Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202

DOI 10.1007/s10979-006-9027-y
ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame,

and Jury Decision-Making

David A. Bright · Jane Goodman-Delahunty

Published online: 31 May 2006

C American Psychology-Law Society/Division 41 of the American Psychological Association 2006

Abstract Judges assume that gruesome evidence can influence juror verdicts, but little is known
about the manner in which the influence is manifested. In a 2 × 3 study that varied the gruesome
content of photographic and verbal evidence, gruesome verbal evidence did not influence mock
juror emotional states, and had no impact on the conviction rate. Mock jurors who saw gruesome
photographs, compared with those who saw no photographs, reported experiencing significantly
more intense emotional responses, including greater anger at the defendant. The conviction
rate when visual evidence in the form of gruesome or neutral photographs was included was
significantly higher than the conviction rate without photographic evidence. Mean ratings of the
inculpatory weight of prosecution evidence by mock jurors presented with gruesome photographs
were significantly higher than those by mock jurors who did not view any photographs. Further
analyses revealed that mock juror anger toward the defendant mediated the influence of the
gruesome photographs in enhancing the weight of inculpatory evidence.

Keywords Gruesome evidence . Emotion . Jury decision making

In the criminal trial of Simpson (People of the State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson,
1995), the prosecutors’ closing arguments concluded with an audiotape of Nicole Simpson’s
911 calls to the police, whereas color photographs of the bloodied bodies of Nicole Simpson and
Ron Goldman were displayed on a screen. The legal systems in the United States, Australia, and
other common law countries assume that this type of gruesome evidence can exert a prejudicial
influence on culpability determinations in criminal cases. However, little is known about precise
ways in which gruesome evidence affects juror decision-making. Emotional reactions to the
grisly evidentiary details may inhibit logical and rational decision processes and impair jurors’
ability to deliver a verdict based only on the probative value of evidence in a case. Jurors who
attribute weight to gruesome evidence in determining their verdict separate and apart from the
probative value of the evidence, violate core assumptions of the criminal justice system, such as

D. A. Bright (
) · J. Goodman-Delahunty

School of Psychology, University of New South Wales,
Sydney, New South Wales, 2052 Australia
e-mail: dbright@psy.unsw.edu.au
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184 Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202

the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the jury’s role as impartial finders of fact, and the defendant’s
right to be considered innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Considering the
magnitude of these issues, there are correspondingly few references to the potential influence
of gruesome evidence on legal decision-making in the statutory law, the common law, or in
psycholegal research.

Prejudicial and probative evidence

To ensure a fair trial for the defendant in criminal proceedings, many common law countries
permit the exclusion of evidence that is determined to be more prejudicial than probative. In
the United States, the rules of evidence in most states are consistent with the Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE; 2004). According to FRE 401, relevant evidence means “evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence,” (p. 3). Rule 403 on
the “exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice; confusion or waste of time” reads,
“although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice,”(p. 4). Notes from the Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Evidence state that unfair prejudice means “an undue tendency to suggest decision
on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one” Legal Information
Institute (n.d.).
In Australia, “probative value” is defined in the Evidence Act (1995) as, “the extent to which
the evidence could rationally effect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact
in issue” (Section 3; Part 1). “Danger of unfair prejudice” is explained by the Australian Law
Reform Commission (1985) as follows:
By risk of unfair prejudice is meant the danger that the fact-finder may use the evidence to make a decision
on an improper, perhaps emotional, basis, i.e., on a basis logically unconnected with the issues in the case.
Thus, evidence that appeals to fact-finders’ sympathies, arouses a sense of horror, provokes an instinct
to punish, or triggers other mainsprings of human action may cause the fact-finder to base his decision
on something other than the established propositions of the case. Similarly, on hearing the evidence,
the fact-finder may be satisfied with a lower degree of probability than would otherwise be required.
(pp. 351–352)

A common theme in both the jurisdictions is the concern that some types of evidence can
prejudicially impact juror decision-making, especially when that evidence induces emotional
responses in jurors. The current study examines the impact of a specific type of potentially prej-
udicial evidence on juror decision-making in criminal trials: verbal and photographic evidence
that contain gruesome details.

Gruesome evidence and jury decision-making

In both the United States and Australia, statutory provisions allow for a more punitive sentence
when gruesome evidence, such as a description of a postmortem mutilation, is submitted at a
sentencing hearing. There are no statutory or common law provisions that allow jurors to be
more punitive toward defendants in making determinations about culpability when gruesome
evidence is presented during a trial. However, preliminary research suggests that mock jurors
are biased toward conviction by gruesome evidence adduced at trial.
One of the earliest studies on the influence of gruesome evidence on juror decision-making
examined the issue in the context of a mock civil trial (Oliver & Griffitt, 1976). Participants
read one of two cases in which the severity of the injury (no permanent damage vs. amputation
of a limb) was varied. Half of the participants in each condition viewed four slides depicting
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the victim’s injuries and the other half were not shown any slides. Participants who saw the
injury slides awarded a significantly greater proportion of the requested damages than did the
participants who did not see the slides. The authors concluded that gruesome visual evidence
influenced mock juror decisions by increasing the damages awarded to the plaintiff-victim.
However, the observed effect may have been a methodological artifact, as all participants awarded
damages, irrespective of the degree to which they found the defendant negligent. Although no
measures of mock juror affective states were gathered, the researchers attributed the biasing
effect of the photographs to emotional arousal in mock jurors who viewed the gruesome visual
evidence.
In another examination of the impact of gruesome photographs in the context of a civil trial,
three groups of participants read a transcript of a trial in which parents sued a building construc-
tion company for injuries to their child who fell through a floor of the building while trespassing
(Whalen & Blanchard, 1982). One-third of the participants were shown a color photograph of
the boy lying face down, with his leg at an unnatural angle, and a pool of blood nearby from cuts
to his hand and arm. One third saw a black and white version of this photograph, and one third
did not see any photograph. In addition, the severity of the victim’s injury (temporary injuries vs.
permanent blindness) and the blameworthiness of the defendant (level of safety precautions exer-
cised) were varied. Participants who viewed the color photographs awarded significantly higher
sums in damages than did the participants who viewed either black and white or no photographs,
but only when the severity of the injury was permanent and the defendant was portrayed as more
blameworthy. Although identical information was provided in the color and black and white
photographs, a biasing effect was found only in response to color photographs, and only in
the presence of other facts (permanent victim injury and greater defendant blameworthiness).
The authors submitted that the result could not simply be attributed to an increase in the amount
of information available in the photographs, and suggested that the emotional arousal of mock
jurors produced this result. In an extension of these two studies, the current study investigates the
impact of gruesome evidence in a criminal context and measures mock juror emotional arousal.
The effects of exposing mock jurors to videotaped evidence displaying an image of a murder
victim were investigated by Kassin and Garfield (1991). Although no direct effects on verdict
were found, mock jurors who viewed gruesome visual evidence and were told it depicted the
crime scene in their case applied significantly lower thresholds of proof for conviction (76%)
compared to mock jurors in two other conditions (93%). Use of a lower threshold of proof for
conviction can transform acquittals into convictions. The threshold of proof used by mock jurors
in the case relevant videotaped evidence condition fell short of the interpretation of “beyond
reasonable doubt” reported by mock jurors in the nonrelevant and no videotaped evidence
conditions, and short of quantified thresholds of reasonable doubt established in other empirical
research (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979; Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt, et al., 1976; Simon
& Mahan, 1971). In other words, jurors exposed to gruesome evidence may employ a lower
threshold in applying the legal standard “beyond reasonable doubt,” and may convict on the
basis of less convincing evidence than mock jurors who render verdicts in the same case absent
the visually gruesome, case-specific evidence.
The impact of visually presented gruesome evidence on mock juror verdicts was assessed in
a study by Douglas, Lyon, and Ogloff (1997). Three groups of mock jurors read transcripts of
a murder case and viewed (1) neutral photographs and postmortem photographs of the victim
in color; or (2) neutral photographs and postmortem photographs of the victim in black-and-
white; or (3) neutral photographs only, presented in color. Those who saw the photographs were
more emotionally affected (based on self-report measures), and were significantly more likely
to render a guilty verdict, compared with jurors who did not see the photographs. These findings
suggest that gruesome visual information arouses mock juror emotional states, and influences
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their culpability decisions. Scores on self-report scales of emotional distress demonstrated a

significant positive correlation with the extent to which mock jurors believed the accused was
guilty. Interestingly, all participants indicated that the photographs should not and did not
influence their verdicts, and claimed that they acted in a fair and impartial manner as jurors.
Although the graphic photographs influenced verdicts, mock jurors were unaware of or unwilling
to admit the influence of this evidence.
In a subsequent study (a replication of the study by Douglas et al., 1997) Nemeth (2002)
used the Profile of Mood States (POMS) (McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1981) to measure mock
juror emotional arousal to investigate the contention that gruesome evidence exerts its preju-
dicial effect through juror emotional arousal. Mock jurors were presented with either weak or
strong gruesome verbal testimony plus neutral, weak, or strong gruesome photographs. Neither
gruesome photographs nor gruesome verbal testimony influenced dichotomous or continuous
measures of the defendant’s guilt. Emotional arousal measured by the POMS did not vary sig-
nificantly in response to the neutral versus gruesome photographs or verbal testimony. However,
a manipulation check revealed no difference between gruesome and nongruesome conditions,
which may account for the null findings.
More recently, the impact of verbal gruesome evidence on mock juror decisions was examined
in the context of a criminal case (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2004). Mock jurors were
assigned to one of two evidence quality conditions (gruesome and nongruesome), and to one of
two evidence sufficiency conditions (evidence was either legally sufficient or legally insufficient
to sustain a conviction). When verbal gruesome evidence was presented, mock jurors were
significantly more prone to convict the defendant compared with those who read an equivalent
case in which no verbal gruesome evidence was submitted. Mock jurors who read gruesome
evidence combined with weak inculpatory facts also rated the defendant significantly more
culpable than those who had not read gruesome evidence. The authors suggested that when
faced with gruesome evidence, mock jurors might have relied more on their affective states than
on the probative value of the evidence in forming judgments about the guilt of the defendant.
However, no measures of mock juror emotional states were used, so firm conclusions were not
possible.
Together, the studies outlined earlier offer some preliminary evidence of the potentially
prejudicial influence of gruesome evidence on juror culpability decisions. When gruesome
evidence is presented, jurors may assess the weight of the inculpatory evidence differently from
the assessment of its weight when no gruesome evidence is present. The preceding studies do not
establish clear indications of the impact of gruesome evidence (verbal or visual), nor the precise
role played by juror emotional states. The current study seeks to fill the gap in the psychological
literature regarding affective reactions to gruesome evidence in criminal cases.

Psychological theories to account for the prejudicial impact of gruesome evidence

Potential explanations for any prejudicial influence of gruesome evidence on legal decision-
making can be collected under two theoretical umbrellas: the vividness effect and affective
influences. The current study focused on the investigation of the influence of affect and did
not directly investigate the vividness theory. The relevant literature on affective influences is
reviewed next.

Affective influences

When individuals are in the middle of formulating a decision, they may use their emotional
states as a source of information. According to the “affect-as-information” model, “rather than
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computing a judgment on the basis of recalled features of the target, individuals may . . . ask
themselves, How do I feel about it?” (Schwarz, 1990, p. 529). In this model, affect functions as
a judgment-simplifying heuristic device. People are presumed to consult their affective state to
infer a judgment (Clore & Parott, 1991).
Much psychological research on the role of affective states on decision-making has focused
on mood and the differential impact of positive versus negative moods (Forgas, 2000; Petty,
DeSteno, & Rucker, 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). However, some investigators have argued
plausibly that distinct emotions exert differential influences on decision-making in a way not
captured by a simple positive–negative mood dichotomy (DeSteno, Petty, Rucker, Wegener,
& Braverman, 2004). Whether distinct emotional states exert a differential influence on many
cognitive and motivational processes is a topic of current research.

Discrete emotional states

In contrast to the view that negative affective states enhance message processing more than do
positive states (Petty & Wegener, 1998; Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Shatka,
et al., 1991, Schwarz & Clore, 1996, Schwarz & Clore, 1996), more recent findings suggest
that not all negative emotional states increase the processing effort devoted to the consideration
of persuasive appeals (DeSteno et al., 2004). These processing differences may stem from
the specific appraisal patterns attached to discrete emotions. Discrete emotions relevant to
discussions of gruesome evidence and to attributions of blame and responsibility include anger,
disgust, fear and anxiety, and sadness. Research on emotional states and their specific appraisal
patterns relevant to jury decision-making are reviewed next.

Anger. Anger is of particular relevance to juror decision-making about guilt because a critical
cognitive component of anger is assumed to be the attribution of blame (Averill, 1982). People
who are angry are prone to blame others (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993, Lerner, Goldberg,
& Tetlock, 1998). In another formulation, anger is regarded as a combination of reproach and
distress (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988): anger is the affective response to holding someone
responsible for blameworthy behavior (reproach) and being upset at the outcome (distress).
Angry individuals were more likely than were sad individuals to attribute responsibility
for an accident to the persons involved than the circumstances (Keltner et al., 1993). The
emotional experience of anger may focus people on seeking someone to hold responsible for
blameworthy behavior, thus enhancing the salience of the role of others in causing negative
events, consequently leading the angry person to attribute the harm to human agency (Keltner
et al., 1993). Participants who were induced to feel angry were more likely to blame the de-
fendant in subsequent accident vignettes, compared with participants in a control condition.
Consistent with affect-as-information theory (Schwarz, 1990), participants may have misat-
tributed their angry mood to the vignettes and consulted their mood to inform their judgments of
responsibility.
Further, research has demonstrated that angry as opposed to sad people tend to rely more on
heuristic cues when processing social information (Bodenhausen, 1993; Bodenhausen, Sheppard,
& Kramer, 1994). In one study, people who were induced to feel angry were later asked to assess
a completely unrelated civil case. Angry people awarded more damages to the plaintiff and
judged the defendant to be more deserving of punishment than did people who were not angry,
even though anger was unrelated to the case in controversy (Lerner et al., 1998). Psychological
processes similar to those reviewed above may be activated in cases in which anger is induced
by the presentation of gruesome evidence.
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Disgust. A cluster of “other-critical moral emotions” that are affective responses to the moral
violations of others, have been identified (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Disgust (or
socio-moral disgust) (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1993) has been shown to be triggered by a
variety of situations in which people behave without dignity or in which people strip others of
dignity. Socio-moral disgust is often triggered by third-party violations of others (Rozin et al.,
1999). Gruesome photographs that focus on victim harm (e.g., postmortem photographs) may
fit into this category. Disgust may be one possible reaction to viewing or listening to gruesome
elements of a criminal trial.
Fear. Some research has demonstrated that when injuries to an accident victim are more severe,
decision-makers attribute more blame and responsibility to the person who caused the accident
(Robbennolt, 2000). One explanation for this finding is that people make defensive attributions:
when harm is severe, people are threatened by the possibility that similar harm will befall
them. To restore a sense of safety, people reassure themselves that such harm does not occur
accidentally, and assign more responsibility to the actor. Fear can be considered the affective
component of the defensive attribution reaction.

Emotions and blame

Theories of blame and responsibility are dominated by decision-stage models (Shaver, 1985;
Weiner, 1995) that prescribe the factors a rational perceiver should consider in assessments of
blame, but are unable to account for psychological processes that produce deviations from rational
outcomes. Alternatively, the “culpable control” model (Alicke, 2000) offers an explanation of
the process of blame that incorporates personal expectations and emotional reactions as central
components and that can account for biased information processing and decision outcomes.
According to the culpable control model, affective reactions (or “spontaneous evaluations”)
to characteristics of a harmful event or the people involved, influence blame attributions. In
the model, affective reactions include positive and negative attitudinal judgments about the
events and the people involved, as well as emotional responses that moderate the strength of
the spontaneous evaluation (Alicke, 2000). The model suggests that spontaneous emotional
reactions to the evidence activate the desire to blame the person or persons who evoke the
most negative affect. One useful component of the model in relation to the impact of gruesome
evidence on decision-making is that it offers three empirically testable mechanisms for these
effects: (1) altered evidentiary standards; (2) altered perceptions of the evidence; and (3) biased
information search.
Altered evidentiary standards. Common to cognitive information processing models of jury
decision-making in criminal cases is the view that the task of the juror is to listen to conflicting
evidence from multiple sources and integrate or synthesize that information in reaching a decision
to convict or acquit the defendant (Hastie, 1993; Kerr, 1993; Pennington & Hastie, 1993). Jurors
are presumed to arrive at a subjective estimate of guilt and then compare that estimate with
a threshold of reasonable doubt, on the basis of a judicial instruction. If the juror’s subjective
estimate of guilt exceeds the threshold of reasonable doubt, then the decision is to convict
(Ostrom, Werner, & Saks, 1978).
As discussed earlier, mock jurors who viewed a videotape of a murder scene applied lower
conviction standards than did those who saw no video or a video depicting an unrelated crime
scene (Kassin & Garfield, 1991). The alteration in conviction standards may have been influ-
enced by the unfavorable responses evoked by the graphic crime scene video (Alicke, 2000).
The culpable control model asserts that the need to restore or preserve justice results in “unfa-
vorable” spontaneous emotional reactions to a victim’s suffering, and a consequential lowering
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of the evidential threshold in ascribing blame and responsibility. Criminal prosecutors routinely
introduce graphic crime scene photographs or videotapes in an apparent attempt to influence the
jury toward conviction (Alicke), as occurred in the criminal trial of OJ Simpson.

Altered perceptions of the evidence. The model predicts that observers who spontaneously
evaluate the actor’s behavior unfavorably will exaggerate inculpatory evidence and de-emphasize
exculpatory evidence. For instance, negative reactions to harmful outcomes in a civil case
led observers to skew the evidence in a way consistent with blaming the decision-maker for
the consequences (Alicke, Davis, & Pezzo, 1994). In another study, when verbal gruesome
evidence was submitted, mock jurors rated other (i.e., non-gruesome) items of evidence as
more inculpatory compared with mock jurors who were not exposed to the gruesome evidence,
suggesting that their assessments of the weight of evidence were influenced by their reactions to
the gruesome details (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2004).

Biased information search. Observers may engage in a biased information search to support
a desired blame attribution. Results of one study (Mazocco & Alicke, 2005) suggested that
participants who reacted more negatively to the actor who killed innocent victims favored
information that supported a blame attribution.
The current study investigates the impact of gruesome verbal and visual evidence on mock
jurors’ affective responses, especially anger, disgust, and sadness, and on mock juror decision
processes, within the context of the “culpable control” model. This study examines (1) whether
mock jurors’ evaluation of evidence is influenced by gruesome evidence presented visually and
verbally; (2) whether gruesome evidence (verbal and/or visual) influences mock juror affective
states; and (3) whether this affective reaction exerts a prejudicial influence on mock juror
judgments. The gruesome evidence in this study included details (presented verbally or visually)
of wounds inflicted on a murder victim.
The specific hypotheses tested in this study were (1) mock jurors would render more guilty
verdicts, and report elevated subjective estimates of the factual guilt of the defendant, elevated
ratings of the sufficiency of prosecution evidence, elevated confidence in their verdicts, and
less doubt about the defendant’s guilt when the evidence includes gruesome visual and verbal
factors; (2) mock jurors who read and/or see gruesome evidence would report higher levels of
negatively valenced affective states (specifically, anger, sadness, fear, and disgust); (3) mock
jurors presented with gruesome evidence would rate individual items of evidence as more
inculpatory than would mock jurors presented with non-gruesome evidence; (4) mock jurors
presented with gruesome evidence would be more sympathetic to the victim and more angry
toward the defendant than would mock jurors who are not presented with gruesome evidence;
and (5) negatively valenced emotional states (in particular, anger) would mediate the influence
of gruesome evidence on mock juror decisions.

Method

Pilot study

Seventy-eight undergraduates at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, partic-
ipated in this study during a third year Psychology and Law tutorial. We randomly assigned
participants to one of four groups: verbal gruesome, verbal non-gruesome, color photographs,
and black-and-white photographs.
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Participants in the two verbal conditions received a booklet containing two trial excerpts
ranging in length from one-third of a page to two pages. The gruesome version contained detailed
descriptions of the wounds to the victim’s neck. These detailed descriptions were omitted from
the verbal non-gruesome trial excerpts. Participants in the two photograph conditions viewed 20
photographs from a real murder case tried in NSW (R v. Valevski, 2000) in color or black and
white, with dimensions approximately 15 cm × 20 cm, selected to include both neutral and
differentially gruesome photographs (e.g., close-up of victim’s neck wound vs. blood stained
clothing).
To assess the effectiveness of the manipulation of gruesome evidence, participants in the verbal
conditions rated each of the two written passages and participants in the photograph conditions
rated each of the 20 photographs on 5-point scales assessing evidence as gruesome, upsetting, and
disgusting. Response scores were summed to create an index of how gruesome, upsetting, and
disgusting the evidence was perceived to be. Higher scores indicated more gruesome evidence
(maximum score of 15 per item). Mock juror ratings of the two verbal passages were summed
to produce a total score for the verbal passages (maximum score of 30). Mock juror responses
to the measures of gruesome evidence in this study indicated that the verbal evidence, which
described the victim’s wounds in lurid detail, were rated significantly more gruesome than the
non-gruesome verbal evidence. A one-way ANOVA yielded a significant result, F(1, 35) = 4.32,
p < .05. Verbal evidence describing the injuries to the murder victim was rated significantly
more “gruesome, upsetting, and disgusting” (15.47) than was the evidence that did not include
this detail (12.45).
The 20 photographs were ranked on the basis of the mean aggregated total scores. The
five photographs with the lowest total scores (under 4) were designated as neutral. The five
photographs with the highest total scores (over 8, four photographs had total scores exceeding
12) were designated as gruesome. The five neutral photographs depicted an internal door with
damage to the outer panel, an external view of a house, a close-up of a gold necklace, a laundry
containing a sink and washing machine, and a bed. Four of the gruesome photographs depicted
the victim postmortem, displaying deep wounds to her neck from different angles. The fifth
gruesome photograph showed a blood spatter on a set of drawers.
In sum, the experimental variation of the evidence to produce visual and verbal gruesome
and non-gruesome versions was successful.

Participants

One hundred and two first-year undergraduate psychology students (age range 17–54 years; 30%
male and 70% female) at the University of New South Wales participated in the study for course
credit. All participants provided informed consent and were fully debriefed at the conclusion of
the study.

Design

A 2 × 3 between-participants design was used. We assigned participants to one of the two verbal
evidence conditions: gruesome and non-gruesome evidence differed in the amount of detail
that was presented regarding the wounds to the victim. We further assigned participants to
one of the three visual evidence conditions: no photographs, neutral photographs, or gruesome
photographs.
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Materials

Trial transcripts

Participants read a 20-page, double-spaced summary of a trial involving a defendant charged

with his wife’s murder. The materials were drawn from a real murder case. The summary was
constructed from judicial comments contained in the appellate opinion. The materials consisted
of (1) a summary of the opening statement by the prosecution and the defense; (2) extracts from
the direct and cross-examination of witnesses, taken from the trial transcript, in question and
answer format; and (3) a judicial summary of the evidence, and the judge’s instructions to the
jury. The judge’s instructions outlined the role of jurors, the elements of the crime of murder,
and the definition of reasonable doubt. The instructions were identical to those administered
by judges in similar cases in criminal courts in New South Wales (Judicial Commission of
New South Wales, 2002). Apart from the manipulation varying the verbal and visual gruesome
evidence, all other information in the trial summary was held constant across experimental
conditions.

Affect measure

The Juror Negative Affect Scale (JUNAS) was constructed by combining items on three subscales
(anger, fear/anxiety, and sadness) from the Profile of Mood States (POMS; McNair, Lorr,
& Droppelman, 1981) and the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark,
& Tellegen, 1988). A fourth subscale, disgust, was added by including parallel items using
common synonyms for the word “disgust.” The JUNAS comprises 30 items and four subscales
(fear/anxiety, sadness, anger, and disgust) shown in Table 1.

Procedure

Participants completed the JUNAS to provide a baseline measure of negative affect before
reviewing the case materials. Mock jurors were instructed to “circle the response that best
describes how you feeling right now” on a 5-point scale from not at all to extremely. Next,
participants read one of six versions of the trial transcript, and then completed the JUNAS again.
They indicated (1) legal guilt in the form of a dichotomous culpability judgment (guilty/not
guilty); (2) confidence in their verdict, on a 7-point scale from not at all confident to completely

Table 1 Items and subscales of the JUNAS (Juror Negative Affect Scale)

Fear/anxiety Anger Sadness Disgust

Tense Angry Unhappy Disgusted

Shaky Annoyed Sad Repulsed
On edge Resentful Discouraged Disturbed
Panicky Bitter Miserable Revolted
Uneasy Furious Gloomy Shocked
Restless Bad tempered Helpless
Nervous Hostile
Anxious Irritable
Distressed
Upset
Afraid

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confident; (3) factual guilt in the form of the likelihood that the defendant took the life of the
victim, on a 7-point scale from very unlikely to very likely; (4) the degree to which the prosecution
evidence was sufficient to support conviction, on a 7-point scale from not at all sufficient to
completely sufficient; and (5) the amount of doubt in their minds about the defendant’s guilt, on
a 7-point scale from no doubt to complete doubt. Finally, mock jurors rated how sympathetic
they felt toward the victim and how angry they felt toward the defendant, on a 5-point scale from
not at all to extremely.

Results

Dichotomous verdict

Overall, 29% (n = 30) found the defendant guilty. Table 2 displays the conviction rates (per-
centage who found the defendant guilty) in the six groups. A logistic regression analysis was
performed on verdict to analyze differences in verdict as a function of photographic evidence
and verbal evidence. This analysis produced a significant overall effect, χ 2 = 12.20, p =
.007, df = 3. Mock jurors in the neutral photograph condition rendered more guilty ver-
dicts (38.2%) than did those in the no photograph condition (8.8%), B = −1.86, Wald’s
statistic = 7.04, p = .008. Mock jurors in the gruesome photograph condition rendered more
guilty verdicts (41.2%) than did mock jurors in the no photograph condition (8.8%), B = −1.98,
Wald’s statistic = 8.05, p = .005. Figure 1 displays conviction rates in the three photographic
evidence groups (no photographs, neutral photographs, and gruesome photographs). There was
no significant relationship between type of verbal evidence and participants’ verdict (B = − .21,
Wald’s statistic = 0.21): 27.5% of participants in the low verbal gruesome condition and 31.4%
of participants in the high verbal gruesome condition rendered a guilty verdict. There was no
significant interaction between verbal and photographic evidence conditions.

Continuous culpability measures

A two-way between groups MANOVA was performed on the four continuous dependent mea-
sures related to verdict decisions: mock juror confidence in verdict, factual guilt (the likelihood
that the defendant killed the victim), the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, and doubt about
the defendant’s guilt. Table 3 displays the means (with significant differences indicated) for the
verbal and photographic evidence conditions for each of these dependent measures. There was
a significant main effect of photographic evidence on the continuous measures, multivariate

Table 2 Percentage of mock jurors voting to convict, by experimental condition

Form of gruesome evidence Conviction rate (%)

No photographs
Verbal low gruesome 17.6
Verbal high gruesome 0
Neutral visual
Verbal low gruesome 41.2
Verbal high gruesome 35.3
Gruesome visual
Verbal low gruesome 23.5
Verbal high gruesome 58.8

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Fig. 1 The influence of photographic evidence on verdict

F(4, 93) = 2.34, p < .5, η2 = .09. Univariate tests revealed that this effect held only for mock
juror ratings of the sufficiency of prosecution evidence, univariate F(2, 96) = 5.35, p < .01.
Post hoc Tukey HSD analyses revealed that mock jurors who saw gruesome photographs rated
the prosecution evidence as significantly more adequate or sufficient (3.21) than did mock jurors
who saw no photographs (2.15). There were no significant differences between the neutral photo-
graph condition and either the no photograph condition or the gruesome photographs condition.
Post hoc contrast tests revealed that mock jurors who saw gruesome photographic evidence rated
the prosecution evidence as significantly more sufficient than did mock jurors who saw either
neutral photographs or no photographs, univariate F(2, 99) = 5.47, p < .05. Contrast tests
also revealed that mock jurors who saw any photographic evidence rated the prosecution evi-
dence as significantly more sufficient than did mock jurors who saw no photographs, univariate
F(2, 99) = 5.47, p < .01.
There were no significant main effects for type of verbal evidence, multivariate
F(4, 93) = .66, p = .62, η2 = .03, and no significant interactions between verbal
evidence and photographic evidence on the continuous measures, multivariate F(8, 186) =
0.55, p = .82, η2 = .02.

Emotion measures

A 2 (verbal evidence) × 3 (photographic evidence) ANOVA was conducted on the total pre–
post difference score on the JUNAS. Table 4 displays the means for verbal and photographic
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194 Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202

Table 3 Continuous measures by experimental condition

Photographic evidence Verbal evidence

No Neutral Gruesome Low verbal High verbal
photographs photographs photographs gruesome gruesome

Sufficiency of 2.15a 2.82 3.21a 2.69 2.76

evidence
Factual guilt 3.94 4.32 3.62 3.80 4.12
Doubt that 3.82 3.65 3.65 3.65 3.76
defendant
guilty
Confidence in 3.88 3.65 4.12 4.00 3.76
verdict

Note. Means sharing the same superscript were significantly different (p < .01).

evidence conditions for the JUNAS subscales pre–post difference scores and total pre–post
difference scores. This analysis yielded a significant main effect of photographic evidence,
F(2, 96) = 3.87, p < .05, η2 = .08. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test con-
firmed that the mean difference score for the participants who saw gruesome photographs was
significantly higher (19.24) than that of the participants who did not see any photographs (8.62).
There were no significant differences between the neutral photograph condition and either the
condition without photograph or the condition with gruesome photographs.
Post hoc contrast tests revealed that the mean difference score for mock jurors who saw
gruesome photographic evidence was significantly higher than that for mock jurors who saw
either neutral photographs or no photographs, univariate F(2, 99) = 6.54, p < .01. Contrast
tests also revealed that the mean difference score for mock jurors who saw any photographic
evidence was significantly higher than that for mock jurors who saw no photographs, univariate
F(2, 99) = 6.54, p < .01.
A two-way between groups MANOVA was performed on the pre–post difference scores
(i.e., posttrial score minus the pretrial score to account for baseline emotional responses)
on the JUNAS subscales of fear, anger, sadness, and disgust. There was a marginally sig-
nificant main effect of photographic evidence on the pre–post difference scores, multivariate
F(8, 186) = 1.97, p = .05, η2 = .08. Univariate tests revealed that this effect held only for
pre–post differences on the disgust subscale, univariate F(2, 96) = 6.51, p = .002. Post
hoc Tukey HSD analyses indicated that mock jurors who saw gruesome photographs had

Table 4 Affect measures by experimental condition

Photographic evidence Verbal evidence

Difference between pre- and posttrial No Neutral Gruesome Low verbal High verbal
score photographs photographs photographs gruesome gruesome

JUNAS
Disgust subscale 2.71b 3.94c 6.79b,c 4.80 4.16
Fear subscale 3.35 3.03 5.88 4.90 3.27
Anger subscale 1.15 2.09 3.41 2.51 1.92
Sadness subscale 2.44 3.47 4.41 3.80 3.08
Total 8.62d 11.15 19.24d 14.78 11.21

Note. Means sharing the same superscript were found to be significantly different (p < .05).
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Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202 195

significantly higher pre–post disgust scores (6.80) than did mock jurors who saw no photographs
(2.71) or neutral photographs (3.94).
Post hoc contrast tests revealed that the mean difference score for mock jurors who saw
gruesome photographic evidence was significantly higher than that for mock jurors who saw
either neutral photographs or no photographs, univariate F(2, 99) = 6.54, p < .01. Contrast
tests also revealed that the mean difference score for mock jurors who saw any photographic
evidence was significantly higher than that for mock jurors who saw no photographs, univariate
F(2, 99) = 6.54, p < .01.
A two-way between groups MANOVA was performed on mock juror ratings of their emo-
tional reactions to the defendant and the victim, that is, anger toward the defendant and
sympathy for the victim. Table 5 displays the means for verbal and photographic evidence
conditions for mock juror affective responses to the victim and defendant. There was a sig-
nificant main effect of photographic evidence on mock juror ratings of their emotional re-
actions, multivariate F(4, 190) = 2.94, p < .05, η2 = .06. Univariate tests revealed that
this effect held only for ratings of anger toward the defendant, univariate F(2, 96) = 5.95,
p = .004. Post hoc Tukey HSD analyses confirmed that mock jurors who saw gruesome
photographs rated their anger toward the defendant significantly higher (2.20) than did mock
jurors who saw no photographs (1.47). There were no significant differences between the neu-
tral photograph condition and either the condition without photograph or the condition with
gruesome photographs. Post hoc contrast tests revealed that the mock jurors who saw grue-
some photographic evidence rated their anger at the defendant significantly higher than did
mock jurors who saw either neutral photographs or no photographs, univariate F(2, 99) =
3.93, p < .01. There was no significant difference between mock jurors who saw any photo-
graphic evidence compared with those who saw no photographs on ratings of anger toward the
defendant.

Mediation analysis

Given the significant findings regarding the influence of photographic evidence on mock ju-
ror ratings of the sufficiency of prosecution evidence and the experience of both disgust and
anger toward the victim, four mediation analyses were conducted to investigate whether anger
and/or disgust mediates the influence of gruesome photographic evidence on the sufficiency of
prosecution evidence and verdict. For the mediation analyses, four multiple regression analyses
were conducted. This analysis involves demonstrating that (a) gruesome photographic evidence
significantly affects sufficiency of evidence/verdict ratings; (b) gruesome photographic evidence

Table 5 Affective responses to victim and defendant by experimental condition

Anger at defendant Sympathy for victim

Photographic evidence
No photographs 1.47e 3.09
Neutral photographs 1.76 3.18
Gruesome photographs 2.21e 3.18
Verbal evidence
Verbal low gruesome 1.76 3.06
Verbal high gruesome 1.86 3.24

Note. Means sharing the same superscript were found to be significantly different (p < .01).
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196 Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202

significantly affects ratings of anger/disgust toward the defendant; (c) anger/disgust significantly
affects sufficiency of evidence; and (d) when anger/disgust toward the defendant is controlled, the
effect of gruesome photographic evidence on ratings of sufficiency of evidence should decrease
significantly (Baron & Kenny, 1986).
Two orthogonal contrasts were substituted in each analysis for photographic condition (con-
trast Y1 compared gruesome photographs with no and neutral photographs, and orthogonal
contrast Y2 compared no photographs with neutral photographs) to allow for meaningful inter-
pretations of the results.
The first mediation analysis investigated anger as a potential mediator between gruesome
photographic evidence and sufficiency of evidence ratings. The first regression analysis was
a standard multiple regression with ratings of the sufficiency of prosecution evidence as the
criterion variable and photographic condition (contrasts Y1 and Y2 ) as the predictor variable.
Gruesome photographic evidence significantly predicted ratings of evidence sufficiency, adjusted
R2 = .08, b = .25, F(2, 99) = 5.47, p = .001. Gruesome photographic evidence also
significantly predicted participant anger at the defendant, adjusted R2 = .09, b = .30, F(2,
99) = 6.05, p < .003. Ratings of anger at the defendant significantly predicted ratings of the
sufficiency of prosecution evidence, adjusted R2 = .11, b = .35, F(1, 100) = 13.58, p < .005.
Consistent with the requirements for mediation, when anger at the defendant was controlled,
the effect of gruesome photographic evidence on ratings of evidence sufficiency diminished
(adjusted R2 = .14, b = − .16, ns). However, the effect of anger at the defendant on sufficiency
of evidence was significant, b = .28, F(3, 98) = 6.56, p = .006. Thus, mock jurors in the
gruesome photographic evidence condition rated the prosecution evidence as more adequate or
sufficient to support a guilty verdict compared with mock jurors who saw no photographs or
who saw neutral photographic evidence, because the gruesome photographic evidence enhanced
mock juror anger at the defendant.
The second mediation analyses investigated disgust as a possible mediator between gruesome
photographic evidence and sufficiency of evidence ratings. The first regression analysis was
identical to the one conducted for anger. Gruesome photographic evidence significantly predicted
ratings of evidence sufficiency, adjusted R2 = .08, b = .25, F(2, 99) = 5.47, p = .001.
Gruesome photographic evidence also significantly predicted participant ratings of their disgust,
adjusted R2 = .10, b = .32, F(2, 99) = 6.51, p = .002. However, ratings of disgust did not
significantly predict ratings of the sufficiency of prosecution evidence (adjusted R2 = − .005,
b = .02, ns). Therefore, there was no evidence that disgust mediates the influence of gruesome
photographs on mock juror ratings of the sufficiency of the evidence.
The third mediation analysis investigated anger as a potential mediator between gruesome
photographic evidence and verdict. The first regression analysis was a logistic regression with
verdict as the criterion variable and photographic condition (Contrasts Y1 and Y2 ) as the predictor
variable. Gruesome photographic evidence significantly predicted verdict decisions, R2 = .16,
b = − .35, Wald’s statistic = 4.53, p < .05. Gruesome photographic evidence also significantly
predicted participant ratings of their anger, adjusted R2 = .10, b = .32, F(2, 99) = 6.51,
p = .002. Ratings of anger at the defendant significantly predicted verdict decisions, R2 = .12,
b = − .69, Wald’s statistic = 8.08, p < .005. Consistent with the requirements for mediation,
when anger at the defendant was controlled, the effect of gruesome photographic evidence on
the ratings of evidence sufficiency diminished (R2 = .12, b = − .25, ns). However, the effect
of anger at the defendant on verdict was significant, b = .69, Wald’s statistic = 8.08, p <
.005. Thus, mock jurors in the gruesome photographic evidence condition were more likely
to convict the defendant, compared with mock jurors who saw no photographs or who saw
neutral photographic evidence, because the gruesome photographic evidence enhanced mock
juror anger at the defendant.
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Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202 197

The fourth mediation analysis investigated disgust as a potential mediator between gruesome
photographic evidence and verdict. The first regression analysis was a logistic regression with
verdict as the criterion variable and photographic condition (Contrasts Y1 and Y2 ) as the predictor
variable. Gruesome photographic evidence significantly predicted verdict decisions, R2 = .16,
b = − .35, Wald’s statistic = 4.53, p < .05. Gruesome photographic evidence also signif-
icantly predicted participant ratings of their disgust, adjusted R2 = .10, b = .32, F(2, 99)
= 6.51, p = .002. However, ratings of disgust did not significantly predict ratings of the
sufficiency of prosecution evidence (R2 = .04, b = .07, ns). Therefore, there was no ev-
idence that disgust mediates the influence of gruesome photographs on mock juror verdict
decisions.

Discussion

In the United States and Australia, trial courts routinely admit visually presented gruesome
evidence in the form of verbal accounts and photographs, and appellate courts are hesitant
to reverse such decisions. A decision to admit gruesome evidence is usually based on an
assessment that the probative value of such evidence outweighs any potential prejudicial impact
on the fact-finder. This study tested the hypotheses that verbally and/or visually presented
gruesome evidence influences mock jurors’ evaluations of the inculpatory evidence presented,
their subjective estimates of the defendant’s guilt, and their verdicts.

Verdict

In this study, verbal gruesome evidence had no influence on mock juror verdicts. This is contrary
to the hypotheses and to findings in previous research (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2004). As
predicted, the conviction rate when visual gruesome evidence in the form of photographs was
included exceeded the conviction rate in the absence of any photographic evidence (see Fig. 1).
The increase in convictions in response to gruesome photographs confirmed the hypothesis that
jurors are more prone to convict a defendant when gruesome photographic evidence is led in
evidence, compared with the equivalent case in which no such gruesome evidence is submitted,
or where such evidence is excluded by the judge, irrespective of the inculpatory strength of
the balance of the evidence. However, a similar and unexpected pattern of results emerged in
response to the neutral photographs. The conviction rate when neutral photographic evidence
was included exceeded the conviction rate in the absence of photographic evidence. Photographic
evidence, with either gruesome or neutral content, appears to have a similar influence on the
conviction rate. It may not be the gruesome content of the photographs, but the visual mode of
presentation that influences mock juror decision making toward conviction. Such evidence may
be more easily encoded and subsequently recalled at judgment. Nonetheless, it is interesting
that the highest conviction rate in the six experimental conditions was obtained when gruesome
verbal evidence was accompanied by gruesome photographic evidence (58.8%, more than double
the overall mean conviction rate; see Table 1) providing preliminary support for the notion that
gruesome evidence presented in the context of a criminal case can increase the likelihood of a
conviction, especially when the evidence is presented in both verbal and visual modes.
The relatively low conviction rate overall is a likely consequence of the circumstantial nature of
the inculpatory evidence, generally viewed as less persuasive than the direct evidence (Aronson
& Hunter, 2001). More direct inculpatory evidence (e.g., eyewitness evidence) may produce
higher conviction rates.
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198 Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202

Culpability measures

Contrary to the hypotheses and to findings in some previous research (Bright & Goodman-
Delahunty, 2004), verbal gruesome evidence exerted no influence on measures of culpability.
Neither verbal nor photographic gruesome evidence influenced mock juror ratings of the factual
guilt of the defendant, doubt in the defendant’s guilt, or confidence in their verdict. One possible
explanation for this outcome is that the brief excerpts of gruesome testimony (although rated
significantly more gruesome and upsetting in the pilot study), were less prominent, and exerted
little impact when contained within 25 pages of other evidence and testimony.
Mean ratings of the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence (3.21) by mock jurors who were
presented with gruesome photographic evidence were significantly greater than those of mock
jurors who saw no photographs (2.15). The gruesome photographic evidence appeared to enhance
mock jurors subjective perception of the sufficiency of the prosecutorial evidence, compared with
an identical case in which no photographic evidence was shown to jurors. Mock jurors who saw
gruesome photographs rated the sufficiency of evidence as more sufficient compared with mock
jurors who saw no visual gruesome evidence. These findings further support the hypothesis
that gruesome evidence, once admitted, can influence the evaluation of evidence during the
culpability phase of a criminal proceeding, compared with an analogous case in which such
evidence is excluded. This suggests that any photographic evidence, neutral or gruesome, may
have the same impact on ratings of the sufficiency of prosecution evidence.
Interestingly, mock jurors who saw any photographic evidence rated the sufficiency of evi-
dence higher than those who saw no photographic evidence. This suggests that both the mode
of evidence presentation (i.e., visual) and the gruesome quality of visual evidence can increase
the perceived weight that jurors ascribe to evidence. This unexpected pattern of results requires
further exploration in future research.
The ALRC (1985) suggested that prejudicial evidence might cause jurors to inflate the weight
of evidence or make decisions on the basis of extra-legal information. The current study provides
preliminary empirical support for these concerns, especially when comparing the exclusion
versus admission of such evidence. A real case would usually involve the presentation of both
neutral and gruesome photographs. The current study did not investigate the combined influence
of neutral and gruesome photographs, thus firm conclusions on this issue are not possible.

Mock juror affect

As expected, mock jurors who saw gruesome postmortem photographs of the victim reported
experiencing significantly more intense emotional responses than did mock jurors who saw no
photographs. Mean pre–post difference scores on the JUNAS were inflated among mock jurors
who saw gruesome photographs compared with those who saw no photographs, suggesting
increased emotional responses in mock jurors who saw gruesome photographs. The presentation
of evidence visually compared with verbally, and the gruesome quality of evidence appeared to
enhance mock juror emotional reactions. Although gruesome evidence was expected to influence
emotional reactions, the impact of any photographs on emotional reactions was unexpected and
requires further exploration.
Mock jurors who saw gruesome photographs also reported higher levels of anger directed
at the defendant compared with mock jurors who did not see any photographs. Anger at the
defendant was not influenced by the mode of evidence presentation (visual vs. nonvisual), but
mock jurors who saw gruesome photographs were more angry at the defendant than those who
did not see gruesome photographs. Mock juror pre–post ratings on the disgust subscale of the
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Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202 199

JUNAS were significantly greater when gruesome photographs were presented, compared to
those scores in response to neutral photographs or no photographs.
The finding that specific negatively valenced emotions (anger and disgust) were induced by
gruesome photographs specifically, suggests that rather than impacting on negative affect in
general, or producing a generally negative mood, gruesome visual evidence influences specific
emotions (DeSteno et al., 2004). Mock jurors reported elevated anger toward the defendant and
general disgust in response to the gruesome evidence compared with mock jurors who saw no
photographs, supporting the contention that specific emotions are influenced by admitting rather
than excluding such evidence. Disgust has been associated with the violation of sociocultural
norms (Rozin et al., 1999) and anger related to blame attributions (Averill, 1982). The experience
of disgust and anger may activate a desire to blame the person who elicits the most negative
affect, in accord with the “culpable control” model (Alicke, 2000). Further support for this
notion could be demonstrated if the emotional reactions of mock jurors mediate the influence
that gruesome evidence has on mock juror culpability decisions.

Mediation analysis

Mediation analyses were conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that mock jurors’ anger/disgust
toward the defendant mediated the influence of gruesome evidence on ratings of the suffi-
ciency of prosecution evidence and verdict. Results indicated that for the influence of gruesome
photographs on both sufficiency of anger and verdict, anger, but not disgust, mediated the rela-
tionship. This effect did not hold for neutral photographs. Results indicated that the inclusion of
gruesome photographic evidence compared with neutral or no photographs increased the level
of anger that mock jurors reported toward the defendant. Gruesome photographic evidence also
increased mock juror ratings of the sufficiency of inculpatory evidence and convictions, hold-
ing constant any influence of anger. Consistent with the hypotheses, mock juror anger toward
the defendant mediated the influence of the gruesome photographs in enhancing the perceived
weight of inculpatory evidence and in increasing the likelihood of conviction.
This finding, in combination with the previous findings, suggests that gruesome photographs,
compared with neutral or no photographs, elicit emotional reactions such as anger that may
generate blame attributions, which in turn increases the likelihood of conviction. Neural pho-
tographs may elicit similar affective reactions, but these emotional responses do not mediate the
relationship between neutral photographs and increased convictions. It appears that although any
photographic evidence can increase the likelihood of conviction, the process by which gruesome
evidence influences verdict appears to be mediated via emotional responses. When jurors see
gruesome photographs they may react with disgust and become angry specifically toward the
defendant, possibly because of their aversion to the suffering of the victim or the perception of
the injustice of the treatment of the victim. This anger, directed specifically toward the defendant,
may then lead to biases in the processing of evidence, such as subjective assessments of the
sufficiency of prosecution evidence, leading to an increased likelihood of conviction. Of the three
ways suggested by Alicke (2000) that this bias can be produced, the current study produced data
indicating that this prejudicial influence is generated through changes in the way mock jurors
evaluate the evidence such that in the presence of gruesome photographic evidence, mock jurors
experienced anger (at the defendant) and disgust, such that the prosecution evidence appears to
be more strongly supportive of conviction than it was in the absence of gruesome photographic
evidence.
Photographic evidence in general may exert an influence via an alternate and probably
nonaffective route (possibly memory). This requires further empirical exploration.
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200 Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202

Implications for the legal system

The current study indicates that photographic evidence, irrespective of whether this evidence is
neutral or gruesome, can increase the likelihood of conviction. Admitting gruesome photographic
evidence, rather than excluding this evidence, appears to increase the inculpatory value that jurors
ascribe to prosecutorial evidence by influencing the emotional state of jurors. Further, although
any photographs appear to have similar effects on mock juror overall affect, emotional reactions
to gruesome photographic evidence appear to lead to changes in the processing of evidence
and to an increased likelihood of conviction compared with neutral and no photographs. The
current research provides empirical support for concerns about prejudicial evidence outlined by
the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence (Committee on the Judiciary House
of Representatives, 2004) and the Australian Law Reform Commission (1985), in particular the
notion that prejudicial evidence (such as gruesome photographs) can lead fact-finders to (1) use
evidence to make a decision on an emotional basis; (2) give evidence more weight than it should
have; and (3) base their decisions on something other than the established propositions in the
case.
In criminal cases that involve visual presentations of evidence, including gruesome evidence,
jurors’ decisions about culpability may be biased because available legal safeguards are not
used to exclude such evidence. The results of this study suggest that any photographic evidence
may exert a prejudicial influence on jurors. The current study suggests that affective reactions to
gruesome photographs may impact juror information processing and judgments. Further research
is necessary to examine this issue more precisely.

Methodological limitations

A few methodological limitations in the present research deserve mention. First year psychology
students may not be representative of citizens in the general community who serve in criminal
trials. The study used mock-trial transcripts containing controverted witness testimony and
photographs derived from a real case. Although the 25-page case synopsis with extracts from the
transcript has greater verisimilitude than materials used in the earlier studies, mock jurors read
these transcripts rather than viewing live witnesses. Greater ecological validity can be attained
using videotaped trial materials.
Jury deliberation was not employed in the current study, which examined individual, and not
group, decision-making. Whether deliberation can reduce biases that operate at the individual
juror level is untested. Future studies should also investigate whether judicial warnings are
effective in counteracting the influence of gruesome evidence on juror decision-making.
This study raises questions about what comprises a useful control group for the investigation
of gruesome photographs. From an experimental perspective, neutral photographs may make the
best control to investigate the specific impact of the gruesome content of the photographs above
and beyond the impact of presentation in a visual mode. However, from a real-world courtroom
perspective, the fundamental issue relates to admission versus exclusion of gruesome photo-
graphic evidence, such that a difference between a gruesome photograph and no photographs
conditions has real-world implication regarding the potential for prejudice. This issue requires
further theoretical and empirical investigation.
Overall, the current research provides preliminary support for the notion that photographic
evidence can exert a prejudicial influence on mock juror decision-making in criminal cases, and
that in the case of gruesome photographs, this influence is mediated by emotional reactions of
jurors to such evidence. Future research is required to further explore this issue.
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Law Hum Behav (2006) 30:183–202 201

Acknowledgements The authors thank the New South Wales Department of Public Prosecutions (Sydney,
Australia) for providing the photographs used as experimental materials for this study.

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