De Guzman, Andrea
2020400511
CASE BRIEFS
Tanada, et al. v. Angara, et al. G.R. No. 118295, 02 May 1997.
Doctrine:
“While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing
on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations
voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of
the family of nations.”
Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the
concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the
international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), as it
runs counter to Constitutional mandates, such as: 1) economic nationalism 2)
Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power. The Supreme Court
dismissed the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the
President’s ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.
Facts:
The Philippines joined the World Trade Organization as a founding member with
the goal of improving Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major
trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports. The President also
saw in the WTO the opening of new opportunities for the services sector, the
reduction of costs and uncertainty associated with exporting and the attraction of
more investments into the country. Hence, in April 1994, respondent Navarro, then
DTI Secretary, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. In December 1994, the
Senate concurred in the ratification of the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement Establishing the WTO which includes various agreements and
associated legal instruments. On December 16, 1994, the President signed the
Instrument of Ratification.
Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the
concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO
Agreement, for brevity) and for the prohibition of its implementation and
enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of
De Guzman, Andrea
2020400511
public officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and
resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution
mandating "economic nationalism" are violated by the so-called "parity
provisions" and "national treatment" clauses scattered in various parts not only of
the WTO Agreement and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and
Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
Specifically, the "flagship" constitutional provisions referred to are Sec 19, Article
II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Constitution.
It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity
provisions" of the WTO Agreement "place nationals and products of member
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products," in contravention of
the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless
the phrase "effectively controlled by Filipinos." The constitutional conflict
becomes more manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on
the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations
and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
agreements. Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene
constitutional limitations on the role exports play in national development and
negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such
Charter provisions are not self-executing and merely set out general policies; (2)
that these nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should
not be read in isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art.
XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited WTO
clauses do not conflict with Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement
contains sufficient provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines
from the harshness of sudden trade liberalization.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the WTO agreement violates the 1987 Constitution’s
mandated economic nationalism, hence, unconstitutional.
2) Whether or not the WTO Agreement which provides that, "each Member
shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative
De Guzman, Andrea
2020400511
procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.",
unduly limits, restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the
legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines.
Supreme Court Ruling:
1) No. The WTO reliance on "most favored nation", "national treatment", and
"trade without discrimination" cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as
in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity, that apply to all WTO
members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on "equality and
reciprocal", the fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive
in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy
against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the
gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in
the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have
shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free
trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have
demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best
offered under a policy of laissez faire.
2) No. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness
of sovereignty. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute
and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to
restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines,
expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.
Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of
the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and
State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations."
By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part
of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in
international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be
performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral
obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state
which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment
of the obligations undertaken."
De Guzman, Andrea
2020400511
Bayan, et al. v. Zamora, et al. G.R. No. 138570, 10 Oct 2000.
Doctrine:
“As long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international
law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.”
The Republic of the Philippines entered into an agreement called the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA). Such agreement was treated as treaty by the Philippine
government. Petitioner argues that the agreement violated Sec. 25 Art. XVIII of the
1987 Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law of the land, which
specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases and troops.
Petitioner argues that VFA, to be constitutional, must sufficiently meet the three
(3) requisites. The third requisite: c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State, is argued by the petitioner to be lacking. Hence, such agreement is
unconstitutional. It was ruled that it is inconsequential whether the United States
treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
Facts:
In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in
1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of
the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate
rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security
which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the
Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States panel met with the Philippine
panel to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of the United
States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed, among
other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for
brevity). On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. Petitioners went to the Supreme
Court to question the validity of the VFA.
Issue:
Whether or not the VFA is constitutional.
Supreme Court Ruling:
De Guzman, Andrea
2020400511
Yes, the VFA is constitutional. Under Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions
are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c)
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the
VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution the provision in Section 25,
Article XVIII requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means
that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.
To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to
submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its
Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. It is inconsequential whether
the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as
long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law,
the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty. The records reveal that the
United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated
that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of
the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the
VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the
treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution. In
this jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements
even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress.
Bayan Muna, et al. v. Romulo, et al. G.R. No. 159618, 01 Feb 2011.
Doctrine:
“A signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty, and any argument obliging the signatory state to
follow any provision in the treaty would be premature.”
De Guzman, Andrea
2020400511
The Supreme Court dismissed a claim by Bayan Muna, a duly registered party-list
group set up to represent the marginalized sectors of society, which sought to
nullify hthe Non-Surrender Agreement concluded between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America as it contravened the obligations of
the Philippines under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Moreover, Bayan Muna argued that it was void ab initio because it created
obligations that were immoral or that were contrary to universally recognized
principals of international law. Regarding thefirst argument, the SC concluded that
the Agreement did not undermine the Rome Statute as it complemented each other
and thus conformed to the ICCS’s ‘principle of complementarity’. Additionally, in
terms of the second argument that the Agreement was immoral, the SC disagreed.
Facts:
The Philippines signed the Rome Statute, a treaty which establishes the
International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern (considered grave
under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and crimes of agression) and shall be complementary to the national criminal
jurisdictions. On December 28, 2000, the Philippines, through Charge d’ Affaires
Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant
petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the
ratification, approval and concurrence process but the Philippines is not among the
92 signatories. However, a non-surrender bilateral agreement was executed
between the Philippines and the United States which aims to protect what it refers
to and defines as “persons” of the Philippines and the United States from frivolous
and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.
The Agreement prevents the State-parties from surrendering a national of the other
to a third party or to the international tribunal without the consent of the said other
State.
Issue:
Whether or not the non-surrender bilateral agreement contravenes and undermines
the Rome Statute.
Supreme Court Ruling:
De Guzman, Andrea
2020400511
No. The non-surrender agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it
differ from, the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements
the other. Far from going against each other, one complements the other. As a
matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC.
As aptly pointed out by respondents and admitted by petitioners, the jurisdiction of
the ICC is to be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions of the signatory
states. This provision indicates that primary jurisdiction over the so-called
international crimes rests, at the first instance, with the state where the crime was
committed; secondarily, with the ICC in appropriate situations. Also, under
international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a
signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a
signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of a treaty; whereas a State- Party, on the other hand, is legally
obliged to follow all the provisions of a treaty in good faith. In the instant case, it
bears stressing that the Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not
a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. As it were, the Agreement is but
a form of affirmance of the Philippines national criminal jurisdiction. Thus, the
Philippines may decide to try persons of the US, as the term is understood in the
Agreement, under our national criminal justice system. Or it may opt not to
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US persons
committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal
jurisdiction of the ICC over them.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, 08 Apr 2010.
Doctrine:
“The principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application
relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation.”
The COMELEC refused to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under
R.A. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, on the ground that the
LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and R.A. 7941, nor is it
associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration. The denial of
Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of
dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial
public interest. Hence, the Petition is granted and the Commission on Elections is
directed to GRANT petitioner's application for party-list accreditation.
De Guzman, Andrea
2020400511
Facts:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
The case has its roots in the COMELEC’s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a
party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the
Party-List System Act. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar
as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional
guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the
Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of
speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based
on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete
and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was
validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and
that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad's application for accreditation be granted.
Supreme Court Ruling:
Yes. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status. Law of general application should apply with equal force to
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs), and they deserve to participate
in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-
represented sectors
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general
application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of
De Guzman, Andrea
2020400511
sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a
status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human
Rights Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be
construed to include "sexual orientation." Additionally, a variety of United Nations
bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be
prohibited under various international agreements.
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the
responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines’ international law obligations, the
blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We
refer now to the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the
Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity), which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of
international law.
Province of North Cotabato, et al. v. Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, 14 Oct 2008
Doctrine:
“The right of a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in
international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond
‘convention’ and is considered a general principle of international law, but should
not be understood as extending to a unilateral right of secession”
In 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of
the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of
2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Invoking the right to information on matters of
public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish
them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also
pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO
enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
Facts:
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in
the birth of this MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA
Law, international laws such as ILO Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the
De Guzman, Andrea
2020400511
principle of Islam i.e compact right entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and
order). The body is divided into concepts and principles, territory, resources, and
governance.
Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all
indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people have the
right to self- governance of their Bangsamoro homeland to which they have
exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of occupation in the land. The
MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with
defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of
amity and commerce with foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the
"Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and
jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.
As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-
Sulu-Palawan geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are
those which voted in the inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is
divided into two categories, “A” which will be subject to plebiscite not later than
12 mos. after the signing and “B” which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from
the signing of another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE
shall have jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the
BJE territory; they shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond
the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP)
south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial
waters, the BJE and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and
management over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in
the territorial waters; but no provision on the internal waters.
Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any
economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the
option to establish trade missions in those countries, as well as environmental
cooperation agreements, but not to include aggression in the GRP. The external
defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the government. The
BJE shall have participation in international meetings and events" like those of the
ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to
participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of
border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing
of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the
islands forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to
explore its resources and that the sharing between the Central Government and the
De Guzman, Andrea
2020400511
BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the
BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions and TLAs.
And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between
the GRP and MILF is associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and
responsibility. This structure of governance shall be further discussed in the
Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly contested before the
court. The BJE shall also be given the right to build, develop and maintain its own
institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact
as well.
Issue:
Whether or not MOA-AD is constitutional.
Supreme Court Ruling:
No. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws.
Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the
associative relationship (a state within a state) envisioned between the GRP and the
BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is
a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
“The right of a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in
international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond
‘convention’ and is considered a general principle of international law.” Among
the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by virtue of the right of
self-determination, “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development.”
The people’s right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as
extending to a unilateral right of secession. A distinction should be made between
the right of internal and external self-determination.
Moreover, assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, must now be regarded as embodying customary international law; it does
not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an
De Guzman, Andrea
2020400511
associated state. Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the
land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to
uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws
unnecessary.
It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot
be reconciled with the Constitution and the laws as presently worded
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, 08 Mar 2016
Doctrine:
“Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is supported by some
treaties, adhering to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of
the country in which the foundling is found.”
Parental care and custody over the petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his
relatives, Emiliano Militar and his wife. Emiliano reported and registered Grace
Poe as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Fernando
Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces adopted Grace Poe. When the petitioner filed her
certificate of candidacy, this court has yet to squarely rule on the issue of whether a
foundling-a child abandoned by her parents-is a natural-born Filipino citizen. In
the case at bar, petitioner discharged her burden to prove that she is natural-born
when the parties stipulated as to her status as a foundling found in front of a church
in Jaro, Iloilo. When the yardsticks of common sense and statistics are used, it
borders on the absurd to start with the presumption that she was born to both a
foreign father and a foreign mother. In all likelihood, she was born to at least a
Filipino father or to a Filipino mother, or both. As a matter of law, foundlings are
as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either. Customary international law dictates that foundlings are
entitled to a nationality and are presumed to be citizens of the country where they
are found. Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines.
Facts:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar
(Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was
De Guzman, Andrea
2020400511
passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife.
Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as
a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her
Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the
name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar."
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a
petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City.
On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's
name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo
on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption, the
petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005
that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-
Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the
name of her adoptive parents. Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an
affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo.
On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
In 1991, Poe went to the US to be a permanent resident therein. In 2001, she
became a naturalized US citizen. In the first quarter of 2005, she came back to the
Philippines to permanently reside herein. On February 14, 2006, she went back to
the US to dispose family belongings. On July 18, 2006, she re-acquired Filipino
citizenship. According to Poe in her 2013 COC for Senator, before the May 13,
2013 election, she has been a resident of the Philippines for 6 years and 6 months –
reckoned from year 2006 when she reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA
9225). Poe filed her COC for Presidency for the May 9, 2016 elections. Hence,
computing from May, 2013, she has been a resident in the Philippines for 9 years
and 6 months only. In 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the
May 2016 Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born
citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016
would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. The
petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A.
Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14
October 2015. Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming
elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were
the subject of these consolidated cases.
De Guzman, Andrea
2020400511
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered
as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling. Elamparo
claimed that international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino
citizenship on foundlings. Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not
qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for
she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin with. Even assuming arguendo
that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status
when she became a naturalized American citizen. According to Elamparo, natural-
born citizenship must be continuous from birth.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is considered a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, her being a foundling.
Supreme Court Ruling:
Yes. As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the
1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Customary
international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are
presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found. Consequently, the
petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987
Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that
an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from
treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include
international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations. International customary rules are
accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the
established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to
law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in
question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
"General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are principles
De Guzman, Andrea
2020400511
"established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which
are "basic to legal systems generally," such as "general principles of equity, i.e.,
the general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle against
discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation." These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine
Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Bill of Rights.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by
this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law
and binding on the State. Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right
to change his nationality.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles
are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague
Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
Article 15(1) of which effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague
Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR. In Razon v.
Tagitis, this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the
"International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced
disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally
accepted principle of international law."
