Myanmar: The Challenging Transition from

Military to Democratic Government 7

# Springer International Publishing AG 2018 177

A. Croissant, P. Lorenz, Comparative Politics of Southeast Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68182-5_7
178 7 Myanmar: The Challenging Transition from Military to Democratic Government
7.1 Historical Background and Current Political Challenges 179

7.1 Historical Background and Current Political Challenges

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, known as Burma prior to 1989, is one of
the ethnically most heterogeneous societies in Southeast Asia with 135 officially
recognized ethnic groups (see Table 7.1). Myanmar’s ethnic minorities such as the
Kachin, Kayah (Karenni), Karen, Chin, Mon, Rohingya, and Shan make up an
estimated 30–40% of the population and live primarily in the peripheral states,
whereas ethnic Bamars, often called Burmans, settle primarily along the Irrawaddy
valley and in Upper Burma (also known as “Burma proper”).1 Since its indepen-
dence in 1948, the multiethnic society has seen a high number of armed conflicts
between the central government and a rich tapestry of different insurgent groups
driven by nationalist, ideological, or economic motives. Ethnic conflicts
contributed to the rise and persistence of a “praetorian state,” in which the Burmese
military (Tatmadaw) has dominated politics, the economy, and society for more
than five decades. In 2011, the military initiated a process of gradual disengagement
from day-to-day politics. The ratification of a new constitution followed by
disbanding the Burmese junta and reasonably free legislative elections in
November 2015 constitute remarkable achievements in the transition from overt
military rule towards “something else” (Croissant 2015; Egreteau 2015b). Many
scholars have explored possible reasons behind this military-controlled liberaliza-
tion, although the Tatmadaw remains a pivotal political actor and a powerful veto
player (Callahan 2012; Huang 2013; Croissant and Kamerling 2013; Dressel and
Bünte 2014).
The first Burmese Empire of the Bagan Dynasty, founded in 1044 AD, is often
considered the “Golden Age” of Burma. During its 250-year rule, Burman lan-
guage, culture, and Theravada Buddhism spread along the Irrawaddy valley and
into Upper Burma. After internal unrest and the Mongol invasion in the late
thirteenth century, the Kingdom finally collapsed around 1300. In the
mid-sixteenth century, King Bayinnaung of the Taungoo Dynasty created a second,
short-lived Burman Empire. It was followed by the third Burman Empire of the
Konbaung Dynasty (1752–1885; Bellwood 1999, p. 116). The Konbaung Dynasty
unified Upper and Lower Burma with the Kingdom of Arakan, Manipur, and Assam
(Ricklefs 2010, pp. 135–136). After three Anglo-Burmese Wars between 1824 and
1885, the British annexed Upper Burma, and in 1886, Burma became the province
of Burma in British India. In 1923, a dual governance structure was established, a
so-called diarchy, which left certain issues up to an administration of Burman
ministers accountable to a legislature elected under census suffrage. The British
governor held executive authority over policy and controlled certain resorts like the
police directly. From 1937 until the Japanese invasion in early 1942, Burma

1
There are 135 officially recognized nationality groups, divided into eight national ethnic races
(Minahan 2015). In Bamar language, “Burma” is used as a colloquial term for the country and its
citizens, whereas “Myanmar” is the more formal version of this name (Z€ ollner 2000, p. 30).
Members of the largest ethnic group are referred to as “Bamar” or “Burmans,” while “Burmese” or
“Myanmarese” refers to all of the citizens of Burma/Myanmar.
180 7 Myanmar: The Challenging Transition from Military to Democratic Government

Table 7.1 Country profile

Year of full national Form of
Population sovereignty government
55,123,814 1948 Republic
Total area Current constitution enacted Head of state
676,578 km2 2008 Htin Kyaw (since
2016)
GDP p.c. (PPP, 2015) Official language Head of
government
1161 Burmese Htin Kyaw (since
2016)
Ethnic groups Democracy score (BTI 2016) System of
government
Burman 68%, Shan 9%, Karen 7%, 3.0 (range from 1 to 10, higher Presidential
Rakhine 4%, Chinese 3%, Indian 2%, scores indicate higher levels of
Mon 2%, other 5% democracy)
Religious groups Regime type Cabinet type
Buddhists 87.9%, Christians 6.2%, Autocracy Single party (plus
Muslims 4.3%, others or none 1.6% military-reserved
cabinet posts)
Sources: CIA (2017), World Bank (2017a)

enjoyed limited autonomy under a Burman chief minister and the Burma Office, a
British government department (Owen 2005, pp. 86–88).
However, direct British rule was established only in the country’s heartland, the
so-called Ministerial Burma, and the number of British officials remained remark-
ably low, leaving most subaltern positions to “Asiatic” officials from different
regions of the British Empire. The Chin and Kachin “Frontier Areas” and the
Federated Shan States remained under the formal rule of semi-sovereign local
rulers. As in Malaysia, British rule over culturally and politically diverse areas
and populations and their integration into a single economy created a segmented
“plural society” (Furnival 1960, p. 186).2 Because Burma could not supply suffi-
cient labor during the rice planting and harvesting seasons or in the emerging
modern industries, the colonial authorities encouraged labor migration during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While there was some Chinese
immigration after 1852, most immigrants came from Bengal and the Madras state
of India. Society in colonial Burma assumed a “three tiered” structure, in which
Europeans occupied the top managerial, administrative, and professional positions.
On the second tier, Indians and, to a lesser extent, Chinese operated retail shops and
held skilled and unskilled jobs in the modern sectors of the economy; Indians also

2
Furnivall’s concept of the “plural society” refers to the fragile nature of societies that emerged
under European colonial rule. In a plural society, people are bound not by “custom” but by “law”
imposed by outsiders. Furnivall argued that plural societies were fragile precisely because they
were held together only by economic self-interest and were mediated by the market and the
coercive apparatus of European colonial power (Jory 2013).
7.1 Historical Background and Current Political Challenges 181

held more than 50% of all government jobs in Lower Burma in 1931, whereas the
British recruited primarily ethnic minorities to serve in the colonial army (Steinberg
2010, p. 29). On the lowest tier were the Bamars, who lived in the villages and
worked in the traditional sectors of the economy.
Before the first decade of the twentieth century, the Burmese used to be
independent cultivators, possessing a relatively high standard of living. They
shunned the low-paying migrant labor jobs, and Indian control of capital was not
seen as oppressive as long as the market for rice was good and loans could be easily
repaid. However, in the early 1900s, uncultivated land became scarce, population
growth began to outstrip economic growth, and fluctuations in the price of rice
created new and unstable conditions. Burmese cultivators, dependent on credit
loans, faced foreclosure with increasing frequency. This created a class of Indian
absentee landlords whose farms were often operated by Indian tenants: Whereas in
1901 only 17% of the cropland had been owned by absentee landlords in the
Irrawady delta region, by 1940 this figure had increased to 67%. The resulting
social grievances led to local uprisings (Charney 2009, pp. 10–12) and fueled the
emergence of a Burman national movement in the 1920s and 1930s led by low level
civil servants, university students, and Buddhist monks (Osborne 1990). The
Dobama Asiayone (“We Burmans-Association”) became the core of the Burman
Independence Army, created by Aung San with Japanese support in 1940 (Kratoska
and Batson 1999).
During World War II, Japanese troops occupied Burma and fostered both the
Burman nationalist movement as well as nationalist sentiments among the ethnic
minorities (Sidel 2013). The increasingly oppressive nature of Japanese military
occupation turned Burman nationals against the Japanese. In early 1945, Aung San
and the newly formed Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) declared
war on Japan. In 1946, the British authorities agreed to start negotiations regarding
Burma’s independence and invited Aung San to become Burma’s de facto head of
government (Z€ ollner 2000). During the Panglong Conference in February 1947, the
Burmese government under Aung San and representatives of the Kachin, Chin, and
Shan agreed on the basic principles for a federal and democratic constitution
(Sakhong 2012, p. 3). However, representatives of the other ethnic minorities did
not participate in these negotiations and boycotted the 1947 elections for a consti-
tutional assembly that gave AFPFL broad parliamentary control.
In July 1947, Aung San was assassinated by a member of his own party. The new
government under Prime Minister U Nu abandoned Aung San’s conciliatory
approach in favor of a Burman-dominated unitary state (Gravers 1999,
pp. 41–43). Shortly after the Union of Burma became independent on January
4, 1948, several insurgencies broke out (Lintner 1999). At the time, the central
government had little military means to counter these threats: When General Ne
Win took command of the Burmese Armed Forces (Tatmadaw), they totaled only
around 2000 troops (Callahan 2001, pp. 414–416). Ne Win quickly reorganized the
Tatmadaw under a centralized command, expanded troop strength, and modernized
its military equipment (Selth 2002, pp. 10–11). This allowed the government to
regain control over most of the Union’s territories. The strength of the new military
182 7 Myanmar: The Challenging Transition from Military to Democratic Government

contrasted sharply with the weakness of civilian institutions. Following factional

conflicts within the AFPFL, the Tatmadaw forced Premier U Nu to appoint Ne Win
as interim prime minister in 1958 (Selth 2002, p. 12). The military handed back
control to an elected government in 1960, but U Nu’s decision to declare Buddhism
the state religion triggered a new wave of ethnic rebellions. Finally, the Tatmadaw
under General Ne Win staged a coup d’état in 1962.
The military governed until 1974 through a ruling council and then through its
Buddhist Socialist Program Party (BSPP; Callahan 2001; Steinberg 2001). Despite
institutionalizing a nominally civilian regime, the military remained in full control
of the state bureaucracy, the government, and the BSPP, whereas civilians occupied
subordinate positions (Taylor 1996; Myoe 2007). Under the official motto of a
“Burmese Way to Socialism,” industries and trade were nationalized, about
300,000 South Asians were forced to leave the country, and domestic businesses
were relegated into the shadow economy (Jones 2013, p. 148). The regime cut most
of its existing international links and implemented a strict program of import
substitution with the ultimate goal of creating an autarkic domestic economy
(Taylor 2009, pp. 342–344). As a result, the contribution of imports and exports
to the GDP plummeted from 36% in 1962 to less than 10% in 1987, and the share of
the manufacturing sector fell from 37.1 to 23% in 1985 (Myat Thein 2004,
pp. 75, 87).
Spiraling inflation, a fuel and rice shortage, and the complete demonetization of
small banknotes in September 1987, a decision that in one sweep rendered some
60–80% of the money in the cash-based economy worthless (Guyot 1989), trig-
gered a popular uprising in 1988. In the face of this unrest, Ne Win formally
resigned from his post as BSPP leader, although most observers still regarded
him as the e´minence grise behind the government (Steinberg 2001, p. 14). Protests
reached a first peak on August 8 (“8-8-88 Uprising”), when coordinated protests
occurred in most Burmese towns and cities and particularly in the capital city of
Rangoon (today’s Yangon). Until then, the regime had relied on the repression of
the internal security forces, but now, elite counterinsurgency troops of the
Tatmadaw were ordered to assist the overwhelmed police in suppressing the
protests. In the following crackdown, about 3000 protestors and bystanders were
killed (Ferrara 2003). However, the protests did not stop. Following the BSPP’s
announcement to hold elections within 3 months, the country was swept by another
massive wave of protests. Finally, on September 18, the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces and Defence Minister, Gen. Saw Maung, installed the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC). Army troops began a four-day long massacre during
which several thousands of people were killed, injured, or arrested. Nevertheless,
the SLORC allowed the National League for Democracy (NLD) under the leader-
ship of Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Aung San, to participate in the elections
for a constitutional assembly in 1990. The NLD won 392 out of 485 seats. While the
opposition argued that the election provided the NLD with a popular mandate to
form the government, military leaders insisted otherwise, put Aung San Suu Kyi
under house arrest, and used hard repression to suppress the opposition.
In the following decade, the junta engaged in a massive expansion of the
Tatmadaw, whose troop size doubled to more than 400,000. Regional army
7.2 Constitutional History 183

commanders took over all important state functions at the subnational level (Kühn
and Croissant 2011, pp. 141–142). The junta—renamed the State Peace and Devel-
opment Council (SPDC) in 1997—abandoned the experiment with a socialist
planned economy in favor of military-dominated rentier capitalism and managed
to sign ceasefire agreements with a large number of ethnic rebel groups that
guaranteed both parties a share of the earnings from local resources in the territories
under rebel control (Nilsen 2013). The resulting mélange of military, rebel, and
civilian businesses further weakened state institutions and strengthened the exploit-
ative nature of the military-dominated economic system (Jones 2014).
In 2003, the SPDC announced its roadmap to a civilian government. A
handpicked constitutional assembly presented a new constitution in 2008 that was
adopted in a rigged referendum the same year. Manipulated elections in November
2010 and the formation of a government under President Thein Sein, a former
general, in 2011 completed Myanmar’s transition to electoral authoritarianism
(Huang 2013; Dressel and Bünte 2014).
Several political reforms followed, including a national dialogue with opposition
leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the legalization of political parties, and the release of
political prisoners. The regime also eased its limitations on the freedom of speech,
association, and assembly. In the general election of November 2015, the NLD won
255 out of the 330 contested seats in the Lower House and 135 of the 168 contested
seats in the Upper House. Since Aung San remains barred from ascending to the
presidency herself, the parliament elected her close confidant Htin Kyaw Union
president on March 15, 2016 (McCarthy 2016).

7.2 Constitutional History

The current constitution came into force on January 31, 2011, and officially
replaced the socialist constitution of 1974 that had been suspended by SLORC in
1988. The constitutional process lacked democratic legitimacy along three
dimensions (cf. Croissant 2016). First, it lacked “upstream legitimacy” because
the constituent assembly that wrote the document did not come into being in a
legitimate way. The national convent assembled by SLORC in 1993 originally had
703 members, including 107 representatives who had been elected in 1990. After
the NLD withdrew from the convent in 1996, the whole process was suspended and
only reestablished in 2004 (Myoe 2007, p. 4). The constitutional convent now
included 1088 delegates, only 13 of them elected and none of them from the
NLD (Myoe 2007, p. 21). Second, it lacked “process legitimacy” because the
military dominated the internal decision-making procedures of the constitution-
making body. The Junta had decreed a list of 104 principles that had to be respected
and penalized any form of public criticism of the constitutional process (Williams
2009, p. 1668). In most essential points the draft constitution presented in 2008 was
identical to the SLORC draft of 1993 (Jones 2014). Third, the process lacked
“downstream legitimacy”: even though it had been submitted to the people in a
referendum in May 2008, many local and international observers attributed the
184 7 Myanmar: The Challenging Transition from Military to Democratic Government

official turnout of 98% and the approval rate of 92% to massive manipulation
(Seekins 2009, p. 169; Than 2009, pp. 202–204).
The 2008 Constitution primarily establishes institutions and distributes govern-
ment power. Only towards the end of the 448 provisions does it mention citizens’
rights and responsibilities. Chapter 1 (Art. 1-48) of the constitutional text defines
the union as a system of “genuine, disciplined multiparty democracy” (Art. 6d).
This chapter decrees the administrative division of the Union into seven regions and
states, reserved parliamentary representation and institutional autonomy for the
Tatmadaw, and special prerogatives for the military commander-in-chief. In addi-
tion, Article 20(f) establishes the military as the guardian of the constitution and
puts forth the national integrity and sovereignty of the Union. This chapter also
guarantees a market economy and rules out the nationalization of businesses and the
demonetarization of the national currency. Chapter 2 of the constitution (Art.
49-56) concerns the administrative organization of the state. Chapters 3–6 deal
with the basic principles and functioning of state bodies, including the national
executive consisting of the president, two vice presidents, the cabinet, and the
National Defence and Security Council (NDSC, Art. 57-73), a bicameral national
parliament and the regional parliaments (Art. 74-198), and the court system,
including the Constitutional Tribunal (Art. 199-292). Chapter 7 enshrines the
position of the Tatmadaw in the political system (Art. 337-344) and Chap. 8 deals
with citizenship and provides a list of civil liberties and duties as well as economic
and social rights (Art. 345-390). At first glance, the constitution contains a wide
range of substantive rights, but most provisions find their limits in existing legisla-
tion, which means that the realization of these rights appears to be almost entirely
dependent on the whim of the parliament (Nardi 2014, p. 650). The constitution
guarantees the special status of Buddhism but also recognizes Christianity, Islam,
Hinduism, and animism as other established religions (Art. 361-2) and rules out the
“abuse of religion for political means” and the spreading of religious hatred (Art.
364). Chapters 9 and 10 regulate national and regional parliamentary elections (Art.
391-403) and the status of political parties (Art. 404-409). Chapters 11 and 12
provide regulations for imposing a state of emergency by the president and the
authority of the military commander-in-chief (Art. 410-432) and the constitutional
amendment process (Art. 433-436). Finally, Chapters 13 through 15 contain
regulations on state symbols as well as temporary and closing arrangements (Art.
437-457).
Although the 2008 Constitution includes several innovative elements, it is also
firmly rooted in the tradition of the 1947 and 1974 constitutional texts. This
includes the lack of a privileged status for constitutional rights provisions and the
privileged status of Buddhism. The return to a bicameral legislature, the indirect
election of the president by the Union parliament, and the appointment of regional
governments by the central government are also inspired by the 1947 Constitution,
whereas the division of Burma into seven regions and states is the same as in the
1974 Constitution (Zhu 2009, p. 46). The most important innovations include the
constitutional acknowledgment of a market economy and a multiparty system and
the equal representation of all 14 states and regions in the Upper House, regardless
7.3 System of Government 185

of their population (Art. 9a, 141). Unlike in the first constitution of 1947, states can
no longer legally secede from the Union (Art. 201-202, Constitution of 1947). For
the first time in Burma’s history, regions and states have elected legislatures and the
constitution institutes a Constitutional Tribunal as a separate institution to hear
cases for constitutional review (Art. 40).
Amendments to the constitution require the vote of more than 75% of the
members of both houses of the Assembly of the Union, which gives the military
that controls 25% of the seats a de facto veto. Substantial changes to the constitution
such as the status of the presidency, the National and Defence Security Council, and
the rules for amending the constitution require additional approval by referendum.
Overall, the constitution reflects the self-interests of the military. It is a “military
constitution” drafted in order to demand obedience in the name of the law, to win
legal recognition from the international community, and to regulate access to power
within the ruling elite (Croissant 2016). It imposes severe constraints on the func-
tioning of the political regime, “something which military rulers typically intend to
do to preserve their reforms and protect their personal and corporate interests after
leaving power” (Negretto 2013, p. 83). In fact, under the constitution, the Tatmadaw
is a fourth branch of government. It sets its own budget independently of the president
and parliament and has the right to administer and adjudicate all military affairs itself.
It appoints the defense, home, and border affairs ministers both in the national cabinet
and in the regional governments. It also has the right to veto decisions of the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government as far as national
security, defense, or military policy are concerned. Members of the Tatmadaw enjoy
full impunity for any actions taken prior to 2011 (Art. 445), and members of the
armed forces can only be tried by the military court system. Furthermore, the armed
forces have constitutionally secured a quarter of all seats in the Union parliament and
in the 14 state and regional legislative assemblies. Amending the constitution requires
military approval. The Tatmadaw’s commander-in-chief appoints and removes the
military members of parliament and the ministers of defense, home, and border
affairs as well as the ministers for border security in the subnational governments
(Art. 232). He commands all military units, paramilitary forces, and border troops;
has to confirm the appointment of any additional military cabinet member; and can
reverse any decision by the military courts (Art. 343). In case the president declares a
state of emergency, all legislative and executive powers are transferred to the military
commander-in-chief (Art. 40, 149). Finally, the NDSC, an 11-member group of
which five are active duty officers, must approve the declaration of a state of
emergency and appoints the commander-in-chief, providing the Tatmadaw a veto
over these decisions (Art. 201).

7.3 System of Government

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar is a unitary state with a presidential system
of government. All executive power is vested in the president, who is also head of
state. Legislative power is vested in the Assembly of the Union (Pyidaungsu
186 7 Myanmar: The Challenging Transition from Military to Democratic Government

Supreme Court Constuonal Naonal Defense and

Tribunal Security Council (NDSC)

President leads,
Vice Presidents are
members
nominates
member nominates

President of the country appoints 3 Commander-in-Chief

(2 Vice Presidents) Ministers of the Tatmadaw

appoints and
elects leads appoints appoints 25% of
Minister for all Members of
Border Affairs Parliament
Cabinet

appoints Local Government

Naonal Chief Minister (24)
Parliament

House of House of Local Parliament

Representaves Naonalies (14)

elects 75% of
elects 168 elects 330 members of
members of members of Parliament
the Parliament the Parliament

Voters

Fig. 7.1 Myanmar’s system of government, as of March 2016. Source: Authors’ compilation

Hluttaw), which consists of the Upper and Lower House. The 14 ethnic states and
regions have unicameral state legislatures and appointed chief ministers. The
judiciary is a separate branch of government (see Fig. 7.1). In April 2016, the
Union Parliament appointed former opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi to the
official government role of state councilor, allowing her to contact ministries,
departments, and other organizations and individuals in an official fashion. It is
too early to tell how this position will fit into the broader system of government.

7.3.1 Head of State and Government

The president is head of state and government. The 2008 Constitution abolished the
position of the prime minister, although some observers compare the position of a
state counsellor that the parliament established in 2016 to the position of a prime
minister. The president is not politically accountable to parliament, but unlike in
other presidential systems, is indirectly elected by the Assembly of the Union. The
elected members of the House of Representatives and of the House of Nationalities
and the military representatives in both Houses each form an electoral college that
elects one vice president, who then automatically becomes a candidate for the
presidency. The joint session of the elected and appointed members of parliament
7.3 System of Government 187

elects the president by plurality rule for a 5-year term that is renewable once. The
other two candidates serve as vice presidents (Art. 60). Eligibility criteria for the
office are restrictive: Only members of the Union Parliament, who are at least
46 years of age, have lived in Myanmar for the last 20 years, and who are familiar
with the political, administrative, economic, and military affairs of the Union can
stand for election. Any person who holds a foreign citizenship or whose parents,
spouse, children, or children’s spouses hold a foreign citizenship are ineligible for
the office (Art. 59F). The president and the vice presidents are barred from taking
part in the affairs of political parties while in office. The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw can
impeach the president upon request by a quarter of the members of the Upper or
Lower House. If the motion passes with a two-thirds majority of one house, the
other house conducts the trial hearings and can impeach the president by a
two-thirds majority (Art. 71).
The president represents the Union internationally, has the right of pardon, can
impose a state of emergency, and governs the administrative district of the capital
Naypyidaw. The president appoints the union ministers who together with the two
vice presidents and the attorney general constitute the Union Government. The
president also appoints the chief ministers of the 14 regions and ethnic states and the
justices of the Supreme Court, the higher courts, as well as for the Constitutional
Tribunal. The national parliament and—in case of the heads of the regional
governments—the regional parliaments can only turn down these appointments if
they violate formal procedures. The president can initiate bills, issue decrees and
presidential orders, and has a suspensive veto over parliamentary legislation.
Finally, he can request constitutional interpretations and abstract judicial review
by the Constitutional Tribunal. He or she also appoints diplomatic personnel and
senior bureaucrats, but not high-ranking military officers, who are appointed by the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Neither does the president have any other
authority over the armed forces. The president leads and organizes the cabinet. In
the first NLD-led government of March 2016, there were 20 ministers with a
portfolio and the minister in the presidential office. Only the ministers of defense,
border, and home affairs, appointed by the NDSC, remain active military officers.
The cabinet consists largely of NLD politicians but also includes members of the
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and ethnic minority parties (The
Guardian 2016).
The constitution also imposes some limitations on presidential authority.
Presidential decrees need confirmation by parliament, which can also overturn a
presidential veto by plurality vote (Art. 106). More importantly, both the NDSC
and the commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw participate in the government.
Control over the interior and border protection ministries comes with oversight
of the police, the prison system, and the General Administration Department,
which oversees all administrative personnel, giving the military de facto control
over the whole civilian bureaucracy (Nixon et al. 2013, pp. 14–15). Moreover,
under a state of emergency, all executive authority is transferred to the
commander-in-chief based on what can be described as a “two-step coup d’état
clause” (Nyein 2009, p. 639).
188 7 Myanmar: The Challenging Transition from Military to Democratic Government

7.3.2 Legislature

Myanmar’s Assembly of the Union (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) consists of an Upper

House, the House of Nationalities (Amyotha Hluttaw) representing the interests of
states and regions, and a Lower House, the House of Representatives (Pyithu
Hluttaw). Together with the regional and state legislatures, the two chambers are
elected for 5-year terms. Members of parliament cannot serve in other elected or
other government positions. Each of the 14 states and regions elects 12 members to
the Upper House; the remaining 56 of the 224 seats are reserved for the military.
The House of Representatives has 440 members, of which 330 are popularly elected
and 110 are appointed by the military. All 166 military MPs are appointed by the
commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw. The duration of their mandate is not
delineated and since the opening of the new parliament in 2011, military MPs
have been replaced by the army commander on a regular basis (Egreteau 2015c,
p. 339). The size of the regional parliaments depends on population numbers and
varies between 20 and 143 (Nixon et al. 2013, p. 57), of which one-third of the total
elected seats, i.e., 25% of total seats, belong to members of the military.
In Myanmar’s symmetrical bicameralism, the Lower and Upper Houses have
equal legislative powers: Bills can be initiated by either of the houses and the
consent of both houses is needed for the enactment of laws, and the Lower House
cannot unilaterally override vetoes or amendments adopted by the Upper House. If
there is disagreement between the two houses, a joint session determines the
content of the final bill (Butenschøn et al. 2015). With the exception of amendments
to the constitution, all decisions are made by simple majority vote. Once a bill has
passed in both chambers, it goes to the president for enactment. If the head of state
does not veto the bill or parliament overrides his veto, the bill becomes law. Both
houses of parliament elect a speaker by simple majority. The speaker allocates seats
in the committees, determines the legislative agenda, and presides during plenary
sessions. Both the Upper and Lower House can form committees, with the consti-
tution only requiring four standing committees necessary for parliamentary proce-
dure, like the “Government Guarantees, Pledges and Undertakings Committee.”
The Security and Defence Committee is reserved for military members of the
assembly. Elected representatives can be included if “necessary” and “suitable”
(Art. 115b). Currently (April 2016), there are 18 standing committees.
Contrary to initial expectations, Myanmar’s legislature has proven to be a
powerful institution that does not shy away from conflicts with the president or
other state organs. In a particularly visible example, the Upper House moved to
impeach the Constitutional Tribunal in August 2012 and the motion was supported
by civilian legislators from both USDP and NLD, who objected to a decision of the
tribunal (see below). Especially since the by-elections held in April 2012, in which
the NLD won all 37 contested seats for the House of Representatives, the parlia-
ment has developed into a thriving force of political and economic reforms.
Opposition MPs and representatives of the USDP, founded by the military in
advance of the 2010 election, have used their authority to monitor the government
(ICG 2013, p. 1; Holliday 2013, p. 94), although most NLD parliamentarians are
7.4 Legal and Judicial System 189

inexperienced in lawmaking and other parliamentary affairs. Whether for norma-

tive or merely strategic reasons, members of USDP in the first elected Union
parliament (2010–2015) sometimes took joint opposition policy positions and
cooperated with their opponents. For example, USDP representatives supported
NLD’s demands to eliminate the Tatmadaw’s blocking minority for constitutional
amendments provided for in Article 436 (Poling et al. 2014; Soe 2014). Whereas
the national parliament acted as an agent of change under President Thein Shein,
regional parliaments were far less influential (Lwin 2014).
A number of studies have provided preliminary insights into Myanmar’s legis-
lative processes and the behavior of civilian and military members of parliament
(ICG 2013; Kean 2014; Egreteau 2015a, b, c). Available circumstantial evidence
suggests that in the period 2012–2015, legislative coalitions frequently cut across
party lines, strengthening the position of parliament vis-à-vis the government. At
the same time, civilian legislators have few regular interactions with their military
colleagues. Most MPs in khaki seem to have been drawn from the younger age
group of the Tatmadaw; two-thirds were ethnic Bamar; and about 40% of the
military officers seconded to parliament belong to the group of majors and captains,
with only very few senior officers above the rank of lieutenant-colonel (Egreteau
2015c, pp. 347, 350, 361). Yet until now, little is known about the bases on which
officers are appointed and removed from the legislature or the actual legislative
behavior of military MPs not only in the Union parliament but also in the provincial
assemblies. Available studies suggest that the military appointees have not
appeared to favor obstructionist tactics systematically. Rather, thus far, the level
of their legislative involvement has remained low (Egreteau 2015a, p. 9). However,
it is worth noting that military MPs do not always vote as a bloc and have only
consistently objected to draft bills that would have interfered with the army’s own
corporatist interests, or more generally with the three main “national causes” of
national integrity, solidarity, and sovereignty (Egreteau 2015a).

7.4 Legal and Judicial System

Myanmar’s law system is a combination of customary law, codified English

common law, and legislation passed after 1947. The principles of English common
and statutory law were implemented by British legal codes of the pre-independence
India statutes (Crouch and Lindsey 2014, pp. 5–7). Since independence, the judicial
system has evolved through several phases. Under the parliamentary democracy
from 1947 to 1962, there was a professional and independent judiciary trained in the
Anglo-Indian legal tradition, with the Supreme Court as the highest court of the
land, a High Court, and regional courts. Following the 1962 coup, the military
dissolved the Supreme Court and abolished the regular court system in favor of
so-called Special Courts. The ruling council saw no need to feign adherence to the
rule of law and state actions were not bound by law in any predictable manner
(Cheesman 2009, pp. 598–599). Under the 1974 Constitution, the judicial system
was transformed into a socialist system. The BSPP Socialist State introduced
190 7 Myanmar: The Challenging Transition from Military to Democratic Government

so-called People’s Tribunals presided by military officers, BSPP cadres, and loyal
bureaucrats who served as enforcers of state power (Cheesman 2011, p. 822; Nardi
2014, pp. 642–644). When the SLORC abandoned socialism in 1988, it returned to
the pre-1974 civil court system (Crouch and Lindsey 2014, pp. 5–7; Cheesman
2011, p. 802). Notwithstanding these reforms, the judicial branch of government
remained subservient to the executive branch and access to justice in Myanmar
remained elusive.
For the past six decades, corruption in the judicial system and abuse of office
have been endemic (Steinberg 2010, p. 130). Accordingly, the weakness of the rule
of law and high levels of public corruption—affecting all branches of government
and all levels of state administration—are reflected in the low rankings of Myanmar
in the World Bank’s Rule of Law Indicator and Transparency International’s
Corruption Perception Index. In both indices, the country frequently finishes last
or second to last in the region (World Bank 2017b; Transparency International
2015).
Myanmar’s history of a politicized judiciary and dysfunctional rule of law means
that it would be unrealistic to expect an overnight transformation in this regard.
Nevertheless, many observers have noted slow but significant improvements. Even
though courts have so far exercised only limited influence on the executive and
legislative branches of government, the new constitution at least creates the institu-
tional machinery for judicial review of both branches and authorizes the Supreme
Court to enforce fundamental rights. Political activists are now more likely to be
charged in court rather than simply incarcerated or assassinated as before. Still, they
cannot expect a fair trial, and the poor state of the judicial infrastructure, outdated
legal codes, and judicial corruption mean it is difficult for most citizens to gain
access to justice (Holliday 2013, p. 95).
Under the 2008 Constitution, the country’s civilian courts were reorganized into
four levels with the Supreme Court at the apex. As highest judicial body in the land,
it presides over 14 state and regional High Courts, 67 District and Self-
Administered Area Courts, and 324 Township Courts. Village chiefs (“headmen”)
also wield certain quasi-judicial powers and there is a parallel system of marital
courts. In addition, the constitution introduced a bifurcated system of judicial
review steeped in common law: The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over concrete
administrative review cases involving constitutional rights, whereas the Constitu-
tional Tribunal serves as a constitutional court with the authority of constitutional
review (IBA 2012, p. 56).
The 2008 Constitution guarantees the independence and impartiality of the
judiciary, and it mandates public courtroom hearings, a right of defense, and a
right of appeal. The formal safeguards for judicial independence are, however,
somewhat undermined by the extent of executive control over the judiciary (IBA
2012, p. 57). The president nominates the chief justice and seven to 11 justices of
the Supreme Court, and parliament may only withhold its approval if “it can clearly
be proved” that the prospective appointee lacks the qualifications prescribed for the
post (Art. 301). The chief justice of the High Courts is also appointed by the
president; the remaining up to six judges are appointed by the chief minister of
7.4 Legal and Judicial System 191

the territorial unit (Nardi 2014, p. 650). Judges of the Supreme Court and High
Court ordinarily “shall hold office” up to the age of 70 and 65, respectively. The
president’s powers of appointment are augmented by his or her control over the
financing of the court system. Although the Supreme Court is responsible for
assessing the judiciary’s annual budget in advance, it is the executive’s task to
present that budget to the legislature (Nardi 2014, p. 650).
For the first time in Myanmar’s history, the 2008 Constitution instituted a
centralized constitutional court. The nine-member Constitutional Tribunal is
empowered to interpret constitutional provisions, to review the constitutionality
of enacted legislation, and to resolve constitutional disputes between the Union
government, states, regions, and self-administered areas. Its decisions are final and
conclusive in all such cases (Art. 324). In contrast to Indonesia, there is no provision
for constitutional complaints, and individual citizens do not have direct access to
the court. The Union president, the two parliamentary speakers, the chief justice of
the Supreme Court, the head of the national election commission, and groups of
legislators of at least 10% of the total members of either the Lower or Upper House
are entitled to appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal. In case of constitutional
disputes between the Union and subnational governments, the chief ministers and
speakers of the state or regional parliaments can appeal to the tribunal. All of these
actors are also entitled to file a request for constitutional interpretation. Finally, if
any ordinary court finds itself having to address a matter within the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction, it “shall stay the trial and submit its opinion to the Constitutional Court
of the Union [for] resolution” (Art. 59b).
The Union president and the two parliamentary speakers each nominate a third
of the Tribunal’s justices to parliament, and legislators may only withhold approval
from persons who are demonstrably unqualified. The justices of the Constitutional
Tribunal serve a 5-year term. The first bench (2011–2012) was elected by a
parliament that consisted of the military-backed USDP, military representatives,
and ethnic minority parties. Following the resignation of the nine justices in 2012, a
second bench completed the term until the NLD-dominated parliament in early
2016 elected a third bench.
Members of the Tribunal can be impeached by a motion of either government or
parliament (Art. 320-1). The details vary depending on the way the process is
initiated, but a legislative chamber can act if two-thirds of representatives vote in
favor of charges related to high treason, breach of any constitutional provision,
misconduct, the loss of a required qualification for office, or the inefficient dis-
charge of duties assigned by law (Art. 302, 311, 334).
The primary role of the Tribunal is to hear cases concerning the constitutional
review of laws issued at either the national, state/regional, or self-administered area
level. From 2011 to 2015, the court heard and decided 13 cases. So far, the Tribunal
has demonstrated considerable political autonomy from the executive branch of
government and repeatedly revoked presidential acts and decrees (Nardi 2014). In
contrast, it has been highly dependent on the political will of parliament. In early
2012, the government requested a constitutional assessment on whether parliament
could demand the presence of government ministers in all committee meetings, and
192 7 Myanmar: The Challenging Transition from Military to Democratic Government

the court supported the government’s position and ruled against such a parliamen-
tary right (Nardi 2014). In reaction to the Tribunal’s decision, representatives of the
NLD and the USDP argued the decision was “not correct” and that the judges had
violated the constitution. After the Upper House voted for impeachment on August
28, all nine judges chose to resign on September 6, 2012 (ICG 2012, pp. 9–11).
Even though the impeachment was formally permissible under the constitution
(International Bar Association 2012: 38), legislators ignored the fact that decisions
by the Constitutional Tribunal cannot be overruled by parliament. Parliament has
since amended the law on the Constitutional Tribunal to make the Tribunal report to
the president and the speakers of both houses of parliament and appropriated the
authority to select the chief justice (Nardi 2014, p. 670).

7.5 Electoral System and Elections

The first elections to the newly created Legislative Council were held across
“Ministerial Burma” in November 1922 under census suffrage. Universal suffrage
was introduced in 1947. Multiparty elections for the Chamber of Deputies (Lower
House) were held regularly between 1951 and 1960. One-party dominance by the
AFPFL characterized elections during this period (cf. Table 7.2). Even though there
were administrative shortcomings and security issues in some regions, elections
were regarded as free and fair (Steinberg 2010). Whereas there were no elections
from 1962 until 1974, under the 1974 Constitution, only candidates from the
military’s Buddhist Socialist Program Party could run in elections. In 1990, the
military junta permitted open elections in which the NLD won 80% of seats but
SLORC did not allow the newly elected parliament to convene. The 2008 Consti-
tution introduced multiparty elections for the Union parliament and the regional and
state assemblies. The last elections to the Pyithu Hluttaw were held in November
2015, and despite problems—especially with voter registration and unregulated
party finances—the integrity of the elections compared favorably in the region and
even globally. According to the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) index, the
2015 elections achieved the second-highest quality score among the seven South-
east Asian countries in the project (54.07 compared to an average of 50.59). In
January 2016, elections of village tracts and urban ward administrators took place
across the country.
The current electoral system was established by the 2008 Constitution. Suffrage
is guaranteed for all natural-born citizens who are at least 18 years old, but Article
392 specifies important exceptions to voting rights, for example for members of the
Buddhist sangha. Natural-born citizens aged 25 (30 for the Upper House) or older
are eligible to stand in elections if Myanmar was their general residence for the past
10 years. A passage in the election law that would have banned any convicted
criminal from becoming a member of a political party and which would have forced
the NLD to exclude numerous members was dropped before the by-election of 2012
(Taylor 2012, p. 227). Candidates can run under a party banner or as independents
(Kudo 2011; The Burma Fund 2011). While the Union Election Commission (UEC)
Table 7.2 Parliamentary elections in Myanmar, 1951–2015
7.5

2010 (Lower 2010 (Upper 2015 (Lower 2015 (Upper

Party 1951 1956 1960 1990 house) house) house) house)
NLD % – – – 59.8 – – 57.1 –
Seats – – – 392 (37c) (4c) 255 135
NUPb % – – – 21.2 19.5 – – –
Seats – – – 10 12 5
SNLD % – – – 1.7 – – –
Seats – – – 23 – – 3
AFPFL(plus allies) % – – – – – – – –
Electoral System and Elections

Seats 199 148 – – – – – –

AFPFL (Stable) % – – – – – – – –
Seats – – 41 – – – – –
AFPFL (Clean) % – – – – – – – –
Seats – – 158 – – – – –
UHPC % – – – – – – – –
Seats – 14 – – – – – –
NUF (u. SUF) % – – – – – – – –
Seats – 48 – – – – – –
PDF (and allies) % – – – – – – – –
Seats 19 – – – – – – –
USDP % – – – – 56.8 – 28.2 –
Seats – – – – 259 (0c) 129 (1c) 30 12
SNDP % – – – – 0.2 – –
Seats – – – – 18 3 (1c)
RNPP % – – – – 2.9 – – –
Seats – – – – 9 7 10
(continued)
193
Table 7.2 (continued)
194

2010 (Lower 2010 (Upper 2015 (Lower 2015 (Upper

Party 1951 1956 1960 1990 house) house) house) house)
7

NDF % – – – – 7.1 – – –
Seats – – – – 8 4
Others & % – – – 17.2 11.4 – 14.7 –
independentsd Seats 21 33 38 60 19 14 38 11
Tatmadaw Seats – – – – 110 56 110 56
(appointed)
Total % – – – 99.9 97.9 – – –
Seats 250 250 250 485 435 224 433 224
(vacancies) 11 7 13 7 5 0 7 0
Turnout % – – – 72.6 77.2 76.8 69.7 69.8
a
Vote shares are only available for 1990 and the Lower House elections of 2010 and 2015
b
Formerly BSPP
c
By-elections held on 1 April 2012
d
“Others” are political parties with less than 2% of total vote/seats
Source: Englehart (2012), Frasch (2001), The Burma Fund (2011), Than (2014), Carr (2017), IFES (2017)
Myanmar: The Challenging Transition from Military to Democratic Government
7.6 Parties and Party System 195

is responsible for voter registration as well as organizing and managing the election
of members of the Union parliament and that of the state and regional legislative
assemblies, local elections are under the purview of the military-governed General
Administrative Department (GAD). The UEC can call by-elections if a member of
parliament takes up a government office. Candidates can file an electoral complaint
with the commission, but this procedure again requires a considerable fee (Oo 2014,
p. 195). All national and subnational legislatures are elected by a system of plurality
rule in single-member districts. In September 2014, the USDP proposed to change
the system to proportional representation with open or closed party lists, but most
ethnic parties and the NLD opposed it.
In 2010, Myanmar held the first elections under the 2008 constitution. Several
dozen parties registered, representing a variety of ethnic groups, though the NLD
and many other opposition parties boycotted the polls. The military-backed USDP
was the only party that filed a full slate of candidates for the Union parliament and
the state and regional assemblies. Political space was highly restricted and the
political playing field was heavily skewed in favor of the USDP (Kudo 2011,
pp. 3–4; Englehart 2012, p. 668) which, unsurprisingly, won a landslide victory
(see Table 7.2).
Following the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, the NLD decided
to participate in by-elections in 2012. Again, the USDP had an unfair advantage, but
all parties could campaign freely and were given access to state radio and television
(Than 2014). The NLD won 41 seats in the Union parliament, whereas the USDP
emerged with a single seat. The fact that NLD managed to defeat USDP even in
constituencies with large military and civil service populations indicated strong
support for the opposition even among groups close to the government. The general
election of November 2015 confirmed the strength of the NLD. On a nationwide
basis, the party won 887 of the 1150 contested seats. The ruling USDP came in at a
distant second with 117 seats. In both chambers of the Union Parliament, NLD took
more than three-fourth of the elected seats and won an absolute majority (taking
into account the 25% of seats allocated to the military) in seven regional and three
state assemblies. The USDP-led party alliance won an absolute majority only in the
Shan State (Dinmore and Guyitt 2015). The election results demonstrate the
ambiguous nature of multiparty elections in authoritarian regimes. Rather than
stabilizing the military’s sway over an electoral authoritarianism, it offered the
opposition a chance to challenge the post-2008 regime structures designed to
continue military dominance in civilian disguise.

7.6 Parties and Party System

One party—the AFPFL—was at the forefront of Burmese politics after 1945.

Founded as a merger of the Burma National Army led by Aung San, the Communist
Party of Burma, and the People’s Revolutionary Party in March 1945, the AFPFL
was victorious in the elections of 1947, 1951, and 1956. The party enjoyed a
monopoly on power that reflected its strong support especially among Bamar voters,
196 7 Myanmar: The Challenging Transition from Military to Democratic Government

but it suffered from factional conflicts (Taylor 1996). Before the 1960 elections, the
party broke up into two factions, the military-backed “Stable AFPFL” and the
“Clean AFPFL” of Prime Minister U Nu, who won the vast majority of parlia-
mentary seats in 1960 (Bigelow 1960; Steinberg 2010). Other political parties and
independents had little success, except in those parts of Burma inhabited by ethnic
minorities. Following the military coup of 1962, the new rulers dissolved all existing
parties and created the Buddhist Socialist Program Party. Following the “8-8-88
Uprising,” SLORC replaced the BSPP with the National Unity Party (NUP) and
allowed the registration of other political parties. Although 93 political parties
contested the 1990 election, only the NLD and a few ethnic or pro-regime parties
survived the authoritarian crackdown that followed the elections.
Following the passage of the 2008 Constitution, political parties regained a
central role in Myanmar’s politics. Art. 39 of the constitution prescribes a multiparty
system for the Union, although parties can be banned for “treasonous” activities,
abuse of religion for political purposes, or for “directly or indirectly receiving and
expending financial, material, and other assistance from a foreign government, a
religious association, other association or a person from a foreign country” (Art.
407). Buddhist monks, civil servants and state employees, and members of the
Tatmadaw cannot join a political party. Political parties who want to contest
elections must register with the election commission. Requirements for registration
are quite low—political parties must have at least 1000 members, possess 15 execu-
tive committee members, and run in at least three constituencies. Consequently, a
total of 91 parties registered for the 2015 elections (Myanmar Times 2015). Most
parties are small and many focus on their ethnic base; only USDP, NLD, NUP, and
the National Democratic Force (NDF) have a national presence.
Two political cleavages have endured in the development of Myanmar’s party
system since the 1950s. The first one is the center–periphery conflict; the second
one is the conflict between pro-military and pro-democracy parties. Accordingly,
political parties can be grouped into three blocks, although voting patterns in the
Union parliament and party alliances at the state and regional level cut across block
lines (Oo 2014).
First, the block of pro-military parties includes the National Unity Party (NUP)
and the USDP. SLORC created the NUP as an offshoot of the BSPP but dissolved
the party after its poor showing in the 1990 elections. In 2010, former high-ranking
members of the pre-1988 regime resurrected the NUP, but following an already
weak performance in 2010, it failed to win any seats in 2015. The USDP is an
offshoot of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), formed by
the military in 1993 as a mass organization and the civilian arm of the junta. The
USDP registered as a party in 2010, its leaders and candidates handpicked by the
military junta. Originally, USDP reported more than 20 million members, and its
leadership consisted mostly of retired military officers, USDA cadres, and local
businessmen (Jones 2013, p. 159). Before 2015, the party dominated parliaments at
the national and local level. Compared to other ruling parties in electoral authori-
tarian regimes in Southeast Asia such as the People’s Action Party in Singapore, the
Cambodian People’s Party, or the UMNO in Malaysia, the USDP is weakly
institutionalized and failed to emancipate itself from its perception as a political
7.7 State Administration 197

tool of the Tatmadaw. While its MPs had 5 years to build support in their
constituencies and benefited from government support, the 2015 elections brought
a crushing defeat (cf. Table 7.2).
The majority of political parties belongs to the second, heterogeneous group of
ethnic and regional parties. The ethnic parties try to coordinate their activities and
position on key issues, for example, through the Nationalist Brotherhood Federa-
tion, which is a coalition of 25 minority parties. Even though many of these parties
also contest national elections, their focus is primarily on the elections for the
legislative assemblies of the ethnic minority states, where the nationally oriented
parties are relatively weak. For example, most of the 23 parties achieved represen-
tation in at least one of the state or regional parliaments in 2010, but most parties
also contested the elections in only one state or region (Yhome 2011; Nixon et al.
2013). Some minority parties align themselves with rebel groups. As with most
political parties in Myanmar, their intra-party politics are personalized, informal,
and elite-centered (Thawngmung 2012). Most ethnic parties are not clearly aligned
along the authoritarianism versus democracy cleavage that separates pro-military
parties and the NLD (Oo 2014; Nilsen 2013, pp. 123–124).
The third group of political parties comprises parties, that trace their origins to
the 1988 student movement and the 1990 election, and includes several small or
tiny parties, the NLD, and the NDF, the latter of which broke away from the NLD in
2010. The parties in this group compete for votes particularly in the Bamar-
dominated constituencies (Nilsen 2013, p. 132). Even though all of these parties
demand the further democratization of the political regime, their preferred strat-
egies and the details of their preferred democratic institutions differ (Nilsen 2013,
p. 131). Whereas the NDF aimed to play a role as a “third force” between the USDP
and the NLD, it suffered a defeat in the 2015 election and failed to win any seats.
The NLD was established by reform-oriented military officers, politicians, and
democracy activists in September 1988 (Yhome 2011, pp. 8–9). Lead by Aung
San Suu Kyi, the party won 80% of parliamentary seats in 1990. Soon after the
election, however, the party was repressed, its leader placed under house arrest, and
many of its members and leaders arrested or driven underground or into exile
(Z€ollner 2012). In the aftermath, the NLD created alliances with different ethnic
parties and participated in a government-in-exile that was initially successful at
generating international support. The party boycotted the 2010 election but
reregistered for the by-elections in 2012. While the party advocates a nonviolent
transition to multiparty democracy and has reopened party offices in most
constituencies, its strength lies mostly in the popularity of Aung San Suu Kyi
(Z€ollner 2012, p. 479; Jones 2013, p. 166).

7.7 State Administration

Myanmar is a centralized unitary state. There are two tiers of government: the
central government and the governments of the seven regions and seven states.
Whereas the regions have Bamar-majority populations, the populations of the states
are composed of mostly ethnic minorities. Despite the terminology distinguishing
198 7 Myanmar: The Challenging Transition from Military to Democratic Government

historically existing ethnic states from Bamar-majority regions, states and regions
are constitutionally equivalent. Under the 2008 Constitution, state and regional
governments consist of a partially elected unicameral parliament (hluttaw), an
executive led by a chief minister, a cabinet of state or region ministers, and state
or region judicial institutions. The hluttaw is composed of two elected members per
township, representatives of “national races,” and appointed military
representatives making up one quarter of the total representatives. The chief
minister is selected by the president from among elected or unelected hluttaw
members and is confirmed by the hluttaw. The state or regional minister for border
and security affairs is a military officer nominated by the commander-in-chief
(Nixon et al. 2013, v).
Below states and regions are the administrative levels of 67 districts and six
autonomous regions of the Shan State as well as 325 townships. The latter are the
critical building blocks of the national administration (Saw and Arnold 2014). The
townships consist of village tracts and village or municipal quarters (see Fig. 7.2).
The General Administration Department (GAD) of the Ministry of Home Affairs
(MOHA) supports coordination and communication among the Union govern-
ment’s ministries and connects the capital, Naypyitaw, to approximately 16,000
wards and village tracts. The GAD also provides administrative support to the
Union territory of Naypyidaw. However, its primary responsibility is the manage-
ment of Myanmar’s public administrative structures. Governments in the regions
and states rely upon the GAD to serve as their civil service. Civil servants are under
the supervision of local governments, but their personnel management is directly
managed by the MOHA and they are responsible for and accountable to both local
governments and the MOHA. Functions and responsibilities of local governments
are relatively small compared to the central government. Furthermore, local
governments lack human resources and suffer from weak bureaucratic and financial
capacities (Saw and Arnold 2014).
Population data is unreliable and contested in Myanmar but does show wide
variation in the populations of different states and regions. Levels of socioeconomic
development and armed conflict also vary widely (see Table 7.3). Despite their
wealth of natural resources, ethnic states are generally poorer and underdeveloped
relative to the Bamar regions and some have suffered decades of armed conflict
(Smith 2007).
The constitution lists the policy domains over which subnational governments
have legislative powers. The specified responsibilities are quite narrow and exclude
major areas such as health, education, energy, mining, and forestry (Nixon et al.
2013, pp. 13, 53). The territorial units lack financial resources, and the central
government has reserved the authority to tax all major sources of revenue. Together
with an insufficient system of national transfer payments, less than 5% of overall
government expenditure originates from the subnational level (Nixon et al. 2013,
viii). High levels of political, administrative, and fiscal centralization contrast with
weak administrative, fiscal, and infrastructural state capacities (Englehart 2005).
For example, government revenues have been exceptionally low: Although total
revenues (excluding transfers from SOEs) as a percentage of GDP increased from
7.7 State Administration 199

Union

Union Territory Regions States

(Naypyitaw)

Districts Self-Governed Zones Self-Governed Divisions

Districts

Communies

Cies
Associaons of Villages

Villages City Districts

Fig. 7.2 Territorial organization of Myanmar. Source: Authors’ compilation based on Nixon et al.
(2013)

Table 7.3 Regional asymmetries in Myanmar

Population (2010, Intensity of armed conflict % of population in
in million) (2000–2009)a poverty (1997)b
Regions
Ayeyawdy 6.3 8.0 22.7
(Irawadi)
Bago 4.8 10.0 24.7
Magway 4.1 10.0 37.9
Mandalay 5.8 – 22.2
Sagaing 5.1 12.33 24.9
Taninthayi 1.4 12.33 8.1
Yangon 5.9 9.75 16.7
States
Chin 0.5 8.0 42.1
Kachin 1.4 10.0 10.1
Kayah 0.3 10.5 35.4
Kayin 1.4 12.18 12.7
Mon 2.1 12.0 19.9
Rakhaing 3.2 12.25 22
Shan 4.5 11.03 12
a
Average regional intensities from 2000 to 2009. Regional intensity is the sum of five indicators
(type and use of armament, number of involved personnel, fatalities and refugees, and destruction)
measured on a scale from one to three for each unit, month, and type of armed conflict between
state and non-state actors. Higher scores indicate higher levels of violence
b
National poverty line
Source: Shein and Myint (2001), Nixon et al. (2013, p. 10), Trinn (2015)
200 7 Myanmar: The Challenging Transition from Military to Democratic Government

5.6 (2009) to 9.3 (2014–15), it is still the lowest in Southeast Asia (OECD 2014,
pp. 167–168). Bureaucratic inertia and the dominance of vested interests make the
civil service an obstacle for the implementation of policy measures on the ground.
In contrast, coercive state capacity is overdeveloped. The Tatmadaw claims the
lion’s share of the country’s economic resources as the government spends 4.18%
of GDP on defense expenditure and military commanders are in control of many
state-owned enterprises (IISS 2014). In addition, under the SLORC/SPDC govern-
ment, the military fired several thousand government officials suspected of
sympathizing with the democracy movement and transferred most administrative
tasks to military-led Local Order Reconstruction Councils (LORC, renamed Peace
and Development Councils in 1997; Than 2006, p. 221). Political liberalization and
ceasefire agreements with many rebel groups have strengthened non-military
institutions and opened contested areas to the national government. However, so
far there are no signs of a comprehensive administrative reform that could disem-
power local military commanders and regional warlords.

7.8 Civil-Military Relations

Burma/Myanmar is the paradigmatic case of a “praetorian state” that emerges in

countries with low levels of political institutionalization and high levels of political
mobilization, fragmented political parties and civilian elites, and a politically self-
conscious military. The mismatch between the organizational strength of the
Tatmadaw and the weak institutionalization of civilian organizations as well as
the lack of sustained support for democratic structures was key for political
developments after 1948, in which the military played a highly significant role in
key political structures and institutions, acting either as the actual ruler (1958–60,
1962–1974, 1988–2011) or controlling politics behind the scenes through a chosen
civilian agent (1974–1988 and 2011–2016).
The extraordinary durability of military rule and the fact that the Tatmadaw was
able to initiate a top-down transition in which it carved out political autonomy,
substantial policy prerogatives, and veto powers contrasts with the experiences of
other military regimes in Southeast Asia and in other world regions. Generally,
military dictatorships are highly unstable and short-lived, as they usually lack the
organizational strength to govern and maintain power and are prone to intra-
military conflicts (Geddes 1999; Ezrow and Frantz 2011). The enigma of durable
military rule in Myanmar lies in the ability of military elites to create a well-
organized and cohesive military institution, solving credible commitment problems
between military factions and maintaining respect for hierarchy among officers.
More specifically, three factors helped the Tatmadaw avoid the characteristic
instability of military regimes. First, military rule in Myanmar was the result of a
“corporative coup” (Brooker 2009): The 1962 coup and the installment of the
SLORC in 1988 were supported by key military elites, and the military junta
included all services and relevant power groups within the Tatmadaw. Moreover,
both the Revolutionary Council established after 1962 and the SLORC were
7.8 Civil-Military Relations 201

composed entirely of military officers loyal to Ne Win (Steinberg 2001; Callahan

2005). The resulting “hierarchical military regimes” (Linz and Stepan 1996) man-
aged to institutionalize power-sharing arrangements between different military
partial elites, which made sure no individual faction would be able to undermine
the power base of the military government within the military-as-institution (Crois-
sant and Kamerling 2013). This immunized the regime against possible
countercoups.
Second, the military government established a buffer of legitimacy after 1962 by
creating mass organizations like the BSPP and, after 1988, the USDA/USDP,
stressing the military’s leadership on the “Burmese way to socialism” and the
struggle to defend the nation against separatist insurgencies in the periphery.
Following the “8-8-88 Uprising,” the Tatmadaw successfully recalibrated its own
strategy of legitimation. It gave up any socialist claim of transforming society in
favor of a limited phase of military transitional rule by the SLORC/SPDC with the
official aim of establishing a “disciplined democracy” (Taylor 2005, p. 21). The
creation of new military and political institutions also allowed the government to
monitor and control society. Immediately after taking power in 1988, SLORC
created a new institutional structure that extended direct and complete military
control over the political system. While day-to-day governance was conducted by a
prime minister and his cabinet, all cabinet posts with the exception of health and
education were held by military officers (Taylor 2009, p. 394). The police were
reorganized and put under the direct control of the Tatmadaw (Than 2006, p. 225).
Following the 1990 elections, the military tried to improve its relations with the
wider population through the Union Solidarity and Development Association,
which played an important role for the political indoctrination of the population,
the creation of paramilitary units, and the repression of political dissidents (Hlaing
2004, p. 406; Taylor 2006; see below). The regime also expanded its propaganda
activities to portray the military as the only reliable and functioning national
institution (Than 2006, p. 245; Steinberg 2007, p. 126).
Third, the different military governments managed to alleviate the tensions
between the interests of the military-in-government and the military-as-institution
that make military regimes prone to collapse (cf. Geddes 1999). Geddes argues that
a military with an intact chain of command and institutional autonomy values the
survival and unity of the military institution over the survival of the military regime.
Because controlling the helms of government often create rivalries within the
military, “military regimes carry the seed of their own destruction” (Geddes
1999, p. 131). Even though the Tatmadaw has also suffered from latent factional
conflict, these were always defused before they could threaten military cohesion or
regime survival (Hewison and Nyein 2009, p. 26). The junta included between
19 and 21 officers, including members of the army, navy, air force, and the
Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI) as well as most of the
12 regional commanders (Selth 2002, pp. 51, 59; Min 2008, p. 1024; Steinberg
2010, p. 82). DDSI became the most important government instrument for opposi-
tion surveillance and the internal affairs of the Tatmadaw. Finally, the army was
modernized and military units were stationed in strategic locations all over the
202 7 Myanmar: The Challenging Transition from Military to Democratic Government

country (Myoe 2007). In addition, the military government tried to co-opt different
rebel groups and strengthened direct military control over the most lucrative
branches of the national economy (Bünte 2008) but allowed regional commanders
and military units to pursue their own business interests (Myoe 2007; Hewison and
Nyein 2009, p. 27; Jones 2013, p. 149).
Through all this, the junta managed to preserve the coherence of the military
institution with the help of several counter-strategies. These included frequent
personnel rotations, the appointment of loyal commanders for key positions, and
the co-optation of potential military counter-elites (Kühn and Croissant 2011,
p. 147). Moreover, the scholarship on the Tatmadaw has long emphasized the fact
that, despite the dominance of Bamar senior officers at the highest levels of the
Burmese army, racial background has been less of an issue in promotions than
social and religious backgrounds. Rakhine, Mon, and Shan officers could indeed
reach the ranks of colonel and above, as long as they could prove that they were
Buddhist, well-educated, and wed to similarly educated spouses (Egreteau 2015c,
p. 349). The military strengthened the authority of the commander-in-chief,
enhanced the position of the Ministry of Defence, and placed elite combat units
under the control of the Bureau for Special Operations (Callahan 2005, p. 211).
Prior to 2004, the military junta also relied on DDSI to monitor military units (Fink
2009, pp. 168–170), but conflicts between military intelligence and other military
services led to a purge of the clique around the chief of military intelligence, Khin
Nyunt, and the installation of a new intelligence service, the Military Affairs
Security (Min 2008, pp. 1028–1030). Ideological indoctrination was meant to
increase the esprit de corps among officers and troops (Fink 2009, pp. 153–155).
In addition, their families and retirees enjoyed access to a system of material
incentives, including welfare, health, and education services as well as privileged
access to foodstuff and rare goods. Overall, more than 2 million people, or about
4% of the population, enjoy these advantages and other benefits (Steinberg 2010,
p. 101).

7.9 Political Culture, Civil Society, and Media System

So far, neither the World Values Survey nor the Asia Barometer Survey has
published comprehensive data on the political beliefs, values, and motivations of
the people of Myanmar (but see Welsh and Huang 2016 for preliminary ABS
results). Indirect measures such as the frequency of demonstrations and public
mass protests, political performance data, and election results in which opposition
parties contested indicate that large parts of the population appear to not support the
military’s claim to political leadership. Rather, mass protests in 1988 (“8-8-88
Uprising”) and 2007 (“Saffron Revolution”) and the NLD’s landslide victory in
1990 and 2015 support the view that the Tatmadaw has been rather unsuccessful in
engendering and maintaining the popular belief that military-controlled political
institutions are the most appropriate for Myanmar’s society. Yet, weak support for
the military government does not necessarily mean strong support for democracy.
7.9 Political Culture, Civil Society, and Media System 203

As documented in the first nationwide survey of Myanmar conducted by the Asia

Foundation among more than 3000 respondents across all 14 states and regions in
2014, public knowledge and awareness of government institutions and processes
are poor. More than 80% of respondents are unable to name any branches of
government, and most people have no knowledge about the selection or appoint-
ment processes for key government positions, including the parliament and the
president of the Union and the chief minister of their state or regional government.
While people appear to be cautiously optimistic about the direction in which the
country is heading, the level of optimism is markedly higher in the Bamar majority
regions than in the ethnic states (Asia Foundation 2014). As in most countries of
Southeast Asia, people express a strong preference for abstract democracy, but
possess a limited understanding of the principles and practices that underpin a
democratic system. While 37% of Burmese stress equality as an essential element
of democracy, less than a quarter name procedure, freedom, or good governance,
and almost three quarters of respondents oppose the principle of horizontal account-
ability (Welsh and Huang 2016, pp. 30, 32). Finally, social trust is low and political
disagreements are deeply polarizing (Asia Foundation 2014).
Civil society structures in Myanmar traditionally existed at the local level within
religious groups, emerging from Buddhist and Christian-initiated social welfare
activities that focused on social service delivery. Particularly in areas of armed
conflict, such groups often filled the state’s service-delivery role (ADB 2015). In
precolonial times, Burma had numerous informal solidarity associations and self-
help networks. Some of these exist until today or have evolved into contemporary
forms of societal self-organization (Kramer 2011, p. 6). The origins of “modern”
civil society—understood as an intermediary sphere of voluntary organizations that
publicly articulate and organize societal interests, values, and demands autono-
mously from the state (Croissant 2000, p. 16)—emerged in colonial times (Hewison
and Nyein 2009, p. 17). Since political associations were banned, Buddhist groups
like the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) and student associations
became pioneers of political civil society (Steinberg 1999, pp. 4–5; Hlaing 2004;
Hewison and Nyein 2009). In addition, Christian organizations gained importance
among ethnic minorities and contributed to the creation of formal organizations,
such as the Karen National Association created in 1881 (Kramer 2011; Taylor 2009,
p. 156). Inspired by examples in British India and resonating with the urban
population, various “modern” associations emerged in the first half of the twentieth
century, including charitable organizations, interest groups, worker unions, and
cultural or civic associations (Steinberg 2001, p. 106; Kramer 2011, p. 7).
While Burma did have a relatively lively civil society compared to many other
countries in Southeast Asia, the military junta in 1962 relied on several tools of
repression and co-optation to suppress any form of political dissent or associational
pluralism. In the following years, the military either disbanded existing
organizations or forced them to join various front organizations of the BSPP. The
military also barred the establishment of non-registered associations, whereas
Buddhist monasteries and monks (sangha) were obliged to register with the Minis-
try of Religious Affairs. Monasteries were infiltrated with informants, but the
204 7 Myanmar: The Challenging Transition from Military to Democratic Government

military also hoped to win sangha acceptance through generous donations (Smith
1991; Matthews 1993; Hlaing 2004, p. 393; Kramer 2011, p. 8). Yet, the govern-
ment never tried to enforce a complete monopoly on associational life. Community-
based and Christian-led organizations were allowed to continue their apolitical
social welfare activities (Seekins 2005; Lorch 2006). The existence of some groups
from pre-authoritarian times, including the Union of Burma Chamber of Commerce
and Industry (UBCCI) and the All-Burma Young Monks’ Association, were
condoned at least tacitly because the military did not perceive them as a threat
(Hlaing 2004, p. 394; Kramer 2011, p. 11). In addition, students, teachers, and
university lecturers organized clandestine discussion groups in monasteries or
private apartments that helped spread opposition literature and alternative political
thinking (Hlaing 2004, pp. 395–396).
In spite of repression, including a rigid command system that managed people’s
lives and systematic surveillance through networks of informers (Fink 2001), there
were a number of demonstrations and protests against military rule over the years,
with the biggest explosions of public frustration in 1988 and 2007 (Schock 2005;
Chenoweth and Stephan 2013). Following the 1988 uprising, hard repression,
including abductions, murder, and incarceration of civil society activists, made
oppositional civil society activity all but impossible. At the same time, SLORC
replaced BSPP with new mass organizations, including the Union Solidarity and
Development Association. USDA forcibly organized up to 12% of the population
and became the new source of paramilitary groups and repression against the
opposition (ICG 2001, p. 10; Hlaing 2004, p. 406). The junta tried to limit the
political clout of the sangha by creating new control mechanisms meant to monitor
the admission, education, and conduct of the 300,000 Buddhist monks in Myanmar
(Matthews 1993; Lorch 2006, p. 16). Local and international NGOs could engage in
village-level social services delivery if local military commanders decided to
tolerate them, but all NGO activity above the village-level had to acquire a license
(Lidauer 2012, p. 94). Despite these pressures, there were more than 200,000
community-based service providers and almost 300 local NGOs in Myanmar at
the beginning of the twenty-first century (South 2009; McCarthy 2012, pp. 4–5).
After Cyclone Nargis in 2008, many new organizations emerged and operated in a
legal gray area because they eschewed the difficulties of applying for registration
with the state (Lidauer 2012, pp. 89, 95).
The transition from military rule towards a less repressive political order since
2008 triggered a resurrection of civil society activity in Myanmar, although this was
a consequence probably unintended by the military (Lidauer 2012, p. 89). In
addition, domestic civil society is increasingly networked into the international
development and rights-based communities. The legalization of independent trade
unions, better protections for the freedom of assembly and association, the abolish-
ment of censorship, and the creation of a national human rights commission and a
national press council are other tangible results of the recent reforms. A pluralist
media is emerging and there is relatively broad space for critical reporting
(Wagstaff 2010; Holliday 2013, p. 95). While internet and social media still play
a relatively minor role in Myanmar, as only 22.4% of the population has access to
7.10 Outlook 205

the internet (Internet World Stats 2017), radio remains the most popular source of
information. Radio stations and public television are monitored by the Information
Ministry and the Tatmadaw, but foreign radio broadcast can be received easily in
many parts of the country and enjoy a large audience (Wagstaff 2010, pp. 13–15).
Myanmar’s position in the World Press Freedom Index improved from rank 171 in
2009 to 131 in 2017, placing it ahead of Malaysia and Singapore (Reporters without
Borders 2017). The Freedom House ranking Freedom of the Press also documents
an improvement, moving Myanmar from 193rd place of the 195 countries in the
sample to 161st place among 199 countries and territories (Freedom House 2015).
Yet, civil society organizations still face many legal and informal constraints, and
the expansion of civil society is not without its own contradictions. On the one hand,
hundreds of Burmese exiles have returned to the country over the last few years after
the government invited dissidents to come home and removed more than 2000
names from its blacklist. This contributed to latent tensions and sometimes manifest
conflicts between more “politically” oriented exiles and domestic activists over how
to cooperate and to what extent to collaborate with the then still military-dominated
government (Kramer 2011, p. 28). On the other hand, divisive groups have taken
advantage of the new political and media freedoms to pursue a nationalist or
xenophobic agenda that threatens the country’s Muslim minority (Lee 2016). For
example, since 2012, Buddhist groups have played a role in the creation of the “969
movement,”3 an extremist group that is believed to have organized anti-Islamic
protests in the country and to have escalated tensions between Buddhists and Muslim
minorities in the northern Rakhine State (ICG 2013; Than 2014, p. 28). The
movement was renamed the Patriotic Association of Myanmar after its original
name was declared illegal and championed four controversial laws passed in 2015 in
the name of “protection for race and religion.” These included a law on population
control, interfaith marriage, monogamy, and religious conversion (McCarthy 2016).

7.10 Outlook

The two key challenges of political development in postcolonial Burma have been
center–periphery conflicts resulting from unsolved problems of state- and nation-
building and the institutionalization of stable and effective civilian political
structures. The failure to integrate ethnic minorities into the postcolonial nation-
state has resulted in numerous and persistent intrastate conflicts between the state
and ethnic rebel groups. Sixty years or so of intrastate conflict, in turn, have
contributed to a notoriously weak state that not only lacks the monopoly on the
use of force in some areas but whose administrative structures barely reach beyond
central Myanmar and into the peripheral territories of the ethnic states (Dukalskis
2009; Englehart 2005; Yhome 2011; Nilsen 2013, p. 116). Failed nation-building

3
The numbers symbolize the nine attributes of Buddha, the six elements of Buddhist teachings, and
the nine attributes of the sangha (ICG 2013).
206 7 Myanmar: The Challenging Transition from Military to Democratic Government

and center–periphery conflicts are closely related to the second problem: the
relationship between the military, society, and politics. The failure of civilian
institutions to integrate ethnic minorities and insurgencies at the periphery provided
motive and opportunity for military intervention and the long-lasting rule of the
Tatmadaw. At the same time, the military’s strategy of coercive state-building has
undermined civilian state institutions and further eroded interethnic trust and
center–periphery relations.
Weak public infrastructure, widespread extreme poverty, and the exploitation of
Myanmar’s natural resources by a small group of regime beneficiaries will impede a
comprehensive transition towards constitutional democracy. Nevertheless, the
country’s political system is much less repressive and provides more space for
political parties, civil society, and the media as well as more autonomy for ethnic
minorities than at any point in the last five decades. Still, Myanmar is far from
completing its “first transition” (O’Donnell 1992) from an authoritarian govern-
ment towards a democratically elected one and will not face the “second transition”
towards a consolidated democratic regime in the near future. Considering the
economic strength and autonomy of the Tatmadaw, the cohesive character of the
military institution, its control over the most powerful ministries—Home Affairs,
Border Affairs, and Military Affairs—and the fact that the constitution is designed
to be impossible to change without the military’s approval, it is unrealistic to expect
the new NLD-led government to control its military. Yet, Myanmar’s political
liberalization also brings new uncertainties for political stability and the fragile
interethnic peace. The first challenge is the subversive consequences of the new
representative institutions. Even though the 2008 Constitution enshrines significant
political prerogatives and autonomy for the military, it also limits the power of the
generals. Overstepping these new boundaries in case of a conflict between civilian
and military regime elites or between the government and the opposition would be
costly and might destabilize the political transformation that is currently under way.
Furthermore, military leaders will have to control centrifugal tendencies within the
Tatmadaw. In the past, the regime managed to subdue regional commanders and
preserve the institutional coherence of the armed forces. There are, however, latent
tensions among different patronage networks as well as between senior officers and
the ranks because the latter never partook in the appropriation of the country’s
economic resources (Englehart 2012, p. 675). The co-optation of most rebel groups
has eliminated the common enemies that helped unify the military in the past
(Williams 2011, p. 1206). In addition, the ceasefire agreements have triggered the
emergence of distinct rentier economies in the border areas (Jones 2013, 2014) but
have done little to solve tensions between the center and the periphery or the
underlying grievances among the many ethnic minorities (Englehart 2005). Finally,
political liberalization and the institutionalization of political contestation has not
only resulted in a “resurrection of civil society” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986)
but has also created ethno-nationalist, xenophobic, and violent groups and has
contributed to sectarian violence, as reflected in mass violence against the country’s
Muslim minority.
References 207

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