of education did not make any conces­ unity. If denominational educational institutions were per­
sions either to their traditional values of learning or to their mitted to exist and multiply, they said, Indian national unity
cultural background. They felt a deep loyalty to Arabic, the would be jeopardized. They stood for secularism in education·
language of their Holy Book, and to Persian, the language of as well as in politics. To this the Muslim replied that the Hindu
their culture and the mother of Urdu. Oriental learning in opposition was not innocent of vested interests: the Hindu did
general was also dear to them. But these were either ignored or not want to see the Muslim progressing in the educational
given insufficient scope in the official scheme of public instruc­ sphere and desired to suppress him culturally.I He supported
tion. Oriental-classics found no place in the curricula. Oriental om this argument by pointing to the foundation of a Hindu
faculties did not exist in any college or university in the earlier university at Benares and to Hindu opposition to the creation
years. For some time Muslim colleges were ineligible for affi­ of a university at Dacca (which was not to be a Muslim uni­
liation to universities. 2 versity but would detract from the importance of Calcutta).
The tardy and sluggish growth of Muslim nationalism was in In 1939, at its fifty-second session held at Calcutta, the All
great part due to a lack of educational progress. Conservatism, India Muhammadan Educational Conference (which was a
poverty and attachment to traditional and partly out-moded completely non-political body and had no liaison with the
values slowed down the tempo of advance. The results were Muslim League) appointed a committee to ·examine the entire
unhappy. Literacy was slow. Higher education was of poor educational field in India and to prepare a scheme for Musliip.
1 Though in Britain 'religious instruction is an integral part of the education with a view to 'the preservation of the distinctive
teaching given in our elementary schools, whether public or voluntary',
features of their cultural and social order'. Nawab Kamal Yar
Ernest Barker, National Character and the Factors in its Formation (1st 1 For Gandhi's responsibility for creating sharp communal divisions
ed. 1927, 4th ed. 1948), p. 225. through his educational theories see R. F.ulop-Miller, Lenin and Gandhi
2 L. S. S. O'Malley, op. cit., p. 648. (1927 ed.), p. 240.
 THE MAKING OF PAKIS'l'AN LITERATURE 135
Jung was the chairman of this committee, which consisted of temple) was a challenge to the Muslims, for it smacked of
some distinguished educationalists. The main work was done Hindu idolatry.
by a sub-committee headed by Sir Aziz-ul-Huq, then the In a brilliant note appended to the Report by Sir Aziz-ul­
Speaker of the Bengal Legislative Assembly and Vice-Chan­ Huq occurred the follmving paragraph: 'Either the present
cellor of the University of Calcutta and later a member of the system of school and university studies must have such syl­
Viceroy's Executive Council and still later High Commissioner labuses and themes that the Hindus, the Muslims and all other
for India in London. creeds and communities can meet on an essentially common
The Committee published its report1 in the spring of 1942. platform with no influence, tendency or bias in favour of the
The picture it depicted of the position and prospects of Muslim one or the other. Or educational India must be a federation of
education was indeed dismal and gloomy. The proportion of two or more distinct types �f educational organizations, each
Muslim students in all institutions was low. Muslim studies trying to develop its own culture and heredity, but in a spirit
figured poorly in the courses of study. Higher research in of catholicity and goodwill to others. I do hope and pray that
Muslim history and culture was negligible. In primary and wisdom and sense will still prevail and there will be a common

Aghazetaleem.c
secondary education Muslim and Urdu schools were being and united plan and programme of education. ' 1
closed down or strangled by niggardly grants in aid. Thus in culture, too, as" in polities, separatism was invading
One full chapter (XIII) of the Report dei:tlt ·with the Wardha the Muslim mind.
Scheme of education which Gandhi had drawn up and which
the Congress Governments had been implementing in the LITERATURE
provinces. This, said the Report, was an essentially communal More than anything else it is literature which reflects the con­
scheme shot through and through with Hindu ideals. The tours of cultural nationalism. That is so because it enshrines
teaching of religion was completely ignored and this amounted in itself the thoughts and ideals, the history and language, the
to an attempt to disengage the Muslim child from his faith. art and character, of the people who have produced it. It is
Muslim children were obliged to honour the Congress flag, to only by acquainting ourselves with their literature that we
sing the Bande Mataram, to wear home-spun cloth (khadi) know so much about the cultures of past ages.
and to do puja (worship) to Gandhi's portrait. In India there was no dichotomy of Hindu and Muslim
It was in the Central Provinces that the Wardha Scheme literature. There was an ancient Hindu literature, but no such
appeared in its most orthodox and (to the Muslims) obnoxious om thing existed in modern India. Similarly there was a body of
form. This was the Vidya Mandir, the creation of 'temples of literature in the world which could be called Islamic literature,
learning'. In the provincial legislature and all over the pro­ but in India no such title could be given to the literature pro­
vince Muslims had bitterly opposed the introduction of this duced by Muslims. The distinction was more subtle. The Mus­
plan, but their resentment was unheeded. When the bill lims' liter�ry production was of a different nature, had a
relating to the scheme came before the assembly it was op­ different background and was inspired by different sources.
posed by every single Muslim member and also by a few Hin­ Three sources of the literature of Muslim India may be
dus, including the former Chief Minister, Dr. Khare, but it was identified. One was religion. Many writings were religious in
carried through by the weight of Congress votes. Under this character, without being theological; religious poetry (na'ats) is
scheme, schools were to be managed by committees chosen by an example. The second was history. The Muslim past, in India
a joint electorate. No separate Muslim schools were provided, or elsewhere, was the theme of innumerable poems, novels,
nor were arrangements made for training Urdu-speaking essays and even plays. The third was the pervasive influence
teachers: The very name Vidya l\fandirs (mandir=Hindu of Persian and Arabie cultures. A Muslim. boy's education
1 Report of the Kamal Yar Jung Education Committee, Calcutta, 1942. 1 Ibid., p. 279.
136 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN LITERATURE 187
was considered to be incomplete without a fair grounding in some cases the Persian work is superior to the Urdu. Iqbal
in Persian literature. Old-style gentlemen could recite thou­ is the outstanding example. Ghalib, too, wrote well in Persian.
sands of lines from poets like Saadi and Hafiz. In the traditional Even among minor poets it was not an uncommon practice to
idea of culture Persian and Arabic had precisely the same scatter Persian verses among their poems, which made their
position which was held by the classics in the education of a work unintelligible to those who knew no Persian.
cultured Englishman in the nineteenth century. This inevit­ This shows how deeply Urdu (Muslim Indian) literature was
ably left its mark on literature, attached to and grounded in Islam, Islamic history and Per­
It was in this sense that what we may call for the lack of a sian and Arabic cultures. This made it essentially 'Muslim',
proper name the literature of Muslim India differed from the and therefore essentially different from the literature of the
literature of the rest of India. As most of this literature was rest of India. 1 The point is that Hindu and Muslim writers re-·
produced in the Urdu language, we will here refer to it as Urdu ceived their inspiration from different sources. The 'Hindu
literature, though we must bear in mind that several Hindus, :writer referred back to the time of glory under the Mauryas,
a few of them eminent in their field, contributed to it. Guptas and .Marathas, the Muslim looked back to the glorious

Aghazetaleem.c
The religious content of Urdu literature was not much. It days under the Grand Mughuls and pinned his faith on pan­
contained a body of religious poems, mainly in praise of God Islamism as a panacea for the ills of the present'.2 Their
and the Prophet, and one major item, the Shalmama-i-lslam, memories of a golden past were as much at variance as their
a long epic by Hafeez Jullundheri, soothing in its mellifluous dreams of a future Utopia. Though there was a considerable
and liquid rhythm and very moving for Muslim readers, but body of Hindus and Muslims who enjoyed erotic Urdu poetry
of no great poetic merit. and whose hearts were deeply moved by the supple grace of a
The historical content was considerable, both in poetry and Momin or the naughty wit of a Dagh, yet the real spirit of
in prose. Many poems, like several of IqbaFs, are incomprehen­ Urdu literature remained alien to the Hindu mind, which did
sible without a good knowledge of Islamic history. Allusions not, could not, share its cultural background. To expect a
to minor events and incidents of this history abounded, and the Hindu to understand and appreciate the bulk of Iqbal's work
ability to understand them was taken for granted. In prose, is like asking someone completely ignorant of Greek mytho­
too, historical works glorified the victors of Islam. Biographies logy and Christian lore to comprehend and enjoy Milton's
of Muslim heroes were popular, with Shibli's six-volume bio­ Paradise Lost.
graphy of the Prophet as the crown of achievement in this om Literature can be a cruelly divisive agent in a multi-cultural
genre. Historical fiction was not much in evidence, but the society. And it is exceedingly difficult either to suppress it or
little that was was avidly read by the semi-educated, par­ to submerge it completely in a different literary tradition. It
ticularly by women. Literary skill was not their forte, but they was after a century and, a half of Germanization that the
appealed to the raw imagination of the newly-awakened masses ideal of Bohemian independence reappeared through the de­
and so accelerated the growth of national consciousness.• liberate recreation of Czech culture. The process of Lithuanian
The most prominent characteristic of Urdu literature was national independence did not begin until the Lithuanian
the colour it took from Persian ( and to much less extent from literary culture was revived in the second half of the nine­
Arabic) literary and cultural heritage. Urdu poetry borrowed teenth c�ntury.
its scansion from Arabic and most of its metaphors from 1 Nothing has been said here of Bengali Muslim literature, because the
Persian. No poet worth his salt could be ignorant of these two author knows no Bengali and is not qualified to write about it. This is an
languages, and some grounding in them was essential even for unfortunate omission but does not invalidate his major hypotheses.
appreciating Urdu poetry. Furthermore, some Urdu poets 2 B. G. Gokhale, The Making of the Indian Nation (1960 ed.), pp.

wrote both in Urdu and Persian, and literary critics agree that 298-9.
138 THE :MAKING OF PAKISTAN LITERATURE 139
Literary groups and associations play an important part in polished by constant use and additions, and in the process
the regeneration and progress of literature. vVhat would French literature was inevitably enriched.
literature be without the Academie frarn;aise? Literary associa­ Western parallels to this development are not hard to come
tions were formed in Canada for the purpose of promoting the by. French literature began in the eleventh century with the
growth of an 'original Canadian culture'. The United States Chansons de Geste (epic stories recounting the achievements of
considered it necessary in 1904 to found the American Academy military heroes) and later with lyric poetry. At the beginning
of Arts and Letters. In India, the Hindus, under the inspira­ of the fourteenth century Italian was accepted as the supreme
tion of the Nobel Laureate Tagore, established the Shantini­ common language of Italy because much creative writing­
ketan, a sort of an academic centre for the protection and culminating in the works of Dante and Petrarch-was being
promotionofindian(Hindu)culture andliterature. TheMuslims done in it. But the classical example of a literary urge coming
founded the AnjUQ1an-i-Taraqqi-i-Urdu (Society for the to the rescue of (or serving the cause of) national integrity and
Promotion of Urdu) at Hyderabad Deccan. Soon it had awakening is that of the Norwegian literature which instigated
branches all over India and for a quarter of a century it did the Norwegian people to liberate themselves from the cen,�

Aghazetaleem.c
noble service to the cause of Urdu language and literature. turies-old cultural and social domination of · the Danish
Men of letters play no small role in nation making. They de­ .· national society.
velop the language out of either a rough dialect or a mixture of Three literary figures of Muslim India must be given special
two or more regional tongues. They record and collect literary · mention for the powerful impetus they gave to national
gleanings, relate them to current myths and legend�, translate consciousness. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's essays on social-cum-re­
treasures of traditional (but linguistically foreign) literatures, ligious topics were published in his own journal, 1'ahzib-ul­
and synthesize the various cultural streams by writing the Akhlaq (which was modelled on Steel's Tatler), and their in­
hitherto unwritten folk-lore. They modernize the language and fluence on social emancipation and religious liberalism cannot
keep it alive by constant borrowings from other tongues; They be exaggerated. Hali, a luminous star in the firmament of the
point out the deep relationship between literature and its his­ Aligarh Movement, not only acted as the Wordsworth of Urdu
torical inspiration. They relate poetry to patriotism (at times poetry by simplifying diction and glorifying nature, but also
even to parochialism) and prose to national pride. The gram­ gave the literary world one of its masterpieces, the Musaddas.
marians among them prepare dictionaries and lexicons, thus Nothing like this had been written before. In sweet-melancholy
legislating on the meanings, nuances and shades of words. They om rhythm he portrays the decline and fall of Islam in India and
fix the usage of phrases, adopt new words and evolve new weeps over the misfortunes and miseries of his stricken com­
figures of speech. patriots. It is a dirge which moved the hearts and minds of
All this was done in Muslim India by litterateurs of the men and did more than any other literary creation in opening
calibre of Hali, Shibli, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Nazir Ahmad, their eyes to their perilous plight. This creative lamentation
Abdul Huq, Niaz Fatehpuri and others. Great stress was laid · ranks with those few poems of the world which combine
on the development of the language. The 'Urdu bolo' (speak poetic merit of the highest order with far-reaching practical
Urdu) movement was initiated. Urdu literature was enriched utility. The last among these giants was Iqbal, who sang of the
by translations of Persian, Arabic and European classics. _The . storied past with a lyricism which was strong in accent but soft
language was extended by such efforts as the publication of in tone. He had a message to give-the message of Islamic
glossaries, preparation of technical terminologies and coinage .I brotherhood and Islamic purity-and gave it well without let­
of new scientific terms. Even religion was. 'nationalized' by I ting his muse degenerate into dull didacticism. His Complaint
translating the Quran, rendering Arabic prayers and writing (Shakwa) to God about the plight of the Muslim is at times
sermons in Urdu. In short, the language was refined and impudent, at times supplicatory, yet ever sincere. The general
140 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN PHILOSOPHY 141
effect is neither of a derisive howl nor of a cringing whimper, the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam as navigation
neither of gnashing of teeth in impotent rage nor of a maudlin has with play-writing. Even if India had, by the play of
emotion, but of a heart-breaking grief 'felt in the blood and felt historical forces, continued to be politically one country, her
all the way'. Muslims would never have considered Radhakrishnan or
What Sayyid had said in speech and prose Hali put in Aurobindo as the mouthpiece of their ideas, just as her Hindus
measured stanzas and Iqbal sang with the abandon of a Shel­ would never have looked to Iqbal or Shah Waliullah as the
ley. The combined assault on Muslim ignorance, apathy and fount of their philosophy.
conservatism was shattering. From a defeated and demoral­ The influence of intellectual leaders on the history of
ized rabble Sayyid lifted his people and made them conscious nationalism should_ not be underestimated. Politicians come
of their identity. When Hali bemoaned their backwardness afterwards and build on the soil prepared by thinkers and
and offered a prayer for their salvation, he deepened their writers. The emergence of Hindu (or 'Indian') nationalism was
sense of guilt but also intensified their resolve to catch up with from the very first influenced by intellectuals who compared
the times. Iqbal turned a minority, already half-conscious of the history of Hh1du civilization with the history of modern

Aghazetaleem.c
its destiny (but only half), into a solid group. Mentally the Western civilization and exalted the former. Gandhi was by
soil had been well ploughed by these intellectual giants. It now no means the first to do so, but he is a more typical example be­
waited for a statesman who had the vision to look into the cause he lived in the twentieth century when the civilization
future and the strength to make the people look with him. So of the West was known to the Orientals better than it was to
when Jinnah arrived with his clarion call of a separate national their forefathers. In his opinion Hindu civilization represented
State people welcomed him as the long-sought-for deliverer, the highest spiritual values in contrast to the West's stress on
the liberator of the oppressed, whom, Divinity had sent in materialism. In the same way, though not to that uncompro­
answer to their prayers. mising extent, the Muslims looked back to Islam's golden age
with nostalgia and frowned upon both the Hindu and the
PHILOSOPHY Western ways of life.
Every nationality has its o-wn philosophy, which may be a Both Hindus and Muslims reacted unfavourably to the
collection of certain definite philosophic teachings of the past West, but there was one subtle and significant difference be­
or a body of philosophic ideas expounded by modern thinkers. tween the two approaches. The Hindu looked at the West not
Philosophy is not essential to nationalism in the sense in om only with disapproval but also with hatred. Hatred always
which, for example, language is. But it performs a necessary implies fear; we hate a man of whom we are secretly afraid, we
function. It gives ballast to the national idea, to the ideology. have a contempt for a man whom we consider our inferior. To
In India the Hindus looked to their own ancient philosophy the Hindu the West was an unknown entity, a completely
just as the Muslims traced their intellectual ancestry to Mus­ foreign element-foreign to his past, to his country and to his
lim thinkers like Avicenna and Al Ghazali. When the Hindu tradition. On the contrary, the Muslim looked with disfavour
was contemplating his past, he thought of Kautallya (the only at some aspects of the Western civilization. He did not re­
author of Artha-shastra); when the Muslim looked back, he re­ ject everything Western, nor was his rejection so complete and
called Al Farabi. The philosophic past of the two peoples was so thorough as the Hindu's. People like Sayyid Ahmad could go
different as to obliterate any prevailing community of thought. to the extent of comparing the English and the Indians and
In the modern age, again, this dichotomy ran right through calling the latter animals and brutes. In their desire to borrow
the country. To the Hindus inspiration came from Radhakrish­ the best features of the West and to combine them with those
nan, to the Muslims from Iqbal. Radhakrishnan's Hindu of Islam, these makers of the Indian Muslim renaissance were
View of Life had as much in common with Iqbal's Lectures on reflecting the general opinion of Muslim India.
142 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN CONCLUSION 148
Ameer Ali; Cheragh Ali and others who came after them knows how different was the Hindu art from the Muslim's, and
adopted the same line of thinking and did not allow their how rarel th� two mixed or merged. To a ��slim a..Hi.llil:t!
devotion to Islam to obliterate their wholesome respect (al­ tenw}e, �t )'.'
�--:�- nakeclg9dd�si;!es _a11d _pp.�llic__Ill}ageshwas. a
most affection) for the virtues of the West. In political terms positively distasteful si�h:,t1,_in fact, the anti-idolatry spirit of
the same idea may be expressed by saying that while Gandhi -rs1am was revolted by all kinds of Hindu architecture. The
was, by his own confession, an orthodox Hindu who was op­ Hindu, on the other hand, saw most of Muslim architecture
posed even to such things as Western medicine and technology enshrined in mosques and domes and minarets and mausolea,
and who used satyagraha as his political weapon, Jinnah was a which carried upon them the clear impress of Islam and there­
modern constitutionalist who fought the British with their· fore could not be a part of his artistic world. There were a few
own liberal weapons. This contrast is not merely a superficial ' buildings here and there which were 'secular' in purpose or
way of bringing out the difference between the mentalities of content and whose beauty was appreciated by both the '
the two leaders. It goes deeper and reflects the essential, · peoples, but this rare coincidence could not make for a common
though partial, affinity between Islam and the West. Muslim artistic heritage.

Aghazetaleem.c
India never, not even in the heat of the political battle, called
the British or their civilization 'satanic', as Gandhi did. The CONCLUSION
explanation lies in the fact that Islam had behind it a history Thus Hindu-Muslim conflict was not merely religious. It was
of centuries of contact with the West; it was through the the clash of two dvilizations, of two peoples who had different
Arabs that Greek philosophy and science had passed into languages, different literary roots, different ideas of education,
Europe. In meeting the West Islam had no fear of the un­ different philosophical sources, and different concepts of art.
known-that implacable enemy of confidence as well as Such a yawning cultural gulf was enough to destroy any
courage. affinity which the two peoples might have had and to bring to
nought all efforts at unity. When this cultural variance was
ART
combined with diversity in social-customs and modes of liveli­
ln the aesthetic sphere, too, different nationalities come to hood the emergence of a united. Indian nationalism was doomed
have an art of their own, or come to believe that the works of without redemption. ·
certain artists make up a national art. If art is an expression or
manifestation of life and its values, its significance for the
feeling of national solidarity needs no elaboration.
om
In India the Muslims look_ed to Mughul buildings as their
artistic heritage. It was the Taj Mahal of Agra, or the Red Fort
of Delhi or the Royal Mosque at Lahore, which stirred their
imagination and excited their pride. It was the art of miniature
painting, perfected in the court of Shah Jahan, which appealed
to them. On the other hand, the Hindus were equally im­
pressed and affected by the architecture of south Indian
temples, the Rajput or. Kangra schools of painting, or the
Gandhara school which was definitely Hindu in origin and
nature.
Every reader of Percy Brown's Islamic Architecture in India
or Vincent Smith's A History of Fine Arts in India and Ceylon
 1\1:YTHS AND SYMBOLS 140
could be called a nation. Several ingredients were missing. And
so the final argument on which the claimants of nationalism
took their stand was the argument from psychology. They felt
Chapter 6 that they were a nation: therefore they were a nation. No
more effective definition of nationalism has yet been suggested
than Renan's, and he based his theory on the simple but power­
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR ful fact that if a people feel strongly and passionately that they
make up a nation, historical wisdom as well as political pru­
'P ATRIOTIS�I is in political life what faith is in religion, and dence dictate the acceptance of this claim. The clash of na­
it stands to the domestic feelings and to homesickness as faith tionalisms in India was, as we will see in this chapter, basically
to fanaticism and to superstition.'1 Patriotism, like faith, is a psychological conflict. The battle was fought not so much mi
fundamentally a state of mind. There may be, and usually are, the field of politics as in the minds of men-a battle ground
visible, material and tangible agents which create or promote where a different set of weapons is used, weapons like myths

Aghazetaleem.c
patriotism. But in essence it remains a spiritual feeling. To and symbols, images and legends, pride and hero worship.
pursue Lord Acton's analogy a little further, we may say that
as faith is created and strengthened by the Book, the place of MYTHS AND SYMBOLS
worship, the history of the creed and religious relics, so patriot­ A myth is not a purely fictitious narrative or idea. In the
ism is born and fed upon: the concepts of a territory, a human political or psychological sense it has always an element of
group, a literary or artistic inheritance, a language and politi­ truth in it and an element of untruth. It is compounded of
cal history. But by themselves these agents are not enough. popular ideas, of which some have some reality and some are
They have to be sustained by a feeling that our faith is the · fabrications. The presence of both these elements in a myth
true faith and that our patriotism is the right patriotism. must be kept in mind if what follows is to be understood.
There must be a conviction that our faith is not heresy, that One major myth in Imperial India was that she was orie
our patriotism is not mere chauvinism. To create this belief homogeneous country and therefore very nearly one nation.
people seek foundations for their faith or patriotism. These Geographically speaking India was one country; in fact; a
foundations or bases constitute the psychological factor in glance at the map tells us that nature must have meant it to be
nationalism.
The importance of this factor is obvious. It is a very weighty
om one geographical entity. But sometimes it is nature which pro­
poses and man who disposes. Because India was a convenient
factor-sometimes even more significant than the historical or geographical concept, therefore it was also a national concept;
cultural ingredients. History may all be wrong and culture This was a myth which was upheld by the Hindu as passion�
may be a farce, but you cannot quarrel with the feeling of a ately as it was exploded by the Muslim. The Hindu deeply
people that they are a separate entity. You may not agree with felt that his country was one, that his nation was one, and that
them, but that would not affect their feeling of separatism. the Muslim was.a disruptionist who was bent upon undoing the
In India the psychological factor gained even greater sig­ work of centuries. The Muslim believed that the myth of an
nificance because Muslim nationalism (not unlike Hindu or Indian country or nation was a figment of the Hindu imagina:.
Indian nationalism) did not receive strong support from either tion, that at least he did not subscribe to it, and that if such
history or language or culture. By normal standards set by the a thing as an Indian nation did exist he was not a part of it;
theoreticians of nationalism neither India nor Muslim India The debate was peppery and pitiless. Both sides appealed to
1 Lord Acton, 'Nationality' in Essays on Freedom and Power (Boston, history for evidence and each found in it what it wanted to
ed., 1948), p. 188. find. The bountiful and generous Clio shares its opulence with
 146 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN MYTHS AND SYMBOLS 147
all. And so the two myths-that of the Indian nation· and that British closer). The Muslims were melechchas, lower than the
of Indian disunity-grew up side by side, destined to ruh in untouchables, who must be driven out of mother India. The
_parallel lines, never to meet or merge. mythical part of this idea was that India was original1y a
Another myth was that of an out-of-all-proportions em­ Hindu land. In actual fact, if her parenthood had to be dis­
phasis on the martial qualities of the Indian Muslims. Its covered it would probably be the present-day untouchables
parentage must be equally shared_ by the British, the Hindus or the Dravidians who were the earliest known inhabitants of
and the Muslims. First the British spread the news that Mus­ the country before the Aryan hordes came from the north and
lims were good fighters and therefore the backbone of the slowly pushed them to the south.
Indian Army. The Hindus resented this 'favour' to the Muslims Another aspect of this myth was also historically untenable.
and, politically, argued against its validity; but many of them The Muslims had come to India as conquerors, but they had
believed in it and tb,erefore feared a Muslim rising against other settled down here and made a home. The point becomes clear
Indians. The Muslims accepted the myth like a woman accept­ by comparing them with the British. Both were alien to India
ing a compliment-without caring to verify its truth. Had they in race, religion, language and culture. But Muslims became a

Aghazetaleem.c
not conquered India by feat of arms and for centuries kept it part of India and disowned the lands of their origin. The Brit­
by the sword? The Pathans, the Baluchis and the Punjabis ish came as mere rulers, with no intention of living in India or
were good fighting men, and this buttressed up the myth. even of mixing with the natives without careful discrimination.
What was forgotten in the _flush of the tumult was that the They sent relays of bureaucrats from the home country who
Rajput had an even longer history of succes.sful soldiering, took their turn at the imperial wheel and then returned to
that the Gurkha (for the purpose of the present argument an Britain laden with honours and sometimes also riches. They
Indian) was a legend on the battlefield, that the Hindu of could be called foreigners who had to be turned out before
some areas had made a name among the sappers and miners, India was free. But to make a similar demand upon the Mus­
and that, above all, the Sikh was as good a soldier as anyone lims w�s mere sophism.
else. But the myth of the martial race flourished and the con­ The last myth which we will consider _here (every student of
fusion it created was greater than the truth it contained. modern history can add his own to the list) is that of the glori­
Why was this myth invented? The British invented it ous past. The Hindu harked back to the golden age of the
partly out of a genuine conviction that the meat-eating Muslim Mauryas or the Guptas. The Muslim reverted to the Mughuls
was the hardiest and the bravest of all, partly because they om or to the past glories of Islam outside India. The idea was to
wanted to frighten the Hindu into sub:rn}ssion with the bogey of demonstrate that the people, though now subject to a foreign
the fighting Musalman who would devour them as soon as im­ rule, had once upon a time been great. This cheered them up
perial protection was withdrawn, and partly because they and drew t�em together: people who believe in the same past
wanted to strike a communal balance in the Indian Army. tend to form a group apart.
· Still another myth was that India belonged to the Hindus. This enshrinement of the past took many shapes. There was
and that Muslims were foreigners who had no business to be a new emphasis on the antiquity and merit of the Indus Valley
there. This was an exclusively Hindu myth given currency by civilization. There was a renewal of interest in ancient chron­
Bankim Chandra Chatterjee and his fellow-Bengali novelists icles. The process of reinterpreting the past grew apace, Muslim
and by Bal Gangadher Tilak and his Maharashtra school of historians had to prove how beneficial to India had been the
politics. They carried on a merciless propaganda aimed at advent of Islam or how great and pious was Aurungzeb.
bracketing together the Muslims and the British as aliens who, Praises were sung to the Mutiny which was now proc]aimed
by conquering India, had committed an unpardonable sacri­ to have been a 'war of independence' and a 'war of liberation'.
lege (incidentally, this helped to bring the Muslims and the All those who had resisted the British authority were deified
148 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN MYTHS AND SYMBOLS · 149
The remarkable thing is that these myths were taken seri­ tan). Each party also boasted of a volunteer corps, a militia,
ously by the elite of the society and disseminated among which was integrated with the main political party. The R.S.S.
the masses. Every Hindu and every Muslim took pride iri the I and the Deval 'volunteers' among the Hindus and the Muslim
achievements-real or supposed-of his own particular past. League National Guards and the Khaksars among the Muslims
Attachment to these myths produced two results. It separated symbolized militant nationalism.
the Hindu from the Muslim and aggrandized the nationalism of The� there were symbols which we:'e not political in °:ature.
each. I fhe Hmdu began a letter Qr a book with the word 'Om', Just as
A symbol may be defined as a thing regarded by generai \ the Muslim inscribed the Arabic phrase meaning 'I begin in the
consent as naturally typifying or representing or recalling name of Allah' on the head of every writing. The Hindu temple
something which is common to a society or a people. It is the and the Muslim mosque were quite different in shape and as­
mark or character taken as the conventional sign of some ob­ pect and the two emblems threw the two religions into a stark
ject or idea or process. We say, for example, that white is the contrast.
symbol of purity, the lion of courage, the dome or minaret of a Institutions, memories, traditions and ideals assume a sym­

Aghazetaleem.c
mosque. It is a token or watchword which summarizes for us bolic shape by the process of historical forces and accidents.
the association of some quality or object with another quality Many examples of this can be quoted. We used to associate
or object. the Swiss with the idea of neutrality, the Germans with the
Symbols, like myths, have played a not inconspicuous part struggle for a place in the sun, the Italians with the effort to
in the formation of nations. Of all the symbols it is the flag regain 'unredeemed' territory, the British with sea power, and
which is perhaps the most characteristic sign of nationalism. France with the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. In the world
One historical instance will illustrate this. In France the revo­ politics of today similar ideas are expressed by phrases like
lutionary government of 1848 was confronted with a serious 'peaceful co-existence', Chinese 'expansionism', American de­
conflict between those who demanded the red flag and those fence of the 'free West', Japan's 'aggressive industrialism',
who wanted the tricolour. Again in 1878 a fierce struggle and so on.
raged over the question whether the white flag of the Bourbons In India this kind of symbolism was expressed by the con-
or the tricolour should be adopted. In India both the Congress ception of a 'greater India' given currency by some Hindus, to
and the Muslim League had their own flags, and the reverence which some Muslims replied with a plan to reconquer and
in which they were held was such as to convey an impression om Islamize the whole of India (vide F. K. Khan Durrani). Among
as if the two peoples were already free countries. During the the more responsible quarters, too, the picture of the future
� was expressed in two different words: 'Akhand Hindustan'
Congress rule in the provinces the Congress tricolour was 1
•1

flown over public buildings, and this was taken by the Muslims \ (united India) and 'Pakistan'. In spite of, and during, all
as a sign of the coming of a Hindu raj. \ negotiations, discussions, compromises and agreements, these
Other symbols which cut the Muslim adrift from the Hindu 1 two symbols summarized the goals set bef ore theID:.selves by the

may be mentioned. The Hindu (especially the Congressman) ) two nationalisms. .

wore a khadi (homespun) cloth cap, which came to be called To anyone acquamte � d with Ind'1an history it will not come
the Gandhi cap. The Muslim (in particular the Leaguer) as a surprise that these myths and symbols appealed as much
adopted the karakuli (lamb fur) cap, which soon was given the to the sophisticated intellectuals as to the simple masses.
label of Jinnah cap. Slogans also became symbols when the Emotionalism is alwa.,yJ,.J!.f>my�rfaj ingredient;_j11 that curious
Hindu cried Bharat mata ki jai (long live the motherland) or .....E1i�1ll!'_�__qf_ inip..9_p._9.:�!'ables called _;riationalism. ·When it js _
Jai Hind (vive l'Inde), and the Muslim shouted All,ah o _ allie� to illiteracy.?,..n.dJ��k of education_its impact on a people.
Akbar (God is great) and Pakistan zindabad (long live Pakis- striving for independence can well be imagined. Countries
 150 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN FEAR AND INSECURITY· 151
which are worldly wise have cheerfully succumbed to these Nationalist Muslims. 'The crux of the problem is,' said Shau­
t�mptations. I� I dia it was child's pl_,:!,Y _to__ rou�� _!��-�1!12.:__ katullah Ansari in 1944, 'that the Hindus are small-minded in
� the social field, and that has touched the Muslims to the quick.
t10ns of the people-an:d- to-inveif·niiyths a:r:id. cr.eate _symbols.
-�AiicfontnJannot ·say:�tliaf fJiey wei:�- ��-�pletely �seless.Th�y Hindus have treated Muslims as untouchables.. .. You may
_.,,- might. ha,,v� J:>ee:r!wational (4Q!Y_li.:f;.!l,5:: R�rt @�_!'.!�I!�op. play_ in be a pucca nationalist and four-square Gandhiite, yet you will
__ _o�Jij:'e !); p�!,ih,ey ha,,d_ immep.se psy�l}.9l_ogig�l _y1i,lue_ in the be treated as untouchable as soon as you announce to a Hindu
nationaJis.!¼L,:renaissance. They crystallized the issues at that you are a Muslim.'1
"-�--stake:· hung out the signals of alarm and pinpointed the Such evidence can be multiplied a hundredfold. Everyone
i\ national objectives. It was unnecessary as well as undesirable ' from Sayyid Ahmad Khan to the meanest leader felt and ex­
' to chop logic· _with th�ssesoito--iirepare. them-forsubtie 1. pressed this. Jinnah's speeches and writings are replete with
_ ·-argument: The-neei:l:of��-11-o-ur-w.asto_.p�suade the peoRl_e_fu�i;_____ this fear of insecurity, and so are the resolutions of the Muslim
�· ___tli.�ii: _salvation lay in adopting a certain course of ac tion and League and other Muslim organizations which did not share the
(
�tc:> ma:k� _that course of .action appear_J.Q p,e_w:.or.th_their. while. optimism of the Congress that sometime, somehow, somewhere
j

Aghazetaleem.c
all will be well.In fact, it is no exaggeration, though it may
J If myths and symbols and emblems and signs achieved this
object, they br<?ught welcome grist to the political mill. In be an over-simplification, to say that Pakistan is the child
India the psychological factor was particularly useful not only of this feeling of insecurity.
in creating a new nationalism but also in sust:ti:ajng a nascent Lack of national unity is always productive of tension. In
nationalism. Its role on the national level may be likened to the the case of India i t was the Muslim community which was the
imp�ct. of suggestion· and auto-sugge�ion og_ th�_!Ilf!.!_yj,,du.:al victim of this tension.They felt that the majority community
·· · -- was imposing its views upon them, that this imposition of its
mind.
will was leading to an oppression which became increasingly
FEAR AND INSECURITY ·unbearable as the years passed. The Hindus-the majority
It is a commonplace observation that the solidarity of a group community-themselves intensified this l\fuslini fear by
becomes especially marked when it is threatened by other adopting a muddle-headed attitude towards the Hindu-Mus�
groups which do not share its particular beliefs and sentiments. lim problem. The Congress leaders never took this issue
One of the most powerful factors which nurtured Muslim seriously, and that was their greatest failure in politics. They
nationalism was the Muslim feeling that they were not getting, om always consid�red it as a problem which would solve itself with
time.Jawaharlal Nehru underestimated the Muslim feeling to
and would not get, a fair deal at the hands of the Hindus..
Two pieces of evidence will suffice to demonstrate the vali­ such an extent as to deny altogether the very existence of it.
dity of this feeling. Sir Fazl-i-Husain once wrote to one of his He harped upon the economic problem and explained away
friends, 'An Indian Muslim in the Punjab may be intensely the communal rivalry as a sordid race for the loaves and fishes
national, sincerely non-communal, not only in thought but in of jobs. Gandhi was equally convinced that it was the British
action, in all his dealings and none may point · out a single presence in India that kept the pro�lem alive, and that all would
incident to the contrary and yet when the occasion arises the be well the moment the 'third party' was gone. This refusal to
non-Muslim leaders and the- public would not prefer him es­ face the realities of the situation kept the Hindus away from
pecially if he happens to be capable and strong.' 1 The second understanding the Muslim point of view and in the end caused
piece of testimony is even more reliable, for it comes from one an explosion and a partition.
who was all his life a staunch Congressman and a leader of the The Muslims were intensely suspicious of every Hindu move.
1 Quoted in Azim Husain, Fazl-i-Husain: A Political Biography,
Haunted by the fear of being dominated and then crushed by
1 Shaukatullah Ansari, Pak:istan: The Problem of India, 1944, p. 27.
1946, p. 81.
 152 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN FEAR AND INSECURITY 153
the overwhelming Hindu majority, the entire course of their and without a future. This was the cardinal point which Jin-
politics was coloured by a defensive attitude. These fears and nah drummed . into Muslim ears _and on-which - ·he
· --built the
suspicions may have been due to a sense of inferiority trace­ campaigI1_fur_a sep�rate M1,1slim State.
able to the post-Mutiny days when Muslims were the sup­ . The doctrine of self-determination, as originally applied to
pressed community-suppressed by the.British in politics and India, was equally deadly to the Muslim cause. The world
'i · by the Hindus in education and commerce. Or it might be knew India as one country and could, through propaganda
accounted for by the simple fact that they were a minority in and moral appeal, be made to constrain Britain to free _it. But
, India, and minorities always suffer from a feeling of insecurity. the world knew little of the Muslim nationalism withi�the
' Another reason may have been their backwardness in practi­ 'larger 'Indian' ��tion�li;m, a:�cithe C�ng;�s� � -aw to it th�t this
cally every department of modern life. They made a stupid _:,gii.p::intneworld'sinfqr:ijiation was_ not fiifed.-When, therefore,
mistake right at .the beginning of their political career _ th_�_Mill?limsfav:oked the p_rinGiple of self-determination, they_
when they refused to take heed and continued to live in the were ri�icµkq as a small minority pretending to be a n1;1,tion.
cloister. This damaged their cause andr als,o their rep1.1tation, but in_ tlt�.

Aghazetaleem.c
Economic nationalism was also active in this feeling of in­ �icted as a. spur to thi!i dete1:mination to sever all links
security. Muslims resented the Hindu control of the economic with India.
field. 1 They were shut out from business, trade and commerce. The-·reaI roots of the idea of Muslim separatism should
They had no banks of their own, no insurance companies, no therefore be sought in the minds of men rather than in
shipping lines. When a Muslim opened a shop or set up a pro­ political factors. The latter only reflected the struggle going
duction plant·he ran a considerable risk hy invading a sphere on in the former. This explains the extraordinary strength
which was monopolized by the other community. There were of Muslim nationalism which was able to split India within
no economic leaders among them, no capitalists, who had seven years of the formulation of its demand f or a separate
either the courage or the resources to stand up to the Hindu State.
and break his stranglehold. It was only towards the end that '-- ·As a national minority three courses were open to Indian
one or two banks and insurance companies were opened. Muslims. They could seek help from their co-religionists in
. It was in the political field that Muslim fears received the other States extending from Afghanistan to Turkey, as the
strongest confirmation. If the nineteenth century had been Sudeten Germans did when, before the Second World vVar,
one of colonialism and imperialism, the twentieth was the cen­ om they appealed to Germany for help. But this the Muslims never
tury of democracy and self-determination. On b_otli_ .these did, though they gave their own support to the pan-Islam and
_ principles the Muslim stood to lose in India. In a derp,qcratic Khilafat movements. Or, they could secure privileges from the
. government. he would ever be a minority-and an :!.mchange­ majority group within India, as did the Catalans in Spain be­
. able :minority, to boot. He would never control the administr_a_:: fore the time of Franco. This they had been doing since 1906
-.,lion because b,e_ n�y�i:__co.uld. be a-majorityj]!_t_�J_egi§!_ gt_1.1,re.
This :was a__chi_l_ling..pr.osp��t,�l!�h }{tiled his intere_st in_a :f.utll!'!L
when they expressed a desire to have separate electorates.
Safeguards and concessim;is were repeatedly demanded and
democratic Indian State. For this the Congress called him 'un­ mostly conceded-but by the British rulers, not by the Hin­
democratic' and 'reactioiiary', but p�litical abuse �ould l!_o_! _ dus. This was an important factor, for it convinced the Muslims
, alter the fact that in any_pJ:1.pJilar_system of gQvernmer1,t he _ that the Hindus were not prepared to safeguard their interests
';;ust b�-�;ti�fieci'with-the status_ of a minority. without' hope._ or meet their wishes. In actual working, moreover, even the
1 This again is the testimony of a Nationalist Muslim leader who was a
safeguards proved to be futile. Gradually Muslim thoughts
, staunch opponent of the Muslim League, see Afzal Haq (Ahrar), Pakistan
turned to the third course open to them, viz., complete separa­
and Untouchability; 1941, pp. 89-90. tion from the major group. This the Muslims demanded for the
154 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN HISTORY AS A DIVISIVE FACTOR 155
first time in 1940 when the Muslim League passed the Lahore or memory of Qasim, who was the first Muslim to invade India,
Pakistan Resolution. and cursed the name of Mahmud, who had despoiled their
All safeguards, guarantees and promises of protection had temples and shrines.
failed to erode the foundations of suspicion and fear. Tension Hindu historians had a soft corner for Akbar, whom they re­
was not lessened. Insecurity had not decreased. Irritation had garded as a peacemaker and a monarch of great toleration.
increased and with it the possibility of civil war. The spirit of Muslim historians reserved their praises for Aurungzeb, whom
compromise was absent. There was no point on which a bridge they thought to have been a most pious and God-fearing king.
of understanding could be built. The psychological gulf finally The Hindus had no love for Aurungzeb on account of his
proved to be too wide and too deep to be spanned by any orthodox Islamic views. The Muslims disliked Akbar for his
known political device. So a separate State had to be created renunciation of Islam. The Hindus idolized Shivaji as the
whose nationalism was psychologically well vested but politi­ liberator of South India and the founder of the Marhatta
cally yet untried. power. The Muslims frowned upon him as the inveterate foe of
Muslim power and a crafty soldier who killed a Muslim general

Aghazetaleem.c
PRIDE IN HEROES under deception.
The absence or otherwise of a spirit of nationality can be tested
by observing whether all the people claiming one nationality HISTORY AS A DIVISIVE FACTOR
adore the same heroes. Social solidarity will be as powerful and The philosophy of history is a part of the philosophy of nation­
widespread as the attachment of the group to a body of heroes '
alism. National bias is the most obvious trait of all historical
to whom it pays homage. A hero impersonates common values ·1 work.1 Battles, wars, territorial expansions, foreign invasions
of a social group and the acceptance of him contributes to the -all enter into the making of greater pride in national unity
maintenance of group solidarity. and feeling.
The history of Western nationalism illustrates the connec­ The growth of the nationalist sentiment in India affected the
tion between the spirit of nationality and the acceptance of
common heroes. Heroes have been of several ldnds. There were i Hindu and Muslim chroniclers in different ways. 'The Hindus
began to lay great stress on their heroic fights against Muslims.
religious heroes or saints, like St. Patrick of Ireland, St. Denis Tod's Annals and .Antiquities of Rajasthan served as a model
of France and St. Stanislas of Poland. There were royal heroes, and a store-house of materials. Inspiring historical accounts
like Charlemagne and Louis XIV (the Roi-soleil) in France and om were written of the long-drawn-out struggle between the Raj­
Peter the Great in Russia. There were political heroes, like puts and the Muslims, in which the Rajputs almost always
Napoleon in France, Bismarck in Germany and Garibaldi in. came out with flying colours.' In dealing with the Marhattas it
Italy. There were 'national' heroes ('defenders of the country'), was emphasized that they were inspired by the ideal 9f found­
like Jeanne d'Arc of France, William Tell of Switzerland and ing a Hindu Empire, but 'their treatment of the Rajputs and
Kossuth of Hungary. plundering raids against the Hindus were either forgotten or
Similarly in India Hindus and Muslims had different heroes. ignored'. Shivaji's faults were minimized or 'even explained
Hindu India looked to such figures asShivaji, Tilak, Aurobindo, away'.2
Gandhi and Nehru. Muslim India revered Shah Waliullah, There is an interesting connection between Indian historical
Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Ali and Jinnah. Going
1 For the significance of history in the development of modern nation­
farther back, Hindu India extolled Asoka and Ghandargupta,
alism see R. W. Seton-Waston, The Historian as a Political Force in
for whom the Muslims could have no feeling of loyalty or even Central Europe, London, 1922.
interest. Muslim India looked lovingly to Muhammad bin 2 R. C. Majumdar, 'Nationalist Historians', in C. H. Philips (ed.),
Qasim and Mahmud of Ghazna: the Hindus detested the Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, 1961, p. 428.
156 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN NATIONAL CHARACTER 157
and political writings and the then prevailing state of Hindu­ Historians play an important part in the formation of
Muslim relations. The works written in the 1920's emphasized national spirit. They exalt the history of their own people.
'the community of interests and the cultural intercourse of They seek to prove the supremacy of their civilization. In
Hindus and Muslims'; those of the 1930's underlined 'their modern Europe, Italian scholars were probably the first to
polarity in religion and thought' but suggested that 'political praise their history, culture and nationality.
co-operation had been and could be secured'; and those of the In India, as we have seen, there was no mentionable work
l 940's stressed 'the separate political achievements and des­ on the modern period, but some historians looked to the great
tiny of the Muslims in South Asia'. 1 It is apparent that in the Islamic past or to Muslim rule in India. The Mughuls and their
1920's the Khilafat movement and the Amritsar shooting had Muslim predecessors attracted a few historians, like Abdul
brought the two peoples together and therefore the historians Aziz, but not much work was done, and it was not till after
of the period spoke of their unity. In the next decade, however, Independence that the importance of 're-writing' national his­
this spirit of camaraderie was fast disappearing and an optimis­ tory was emphasized.
tic historian could at the most recall past unity and hope for Teachers of history can be no less effective agents of national­

Aghazetaleem.c
the best. But in the 1940's even this hope was irretrievably gone ism than the historians. The way history is taught is a good
and the rift was there for all to see, including the historians. general help or hindrance to the inculcation of national loyalty.
It is a pity that the Muslims, once renowned as the masters Glorification of one's own nationality becomes a part of the
of the science of history, did little history-writing in India, lesson. Biographies of great heroes are prescribed as aids to
particularly in the modern period. It has been pleaded on their character formation. Only those historical events are treated
behalf that they were so much engrossed in the developments in the classroom which add to national glory. Only such inter­
occurring in other 1\foslim countries that they had little time pretations are given currency as agree with the prevailing
to observe and asses their own history. But this is only an national ideals. All this was done by Hindu and Muslim history
excuse. Their interest in world Islam was never so absorbing teachers in schools and colleges. And it was here that the
(except perhaps for four or five years during the Khilafat paucity of Muslim scholars and their works was keenly felt.
period) as to preclude all study of Indian past or present. Even the Muslim periods of· Indian history were written up
:Moreover, if Muslim historians were so greatly involved in the and taught by Hindu authors and lecturers.
affairs of Turkey, Persia and the Arab world, why did they not
produce some work on these areas? om NATIONAL CHARACTER
The fact is that history-writing was not the Muslims' strong The idea of national character is highly deceptive because of
point in modern India. Historical works proper do not make �n the wide variety of individual characters and cultural traits
appearance in their literature. Apart from a few attempts m in a national group. It has been suggested, therefore, that the
Urdu and Bengali, whose scholarly quality is doubtful, the term 'national character' should be replaced with 'national
only serious work was done by Ameer Ali, Yusuf Ali and Sir traditions', but traditions alone do not determine a group's
Shafaat Ahmad Khan. But Ameer Ali's interest was in world way of life and thinking. Perhaps 'national mentality' is a
Islam rather than in India. Yusuf Ali was not a scholar, but the better term to describe the impression that we want to convey
little he wrote on modern India at least spoke of promise. about a group's communal thought and action.
Shafaat Ahmad Khan's only work on the modern period was Whatever words we use, the fact remains that nearly every
on the 1935 constitution and can hardly be classed as a piece national group has its own traditions, interests and ideals
of historical writing. which distinguish it from other such groups and enable an
:i: P. Hardy, 'Modern Muslim Historical Writing on Medieval Muslim observer to determine the lineaments of its national existence.
India', ibid., p. 808. Applying this to India we see that though the Hindu and
 158 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN NATIONAL CHARACTER 159
the Muslim had many things in common and though a Pun­ The grooves of a national - character come to be fixed in
jabi Hindu looked and acted very much like a Punjabi Mus­ perpetuity. The Muslims looked upon themselves as Muslims
lim, yet there was a manifest difference in their outlook on and not as anything else. The Hindus were Hindus or non­
life. The Muslims had their own characteristics (in Frederick Mu�lims, �ut n?t anything else. This feeling of sep�atenes�,
_ Hertz's words, a 'constellation of forces') which imparted to which was m this sense purely a state of disposition, gnawed at
them a unity or fixity of character. These characteristics were th� vitals of unity or the prospect for it. 1'7l1en !_�Q_gro_!!P!> ·
so widespread and pervasive that, on the one hand, they trans­ _ thmk tha! _!��Lj.o not,_belong together, it is impossibl� to
cended the features which the Muslims shared with the Hindus _"rrialreone naJiop_ of them� A multi-national political system
and, on the other, they moulded the image of the Muslim
group both in the mind of the community itself and in that of
I. could be devised, or perhaps a multi-national society concocted
�mt of this disarray. But the first could only have been a
the Hindus. However much the Hindus and the Muslims of rickety structure without the solid foundation of a united
one province appeared to have in common and however much political impulse, and the second only a temporary expedient
a foreign observer might insist on refusing to distinguish be­ without the spiritual ballast of a shared view of life.

Aghazetaleem.c
tween the two, their ways of living and thinking were cer- However poor the prospects for such a compromise, it cannot
tainly not the same. be said that no efforts were made to achieve at least minimal
An educated Hindu and an educated Muslim of the urban unity. There were several long-drawn-out negotiations be­
area were superficially alike. They lived and studied· and tween Hindus and Muslims and all of them cannot be dismissed
( as meaningless gestures. In 1916 and 1917, in 1928 and 1931
dresseg. and enjoyed themselves in the same way. But there
the affinity ended. At home their ways of e�ting were d�fferent. and again in 1944, there were conversations and exchanges of
_ views. To pass judgement on the sincerity of the negotiating
\ Food was not the same. They professed different rehg1ons. In
i thenorne··-nrost-of·thyJn_�:vin clresspd- 4_1ffe:rently:. They read parties is neither possible nor desirable. But it is necessary to
\ q[�iep;t.1w.wspapers and had different v:iews on politics. Their record the fact that the result was far from a success.
\ social institutions, in connection with marriage and death, In another respect we may say that a continuous attempt at
\ were different. Apart from their social intercourse outside the the creation of a national society was made by the political
\ home, which was both superficial and sophisticated, their systems devised at various stages by the British. Local self­
· lives had different values. The whole environment was differ- government institutions, separate electorates, increasingly
1 / ent, for it was based on different traditions. In a word, they
om represe�tative legislatures, dyarchy, provincial autonomy,
/ had different ideals, or, what is even more important, they felt federalism, reservation of seats for mip.orities, weightages, safe­
1
·\ that they had different ideals. guards -all these were tools and instruments shaped by the
This feeling of being different, of not sharing the vital British to achieve Indian unity or at least to lay its foundations.
/things of life, directed their political opinions. National charac­ The greatest experiment in this field was the 1985 constitution
/ ter or mentality, or what you will, is predominantly a psy­ which had the dual merit of recognizing the lack of basic
\ chological sentiment. The Muslim thought that he had a mind unity in India and at the same time of giving her a constitu-
different from that of a Hindu. When this feeling spread among . tional structure which, if worked in a spirit of goodwill and
the community and Muslims generally came to believe that they amity, could result in a coherent federal union. But the
had a mentality which was not the same as the Hindus', the e:xyeriment, perhaps the greatest of its kind in the world,
Muslim nation, or at least the spirit of it, was born. When time · failed because one part of the constitution was not worked
and assimilation confirmed this belief, it became a faith. And in the spirit in which it was intended to be worked and
faith is a powerful, perhaps the most powerful, foundation of the other never came into operation by the intervention of the
nationalism. · war.
 160 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS 161
. Hypothetical questions are notoriously difficult to answer. it is a sort of a group consciousness working on a larger can­
But it was within the realm of possibility that a multi-national vas. It arises from, as well as causes, group solidarity. It aims
India might have maintained its unity had the Act of 1935 at discovering, and then communicating to the people, the links
been given a fair and complete trial. But it can also be argued which make for their unity. It points out the aims the pursuit
that the psychological rift betwee.n the Hindus and the Mus­ of which becomes the duty of the group. It is.not a uniform pro­
lims had, by 1937, gone too far to be healed by political or cess, but contains many strands and variations ranging from
constitutional devices. At what precise time did the Muslim ;! definite ideology to feeble doubt.
feeling of 'nsecurity mature into a belief that they must part /I The first indication that a national group has 'arrived' is
company with the Hindus? This leads us to the question of , the development of a consciousness of the fact that a:ll the
\
political consciousness. \ members of that group belong to one nationality. They must
- believe that they belong to one nationality. But that should
NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS \ not be taken to mean that each individual member of the
. Robert Michels was right when he said that the essence of group shares the will to live together. The Muslim League never

Aghazetaleem.c
1 nationality lies, above all, in the will of a people. 1 There are the claimed that it spoke for every single Indian Muslim. Nor was
usual components of a national spirit which we have men­ PaJdstflll the .demand of all Muslims living in the sub-con:ff:
tioned in the preceding pages, but the common will to live nent. There were some who were just indifferent to politics;
and belong together transcends them all. If all these standard '-·ther�_�ere otl).ers who did not agree with the League brand of
ingredients were absent, but the will was P!escnt, it would still politics; there were stiHothers who did not care what befell
be possible to have a national group. , _!heir community. The national will must be shared by a
As a 'pragmatic' or 'historical' factor, nationality has existed great majority of the group. National consciousness does not
in history for a long time, but it is only through consciousness, j have to spread to every nook and cranny to qualify as such. ·
or rather the awakening of it, that it becomes the 'absolute' The spirit of nationalism is actuated by three types of mo�
factor. In the words of Hans Kohn, 'nationality is formed by I tives: traditions, interests and ideals. Traditions are 'patterns
of behaviour which are regarded as values simply because they
the decision to form a nationality'.
--1 Muslim nationalism conforms to this theory (or to part of are a collective heritage regardless of any reasons ·of utility,
it) to an extraordinary extent. It was the result, not of blood beauty or supernatural sanction'. An interest is a 'claim re­
(race is a fiction), nor of a common language (the Bengalis did om garded as useful to the existence and well-being of the group'.
not speak Urdu), nor of pure religion (many Muslims were re­ An ideal is an 'aim which is not a direct interest of individuals.
cent converts from Hinduism), nor even of a shared territory It is regarded as possessing a high authority, and thereby has
(not a single province was completely Muslim)-but of the power to command obedience and the sacrifice of individual
consciousness. It was the power of an idea which constituted interests'. The traditions connect a nation with its past, the
and moulded it. Material facts, of course, helped the configura­ interests with its present, the ideals with its future. 1
tion, but the real driving impetus behind the movement was It is not always possible to distinguish between these three
spiritual-'spiritual' in the broader rather than .the religious motives. They form a part of a psychological sub-structure on
sense. Without a sufficient measure of national consciousness which nationalism is built. National consciousness means the
there would have been no idea of separation, and therefore no awareness of this sub-structure. Muslims were conscious of
nationalism� their being a nation when they became aware of their tradi­
National consciousness is an exceedingly complex process. tions and heritage, whether Indian or Islamic; when they came
1 Robert Michels, Notes sur les Mayen de oonstater la Nationalite, 1917, 1 See the very interesting discussion on this point in Frederick Hertz,
p. I. Nationality in History and Politics, 1944 (3rd. imp. 1951), pp. 18 et seq.
L
162 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN
to know what their interests were and what was conducive
to their safety, freedom and prestige; and when they came to
have their own ideals of what they wanted to achieve.
National consciousness is another name for having national Chapter 7
aspirations. These aspirations can relate to four things: unity,
liberty,. individuality and prestige. For Muslim India unity
meant that all Muslims were one political body, with common THE TW0°NATION THEORY
social and economic ideas, . professing the same religion and
owing allegiance to the same· cultural heritage. Liberty im­ JINN AH was not the first to call the Muslims of India a nation.
plied to them not the independence of India as a whole (tho.ugh Before him Sayyid Ahmad Khan had addressed them as a
that was a part gf their programme), but liberation from qaum, an Urdu word which can be paraphrased as 'nation'.
British as well as Hindu domination and from any external The Aga Khan, Ameer Ali and others often referred to their
pressure or interference. Individuality was for them the 1:1sser­ community as a 'nation' or a 'nationality'. J3ut it was Jinnah

Aghazetaleem.c
tion of their separateness and distinctness: they were not the ,::who,Jor the first tiine! procbi,im�d th::i,:Und.ia was inhabited-by
same as other Indians, they were different. Prestige conveyed �n..c_t_ natiQIJ.� :--iIJindus and_ M11slims -which could not
to them the idea of distinction; they wanted honour, dignity live in one State. ,g� ��pgunde_d_ thl_s_t'Yo"�nation_theor:y_in ..
and influence, if possible in India, if not in a separate State of such detaij_ig1d__with_J,:uc_l). effect thaj;__m_ost_Mu_slims and even_
their own; they did not want to live as a helpless minority }§�_Jfi"qµ§_ c�1:1-e_to belie_ve. in_its tru_!;��_The Muslim League
without self-respect. demand for Pakistan was based on this theory and, though.
The significance of these aspirations lies in the fact that they ·1 generally neither the Hindus nor the British accepted it, India
crystallized the psychological force behind Muslim nationalism. was partitioned on the premiss that Muslims constituted a
It was not enough to have a common religion, a common lan­ separate p.ation and should therefore be given a separate State.
guage or a common history. People must be consciou� of t�e�r The real problem of India was national. The Hindus claimed
_
past and of their future. They must be aware of thell' md1v1- that India was one nation and a united country and wanted
duality. They must believe that they are different from others. independence. The Muslims replied with the counter-claim
This belief was the hard core of their nationalism, and the that India was neither a unity nor a nation, that the Muslims
most difficult to challenge or counteract. You can debate on om formed a separate nation, and that Muslim freedom from
historical antecedents, on linguistic unity, even on ideology. Hindu domination was as essential as Indian liberation from
You cannot argue with faith. British rule.
THE THEORY ENUNCIATED
The most clear and emphatic exposition of the theory is to be
found in Jinnah's statements and speeches. The sub.stance of
his argument can be put as. follows.
Hinduism and Islam represented two distinct and separate
civilizations and were in fact as distinct from· one another in
origin, tradition and manner of life as were the different
European nations. In India there was a major and a minor
nation, and it followed that a parliamentary system based on
the principle of majority '.rule must inevitably mean the rule
164 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN THE THEORY ENUNCIATED 165
of the major nation.Therefo�e a constitution must be evolved lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric
that recognized the fact that there were in India two nations, that may be so built up for the government of such a nation.
both of whom must share the governance of their 'common ...l\fusalmans are a nation according to any definition of a
motherland'. 1 One thing was now obvious, that 'we are by no nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory
means a minority but a solid and distinct nation by ourselves and their State.We wish to live in peace and harmony with
with a destiny of our own'.2 our neighbours as a free and independent people. We wish our
It was in his presidential address to the Muslim League people to develop to the fullest our spiritual, cultural, econo­
session at Lahore, at which the partition Resolution was mic, social and political life in any way that we think best and
passed, that he explained the theory in detail.'Notwithstand­ in consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius
ing a thousand years of close contact, nationalities, which are of our people.'1
as divergent today as ever, cannot at any time be expected to To the Hindu objection that Muslims were mere invaders
transform themselves into one nation merely by means of sub­ and outsiders and had thus no territorial right to India,
jecting them to democratic constitution and holding them Jinnah's answer was roo�d in t_l),e J_ggjc _.of IP.:dian history.
forcibly together by unnatural and artificial methods of '?}ft�!Y:fndf -is _j:io( t(ie �ole. p1:_o:g�ty of_t_li�-C.�mwess, a:Ud if
a

Aghazetaleem.c
British Parliamentary Statute.' The problem in India was not th,:_e_r�al �other. W::),�__!;9_ h.� gis_coy�:r_ed, it_ woukLb_e the Dravi-_

1
'of an inter-communal character but manifestly of an inter­ ·clians and still further the Aborigines.It would neither be the
national one', and it must be treated as such. If Britain was i\Fya1i iior ·tne Musalman. 'I'he Ayr�n-cTa1m to-Inafa- is- no
really in earnest and sincerely wanted to secure the peace and ·oetter· than tnat oCtlie Musalmans, . except tJiat . - - they -iere
happiness of India, it should 'allow the major nations separate •·earlier arrivals in poinfof time.' 2
homelands by dividing India into "autonomous national a·
--Eveii Nationalist Muslim, who was opposed to the two­
States"'.Hinduism and Islam were not religions in the strict nation theory, admitted that 'Muslims felt that they cannot
sense of the word, but were, in fact, 'different and distinct withstand humiliating conditions and they would much
social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims rather live in the hell of Pakistan than serve in the heaven of
can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception · Hindustan and its degrading economic and social treatment'. 3
of one Indian nation has gone·far beyond the limits and is the l�e fact was that :Muslims had maiI1tained their separate
cause of most of your troubles and will lead India to destruc- entity in India for several centuries, first as victorious invaders
tion if we fail to revise our notions in time.The Hindus and om and imperial rulers and later as fellow-subjects of the British.
Muslims belong to two different religions, philosophies, social When the Hindus awoke to their position of strength vouch­
customs, literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine safed by numerical majority, the Muslims realized their peril
together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations !:l,nd reasserted their ancient superiority. Since it was no longer
which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. possible to rule over11:ie-whole of India as they had done in the
Their aspects on life and of life are different.It is quite clear past, they must consolidate what they had or could have and
that Hindus and Musalmans derive their inspiration from thus check the process which would certainly undermine the
different sources of history. They have different epics, different �I\ entire structure of their religion, culture and tradition. This
was the central argument on which Muslim India reared the
heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a
foe of the other and, likewise, their victories and defeats over­ I) I two-nation theory.
i
lap. To yoke together two such nations under a single State,
one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must•
1 Ibid., pp. 176-80.
2 Statement of l April 1940, reproduced in India's Problem of her
1 J'amiluddin Ahmad, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 130-31, 188. Future Constitution, ?1940, p. 81.
3 Shaukatullah Ansari, op. cit., p. 28.
2 Ibid., p. 154.
166 THE :MAKING OF PAKISTAN EXTERNAL EVIDENCE. 1(}7
sure to move in opposite directions. In that event the Hindus
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE would become more Hinduized and the Muslims more Islamic.
Several Hindu and many British writers on India have This was what actually happened. As a result of the resuscita­
admitted the deep rift between Hindus and Muslims in Indian tion of the Hindu past, the · nineteenth century witnessed a
society and politics. To take the Hindus first. In 1926, a progressive de-Islamization of the non-Muslims of India and
Hindu emphasized the distinctiveness of the Muslim popula­ together with it a tremendous revival of Hindu traditions.
tion and the fact that this distinctiveness had been maintained • On the Muslim side there was a continuous attempt to complete
up to that time. The 'broadest division' of Indian population the Islamization of the Muslims of India, both qualitatively
was between the Hindus and the Muslims.1 In 1989, another and quantitatively .. ..The process inevitably tended towards
student of the Indian minority problem, .who wrote a doctoral a waning loyalty to the common heritage. The common
thesis at Columbia�to disprove the necessity and wisdom of heritage was a pleasant modus vivendi for the Hindus and
communal representation, began his treatment of the subject Muslims in certain conditions.But it could do nothing, nor did
by the bland statement that 'India is a land of nations'. 2 it do anything, either to modify the group consciousness of the

Aghazetaleem.c
In 1948, another Hindu declared that the demand for Pakistan members of the two societies or to make them forget that they
was·-the�i;;uit�a�\ii;�-�1.!g :g����:t\i!):!Sl!.!!1 _11PP!'.e�ension were antithetical in all matters except a few inessentials.' The
that in case of a united India 'they would be submerged by the heart of the matter was that 'the Hindu, as a member of a
overwhelming majority of Hindus'. His picture of a future closed society bas�d on birth and blood', found it hard to
India was that of a number of autonomous States with a un,derstand 'th� nature of an open society which can expand
central government of a confederal type. 3 itself through proselytization and conversion'.1
A most perceptive explanation of the Hindu-Muslim discord This long passage has been reproduced because it touches
is given by Nirad Chaudhuri. The Hindus, led by their the pith of the argument and uncovers the roots of Hindu­
scholarly elite, came to believe that there was a cultural Muslim enmity.
heritage common to the Indian Muslims and Hindus. 'In During the same period several British observers with
reality, the so-called common heritage was hardly deeper than Indian experience had also underlined the essential disunity of
a veneer to begin with and found to be extremely fragile in the India and her lack of national solidarity. Sir Sidney Low and
event. The relative quickness with which its hold weakened on Lord Meston enumerated the obstacles to the creation of a
the people of India leads one to conclude that it had some om true national spirit; 2 while E. A. Horne saw, even when
inherent weakness. So it had. The common heritage was not a Hindu-Muslim amity was at its peak, a 'fundamental an­
homogeneous product. . . . As long as the Hindu masses of tagonism of thought and feeling'.3 In India religions were a
India remained the adherents of a primitive kind of Hinduism substitute for nationalities, and the Muslims in particular were
created by the break-up of the ancient Indian civilization, and 'to all intent a nation, and the Government has to regard them
the Muslim masses remained a horde of semi-Islamized con­ as such\4
verts, all was likely to go well with the common heritage. But The pressure of British domination and the universal use oi
were either of the two wings to rise to a higher plane, they were English as a language throughout the country were factors
1 For this interesting discussion see Nirad C. Chaudhuri, The Auto•
1 S. Dutt, Problem of Indian Nationality, 1926, p. 73.
2 B. K. Krishna, The Problem of Minorities or Communal Representa- , biography of an UnknO'Wn Indian, 1951, pp. 480-83.
2 See S.Low, A Vision of India, 1910, pp. 348-9, and whole ofMeston,
tion in India, 1939, p. 20.
3 A. K. Pillai, of the Radical Democratic Party and Indian Federation India at the Crossroads, London, 1920.
3 E. A. Horne; The Political System of British India, 1922, pp. 23-24.
of Labour, in a discussion on Lord Erskine's paper on 26 October 1943,
Asiatic Revieu•, April 1944, p. 141. 4 C.H. V. Tyne, India, in Ferment, 1923, pp. 216-17.
 168 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN INTERNAL EVIDENCE 169
making for national unity, but these were artificial ingredients
of nationalism and could not be expected to result in a group INTERNAL EVIDENCE
solidarity in a country with such wide diversity and variety.1 !he Usual Congress-Hindu answer to the danger of conimunal-
The Muslims feared that in a united Indian democratic govern• 1sm was that with the development of economic ideas all
ment they would be swamped and devoured by the Hindus. Hindu-Muslim trouble would by itself come to an end. This;
'In the last resort, and this was freely acknowledged by leading however, was no more than wishful thinking or shutting the
Indian statesmen in both camps, the Muslims .will fight rather eyes to unpleasant realities. The fact was that even among the
than submit.' 2 Indian labour where, according to the Congress theory, there
Indian unity was based on shallow and unhealthy founda­ should have been complete solidarity, unity was missing. The
tions. 'After all, it is only the unifying bond of indifference, Trade Union Congress and the Trade Union Federation were
submission, or hosj;ility to alien rule that has· held India in their earlier stages purely labour organizations without
together.' As that bond was being removed the essential dis­ communal bias. But as Muslim nationalism grew the Muslim
cord was being demonstrated. The Muslims did not seek working classes began to realize the danger of Hindu domina­

Aghazetaleem.c
supremacy over all India. They wanted to be sure that 'if tion in trade unions. Gradually separate unions came to life
harmonious co-�peration with Hinduism proves :finally im• which made a point of Muslim rights as strongly as the Muslim
possible, they will not be denied on that account the next best League was doing in the political field.1 Just before partition
thing in constitutional advance'. 3 By .the beginning of 1942 the all India Trade Union Congress was as much representative
there was 'not a single Muslim in India who would not re­ of Muslim labour as was the Indian National Congress of
sent any form of Constitution which put the Hindus into not Muslim masses. .
only a permanent majority, but a permanent position of

1
The Hindus made no serious effort to reassure the Muslims
power'.' or to allay their fear. On the other hand, several Hindu leaders
A year before the creation of Pakistan the Economist traced and intellectuals of influence are on record as having,glorified
the origin of Muslim nationalism in an article which showed a Hinduism and desired its supremacy over the entire sub-con­
deep understanding of the situation. There had never been tinent and even beyond her boundaries.
such a State as Pakistan, but then neither was there a Jugo• · According to Rabindranath Tagore, the Hindu poet and
slavia or a Czechoslovakia before 1919. 'The reality is the Nobel prize-winner, the term 'Hindu' had an extended conno­
Muslim population of India-some 90 millions-with its own om tation. Islam denoted a .particular religion, but the concept of

\
system of law and social organization, its own distinct variant a Hindu in the history of India was coeval with that of a
of the Hindustani language, its historical traditions and its nation in its social sense.2 One Hindu writer, in a book which
connections outside India... .' The Hindu-controlled Congress purported to be an academic study of communal riots,
.\ provincial governments of 1937-9 had behaved arrogantly and seriously suggested the following 'cures' for the removal of
this caused the 'phenomenal growth' of Muslim nation1:1lism. Hindu-�uslim rivalry: Islam should change its name to
'When the present tension in India is viewed in its historical Nirakar Samaj; all Muslims should become Hindus; all
setting, it cannot be denied that we are confronted by some­ communal educational institutions should be abolished; .and
thing more than a mere factional strife within a single nation.' 5
1 See Sir Walter Citrine, Secretary of the British T.U.C., speaking on
1 Lord l\foston, India and the Empire, 1924, p. 21. India, (British) Trade Union Congress Annual RepOTt of 1942, p. 801;
2 J; M. Kenworthy, India: A Warning, 1981, p. 57.
and H. G. Bottomley (who haa visited India as a member of the British
3 Patrick Lacey, letter to Manchester Guardian, 4 April 1940.
Parliamentary Delegation), 'Trade Unionism in India', The Times, 10
4 Lord Hailey, H.L. 121. 5S, 3 February 1942, _Col. 616.
April 1946.
5 'Black Flags in India', Economist, 7 September 1946, pp. 862-4. 2 Sachin Sen, The Political Thought of Tagore, 1947, p. 200.
i
' .
170 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN SEPARATE ELECTORATES 171
all communal electorates should be immediately done away for separate electorates was a manifestation of Muslim feeling
with.1 A Hindu professor claimed that 'Hindu' was a terri­ of separateness; whether this :feeling had by then matured into
torial term rather than a badge of religion, and that therefore a full-fledged theory or not is difficult to see.
all Muslims were in fact Hindus. And therefore, by his logic, In the elections of 1892, out of the candidates recommended
there was no communal problem and the Congress resolution by the various electoral bodies for the Central Council the
on self-determination was silly. 2 Muslims obtained only about half the number to which their
Lala Hardyal, the legendary _figure of Hindu renaissance, numerical strength entitled them. For the Council of the
was even more ambitious. He said that if Hindus wanted to United Provinces not a single Muslim had been recom­
protect themselves they must conquer Afghanistan and the mended.1 When, therefore, it was known that the British
'frontiers' and convert them to Hinduism. 3 Another Hindu Government was contemplating reforms for India which
leader contented himself by saying that to force Muslims into would introduce a larger element of representation, the
an Indian national State would not be 'com.pulsion'.4 Muslims, in 1906, took a deputation to the Viceroy to argue
Such expressions of Hindu imperialism did not add to the their case for separate representation on all local and provincial

Aghazetaleem.c
Muslim feeling of security. Even Lord Mountbatten, no friend elected bodies. This claim was based on three grounds. (a) In
of the Muslims, had told Gandhi that 'if the partition had not the existing state of tension between Hindus and Muslims, no
been made during British occupation, the Hindus being the Muslim who sincerely represented the opinions of his com�
major party would have never allowed partition and held the munity could secure election in a general electorate, since in all
Muslims by force under subjection'. 6 There can hardly be more but two provinces Muslims were a minority of the population.
impartial evidence to dispose of the Congress thesis that the ' i' (b) If the two communities were not kept apart at the polls
moment the British withdrew communal peace would return every contested election would res.ult in communal riots,
to India and all Hindu-Muslim trouble would be forgotten in accompanied by bloodshed, and would leave bitter memories
the glow of freedom. which would retard the political integration of the country.
(c) Where the system of separate electorates had been estab­
SEPAif;ATE ELECTORATES lished, as in municipalities and district boards, it had worked
Whether the Muslims demanded separate representation in well and secured peace.
legislatures because they considered themselves a separate Simultaneously,· the deputation also made a plea for
nation, or the two-nation theory was advanced because the om weightage, i.e. the concession of more seats to the Muslims
working of separate electorates for many years had made the I than their population figures warranted. This demand was
Muslims conscious of their distinctiveness, is a pointless con­ I supported by another set of three arguments: (a) Muslims
still owned much of the landed property in India. (b) They
troversy. What is more important is to find out the connection
between the two and to assess the influence of the electorate on·
II constituted a very large proportion of the Indian Army. (c)
the working out of the theory. We may say that the demand They were, geographically speaking, the gatekeepers of
India.2
1 R. M. Agarwala, The Hindu-Muslim Riots: Their Causes and Cures, The political principle behind this deman'd was underlined
1943,pp.85,93-'-96,103,106. in ari eloquent sentence by the Economist: 'Whatever may be
2 See Radhakumud Mookerji, Akhand Bharat, Bombay, 1945.
a Quoted in Shaukatullah Ansari, Pakistan: The Problem of India, 1 R. Coupland, India: A Re-Statement, 1945, p. 105.
1944, p. 37. 2Full text of the Deputation's address (which was drafted by Bil­
'C. P. Pillai, Pakistan and its Implications, n.d. grami) in Addresses, Poems and other Writings of Nawab Imad-ul-Mulk
6 Quoted in Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, Vol. II, 1958, Bahadur (,Sayyid Husayn Bilgrami, C.S.I.), Hyderabad, 1925, pp.
p. 290. 139-44.
172 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN SEPARATE ELECTORATES 178
the political atom in India, it is certainly not the individual of �ould remove the necessity for special representation. Until
Western democratic theory, but the community of some then Muslim representation must continue.1 (Incidentally, this
sort.'1 line of thought goes counter to the idea that the demand for
The significance of the Muslim demand was fully brought separate representation flowed out of a consciousness of
out in. the debate which accompanied the making of the separate Muslim nationalism). The Aga Khan gave still
Morley-Minto reforms. The main point made by the Muslims another reason for the extension of the principle of separate
was that the type of Muslim who secured Hindu support did so representation to other minorities-it would stimulate an
by virtue of his utility to Hindu rather than Muslim interests; interest in public affairs on the part of the backward classes. 2
yet this was the type most likely to be elected if separate In this he received firm support from Sir Valentine Chirol,
electorates were not created. The expedient of a double who took exception to the inadequate allowance the Montagu­
register had proved_very successful in the Austrian Empire as a Chelmsford Report made for the deep lines of cleavage in
means of preventing national conflicts. ·where conflicting Indian society. Theoretical objections to separate electorates
nationalities occupied the same territory experience proved had led the. writers of the Report to restrict it within nar­

Aghazetaleem.c
that the most effective way of setting them by the ears rower limits than the actual circumstances showed. The
was to let them fight out a contested election. To preserve report professed to be afraid of accepting existing divisions,
harmony it was necessary to take away from them any such but was there not a greater danger still in seeking to
occasion for strife. This could only be done by separate repre­ ignore their existence?-viz., the danger of doing a grave
sentation. injustice to those who were most liable to suffer from their
One major argument against this system was that such existence. 3
admission of dividecl allegiance by the State was against the The Simon Report shared all the objections raised by its
history of self-government. Another was that division by predecessor, the l\fontagu-Chelmsford Report, against a
creeds and classes taught men to think as partisans, that the separate Muslim electorate, but found it unavoidable in view
give-and-take which was the essence of political life was of the general Muslim feeling of alarm if it were not conceded,
lacking, and that it stereotyped existing relations and per­ the absence of a Hindu-Muslim settlement and the unanimity
petuated current splits. 2 To the objection that communal and firmness with which all Muslims demanded it;4
representation was opposed to the teaching of history, it could The issue of a Muslim electorate was thoroughly debated in
be answered that it was only the history of Western democracy om British and Indian political circles on three major occasions,
that was being considered and that the teaching of Indian viz., the making of the 1909 reforms, the framing of the 1919
history exhibited an entirely different picture. Similarly the reforms and the Round Table Conference. On all of them the
apprehension that it would stereotype existing relations pre­ Hindus expressed their resentment against this 'concession' to
supposed that the Western pattern of popular government was Muslims, though on one occasion (1919) they had previously
suited to India-a presumption of doubtful validity.3 There committed themselves to the principle by the Lucknow Pact of
was another answer to this argument, too. The Muslims hoped 1916. The Hindu argument that they were opposed to the
that a time would come when the growth of full unity of senti­
ment and a complete consciousness of identity of interest 1 Ameer Ali, letter to The Times, 14 August 1918.
2 Aga Khan, India in Transition: A Study in Political, Evolution, 1918,
1 Ecorwmist, 27 February 1909, p. 444. pp. 50-51.
2 'l'his is a summary of paras. 228-32 of the Montagu-Chelmsford 3 V. Chirol, 'The Indian Report', The Times, 10 July and 14 August

Report, 1918, Cd. 9109. 1918.

a See E.G.. Colvin, 'The Changing Scene in India', Nineteenth Century, 4 See Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, 1930, Vol. II, Cmd.
May 1919, p. 1044. 3569, pp. 55-63.
174 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN 'NATIONALIST MUSLIMS' 175
system on purely national grounds is belied by the inconsis­ idol of the people, that Ansari- was respected by the whole
tency they showed in applying this standard to India and to country, and that Aj:tnal Khi�,n enjoyed great popularity
Ceylon. Whereas in India they objected to communal repre­ among the masses -but this was only true of the hectic
sentation, in Ceylon they themselves asked for it.1 The natural Khilafat days when emotions ran high and anyone with Islam
explanation is that in India they were a majority and did on his lips was treated as a celebrity. Once the sweep of the
not approve of any diminution of their right to rule the movement had weakened, their audience shrank and their
country. In Ceylon they were in a minority and felt to be in following melted away. Others among them, like the Deoband
need of safeguards. But what was politically practicable and ulama, were never the men of the public. On the whole, the
wise in Ceylon was disruption and divide-and-rule in India. group provided intellectual leadership to the non-Muslim
It was such show of blatant opportunism that alienated the League Muslims, thought out a philosophy to give backbone to
Muslims and gradJJally led them to the conclusion that they their political activity and, quite unwittingly, emphasized the
could not live together with the Hindus under one political Muslim or Islamic .strand of Indian nationalism.
roof. A third characteristic of this group was the diverse back•

Aghazetaleem.c
grounds of its members. Their routes of entry into politics and
'NATIONALIST MUSLIMS' AND their later careers and opinions were not the same. Azad
MUSLIM NATIONALISM started as a zealous Muslim, as an uncompromising upholder
This alienation, however, was not total. There was, throughout of pure Islam (vide his al-Hilal), as the man who, between 1912
the course of modern Indian politics� a section of Muslims and 1920, deepened and strengthened the foundations of
which did not share the general Muslim view that a Hindu­ Muslim nationalism; but after the demise of the Khilafat
Muslim entente was impossible or that separation was the only movement he shed his earlier ideas and almost overnight
solution. This group may be called the Congress school of became an ardent supporter of a united Indian nationalism of
Muslims, as politically it always identified itself with the the Congress variety, and remained steadfast to it till the end.
Congress; it may also be called the 'Nationalist Muslim' group, Muhamad Ali was, by turns, a Muslim Leaguer, a Khilafatist,
for that was the label given to it by the Congress and accepted a Congressman and towards the end a virulent critic of the
by it. 'Nationalist Muslims' were Muslims who were opposed to Congress. Both Ajmal Khan and Ansari were former presidents
Muslim separatism, to the two-nation theory, and later to the of the Muslim League who later turned to the Congress and
Pakistan demand, and who subscribed to the Congress view of om never looked back.
the communal problem. They believed in one united Indian The Nationalist Muslims were a small company and, outside
nationalism in which religious affiliations were both irrelevant the Khilafat period, their following among Muslims was insig­
and undesirable. nificant. Their record in elections to legislative assemblies was
Some features of this group are noticeable. First, it was led inglorious. Their organization was weak, loose and sporadic.
by some men of exceptional ability and transparent sincerity. Their following was a motley crowd of disgruntled Muslim
Their worst enemies cannot prove that they were men without Leaguers, anti-British divines, Muslim Congressmen, and
deep convictions or without the courage to espouse an un­ personal friends of Hindu leaders.
popular cause. Men of the stamp of Ansari and Ajmal Khan, Before examining the role of this group in Indian politics let
Husain Ahmad Madani and Abul Kalam Azad, Mahmud us briefly look at their opinions and beliefs. Maulana Abul
Hasan and Muhamad Ali (one of them for a few years) could Kalam Azad is, by common consent, the outstanding spokes­
not be bought. Secondly, it was an elite of intellect rather than man of this school. He is also an interesting study because of
a band of mass leaders. It is true that Muhamad ,Ali was an · the sudden anq sweeping change in his outlook which occurred
1 Ivor Jennings, The Approach_ to Self-Government, 1956, p. 86. in 1920 or immediately afterwards. He began his career under
 176 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN 'NATIONALIST MUSLIMS' 177
the inspiration of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's writings, which spoke, Muslim plans for separation had matured and the
'greatly impressed' him. 1 For him religion and politics were 1· Lahore Resolution was adopted in the same month.__ But _____
inseparable. When launching his weekly paper al-Hilal (the oblivious of Muslim feelings and fears, he repeated the usual
Crecent) in June 1912 he declared that its aim was 'to invite Hindu arguments and assured the Muslims· that all would be
Muslims to f ollow the Book of Allah and the sharia of His --well aft� the-ifritish had gone and f;�ed�m had com�. Ther�
Prophet. In cultural, political or other matters Muslims ought ·-_:w·as _!l�f�ort t() llnd�I'§ta.�� th-�. p��hl�m, to examin� the­
to be Muslims.' Asked if Muslims should join the Hindus in . foundations_ of Muslim apprehensions, to offer any alternatives
l political matters, he answered, 'Islam is so exalted a religion __!o_ i.i, uµJted Jndi�. or �o rakistan, to giy� any definite assur-
\ th1;1,t its followers are not constricted to ape the Hindus for ances to Muslims, or even to argue his own case with convic-
\ the formulation of their political policy.' Distinguishing his 1· tion. 1 ' . ' . . . .

l theory of nationalism from the Hindu's, he .wrote, 'Hindus )j · It w�s . �-

��� �! i�� i����!Jc_ a �io!!_lV�t_h _whatever the Congress
; can, like other nations, revive their. self-awareness on the . . whi_ch "(as_ Azl'l,d'� und9j_ng. The more he merged
j . lai�.·...::dQWll_
basis of secular nationalism, but it is indeed not possible for \ himself with the Congress the more he estranged even his own

Aghazetaleem.c
Muslims.' 2 He continued to profess and preach this brand of following, until by about 1941 or 1942 jt is doubtful if 1:ie
Muslim (or rather Islamic) nationalism from 1912 to about rep:r:-esentedanfciiie- .exc.epf the Hind1J.s, The Musiims believed
1920. that he was .being exploited by the Congress ':"ith !t _ yiew t.o
After the failure of the Khilafat movement he took his wearing the look of a 'national' party. How could the Congress
followers by surprise by shifting his ground suddenly and 'be a IH:ndu party if its president was a Muslim divine and
~unexpectedly. He renounced his Islamic nationalism and em­ theologian? '.f.!iis a .�!ever_ idt:a, �ut failed. to work No
�.
braced Indian nationalism. The votary of Muslim nationalism , on� was taken in except a handful of B.ritish leftists .YY:ho,
·liad come under the spell of the new Turkish nationalism and anyway;were foo partial to the Congress to be open to convic­
the nascent Arab nationalism and forsaken all earlier beliefs tion. The Congress leaders themselves were well aware of
and pronounced his faith in a joint (Hindu-Muslim) national­ Maulana's unpopularity among his own co-religionists. In a
ism in India which, he said, was a prerequisite of winning book planned and edited by one of his staunch admirers,
independence from the British.3 a well-known Congress leader, while paying his tribute to
From this time onwards he became a loyal and trusted. Azad, wrote, 'If even Akbar was disappointed by his fellow
member of the Congress and never dev:.i�t(fd from its pcJicies. om Musalmans, why should we be surprised if Maulana Abul
He was first elected.its president in 1923_ and then every yea:r: Kalam received no response from the organized Muslims of
. f;6ru'l940 to i946. His presidential address at Ramgarh India today?'2
· delivered in March 1940 is worth a passing mention. W�en he In consistency of opinion and originality of thinking the
Deoband school and its political manifestation,, the Jamiat-ul­
1 A. K. Azad, India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative, Ulama-i-Hind, were more representative of the Nationalist
1959, p. 3. Muslims than Azad (though he too was for a time in the
2 A. K. Azad, Mazameen-i-Abul Kalam Azad (Essays of Abul Kalam
Azad), 1944, pp. 17, 22, 25-26, 87, translated and quoted in. Hafeez 1 A. K. Azad, Musalman aur Congress (Muslims and the Congress),

Malik, Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan, 1963, pp. 269-70. Lahore, n.d.
a See his address to the All India Khilafat Conference at Cawnpur on 2 C. Rajagopalacharia, 'The Great Akbar of Today', in Abdullah

24 December 1925; summary in The Indian Annual Register 1925, Vol. Butt (ed.), Aspects of Abul Kalam Azad, 1942, p. 67. Comparison with
II: July-December 1925, 1926, p. 343, the Urdu original reprmted m full Akbar is, in itself, significant. In Muslim eyes Akbar, in founding
in Khutbat-i-Abul Kalam Azad (Addresses by Abul Kalam Azad), his Dm-i-Ilahi, had definitely forsaken Islam and was no less than an
Lahore, n.d. apostate.
M
 178 TH'E MAKING OF PAKISTAN 'NATIONALIST MUSLIMS' 179
Jamiat). In 1867 a Dar-ul-Uloom (lit. 'House of Learning') Islamic nationalist, and from Maudoodi's, who was anti­
was established in Deoband under the guidance of Maulana Muslim League but even more anti-Congress.
Muhamad Qasim Nanawtawi as a counterpoise to Sayyid Partly to play a more important role in the Khilafat move­
Ahmad Khan's West-oriented movement.· In religion it was ment and partly to enter the political field in their own right,
sectarian, propounding the teachings of the Hanafi school of in 1919 the Deoband divines founded the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i�
theology. In sphere of influence it was parochial, its reach Hind (Association of the Divines of India). For the first few
confined to the United Provinces and Delhi. In politics it was years when party politics-within Muslims as well as between
rabidly anti-British, preaching disloyalty _to the Government. them and the Hindus-was silenced by the exigence of the
In 1880 Nanawtawi died and was succeeded by Ras1!id Ali!!!.!!. Khilafat campaign the Jamiat contained all varieties of
Q...__
Gangohi, who gave af�twa that in worldly matters-co_���!��ion divines, but once the Khilafat issue was dead the Deobandis
with the Hindus-_was permissible. provia.ea tliat it did no took it over and it became the political arm of the Deoband
violence-to iny-basw pri:rid.ples··orislam. 1 .This -�as.Jion� J.2. School. Among its aims and objects were 'to defend Islam ...
allow the followers of Deoband to join the Indian Nation�l __ Islamic rituals and customs and Islamic nationalism against
-congress_--Gangohf ·was.. succeedea•··by'·-Maulana- �Mahmud

Aghazetaleem.c
all odds injurious to them'; 'to achieve and protect the general
-Hasan Hi 1905, and in 1920 the headship of the school devolved religious and national rights of the Muslims'; 'to establish good
upon Husain Ahmad Madani. and friendly relations with the non�Muslims of the country to
Deoband was a centre of conservative Islam where young the extent permitted by the shariat-i-lslamiyah'; and 'to fight
men of a religious turn of mind were trained in theology, for the freedom of the country and religion according to the
Islamic history and other old-fashioned disciplines. _}yes_!;�.!!.,___ shari objectives' .1
,learning wai tab�z. for it was one of the fundamental beliefs of The Jamiat favoured 'unconditional co-operation' with the
the school that any truck with the infidel West was tantamount Congress 'so far as the cause of freedom was concerned'. 2 It
to a compromise with heresy. InevitablY-, therefore,_the_D� believed that the Muslim minority in India need have no fear
\
u!-!!.!.?.��:µ�eg .1J1,1f!l.ti���.?..-� �ilful _i n theol�gicaJ.hai:".'._ as, once the British were gone, the Hindus would co:rµe to
\.,!plittin�
_ -�o�p_ e t _ t i_n __ ��:P_?u1_1:. �i:n,.i the
e_ n .
- . ..o.r!!?-Adgxies .oLtheir__
1 terms with it. It was chiefly the British Government which was
(. · particular sect, but compl�!�ly ignorant of �odern movements ... responsible for the Hindu-Muslim conflict. In 1928, _]J.owever,
\ aiid developme_nts-even in Islam. When these graduates le�t the Ja�t..J;;.mpds_ed _ __t_he_r.9,gg_!'.eSS �Y_E.!d��ti:ng _tht. Nehru ..
/
I "tneschool ancfbegan the rounds of the countryside as pert- om Jleport.-Its criticisll!_was based -�n _two points. The safeguards .
patetic religious teachers, a 'great many' of them 'i� the na�e · provided for the Muslims were inadequate; and the plan for
of the spiritual guidance of the common man have hved on his Dominion Status for India was inconsistent with the Jamiat's
blood and sweat. There they have also fought religious wars commitment to complete independence. 3 But this estrap.gement
against· their counterparts of other schools, lik� '.'Barelv�s" was temporary and peace was made int�� f�llowing year when­
_
and "Ahl-i-Hadith". Moreover, their purely rehg10us tram­ the Congress repu_di;tted __the _Neh:n1_Rep.or:C In the. 1937
ing had kept them aloof and isolated and intellectually Muslim mass contact campaign organized by the Congress the
estranged from the people educated in secular schools and Jamiat gave full support to the Congress.4
colleges.' 2 ;
· \---- ----
- - - ---------- -- -
The men of Deoband struck out a path for themselves which
•
1 Sayyid Muhammad Mian, Jamiat-ul-Ulama Kia Hai (What is
was different from Azad's; who was in the beginning an ardent Jamiat-ul-Ulama ?), Part I, n.d., p. 10.
2 Z. H. Faruqi, op. cit., p. 70.
1 Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for 3 Waheed-uz-Zaman, Towards Pakistan, 1964,
p. 177. The Jamiat had
Pakistan, 1963, p. 43. declared its goal as complete independence in as early as 1920, ibid;
2 Ibid., p. 40 fn. 4 Z. H. Faruqi, op. cit., p. 89.
 180 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN 'NATIONALIST MUSLIMS' 181
The Jamiat stood for a 'united Nationalism' ('muthidda breakaway group there were two divines of admitted excellence
qaumiat') for India, did not adhere to the two-n:13.,tjoI_l. ..t.heo:ry, ·'­ and considerable influence: Mau1aiiasAslii-af AIPrlianvi i:i:�d
r-�----·-----·~•--- ·--
opposed the Pakistan. plat?:, an4_.a_I'gll�d .. for- a :t.e:z:rito,rial, 1:J.S Shabbir Ahmad Usmani.1
,i '----·
opposed-t; o religious;
.... --··--·-·- .. nationalism.Its arguments against Mus- ___ Let-the final ,vord on the Jamiat be said by one of them.
; lim separation were: the Pakistan demand has British support 'The ulama were not prepared to follow the ·western-oriented
and is nothing but an instrument forged by them to further Musli intellige�tsia whom they suspected to be the repre­
1:1
their policy of divide-and-rule (n9.__ evid�nce was offered in sentatives of a different culture. They were still medieval in
st1pport of this); Pakistan will split and therefore weaken the their outlook ....They failed to understand the genesis of the
Muslims of India; our real enemy is British imperialism and Hindu Renaissance and never tried to comprehend the
our only duty to defeat it, only a united action can achieve modern Islam which in the 1980's, under the poetic inspiration
this; Muslims left-behind in India after separation will be at of lqbal, became an ideological force. . . . The crux of its
\the mercy of the Hindus (no effort was !113:dej;q r,e.concile this opposition [to the Pakistan plan] lay in its traditional con­
�tatement with the general stand ,o{the Jamiat that there was ception of Islam an,d [the fear about] the future fate of its

Aghazetaleem.c
no Hindu-Muslim problem); partition wilr hinder the mis­ "Islam" in Pakistan.The ulama thought that it was only they·
sionary activities of the ulama (it was not made clear whether who could give the right lead to the Muslims.•2
, this would result from · mere inconveniences of national The Muslim League leaders were thus caught between two
barriers or from a possible lack of freedom of proselytizing in fires of exclusiveness-the Congress exclusiveness of national­
the free Inctia); Muslim League leaders are· ignorant ofislam,· ism and the Deoband exclusiveness of religion. For the
'·have no ideology, and are only exploiting the name of Islam Congress they were too reactionary to enter the mainstream of
for the worldly gain of Muslim vested interests; and Muslim Indian nationalism; for the divines they were too secular to
League leaders are incapable of building up an Islamic State lead the M slims aright. To escape from this cross-fire they
_u
and their Pakistan will be no better than the Turkey of cr�a �ed a different �onception of nationalism which was partly
Mustafa Kamal ( this provokes the question if the Jamiat would rehg1ous (all Muslims are a nation), partly territorial (all
have agreed to siipport tne Pakistan demand had the League Muslim-majority areas should form Pakistan) and wholly
leaders pledged tha_t the new State would.be Islamic; it also. psychological (we feel that we are a nation).
shows up a ,eogtradiction in the Jamiatrel:J,�Oning:_ it was, _in_ In spite of their small size, their muddled thinking and other
the same breath, upholding the secular nationalism of the. om weaknesses the part played by the Nationalist Muslims in
Congress and condemning the non-orthodox nationalism of the Indian politics was far from unimportant. How can this be
League).1 explained? Several factors helped them to occupy an exagger­
Towards the end there was a split in the Jamiat on the issue ated place in the political field.Their most effective weapon
of its attitude to the Pakistan plan.In 1946 a section defected was their alliance with the Congress. They were, so to say,
. � :11_ d . formed a Jamiat-ul-U1ama-i:.Jslam which worked in �doJ?ted ?Y �he Congress �nd offered to the public as the only
support of the. Muslim League. Among the leaders ·of the nationalists among Muslims. They were happy to live in this
1 This list of .Jamiat's arguments is culled from the following sourees: borrowed glory, for it brought them status, stability and
Husain Ahmad Madani, Muslim League Kia Hai (What is Muslinl 1 Husain Ahmad Madani's theory of a 'united nationalism' was not
League?), Delhi, 1945; Pakistan Kia Hai (What is Pakistan?), Delhi,
palatable even to his followers and, on the testimony of one of his col­
n.d.; Makateeb-i-Shaikh-ul-Islam (Letters of Shaikh-ul-Islam), Deo­
band, n.d., later enlarged ed. Azamgarh, 1952, 2 vols.; and Sayyid leagues, when he stood up to propound it 'hardly five hundred in a
Muhammad Mian, Ulama-i-Haqq aur un kay Mujahadana Kamamay gathering of ten thousand would listen to him', Sayyid Muhammad l\fian,
(The Truthful Divines and their Brave Deeds), Moradabad, 1946-8, Ulama-i-Haqq, Vol. I, 1946, p. 287.
2 Z. H..Faruqi, op. cit., pp. 76, 85, 124.
2 vols.
 182 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN CONGRESS AND THE TWO-NATION THEORY 188
immense monetary resources. This identification with a large monopoly. This magnified their role and gave them publicity
Hindu organization had two other results. First, it made them. which was out of all proportion to their importance.
indolent and intellectually sterile. If their political duty did not Alliance with the Congress brought them another advantage.
lie beyond endorsing the Congress policy, any further exertion They were, or at least claimed to be, anti-imperialists, and this
was unnecessary. By becoming uncritical supporters of one . made for popular appeal. Their public image was improved by
party they lost their power of thinking, their independence of their a�ti-British propaganda, by their participation in non­
co-operation campaigns and by consequent imprisonment.

l
outlook, their former flexibility of manreuvre and even their
former penchant for lively debate. Secondly, it made them even For a great mass of people in India politics meant opposition
less agreeable to the Muslim masses. As the opponents of to the British and the martyrdom of imprisonment. The
Muslim nationalism it was incumbent upon them to meet it
I
Nationalist Muslims fulfilled these qualifications and so rose in
with equal argumep.t, to try to provide a platform for non­ public estimation. The Congress Muslim rank and file used to
Muslim League politics, to evolve a creed which could at least taunt the Muslim Leaguers by saying, 'vVhat sort of leader is
compete with other ideas and offer an alternative to separation. yo�r Jinnah who has never been to prison!'

Aghazetaleem.c
By repeating the Congress dogma ad infinitum they confirmed Another factor working to their advantage was their
that they had no wares of their own to put on the market. For religious appeal to the masses. l!._isy,.nirony of _history that
this they paid the price of unpopularity and near political wlrile� Con�s�_a,_!ways. charged the l\foslirri- League. with..

:��,.::w�0
· ·
extinction. reli i��-in_!<.> .r2litics
I,, This unwillingness to strike out a new path for themselves is the _congress Muslims whose entire .. popular
astonishing because the Nationalist Muslims were men of wit 0

and ability. Their learning was substantial, their scholarship I ��:;�•;�i:t:p;;:·:;:-�� :i

.\ / exact, their intellectual achievements well known. When they / ,-l\foslun.�, ...Ql!Lh� was _ e
est_ ellle!! and. a din�d fqr his religfous ..
'ii spoke or wrote in defence of the Khilafat or in support of the .....Y"orks. Husain Ahmad Madani and his Deobandi colleagues
had no position in politics (except as the. hangers-on of
Ottoman Empire their arguments were sharp and their
knowledge deep. When Azad commented on the Quran his Congress), but in some areas they commanded obedience as
erudition was unrivalled and his understanding of Islam religious leaders of a certain school of thought. Ansari and
unerring. When the divines of Deoband expounded the ortho­ Ajmal Khan had no political following among Muslims, but in
dox Islam of which they were the modern torch-bearers, their om the Khilafat days their star was in the ascendant. In Muslim
vision was unclouded and their logic straight. Ajmal Khan !o�i�s it has~always been_easy..to..:wln..popular..acclaim..bi_.
was a poet of distinction in two languages and commanded a .:...1P-�;ki11g_r�!jgiqu__an)§sue. This explains the hold of the Nation­
lively imagination. Ansari��9-�g� �-i;�g�_9!1_by___ p_!'()fes§.i.911,. alist Muslims on certain Muslim circles; on the other hand, the
was a very learned man. But in ·Indian (apart from Islamic) fact that even this religious appeal failed to win them popular
-politics the1:r contribution was slight and shallow. H�:t:>i.tuaL_ support explains the unshakable distrust of the great majority
dependence on the_cgng!J!§§_haQ.c:l_!'.i�d-�p_tl_1eir fou:rif�i;nh�a<l 9f -.. of Muslims in all those who allied themselves with the Congress.
);lj:fijJ�iiig�Aniryet there were thousands of Muslims who, in
CONGRESS AND THE TWO-NATION 'l'HEORY
spite of their politics, admired them for their writings, their
achievements in the realm of mind and their reputation as In the preceding chapters we have tried to set Muslim national-
savants. ism against the background of Muslim thought and politics.
The Nationalist Muslims were very vocal and their voice \ But, how far was the Congress responsible for the emergence of
was amplified by the Congress Press. In the absence of a national consciousness among the Muslims? This is an im­
Muslim Press political propaganda in India was a Congress portant question because Muslim nationalism did not grow in
\,
I
184 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN CONGRESS AND THE TWO-NATION THEORY 185
a vacuum. Two forces intermingled to give birth t� it. One was chosen to castigate the Muslim demand for separate represen­
the Muslim feelingoT separatism; tfie-crther- was the Hindu _ tation (which was made by the most representative Muslim
attitude to the Muslim problem as a whole. It is impossible to deputation of modern history) had it really had a_ Muslim
study the development of Muslim nationalism without closely following. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, a great Congress­
examining the impress of both the factors. So far we have dealt man-Mahasabhite, confessed that Muslims had kept aloof
only with the Muslim aspect of the question: how Muslim from the Congress. 1 By signing the Lucknow Pact the Congress
thinking and experience shaped their national growth. The supplied a statutory confirmation of its failure to speak for
rest of this chapter is intended to appraise the role of the Muslim India: for a party does not enter into a pact of this
Congress or the Hindus in its growth. nature with its own followers but only with a rival or enemy
The question is complicated and therefore the temptation to organization. Speaking as the president of the special Congress
over-simplify is great. It is commonly remarked that the conference held at Lucknow on 10 August 1917, · Pandit
Muslims owed the creation of Pakistan to the Congress, in the Motilal Nehru referred to the Congress and the Muslim League
sense that had the Congress treated the Muslims differently as 'those national bodies which represent the best intellect and

Aghazetaleem.c
there would have been no Muslim separatism and therefore no culture of the country'.2 Unfortunately this was the last
Pakistan. There is more than a modicum of truth in this occasion on which the Muslim League was acknowledged to be
popular generalization. But Congress thinking on the Muslim a national body by a Congress leader.
problem was so confused and confusing that it is difficult for an After the failure of the Khilafat movement the tide of events
historian to portray the situation in straight, clean lines. moved fast towards an irretrievable split between the two
There are too many curves and contours in the picture to lend 'national bodies'. The Nehru Report, prepared under the chair­
themselves to a simple description or to an analysis in black manship of 1\fotilal Nehru, repudiated the status of the
and white. Muslim League as a representative body and challenged it to a
The only stark fact is that the Congress never made a show-down by recommending the immediate abolition of
serious effort to understand the Muslim problem. It had no separate electorates without compensation. The flood of
definite policy on the matter and tried to meet each crisis as it unrestrained democracy, against which Sayyid Ahmad Khan
arose. But it is difficult to practise this typically British had warned his people, had overtaken the spirit of accommo­
empiricalism in politics without the British genius for com­ dation which the Congress had shown at Lucknow, and had in
promise which goes with it. om the process inundated all Muslim expectations of an honour­
When the Congress was founded in 1885 an attempt was able alliance with the Congress. The Round Table Conference
made to woo the intelligentsia into joining it. But Sayyid and the making of the 1935 constitution did not mend matters.
Ahmad Khan in northern India and Ameer Ali in Bengal The divorce was signed, ratified and confirmed by the Com­
rejected these overtures, partly under the influence of the munal Award and the Congress attitude towards it. The elec­
traditional post-Mutiny thinking, partly because of the Muslim tions of 1937 registered this separation, and in 1938 two
policy of 'loyalty' which was then becoming fashionable staunch Congressmen, writing a semi-official history of the
among Muslim leaders, and partly because of the predomi� organization, had to confess that the Muslims had generally
nantly Hindu composition and tone of the Congress itself. This kept away from it. 3
initial repudiation of the Congress was big with consequences
and visibly reproduced itself on all important occasions during
1 Speeches and Writings of Madan Mohan Malaviya, 1919, pp. 48--49.
2 Quoted in K. M. Panikkar and A. Pershad (eds.), The Voice of Free­
the following sixty years. And this rejection was not, as most dom: Selected Speeches of Pandit Motilal Nehru, 1961, p. 71.
Congressmen suggested, a mere figment of the Muslim and 3
C. F. Andrews and G. :Mukerji, The Rise and Growth of the Congress in
British political imagination. The Congress would not have India, 1938, pp. 170--75.
186 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN CONGRESS AND THE TWO-NATION THEORY 187
The part which the Congress provincial governments of Hindu leader, adopted a different attitude towards the
1937-9 played in alienating the Muslims, strengthening the Muslim problem. He denied its very existence. There was no
roots of their separatism and laying the foundations of such problem as the Muslim problem in India. Communalism
Pakistan, is too well-known to bear repetition. was mere propaganda, and would 'not present the slightest
Of all the Congress leaders Gandhi was the most vocal on the difficulty'. 1 It was 'overrated and over-emphasized'. It did 'not
necessity of achievirig Hindu-Muslim unity. He claimed that fundamentally affect the masses'. As 'social issues' would
he had made it a part of the Congress programme and declared come to the forefront, it 'is bound to recede into the back­
again and again that independence would not come till the ground'.2 Yet it was Nehru who started the ill-fated campaign
demon of communalism was exorcized. But even he always of Muslim mass contact, thus not only admitting the existence
spoke of Hindus as 'we' and of Muslims as 'they'.1 He refused of a Hindu-Muslim problem but also showing his true feelings
_
to distinguish between a Hindu Indian and a Muslim in relation to the Muslim League. Subsequent events convinced
Indian, but said in November 1946, when Muslim fears were at Nehru that the communal problem could not be wished away
the highest pitch, that when British troops were gone the by denying its existence. In early 1947, when the Hindus of the

Aghazetaleem.c
majority would know how to behave towards the minority. 2 Punjab and Bengal urged him to demand a partition of their
He repeatedly said that he had no objection if the central . provinces in order to safeguard them against the rule of the
government was given into the control of the Muslim League majority, he immediately accepted the logic and the justice of
and Jinnah was made the Prime Minister of the country, but their suggestion. This acceptance was a proof of the fact that
when in November 1946 the Viceroy requested him to sign, 'in contrast to his earlier view of communalism, he now recog­
along with Jinnah, a statement condemning violence and nized it to be an abiding and centrifugal force in Indian poli­
asking Indians to stop fighting among themselves, he refused tics'.3 If he did not really believe in the two-nation theory he
with the remark that this was 'parity with a vengeance'.3 A should have opposed the Bengali Hindus' desire to cut loose
man who was ready to lay down his life for communal peace from the Muslim majority and, instead, should have supported
could not bear to see his name coupled with Jinnah's, with the conception of a united Bengal which was then (March
· whom, in 1944, he had carried on negotiations on an equal 1947) being propagated in earnest by some Hindu and Muslim
footing. It was Gandhi who, in 1945, overruled Desai and Bengali leaders. Again, in his statement on 15 August 1947, he
ordered that the Congress should proceed to form a govern­ voiced the sadness of many Indians for 'our brothers and
ment in the Frontier Province, although the Congress was not
allowed to take up power in any province under instructions
om sisters who have been cut off from us by political boundaries
and who unhappily cannot share at present in the freedom
from the High Command issued in November 1939. 4 Muslims that had come'.4 Obviously he was referring to the Hindus left
were quick to see in this the Hindu determination to keep the in Pakistan who, in his opinion, were not free. The implication
Muslim League out of power in a Muslim province. In view of is apparent that the Hindus of India were one nation, that a
all this there was some justification for the Muslim inability to part of this nation had been left in Pakistan, and that this
take Gandhi's protestations of his love for the Muslims as part was yet not free because it was under the rule of another
seriously as he himself took them.
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, after Gandhi the most important 1 Interview to News Chronicle, 2 January 1937.
2 Letter to Lord Lothian of 17 January 1936, Jawaharlal Nehru, A
1 Hirendranath Mukerjee, India Struggles for Freedom, 1946, p. 162. Bunch of Old Letters (1960 ed.), p. 148.
2 Interview to the United Press of India on 6 November 1946, Pyare­ 3 Michael Brecher, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Political Biography, 1959, p.

lal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, Vol. I, p. 335. 377 fn.
3 Ibid., p. 354. 4 Quoted ibid., p. 358. Incidentally, the words 'at present' indicate his
4 Jbid., p. 127. hope (or plan !) for a re-unity of India and Pakistan.
188 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN CONGRESS POLICY OF DIVIDE-AND-RULE 189
nation, the Muslims. It is difficult to put a different construc­ accused the British of practising in relation to India as a
tion on his words. whole.
The Congress responsibility for the creation and encourage­ A deliberate effort was made to break the political unity of
ment of Muslim separation lies in the fact that it did not evolve the Muslims and to cajole, persuade and humour some of
a policy to handle the Muslims. It made no effort to convince them into joining the Congress ranks. In its infancy it 'cap­
the Muslim masses of the goodness of its own brand of national­ tured' a few Muslim public figures like Badruddin Tyabji and
ism. It did not attempt to persuade the Muslim citizenry of Rahmatullah Syani. During the debate on the Morley-Minto
the benefits of a non-communal democracy. It took a half­ reforms it was able to enlist Sir Ali Imam, who was vocal in his
hearted stand on the Communal Award and did not counter opposition to the Muslim demand f or separate representation.
the separatist tendencies of the Muslim voters which had During the Khilafat period, of course, there was a sizeable
unmistakably sho::w-n themselves in the elections of 1937. By group of Muslims who did not distinguish between the Congress
refusing to contest Muslim seats in these elections it admitted and the Muslim League in so far as both were concentrating on
its non-Muslim character. Out of a total of 482 Muslim seats in the Turkish question. But after the disintegration of this unity

Aghazetaleem.c
the provinces it had the courage (or the wisdom!) of contesting a few Muslims still lingered on in the Congress-some out of
only fifty-eight and the ignominy of winning only twenty-six. genuine conviction that it represented the essence of national­
By this performance, or the failure of it, it forfeited all title to ism, some out of blinding frustration which accompanied the
speak for India. Yet it persisted in ignoring other parties and fiasco of the Khilafat movement, and some because of the
claiming for itself an all-inclusive status. The electoral verdict absence of a strong Muslim organization to which they could
had gone against it and proved to all that it had no hold over attach themselves.
the Muslim community. But that did not discourage it from · There has been a long and· at times distinguished line of
accusing other parties of being unrepresentative of the people. Muslim leaders who at one time or another allied themselves
It refused to acknowledge the credentials of any Muslim with the Congress-Tyabji, Muhammad Ali, Shaukat Ali, l\L A.
politicians other than its own Nationalist Muslims whom it Ansari, Ajmal Khan, Abul Kalam Azad, Zakir Husain and,
duly paraded on all ceremonial occasions. This was a short­ above all, Jinnah. To recall their loyalty to the Congress is not
sighted policy and did great harm to its prospects as a national­ to accuse them of insincerity in conviction or of treachery in
ist party seeking independence for the whole of India. On the politics. They were all men of intelligence and considerable
other hand, it incensed an overwhelming majority of the om political acumen, and their conversion cannot. be explained
Muslims who looked at the handful of Congress Muslims as away by Congress trickery. They were not bribed-though the
nothing less than renegades who had surrendered their self­ Congress was not above dangling ministerial prizes before the
respect for a ribbon to stick in their coat. This redoubled their lesser breed of Nationalist Muslims, particularly during its
resolve to consolidate their strength and to riposte the supremacy in the provincial field. The point is that the
Congress nationalism with an equally resolute Muslim national­ Congress made a consistent effort to breach the Muslim front
ism. and to take away from the Muslim League as many leaders as
it could.
'rHE CONGRESS POLICY OF DIVIDE-AND-RULE One important weapon in this one-sided war of nerves ( one­
The Congress approach to the Muslim problem was complicated sided because the Muslim League, by the definition of its
by yet another factor. Throughout its history there was an creed, could not influence the non-Muslim membership of the
element of divide-and-rule in its policy vis a vis the Muslims. Congress to forsake it) was the enthusiasm with which the
After its initial lack of success in recruiting Muslims to its Congress sought and forged alliances with some Muslim orga­
fold, it practised in relation to Muslim India exactly what it nizations which did not share the ideals of the Muslim League.
190 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN CONGRESS POLICY OF DIVIDE-AND-RULE 191
It allied itself with such miscellaneous bodies as the Red 'Muslims asked for something, that was communalism. Even
Shirts, the Ahrars, the Momins, the Shia Conference and the. · Pakistan was painted as a child of communal politics, rather
Jamiat-ul-tnama: Sometimes it created an anti• Muslim League . than of nationalist urge.
front, e.g., in 1940 it put up an Azad Muslim Conference to .r In �ontrast to this, all Muslims who joined the Congress
counteract the Muslim League and to oppose the Pakistan were given the honourable designation of 'Nationalist Muslims'.
resolution. Sometimes this anxiety to keep the Muslim League A Muslim was a communalist, and ipso facto an enemy of
isolated from other Muslim groups led it to acts of blatant Indian freedom, if he was a Muslim Leaguer, but the same
opportunism and political folly. The best example of this was · Muslim became a 'Nationalist', and therefore a valiant soldier
the Congress alliance with the Punjab Unionist Party in 1946 in the cause of independence, as soon as he had filled in the
to form the Punjab provincial ministry. It must be recalled Congress membership form. Here again Congress propaganda
that in 1987 the Congress had flatly refused to share power was so well done that to this day the phrase 'Nationalist
with the Muslim League on the ground that it could not · Muslim' is reserved for one who sided with the Congress. Even
compromise its economic and social programme by forming a the British rulers, who were alleged to be the perfect practi­

Aghazetaleem.c
coalition with a conservative body like the League (though in· tioners of the policy of divide-and-rule, did not create such
fact the election manifestos of the two parties were almost phraseology or use it to such lethal effect.
identical even on economic and social matters). But in 1946 '\ Two interesting aspects of Congress policy must be noticed.
the same Congress party cheerfully agreed to form a coalition The Congress encouraged and allied itself with only the weak
in the Punjab with the Unionist Party, which was notoriously and backward Muslim groups-the Jamiat-ul-Ulama, a
reactionary in policy and feudal in composition, and which had reactionary, semi-theological body which looked askance at
won only a handful of seats in the legisla.ture. It was even worse all efforts to liberalize Islam; the Ahrars, a Punjabi organiza­
than a coalition because the leader of the tiny Unionist Party tion of middle-class Muslims whose militarism outran their
was accepted as Chief Minister. This unnatural alliance can be intelligence; the Momins, a class of poor and illiterate weavers;
explained in political terms: it was a tactical move to keep the the Shia Conference, a splinter group which wanted to fight
Muslim League out of office in a province where it had won an the Sunnis with Congress help.1 It is important to remember
overwhelming majority of Muslim seats. This telling contrast that none of these organizations contributed to the leadership
between its proclaimed principles and its political action con­ of the ·Congress. The important 'Nationalist Muslims' were
vinced the Muslims that the Congress had no policy or prin­ om individuals who came to the Congress from other sources and
ciple except to divide the'Muslims with a view to maintaining · not as leaders of these minor groups. On the whole, the so­
its own hegemony. called Muslim Nationalist Party was of no practical use to the
Even the language used by the Congress to describe the · Congress. On the testimony of a Hindu historian, it was 'so
Muslim League and its friends, on the one hand, and the poor in numbers and so weak in influence that its voice re­
Congress Muslims, on the other, was meant to divide the· mained almost unheard'. 2 Even in the Frontier Province,
Muslims and to mislead the outside observers. Muslim politics which the Congress always proffered as . the most striking
was always referred to as 'communalism' -a dirty word in refutation of the League claim to speak for Muslim India, the
Indian politics. In all political debate the Muslim point of
. 1 This was the worst kind of divide-and-rule, for it fermented sectarian
view was either airily dismissed or contemptuously sneered at trouble between the two major sections of the Muslim people.
as charlatanism. So persistent was this propaganda and so 2 M. B. L. Bhargava, Political and National Movements in India, 1936,
effectively done that all foreign writers on India adopted this p. 53. This was confirmed ten years later by such an oi'.thodox Hindu
phraseology without criticism. When the Congress made a leader as K. M. Munshi; see his 7.'he Changing Shape of Indian Politics
demand, it was tne voice of Indian nationalism. When the (1946 ed.), p. 67.

,j
 192 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN PARADOX OF THE CONGRESS APPROACH 193
Nationalist Muslim leaders did not have the courage to partici­ a
'anti-imperialist vis vis Britain, but imperialist vis a vis
pate in the 1947 referendum which was held to ascertain Pakistan'.1
whether the province wanted to join Pakistan or India.
This alliance with 'Nationalist' Muslim individuals and THE PARADOX OF THE CONGRESS APPROACH
groups did not in the end pay the Congress. In practical ' The paradox of the situation lies in the fact that, in spite of
politics they remained a drag on the Congress-for two this approach to Muslim nationalism, the Congress was at the
reasons. They 'failed to convert any appreciable section of the same time conscious of the existence of Indian disunity and, in
Muslim community to Congress secularism', and they 'vitally later stages, it in effect acknowledged the two-nation theory.
influenced the Congress decisions relating to communal settle­ That it did so reluctantly and under acute pressure of events
ment'.1 Not only that, but V. P. Menon, who had access to does not affect the argument.
inside information, thinks that 'even the safeguard and pro­ It is said that during the First World War the Hindus,
tection demanded for their community by the Nationalist particularly the Jats, showed great eagerness to join the
Muslims went so far that, if acceded to, they would have Indian Army because they wanted to fight the Turks. The

Aghazetaleem.c
prevented for all time the growth of a united nation'.2 It is not Muslims came forward to enlist in a spirit of loyal duty; the
insignificant that in 1942, when C. Rajagopalacharia's resolu­ Sikhs for sheer love of fighting; but the Hindus 'rallied·
tion on recognizing the Pakistan scheme was voted upon in the against their hereditary enemy as if to a crusade'. 2
All India Congress Committee, five prominent Muslim mem­ The Hindu masses looked upon Muslims as one big caste and
bers of the Committee-Ghaffar Khan, Khan Sahib, Mian as tresspassers in India, 3 and this underlying tension was
Iftakharuddin, Dr. Ansari (Secretary of the Azad Muslim noticed by many Congress leaders. Motilal Nehru, as president
Board), and the Muslim Minister of Education in Sind­ of the Congress, did not wish to make of India 'a cheap and
supported the resolution. In addition, all the members from slavish imitation' of the West, for Western democracy had not
the Frontier Province remained neutral. 3 proved a panacea for all ills and had not solved the problems
In Bombay the Congress 'made a Muslim member of the facing India.4 In 1928, again as the Congress president, he con­
Assembly sign the Congress pledge on one day and made him fessed that 'there is no overlooking the fact that we are divided
minister the next day. This was indeed a travesty of Muslim into a number of large and small communities, more or less
· representation when that Muslim minister had not the confi­ disorganized and demoralized'.5 This shows that in spite of the
dence of the twenty-two Muslim League members of the om Congress insistence on the rule of the majority and on the
Bombay Legislative Assembly.'4 supposed unity of India, it acknowledged the difficulties in-,
The fact of the matter is that the Congress leaders were so volved in erecting a political system which did not take notice
obsessed with the Western principle of majority rule that they of Indian divergences.
shut their eyes to the magnitud� of the Muslim problem and' In 1947, soon after the All India Congress committee had
thought that they would be able to deal with it effectively
either by completely ignoring it or by weaning away Muslims 1 Ralph Borsodi, The Challenge of Asia: A Study of Conflicting Ideas
and Ideals, 1956, p. 25.
from the Muslim League. They, and especially Gandhi, were 2 Michael O'Dvvyer, India as I knew It, 1885-1925 (2nd. ed. 1925), p.
1 Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims: A Political History, 1858-1947, 1959,
415.
p. 294.
3Harcourt Butler, India In:nstent, 1981, p. 40.
2 V. P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, 1954, p. 489.
4Presidential address at Amritsar on 27 December 1919, K. M. Panik­
, 3 Observer, 17 May 1942. kar and A. Pershed (eds.), The Voice of Freedom: Selected Speeches of
4 C. H. Setalvad, Recollecticms and Reflections: An Autobiography, Pandit Motilal Nehru, 1961, p. 40.
1946, pp. 414-15. 6 Presidential address at Calcutta on 29 December 1928, ibid., p. 51.
N
194 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN
PARADOX OF THE CONGRESS APPROACH 195
ratified acceptance of the 3 June Plan (partition of India}, the
Chief Minister of one of the Hindu provinces declared in a Jawaharlal Nehru's interest in East Pakistani Hindus? He
public meeting that Muslims left in India 'could not expect to looked at them as a part of the Indian nation-aga1n · in an
be treated otherwise than as aliens. They would have no .•extra-poIitica
• l' way-and therefore negotiated with the
citizenship rights. '1 The Momins, who had always supported Government of Pakistan for their welfare and security. This
the Congress and were counted among the most ardent should be answer enough to those Indian leaders who still
'Nationalist Muslims,' were not spared the horrors of killing decl�re thft they accepted the partition of India under com­
during the Bihar riots of 1946; in fact, they alleged that many pulsion without accepting the two-nation theory which was
leaders high up in the Congress had taken part in the riots the cause and the condition of the partition.
directed against them. 2 India was not safe for any Muslim,
'Nationalist' or 'communalist'. The two-nation theory had
annihilated all political values and distinctions created by the
Congress. In the last analysis what alone mattered was whether

Aghazetaleem.c
an Indian was a Muslim or a Hindu. His political affiliations
were swept away by the fact of his professing a particular
religion. History was vindicating the two-nation theory, but
at what human cost!
But the greatest refutation of the Congress logic is to be
found in Indo-Pakistan relations after 1947. The Muslims left
behind in India are still regarded by Pakistanis to be in some
way related to them. Any communal riot in India sends a wave
of resentment in Pakistan and the Government sends a note of
protest to Delhi. Similarly in India, Hindus look to the future
of the Hindu population of East Pakistan (there are no
Hindus in \Vest Pakistan) as their concern, and in 1950 the
Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India actually signed a pact
(Liaqat-Nehru Agreement) safeguarding the interests of
Indian Muslims and Pakistan Hindus.
om
Pakistani interest in Indian Muslims can be explained by
the two-nation theory. All the Muslims of the Indian sub­
continent were one nation. It was an accident of history that a
portion of them was left behind in the Indian Union, but that
portion is still in some 'extra-political' way an extension of the
Pakistani nation: because India was divided on the basis of
the two-nation theory. But the interest of the Indian Govern­
ment in the Hindus of Pakistan is impossible of any explana­
tion except that the Congress also had at the end accepted the
two-nation theory. How else can we justify or even explain
1 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, Vol. II, 1958, p. 818.
2 Ibid., Vol. I, 1956, p. 624.
 EPILOGUE 197
�in?-u or a Muslim.. A study of sufism strengthened this con­
:viction. Forms and rituals were the husk of religion, spirituality
1ts heart and core.
Chapter 8 In ?oth Hinduism and Islam he attacked the meaningless
pursmt of external requirements and text-book forma lities.
But there was one difference. In Hinduism he criticized even
EPILOGUE the fundamentals: caste system, untouchability, taboos in
food, idol worship, incarnation, polytheism, even metem­
psychosis. In Islam he was content to assault ritual and
IF the foregoing pages have p ainted a dark picture of incessant
custom ;al?ne, ne:er questioning its basic teachings. On the
strife and unceasing warfare, it is necessary to emphasize that
whole his ideas, his concepts, the contours of his thought, the
for a large number of people-both Hindus and Muslims-the .
turn of his phrase, the very edge of his argument, are Islamic,
normal, workaday life was one of indifference, though hardly
not Hmdu. Formally he did not forsake Hinduism, but in a ll
of a mity and harmony. In several fields of human endeavour

Aghazetaleem.c
but name he became a Muslim and a sufi.
and the daily grind people lived in peaee. Certain bridges were
Yet his attitude to Hinduism differed from that of the
made which served, albeit briefly and superficially, to bring
M1:5�ims. It was neither self-righteous nor superior. Both
the communities closer, to accentuate the common bonds, to
magnify the links, to play down the diversities, and to create a :ehgions had weaknesses and it was futile to compare them
spark of common sympathy. Sometimes these attempts bore m ord�r to prove the primacy of either. All religious quest
was virtuous. He made this not only the bed-rock of his
fruit, sometimes they failed to compose the differences. The
belief but also the starting-point of his mission of creating
fact that such attempts were made is as significant a s the fact
and sprea ding Hindu-Muslim unity. If the followers of the
that they ultimately failed.
Nothing illustrates the genuinen_ess of these attempts so two creeds were once united on the spiritual plane, social,
much as the fact that they were m ade even in a sphere where cultur al, perhaps even political unity would come of its own
volition.
divergence was at the maximum, n amely, religion. In the
How were Kabir's tea chings received by those for whose
fifteenth century Kabir stands out as the p aramount expositor
of a rapprochement between Hinduism and Islam. Abandoned ultimate unity they were fashioned? They first startled and
by her mother, a Brahmin widow of Benares, he was adopted
om then enr aged everyone. So great was the popular resentment
and brought up by a poor Muslim weaver family. Goaded by an that the case went to the Emperor himself the orthodox
Sultan Sikandar Lodhi. It is perhaps an indic�tion of Kabir's
innate curiosity, bred with a mind torn by doubt and uncer­
acceptance {by the Muslims) as a Muslim that the royal eyes
tainty, he wanted to ask questions, to seek the answers and to
saw 1:oth!ng improper in his teachings, and the controversy
pursue the truth. Knowing that he was the son of a Hindu of
was dismissed by the suggestion that Kabir should betake him­
the highest caste, living in and imbibing the influences of a
self to som� distant and obscure place where his message
Muslim household, breathing the air of the holy city of
would not disturb the peace of the realm. By the time he died a
Benares, listening to religious and intellectual discussions, his
loyal body of disciples ha d gathered around him who propa­
natural intelligence awakened in him a desire to know more
g ated his word and did not let his name or effort die.
about the two religions. He listened and thought a nd absorbed
It is significant that the complaihants against him came from
the ideas of his friends, teachers and neighbours. What
both religions. Hindus and Muslims equally believed that their
appealed to him, p a rticularly under the inspira tion of Raman­
anda , was the inherent significance of the spiritual side of :eli�on was being subverted, that Kabir, in following an
religion. Spiritual attainments took precedence over being a ignis fatuus, was uprooting their beliefs, their traditions and
198 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN EPILOGUE 199
their faith. To this day his following remains divided into a When the common Muslim argued in this manner no virtues of
Hindu group and a Muslim group, each tenaciously holding Bhakti could attract him.
that he belonged to its religion. Still another factor worked against the new movement. Its
Kabir's place in the religious history of India remains high,
'because through him was articulated most forcefully and with
i' central belief struck at the root of Muslim self-respect. If
religion was nothing but spirituality, if Hinduism and Islam
I,
great effect the belief that Hinduism and Islam could unite in a I,
were the same, if all religions were the same, what happened to
fervent belief in God and that the division on the basis of lj' the Muslim's pride 'in Islam? In the loyalty of the. Indian
community, ritual or theology was not important. The torch Muslim to his religion neither colour nor race played.any part.
lit by Kabir ignited in course of time a wild fire which, carried He was a Muslim because he believed in Islam. Religion was his
upon the emotions of sincere seekers of spiritual ecstasy, individuality, his distinguishing mark, his singularity. When
spread to all corners of the sub-continent.' this was taken away from him he forfeited all he had. There�
Kabir had not spoken in vain, and the names of the saints fore, he regarded such movements not as attempts at social
and thinkers who followed in his footsteps make a distinguished unity or even as an intellectual quest for conciliation, but as a

Aghazetaleem.c
roll: Dadu, Chaitanya, Namdeva, Tukaram, Nanak. conspiracy to undermine his religion. For him it was a religious
\Vhy did the Muslims refuse to tread the path lighted by problem, a crisis of belief. The choice lay clear between Islam
such intellects? To them the important question was whether and compromise. Unhesitatingly he chose Islam. Whatever the
the voice that beckoned them was the voice of Islam or the cost the Indian Muslim was not prepared to lose his individu­
voice of Hinduism. Their answer was that, though it sounded ality.1
like the call of Islam, it was a subtle Hindu move to subvert The movement for Hindu-Muslim unity thus came to
Islam, to absorb the alien element into the Indian milieu, and nothing. But it left its marks on several minor things, both
thus to turn the Muslim triumph in India into a defeat. They social and religious. During periods of communal peace arid
knew that in the past Hinduism had, by this method, consumed 1
political calm toleration showed its welcome face. Hindus of
many sects which had arisen within its fold. By preaching the some areas were regular visitors of Muslim shrines and other
acceptance of a few Islamic values Hinduism, far from com­ centres of pilgrimage. Some Muslim saints, like Khwaja Hasan
promising with Islam, was actually manifesting its remarkable Nizami of Delhi, counted Hindus among their disciples. Hindu
capacity for synthesis. women prayed atthe tombs of Muslim saints and believed that
Further, any success of such ideas would have led to a de-,
crease in the number of professing Muslims in India. This could
om their wishes would come true. Hindus and Muslims were
present at each other's religious festivities. Muslims were to be
not have been a pleasing prospect to a community which was seen in the Dusehra processions. At Holi they threw <;oloured
ever conscious of its minority status. Moreover, the emphasis water on their Hindu friends. Hindus re_ciprocated by visiting
on the spirituality of religion, coupled with a const13,nt re­ their Muslim friends at Eid and even participating in the
minder of the emptiness and wickedness of ritual, gradually Muharram festival.
led to laxity in the practice of religion. This neglect was un­ These might have been minor things, mere drops of good
welcome both to the orthodox and to the commonality. will· in the wide waters of antipathy and misunderstanding,
Formal observance is dear to every religion. It helps solidarity and they did not avert a final break-up. But they did exist and
·and distinguishes the 'we' from the 'they'. Laxity could, it is our duty to record them.
perhaps one day would, lead to irreligiousness and Islam
1 In t!iese paragraphs I have heavily drawn on the excellent treatment
would vanish from the face of India. Had Islam conquered
in Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, The Muslim Community of the lndo-Pakistan
India so that one day it would compromise with the heathen Subcontinent (610-1947): A Brief Historical Analysis, 1962, Chapter V.
and lose itself in the vast and infidel world of Hinduism? The passage quoted is on pp. 116-17.
200 THE MAKING OF P AKI STAN EPILOGUE 201
In culture, too, there were strands of unity. Above all, the courtiers, conscious of their superiority, of their wealth, and,
Urdu language could have, and in some measure did, become as time passed, of their insecurity. As popular rule approached
a cementing f orce. It was the spoken tongue of millions of nearer they closed ranks, and, like all men in fear of an ill
Hindus and Muslims in the Punjab, Delhi, the United Pro­ wind, magnified their community of interest. It was a closed
vinces, the Central Provinces and Bihar. Several Hindu names society whose standards and values did not touch the masses.1
appear in the annals of its literature, from Ratan Nath The important point is that even this superficial common
Sarshar to Firaq Gorakhpuri. Hindu prose-writers and culture failed to spread. It stayed within the confines of
essayists contributed to Urdu journals. Hindu poets recited Delhi, Lucknow and Hyderabad. This was due partly · to
their verses in mushairas. A few of them have been men of historical reasons (this culture wasreally a weak and corrupted
distinction in modern poetry. There were well-known Hindu version of the old Mughul culture of the Delhi imperial court),
patrons of Urdu Jiterature like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. The partly to economic reasons (the poor masses could not partake
first comprehensive history of Urdu literature in English was of this culture of the wealthy: the good example of common
written by a Hindu (Saksena). living was thus disregarded), and partly to geographical

Aghazetaleem.c
This 'Hindu-Muslim' culture bloomed in the United Pro­ reasons (in a country of India's dimensions currents sent f orth
vinces where diverse cultural traits met and merged to produce from one or two centres died away before reaching the far­
a way of life which was neither exclusively Hindu nor exclus­ away places).
ively Muslim. In Lucknow and other cities one saw this inter­ Another weakness was its highly formal character. It put
mixture in its glory. It extended to many walks of life -dress, too much emphasis on the external observance of politeness,
language, literature, f olk-lore, good living, even parts of food. manners and other graces of good society. The ridiculous
Friendships crossed communal boundaries (though inter­ length to which such f ormalities, practised for their own sake,
marriage remained an impossibility). One language united could be taken has become a part of the lore of the U.P. wala.
those who spoke it. Literary gatherings took no notice of This rigidity of f ormal behaviour, this primness, often coupled
religious beliefs. In normal times there were definite signs of with contemptuous references to those outside the pale of this
the evolution of a common culture. code of conduct ('the Punjabi is a boor'), hindered the spread
But this attempt failed to hold its ground owing to some of this culture to other regions. In the end its mannerisms
serious weaknesses in its character. }"irst, · it was an urban became an object of kindly ridicule.
phenomenon, confined to places like Aligarh, Allahabad,
Lucknow and some smaller towns. It did not touch the
om Basically the U.P. culture was Muslim in character and
content. It was an example of the Hindu upper classes accept­
hamlets, where lack of education continued to breed ill-feeling. ing the remnants of the Mughul way of life, not of the Muslims
Urbanization always unites the city-dwellers in some sort of making a compromise with the Hindu environment. Such one­
veiled opposition to the outsiders. There was an element of sided borrowing could not make it a genuine movement to­
culture in it, but it was predominantly a question of the wards unity. It lacked the solid foundations of a common
urbanites versus the countryfolk, not of a conscious effort to outlook on life, a common mode of thinking, the awareness of a
evolve a Hindu-Muslim culture. Secondly, even in the cities it common past and a common future, an accord on the values of
was confined to the upper classes. The well-to-do dressed alike,
had com;mon culinary tastes, entertained each other, read the 1 'l'his phenomenon reproduced itself in several other parts of India.

same books, lived in similar houses, belonged to the same clubs. Ip. Hyderabad Deccan the Muslim nobles and the Hindu courtiers of the
They were the upper classes and were aware of it. Less than a Nizam were indistinguishable in appearance and other things. In Cal­
cutta or Bombay the urban trader, Hindu or Muslim, had much in
century ago they had been united in their allegiance to the common. In the Punjab the rich Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs of Lahore
court of Oudh. Temperamentally and by upbringing they were shared many cultural features.
202 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN WAS PAKISTAN INEVITABLE? 203
life. That is why it failed to withstand the assault of communal the unity of India was a British gift which India was fated to
politics. When the times were normal and political controversy enjoy only so long as the donor was present on the spot.
was languid there was a show of amity and good fellowship­ Perhaps a more rational approach to this question would be
part genuine, part made-up-and all was well. When prospects I
1·,
to view it against the background of the development of self­
of self-rule appeared on the horizon, when one of the parties ''
'' government in India. The seeds of Hindu-Muslim discord were
took over the reins of government, when jobs were to be dis­ sown during the partition of Bengal and the making of the
pensed, or when a single communal riot broke out, the entire 1909 reforms. The former divided the Hindus from: the
world of civility came tumbling down in dust and smoke. Muslims; the latter was the first major instalment of a series of
measures eventually leading to independence. In other words,
the incipience of self-government was c9terminous with the
* appearance of Hindu-Muslim schism. The larger the dose of
Sometimes J.{nowledge increases not so much by• g1vmg self-government to India the deeper the Muslim fear of Hindu
answers as by asking questions. In this chapter we will ask rule.

Aghazetaleem.c
four leading questions. Was Pakistan inevitable? Could an Hindu opposition to the grant of separate representation
alternative scheme be substituted for Pakistan? Why did the aggravated the situation and made the Muslims look at each
Muslims of the Hindu provinces support the Pakistan demand? advance towards self-rule as one more step towards their·
How can: the leaving behind of millions of Muslims in the thraldom. This process continued until the working of pro­
Indian Union be reconciled with the theory that all Indian vincial autonomy in 1937-9 told them that the consummation
Muslims constituted one nation and wanted one homeland for of Indian independence would not bring freedom. It was only
that nation? then that they began to think of a separate state of their own
Some of these questions are hypothetical, others do not lend where independence would be meaningful and freedom a
themselves to a definite answer. No attempt will be made here reality.
to simplify matters, for sometimes to simplify is not to clarify. Perhaps the expedient of communal electorates was neither
What follows is merely thinking aloud on certain aspects of the enough nor effective. Had more drastic safeguards against
. I
Muslim problem in imperial India, the two-nation theory and communal tension been devised and incorporated in the 1935
the creation of Pakistan. coristitution, Muslims might have shown less fear of demo­
om cracy and greater willingness to enter a federal union.
WAS PAKISTAN INEVITABLE? Was Congress responsible for the emergence of Muslim
The point at issue was whether a divided India, with all its nationalism and the creation of Pakistan? We have already
flaws, was better or worse than an Indian chaos? Was the touched upon this question, but· there seems to be a near
unity of India a creation of the British which was destined to un�nimous opinion.!'�<?,J!g_JI}.!�...Jcn,_Qwledgtable j;gg..t_ Congress___
disappear with them? �-·�t!1�u_de_ t?wards the Muslim problem :was_ .a. Ill�j9r �on_trLbY:;;
It may be that it was the British determination to introduce _!filY.: "f�ct�l'._� Professor Coupland; Lord Eustace Percy, Sir
.,,,,
a parliamentary form of government in India that led to a Stanley Reed, Sir Ivor Jennings, Sir Francis Tuker, Mr. Ian
Stephens, Professor Rushbrook Williams, Mr. Penderel Moon

l
demand for partitition. It may also be argued that an early
implementation of the federal part of the 1935 constitution and other competent judges of Indian affairs agree that the
would have created a situation where the idea of separation Congress 'arrogance' and the way in which it worked the
might not have germinated in the Muslim mind. It is possible provincial governments destroyed all the assumptions on
that there is a direct and causal connection between separate
electorate and the creation of Pakistan. It is also possible that
I
I,
which Muslim acceptance of the federation had been grounded,
and so intensified separatism. Sir Ivor Jennings_ thinks that
 204 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN I MUSLIMS OF HIN DU PROVINCES 205
even as late as 1945 a united India in the shape of a loose feder­ ,_oEe of their leaders gave serious thought. to an alternative to
ation of Hindu and Muslim States would have been possible , \i : partition. T[e5'.}_p._o.W�9.-J'�!llarkable ingem,1ity in 3<rguing
if the Hindus had realized that the Muslim demand for a
separate Muslim State with Islamic ideals needed to be met. -�g!1ffist Paki�tan, in pointing out its disadvantages and in
predicting a calamitous future for this artificially created
The Congress refusal to see this made the creation of Pakist�n_ . State. Rajendr ::i. Prascd wrote a long book on India Divided,
, ..--inevitable. His latest view Is that agreement could have been but suggested no alternative to it: This is where the weakness
-....._reached in 1940 or 1942 if the Congress had been willing to 'or the· Ccingres·sapproach showed its most damaging aspect.
concede more to the Muslims. 1 Because the Muslim problem did not exist, therefore it offered
no obstacle to Indian independence. Because Muslim national-
ALTERNATIVES TO PAKISTAN J§IXL:Was__a myth,. therefore it merited "nci ·attention. The
When the Muslimmind was evolving the theory of two nations Muslim League was an unrepresentative body which spoke for
and preparing the demand for a separate State many alterna­ the minority of a minority, therefore its demands could safely
tive schemes were formulated. Abdul Latif of Hyderabad, 'A be ignored. This was the cardinal mistake, for which the

Aghazetaleem.c
Punjabi', Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Sir Firoz Khan Noon and Congress had to pay the heavy price of partition. Its political
others suggested their own plans. From the British side, too, short-sightedness was Jinnah's triumph.
came some suggestions to solve the Indian problem without Why did the Congress not make an effort to reach some sort
the ultimate recourse of partition. Professor Coatman was in of an agreement with the Muslims on the issue of Pakistan?
favour of re-drawing provincial boundaries and forming a One explanation is that it was convinced that if it stood firm
federation of autonomous provinces. 2 Clement Davies, the the pressure of events and the logic of history (as the Congress
Liberal leader, thought of something on the lines of the United understood it) would force the Muslims to come into a united,
States, with sovereign provinces, transferring to the centre unitary India. Another reason was that it never appreciated
such rights as they deemed satisfactory, with full right to the strength of Muslim nationalism and dismissed it with such
contract out subject to some sort of plebiscite. 3 Koni Zilliacus irrelevancies as that the Muslims were converts from Hinduism,
suggested a multi-national Indian membership of the United or that religious nationalism was a relic of primitive bar­
Nations, under which Muslims would be a separate United barism, or that the Muslims themselves did not realize what
Nations member and under its protection. 4 Sir Arthur Page's they were asking for, and so on. These arguments might have
rather impracticable solution was to divide India into pre­ om been enough to salve the Congress conscience, but they gave no
dominantly Hindu and Muslim districts and to give them clue to the political conundrum.
dominion status. 5 Finally, there was Professor Coupland's
MUSLIMS OF HINDU PROVINCES AND PAKISTAN
'regionalism'. Among the official alternatives were those of
Cripps, contained in his draft declaration of March 1942, and It was an interesting feature of Muslim politics in India that
the demand for Pakistan received greater support in the
I II of It
the Cabinet Mission.
is a fact of great importance that all these ischemes came Hindu-majority provinces than in the Muslim-majority
\ \ from the Muslim or British sides. :�e Hindus_kept_sjlen�. �<::�- provinces. The Punjab was predominantly Unionist till the end
of 1945, Sind did not take kindly to the Muslim League till
' 1 See his The Approach to Self-Government, 1956, pp. 45-46, and 1946, and the Frontier Province maintained its Red Shirts in
Problems of the New Commonwealth, 1958, pp. 14-15. power right till the Independence Day. In Bengal alone was
2 John Coatman, letter to Manchester Guardian, 25 April 1942.
3
H.C. 420, 68, 28 July 1944, Cols. 1063-4. the Pakistan credo popular, but even there the League follow­
4 H.C. 434, 68, 5 March 1947, Cols. 547-8. ing was less resolute and numerous than it could have been.
5 In Asiatic Review, April 1942, p. 160.
But the Muslims of the Hindu provinces were completely loyal
 206 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN MUSLIMS OF HINDU PROVINCES 207
to Jinnah and fully supported the Pakistan idea. What .QnU?iPl~ti<;rgjs that their struggle in behalf of Pakistan
explains this phenomenon? was a sort of vicarious suffering. They wanted Pakistan because
One reason springs to mind at once. The Muslims of the at least a major portion of the nation could live in freedom. In
Muslim-majority areas felt secure in their provinces, though psychological terms it was a 'compensation' for them to see
they did not live under a Muslim League Government. The that they would be free-'they' here meaning their 'nation',
regime did not matter much as long as they were in a majority. not they themselves. This wore the appearance of sacrifice:
They had no fear of a Hindu raj. On the other hand, Muslims they were incurring the hostility of their Hindu neighbours and
of the Hindu areas lived in terror, not only of the present but future masters by agitating for Pakistan. But in fact it was not
also of the future. They were living, or would live, under a ,-)\, so. ~~~Q!_tcepJ; ,of..:r-o.li~iS:atr~_!_aJ:i_3:~i91)._pl~y:_~djt1? ,,part_!!! the-
Hindu Government, in which they had no confidence. This was ' J~- situ_aj;j_q~1.:, It w~s t~en ~idely .understood that the presence of a
not conducive to~ feeling of security. The two years of Con- large Hmdu mmority m Pakistan would assure the protection
gress rule had been a nightmare for them and they would have of the Muslim minority in Hindu India. Q:i::i._one or two occa-
given their right hand to stop a repeat performance. They
.:1~.!~:~::,~t:~r~r. i

Aghazetaleem.c
would never be a majority and would therefore never rule over ~~:.eTu!~!~~~~~~~d~:.}t~:e.1ff
)
themselves. They were in this morass of hopelessness when justly _with _its __ Hindus_ there was no reasoQ _for the Indian
Jinnah presented them with the idea of a separate State where 1-:~~ver~\~_ent_~_o_!_ _1;x_!_~tlfoiJti1i_ -r~ote_~tio.!l 'to_-_ i_t~ :-Mii~1i~·
[ _pnnority ...
the spectre of a Hindu raj would never materialize. The plan
captured their imagination and from that moment they were ~nother explanationis that the emo_tional wave oLpropa-
Jinnah's men. ~nda for _Pakistan was then at such a pitch that the Muslims
So far the argument is clear and strong. But-and there is of Hindu India gave no thought to their own future. The two-
the rub-these Muslims were not going to be a part of Pakis- nation theory h~g gnthrallecl t4~lP.JiQg_oJ'.!lplet~ly__that it never
tan. It is true that Jinnah used the word 'homeland' for the occurred to them that the creation of Pakistan on its basis
Pakistan he was demanding, but this was loose thinking. If by would create a problem for them or adversely affect their
a 'homeland' he meant a country which would accommodate future. Critical faculties were benumbed in the hurly-burly of
all the Indian Muslims (the 'nation'), he should have made it events and by the sweep of the nationalist movement. They
clear that it implied a transfer of population. But he definitely never considered themselves to be in a position different from

om
rejected this idea. He neither favoured nor anticipated a whole- that of their co-religionists of the Muslim provinces. This
sale migration of Muslims to the projected Pakistan. On the difference was brought home to them only when large
contrary, he asked them to stay in India and to be loyal to scale riots started towards the end of 1946. By then it was
their Government. He wanted them to stay back and not to . too late. They had then gone too far in their support to
come to Pakistan. Apparently the word 'homeland' was not Pakistan to withdraw from it and were too deeply committed
used in the normal sense of a country to which all the people to change their views. It is possible that had they known what
demanding it are expected or asked to come. was in store for them their enthusiasm for the Pakistan plan
So it is evident that Muslims of the Hindu areas voted for might not have been so uncritical.
Pakistan in full knowledge that they would have to remain in
India. They fought for a cause which was, strictly speaking,
not their cause at all. They strove for the creation of a country
which was not going to be their country and in which they
I It is not impossible that Muslims of the Hindu areas neither
wanted Pakistan nor believed that it was possible of realiza-
\ tion. They supported the idea in the belief, or at least in the
attempt, that their pro-Muslim League policy would help
were never going to live. Why, then, did they vote for Pakis- create a political deadlock and thus postpone a final settle-
tan? ment leading to British withdrawal. It was in their interest to

:':,,
,I:: !
I

I,:' I
1!11 i
:' i I
 208 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN CONCLUSION 209
prolong the rule of the impartial British and to put off as long Pakistan demand lost its philosophical meaning. With it the
as possible the rule of the partial Hindu. Pakistan might or Muslims could at least make out a case for themselves. It is
might not come, but their interest lay in giving their loyalty against this background that the strength and weakness of the
to Jinnah and thereby protect their stakes. two-nation theory should be viewed.
THE PRACTICAL SIDE OF THE CONCLUSION
TWO-NATION THEORY The formulation of the idea of a Muslim nationality in India
We have already seen that for multifarious reasons the Muslims started with a relatively small nucleus. Then its influence
of India had come to look upon themselves as one nation. They slowly spread until it reached millions of people. The idea
demanded the creation of a separate State for this nation. But originated with a few individual leaders in various realms of
if all Indian Muslims constituted one nation, and if the mental and intellectual activity: a Sayyid Ahmad Khan here,

!\ nation-state of Pakistan was brought into being for them, how

_ do we explain the fact that about forty million members of'
1:1,n Ameer Ali there, a Shibli at one time, an Iqbal at another.
Gradually the different strands of Muslim life and culture in

Aghazetaleem.c
th�-nation were_1e:l:"t" behind and did not become a part-of._ the sub-continent were synthesized. The image of a Muslim
� Pakistan:-? Either Pakistan was meant, or it iwas not meant, to India took shape, an image which was simultaneously the
�-- be ·a horn.eland forthe l\foslims-of India:- If t was, then Ihese - cause and the effect of an increasingly coherent intellectual
millions-sliould-· liave come to Pakistan so - that the whole life. The ideals of a culturally united community and of a
..__iiiiticimvas accommodated-in the new State of their dreams. If socially consistent society were accepted by the masses. They
__Jt w��-,1mt, _.then _th�r_e_ was_ n_� poj_ nt in claiming-tliat-al - tlle­
l
were also persuaded of the fact that they shared the same

.>·l--�a
- Muslims in India were one nation and wanted Pakistan. As historical background. Thus were laid the foundations of a
tters -_turned "out fo" be,_ itcSee-ms_ that the' inclusion of -all - separate nationalism. This feeling of separate nationalism
' Indian Muslims in Pakistan was not contemplated. If thatj_s� received an impetus from Hindu opposition to it. Nationalism
: �co�rect, then the :Miisiim Le�gue did n6t want a- homel�nd, _b�t thrives on opposition. The more i t is crushed the more vigorous
_ _. onlyincrependence for cer�ain Mus_fim-fL_reas. !_n t�eory, there-. its rebirth. It is stronger when it is holding an enemy at bay.
- -- �1· ·-roie;· the-_conception '<i{ the_ two "nah�nis l}�d a __seriqu� fl�.w::---- This is precisely what happened in India. The higher the tempo
- Perhaps �e c�� deal with this quandary by looking at the of Hindu criticism the greater the determination of the Mus­
practical side of Jinnah's politics. He felt that a united India om lims to achieve their goal. The Muslim enthusiasm for Pakistan
under a democratic government would inevitably mean a was in direct proportion to Hindu condemnation of it. National­
Muslim minority living for ever under a Hindu majority. How ism is a two-fold sentiment: of sympathy towards all within
could he avoid this? Safeguards were not enough, and anyway the group and of hostility towards all without it. The solidarity
after the British were gone who would guarantee them? The of Muslim India marched with her distrust of all those who
only solution he could think of was that Muslim-majority stood in her waY;. Coherence flourished in the face of opposition.
provinces 'should make a separate State where Muslims would In the final analysis, the idea'. of Muslim nationalism was
not have to live under a perpetual Hindu Government. He more subjective than territorial, more psychological than
therefore formulated the Pakistan demand. Then the question political; while 'Indian' or Hindu nationalism was more
arose: how to justify this demand? On what basis should it be territorial than cultural, more historical than religious. This
made? Modern history supplied the answer: on the basis of difference of approach was fundamental, and it is interesting
nationalism. Muslims were a nation apart and therefore could to see that the Muslim theory followed the ideals of the
not live in a united India under the control of another nation. English and French thinkers (e.g. Mill, McDougall and
That is how the two-nation theory was born. Without it the Renan), who have emphasized personal feeling as the first test
0
 210 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN
of nationalism· while the Hindu conception had an affinity
' .
with the opinions of German writers (e.g. Herder, Lessmg and
r
I
Wieland), who judged a nationality by its objective marks.
The Muslims felt that they were a nation, and by so doing they
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i
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:ji:

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 \ i
,1

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1,
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I:.!:
,11'
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I'
 'I

f\1 I 218 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN

,1'11:,
'"
'I'
III, Lacey, Patrick, 'Deadlock in India', Nineteenth Century, July 1937.
I 'I 'Lord Chelmsford's Viceroyalty', Quarterly Review, July 1921.
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1
ligious Element in Government Education in India', Imperial and
l:1.1
Asiatic Quarterly Review, October 1900.
'iil1 Meston, Lord, 'India Today and Tomorrow', Nineteenth Century, March
J1,11 INDEX
1932.
l11·i1
Mijatovich, Chedo, 'The Problem of the Near East', Fortnightly Review,
I':I ,,I , October 1906.
Afghani, Jamaluddin, 115 Babur, 17
Agarwal, S. N., 101 Baker, Sir William, 71
Morison, Theodore, 'The Hindu-Muslim Problem of India', Contemporary Ahimsa, IOI, 102 Balkan Wars, 36, 109
f11'
,'1:
Review, June 1931. Ahmad, Nazir, 22, 138 Bande Mataram, 82, 84, 101, 134
::::::
O'Dwyer, M. F., 'India under the Congress', National Review, July 1939. Ahrars, the, 83, 190, 191 Banerjea, Surendranath, 80
t'' 'i1l'' I
,, I
Rice, Stanley, 'India: Partition or Unity', Asiatic Review, January Aibak, Qutbuddin, 17 Banerji, Sir Albion Rajkumar,
1943. al-Hilal, 176 118

Aghazetaleem.c
Jl1'1' Sharrock, J. A., 'Some Misconceptions about the Unrest in India', Alexander, Horace, 120 Barton, Sir William, 59
Nineteenth Century, September 1909. Ali, Chaudhari Rahmat, '54--55, 60 Bell, Gertrude, 72
::1:·1 Ali, Cheragh, 142 Bengal, partition of, 23-27, 31-32,
,:·1, Smith, Leslie, 'The Congress and Modern India', National Review, April
1889. Ali, Muhammad, 113, 114, 174--75, 72, 80-81, 90
::.,,I Srinivasan, S., 'Communal Problem in India', Empire Review, January
189 Benn, Wedgwood, 44
i"' Ali, Sayyid Ameer, 22, 30, 72, 79, Besant, Annie, 71, 82
1·il I 1941.
lid''I'I 113,142,156,163,184 Birkenhead, Lord, 41, 87
Vambery, A., 'Pan-Islamism', Nineteenth Century, October 1906. Ali, Shaukat, 73, 189 Blunt, W. S., 86
!:1111 Williams, L. F. R., 'The Indian Constitutional Problem', Nineteenth Cen- Ali, Yusuf, 156 Bose, S. C., 100
:.1111'
tury, March 1939. Aligarh Movement, 18-23,
1,,, I' Williams, Monier, 'Progress of Indian Religious Thought', Contemporary 124--25 Cabinet Mission (1946), 68-69,
1!:I
1

1'
1,11: Review, December 1878. Aligarh University, 130-31, 133 204
:1:1::11 Wilson, H. A., 'The Muslim Menace', Nineteenth Century, September 1907. All Parties Conference, 41--42 Caste and nationalism, 103-04,
'I' Amery, L. S., 51 107
:\:
111\ (v) DAILY AND WEEKLY BRESS Ananda Math, 82 Central Hindu College, 130
·;1'1': Anderson, Sir John, 62 Central National Muhammadan

om
. :,,111
Manchester Guardian Economist Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam, 131 Association, 89
','Ill Observer New Statesman Anjuman-i-lslamia, 131 Chatterjee, Bankim Chandra, 80, I,,,J
'l·'.'I
(, The Times Spectator Anjuman-i-Taraqqi-i-Urdu, 138
Annals and Antiquities of
82 ·!

'J i'''
,, !11
Rajasthan, 155
Ansari, Dr., 192
Chatterjee, Bipin Chandra, 117
Chaudhuri, Nirad C., 166-67
Chirol, Sir Valentine, 81, 173
i;·1·
,,, Ansari, M.A., 113, 114, 174--75, Christianity and Islam, 118-21 1!:
,I,
1!11 182,185,189 Churchill, W. S., 62 I
11 1
,
Ansari, Shaukatullah, 151 Coatman, John, 58, 204 1 •
:111'
: I: Archbold, William, 56 Colvin, Sir Elliott, 58-59
,I Arya Samaj, 80, 99-100 Congress-League scheme, 34
' Azad, Abul Kalam, 174, 175-77, Coronation Durbar, 32
182,183,189 Coupland, Sir Reginald, 51, 203
Azad Muslim Conference, 190 Cow Protection Society, 80
Aziz, Abdul, 157 Craddock, Sir Reginald, . 58
Aziz-ul-Huq, Sir, 134 Crewe, Lord, 32
1.:n,I')'
.!- ,I
i i\
.,!.: 220 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN INDEX 221
. i Hali, Altaf Husain, 22, 138, 139
Cripps Offer, 61-62, 204 Khan, Hakim Ajmal Khan, 174, Mehta, Sir Pherozeshah, 29
Croft, Sir Henry Page, 58 Hansard, 47 182,185,189 Menon, V. P., 192
I !i
i! ,11
Curzon, Lord, 23-25 Hardie, Keir, 119-20 Khan, Sayyid Ahmad, 19-22, Meston, Lord, 167
Hardinge, Lord, 31-32 70-71,74,106,124,129,138, Modern Review, 117-18
I !' Dacca Anushilan Samiti, 81 Hardyal, Lala, 170
i'I 139,141,163,176,184 Momins, the, 83, 137, 140, 144
Dagh, 137 Hindi, 126-29 Khan, Sir Shafaat Ahmad, 47, Montagu, E. S., 35, 111
Davies, Clement, 204 Hindus, Fear of, 150-54 156 Montagu announcement, 35
Deccan Provincial Muslim League, Hindu-Muslim rift, 85-88 Khan; Sir Sikandar Hayat, 55, Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, 35,
30 Hinduism and Indian nationalism, 60, 204 37-38,39
Deliverance Day, 52 79-85,99-104 Khan, the Aga, 28, 29, 30, 33, 42, Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 35,
Deoband School, 177-79 Hindustani, 127 44,45,47,72,79,113,163,173 173
'Divide and Rule', 92-95, 188-93 Horne, E. A., 167 Khan, Sir Zafrullah, 47 Moon, Penderel, 203
Disraeli, Benjamin, 108 Hume, A. 0., 88 Khandesh, 27 Mopla revolt, 37
Durrani, F. K. Khan, 149 Huq, Abdul, 138 Khilafat Movement, 35-37, 90, Morison, Sir Theodore, 57
Dyarchy, 39 Husain, Mahmud, 174, 178 108-15,116,156,175-79,182, Morley-Minto reforms, 30, 172

Aghazetaleem.c
Husain, Zakir, 189 189 Mountbatten, Lord, 69, 170
Eastern Bengal and Assam, Knox, Sir Alfred, 58 Muhammadan Educational
24---27,31 Iftakharuddin, Mian, 192 Conference, 124, 133-34
Economist, 57, 59, 168, 171-72 Imam, Sir Ali, 41, 189 Lahore Resolution, 55-56, 60, Muir, Sir William, 119
Education and nationalism, Indian Councils Act (1892), 23, 28 154,164 Musaddas, 139
106-07,129-35 Indian National Congress, 21, 29, Latif, Abdul, 55, 204 Muslim Conference, All India,
Edwardes, Herbert, 118 40,42,43,48-53,60,71,82, Lausanne, Treaty of, 37, 112 45,90
Elliott, Sir Charles, 27 83-85,87,88-92,93,100,102-03, Lawrence, Sir Walter, 58 Muslim League, All India, 25-26,
Empire Review, 57, 73 127-28,169,176-77,179, Lectures on the Reconstruction of 29, 32-33,34,40,42,47,50,
Essay on the Causes of the Indian 183-95,203-04,205 Religious Thought in Islam, 55-56,63,67,88-92,124,127,
Revolt, 19 Iqbal, Muhammad, 45, 54, 55, 60, 140--41 151,161,181,186,189-90,192,
105,107,136,137,139--40,141 Liaquat-Nehru Agreement, 194 208-09
Fazl-i-Husain, Sir, 150 Islam and nationalism, 104---06 Linlithgow, Lord, 49 Mutiny, the, 18, 19, 76, 109, 147
Firaq, Gorakhpuri, 200 Lodhi, Ibrahim, 17
Jamiat-ul-IBama-i-Hind, 83, 177, London Muslim League, 88 Nanawtawi,MuhammadQasim,178
Gandhi, M. K., 36, 63, 64, 65, 82, 179-81, 190, 191 Nation, 11-12

om
Low, Sir Sidney, 167
100-02,112,142,186 Jamiat-ul-IBama-i-Islam, 180-81 Loyal Muhammadans of India National character, 157-60
Gandhi-Irwin Pact, 44 Jennings, Sir Ivor, 203-04 (The), 19 National consciousness, 160-62
Gangohi, Rashid Ahmad, 178 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali, 40, 52, Loyalty, 70-75, 113-14, 184 Nationalism, 7, 11-15
Garratt, G. T., 58 53,62,63,64,65-67,68-69,74, Lucknow Pact, 33-34, 173, 185 Nationalism,
George, Lloyd, 111 91,92, 102-03,151,163-65, Art and, 142--43
Ghalib, 137 186,189,205,206,208-09 M-A. 0. College (Aligarh), 20, 22, Caste and, 103-04, 107
Ghuznavi, Sir A. H., 47 'Jinnah League', 40 56,124,130-31 Culture and, 122-23, 200-202
Gladstone, W. E., 108 Joint Committee on Indian MacDonald, Ramsay, 44, 86 Education and, 106-07, 129-35
Gokhale, B. G., 86 Constitutional Reform, 46--47, MacMahon, Sir Henry, 116 Hinduism and Indian, 79-85,
Goodman, Colonel, 57 54,55 l.VIadani, Husain Ahmad, 174, 178, 99-104
Government of India Act (1935), Jonson, Ben, 11 183 Heroes and, 154---55
47 Jung, Nawab Kamal Yar, 133-34 Mahajana Sabha, 80 History and, 155-57
v
Grigg, Sir P. J., 62 Malaviya, Madan Mohan, 185 Imperial pride and, 75-78
Kabir, 196-98 Manchester Guardian, 40, 58, 87, Islam and, 104-06
Hafeez Jullundheri, 136 Khalifa, 109, 112 91, 117 Language and, 125-29
Hailey, Lord, 61-62 Khan, Abdul Ghaffar, 192 Maudoodi, Abul Ala, 105-06 Literature and, 135--40
 INDEX ~3
222 THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN
Tyabji, Badruddin, 89, 189 Wardha Scheme, 84, 134
Nationalism- continued Rajputs, 155 Williams, Monier, 119
Myths and, 145--48 Ram Raj, 82 Williams, Rushbrook, 59, 203
Urdu, 126-29, 200
Philosophy and, 140--42 Reading, Lord, 111
Usmani, Shabbir Ahmad, 181
Religion and, 96-99 Red Shirts, the, 83, 190 Zetland, Marquess of, 57, 59
Symbols of, 148-50 Reed, Sir Stanley, 203 Zilliacus, Koni, 204
Vidya Mandir, 127, 134-35
Nationalismus, 15 Reynolds, Reginald, 120
'Nationalist Muslims', 174-83, Round Table, 57, 59
188, 190-91 Round Table Conferences, 44-46,
Nationality, 11-12 54,73,87.118,173
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 52, 100,
186-88, 194.-95 Sahib, Dr. Khan, 192
Nehru, Motilal, 41, 185, 193 Sapru, Sir Tej Bahadur, 200
Nehru Report, 41--48, 45, 90, 179, Sarsliar, Ratan Nath, 200
185 Sarvajanik Sabha, 80
Niaz Fatehpuri, 138 Satyagraha, 74, 100, 101, 102,

Aghazetaleem.c
Nizami, Khwaja Hasan, 199 142
Noon, Sir Firoz Khan, 204 Self-determination, 153
Northcliffe, Lord, 111 Separate electorates, 170-74, 203
Now or Never, 54 Sevres, Treaty of, 37, 110
Shafi, Sir Muhammad, 40
O'Dwyer, Sir Michael, 51 Shakwa, 139--40
Oudh, 27 Shia Conference, 190, 191
Osmania University, 131 Shibli, 22, 136, 138
Ottoman Empire, 13, 35-37, Shivaji, 81
108-09 Simla Conference, 65-67
Simla Deputation, 28, 171-72
Page, Sir Arthur, 204 Simon, Sir John, 39--40
Pakistan demand, 53-69, 118, Simon Commission, 39--41
161, 180, 202-08 Simon Report, 43, 173
Pakistan National Movement, Spirit of Islam, 22

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54-55 Stephens, Ian, 203
Palmerston, 108 Storrs, Sir Ronald, 116
Pan-Islamism, 115-18 Swadeshi, 26, 80, 81
Patriotism, 144 Syani, M. R., 89, 189
Percy, Lord Eustace, 203
Prasad, Rajendra, 205 Tagore, Rabindranath, 169
Punjab Unionist Party, 190 Tahzib-ul-Akhlaq, 139
'A Punjabi', 55, 204 Thanvi, Ashraf Ali, 181
The Times, 38, 42, 51, 56, 59, 71,
Qasim, Muhammad bin, 17 112, 113
Quakers, 120 The Way Out, 64
Qureshi, Shoib, 41 Thompson, Edward, 48
Tilak, B. G., 29, 81, 100
Radhakrishnan, S., 140 Tuker, Sir J?rancis, 203
Rahim, Sir Abdur, 47 Turco-Italian War, 36, 109
Rai, Lala Lajpat, 80 Two-Nation Theory, 162-95,
Rajagopalacharia, C., 64, 192 208-09