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The document discusses electoral and party politics in the Philippines in the postwar period. It describes how Manuel Quezon consolidated power over the Nacionalista Party and Commonwealth government before World War 2. During the Japanese occupation, most Filipino leaders collaborated with the invaders to prevent social breakdown. The Japanese then dissolved all political parties and created the Kalibapi organization to gain popular support. Elections held under Japanese rule led to Jose Laurel becoming president of the new Philippine Republic, though the country remained under occupation. The war weakened the Philippine elite by disrupting the colonial economy.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
197 views5 pages

Script Chapter 4

The document discusses electoral and party politics in the Philippines in the postwar period. It describes how Manuel Quezon consolidated power over the Nacionalista Party and Commonwealth government before World War 2. During the Japanese occupation, most Filipino leaders collaborated with the invaders to prevent social breakdown. The Japanese then dissolved all political parties and created the Kalibapi organization to gain popular support. Elections held under Japanese rule led to Jose Laurel becoming president of the new Philippine Republic, though the country remained under occupation. The war weakened the Philippine elite by disrupting the colonial economy.
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We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Good afternoon everyone! I am Mariane Rae Andrion the first reporter of the group.

Our topic
for today is about ~

ELECTORAL AND PARTY POLITICS IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD


Jorge V. Tigno

The single most distinct feature of Philippine politics is that the two major parties are quite
identical- with respect to the social, occupational, and regional sources of their support as
well as to their policies. -Carl Lande

Carl Lande, perhaps the most influential student of Philippine politics in the last four decades,
defines Philippine political parties in terms of "Members of the (Philippine political) elite,
ranging themselves under the banners of two national parties, compete with each other for
elective offices. Each is supported by his kinsmen, both rich and poor, by his non-kinsmen
clients, and by whoever else among the 'little people' of his community can be induced, by
offers of material or other rewards, to vote for him. The two rival parties in each province, in
short, are held together by dyadic patron-client relationships extending from great and
wealthy political leaders in each province down to lesser gentry politicians in the towns, down
further to petty leaders in each village, and down finally to the clients of the latter: the
common tao". (Lande, 1969:156)

Introduction

After having gone through the period of American military and civilian occupation, the
Philippines was once again put to the test with its involvement in the Second World War and
the ensuing postwar reconstruction. Much can be said about how the Philippines has been
transformed by the war and how it has attempted to use its position as an independent nation
to forge continued special relations with the US in order to address the problem of the war's
aftermath. What lay ahead for the country as the first (albeit fledgling) democracy in Asia were
challenges that also tested the capacity of political parties to draw support from one another
and still be able to generate defined cleavages between them.

Party Politics During The World War II Interregnum meaning a period when normal
government is suspended, especially between successive reigns or regimes

The outbreak of the war overshadowed both the constitutional amendments of 1940 and the
reelection of Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmeña as Commonwealth president and vice
president, respectively, in November 1941. In the months before the war, Quezon had
successfully consolidated both the Nationalist Party and the Commonwealth government
virtually under his sole authority. He had accomplished what no other Filipino had up to that
time. His parny had almost complete dominion over the legislature where most of the
leadership was closely allied with him. What remained of the opposition (from the Federal
Party to the Progressivist Party to the Democratic Party) would continually be too weak to
challenge the dominance of the Nacionalistas.

Indeed, Quezon was also able to consolidate his personal dominance over the party and the
government. By the 1920s he had wrested the leadership of the party from Osmeña. He was
even able to weather the challenges to his leadership by the 1930s to the extent that the 1935
Constitution was practically tailor-made to suit his personality and temperament.

At the start of the war, American and Filipino armed forces were already on the retreat from
the invading Japanese forces. Quezon's second inaugural address was made on Corregidor
in December 1941. Eventually, the Commonwealth government went into exile in the US for
the duration of the war. In this sense, Quezon chose to side with the Americans (from whom
he had gotten so much) rather than remain with the people and face the difficult choice of
collaborating with the Japanese. However, given Quezon's personality, he was not above
commanding others to do so. Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos had been appointed by Quezon
as acting president of the Commonwealth government in the Philippines, with Manuel Roxas
as secretary to the president.' A strong sense of pragmatism (which means   practical
consequences of accepting it, and that unpractical ideas are to be rejected) pervaded the
sentiments of those who remained and cooperated with the Japanese military authorities.
These Filipinos were later to be called collaborators. According to Abinales and Amoroso:

Most Filipino leaders who collaborated with the Japanese did so for pragmatic reasons-the
Americans had abandoned them-or in compliance with Quezon's directive to work with the
invaders to prevent political and social breakdown.

~Elections in the early American period did not significantly expand the electorate in
quantitative terms. But while the expansion may not seem like much from a contemporary
vantage point, by expanding elections outside of the circle of officials, the Americans brought
other sections of the elite into the circle of governance and began the process of shaping the
elite into an instrument of local rule. Political parties were formed at this time, but electoral
campaigning was mainly a matter of organizing elite factions.

Where elections during the Spanish and early American colonial periods were limited to the
elite, once the electorate broke elite boundaries, elites now had to convince non-elites to vote
for them. At first, patron-client ties and deeply embedded traditions of social deference were
sufficient. The organizational requirements of electoral campaigning remained simple. This
allowed elites to concentrate on the task of building factional coalitions in ascending order of
complexity as elections moved from municipal, to provincial, to the national level.

This process was facilitated by the fact that differentiation in the elite at this time was not very
complex. Most of the elite were landowners so differentiation focused on geographic
representation and whether they were exporters of agricultural products or not. Combined
with Quezon's organizational skills, this was a major reason for the dominance of the
Nacionalista Party. This sociological situation changed radically after the second World War.

Such collaboration among the Filipino leadership proved to be invaluable to the existence of
the Commonwealth. The so-called collaborators, comprised mostly of Commonwealth-era
leaders, would provide continuity between the previous regime and the one that was
dominated by Japanese military authorities during the war. Upon ensuring control over much
of the country, the Japanese ordered the creation of an Executive Committee headed by
Jorge Vargas, former executive secretary to the president and the appointed mayor of Manila
at the time. The Japanese further expanded the membership of the committee by creating
another Council of State to serve in an advisory capacity to the committee.

By December 1942, the Japanese Military Administration (JMA) announced the "voluntary
dissolution" of all political parties as "vestiges of American power and authority in the
Philippines... for the purpose of fostering closer harmony, concordance, and unanimity among
all Filipinos...“ In place of parties, the JMA created the Association for Service to the New
Philippines or Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas (Kalibapi) to act as a
nonpolitical service organization in aid of the country's "reconstruction" efforts. Its first director
general was Benigno S. Aquino.

Being a creation of the Japanese, the Kalibapi was thought to "essentially ... serve the interest
of the Japanese, not that of the Filipinos.* It was seen as instrumental in securing some
degree of popular support for the JMA. This is the reason why, by mid-1943, Kalibapi claimed
to have had a registered membership of 3.6 million Filipinos or 20 percent of the country's
population at the time.

For all intents and purposes, Kalibapi could not be considered a political party. It did not
compete or campaign in any election. However, it could also be considered a party to the
extent that its members vied for public office (albeit not by electoral competition). Membership
in the organization was understood by many at the time to be a requirement for employment
in government." Being the only party organization that existed, the Kalibapi was all that stood
between the people and the Japanese military. Indeed, Liang argues that without the Kalibapi,
"the game with the Japanese would have been all the more difficult if not utterly impossible.""
Moreover, the association was seen as
instrumental in voicing the sentiment of the people for Filippinization [sic] of the country's
clergy, campaign for food production, and conducting a peace campaign among the masses
by securing firearms and ammunition from misguided elements in certain sectors of the
country."

The Japanese then set about planning for the eventual declaration of independence of the
Philippines (perhaps in an effort to convince the people of its noble intentions) and its
subsequent support of the former's war effort against the Americans. A Preparatory
Commission for independence was established with Jose Laurel as president. Within two
months, the commission was able to draft the constitution and subsequently had it approved
by a 117- member General Assembly (all of whom were handpicked by the Japanese military
authorities).

Elections for the National Assembly and the president of the new "Republic" (as provided by
the Japanese-sponsored constitution) were held on September 20 and 25, 1943, respectively.
Laurel won the presidency and inaugurated the independence of the country on October 14,
1943, under Japanese occupation.

~The Japanese occupation from 1941 to 1945 weakened the Philippine elite by disrupting the
colonial economy. Landlord control over their tenants and farm workers was attenuated
because landlords moved out of the countryside and their collaboration with the Japanese
occupation army impaired their moral hold on the peasantry . New elite factions, especially
guerrilla leaders, moved into this power vacuum. Although the returning Americans facilitated
the political exoneration of prewar elites, many guerrilla leaders were able to consolidate their
positions through electoral politics.

The more complex differentiation in the elite after World War II complicated the organizational
task of political parties. Where factional dynamics could be accommodated within the
Nacionalista Party before, a two party system came into place during the first postwar
elections in 1946. Nacionalista Party leader Manuel Roxas bolted the party and formed the
Liberal Party. Prewar leader Sergio Osmena allied the Nacionalista Party with guerrilla
leaders in the Democratic Alliance.

The next stage in the development of political parties was set by the candidacy of guerrilla
leader Ramon Magsaysay in the presidential elections of 1953. (Magsaysay’s topic will be
discuss by my other group member)

Despite his acquiescence, Laurel was still seen by the Japanese as belligerent (which means
a nation or person engaged in war or conflict, as recognized by international law). In response
to Laurel's apparent lack of enthusiasm to pursue Japan's wartime agenda, the Japanese
organized the Kalipunang Makabayan ng mga Pilipino (Makapili) or the Patriotic League of
Filipinos on December 8, 1944 (not coincidentally, the third anniversary of the attack on Pearl
Harbor)."

Under the leadership of Benigno Ramos (also the founder of the Sakdal Party of the 1930s),
the Makapili was used by the Japanese as a hedge against Laurel and the republican
government. Ramos was said to have declared that "the Makapili would be independent of
the Republic,' subject only to the authority of the Japanese high command." When American
forces had landed on the islands, "the Japanese decided that the Makapili be given free hand
in running the government in lieu of the 'Republic' for the benefit and aid of the retreating
Japanese forces."

~President Corazon Aquino had an opportunity to transform the party system. She failed
because she refused to become a member of any party, but allowed her brother to sabotage
the reform process by recruiting KBL and other unsavory trapo (traditional politician) types
into what became the de facto ruling party, the PDP-LABAN (Pilipino Democratic Party-
Struggle). She had so much personal authority that if she had chosen to do so, she could
have led in the formation of a political party that incorporated the reform thrust of the EDSA
revolution which toppled Marcos. In particular, she could have worked with then Minister of
Local Government Aquilino Pimentel to use the appointment of local government unit OIC's
(Officer in Charge) in 1986 as a way of either building a new party or strengthening the more
reform oriented PDP part of PDP Laban.

The system of constitutional democracy put in place by Pres. Aquino created a contradictory
situation for the development of political parties. The presidential form of government put in
place by the 1987 constitution restored the conditions for a two party system. But the two
dominant parties of the pre-martial law period were, apparently irretrievably, weakened. Other
parts of the constitution including the party list system pushed in the other direction, towards
a multi-party system. Indeed, in the ten year period since 1987, the Philippines has had what
appears to be a multi-party system, but with rather weak parties.

Collaboration was not the only thing that preoccupied the Filipinos. During the war, the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) continued the resistance against the Japanese.
The CPP established the People's Army Against Japan or Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon
known as Hukbalahap (or Huk for shor). However, not all Huks were communists. Many were
poor peasants."

~Another key organization in the fight against the Japanese was the Hukbalahap. An
abbreviated form of the Filipino translation for “the nation’s army against the Japanese,” the
Hukbalahap was originally created by the leaders of groups of poor farmers, and it numbered
just 500. Under the leadership of Luis Taruc, the organization grew to over 15,000 by 1943,
drawing primarily from agricultural regions of Luzon.23 The “Huks” were not just a group of
farmers, however. As the military branch of a growing Marxist movement in the Philippines,
Taruc and the Hukbalahap had political ambitions as well, frequently putting them at odds
with American forces, particularly when it came to recruitment and materiel. Despite low initial
numbers, Taruc’s forces found success, often by any means necessary. Unable to work out
an agreement with American forces regarding supplies, the Huks raided USAFFE arms
caches. Talented recruits were given the option to join or suffer. Japanese raids resulted in
the loss of soldiers and officers, but despite the Huk’s disorganization, their survival only
strengthened their resolve.24 Key to Huk success was the organizational system, with a base
unit of hundred-man squadrons. At the outset, the Hukbalahap consisted of only five such
groups; by March of 1943 the organization was 10,000 strong, split into at least forty
detachments.25 The focal point of system was Taruc himself, who oversaw and directed the
movements of the organization, particularly the information network, and strengthened the
territory already acquired as the war progressed. By the end of the war, the Hukbalahap had
established a legitimate presence within the Philippines, even if the USAFFE and the
Philippine Republic did not wish to recognize them as such. A third group resisting the
Japanese occupation was the Moro Muslims native to the southwestern islands of the
Philippine Archipelago such as Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. The Moros have come into
conflict with every imperial power that claimed their land since the fall of the Sulu Sultanate,
and the Japanese occupational force was no different. The strength they showed in their
struggle with Imperial Japan was noted, with reports of them forcing Japanese troops to
retreat to their ships at night for fear of attack.26 Furthermore, Moro Muslims had already
reclaimed much of their land by the time American forces returned to the Philippines.

After it had gone into exile in the US, the Commonwealth government under Quezon was
faced with the problem of who would constitutionally succeed the president after his second
term expired in November 1943. The 1935 Constitution (as amended in 1940) restricts the
president's tenure to two consecutive terms only or a maximum of eight years. Since Quezon
was first elected in 1935 and reelected in 1941, his term was supposed to end by November
15, 1943, without reelection. There arose a constitutional dilemma of allowing the president
and vice president to extend their terms without the benefit of an election.

In early 1943, Quezon wrote President Roosevelt so that the former might continue serving as
Commonwealth president without being elected for the duration of the war. Liang states that
Quezon justified this proposal by saying that

Japanese invasion has destroyed all semblance of constitutional government and institutions
in the Philippines. land that the Filipino people would be at a loss upon learning as to how he
could have been invited to come to Washington as the head of the Commonwealth
government and then dropped all of a sudden just because of the constitutional limitation of
the presidential term to eight consecutive years."

Shortly after the appeal was made (with the concurrence of Quezon's cabinet and vice
president), the US Congress passed a joint resolution (which was subsequently approved by
Roosevelt) that effectively allowed Quezon to continue in office for the duration of the war." All
was set for Quezon to succeed himself as president of the Commonwealth. Unfortunately, he
died of a chronic pulmonary disease on August 1, 1944. Upon his death, Osmeña assumed
the presidency.

It may be said that Philippine party politics during the Second World War, while having had
the makings of becoming mass-oriented, had been largely proscribed by Japanese military
objectives. Politics at the time could not be divorced from the particular wartime objectives of
the Japanese. Moreover, contrary to the impression that the war had "corrupted" the country's
democratic institutions, there has been a significant degree of continuity between the prewar
period and wartime episodes as well as the postwar period that ensued."

~That is all for the Introduction and Party Politics During The World War II Interregnum~
Thank you.

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