The human good
Aristotle's account of rational agents, choice, deliberation and action is an appropriate
starting point for his ethical theory. Ethics is concerned with the praiseworthy and
blameworthy actions and states of character of rational agents; that is why it concerns
virtues (praiseworthy states) and vices (blameworthy states) (see Arete).
Aristotle's ethical theory is mostly contained in three treatises: the Magna Moralia, the
Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics. The titles of the last two works may reflect a
tradition that Eudemus (a member of the Lyceum) and Nicomachus (the son of Aristotle and
Herpyllis) edited Aristotle's lectures. The Magna Moralia is widely agreed not to have been
written by Aristotle; some believe, with good reason, that it contains a student's notes on an
early course of lectures by Aristotle. The Eudemian Ethics is now widely agreed to be
authentic, and generally (not universally) and reasonably taken to be earlier than the
Nicomachean Ethics. Three books (Nicomachean Ethics V-VII = Eudemian Ethics IV-VI) are
assigned by the manuscripts to both the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics.
Aristotle conceives 'ethics' (Magna Moralia 1181a24) as a part of political science; he treats
the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics as parts of a single inquiry (Nicomachean Ethics X
9). Ethics seeks to discover the good for an individual and a community (Nicomachean Ethics
I 2), and so it begins with an examination of happiness, (eudaimonia). ('Wellbeing' and
'welfare' are alternative renderings of eudaimonia that may avoid some of the misleading
associations carried by 'happiness'; see Eudaimonia.) Happiness is the right starting point for
an ethical theory because, in Aristotle's view, rational agents necessarily choose and
deliberate with a view to their ultimate good, which is happiness; it is the end that we want
for its own sake, and for the sake of which we want other things (so that it is the ultimate
non-instrumental good). If it is to be an ultimate end, happiness must be complete (or 'final';
teleion) and self-sufficient (Nicomachean Ethics I 1-5, 7).
To find a more definite account of the nature of this ultimate and complete end, Aristotle
argues from the human function (ergon), the characteristic activity that is essential to a
human being in the same way that a purely nutritive life is essential to a plant and a life
guided by sense perception and desire is essential to an animal (Nicomachean Ethics I 7).
Since a human being is essentially a rational agent, the essential activity of a human being is
a life guided by practical reason. The good life for a human being must be good for a being
with the essential activity of a human being; hence it must be a good life guided by practical
reason, and hence it must be a life in accordance with the virtue (arete) that is needed for
achieving one's good. The human good, therefore, is an actualization of the soul in
accordance with complete virtue in a complete life. This 'complete virtue' appears to include
the various virtues described in the following books of the Nicomachean Ethics; this
appearance, however, may be challenged by Nicomachean Ethics.
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Virtue of character
From the general conception of happiness Aristotle infers the general features of a virtue of
character (0thik0aret0; Nicomachean Ethics I 13). He agrees with Plato in recognizing both
rational and non-rational desires. One's soul is in a virtuous condition in so far as the non-
rational elements cooperate with reason; in this condition human beings fulfil their function
well. The argument from the human function does not make it clear what states of a rational
agent count as fulfilling the human function. Aristotle seeks to make this clearer, first
through his general account of virtue of character, and then through his sketches of the
individual virtues.
A virtue of character must be a 'mean' or 'intermediate' state, since it must achieve the
appropriate cooperation between rational and non-rational desires; such a state is
intermediate between complete indulgence of non-rational desires and complete
suppression of them. (Aristotle is not recommending 'moderation' - for example, a
moderate degree of anger or pleasure - in all circumstances.) The demand for cooperation
between desires implies that virtue is more than simply control over desires; mere control is
'continence' (enkrateia) rather than genuine virtue.
The task of moral education, therefore, is to harmonize non-rational desires with practical
reason. Virtuous people allow reasonable satisfaction to their appetites; they do not
suppress all their fears; they do not disregard all their feelings of pride or shame or
resentment (Nicomachean Ethics 1126a3-8), or their desire for other people's good opinion.
Aristotle's sketches of the different virtues show how different non-rational desires can
cooperate with practical reason.
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Virtue, practical reason and incontinence
A virtuous person makes a decision (prohairesis) to do the virtuous action for its own sake.
The correct decision requires deliberation; the virtue of intellect that ensures good
deliberation is prudence (or 'wisdom', phronesis; Nicomachean Ethics VI 4-5); hence the mean
in which a virtue lies must be determined by the sort of reason by which the prudentwould
determine it (1107a1-2). Virtue of character is, therefore, inseparable from prudence. Each
virtue is subject to the direction of prudence because each virtue aims at what is best, as
identified by prudence.
In claiming that prudence involves deliberation, Aristotle also emphasizes the importance of
its grasping the relevant features of a particular situation; we need to grasp the right
particulars if deliberation is to result in a correct decision about what to do here and now.
The right moral choice requires experience of particular situations, since general rules
cannot be applied mechanically. Aristotle describes the relevant aspect of prudence as a sort
of perception or intuitive understanding of the right aspects of particular situations
(Nicomachean Ethics VI 8, 11).
These aspects of prudence distinguish the virtuous person from 'continent' and 'incontinent'
people (Nicomachean Ethics VII 1-10). Aristotle accepts the reality of incontinent action
(akrasia), rejecting Socrates' view that only ignorance of what is better and worse underlies
apparent incontinence. He argues that incontinents make the right decision, but act contrary
to it. Their failure to stick to their decision is the result of strong non-rational desires, not
simply of cognitive error. Still, Aristotle agrees with Socrates in believing that ignorance is an
important component of a correct explanation of incontinence, because no one can act
contrary to a correct decision fully accepted at the very moment of incontinent action.
The error of incontinents lies in their failure to harmonize the demands of their appetites
with the requirements of virtue; their strong appetites cause them to lose part of the
reasoning that formed their decision. When they act, they fail to see clearly how their
general principles apply to their present situation. If their failure results from an error in
deliberation, it is clear why Aristotle insists that incontinent people lack prudence.
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Choice, virtue, and pleasure
It is initially puzzling that virtuous people decide to act virtuously for its own sake as a result
of deliberation. If they decide on virtuous action for its own sake, then their deliberation
causes them to choose it as an end in itself, not simply as a means. Decision and
deliberation, however, are not about ends but about 'the things promoting ends' (ta pros ta
telos, often rendered 'means to ends'). Aristotle's description of the virtuous person, then,
seems to attribute to decision a role that is excluded by his explicit account of decision.
This puzzle is less severe once we recognize that Aristotle regards different sorts of things as
'promoting' an end. Sometimes he means (1) that the action is external and purely
instrumental to the end; in this way buying food 'promotes' eating dinner. Sometimes,
however, he means (2) that the action is a part or component of the end, or that performing
the action partly constitutes the achieving of the end; in this way eating the main course
'promotes' eating dinner. Deliberation about this second sort oof 'promotion' shows that an
action is worth choosing for its own sake, in so far as it partly constitutes our end.
This role for deliberation explains how virtuous people can decide, as a result of
deliberation, on virtuous action for its own sake; they choose it as a part of happiness, not as
a merely instrumental means. Prudence finds the actions that promote happiness in so far as
they are parts of the happy life. Such actions are to be chosen for their own sake, as being
their own end; they are not simply instrumental means to some further end. The virtuous
person's decision results from deliberation about the composition of happiness; virtuous
people decide on the actions that, by being non-instrumentally good, are components of
happiness in their own right.
Aristotle's demand for the virtuous person to decide on the virtuous action for its own sake
is connected with two further claims: (1) the virtuous person must take pleasure in virtuous
action as such; (2) in doing so, the virtuous person has the pleasantest life. In these claims
Aristotle relies on his views about the nature of pleasure and its role in happiness
(Nicomachean Ethics VII 11-14, X 1-5).
He denies that pleasure is some uniform sensation to which different kinds of pleasant
action are connected only causally (in the way that the reading of many boring books on
different subjects might induce the same feeling of boredom). Instead he argues that the
specific pleasure taken in x rather than y is internally related to doing x rather than y, and
essentially depends on pursuing x for x's own sake. Pleasure is a 'supervenient end' (1174b31-
3) resulting from an activity that one pursues as an activity (praxis or energeia) rather than a
mere process or production (kinesis or poiesis).
Aristotle insists, following Plato's Philebus, that the value of the pleasure depends on the
value of the activity on which the pleasure supervenes (1176a3-29). The virtuous person has
the pleasantest life, but the ppleasantest life cannot aim exclusively at pleasure.
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Virtue, friendship and the good of others
The virtuous person's deliberation, identifying the mean in relation to different desires and
different situations, is articulated in the different virtues of character (described
in Nicomachean Ethics III-V). The different virtues are concerned with the regulation of non-
rational desires (for example, bravery, temperance, good temper), external goods (for
example, magnificence, magnanimity) and social situations (for example, truthfulness, wit).
Some concern the good of others to some degree (bravery, good temper, generosity).
Aristotle's Greek for virtue of character, ethikearete, is rendered into Latin as 'virtus
moralis'. The English rendering 'moral virtue' is defensible, since the virtues of character as a
whole display the impartial concern for others that is often ascribed to morality. They are
unified by the aim of the virtuous person, who decides on the virtuous action because it is
'fine' (kalon). Fine action systematically promotes the good of others; we must aim at it if we
are to find the mean that is characteristic of a virtue (1122b6-7).
A second unifying element in the virtues, inseparable from concern for the fine, is their
connection to justice (V 1-2). Aristotle takes justice to be multivocal, and distinguishes
general justice from the specific virtue concerned with the prevention and rectification of
certain specific types of injustices. General justice is the virtue of character that aims
specifically at the common good of a community. Since it is not a different state of character
from the other virtues, they must incorporate concern for the common good.
To explain why concern for the good of others, and for a common good, is part of the life
that aims at one's own happiness, Aristotle examines friendship (philia; Nicomachean Ethics
VIII-IX). All three of the main types of friendship (for pleasure, for advantage and for the
good) seek the good of the other person. Only the best type - friendship for the good
between virtuous people - includes A's concern for B's good for B's own sake and because of
B's essential character (Nicomachean Ethics VIII 1-4).
In the best sort of friendship, the friend is 'another self'; A takes the sorts of attitudes to B
that A also takes to A. Aristotle infers that friendship is part of a complete and self-sufficient
life (IX 9-11). Friendship involves sharing the activities one counts as especially important in
one's life, and especially the sharing of reasoning and thinking. Friends cooperate in
deliberation, decision and action; and the thoughts and actions of each provide reasons for
the future thoughts and actions of the other. The cooperative aspects of friendship more
fully realize each person's own capacities as a rational agent, and so promote each person's
happiness. Hence the full development of a human being requires concern for the good of
others.
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Two conceptions of happiness?
Although Aristotle emphasizes the other-regarding, social aspects of happiness, he also
advocates pure intellectual activity (or 'study', the>ria) - the contemplation of scientific and
philosophical truths, apart from any attempt to apply them to practice (Nicomachean
Ethics X 6-8). The connection between the human function and human happiness implies
that contemplation is a supremely important element in happiness. For contemplation is the
highest fulfilment of our nature as rational beings; it is the sort of rational activity that we
share with the gods, who are rational beings with no need to apply reason to practice.
Aristotle infers that contemplation is the happiest life available to us, in so far as we have
the rational intellects we share with gods.
According to one interpretation, Aristotle actually identifies contemplation with happiness:
contemplation is the only non-instrumental good that is part of happiness, and the moral
virtues are to be valued - from the point of view of happiness - simply as means to
contemplation. If this is Aristotle's view, it is difficult to see how the virtues of character are
even the best instrumental means to happiness. Even if some virtuous actions are
instrumental means to contemplation, it is difficult to see how the motives demanded of the
virtuous person are always useful, rather than distracting, for those who aim at
contemplation.
Probably, however, Aristotle means that contemplation is the best component of happiness.
If we were pure intellects with no other desires and no bodies, contemplation would be the
whole of our good. Since, however, we are not in fact merely intellects (Nicomachean
Ethics 1178b3-7), Aristotle recognizes that the good must be the good of the whole human
being. Contemplation is not the complete good for a human being.
If this is Aristotle's view, then contemplation fits the conception of happiness that is upheld
in the rest of the Nicomachean Ethics and in the other ethical works. The virtues of character,
and the actions expressing them, deserve to be chosen for their own sakes as components
of happiness. In the virtuous person, they regulate one's choice of other goods, and so they
also regulate one's choices about contemplation. The Politics may be taken to develop this
conception of happiness, since (in book VII) it sets contemplation in the context of a social
order regulated by the moral virtues.
