50825 SERVICE DATE – AUGUST 17, 2021

EB

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD

DECISION

Docket No. FD 36332

PETITION BY THE NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION (AMTRAK)

FOR PROCEEDING UNDER 49 U.S.C. § 24903(c)(2)

Digest:1 In this decision, the Board determines compensation for the Northeast
Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation and the Commuter Rail
Division of the Regional Transportation Authority’s use of the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation’s Chicago Union Station facility.

Decided: August 16, 2021

The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) owns Chicago Union Station
(CUS)2 and uses it to provide intercity train service. (Amtrak Opening 1.) The Northeast Illinois
Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation and the Commuter Rail Division of the Regional
Transportation Authority (collectively, Metra) have used CUS for their Chicago Metropolitan
Area commuter service since 1974. (Metra Opening 5.) Metra is presently the primary user of
CUS. (Amtrak Opening 1.)

Metra’s use of CUS was previously governed by an agreement that expired on July 29,
2019 (1984 Agreement), and Amtrak and Metra have since been unable to reach a new
agreement.3 (Amtrak Opening 1.) On July 22, 2019, Amtrak filed a petition under 49 U.S.C.
§ 24903(c)(2), requesting that the Board institute a proceeding and enter an order determining
the compensation and terms for the use of CUS by Metra. At the parties’ request, the Board
 
1
The digest constitutes no part of the decision of the Board but has been prepared for the
convenience of the reader. It may not be cited to or relied upon as precedent. See Pol’y
Statement on Plain Language Digs. in Decisions, EP 696 (STB served Sept. 2, 2010).
2
Until recently, CUS was owned by Chicago Union Station Company (CUSCo).
(Amtrak Opening 6.) In 1976, the Penn Central Corporation conveyed its interest in CUSCo,
which constituted 50% of all outstanding shares, to Amtrak pursuant to the Final System Plan
under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (3R Act), Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985.
(Id.) In 1984, Amtrak acquired the remaining 50% of outstanding CUSCo shares, and CUSCo
became a wholly owned subsidiary of Amtrak. (Id.) In May 2017, CUSCo and Amtrak merged,
with Amtrak as the surviving entity. (Id.) As a result, ownership of CUS passed from CUSCo to
Amtrak. (Id.)
3
Amtrak states that the parties began exchanging initial proposals for a new agreement
during March and April 2018. (Amtrak Pet. 4.)
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

issued an interim service order in this docket on July 26, 2019, allowing Metra to continue to
access CUS pursuant to the terms of the 1984 Agreement until further order of the Board. In this
decision, the Board determines compensation for Metra’s use of CUS.4

I. BACKGROUND

Historical Background. In 1976, Congress enacted the Railroad Revitalization and

Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4R Act), Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31. Section 701(a)(6) of
the 4R Act gave Amtrak the authority to make agreements with other carriers and commuter
agencies for freight and commuter services over rights-of-way acquired by Amtrak. The current
version, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 24903(a)(6), allows Amtrak to make agreements with other
carriers and commuter authorities for freight rail and commuter rail passenger transportation over
rights-of-way and facilities Amtrak acquired under the 3R Act and the 4R Act. In the event of a
failure to agree, section 705(a) of the 4R Act also directed the ICC to determine compensation
for the provision of services. In 1985, Congress included additional language specifying how the
ICC should assign costs. See Consol. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-272, § 4017(b)(5), 100 Stat. 82, 111.

The present version, codified at § 24903(c)(2), specifies that if the parties do not agree,
the Board “shall order that the transportation continue . . . and shall determine compensation
(without allowing cross-subsidization between commuter rail passenger and intercity rail
passenger and rail freight transportation) for the transportation.” Congress directed the Board to
assign “the costs Amtrak incurs only for the benefit of the carrier, plus a proportionate share of
all other costs of providing transportation under this paragraph incurred for the common benefit
of Amtrak and the carrier. . . . based on relative measures of volume of car operations, tonnage,
or other factors that reasonably reflect the relative use of rail property covered by this
subsection.” § 24903(c).

CUS. Metra has provided commuter rail passenger transportation at CUS since 1974.
(Metra Opening 5.) On May 1, 1984, Amtrak’s predecessor in interest and Metra entered into
the 1984 Agreement to govern Metra’s use of CUS. (Amtrak Pet., Ex. A.) On May 1, 1988, the
parties amended the agreement and extended it to April 30, 2019. (Id., Ex. B.) On March 6,
2019, Amtrak and Metra extended the agreement to July 29, 2019. (Id., Ex. C.) Amtrak and
Metra stipulate that the term of their next agreement will extend from May 1, 20195 to
September 30, 2029, with the option to extend for an additional 10 years. (Joint Stipulation ¶ 17,
Jan. 19, 2021.)

 
4
The parties designated certain information contained in this decision as confidential in
their pleadings. While attempting to avoid references to confidential information in its decisions,
the Board reserves the right to rely upon and disclose such information in decisions when
necessary. In this case, the Board determined that it could not present its findings with respect to
particular issues without disclosing certain information.
5
Amtrak and Metra have agreed that the new agreement will apply retroactively to
May 1, 2019. (Amtrak Pet. 7 n.3, Ex. C.)

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 Docket No. FD 36332
 

Procedural History. On July 22, 2019, Amtrak filed a petition under § 24903(c)(2),
requesting that the Board institute a proceeding, establish a procedural schedule, and enter an
order determining the compensation and terms for Metra’s use of CUS. At the parties’ request,
the Board issued an interim service order on July 26, 2019, allowing Metra to continue to access
CUS pursuant to the 1984 Agreement until further order of the Board.

On September 27, 2019, the Board instituted a proceeding under § 24903(c)(2). After
engaging in discovery, the parties filed confidential versions of their opening statements on
May 20, 2020, and confidential versions of their replies on June 24, 2020.6 Following a period
of Board-sponsored mediation requested by the parties,7 which ended on December 4, 2020,
Amtrak and Metra filed supplemental initial briefs on January 22, 2021, and supplemental reply
briefs on February 19, 2021.

Meanwhile, on January 19, 2021, Metra filed a letter identifying 16 errata in its June 24,
2020 reply brief. Amtrak responded to Metra’s errata letter on January 29, 2021, contending that
Metra did not fully correct the errors in its reply brief, explain the meaning of the errors, or
correct the errors in the verified statements it submitted in support of its reply brief. Amtrak also
offered an explanation and context for the errata. On February 8, 2021, Metra filed a motion to
strike Amtrak’s January 29, 2021 letter as an impermissible surreply to Metra’s June 24, 2020
reply brief, alternatively requesting leave to file a substantive response to Amtrak’s January 29,
2021 letter. Amtrak responded to Metra’s motion to strike on February 11, 2021, stating that it
had no objection to Metra filing a substantive response. On April 13, 2021, the Board issued a
decision denying Metra’s motion to strike and permitting Metra to file a response to Amtrak’s
January 29, 2021 letter. On April 20, 2021, Metra filed a response.

II. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Preliminary Issues

The parties disagree about which party bears the burden of proof, the principles that
should guide the Board’s cost allocation, and whether the Board’s jurisdiction under
§ 24903(c)(2) extends to the prescription of disputed contract terms where those terms do not
involve compensation determinations.

a. Burden of Proof

Metra and Amtrak disagree as to which party bears the burden of proof in this matter.
Because Amtrak filed the petition, Metra argues that Amtrak bears the burden of proof under
5 U.S.C. § 556(d)(2) (“Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order
has the burden of proof.”). (Metra Opening 13-14.) Amtrak disputes that it carries the sole
burden of proof in this proceeding. (Amtrak Reply 3, June 24, 2020.) Amtrak contends that
 
6
The parties filed public versions of their opening statements and replies on May 27 and
July 1, 2020, respectively.
7
During mediation, the parties reached an agreement on several, but not all, disputed
issues. (See Joint List of Unresolved Issues, Dec. 15, 2020; Joint Stipulation, Jan. 19, 2021.)

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 Docket No. FD 36332
 

§ 24903(c)(2) mandates that the Board determine compensation if the parties do not agree, and
either party could have notified the Board of this disagreement by filing a petition. (Id.) Amtrak
also asserts that a determination that the petitioner carries the sole burden of proof in a § 24903
proceeding would have the adverse effect of incentivizing one party to delay negotiations in an
attempt to force the other party to file. (Id. at 4 n.2.) Additionally, Amtrak argues that Metra’s
position contradicts the cross-subsidization prohibition of § 24903(c)(2) since “under Metra’s
proposed burden of proof, if neither party proffered evidence, then the Board would assign no
costs to Metra—even though that would result in cross-subsidization.” (Id. at 5.)

The Board finds that neither party bears the sole burden of proof in this matter. Amtrak
filed the petition, but it does not ask the Board for specific relief. Rather it invokes the Board’s
authority pursuant to § 24903(c)(2) to determine compensation when the parties cannot agree.
Here, both Amtrak and Metra submit that, despite negotiations, they cannot agree on certain
compensation issues and ask the Board to determine compensation for those disputed issues.
Accordingly, the Board will determine compensation in this matter by equally weighing the
arguments and evidence submitted by both parties to determine the most reasonable cost
allocation consistent with the statute.8

b. Framework for Cost Allocation

Amtrak and Metra both propose various principles they argue should govern the Board’s
cost allocation in this matter. The first difference arises from the parties’ differing
interpretations of § 24903(c)(2), which has not been previously interpreted by the Board.
Section 24903(c)(2) requires the Board to “determine compensation (without allowing
cross-subsidization between commuter rail passenger and intercity rail passenger and rail freight
transportation)”9 by allocating those “costs Amtrak incurs only for the benefit of the carrier, plus
 
8
This methodology is similar to that applied by the Board in Application of the National
Railroad Passenger Corp. Under 49 U.S.C. § 24308(a)—Canadian National Railway (Canadian
National Railway), FD 35743 (STB served Aug. 9, 2019). In Canadian National Railway, the
Board did not place the burden solely on Amtrak when weighing the evidence and arguments
submitted by the parties, even though Amtrak filed the application. See also Application of the
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. Under 49 U.S.C. 24308(a)—Springfield Terminal Ry., Bos. & Me.
Corp., & Portland Terminal Co. (Guilford), 3 S.T.B. 157, 167 (1998) (finding Amtrak’s evidence
for the cost of rehabilitation work to be “reasonable and the best evidence of record”).
9
The statute does not define the term cross-subsidization. Metra argues that
cross-subsidization occurs when “one segment of the rail industry bear[s] the expenses of
facilities and improvements of primary benefit to another.” (Metra Opening 10 (quoting Bos. &
Me. Corp. v. ICC, 911 F.2d 743, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992)).) In the context of rate complaints,
the Board has stated that cross-subsidization occurs when a captive shipper bears the costs of
facilities from which it derives no benefit or does not use. See, e.g., Rate Regul. Reforms,
EP 715, slip op. at 10 (STB served July 18, 2013); PPL Mont., LLC v. BNSF Ry., 6 S.T.B. 752,
753 (2003).

4
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

a proportionate share of all other costs of providing transportation under this paragraph incurred
for the common benefit of Amtrak and the carrier.” In assigning the “proportionate share” of
common benefit costs, the Board must choose factors “based on relative measures of volume of
car operations, tonnage, or other factors that reasonably reflect the relative use of rail property
covered by this subsection.” § 24903(c)(2).

In Metra’s view, the application of such factors is not sufficient to avoid

cross-subsidization. Metra contends that because “the generalized, perfect, usage factor that
does not result in cross-subsidization may not exist in many factual circumstances,” the Board
should apply the cross-subsidization prohibition “as a secondary, ‘as-applied’ limitation” after
applying those factors that reasonably reflect the parties’ relative use of CUS. (Metra
Opening 12-13.) Metra argues that, in practice, the Board would need to exclude certain costs of
“marginal utility” to Metra after applying reasonable factors because impermissible
cross-subsidization would result if Metra were to pay for costs that primarily benefit Amtrak.
(Id. at 13.)

Amtrak, however, disputes that this secondary step is warranted. Although Amtrak
agrees that “no factor will be able to allocate costs to a certainty based on exact use,” in
Amtrak’s view, the Board’s role is merely to “find a good, broad proxy that provides a
reasonable basis for sharing the costs of facilities used by both Amtrak and another commuter
rail agency.” (Amtrak Opening 15.) According to Amtrak, the Board avoids cross-subsidization
simply by applying factors that reasonably reflect the relative use of CUS, as prescribed by
§ 24903(c)(2). (Amtrak Reply 5-6, June 24, 2020.) Amtrak also argues that the Board avoids
cross-subsidization by allocating all costs from which Metra receives some benefit because “if
Metra receives a benefit from Amtrak without paying for it, that constitutes cross-subsidization.”
(Amtrak Opening 15.)

Furthermore, in determining the factors that “reasonably reflect the relative use of rail
property,” Amtrak advises the Board to consider as instructive the methodologies adopted by the
Northeast Corridor Commission (NECC).10 (Amtrak Opening 15-18; Amtrak Reply 9 n.5,
June 24, 2020.) Metra, however, disputes the relevance of the NECC policy to this proceeding
on the grounds that: (1) the policy is “of dubious legal and constitutional validity,” (2) the policy
addresses issues specific to the Northeast Corridor, and (3) neither Metra nor the State of Illinois
were involved in the policy’s formation. (Metra Opening 3-6.)
 
10
In Section 212 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-432, 122 Stat. 4848, as amended by Title XI of the Fixing America’s Surface
Transportation Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312, entitled the Passenger Rail
Reform and Investment Act of 2015, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 24905, Congress established the
NECC and charged it with developing and implementing a standardized policy for determining
and allocating costs, revenues, and compensation for Northeast Corridor commuter rail
passenger transportation. 49 U.S.C. § 24905(c)(1). Amtrak and the public authorities that
provide commuter rail transportation on the Northeast Corridor are required to implement this
policy in their agreements. 49 U.S.C. § 24905(c)(2). If the parties fail to enter into new
agreements or otherwise fail to comply with the policy, then the Board “shall determine the
appropriate compensation . . . after taking into consideration the [policy], as applicable.” Id.

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 Docket No. FD 36332
 

Metra also contends that, pursuant to the Board’s recent decision in Canadian National
Railway, FD 35743, slip op. at 22 n.41, the Board may only allocate costs to Metra that are
“specific, verifiable, and quantifiable.” (Metra Opening 9.) Based on this principle, Metra
argues that “actual costs” should be used as the basis for compensation when they are available
and reasonable. (Id.) Moreover, Metra contends that this standard prohibits Amtrak from
recovering a cost that is “‘normalized,’ ‘projected’ or ‘budgeted’—or even subsidized by a third
party such that it no longer exists as a cost.” (Id.)

Amtrak responds that the costs it identified in this proceeding are specific, verifiable, and
quantifiable. (Amtrak Reply 6, June 24, 2020.) Nonetheless, Amtrak contends that Metra’s
argument incorrectly assumes that this case, like Canadian National Railway, requires an
incremental costs analysis. (Id.) Amtrak argues that “the requirement that proposed costs be
‘specific, verifiable, and quantifiable’ sprang directly from the fact that those costs were
incremental (and therefore had to be expended . . . in order to be reimbursable).” (Id. at 7.)
Amtrak also reasons that § 24903(c)(2) permits allocation of projected and budgeted costs
because “[t]he purpose of this proceeding is to devise a forward-looking compensation
framework that will remain in place for several years into the future, including an inflation
index.” (Id.) Finally, Amtrak asserts that its funding sources have no bearing on the Board’s
analysis because they do not affect whether Amtrak incurred the cost or whether the cost
provides a benefit to Metra. (Id. at 7-8.)

The Board first turns to the parties’ dispute over whether the application of factors that
reasonably reflect the relative use of CUS is sufficient to avoid cross-subsidization under
§ 24903(c)(2). While Metra contends that “a secondary, ‘as-applied’ limitation” is necessary
because “the generalized, perfect, usage factor” does not exist, (Metra Opening 12), the Board
concludes that § 24903(c)(2) does not require the Board to identify a “perfect” usage factor. As
the Board has previously recognized, allocation of costs “involves judgment on a myriad of
facts” and has “no claim to an exact science.” Amtrak’s Pet. for Determination of PRIIA
Section 209 Cost Methodology, FD 35571, slip op. at 3 (STB served Mar. 15, 2012) (internal
citations omitted). By directing the Board to utilize factors that reasonably reflect the relative
use of the rail property, § 24903(c)(2) prescribes the method by which the Board determines
compensation without allowing for cross-subsidization. The Board declines to construe the
statute as requiring some sort of “secondary, ‘as-applied’ limitation.” Moreover, Metra’s
approach contemplates that the Board will exclude certain costs of “marginal utility” to Metra,
but Metra does not attempt to define that standard or provide any practical way for the Board to
determine which costs provide only “marginal utility” to Metra such that they should be
excluded. Furthermore, as § 24903(c)(2) directs the Board to allocate “the costs Amtrak incurs
only for the benefit of the carrier, plus a proportionate share of all other costs of providing
transportation under this paragraph incurred for the common benefit of Amtrak and the carrier,”
the Board finds that it must allocate some proportion of all costs that benefit Metra. The Board
may consider relative benefit in determining factors for common benefit cost allocation.
However, the Board finds that Metra’s proposed approach would require the Board to exclude
costs that provide some benefit to Metra in a manner contrary to the methodology prescribed by
statute.

6
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

With respect to the NECC policy, the Board will not consider the methodologies adopted
therein as dispositive in this proceeding. Although the parties’ agreed-upon factors for allocation
of dispatching and maintenance of way costs and the agreed-upon formula for allocation of
station operations and maintenance (SOM) costs correspond to the methodologies adopted by the
NECC, (Amtrak Opening 25, 32), the parties disagree about whether the NECC policy factor is
appropriate for the allocation of policing costs (Amtrak Reply 8-9, June 24, 2020; Metra Reply 8,
June 24, 2020). Moreover, despite Amtrak’s insistence that the NECC policy should be utilized
by the Board, Amtrak departs from it in its proposed methodology for capital expenses.
(See Amtrak Opening 20; Metra Reply 7, June 24, 2020.) Since CUS is located outside the
Northeast Corridor, and § 24905(c)(1) therefore does not apply to this proceeding, the Board is
not required to adopt the NECC policy here. Accordingly, although in some instances a factor
that reasonably reflects the relative use of CUS in this proceeding may correspond to one
contained in the NECC policy, the Board is not required to adopt Amtrak’s proposed factor over
another simply because of its connection to the NECC policy.

Lastly, the Board finds that the “specific, verifiable, and quantifiable” costs standard
from Canadian National Railway does not apply to this proceeding. Pursuant to the statute
relevant to Canadian National Railway, 49 U.S.C. § 24308, the Board was required to “consider
quality of service as a major factor when determining whether, and the extent to which, the
amount of compensation shall be greater than the incremental costs of using the facilities.”11
However, § 24903(c), unlike § 24308(a), does not direct the Board to consider incremental costs.
Moreover, the costs at issue in this proceeding do not include the sorts of potentially unverifiable
costs at issue in Canadian National Railway, such as “freight rate suppression, capacity costs,
foregone volume, [and] lost opportunity costs.” Canadian Nat’l Ry., FD 35743, slip op. at 22.
To the extent Metra suggests that projected, budgeted, or subsidized costs cannot be recovered
because they are necessarily unspecific and unverifiable, the Board rejects this argument,
particularly in the context of this proceeding in which the Board must establish a
forward-looking cost allocation framework.

c. Disputed Contract Terms

The parties also disagree on the extent to which the Board should prescribe for the parties
disputed contract terms that are not specifically related to compensation.12 Amtrak argues that
 
11
In defining the term “incremental costs,” which is not defined by statute, the Board
determined that incremental costs are those costs that are actually incurred, and that would not
have been incurred “but for” the presence of Amtrak. Canadian Nat’l Ry., FD 35743, slip op.
at 22. The Board also found that incremental costs do not include costs that cannot be
specifically and verifiably quantified. Id.
12
The Board notes that, early in this proceeding, the parties appeared to contemplate that
the Board would determine compensation and prescribe non-compensation terms. (See Joint
Submission Regarding List of Issues for Determination 1, Feb. 7, 2020 (“The Parties have not
agreed to the terms of an agreement under [§] 24903(a)(6) for Metra’s use of the [CUS]
properties. Thus, the Board must impose terms, including compensation, on the Parties.”).)
However, the parties’ positions diverge in their briefs. Amtrak also suggests that the Joint
Submission included issues that only one party believed that the Board should decide.
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 Docket No. FD 36332
 

the Board must both determine compensation and set specific contract terms for the parties’
agreement. (Amtrak Suppl. Br. 4.) In Amtrak’s view, § 24903(c) contemplates that the Board
would impose terms both while the proceeding is pending and in the final order. (Id. at 4-5.)
Amtrak also asserts that the Board suggested it would set terms in its July 26, 2019 order when,
at the agreement and request of both parties, the Board ordered Amtrak to continue to provide
Metra access to CUS on an interim basis under the terms of the 1984 Agreement until further
order of the Board. (Id.) Additionally, Amtrak contends that the Board should not offer general
guidance on the disputed contract terms because § 24903 is not “a mechanism under which
parties can request advisory opinions to influence contract negotiations” and, moreover, that the
parties need “the material contractual terms to go with the Board’s determination of
compensation.” (Amtrak Reply 1, Feb. 19, 2021.)

Conversely, Metra suggests that the Board may lack the authority to prescribe specific
contract terms because § 24903(c) directs the Board only to set compensation. (Metra Suppl.
Br. 3.) Metra proposes that, in the absence of a clear statutory mandate to prescribe contract
terms, the Board should exercise its discretion to offer its perspective and guidance on the
disputed contract terms and allow the parties to continue to negotiate on the specific language.
(Id.)

The Board has carefully considered the plain language of § 24903(c) and finds that its
jurisdiction over this matter extends only to determining compensation for Metra’s use of CUS.
The language of § 24903(c) is narrower than other statutes in which Congress has specifically
given the Board the authority to set both compensation and other terms and conditions.
Compare § 24308(a)(2) (specifying that in the event of failure to agree, the Board shall
“prescribe reasonable terms and compensation for using the facilities”), and 49 U.S.C.
§ 11102(a) (stating that “the Board may establish conditions and compensation for use of the
facilities”) with § 24903(c) (directing the Board to “determine compensation . . . for the
transportation” if the parties do not agree). Nothing in the legislative history suggests a contrary
conclusion. Furthermore, the Board did not, as Amtrak argues, make any determinations about
its authority to prescribe non-compensation contract terms when, at the agreed-upon request of
both parties, the Board ordered Amtrak to continue to provide Metra access to CUS on an
interim basis pursuant to the 1984 Agreement until further order of the Board. In that July 2019
decision, the Board merely preserved the status quo until issuance of this final decision, as
directed by § 24903(c)(2) (the Board “shall order that the transportation continue”).
Accordingly, the Board will not prescribe contract terms for the parties where those terms do not
involve determining the amount of compensation that Metra must pay Amtrak for the use of
CUS.13
 
(See Amtrak Opening 14 n.8 (“Amtrak’s joint submission of that document does not imply that
Amtrak believes the Board must actually decide every purported issue listed there.”).)
13
Although courts have not yet addressed this specific issue, a recent decision by the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia contemplated the Board’s § 24903(c) role as
limited. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 1:19-cv-00537,
2021 WL 325957, at *12 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2021) (rejecting Amtrak’s argument that declaratory
relief would interfere with the § 24903(c) proceeding before the Board because the Board’s
proceeding “focuses only on compensation”).

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 Docket No. FD 36332
 

Thus, in the following section of this decision, the Board will address only the disputed
compensation categories of (1) SOM, (2) policing, (3) capital expenses, and (4) ground power, as
well as the applicable general and administrative (G&A) expenses addition amount and the
inflation index that will apply to multiple cost categories.14 The parties’ remaining disputed
contract terms, many of which the parties identified as issues but did not brief,15 would require
the Board to make findings on issues that do not involve compensation determinations. For
example, the parties ask the Board to resolve whether the agreement should include a provision
governing termination for material default and whether Amtrak should have ultimate authority to
set service schedules, among other issues. However, the parties have not explained how, if at all,
these terms would impact the compensation that they are asking the Board to determine.16

The Board declines to provide advisory guidance on the disputed non-compensation

contract terms for the reasons discussed above. Given that one party has expressed a renewed
interest and optimism in resolving those disputed contract terms through subsequent mediation,
(see Metra Reply 3-4, 24, Feb. 19, 2021), the Board strongly encourages the parties to consider
mediation on any remaining disputed non-compensation contract terms.

 
14
The parties have reached agreement on compensation for dispatching and maintenance
of way costs. (Joint Stipulation ¶ 1-2, May 18, 2020.)
15
From the joint issues list that the parties submitted at the close of mediation, neither
party presented argument for the issues involving modification of ingress, egress, and square
footage used by Metra and its customers at CUS; the standard under which Amtrak must provide
janitorial and maintenance services; funding for extraordinary maintenance and capital
improvements; whether Metra may assert control over emergency responses; whether Metra is
entitled to any parking; and ADA compliance.
16
The only other disputed contract term that the parties associate with a dollar amount is
the monthly fee for dispatching technology. Here, Amtrak asks the Board to require Metra to
pay a monthly fee of $500 to use the dispatching feed. (Amtrak Suppl. Br. 9-10.) Although
Metra states that it is willing to pay the monthly fee for access to the dispatching feed, Metra
argues that it should have access to technology that would allow Metra to “‘play back’ Amtrak’s
CUS dispatching activities.” (Metra Suppl. Br. 12.) Amtrak objects, arguing that “[p]roviding
Metra with this additional service would go beyond the status quo and present additional costs
and burden to Amtrak.” (Amtrak Reply 9, Feb. 19, 2021.) In order to set a monthly fee for
dispatching technology, the Board would need to determine (1) whether Metra is entitled to
play-back technology (a non-compensation issue) and (2) how much play-back technology
would cost (for which there is no evidence in the record). Thus, the Board cannot set
compensation for the dispatching feed unless the parties reach an agreement on Metra’s
entitlement to play back technology and provide the Board with evidence of the cost of such
technology.

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 Docket No. FD 36332
 

B. Compensation

a. G&A Expenses

Amtrak’s cost calculations include the addition of the following G&A expenses: 6.97%
for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 and 5.81% for FY2017.17 (Amtrak Opening 23-24, 33.) Amtrak
describes the G&A addition as a “common financial tool used to account for indirect costs that
are not tied to a specific cost objective but rather benefit several functions at once,” such as a
phone line that cannot be tied to any specific business function but indirectly supports the
business as a whole. (Amtrak Reply 12 n.7, June 24, 2020.)

Metra “accepts the application of an overhead additive in the spirit of compromise” but
proposes an alternative G&A addition of 3.73% for FY2016 and 3.03% for FY2017.  (Metra
Opening 42-43.) Metra argues that Amtrak’s proposed figures “would result in Metra
contributing to Amtrak’s overall G&A costs, much of which have nothing to do with CUS but
rather with Amtrak’s core function of providing intercity rail passenger service, and for which
Metra derives absolutely no benefit.” (Id. at 43.) Metra excluded the following expenses as
unrelated to CUS operations: administrative services, automotive, chief executive officer,
emergency management and corporate security, government affairs, information systems, and
labor relations. (Id., V.S. Thomas Crowley & Robert Mulholland 10-11.)

Amtrak responds that Metra calculated its proposed G&A addition by excluding expenses
in an arbitrary and unexplained way. (Amtrak Reply 32-34, June 24, 2020.) Amtrak argues that
Metra’s exclusion of information systems appears particularly “result-driven” because Amtrak
incurs over $100 million a year in expenses related to information systems.18 (Id. at 33-34.)

The Board will apply a G&A addition but does not adopt either party’s calculations in
full. The Board agrees with most of the expenses Metra excluded from Amtrak’s G&A
calculation, as the expenses related to Amtrak’s chief executive officer, government affairs, labor
relations, automotive, and administrative services do not provide any readily apparent benefit to
Metra’s operations at CUS. Apart from a conclusory statement that the expenses Amtrak
included “indirectly support [CUS],” (see Amtrak Reply, V.S. Nancy Miller ¶ 35, June 24,
2020), Amtrak does not offer specifics about the individual expenses that these categories
include or the ways in which they support CUS. Furthermore, Amtrak offers very limited detail
about information systems by simply stating that these expenses support human resources,
 
17
The parties agreed, for purposes of this proceeding, to use FY2016 and FY2017 data
as the basis for establishing future costs because they began negotiating the new agreement in
2018. (Amtrak Opening 23 n.11; Metra Opening 18.) Although Amtrak and Metra express their
proposed costs in both FY2018 dollars and/or FY2020 dollars throughout their briefs, the Board
will express disputed costs in FY2018 dollars in this decision. The parties’ proposed numbers
are taken from their workpapers, and where FY2018 numbers were not provided, the Board has
recalculated those numbers in FY2018 dollars for comparison purposes.
18
By way of comparison, the next two largest categories of expenses (legal and finance)
are less than half the amount of information systems expenses. (Amtrak Opening, V.S. Nancy
Miller, Ex. 18.)

10
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

payroll, inventory management, and work management systems. (Id. at 33, V.S. Nancy
Miller ¶ 36.) However, as Amtrak notes, information systems expenses account for, by far, the
largest share of G&A expenses that it seeks to allocate to Metra. (Id. at 33-34.) For such a large
category of expenses, the Board would have expected Amtrak to provide much more detail about
the specific expenses included and describe how those expenses function at CUS.19 Without
more information from Amtrak about how these expenses benefit CUS and Metra, the Board
cannot include them in the G&A calculation while preventing cross-subsidization.

The Board will, however, include expenses related to emergency management and
corporate security. Unlike the other disputed expenses, Amtrak explains how these particular
expenses support CUS by “cover[ing] the cycle of planning, training, equipping, and responding
before, during, and after an emergency.” (Id. at 33.) As discussed in the policing section below,
Metra clearly benefits from Amtrak’s efforts to maintain the overall safety and security of its
facilities. Accordingly, the Board finds that the appropriate G&A addition will be 3.97% for
FY2016 and 3.27% for FY2017.20

b. Inflation Index

Amtrak and Metra agree that an inflation index should be applied annually to costs but
disagree about the appropriate inflation index. Amtrak advocates for the Association of
American Railroads Quarterly Index of Chargeout Prices and Wage Rates (Table C), East,
“material prices, wage rates and supplements combined (excluding fuel)” (AAR Index).
(Amtrak Opening 49-50.) According to Amtrak, the AAR Index is “most closely related to the
type of costs being indexed” because it is the standard index used in agreements between
carriers, and it is directly tied to the types of costs incurred by carriers. (Id. (quoting Guilford,
3 S.T.B. at 170).)

Metra argues that the Board should apply the Core Personal Consumption Expenditures
(Core PCE) Index to costs because Amtrak applies the Core PCE Index to the vast majority of
CUS expenses for internal forecasting purposes in the normal course of business. (Metra
Opening 48.) Metra also asserts that it utilized a market basket index (MBI)—in which it
selected relevant indexes for services, utilities, materials, and labor in the Chicago market and
weighed them based on the observed distribution of FY2016 and FY2017 SOM expenses—to
examine whether inflation patterns for certain CUS costs correspond to the Core PCE Index.
(Id.) According to Metra, the MBI validates the use of the Core PCE Index as a reasonable
proxy for inflation. (Id.)

Amtrak disputes that the Core PCE Index would accurately reflect cost changes at CUS
because the Core PCE Index is a consumer-facing metric based on the cost of goods and services
 
19
Although Amtrak does itemize costs associated with reservations and telephone data
communications expenses, it does not identify the remainder of individual expenses composing
the information systems category. (See Amtrak Opening, V.S. Nancy Miller, Ex. 18.)
20
The Board notes that although the parties included a line item for contract
administration expenses in the FY2017 G&A calculation, they did not do so for the FY2016
G&A calculation. (See Amtrak Opening, V.S. Nancy Miller, Ex. 18.)

11
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

regularly consumed by individuals that does not include labor costs. (Amtrak Opening 50.)
According to Amtrak, Metra’s argument is flawed because it is based upon the incorrect premise
that Amtrak uses the Core PCE Index internally as the inflator for 99% of the policing costs at
issue in this proceeding. (Amtrak Reply 19, June 24, 2020.) Amtrak contends that policing
expenses include a significant wages component for which Amtrak uses an agreed-upon labor
index for inflation of wages in its internal calculations. (Id.) Metra’s mistake, Amtrak argues,
“is not limited to one line-item of expenses but is endemic to their entire discussion of inflation
indices.” (Id. at 19-20.)

Metra challenges the relevance of the AAR Index by arguing that CUS expenses
principally relate to property management, janitorial and building maintenance services, and
utilities, which differ from the Class I freight railroad expenses reflected in the AAR Index, such
as materials and freight railroad labor union contracts. (Metra Reply 33-34, June 24, 2020.)
Metra further argues that the AAR Index does not accurately account for the scope of Amtrak’s
labor costs at CUS because Amtrak’s analysis conflates company-wide labor costs with
CUS-specific labor costs. (Id. at 34.) Although Metra acknowledges that an AAR index was
appropriate in Guilford, 3 S.T.B. at 170, which involved the allocation of costs to Amtrak by
another carrier for Amtrak’s operation of passenger rail service over the other carrier’s lines,
Metra argues that the present proceeding differs because it involves predominantly terminal costs
for building upkeep and maintenance. (Id. at 34-35.)

The Board will apply the AAR Index to maintenance of way and dispatching costs, and
the Core PCE Index to SOM, policing, and ground power. As the parties observe, the Board has
expressed a preference for “the index that is most closely related to the type of costs being
indexed.” See Guilford, 3 S.T.B. at 170. The AAR Index is appropriate for maintenance of way
and dispatching costs because expenses for these operations at CUS are similar to the Class I
freight railroad expenses reflected in the AAR Index. However, the Board finds that the Core
PCE Index is appropriate for the other cost categories at CUS that involve expenses primarily
associated with property management and building maintenance. Although the Core PCE Index
does not include labor costs, the labor costs reflected in the AAR Index associated with freight
rail operations differ significantly from the labor costs at CUS associated with building
maintenance. Furthermore, although Amtrak correctly observes that Metra overstates the
expenses for which Amtrak uses the Core PCE Index in its internal forecasting, Metra’s
calculation error does not, as Amtrak argues, invalidate its entire argument since Amtrak uses the
Core PCE Index to forecast a significant amount of CUS expenses.

c. SOM

The parties agree on the formula for calculating total SOM costs, and they agree to
allocate those costs to Metra based upon a special formula ratio (SFR) with inputs reflecting the
square footage of CUS. However, the parties disagree about how many square feet should be
designated as common benefit area, Metra exclusive use area, and Amtrak exclusive use area, as
well as how the total station area should be defined.

12
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

i. Total SOM Costs

To calculate total SOM costs,21 the parties have agreed to: (1) use Amtrak’s SOM cost
data for FY2016 and FY2017; (2) add G&A expenses (as determined by the Board); (3) apply an
inflation index (as determined by the Board) to convert the FY2016 and FY2017 cost amounts to
FY2018 dollars; and (4) average the adjusted FY2016 and FY2017 cost amounts. (Amtrak
Reply 29-30, June 24, 2020; Metra Opening 39.) The resulting amount will serve as the parties’
foundation for computation of future SOM costs through application of the inflation index.
(Metra Opening 39.) Pursuant to the parties’ agreed-upon formula (with the addition of G&A
expenses and the application of the Core PCE Index as determined by the Board), the total
allocable SOM costs will be $12,244,427 for FY2018.

ii. SOM Cost Allocation

Amtrak and Metra have also agreed to several aspects of the SOM cost allocation. First,
the parties agree to allocate SOM costs based on square footage, and they agree that only the
basement, concourse, and mezzanine levels of CUS are relevant for purposes of the SOM cost
allocation. (Joint Stipulation ¶ 3(a), May 18, 2020.)22 Second, Amtrak and Metra agree that
Metra’s share of SOM costs should be determined pursuant to the following SFR:

Metra exclusive use area + (usage factor x common benefit area)

total station area

(Amtrak Opening 26; Metra Opening 35.) Third, the parties have agreed that 83%23 is the proper
usage factor for the equation. (Amtrak Reply 34, June 24, 2020; Metra Reply 17 n.11, June 24,
2020.) Metra and Amtrak disagree on the other equation inputs: (1) common benefit area,
(2) Metra exclusive use area, and (3) total station area.

1. Common Benefit Area

Amtrak designates 196,590 square feet as common benefit area based upon the areas of
CUS that both parties may access and use.24 (Amtrak Opening 29, 32.) Amtrak asserts that it
 
21
Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, these amounts do not include SOM costs related to
dispatching, as the costs incurred for maintenance and operation of those areas are accounted for
in the dispatching allocation to which the parties agreed. (See Amtrak Opening 29 n.13; Metra
Opening 44-45; Amtrak Reply 31 n.18, June 24, 2020.)
22
Amtrak states that CUS is divided horizontally by floor into 12 levels, including the
sub-basement, basement, concourse, mezzanine, street level, and floors two through eight.
(Amtrak Opening 27.) In addition to the horizontal levels, Amtrak states that CUS is divided
vertically into two areas referred to as the headhouse and concourse. (Id.)
23
This figure represents the average of Metra’s share of train movements and passenger
boardings and alightings at CUS.
24
Amtrak explains that it consulted with its employees at CUS to designate areas as
Metra exclusive use, Amtrak exclusive use, or as common benefit area based on whether one or
13
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

did not consider the parties’ relative use of the common benefit areas because “[i]t is not
administratively feasible to divvy up the square footage for each individual area based on the
relative use of each individual area and assign a different allocation factor to each area.” (Id.
at 30.)

Conversely, Metra designates only 74,850 square feet as common benefit area. (Metra
Opening 37.) Metra bases its proposed number largely on what it refers to as the “Consensus
Floor Plan,” which, according to Metra, the parties developed after a walk-through of CUS on
January 9, 2020, and related discussions and email correspondence. (Id., V.S. Alvin Terry 2.)
Furthermore, Metra considers relative use by excluding certain spaces in the common benefit
area calculation that Amtrak purportedly uses more than Metra. (Id., V.S. Alvin Terry 4-9.)

The primary area of dispute between the parties involves an area of 120,040 square feet
located on the concourse level of the headhouse building, which includes the Great Hall
(Concourse Headhouse).25 Metra argues that only 11,092 square feet (or alternatively,
16,517 square feet) of the Concourse Headhouse should be designated as common benefit area
and the remainder as Amtrak exclusive use area. (Metra Surreply 3, Apr. 20, 2021; see also
Metra Reply 25, June 24, 2020.) Conversely, Amtrak designates approximately 75,000 square
feet of the Concourse Headhouse as common benefit area and the remainder as Amtrak exclusive
use area. (Amtrak Reply 2, Jan. 29, 2021.) Metra asserts that its proposed number is appropriate
because the Concourse Headhouse primarily benefits Amtrak passengers, who remain in the area
for extended periods of time as they await the arrival and departure of Amtrak trains, whereas
Metra passengers use this area as “merely a momentary pass-through” to other areas.  (Metra
Reply 25-26, June 24, 2020.) Metra also suggests that the Board should adopt its proposal
because Amtrak previously agreed that it should bear most of the costs associated with the
Concourse Headhouse before changing its position. (See Metra Surreply 1, Apr. 20, 2021; Metra
Reply 28-31, June 24, 2020.) In support, Metra cites to (1) the June 2019 Proposed Agreement
in which Amtrak allocated only 15% of the Great Hall to Metra; (2) an Amtrak study estimating
passenger dwell time in the Great Hall; and (3) the “Consensus Floor Plan,” which designates
only part of the Great Hall as common benefit area. (See Metra Surreply 1-3, Apr. 20, 2021;
Metra Reply 26-28, June 24, 2020.)

In addition to the Concourse Headhouse, Metra identifies 12,637 square feet that it argues
should be designated as Amtrak exclusive use area, rather than common benefit area: (1) crew
 
both parties can access or use the area, with the exception of those areas from which Amtrak
derives revenue (such as areas occupied by tenants paying rent to Amtrak), which Amtrak
designated as Amtrak exclusive use areas even though Metra passengers may access them.
(Amtrak Opening 29.)
25
In various pleadings, Metra refers to this disputed area as the “Great Hall,” “Great Hall
Building Concourse,” and “Great Hall Concourse.” (See Metra Reply 28, June 24, 2020; Metra
Reply 1, Jan. 19, 2021; Metra Surreply 1, Apr. 20, 2021.) Amtrak, however, asserts that the term
“Great Hall” refers to only one room (an area of approximately 25,000 square feet) within the
greater concourse level of the headhouse building. (Amtrak Reply 2, Jan. 29, 2021.) For
purposes of this decision, the Board will refer to the 120,040-square foot disputed area as the
Concourse Headhouse.

14
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

quarters (1,080 square feet) in the basement consisting of a locker room and rest facilities that
Metra’s staff uses minimally; (2) the refuse dock (1,637 square feet) in the basement consisting
of a trash receptable dock to which Metra passengers contribute less solid waste than Amtrak’s
retail and commercial tenants; (3) six floor paths allowing for North and South stairwell access
(1,946 square feet) to the Great Hall stairs and taxi stand that Metra commuters do not use
regularly; (4) a constrained passageway (2,342 square feet), for which Amtrak has constructed
makeshift barriers discouraging pedestrian flow; (5) headhouse building stairs to Jackson Street
(527 square feet) that Metra passengers generally do not use; (6) a public restroom (610 square
feet) that Amtrak does not permit Metra or other members of the public to use; (7) a parking
garage tunnel (2,160 square feet) that Metra passengers rarely use; and (8) tracks 18-26
(2,335 square feet) that only a single Metra trainset uses on a daily basis. (Metra Opening,
V.S. Alvin Terry 4-9.)

Finally, Metra’s proposed allocation does not include two cab stands26 that Amtrak
designated as common benefit area.27 (Metra Surreply 5-6, Apr. 20, 2021.) Metra argues that
these cab stands should not be included because the parties did not agree that the cab stands were
common benefit areas on the “Consensus Floor Plan,” Amtrak did not designate the cab stands as
public circulation areas in floor plans created “outside of litigation,” Amtrak has blocked public
access to one of the cab stands, and there is no passenger circulation in these areas. (Id. at 6.)

In response, Amtrak contends that Metra’s methodology is flawed because it “takes

spaces that Metra clearly, and many times admittedly, uses, but then assigns to Metra no costs
associated with those spaces” on the basis that Metra does not use the areas “enough.” (Amtrak
Reply 39-40, June 24, 2020.) Amtrak argues that Metra’s reliance on relative use is improper
because such methodology requires “detailed and expensive studies, which Metra has not
performed,” and furthermore, because Metra selectively considers relative use in a manner that
works only to Metra’s advantage. (Id.) Amtrak asserts that pursuant to Metra’s approach, the
Board would need to designate, as Metra exclusive use areas, those areas that Amtrak uses less
than Metra (e.g., areas directly in front of the platforms where Metra passengers queue);
however, Metra did not provide this information to the Board such that its preferred
methodology could be applied in an even manner. (Id. at 39.) In Amtrak’s view, any areas that
both parties use should be designated as common benefit areas such that both parties contribute
to the costs of those areas. (Id. at 38.)

Amtrak also argues that Metra mischaracterizes its previous position on the Concourse
Headhouse. Amtrak explains that in pre-litigation discussions, it offered to allocate a lesser
percentage of the Great Hall room to Metra, but never did so with respect to the entirety of the
Concourse Headhouse. (Amtrak Reply 3, Jan. 29, 2021.) Subsequently, before submitting its
opening statement, Amtrak “further analyzed how Metra passengers and employees use [CUS],
and the areas to which they have access,” and determined that the Great Hall should be
 
26
Metra indicates that the “cab stands” to which it refers are “[n]ot to be confused with
the currently-in use ‘Taxi Stand’” referenced by Alvin Terry in his verified statement. (Metra
Surreply 6 n.7, Apr. 20, 2021.)
27
Collectively, the two cab stands total 36,841 square feet. (See Amtrak Opening,
V.S. Nancy Miller, Ex. 16.)

15
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

designated as common benefit area. (Amtrak Opening 29 n.14.) With respect to the dwell time
study cited by Metra, Amtrak contends that the estimates contained therein amount to “merely an
‘exercise’ based on assumptions, not data.” (Amtrak Reply 38 n.20, June 24, 2020.)
Furthermore, Amtrak argues that Metra’s reliance on the so-called “Consensus Floor Plan” is
misplaced since “[i]t is not true that the parties reached an agreement about square footage
allocation, or that there was any ‘consensus’ about how square footage should be allocated.”
(Id. at 37.) Amtrak contends that “had there been such an agreement, the parties would have
submitted a stipulation, as they have done for the numerous other areas on which they were able
to reach agreement.” (Id.)

With respect to the other miscellaneous areas that Metra excludes, Amtrak argues that
Metra regularly uses the parking garage tunnel to access a terminal for transfer passengers, the
public restroom on the concourse level, and the concourse basement trash receptable dock.
(Id. at 37-38.)28

The Board will adopt Amtrak’s proposed common benefit area allocation. Amtrak’s
proposal to designate areas that the parties both use as common benefit area complies with
§ 24903(c)(2)’s mandate that the Board assign a proportionate share of “all other costs . . .
incurred for the common benefit of Amtrak and the carrier.” Conversely, Metra’s proposal
would require the Board to designate several areas that Metra uses (and benefits from) as Amtrak
exclusive use areas. Metra acknowledges that its employees or passengers use almost all of the
disputed areas (besides a restroom, which Amtrak contends that Metra employees regularly use,
and the cab stands discussed below). Although Metra argues that it does not use certain areas to
the same extent that Amtrak does, Metra does not provide sufficient evidence from which the
Board could meaningfully assign individual usage factors to each space.29 For example, Metra
asks the Board to exclude a trash receptable dock on the basis that Metra passengers contribute
less solid waste than Amtrak’s retail and commercial tenants, but the record contains no evidence
about the percentage of solid waste that Metra contributes to this single trash receptable dock as
compared to Amtrak. Furthermore, as Amtrak notes, Metra does not apply its methodology
evenly by excluding from the common benefit area total and including in the Metra exclusive use
area total individual areas that Metra uses more than Amtrak.

Metra’s argument that the Board should adopt its proposed allocation because Amtrak
purportedly agreed to it previously and then changed its position prior to the submission of
opening statements is not persuasive. Amtrak asserts that the parties did not reach an agreement
as to square footage allocation, and the documents that Metra submits as evidence of the alleged
consensus do not demonstrate that one existed. Regardless, Amtrak is clearly permitted to adopt
 
28
Amtrak did not respond to Metra’s arguments with respect to the two cab stands since
they were raised for the first time in Metra’s April 20, 2021, surreply, although Metra did
account for the presence of the cab stands in its square footage calculations in its earlier filings.
29
The dwell time study cited by Metra is not sufficient because the study merely
estimates usage based on assumptions of how much time Amtrak and Metra passengers spend in
the Great Hall. Furthermore, since the Great Hall constitutes only one room in the larger
Concourse Headhouse area, (see Amtrak Reply 2, Jan. 29, 2021), the study provides no
information about the majority of common benefit areas in dispute.

16
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

a different position in its opening statement than it offered during the parties’ settlement
discussions.

The Board also finds that the cab stands were appropriately included as common benefit
area. In addition to Metra’s misplaced reliance on the “Consensus Floor Plan,” which does not
show an agreement between the parties, the other documents cited by Metra do not indicate that
its passengers cannot use the cab stand areas. Contrary to Metra’s assertion, it is not clear from
the document cited that Amtrak has blocked one of the areas from public access. (See Amtrak
Opening, V.S. Nancy Miller, Ex. 15.) Furthermore, in support of its argument that no passenger
circulation exists in these areas, Metra refers the Board to a model labeled as a “Conceptual
illustration of Union Station concourse passenger flows in PM rush, when there are delayed
Metra departures and late arrival of an Amtrak train.” (Metra Opening, V.S. Robert Byrd, Ex. 1
at 62.) This evidence is unconvincing since the description of the model suggests a specific,
limited situation. Otherwise, Metra does not explain why its passengers would be barred from
accessing cab stands at CUS.30

Table 1 summarizes the parties’ positions and the Board’s conclusion on common benefit
area allocation.

TABLE 1

Common Benefit Area

Amtrak Metra STB
196,590 74,850 196,590

2. Metra Exclusive Use Area

Metra asserts that the parties agreed to designate 10,629 square feet to Metra’s exclusive
use. (Metra Opening 37.) Metra’s number is based solely on the Metra exclusive use areas
designated on the “Consensus Floor Plan,” (Metra Opening, V.S. Alvin Terry, Ex. 2); however,
Amtrak reiterates that this document does not in fact reflect a consensus between the parties,
(Amtrak Reply 37, June 24, 2020). In contrast, Amtrak proposes to assign 8,120 square feet as
Metra exclusive use area. (Amtrak Opening 32.) Amtrak’s proposed number includes those
individual areas that Amtrak designated as solely for the benefit of Metra based on discussions
with CUS operating and station personnel. (See Amtrak Opening, V.S. Nancy Miller 17, Ex. 3.)

The Board will adopt Amtrak’s number for assignment of Metra exclusive use area.
Metra bases its proposed number on the “Consensus Floor Plan,” which, for the reasons
discussed above, the Board does not accept as a binding agreement between the parties.
 
30
The areas identified by the parties (Concourse Headhouse, cab stands, and other
miscellaneous areas) account for all but a small amount of the total disputed common benefit
area. However, neither party discusses which areas of CUS account for the remainder of the
disputed common benefit area and the floor-by-floor square footage allocations provided by the
parties do not clarify the remaining areas in dispute. In any event, the Board finds Amtrak’s
common benefit area number more reasonable for the reasons discussed above.

17
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

Furthermore, the Board notes that the use of Amtrak’s number for assignment of Metra exclusive
use area produces a more favorable number to Metra, although the cost allocation percentage
differs only slightly.31

Table 2 summarizes the parties’ positions and the Board’s conclusion on Metra exclusive
use area allocation.

TABLE 2

Metra Exclusive Use Area

Amtrak Metra STB
8,120 10,629 8,120

3. Total Station Area

As mentioned above, the parties agree that only the basement, concourse, and mezzanine
levels of CUS are relevant for purposes of the SOM cost allocation. (Joint Stipulation ¶ 3(a),
May 18, 2020.) Without any adjustments, this area totals 489,555 square feet. (Amtrak
Opening 32.) However, Amtrak argues that the appropriate calculation for total station area is
360,932 square feet, which includes the entire concourse level, mezzanine level, and the
basement level of the concourse building (Basement Concourse), but only 5% of the basement
level of the headhouse building (Basement Headhouse). (Id. at 27-28.) Amtrak argues that an
adjustment to the Basement Headhouse is appropriate because the area is “primarily devoted to
mechanical and other uses,” including a loading ramp and parking lot, that account for no more
than a de minimis proportion of SOM costs, such as utilities and janitorial services, compared to
other heavily-traveled areas of CUS. (Id. at 28.) In support, Amtrak submits photographs of the
Basement Headhouse depicting the entry gate and the areas surrounding the loading dock.
(Amtrak Reply 40-41, V.S. Christine Suchy ¶¶ 19-21, June 24, 2020.)

Metra opposes Amtrak’s adjustment of the Basement Headhouse. Metra argues that
Amtrak does not offer evidence to support its claim that the Basement Headhouse consumes
significantly fewer SOM services than other areas of CUS. (Metra Reply 22-23, June 24, 2020.)
Metra also contends that no such evidence exists because Amtrak’s accounting assigns SOM
costs to CUS on a generalized basis without tracking the amount of resources each individual
area of CUS consumes. (Id. at 24.) Furthermore, because Amtrak does not adjust any other
areas at CUS, Metra argues that Amtrak’s adjustment of the Basement Headhouse is a
results-driven attempt to achieve a lower SFR denominator and thereby allocate more SOM costs
to Metra. (Id. at 22.)

The Board will not apply Amtrak’s proposed adjustment factor to the Basement
Headhouse. Amtrak’s claim that the Basement Headhouse accounts for no more than a
de minimis proportion of SOM costs compared to other areas of CUS is unsupported by the
record. Amtrak presents no data detailing the proportion of SOM costs consumed by the
Basement Headhouse relative to other areas at CUS, but rather simply submits photographs that
 
31
The difference is approximately 0.5%.

18
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

provide no basis for a determination that the area consumes 95% less in SOM costs than other
areas at CUS. Amtrak offers minimal description of how it uses the Basement Headhouse and
vaguely describes the area as devoted “to mechanical and other uses”; however, to keep any area
of CUS safe and functional for users, Amtrak would need to expend SOM costs for services such
as lighting and mechanical repairs. The Board also observes that Amtrak’s downward
adjustment of the Basement Headhouse contradicts other aspects of its proposed methodology.
Amtrak argues that “[i]t is not administratively feasible to divvy up the square footage for each
individual area based on the relative use of each individual area,” (Amtrak Opening 30), but
Amtrak justifies its adjustment of the Basement Headhouse based upon relative use of SOM
resources. As Metra observes, Amtrak’s adjustment of the Basement Headhouse appears
arbitrary in the context of the fact that Amtrak does not adjust the other areas of CUS or explain
why it is not feasible to do so. Lastly, the Board notes that Amtrak’s proposed adjustment has a
significant impact on the SOM cost allocation by removing almost half of Amtrak’s exclusive
use area from the square footage calculation entirely. (See Amtrak Opening 32.) In the absence
of additional evidentiary support, the Board declines to make such a significant adjustment.

Table 3 summarizes the parties’ positions and the Board’s conclusion on total allocable
station area.

TABLE 3

Total Station Area

Location Amtrak Metra STB
Basement Headhouse 6,770 135,393 135,393
Basement Concourse 88,150 88,150 88,150
Concourse 197,980 197,980 197,980
Mezzanine 68,032 68,032 68,032
Total 360,932 489,555 489,555

4. Conclusion

Based upon the parties’ agreed-upon SFR, Metra will be responsible for 35% of SOM
costs ($4,285,549 in FY2018 dollars). Table 4 summarizes the parties’ positions and the Board’s
conclusion on SOM cost allocation.

19
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

TABLE 4

SOM (FY2018)
Amtrak Metra STB
Total Allocable
SOM Costs $12,801,311 $12,215,859 $12,244,427
Cost Allocation
Percentage 47.5% 14.9% 35%
Total Allocated
SOM Costs $6,080,623 $1,820,163 $4,285,549

d. Policing

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 24305(e), Amtrak may “directly employ or contract with rail
police to provide security for rail passengers and property of Amtrak.” (Amtrak Opening 8.)
Metra’s police department does not police CUS. (Id.) Accordingly, both parties agree that
Metra should pay some proportion of Amtrak’s CUS policing costs. However, the parties
disagree about (1) whether certain specific costs should be included in the total allocable amount
and (2) the appropriate factor for allocation of policing costs.

i. Total Policing Costs

To calculate total policing costs, Amtrak (1) uses the average of Amtrak’s actual FY2016
and FY2017 costs; (2) adds costs associated with four additional officers that Amtrak anticipated
adding in FY2018; (3) subtracts costs associated with one position to reflect the approximate
expense of officers riding Amtrak trains or patrolling the Amtrak rail yard; (4) adds costs
associated with the Amtrak K-9 unit and three detectives assigned to CUS; and (5) adds G&A
expenses and applies the AAR Index. (Amtrak Opening 33.) Amtrak states that it did not
include the costs of equipment, training programs, or labor costs for police management and the
Amtrak police intelligence and counterterrorism unit. (Id. at 35.)

In addition to questioning the appropriate inflation index and G&A addition (discussed
above), Metra disagrees with two aspects of Amtrak’s total policing costs calculation. First,
Metra argues that Amtrak erred in adding costs associated with four officers that Amtrak
anticipated adding in 2018 because “[a] budgeted but unfilled position provides no police
protection, and it is not an actual, incurred police cost.” (Metra Opening 19.) Second, Metra
disputes Amtrak’s inclusion of an officer dedicated to working with the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) because Metra argues that this officer does not benefit Metra.32 (Id. at 20-21.)
Metra contends that the DEA position “targets larger-scale, intercity and interstate narcotics
trafficking, consistent with the scope and baggage-oriented manner of Amtrak travel” as
evidenced by the fact that between January 1, 2016, and March 31, 2019, only 0.8% of all
 
32
Metra also disputes the inclusion of another officer assigned to work with the Federal
Bureau of Investigations on an anti-terrorism task force. (Metra Opening 21-22.) However,
Metra’s argument is moot because Amtrak states that this position was not included in the
calculation. (Amtrak Reply 15-16, June 24, 2020.)

20
 
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reported narcotics-related incidents and calls for service33 involved Metra customers. (Id.)
Furthermore, Metra argues that the costs of the DEA position are “already reimbursed” to
Amtrak through the 10% bounty Amtrak receives for the value of drugs seized at CUS.
(Id. at 21.)

In its reply, Amtrak argues that the projected positions were properly included because
the cost allocation process is designed “to make a reasonable and appropriate determination of
the costs Amtrak was likely to incur throughout the life of the future contract based on past
costs.” (Amtrak Reply 15, June 24, 2020.) Amtrak states that although it hired only three
officers in 2018, it based its projection of four officers on the best information available at the
time. (Id.) Furthermore, Amtrak contends that it properly included the DEA-adjacent position
because Metra benefits from the work of Amtrak police in preventing narcotics trafficking that
could lead to violence at CUS. (Id. at 16.) Moreover, Amtrak asserts that its share of assets
seized at CUS is irrelevant to this matter. (Id.)

The Board will include the budgeted police officers and the officer dedicated to working
with the DEA. Police staffing needs will naturally fluctuate when officers are promoted or leave
the force, and Amtrak is permitted to make projections to account for anticipated staffing
changes. Metra argues that it does not benefit from budgeted but unfilled police positions;
however, Amtrak states that it filled three of the four budgeted positions. The Board will
subtract costs associated with one unfilled position. With respect to the officer who works with
the DEA, the Board finds that Metra benefits from efforts to ensure the overall safety of CUS,
including the prevention of drug trafficking and related crime. Metra argues that the costs of this
position are reimbursed to Amtrak through bounties from seized assets at CUS, but the record
does not contain evidence of any specific reimbursement amounts. Accordingly, the total
allocable policing costs will be $4,320,554 for FY2018.

ii. Policing Cost Allocation

To determine Metra’s share of policing costs, Amtrak proposes a factor based upon an
equal weighting of relative train movements and ridership, equivalent to the parties’ agreed-upon
SOM cost allocation usage factor, which would allocate 83% of the policing costs to Metra.
(Amtrak Opening 33; Amtrak Reply 20, June 24, 2020.) Amtrak argues that this factor is
appropriate because the costs and benefits of policing directly relate to the number of trains and
passengers traveling through CUS. (Amtrak Opening 34.) Furthermore, Amtrak contends that
the NECC policy, which adopted this methodology, “provides a clear and appropriate roadmap
for allocation of policing costs that can and should be replicated here.” (Amtrak Reply 28,
June 24, 2020.)
 
33
Metra states that the term “incidents” denotes “dispatched or self-initiated events for
police to conduct investigations, make arrests, formally document a crime, report an injured
person, or similar occurrences”; and the term “calls for service” denotes “non-criminal events
documented for the purpose of measuring police activity, and to provide a reference marker for
statistical data, such as providing information for lost and found items, assisting a homeless
person or passenger with an issue, or reporting a section of inoperable lighting requiring repair.”
(Metra Opening 24.)

21
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

Metra argues that neither train counts nor passenger counts should be used to allocate
policing costs. Metra asserts that train counts should not be considered because “[t]rains do not
commit crimes, and trains do not need medical assistance.” (Metra Opening 23.) Moreover,
Metra argues that the use of passenger counts misrepresents Metra passengers’ need for police
services because Metra passengers generally spend less time at CUS and are less frequently
targeted by criminals “because of their brisk pace and familiarity with surroundings.” (Id. at 24.)
In support, Metra emphasizes that Amtrak’s records attribute more incidents and calls for service
to Amtrak passengers than Metra passengers, and that Amtrak’s “heat maps”34 show that
incidents and calls for service more frequently occur in areas of CUS in which Metra passengers
spend less time. (Id. at 25.)

Metra also asserts that § 24903(c)(2) prohibits Amtrak from allocating policing costs to
Metra that are unrelated to providing transportation, such as the costs of policing the food court
and event spaces at CUS. (Metra Reply 9-10, June 24, 2020.) According to Metra, CUS attracts
non-train-riding users who visit various vendors, photograph and admire the Great Hall, and use
CUS as a covered pathway to other areas. (Metra Opening 28.) Metra contends that it should
not be required to pay for the police services that Amtrak provides to non-train-riding users of
CUS, although Metra acknowledges that it does not have access to data that specifies how many
non-train-riding users access CUS each day. (Id. at 28-29.)

Metra proposes to allocate 4.28% of Amtrak’s policing costs, which represents the
percentage of incidents and calls for service attributed to Metra passengers between January 1,
2016, and March 31, 2019 (3,482 out of 81,353 total incidents and calls for service).35 (Metra
Opening 25-26.) Alternatively, since only 8,285 of the 81,353 total incidents and calls for
service were attributed to either Amtrak or Metra, and Metra accounted for 42% of the attributed
incidents and calls for service, Metra argues that a 40% cost allocation “is a somewhat plausible
allocation alternative.” (Id. at 27, 29.)

Metra also proposes a separate allocation for CUS K9 unit expenses. (Id. at 29.) Metra
proposes to pay 1.1% of K9 unit costs on the basis that Amtrak primarily uses those services, as
evidenced by the fact that of the 281 total incidents and calls for service involving drugs and
bombs recorded between January 1, 2016, and March 31, 2019, only 1.1% of those were
attributable to Metra passengers. (Id. at 30.)

Metra also asks the Board to consider that (1) each year since 2016, Amtrak has qualified
for $10 million in grant money that Metra argues may be used to defray policing costs;
 
34
Metra states that the term “heat maps” signifies “a graphic representation of data,”
reflecting “the layout of various floors at CUS with plotting of [i]ncidents and [calls for service],
color coded to reflect the frequency of those events in various portions of CUS.” (Metra
Opening 25 n.23.)
35
Metra acknowledges that “[u]ndoubtedly, some number of additional [i]ncidents and
[calls for service] could have been associated with Metra passengers”; however, Metra argues
that since “Amtrak elected not to secure and retain that information . . . Amtrak alone should
bear responsibility for its inability or unwillingness to generate and retain more complete data.”
(Metra Reply 13, June 24, 2020.)

22
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

(2) according to an article in the Washington Post, Amtrak announced in February 2020 that it
would deploy more police officers to ride Amtrak trains rather than patrol stations; (3) Amtrak
posts police at CUS 24 hours a day, even when no Metra trains are scheduled and the station is
closed; and (4) Metra already pays separately for CUS security services through a contract with
BNSF Railway (BNSF) and these officers “handle a variety of security-related tasks that might
otherwise fall to Amtrak’s police.” (Id. at 32-33.)

In response to Metra’s proposal, Amtrak argues that Metra’s methodology is inconsistent

with § 24903(c)(2), which requires the Board to allocate costs based on “factors that reasonably
reflect the relative use of the rail facility,” not factors that reasonably reflect the relative use of
the police. (Amtrak Opening 36; Amtrak Reply 25, June 24, 2020.) Furthermore, Amtrak
argues that the incident and calls for service figures upon which Metra relies are “essentially
meaningless” because Amtrak police do not regularly assign or otherwise denote in their
reporting whether incidents or calls for service are associated with Amtrak or another entity
unless the information is volunteered or the incident or call for service can be geolocated (a
process that is subject to human error and not always precise). (Amtrak Opening 36; Amtrak
Reply 22-23, June 24, 2020.) Amtrak asserts that more than 55% of incidents and 90% of calls
for service were categorized as unknown. (Amtrak Opening 36.)

Moreover, Amtrak argues that police provide many other important services, beyond
responding to incidents and calls for service, that ensure the safety of Metra passengers.36 (Id.)
Amtrak argues that Metra fails to support its assertion that its passengers are less frequently
targeted by criminals because its cited expert, Robert Byrd, a retired police chief with no
experience regarding Amtrak, CUS, or a comparably large urban train station, does not have the
qualifications to opine on policing practices at CUS. (Amtrak Reply 21-22, June 24, 2020.)
Amtrak also asserts that Metra’s claim that incidents and calls for service occur in places that are
less likely to be frequented by Metra passengers is also incorrect, since the heat maps upon
which Metra relies “reflect a limited subset of data and do not represent all activity in [CUS].”
(Id. at 23.) Moreover, “the fact that some areas have fewer incidents would show that policing is
working in those areas, not that there is no need for police and Metra therefore does not benefit
from their presence.” (Id. at 24.)

With respect to K9 costs, Amtrak argues that Metra benefits from K9 teams, which patrol
and monitor the entirety of CUS, which is a famous landmark that could be the target of attack.
(Id. at 17-18.) Regarding Metra’s reference to a $10 million grant, Amtrak clarifies that it cannot
use the grant to fund CUS officers’ regular wages and salaries and, moreover, that Amtrak’s
sources of funding are irrelevant to the cost allocation in this matter. (Id. at 26.) Amtrak
 
36
According to Amtrak, police respond to medical emergencies, requests for assistance,
suspicious packages, thefts, pickpocketing, assaults, and lost property or persons; stand watch
over Metra trains and property; maintain crowd control; work with local law enforcement
agencies to keep CUS safe; provide support and security during special events; protect CUS at
all hours from being damaged, looted, or destroyed; prevent and investigate theft and other crime
by monitoring over 250 cameras; and deter crime and harmful behavior. (Amtrak Reply 10,
June 24, 2020.)

23
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

acknowledges that its police sometimes ride trains but claims that this is not a daily occurrence
and emphasizes that its proposal addresses this issue by subtracting one position from the total
policing cost calculation. (Id. at 27.) Amtrak also disagrees with Metra’s suggestion that Metra
should not pay for overnight policing, asserting that policing is necessary to protect CUS,
including Metra’s areas and facilities, when it is closed. (Id. at 27-28.) Lastly, Amtrak contends
that Metra fails to explain how the amounts it pays to BNSF for security services affect its share
of costs and, even if it had, such amounts are irrelevant to the cost allocation in this matter.
(Id. at 28.)

The Board will not adopt either of the parties’ proposed factors. Amtrak’s proposal does
not adequately account for the substantial benefit that Amtrak, as the owner of CUS, derives
from the security of the station. Since police at CUS protect both people and property, the
number of officers required at CUS depends upon the nature of the property, as well as train and
passenger counts. Amtrak’s proposed factor, based solely on trains and passengers, does not
consider that CUS contains a greater proportion of Amtrak exclusive use areas requiring police
protection as compared to Metra exclusive use areas.

However, Metra’s proposal is also deficient, as it relies on incomplete data. Amtrak

asserts that its police do not regularly associate incidents or calls for service with Amtrak, Metra,
or another entity. (Amtrak Opening 36; Amtrak Reply 22-23, June 24, 2020.) Metra appears to
acknowledge the limitations of the data by noting that approximately 90% of the recorded
incidents and calls for service were attributed to neither Amtrak nor Metra and stating that
“[u]ndoubtedly, some number of additional [i]ncidents and [calls for service] could have been
associated with Metra passengers.” (Metra Reply 13, June 24, 2020.) Nonetheless, Metra argues
that its proposed factor should be adopted because “Amtrak alone should bear responsibility for
its inability or unwillingness to generate and retain more complete data.” (Id.) However, as
discussed above, neither party bears the sole burden of proof in this matter and, regardless,
Amtrak is not required to maintain and collect incident data with the level of detail or in the
exact format suggested by Metra.

Metra raises four other points (grant money, police deployed on trains, overnight
policing, and separate security services) that it asks the Board to consider in allocating costs,
(see Metra Opening 32-33), but Metra does not explain how it would propose to translate these
considerations into specific cost reductions. Moreover, the Board is unconvinced that these
factors support Metra’s proposed cost allocation. First, the record does not contain any evidence
that the grant Amtrak receives from the federal government may be used towards the policing
costs that Amtrak proposes to allocate to Metra.37 Second, Metra offers the Board no meaningful
way to consider Amtrak’s purported intention to deploy police officers on trains because Metra
acknowledges that “how much the shift will affect officers stationed at CUS is unknown.”
(Metra Opening 33.) Third, the Board finds that Metra benefits from overnight policing, which
protects Metra’s designated areas from theft and property damage, ensures the safety of Metra
employees present after hours, and improves the security of the station as whole for all
 
37
Metra suggests that Amtrak may use the grant to offset training costs, (Metra Opening,
V.S. Robert Byrd 24), but Amtrak asserts that it did not include training programs in its
calculation of total policing costs (Amtrak Opening 35).

24
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

passengers and employees. Fourth, Metra references a separate security contract, in which it
retains off-duty police officers to ride Metra trains and patrol Metra platforms, but it does not
explain how the presence of these officers should affect the allocation of policing costs.

Instead of adopting either of the parties’ proposed factors in full, the Board will allocate
police costs based upon the same square footage equation that the parties agreed to apply to
SOM expenses. This calculation more fully encompasses the relative benefit the parties receive
from policing because it incorporates the parties’ proportionate share of trains and passengers (in
the form of the equation’s agreed-upon usage factor), as well as the parties’ relative footprint at
CUS. Specifically, use of the percentages generated by the square footage equation ensures that
Metra does not pay for expenses associated with policing the Amtrak exclusive use areas of CUS
from which Metra derives no benefit.

The Board will also apply this calculation to policing costs associated with the K9 unit.
Contrary to Metra’s argument, Metra does not derive only 1.1% of the benefits from drug and
bomb prevention efforts at CUS. Metra benefits from using a facility in which officers are
actively working to deter drug activity and terrorist attacks, as such efforts ensure the safety of
its passengers and employees and the continuity of its operations. Accordingly, Metra will be
responsible for 35% of policing costs ($1,512,194 in FY2018 dollars). Table 5 summarizes the
parties’ positions and the Board’s conclusion on policing cost allocation.

TABLE 5

Policing (FY2018)
Amtrak Metra STB
Total Allocable
Policing Costs $4,623,836 $3,981,381 $4,320,554
Cost Allocation
Percentage 83% 4.28% 35%
Total Allocated
Policing Costs $3,837,784 $170,403 $1,512,194

e. Capital Expenses

Amtrak proposes a two-tiered capital program for determination of Metra’s share of

future capital costs, which is a departure from the parties’ present arrangement whereby the
parties determine capital project funding on a case-by-case basis. (Amtrak Opening 38, 40.)
Amtrak argues that the status quo is untenable because Metra currently contributes less than 20%
to capital projects that jointly benefit Amtrak and Metra, which forces Amtrak to cross-subsidize
Metra’s operations. (Id. at 38.)

For “Tier 1” investment, which Amtrak would solely control, Amtrak proposes that
Metra contribute $1,700,000 annually (with Amtrak contributing an additional $800,000). (Id.
at 39.) For “Tier 2” investment, Amtrak proposes that the parties “identify appropriate capital
projects through a joint effort, and together . . . spend up to $10 million on those projects

25
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

annually” for each of the first five years of the agreement. (Id.) Amtrak submits that
responsibility for Tier 2 investment should be based on relative train movements at the concourse
that corresponds to the location of the project. (Id. at 40.) Because Metra operates 90.94% of
trains at the North Concourse and 63.69% of trains at the South Concourse, Amtrak asserts that
Metra should be responsible for 90.94% of capital expenditures for projects on the North
Concourse and 63.69% of capital expenditures for projects on the South Concourse. (Id.) In
addition, Amtrak alleges that, pursuant to § 24903(c)(2), Metra should be responsible for
reimbursing Amtrak for costs incurred for capital projects that solely benefit Metra. (Id.)

Conversely, Metra contends that Board intervention is unnecessary because Metra has not
refused to contribute to any specific capital projects. (Metra Opening 50-51.) Metra asserts that
under the parties’ present arrangement, Metra has contributed an average of over $4 million
annually, but Amtrak’s proposed new program would force Metra to contribute to “conceptual,
unspecified, and speculative” capital expenditures. (Id.) At most, Metra proposes that the Board
prescribe a two-step process for contribution to future capital expenses, whereby the parties
would commit to good faith negotiation, and, in the event of impasse, initiate dispute resolution
through arbitration with any resulting award conforming to § 24903. (Id. at 52-54.)

Amtrak responds that Metra has not readily contributed to capital projects in the past.
(Amtrak Reply 43, June 24, 2020.) Amtrak explains that pursuant to the parties’ current
arrangement, Amtrak and Metra representatives meet each year to discuss necessary upcoming
projects, after which Metra tells Amtrak how much it will contribute; however, Metra’s decision
does not reflect the amount of necessary capital investment at CUS. (Id. at 43-44.) Amtrak
contends that Metra has not rejected requests for funding because the process begins with Metra
determining how much it will pay. (Id. at 44.) Amtrak also disputes Metra’s $4 million figure
for average yearly capital contributions, asserting that Metra only contributed an average of
$1.7 million per year for FY2016 to FY2018, and $800,000 for FY2019.38 (Id. at 45.)

In its reply, Metra argues that Amtrak’s 20% contribution figure is misleading because
the calculation includes projects for which Amtrak did not seek funding from Metra, as well as
projects that do not provide a benefit to Metra. (Metra Reply 41-42, June 24, 2020.) Moreover,
Metra asserts that Amtrak fails to identify any specific problems at CUS that it needs funding to
resolve or the specific projects for which it proposes to spend the investments. (Id. at 38-39.)
Metra cautions that if the Board prescribes fixed annual capital contributions that do not
correspond to specific projects, the Board will not be able to ensure that Metra’s contributions
are directed towards projects that benefit Metra. (Id. at 41-42.)

The Board will not adopt Amtrak’s proposed two-tiered capital program, as the proposal
is flawed and would not prevent cross-subsidization. Amtrak requests that the Board prescribe

 
38
Amtrak also asserts that Metra’s $4 million figure does not find support in Exhibit E,
the exhibit cited to generally by Metra to support the number, (see Metra Errata Sheet, June 22,
2020), and furthermore, that Metra does not explain who calculated the number or where any
support for that number can be found. (Amtrak Reply 45, June 24, 2020.)

26
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

Metra’s participation in a Tier 1 fund that Amtrak would solely control.39 However, Amtrak
does not justify why Metra, as the majority contributor to the fund, should not equally participate
in choosing capital projects. Moreover, in practice, Metra’s exclusion may only lead to more
disputes over the projects that Amtrak chooses in its sole discretion to fund.

For Tier 2 investment, Amtrak proposes that the parties establish a working group to
identify appropriate capital projects, but such a working group appears to already exist.
(See Metra Reply, V.S. Richard Oppenheim 1, June 24, 2020 (describing scheduled monthly
meetings between Amtrak and Metra with a standing discussion of “Station Capital Financial
Allocation,” among other topics).) The new aspect of Amtrak’s Tier 2 proposal is that Metra
would be required to pay a set proportion of all capital projects funded with Tier 2 investments.
However, Amtrak does not adequately justify its proposed train movements factor, which would
allocate most of the expenses associated with all future capital improvement projects to Metra
without accounting for the relative benefit provided by individual projects. Due to the diverse
nature of capital improvement projects, the Board cannot practically assign a single cost
allocation factor to all future projects that will not result in cross-subsidization, particularly when
Amtrak did not provide any details about the specific projects it proposes to undertake.

Furthermore, Amtrak has not provided adequate support for its argument that the parties’
present practice violates § 24903(c)(2) because the record contains no support for Amtrak’s
contention that Metra does not sufficiently participate in capital project funding. Amtrak argues
that a new capital program is necessary because Metra currently contributes less than 20% of the
costs to joint capital projects, but the record does not show that Amtrak requested funding from
Metra for all 33 projects that Amtrak included in its calculation. (See Metra Reply, V.S. Richard
Oppenheim 3, June 24, 2020.) Moreover, the record is unclear as to whether all projects would
benefit Metra, as Metra’s witness testifies that 11 projects consist of Great Hall improvements
designed to market the area as an event space and four projects involve the rehabilitation of
Amtrak’s commercial space.40 (Id., V.S. Richard Oppenheim 4, June 24, 2020.) The parties also
dispute how much Metra is currently contributing to capital projects at CUS, but the Board
cannot verify the calculations for either party’s number or determine which specific projects
were included.41

 
39
Amtrak states that Metra would have “input” for Tier 1 projects, but “not the ability to
unilaterally reject projects or add new projects.” (Amtrak Opening 39.)
40
Metra offers as an example that the included “Women’s Lounge” is not a women’s
restroom, but rather an area that Amtrak markets as an event space. (Metra Reply 41 n.31,
June 24, 2020.)
41
Metra’s assertion that it has contributed an average of over $4 million annually to
capital projects is unsupported by Metra’s citation to Exhibit E. (See Metra Errata 1, June 22,
2020.) Amtrak cites to the verified statements of Christine Suchy in support of its numbers but
does not include any underlying calculations. (See Amtrak Opening, V.S. Christine Suchy ¶ 29;
Amtrak Reply 45, V.S. Christine Suchy ¶ 27, June 24, 2020.)

27
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

Furthermore, Amtrak does not offer any examples of specific negotiation failures or
capital projects that Metra refused to help fund.42 (See Metra Reply, Ex. B at 17, June 24, 2020.)
Amtrak contends that “[t]he reason ‘Metra has not rejected’ any requests for funding is because
the process runs backwards: it starts with Metra saying how much it will pay, regardless of the
amount of capital investment actually needed.” (Amtrak Reply 44, June 24, 2020.) This
statement, however, does not explain what, if anything, prevents Amtrak from requesting
additional funding from Metra when necessary for specific joint benefit capital projects.

Contrary to Amtrak’s assertions, the record demonstrates consistent participation from

Metra in capital project funding. The parties have agreed to capital project funding in
38 instances, most recently in April 2019. (See Metra Reply, V.S. Richard Oppenheim, Ex. 6,
June 24, 2020.) The record also shows that the parties pursue third-party funding opportunities
cooperatively, as demonstrated by a February 2019 letter agreement for a joint grant application
to the Federal Railroad Administration, which details Metra’s commitment to pay for over half
of the remaining non-Federal match amount. (Metra Reply, V.S. Richard Oppenheim, Ex. 7,
June 24, 2020.) Amtrak has not provided the Board with sufficient justification to disrupt the
parties’ current collaborative and case-by-case approach.

With respect to Metra’s alternative proposal, the Board will not mandate arbitration but
emphasizes that the parties have access to mediation, arbitration, and assistance through the
Board’s Rail Customer and Public Assistance program,43 to help resolve disputes regarding
specific capital improvement projects.

Lastly, Amtrak argues that Metra should bear responsibility for its sole-benefit capital
projects, which Metra does not dispute. Furthermore, as with the joint benefit projects discussed
above, Amtrak provides no examples of sole-benefit projects that Metra has refused to fund.
Since § 24903(c)(2) requires that the Board assign “the costs Amtrak incurs only for the benefit
of the carrier,” the Board finds that Metra must pay costs associated with those capital projects
incurred solely for its benefit as determined pursuant to the parties’ current collaborative and
case-by-case approach.

f. Ground Power

The parties also dispute whether Amtrak’s supply of electrical ground power constitutes
an allocable cost to Metra. Amtrak proposes that Metra pay a flat fee of $10,500 each month
(subject to the annual inflation index) to use the 480-volt standby electric power at CUS, which
benefits Metra by minimizing locomotive exhaust and facilitating fuel cost savings. (Amtrak
Opening 52.) Amtrak asserts that electrical ground power is a transportation cost because its use
limits the amount of diesel exhaust in the train station. (Id.)

 
42
Amtrak references the installation of LED lights as an example of a common benefit
project that it funded alone; however, there is no indication that Amtrak asked Metra to
contribute to the costs of that project. (Amtrak Reply 44, June 24, 2020.)
43
The Board’s Rail Customer and Public Assistance program can be reached by
telephone at 202-245-0238 or email at rcpa@stb.gov.

28
 
 Docket No. FD 36332
 

Metra argues that electrical ground power is not an allocable transportation cost. (Metra
Opening 46-48.) Metra asserts that electrical ground power is only necessary to remediate
locomotive exhaust because Amtrak’s predecessor in interest previously developed its air rights,
which resulted in covered platforms that block the escape of exhaust emissions. (Id. at 46.)
Accordingly, Metra alleges that any payments for electrical ground power would constitute an
impermissible cross-subsidy of Amtrak’s real estate business. (Id. at 46-47.) Furthermore,
Metra argues that by charging Metra for ground power, Amtrak attempts to recover for exhaust
remediation twice because Amtrak recovers the costs of locomotive exhaust remediation from air
rights users, as evidenced by (1) a 1927 lease between Amtrak’s predecessor in interest and the
Chicago Daily News Printing Company mandating that the latter include a ventilation system for
any constructed structures; (2) two 2001 operating agreements that require the air rights owners
to maintain smoke exhaust plenums; and (3) notes from a December 2016 meeting between
Amtrak and Metra in which Amtrak expressed an intention to take action regarding certain
structural issues at CUS. (See Metra Opening 47-48, Exs. B, C, D; Metra Reply 31, Ex. A,
June 24, 2020; Metra Reply, V.S. Richard Oppenheim, Ex. 5, June 24, 2020.)

In response, Amtrak acknowledges that CUS has covered platforms but argues that
because those tenants have been at CUS as long as Metra has and Metra chooses to use CUS, it
“must take the station as Metra finds it—not invent a hypothetical, preferred station without
overbuild, and claim to owe only the costs Amtrak would incur operating that station.” (Amtrak
Reply 46, June 24, 2020.) Amtrak also contends that Metra benefits from ground power because
it limits Metra’s environmental impact, reduces employees’ and passengers’ exposure to diesel
exhaust, and allows Metra to avoid the fuel costs it would otherwise incur in idling locomotives.
(Id. at 47.) Lastly, Amtrak argues that its sources of funding are irrelevant to the benefit Metra
receives from ground power. (Id. at 47-48.)

The Board finds that electrical ground power constitutes an allocable cost to Metra.
Electrical ground power qualifies as a transportation cost because its use mitigates the diesel
exhaust that would otherwise result from Metra’s idling locomotives. The Board also finds that
electrical ground power benefits Metra by saving fuel costs and limiting diesel emissions that
Metra would need to remediate to avoid adverse effects on its employees and passengers.
Furthermore, as Amtrak observes, Metra was aware that CUS had covered platforms when it
began operating at the station. Metra may prefer a different power source, but Metra cannot
choose an alternative that CUS does not have the infrastructure to support. Metra suggests that
the use of ground power is unnecessary because Amtrak recovers the costs of locomotive exhaust
remediation from air rights users, but Metra’s evidence simply shows some third-party obligation
to maintain certain ventilation systems, and neither proves that Amtrak recovers the costs of
locomotive exhaust remediation from air rights users nor suggests that CUS has the
infrastructure to support Metra’s theoretical unrestricted release of diesel exhaust into an
enclosed train station. The Board finds that Amtrak reasonably chooses to use electrical ground
power to reduce diesel exhaust emissions at CUS. Metra’s presence at CUS necessarily requires
the use of additional electrical ground power, and Amtrak may pass that additional cost on to
Metra.

Amtrak asserts that the $10,500 proposed monthly amount represents the actual cost of
the ground power Metra uses for idling locomotives at CUS based on readings for Metra’s

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 Docket No. FD 36332
 

dedicated tracks. (Amtrak Opening, V.S. Nancy Miller ¶ 77; Amtrak Reply 46, June 24, 2020.)
Although Metra disputes that electrical ground power is an allocable cost, it does not dispute
Amtrak’s proposed amount. Accordingly, the Board finds that Metra will be responsible for
reimbursing Amtrak for electrical ground power in the amount of $10,500 each month in
FY2020 dollars (subject to the Core PCE Index as discussed above).44

g. Conclusion

 G&A Expenses: The G&A addition will be 3.97% for FY2016 and 3.27% for FY2017.
 Inflation Index: The AAR Index will apply to maintenance of way and dispatching costs,
and the Core PCE Index will apply to SOM, policing, and ground power costs.
 SOM Costs: Metra will be responsible for 35% of SOM costs ($4,285,549 for FY2018).
 Policing Costs: Metra will be responsible for 35% of policing costs ($1,512,194 for
FY2018).
 Capital Expenses:  The Board will not adopt Amtrak’s proposed two-tiered capital
program for common benefit capital projects. Metra will be responsible for its sole
benefit capital projects.
 Ground Power: Metra will be responsible for $10,500 per month for FY2020 in electrical
ground power costs.

 
44
Although Amtrak does not specify a fiscal year for ground power costs, Amtrak states
that the readings that formed the basis for the $10,500 proposed amount were conducted between
August 7, 2018 and August 6, 2019. (Amtrak Opening, V.S. Nancy Miller ¶ 77.) Since Amtrak
and Metra used FY2016 and FY2017 data to estimate FY2018 costs for SOM and policing, the
Board finds it reasonable to believe that Amtrak used readings from FY2018 and FY2019 to
estimate FY2020 ground power costs. Furthermore, since Metra does not dispute the $10,500
amount, its expression in FY2020 dollars is consistent with the other stipulated cost categories,
dispatching and maintenance of way, that the parties expressed in FY2020 dollars. (See Joint
Stipulation ¶ 1-2, May 18, 2020.)

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 Docket No. FD 36332
 

Table 6 summarizes total costs.

TABLE 6

Costs Summary45
Amtrak Metra STB
Dispatching
(stipulated) $1,800,000 $1,800,000 $1,800,000
Maintenance of
Way (stipulated) $2,950,000 $2,950,000 $2,950,000

Ground Power $126,00046 - $126,000

SOM $6,080,623 $1,820,163 $4,285,549

Policing $3,837,784 $170,403 $1,512,194

Total $14,794,407 $6,740,566 $10,673,743

It is ordered:

1. Metra is directed to compensate Amtrak for the use of CUS as set forth in this
decision.

2. This decision is effective on its service date.

By the Board, Board Members Oberman, Begeman, Fuchs, Primus, and Schultz. Board
Member Oberman did not participate.

 
45
Ground power costs are expressed in FY2020 dollars for the reasons discussed above.
Dispatching and maintenance of way costs are also expressed in FY2020 dollars because the
parties stipulated to these specific amounts in FY2020 dollars. (See Joint Stipulation ¶ 1-2,
May 18, 2020.) The disputed cost categories of SOM and policing are expressed in FY2018
dollars, as discussed above.
46
This figure represents the $10,500 monthly amount multiplied by 12 months.

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