Decentralization in Myanmar: A Nascent and Evolving Process

Author(s): Kim N.B. Ninh and Matthew Arnold

Source: Journal of Southeast Asian Economies , August 2016, Vol. 33, No. 2, Special
Focus: (De)centralization in Southeast Asia (August 2016), pp. 224-241
Published by: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute

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Journal of Southeast Asian Economies Vol. 33, No. 2 (2016), pp. 224^41 ISSN 2339-5095 print / ISSN 2339-5206 electronic

DOI: 10.1355/ae33-2g

Decentralization in Myanmar
A Nascent and Evolving Process

Kim N.B. Ninh and Matthew Arnold

Under the 2008 Constitution and following the 2010 elections marking Myanmar* s historic
transition from military rule , the country began a series of decentralization reforms. Sub-
national governance is now based on fourteen state and region governments , with more
opportunities for public inputs at the local level. Myanmar, however, remains a highly
centralized state : 25 per cent of national and sub-national parliamentary seats are
constitutionally mandated for the military. Furthermore, the state and region governments
have no civil service of their own and must rely on national ministries. While even the military
now concedes that the country 's future lies in some form of federalism, what that means will
be highly contested given the history of ethnic armed conflicts. Meanwhile, state and region
governments are becoming more active in defining their own policies, developments that the
new National League for Democracy -led government has promised to further.

Keywords: Myanmar, decentralization, federalism, state and region governments, democratic transition.

1. Introduction Fourteen state and region governments were

mandated and some division of power between
As part of a roadmap to "discipline-flourishing
levels of administration was created. This was a
democracy" announced by the military government
historic shift from a highly centralized military
in 2003, a new constitution was drafted and dictatorship. After assuming power in April
approved through a public referendum in 2008. 2011, the Thein Sein government increasingly
Widely viewed as a constitution designed to emphasized decentralization and improvement
maintain the central role of the military in state in local governance while engaging in ceasefire
affairs, it nevertheless introduced significant discussions with the numerous ethnic armed
new structures in sub-national governance. groups. Until recently, the term "federalism" was

Kim N.B. Ninh is the Country Representative for The Asia Foundation, No. 17, Thu Khi Tar Street, Shwe P
Residence Lane No. 1, 15 Ward, Bauk Htaw, Yankin Township, Yangon, Myanmar; email: kim. ninh @asiafoun
org

Matthew Arnold is the Program Director for The Asia Foundation No. 17, Thu Khi Tar Street, Shwe Pyi Thar
Residence Lane No. 1, 15 Ward, Bauk Htaw, Yankin Township, Yangon, Myanmar; email: matthew.arnold@
asiafoundation.org

224 © 2016 ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute

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August 2016 Ninh and Arnold: Decentralization in Myanmar 225

scope and
still viewed as a highly sensitive term depth of further decentralization will
synonymous
be a key
with the disintegration of the state. It element in the political discourse for the
has become
part of the ongoing peace process, years ahead.Myanmar's
with
military publicly acknowledging that the country's
future lies in some form of federalism. Meanwhile,
2. A Brief History of Decentralization in
the newly formed state and region governments
Myanmar
are becoming more active in defining their own
Myanmar's modern history has been defined
policies for sub-national governance.
Despite these developments, Myanmar remains
by highly centralized military authoritarianism.
a highly centralized country. Following
Its system ofin 1962, the country's
a military coup
basic administration
governance is perhaps best understood as a "federal-increasingly concentrated
like" polity. The creation of new sub-national
inside Union (central) ministries led by generals,
governments are constitutionally mandated,
with but
local administration done through assorted
their powers are greatly circumscribed. The
local councils led 2008commanders. Burma
by military
Constitution stipulates that 25 per hascent
had centralized
of both rulethe
given its history as a
national parliament and the state/region series of empires, but the country in its present
assemblies
are reserved for members of the military,
geographic form did who
not exist until British imperial
are under the control of the commander-in-chief expansion consolidated the current boundaries.
of the Defence Services. While the sub-national Basic administration in "Burma proper" relied
governments now have appointed chief ministers upon a hierarchy of administrators overseeing
and elected assemblies, public finances and territorial units extending from the centre to local
administration remain primarily in the hands of levels, in what could be considered a "graded
national-level agencies. territorial system" (Furnivall 1960, p. 7). These
This structural framework for decentralization were routine under the kingdoms of Burma.1
and local governance began in 2011, although the A central-level administrative system started as
Constitution was approved in 2008. The transition early as the Pagan Period, and the first recognized
from military to quasi-civilian rule dominated hluttaw , a council of ministers, was formed during
by the military-backed Union Solidarity and the reign of King Htilominlo (1210-34) (Daw My a
Development Party (USDP) occurred between Sein 1973, p. 5). The monarch exercised absolute
2011 and 2016. For the first time, new sub- power through "certain ministers and councils
national institutions had to figure out their roles, and administrative departments" (Daw Mya
responsibilities and boundaries. In November Sein 1973, p. 17). Ministers, known as wungyi ,
2015, the extraordinary electoral sweep by the oversaw a series of departments responsible for
National League for Democracy (NLD) under different administration requirements. It included
the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi has given a range of ministries such as defence, judiciary
both government and parliamentary institutions a and home affairs, revenue and finance, farmland
more democratic cast. How the new government and agriculture, public service, transportation
will take up issues related to decentralization and and foreign affairs (U Ba U 2011, p. 197). At the
federalism remains to be seen, but it is important local level, the Myo Wun was an important local
to underscore the fact that this paper documents public administrator in pre-British Burma. This
and analyses a political process that is very nascent
person was tasked by the central government to
in a context of rapid socio-political change and administer the township as its governor.
protracted armed ethnic conflicts. Nevertheless, as Under colonial rule, which was exerted across
the space for greater local participation has opened the current territory of Myanmar by 1885, the
up through the démocratisation process and ethnic British had administered the country directly in
groups' demand for a federal union is increasingly majority Bamar areas but had generally used
accepted in the ongoing peace negotiations, the indirect rule to administer areas with ethnic

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226 Journal of Southeast Asian Economies Vol. 33, No. 2

minorities. These divisions still existed in the

complex, and all states and regions contain
new state. As with many other post-colonial numerous ethnic groups. Self-administered zones
and the self-administered division of Wa have a
states, issues of federalism and decentralization
were central to national political discourses after
constitutional status in many ways equivalent to a
independence. In Burma, there were manyregion calls or state, and can form their own indirectly
elected and appointed "leading bodies" led by a
for a federal system to account for the country's
ethnic diversity. These calls soon manifested in
chairperson (Constitution 2008, art. 275-76).3 An
multiple ethnic insurgencies seeking outright appointed administrative council under the direct
secession or at least federalism for ethnically-
authority of the president manages the union
territory
defined states. Compounding the situation was a of Nay Pyi Taw. The smallest formal
communist insurgency that continued throughadministrative
the unit is the village tract, which
late 1980s. consists of a cluster of villages and wards, which
The Myanmar military (tatmadaw) was neverare counterpart units to village tracts in semi-
able to decisively defeat the assorted ethnic urban and urban areas. Wards and village tracts are
insurgent groups, nor were any of the groups everin turn grouped into 330 townships, where many
able to achieve their early goals of secession. Union ministry offices are located. Collections of
What eventually came to be a norm were townships are organized into seventy-four districts,
numerous ceasefires between the tatmadaw and which in turn form the fourteen states and regions
(Constitution 2008, art. 49-51). Townships are the
individual insurgent groups, but no national peace
process was in place. Following the beginning ofkey building blocks of public administration in the
the country's transition to reform in April 2011,
country.
however, President Thein Sein initiated a process Given this basic structure of sub-national
governance, the next section will detail the
that led to the signing of a National Ceasefire
Agreement (NC A) in October 2015 with eight out political, administrative and fiscal dimensions
of the eighteen major ethnic armed groups. It isof decentralization in Myanmar and assess their
hoped that during the coming years, a "politicalchallenges to furthering decentralization.4 Much
dialogue" will allow the ethnic armed groups andof this information has only become known in the
the Myanmar government to agree to a final peacelast few years, with key actors discovering their
agreement. No ethnic armed groups presently own roles and responsibilities for the first time. As
claim secessionist goals but instead demand such,
a in 2013, how state and region governments
federal union. What this exactly means is henceand hluttaws functioned was a black box to many
at the crux of the country's peace process and of inside and outside of Myanmar, with travels
outside of Yangon by international development
critical importance to the wider transition to better
governance. organizations still requiring government approval;
access to state and region governments were also
difficult.
3. Current Status of Sub-national-Central
Relations
3.1 Political Decentralization
The Republic of the Union of Myanmar comprises
seven states and seven regions named in theThe political dimension of Myanmar's de-
2008 Constitution; six self-administered zonescentralization reform is centred on the formation
or divisions; and one union territory for the of the state and region governments, which are led
capital Nay Pyi Taw.2 States and regions, despiteby a chief minister and constitute a state/region
the terminology distinguishing historically parliament (hluttaw). While states and regions
"ethnic" states from majority Bamar regions, previously existed as administrative units for the
are constitutionally equivalent. It can also becountry, they were administered by the centralized
misleading since Myanmar's ethnic map military is dictatorship. Up until April 2011, they

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August 2016 Ninh and Arnold: Decentralization in Myanmar 227

minister will
were managed by regional commanders be elected. This provision does not
supported
by administrative staff from the apply
Ministry of Home
in areas where the ethnic group is already
Affairs' General Administration Department
the majority, or where the ethnic group already has
a self-administered
(GAD). Given that, the formation of sub-national district or zone. In the 2015
governments is a major development as the
election, twenty-nine such ethnic ministers were
elected.
executive, legislative and judicial functions are
separate and distinct from the Union Besides the appointment of chief ministers and
government.
These are primarily enshrined the in election
Schedules of cabinet
Twoministers, hluttaws are
and Five of the 2008 Constitution, entirelywhich cover
new creations of the 2008 Constitution.
legislative and executive powers as Eachwell
hluttaw as is composed of two members
revenue
sources for the states and regions, elected per township and additional elected
respectively.
Each chief minister is supported by a cabinet
representatives for each of the "national races"
of nine ministers, such as ministers for
that pass finance,
a threshold outlined in the Constitution.
planning and economics, socialAs affairs, electric
mentioned, the commander-in-chief appoints
power and industry, and transport. Under the
military representatives that make up one quarter
NLD-led government, the cabinet has been of the total. The hluttaw elects from its number a
streamlined down to five as part of a larger effort chairperson, speaker, and deputy speaker. Schedule
to reduce wastage in government. These ministers Two of the Constitution lists the areas over which
have the duty of managing the state and region the hluttaws can enact laws, establishing the basis
responsibilities as outlined in Schedules Two and for some division of powers between the Union
Five. The appointment process for chief ministers and the states/regions (Constitution 2008, art. 188).
These areas are divided into eight sectors each
involves the president selecting a hluttaw member
possessing the required qualifications,5 who is with a list of specific responsibilities (Constitution
then confirmed by the respective hluttaws . As 2008, Schedule Two).7 The elections for hluttaws
a candidate may only be rejected for proven occur at the same time as those for the national
failure to meet the constitutional qualifications, parliament.
effectively, the selection of the chief ministers is From 201 1 to 2016, over twenty-three opposition
entirely in the hands of the president, with the parties, including many ethnic regional parties,
proviso that he or she be a member of the hluttaw held seats in hluttaws. Thirteen states and regions
(Constitution 2008, art. 261(b)). It is important to had chief ministers from USDP while the Kayin
note that the member selected by the president has State had a chief minister who was a brigadier
usually been, but need not be, one of the elected general in the Myanmar Army. Following the
members, which means he could be a member of 8 November 2015 elections, the hluttaw com-
the military. position shifted markedly, given the landslide NLD
There are three different types of ministerial victory. Only two states and regions - Shan and
posts for governments at the sub-regional level. Rakhine - do not have an outright NLD majority.
Most are selected by the chief minister from Rakhine State has a plurality from the Arakan
among the hluttaw representatives or other suitable National Party while Shan State saw the USDP
candidates and finally approved by the president win a plurality of seats. Nevertheless, the NLD has
(SPDC 2010, art. 8(g)).6 However, unlike these maintained its right to name chief ministers for all
"civilian" ministers, the Minister for Border and states and regions.
Security Affairs is a military officer nominated by Below the states and regions, there is no real
the commander-in-chief of the Defence Services third tier that comprises some form of "local
(the military's senior general), who does not government" as the districts and townships are
relinquish his military post. In addition, in statesadministered by centrally appointed bureaucrats
and regions where a particular ethnic group reaches from the GAD (see Figure 1). They also host a
0.1 per cent of the national population, an ethnic wide range of departments from Union ministries.

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228 Journal of Southeast Asian Economies Vol. 33, No. 2

FIGURE 1
Levels of Government in Myanmar

Union Government

I ' I

Sel^Admi
Division (1) v '
Self-Administered I 1
Zones (5)

Sub-townships Wards & Village

(84) Tracts (241)
i 1

Wards & V
Tracts (16,455)

Source: Nixon et al. (2013).

village tract forums.10 Lastly, it is important to

While President Thein Sein repeatedly expressed
interest to establish elected bodies at both the
note that since independence in 1948, many parts
of Myanmar have been under varying degrees of
district and township levels, these policies never
came to pass during his administration. On the by ethnic armed groups, which often have
control
other hand, there has been some movement their own system of governance.11
towards greater local democracy in the election
of administrators by communities for each of the
3.2 Administrative Decentralization
country's approximately 16,500 village tracts and
wards. The process started in late 2012, althoughAdministrative decentralization in Myanmar
these are indirect elections that are administered remains limited. Aside from one notable exception
by the GAD rather than by the Union Election of the Development Affairs Organizations (DAOs)
which will be further described below, the states
Commission.8 Nevertheless, these local elections,
even if indirect, have brought more diversity and regions do not have dedicated bureaucracies
of local leaders into public life as compared to
to support their legislative or revenue collection
when local administrators were all appointed responsibilities
by as outlined in Schedules Two and
the GAD. Village tract and ward administratorsFive in the Constitution. Rather, the vast bulk of
receive an honorarium from the GAD but are government civil servants working in the state
not GAD staff members.9 Within villages, there
and region government offices and in townships
is a further level of coordination known as the are those from Union ministries. There are no
"household heads" system, whereby groups ofdedicated
ten "ministries" to serve state/region cabinet
households select representatives to participate in
ministers. As such, state/region governments have

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August 2016 Ninh and Arnold: Decentralization in Myanmar 229

no choice but to receive support from every state and region, district, and township down
the Union
ministries. to the wards and village tracts.
The
The Constitution mandates that state and 2008 Constitution had important
region
ramifications for the GAD, which saw its mandate
ministers may exercise executive or administrative
greatly
authority to manage, direct, control and expanded. The department continues
inspect
departments covering the same areas asits
with those
core function of managing the country's
basic units
included in the legislative list (i.e. Schedule Two);of administration - districts and
however, new responsibilities may be added townships
under - and supervises more than 16,700
union law (Constitution 2008, art. 249).wards
As there
and village tracts. The GAD also continues
are more than nine such departments, but to manage
typicallyan assortment of general administrative
tasks ranging
only nine ministerial portfolios (excluding the from excise, taxation and land
management
Chief Minister and Ethnic Affairs Ministers), some to collecting demographic data. In
ministers cover several domains. As such, thesethe GAD now plays new demanding roles
addition,
local departments of Union ministries receive administrative support for state and
in providing
supervision from the state/region ministers, but
region governments and their hluttaws , in addition
continue to report to their own "mother toministry"
coordinating and managing proliferating needs
in Thus,
in Nay Pyi Taw for other responsibilities. districts,thetownships and village tracts. In sum,
the GAD
interaction between sub-national governments withshould be understood as playing two
related
the local departments of Union ministries roles: the continuation of a "historic role"
assigned
to help them remains complicated. The NLD-led
focused on administration, and a second, incipient
one defined
government has indicated that state/region cabinetaround changes in sub-national
will be streamlined to less than nine ministers,
governance, but especially the creation of the fourteen
this may actually increase their reliance onand
state Union
region governments.12
ministries. Within the different levels of administration,
Furthermore, departments do not form GAD stand-
administrators are paramount actors.
The GAD provides basic administrative and
alone administrative units and do not correspond
neatly with state/region ministerial coordination
portfolios. functions for each state and region
Many of the more significant departments
government,and
all of the state and region hluttaws ,
ministries remain centralized, such as health
as well asand
Union ministries and departments
education. Thus, major areas clearlyatof
thelocal
state/region level.13 The senior GAD
concern are outside the sub-national political administrator
and for each state and region is also
administrative framework. their respective executive secretaries. This rather
A unique feature of the current situation is that peculiar arrangement underscores the fundamental
the most significant Union ministry actor working challenge of sub-national governments' ability to
with the new state and region governments is manage their own operations and establish their
the GAD. The GAD is the central institution own independence. In some states and regions the
for public administration in Myanmar. Its power GAD is willing to play a more supportive role, but
derives from its ability to coordinate, communicate in other states and regions the GAD administrators
between, and convene other government actors, asmuch more power and control, which rankle
exert
well as its authority over a vast range of eclectic many Members of Parliament (MPs). The township
responsibilities. Similar to the time since "Burma level is particularly important for Myanmar's
proper", Myanmar still relies upon a hierarchical administration, and all administrations at that level
structure of administrators overseeing units are
fromheaded by a GAD administrator. This is where
the central to local levels (Furnivall 1960, p. 7)many
with key functions of government take place
the GAD acting as its backbone. As the country's such as population registration, land registration,
and
central institution for public administration, most forms of tax collection. Districts form
its
ubiquitous presence connects the capital city to tier of administration, interfacing state/
a middle

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230 Journal of Southeast Asian Economies Vol. 33, No. 2

government
region governments to townships, actor overseen
which by a dedicated local
are also
committee
headed by a senior official from the - the Township Development Affairs
GAD.
Committee
The political significance of the GAD- whichrests
has decision-making
in power
the fact that it is still part ofand
thetheMinistry
majority of its
ofmembers
Home are elected by the
community.
Affairs. Constitutionally, the Ministry In a country without a "third tier" of
of Home
local government,
Affairs is one of three important DAOs represent
ministries thatone of the most
must be led by high ranking significant
military interfaces between the
generals. It Myanmar state
is noteworthy that as part ofand
thetheMinistry
general publicofand the most significant
Home
Affairs, the GAD's sister experiment
organizations - the
so far with decentralizing government
to local
police, the Bureau of Special levels.
Investigation, and
the prison and fire services - are all primarily
focused on security matters 3.3
of the state. Within
Fiscal Decentralization
this group, the GAD officially places a very
The fiscal dimension
heavy ideational value in protecting of decentralization
peace and in
Myanmar
stability, albeit through public likewise remains limited and is in a
administration.
significant
The GAD's security role remains flux. The
central to2008 Constitution introduced
basic
substantial
administration in the country, changes for
including to arrangements
the in public
finance
newly created state and region at both the national and sub-national levels.
governments.14
Administration of districts, townships
The development and parallels that of
of the system
the governance
wards/village tracts in Myanmar continues system as
to a whole.
be While political
powers albeit
dominated by Union ministries, have beenwithspread between
some new institutions
(namely
supervision done by state and regionstate governments.
and region chief ministers, ministers
The only government agency andfully
hluttaws ), the fiscal system has had to evolve
decentralized
awaymunicipal
via the 2008 Constitution were from a legacy offices
of highly centralized, top-
- the DAOs. DAOs functiondown
in and opaque
each fiscal systems and processes
township
defined by needs:
to manage municipal governance military authoritarianism.
a range
of local social services such as sanitation and The 2008 Constitution has a number of
provisions to increase the degree of fiscal
local infrastructure and a variety of economic
governance services, such as issuing constructiondecentralization, specifically Schedules Two
permits and business licences. (expenditure assignments) and Five (revenue
Township DAOs report to an office in each statesources). State and region chief ministers are
and region capital that is in turn supervised by directly
each responsible for the collection of a number
of revenue items, sub-national parliaments can
state and region's minister of development affairs.
promulgate laws according to a set schedule of
Uniquely, DAOs have no connection with Nay
responsibilities, and sub-national executives have
Pyi Taw and only report to the state and region
been
governments. Each hluttaw has also passed a assigned expenditure mandates (Dickenson-
Jones, S. Kanay De and Smurra 2015, p. ix).
Development Affairs Law, meaning that in contrast
Overall, the two most significant public financial
to most government actors working locally, DAOs
management reforms introduced by the 2008
are founded in state/region law rather than in union
Constitution were the parliamentary oversight of
law. Moreover, DAOs are unique as they are fully
public finances and the constitutional separation of
self-funded through the collection of local taxes
state and region budgets from that of the Union
and fees, must use the revenues in the township
(World Bank 2013, p. 96). Beginning in the
where they were collected, and have significant
2012-13 fiscal year, regions and states have had
discretion over revenue use. In contrast, every
other sub-national government actor receivesseparate budgets from the Union, though the
its budget one way or another from the UnionUnion budget continues to include significant
government. Lastly, DAOs are the only local transfers to sub-national budgets. The creation of

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August 2016 Ninh and Arnold: Decentralization in Myanmar 231

Finance
constitutionally separate state and region Commission.
budgets However, the state/region
is intended to allow more bottom-up input
has control over certainto
components of the budget,
budgeting and to improve transparency
notably locally (World
raised revenue and a cross-sectoral
Bank 2013, p. 96). Poverty Reduction Fund. States/regions are
There has generally been a diversification of
already collecting significant revenues as outlined
actors involved in managing public in Schedule
financesFive of the Constitution, but local tax
since
2011 (Nixon et al. 2013, p. 37). Important aspects
policy and administration remain underdeveloped.
of planning and budgeting have been moved
In terms from
of priorities for fiscal decentralization,
the Thein
their former home at the head of the Sein government
military junta placed great emphasis
to the Ministry of Finance and on the Ministry
raising the share ofof public expenditures going
Planning and Economic Development,
throughwhich
the statehave
and region governments (Nixon
and Joelene
been merged into one single Ministry 2014, p. iii). Union transfers to the
of Finance
and Planning by the new NLD-ledstates
government in
and regions increased from 2.2 per cent of
Union
March 2016. National representative expenditures in 2011-12 to 8.7 per cent
institutions
and sub-national governments now in 2015-16
participate(Dickenson-Jones,
in S. Kanay De and
Smurra 2015,
the preparation of the budget annually, and p. ix).
line This is within the context
ministries and their sub-national offices
of overall play
increases in a
public spending. In the
greater role in spending it. This2013-14
pluralizaron of
fiscal year, budgeted Union expenditures
influences is a major driver of change
reached 16.1in public
trillion kyats (29 per cent of GDP),
finances. The reforms have been accompanied by akyats (2 per cent of GDP)
compared to 1.2 trillion
significant reorientation of public for
expenditure away
states and regions (Dickenson-Jones, S. Kanay
from the military and towards De social spending.
and Smurra 2015, p. ix). Within the states and
However, while states and regionsregions,
now the have their
majority of expenditures are carried
own dedicated budgets, their composition andwith the Department of
out by just five entities,
priorities are still limited and centralized with
Public Works carrying out more than half of this,
reduced scope to prioritize between sectors.
primarily on localBoth
infrastructure development.16
Revenue collected
Schedules Two and Five were expanded in July by state and region
2015 to give more legislative powers and revenue
governments, though a relatively small proportion
sources to states and regions, but the government
of overall legal textrevenue, has been increasing.
is vague and requires them to know For the
the2013-14 fiscal year (the most recent
relevant
year of publicly available
union laws well to have a clear understanding of data), overall revenue
what they are entitled to. As such,for the Union
state and government
region reached 13.2 trillion
governments have yet to take advantage ofcent
kyats, or (24 per theof GDP), compared to 1.2
expanded powers. trillion kyats (2 per cent of GDP) for states and
Significantly, state/region budgets areMyanmar's
regions. subjected states and regions are among
to review by the Union Financial Commission,
the most active in collecting revenues relative to
an annual exercise led by the president (Nixon accounting for 8 per cent
their central government,
et al. 2013, p. 42). This meansofthese budgets
total government receipts (Dickenson-Jones,
are not fully devolved as they do S.not
Kanay De and
have Smurra 2015, p. x). However,
a free
hand to spend according to their taxes
choice. Instead,
accounted for only 5 per cent of sub-national
the budget consists of a proposal revenue
preparedin 2013-14, while self-raised revenue from
at the
state/region level on a department-by-department
DAOs, the Yangon City Development Committee
basis and then integrated - potentially and the Mandalaywith
City Development Committee
alterations - into the Union budget.15 accounted The
for 17final
per cent (Dickenson- Jones,
approval still rests with union institutions because
S. Kanay De and Smurra 2015, p. ix).17 However,
the allocations for each department are and
while states settled
regions do collect their own
in discussion with union ministries in the Union revenues through assorted sources, approximately

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232 Journal of Southeast Asian Economies Vol. 33, No. 2

In summary,
half of state and regions revenues were several general conclusions can be
transfers
from the Union government drawn
for along
the three dimensions,
2013-14 as first highlighted
fiscal
year (Dickenson-Jones, S. Kanay in Nixon et De al. and
(2014, Smurra
p. 72). First, the degree of
2015, p. 31). decentralization to states and regions is very limited
There are three channels by which fiscal in all three dimensions and therefore as a whole.
resources go from the Union to the sub-national The actual reach of administrative responsibilities,
levels (Nixon and Joelene 2014). The first the size of the budget, and the restrictions on
channel is to Union ministries or departments political autonomy mean that Myanmar is still
that remain under Union jurisdiction (i.e. thosea relatively centralized country and has room
fulfilling responsibilities under the Constitution's to pursue significant reform. Second, there are
Schedule One), and which have assigned some imbalances in the degree of decentralization across
activities and their accompanying budget to the administrative, fiscal and political dimensions.
their state and region departments, through a Third, it is apparent that this process has been
deconcentrated channel. The second channel is
taking place to different degrees and at different
paces across the country. There are wide variations
when the Union budget gives aid in the form of
grants or loans to support a range of devolved
in capacity and conditions. Given these realities,
Myanmar is still a fairly centralized country.
departments (i.e. to those fulfilling responsibilities
of the Constitution's Schedule Two); these state/ As such, by ranking key elements of political,
fiscal and administrative decentralization on an
region budgets are also supported by tax and non-
tax revenues and local state economic enterpriseindicative 10 point index, Figure 2 shows that the
overall extent of decentralization in Myanmar is
income. The third channel is essentially a variety
both limited and out of balance.
of local development funds, mainly for capital
expenditure on local infrastructure. It is a devolved
to the state/region level, local parliamentarians,4.or
Political Debates
townships according to various distribution and
management criteria. Despite significant steps towards decentralization
in recent years, the constitutional provisions for
Overall, fiscal decentralization is advancing in
Myanmar, but significant challenges exist. The the state and region governments are limited,
challenges are most prominent in the process with major social services, such as health and
of moving from fiscal structures that support education, remaining under the control of national
ministries. Most revenue sources, especially
centralized military authoritarianism to a system
allowing for a plurality of actors to be involvedfrom
in natural resources, continue to flow to the
central government. Moreover, state and region
managing public finances. Most significantly, while
the sub-national fiscal system is changing, governments
the have no dedicated civil service, and
definition of state/region expenditure assignmentscurrently local governance functions are provided
for by the local offices of central ministries, the
under the Constitution is still quite vague. Schedule
Two provides guidance, but as a legislative list most
it significant being the GAD. As Myanmar
continues its transition away from military
falls short of clearly delineating the expenditure
and service delivery responsibilities, making authoritarianism, questions of decentralization will
estimation of their fiscal needs difficult (Nixonremain central to its national reform debate. At
et al. 2013, p. 38). Moreover, a greater long- the same time, the country's multiple ethnic armed
term challenge is a lack of comprehensiveness groups' pressure for a federal government system
in the public finance system. Large shares also of underscores the importance of decentralization
national revenues and expenditures - particularlyin the peace process and the search for a lasting
political settlement.
relating to the military and various state economic
enterprises - are simply not reported in the Under the Thein Sein government, de-
budget (World Bank 2013, p. 42).18 centralization was a concept newly introduced into

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August 2016 Ninh and Arnold: Decentralization in Myanmar 233

F1GURE2
Standardized Comparison of Administrative, Fiscal and Political Decentralization to
Myanmar's States and Regions3

Note: a. This analysis is indicative only and was originally presented in Nixon et al. (2013, p. 72). The meth
for this assessment was based on a simplified version of the Local Public Sector Country Profile Index deve
Boex and Yilmaz (2010).
Source: Nixon et al. (2013).

andin
public discourse, but it was primarily viewed civil society - the discourse will likely be a
the context of improvements in local governance
long and contested one in the years to come.
rather than systematic restructuring of the system.
Indeed, public administration reform initiatives
4.1 From Local Governance to Decentralization
during this initial period came to occupy a
separate track from the peace process. The NLD The description of the political, administrative, and
government underscored decentralization and a fiscal dimension of decentralization in Myanmar
federal union much more in its electoral platform, as outlined above indicates a rather hesitant
with Aung San Suu Kyi repeatedly emphasizing a process. It may be more accurate to say that there
broader national reconciliation agenda that would were political considerations that led the military
bring about fundamental political transformation. regime to put in place new state and region
Such pronouncements are without concrete governments, but decentralization as a transfer of
policies thus far. Given the early stage political authority and responsibility of public functions
debate on the appropriate depth and balance of was not the intent. As such, although the state and
decentralization, or the meaning of "federalism" region governments were created, there were other
for Myanmar's multiple stakeholders - union, institutions and structures that were maintained or
state and region governments and parliaments, created, which makes greater independence from
ethnic armed groups, political parties, the military the centre difficult. It is important to understand

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234 Journal of Southeast Asian Economies Vol. 33, No. 2

the structural challenges that was established

impede in 2015. Discussions have been
further
decentralization in Myanmar, but also how underway in Parliament about decentralizing
political debates in the country are shaped by this licensing approvals for investment to state and
hesitant effort at decentralization. The concept region governments up to a certain amount. If
of decentralization itself needed to be explained approved, it would be a significant development in
and integrated into the wider political discourse decentralization.

when the Thein Sein government proceeded with

reforms particularly from 2013 onwards.
4.2 Decentralization and Federalism : Two
One of the most comprehensive frameworks
Separate Tracks in the Public Discourse
on reform is the Framework for Economic and
Social Reforms (FESR), which was drafted in
During this same period, the government was also
pursuing a peace process with all major ethnic
2012 with participation from both ministries and
civil society organizations through the Centrearmed groups. Questions on decentralization were
for Economic and Social Development. Intended always at the heart of ethnic conflict in Myanmar,
to the extent that the national government
to marshal domestic and international support
for the reform process, FESR laid out policy
provided the space for ethnic groups to voice their
concerns on how their communities are organized,
priorities for development that would be pursued
developed and governed to preserve their cultures
during the Thein Sein administration. Given the
need to stabilize the economy, FESR focusedand languages. Even in late 2013, the term
on fundamental macroeconomic policies for"federalism" was considered by many to be highly
sensitive and would be taken as pushing for the
investment and private sector development and
disintegration of the Union. Greater freedom of
areas for social development such as infrastructure,
health, education and agriculture.19 The phrasesspeech, the emergence of private media, and the
"decentralization and greater autonomy for local intense negotiation between the state and the
ethnic armed groups opened a space to consider
government" and "people-centred development"
were mentioned just once in the document. topics that were previously deemed out of bounds.
However, as the reform process continued,
The term "federalism" is now widely used, and in
"people-centred development" became the
the NC A signed in October 2015, democracy and
government's dominant theme as a response federalism
to were enshrined as the basic guiding
principles to the establishment of a union that can
growing domestic skepticism on the reform process.
Local governance was a means of "people-centred achieve a lasting peace ( Myanmar Times 2015).
development" because citizens interacted the mostPrior to the November 2015 general election,
with the state through this channel. Meanwhile, the consensus for greater decentralization was
as state and region governments assume their new growing within the government, ethnic groups,
and civil society, even if the scope and pace of
roles and responsibilities, the structural challenges
decentralization was under debate. There was
to their ability to govern effectively became
more apparent. In the last two years of Thein
much concern about capacity of states and regions
Sein's government, improved local governanceto manage additional decentralization, but the
became increasingly intertwined with greaterbigger challenge is the debate on bifurcation as
decentralization. Decentralization also became apart of the broader democratization process and
the discussion on federalism in peace negotiations.
core focus for many international development and
Within government, the Office of President was
local civil society organizations, whether through
pushing forward decentralization and improvement
research or through programme activities.20 The
in local governance through two senior ministers,
government has committed to increase the budget
of state and region governments and in key U Tin Naing Thein and U Hia Tun. Another senior
ministries like the Ministry of Finance - a new
minister, U Aung Min, was in charge of the peace
negotiations separate from the two ministries
department focusing on state and region budget

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August 2016 Ninh and Arnold : Decentralization in Myanmar 235

mentioned. This development was less of a

internal armed conflict, pledges that the NLD
conscious
will unplanned
policy than a reflection of the largely "work to ensure a fair distribution across
the country
and evolving nature of the political reform of the profits from natural resource
agenda
at that time. extraction, in accordance with the principles of
Additionally, although there area significant
federal union" and to "guarantee ethnic rights
constitutional reform issues related to and establish a federal democratic union". In the

decentralization and federalism, the public NLD economic strategy document released in July
discourse leading up to the 2015 election was 2015, it states that:
primarily focused on the provisions in the 2008
Constitution that bars Aung San Suu Kyi from The mechanisms for fiscal federalism will be

presidency and the veto power on constitutional developed. Fiscal rights and responsibilities
changes given to military MPs by requiring among different levels of governments regarding

75 per cent majority vote. This constitutional budget preparation, budget execution, and
revenue generation, will be established. Equitable
reform agenda, driven primarily by the electoral
distribution of natural resource revenues will
needs of the NLD but was also the intense
be practised, with such distributions based on
interest of both domestic and international media,
consensus. There is no doubt that decentralization
further contributed to the separation ofwill
the bring some benefits; allowing decisions to be
democratization challenge from the peace process.
made at local levels will bring in the benefits of
As The Transnational Institute (2015) opined in
responsiveness to local needs, and the ability to
the aftermath of the 2015 election, correct mistakes at their source.21 (NLD 2015 b)

Based
on these early pronouncements and on
there can be no hierarchy of needs in the promotion
of national reconciliation and democracy.
meetings we have had with members of the NLD
Myanmar' s challenges in political transition
Central Executive Committee and the Economic
and peace-building are those for a generation to
Committee in 2015 and early 2016, there seems to
address. But of the highest importance in the new
be genuine interest to push forward democratization
government's endeavours is that, at some stage,
through greater decentralization and to address the
democratic processes for parliamentary reform
and peace talks for a nationwide ceasefirecountry's
are painful ethnic history. Aung San Suu
Kyi
brought together. Presently, whether by default or emphasized national reconciliation as a key
goal for the new government in her meetings with
design, these two processes remain on different
President
tracks, but inclusive peace and reform will be Thein Sein and the Commander-in-Chief
impossible unless all communities and partsMinofAung Hlaing. The meetings were to discuss
the country are able to work together for the
thetransition of power after the elections. As such,
common good. there is reason to be hopeful that the new NLD-led
government will have a more comprehensive and
integrated view of decentralization, which lies at
43 Prospects for Decentralization after the
2015 Elections the heart of Myanmar's democratic transition and
political settlement.
In its election manifesto released in SeptemberThe reality of the political structure in Myanmar
2015, the NLD proclaimed four areas to work and capacity-related issues, however, makes
on: "(1) ethnic affairs and internal peace. (2)genuine
a and effective decentralization highly
constitution that ensures that all the peoplechallenging. Looking back at the experience of the
of our country can live together in tranquilityoutgoing government, the lack of an overarching
and security. (3) a system of government that reform strategy with clear institutional support
will fairly and justly defend the people. (4) the
and authority was problematic. The complex
freedom and security to prosper" (NLD 2015«). nature of decentralization requires an institutional
The document emphasizes addressing the roots focal point with inter-ministerial mandate and

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236 Journal of Southeast Asian Economies Vol. 33, No. 2

of Finance
capacity to analyse and formulate is looking to support g
appropriate
decentralization
strategies, which did not exist. to the states and
Reforms tend
changes
to be ad hoc and carried out have
primarily led to an increase in
through
presidential directives, and
the consultation has along with gr
rigid bureaucracy,
from
largely been limited to a small theof
circle top level of government
ministers
to be more
and advisors, rather than through more efficient,
inclusive effective an
There
or systematic engagement across have array
a wide been several
of salary inc
stakeholders. The Thein Sein civil service, but
government's one of the biggest
ability
to conceptualize the actualhears
implementation of
from those working in gover
such reforms was hampered lack of authority
not only to do what they a
by the lack
of concrete data but also by to
thedeliver in concrete
lack of the current structure.22
knowledge of how things are In this context, the
functioning on GAD presents
challenge,
the ground. As such, reforms as it
issued were continues to play
often
inoutcome
unrealistic in expectation of the military's
as well administration
as
Under the
time frame, with the bureaucracy 2008 Constitution, th
responsible
additional
for implementation increasingly power as
frustrated through
it the provis
was largely detached from it to consultation
the staff the state
and and region par
decision-making process. cabinets as well as the chief ministers' office. As
such, itmore
While the NLD has been much has been emphatic
difficult for the state and region
governments toit
in its support for decentralization, consider
willhow they can become
have
a tremendously difficult time more independent
dealing in staffing
with theirthe own offices
(even though
structural and capacity challenges the Constitution
confronting theallows for the
outgoing government. Theestablishment
importance of state and
of region
clearcivil services),
but it also given
goals and strategies is heightened makes less the
sense for the GAD to support
need
further decentralization.
to ensure that any comprehensive decentralization
policy must consider the The requirements for
last factor to consider is the military itself.
federalism in an ongoing Although
peace the progress
military seemsand
to have accepted the
principle
political dialogue. It should alsoofbea "federal
noted union"that
as agreed to in the
NCA,
while the NLD garnered strong its exact notion
support from in relation
ethnicto the military's
long term insistence
populations in the 2015 elections, thereofremains
"non-disintegration" of
significant scepticism as to the union remains to be
whether seen as
the more concrete
NLD
proposals surfaceor
fully understands ethnic grievances through
it couldpolitical dialogue. In
the past, any discussion
potentially be another Bamar-centric governmentabout federalism has been
dismissed
(International Crisis Group 2015, pp.by the
8-9).military. As Lintner (2014), a
Even if all Myanmar's key longtimestakeholders
observer of ethnic conflict in Myanmar,
has noted, one of the
generally support greater decentralization, biggestare
there conundrums in
moving toward
institutions and groups in Myanmar that a federal
are more union is the vague
concept
ambivalent about the issue and have of federalism similarly held
the potential to by the ethnic
armed groups:
slow down the process considerably. As mentioned
earlier in the paper, the lack of engagement with
What kind of federal union would [the ethnic
the bureaucracy by the Thein Sein government has
resistance groups] want Myanmar to be? How
generated frustration and confusion
should power on the goals
be divided between the states
of reform and implementationand of decentralization.
the central government? And what exactly
Ministries have responded in different ways
is the "federal army" some given
of the groups have
the lack of clearly articulated goals and about?
begun talking overarching
Unless those issues have
strategies. The Ministry of Education has
been made clear, devolved
there is little or no hope of the
more functions downward, military
while theitsMinistry
changing mind about federalism.

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August 2016 Ninh and Arnold: Decentralization in Myanmar 237

The Thein Sein government haslack been critical in

of opportunities affecting different groups
getting the military's participation in the
in Myanmar. peace
This could transform the delivery
negotiations and agreement to the
of principles
social services and
as well as the way bureaucracy
terms laid out in the NCA. An NLD-led
engagesgovernment
with the public, establishing the necessary
would need to engage with the military
foundation for on this dialogue in the long term.
political
The current
sensitive topic while moving forward civil service can do more to consider
in dialogue
with all ethnic armed groups, regardless of whether
how to staff the bureaucracy at the local level. This
they have signed the NCA. These stakeholders
would address a key complaint raised by ethnic
would need to discuss their expectations of
political parties andthe
civil society organizations on
structure of a federal union, one that is of
the lack acceptable
opportunities to serve their people in
to the Bamar-majority population.areas
Much where they will
then, are the majority. The "people-
centred
depend on the nature of relationship development" approach has focused
established
on public
between the new government and the spending on the people. It has also
military
from 2016 onwards. opened the door to greater public participation in
the decision-making process, particularly at the
5. Ramifications of Decentralization local level. This has deepened the engagement
with ethnic populations. Given the high level of
At this early stage, it is difficult to predict thepolitical and social distrust in Myanmar, effective
outcomes of debates on decentralization and decentralization can help rebuild the relationship
potential institutional change. As discussed in this
between the state and the people while building
paper, there are multiple dimensions to the debate
the capacity for local administration.
on decentralization. The Thein Sein government On the economic front, there is a crucial
focused on improving local governanceneed
andto address structural problems, which will
better public service delivery, with discussions on national legal, regulatory and institutional
require
federalism happening in parallel. There have reforms
been to increase international and domestic
some tangible results, but much more is needed
investment and spur economic growth. There
given the ad hoc nature of the reforms and has
the been some discussion on devolving licensing
short time frame for implementation. Thereauthority
are up to a certain amount down to the state
ongoing efforts to devolve functions downward,
and region governments. This would need to be
such as those in health and education. This
carefully considered to ensure that investments are
awareness and opening of space within ministries
appropriate and will benefit the local population.
to the different levels of decentralization has also As with many issues in Myanmar, this is a
created a space to discuss other issues that have precedent-setting environment, often with little
been too sensitive to touch in the past, such as data or sufficient analysis. An entity that has
education in the mother tongue in ethnic areas previously been decentralized under the 2008
and its integration with the current national Constitution are DAOs. Their revenue generation
curriculum. Unless more explicit steps on capacity (mostly from fees and licences) can be
decentralization are articulated within a federal
analysed, rationalized and improved (Bissinger
union framework, decentralization policies may
2016). Reforms to increase revenues can contribute
proceed without taking into account the existing to state and region governments delivering better
institutional structures in conflict-affected areas. social services and improving the country's
These areas had little interactions with the domestic sector, which consists largely of micro-,
government and have been governed by ethnic
small- and medium-sized enterprises. On the
armed groups for decades (Jolliffe 2014). other hand, the Ministry of Finance, as mentioned
In the near term, if decentralization is previously, is preparing for an increase to state and
conceived as a more inclusive process, much
region budgets. However, the bigger issue is the
can be done to address discrimination and the extent to which the state and region governments

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238 Journal of Southeast Asian Economies Vol. 33, No. 2

can generate their own revenue. Given the been, the transition to democracy is still in its
limitation of Schedule Five in the Constitution, early stages. There are certainly many political,
which outlines state and region governments' economic and social challenges to overcome.
revenue list, greater fiscal decentralization will Decentralization is not a panacea to Myanmaťs
eventually compete with constitutional provisions. long-standing challenges, but it holds the potential
For now, there is still room to explore. to address many of the country's thorny problems
Another issue the NLD has emphasized is the if thoughtfully constructed and implemented
issue of fair distribution of gains from natural with the engagement of key stakeholders in the
resources, which has been a key grievance of country. At the moment, while decentralization
ethnic groups for decades. Effectively addressing reforms have created new sub-national governance
this would increase revenues that are currently not structure and institutions, significant challenges of
accounted for into the national purse and can also administrative incoherence, lack of coordination,
be shared equitably with states and regions. For uneven capacity, and bureaucratic inertia are
example, Global Witness (2015) estimates that stifling potential gains. Myanmaťs civil service
the jade industry is worth US$31 billion in 2014, remains largely ill-equipped to handle change
equivalent to almost half of Myanmaťs GDP, with of this magnitude, and nascent sub-national
a large portion not reaching the national treasury governing bodies - such as chief ministers,
or local populations. region and state ministers, and hluttaws - have
struggled to assume their basic responsibilities.
A history of highly centralized governance, sub-
6. Conclusion
national conflicts, and ongoing disputes over the
Myanmaťs historic transition from a military constitution mean that continued implementation
of decentralization is likely to be a contested and
authoritarian system to a democratic polity since
difficult process. The new NLD-led government
2011 has taken a significant step forward with
will also face many of the same problems, and
NLD's landslide victory in the 2015 elections.
Myanmar has long grappled with the challengeperhaps
of even more than before as they will have to
adjust from years of being an opposition movement
constructing a coherent state that can accommodate
to having to consider the reality of governing.
the different ethnic groups. It has been argued that
"Time to change" was the NLD's election slogan,
the primacy of a Bamar-dominated centralizing
state drove the military to power, which led to proved to be very effective with voters. The
which
NLD's expressed commitment to decentralization
militarized state-society relations for all groups
in Myanmar (Callahan 2005). As dramatic and andas to a federal union will certainly be tested in
the years to come.
hopeful as the recent changes in Myanmar have

NOTES

1. There have been four dynastic periods in Myanmaťs history: the Pagan Period (1044-1287), the Shan Period
(1287-1531), the Toungoo Period (1531-1752), and the Alaungpaya Period (1752-1885).
2. The six self-administered territories are the zones of Naga in Sagaing Region, Danu, Pa-O, Palaung, Kokang, and
the Self-Administered Division of Wa (all in Shan State).
3. Most of the self-administered zones cover areas controlled by cease-fire groups under conditions previously
described by Mary Callahan as "near-devolution". See Callahan (2007).
4. Much of the information on the political, administrative and fiscal dimensions of decentralization in Myanmar
that follows is drawn from the 2013 report on state and region governments published by The Asia Foundation
and the Centre for Social and Economic Development. See Nixon (2013).
5. These are fairly minimal, primarily age and education requirements.

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August 2016 Ninh and Arnold: Decentralization in Myanmar 239

6 SPDC (2010) sets out in more detail the terms of the Constitution regarding the formati
state and region government, but does not further elaborate the division of assignment
7. The sectors represented are: Finance and Planning; Economic; Agriculture and Liv
Electricity, Mining and Forestry; Industrial; Transport, Communication and Constru
Management.
8. Heads of households, in clusters of ten, elect household leaders who then nominate ca
administrators, and who also vote to elect the winner. For more details about villag
(2016).
9. Under the State Peace and Development Council government, village tract administrators were considered a
part of the local Peace and Development Councils and received a subsidy from the government. Currently, and
according to the 2012 Ward and Village Tract Administration Law, village tract administrators are not GAD
employees.
10. Previously there was also a head for hundred households, which was roughly equivalent to a "village headman".
However, the 2012 Ward and Village Tract Administration Law formally removed this position, which has been
community activists' major criticism of the law, as it is thought to be an attempt to dilute local representation.
11. For a detailed description of the ethnic armed groups' systems of local governance, see Joliffe (2015).
12. Before 1962, administrators were decision makers at township, district and state/region levels. In 1962-74
and 1988-2011, the administrators played supportive role to decision-makers, who were military officials.
From 1974 to 1988, they played similar supportive role to decision makers, appointed by the Burma Socialist
Programme Party (BSPP). At the same time, administrators undertook traditional functions mentioned in the
diagram, which has been done since colonial rule. Since the current government adopted a people-centred
approach, local administrators at district and township level now become "lead decision makers" in various
committees including township development committees. At regional level, they play the supportive role to
state/region governments and hluttaws. Under colonial rule, they were the sole decision makers, a role many
current local administrators longed for. For the most recent description of the GAD, see Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and
Arnold (2014).
13. For example, all state/region meetings must be recorded by the GAD office. SPDC (2010), Article 50.
14. As Robert Taylor has argued of the 2008 Constitution's construction and intent: "Central supervision of
subordinate government is maintained by the appointment of the secretary to the government from the General
Administration Department of the Home Ministry." See Taylor (2009, p. 501).
15. Myanmar s budget process begins around August, when the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of National
Planning and Economic Development issue a schedule outlining the expected timelines for submitting budget
proposals for Union ministries, departments, administrative entities and SOEs. Around November, Union budget
proposals are submitted to the Financial Commission, led by the first vice president, for initial review and
amendment if necessary. Upon endorsement, the Financial Commission then submits the budget to the Union
Hluttaw for review and approval before final approval is sought from the president. See Dickenson-Jones,
S. Kanay De and Smurra (2015, p. 7).
16. Specifically, 54 per cent of state and region government expenditures were undertaken by the Department
of Public Works, while 23 per cent was accounted for by DAOs and the city administrations of Yangon and
Mandalay. See Dickenson-Jones, S. Kanay De and Smurra (2015, p. 32).
17. The officially designated sources of state/region revenue are from the Mandalay City Development Committee,
Yangon City Development Committee, State Owned Enterprises, Public Works, assorted small taxes and user
fees, DAOs, and Budget Departments (central transfers). For a detailed account of state and region revenues, see
Dickenson-Jones, S. Kanay De and Smurra (2015, pp. 23-31).
18. In 2012, for instance, there were well over 13,000 such "other accounts" across the public financial management
system, with the majority in military hands.
19. This includes: finance and taxation, monetary policy, the realization of regulations on trade and investment,
undertaking for private sector development, health and education, agriculture and food sufficiency, the governing
system and transparency, mobile communication services and Internet systems, infrastructure development and
governance reform.
20. The Asia Foundation and the Center for Economic and Social Development, for example, have a joint
Subnational Governance in Myanmar Discussion Paper Series which documents and analyses multiple
dimensions of decentralization and sub-national governance in the country, from fiscal decentralization to natural
resource management to public finances. Since 2013, nine reports have been issued thus far. They have been
increasingly used by government agencies, political parties, ethnic groups, and civil society organizations for
training. The reports can be found on the Foundation's website at <http://www.asiafoundation.org>. The United

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240 Jo urnai of Southeast Asian Economies Vol. 33, No. 2

Nations Development Programme in Myanmar has done a series of

of states and townships, and international non-governmental organiza
with village and township governments to improve transparency and
started a community-driven development project that will eventually b
the country, and The Asia Foundation is providing targeted support to s
the DAOs.
21. Document shared by the NLD Economic Committee with the authors.
22. For further discussion on these public administration reform-related issues, see Hook, Tin Maung Than and Ninh
(2015).

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