COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

SUFFOLK, SS Supreme Judicial Court

for Suffolk County

Ronald Geddes, AC, and RAR,

each on their own behalf and
on behalf of a class of similarly situated
individuals,

Plaintiffs,

v.

City of Boston; Boston Police Department; Civil Action No. ___________

Boston Public Health Commission; Kim M.
Janey, in her capacity as the Mayor of the City of
Boston and individually; Gregory P. Long, in his
Capacity as the Acting Commissioner of the
Boston Police Department and individually; and
Bisola Ojikutu, in her capacity as Executive
Director of the Boston Public Health Commission
and individually,

Defendants.

VERIFIED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE

RELIEF

 
 
 INTRODUCTION

1. In the words of the Mayor-Elect of the City of Boston, “[c]riminalization has failed

as a response to public health crises.”1 Yet, the City of Boston (“City”) has resorted to crackdowns

instead of taking action to actually address the public health and humanitarian emergency at the

homeless encampment area of Massachusetts Avenue and Melnea Cass Boulevard and including

Atkinson and Southampton Streets (“Mass & Cass”).2

2. The City’s ongoing displacement actions—which are driving unhoused persons

from Mass & Cass—fail to address the immediate and urgent needs of unsheltered residents, and

put the health and safety of an already vulnerable population at even greater risk.3 What is more,

the City’s tactics are fundamentally unlawful. Specifically, the City explicitly threatens criminal

sanctions for noncompliance with displacement without any meaningful or individualized process

to ensure that those people driven from Mass & Cass actually have access to available housing

arrangements or shelter that can reasonably accommodate their needs. The City’s actions therefore

violate the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 26 of the Declaration

of Rights under the Massachusetts Constitution, as well as federal and state disability

discrimination laws.

 
1
See A Citywide Plan to Address Homelessness, Substance Use, and Mental Health, Michelle
for Mayor, https://www.michelleforboston.com/plans/housing-justice/homelessness-sud (last
visited Nov. 4, 2021).
2
The Chief Justice of the Boston Municipal Court (BMC) has defined “Mass and Cass” as “the
geographic location surrounded by: a) Melnea Cass Boulevard, Hampden Street and Norfolk
Avenue to the train tracks to the south and west; b) Massachusetts Avenue and Southampton
Street to the train tracks and Interstate Route 93 to the north and east; and c) Washington Street,
Massachusetts Avenue and Harrison Avenue to the north.” Ex. 5, BMC Chief Justice Roberto
Ronquillo, Jr., Boston Municipal Court Comm. Resp. Session Juris., Standing Order 02-21 (Oct.
30, 2021).
3
The word “City” as used in this Complaint includes the Boston Public Health Commission
(“BPHC”), as it is an independent agency of Boston governed by a board of health whose
members are appointed by the Mayor. 
2
 
 
 3. Additionally, in the course of removing these persons from their only shelter, the

City is unlawfully seizing and destroying their personal belongings in violation of the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of

Rights, and federal and state due process protections.

4. With this Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Plaintiffs

respectfully request that these unlawful actions cease immediately.

5. Plaintiffs are unhoused people currently or very recently staying on public ways in

Mass & Cass. They live outdoors because they have no other viable housing options and staying

at individual shelters is not a feasible alternative for them in part because of their disabilities,

medical conditions, and family composition. The unsheltered homeless often raise tents or create

other simple structures to protect themselves from the elements, gain some privacy, and enable

sleeping. Plaintiffs and those similarly situated face or have already experienced displacement

under the City policies challenged in this action, and are terrified about losing their liberty, their

worldly possessions and any place to be, if the City is allowed to continue to force them—under

threat of arrest and criminal prosecution—to relinquish their current living spaces without

providing alternatives adequate to meet their housing and medical needs.

6. Plaintiffs therefore seek preliminary and permanent injunctive relief preventing

Defendants and those acting in concert with them from:

i. implicitly or explicitly threatening individuals with arrest or

criminal process for living outside, including in tents or similar

structures, on City-owned public property, either under the

Executive Order and Protocols or otherwise, at least unless and

until:

3
 
 
 a) the City implements a meaningful, individualized process

to both assess the medical and other needs of each person

and identify an alternative housing option that meets those

needs and is available at the time of the displacement; and

b) the City implements policies to prevent the unlawful and

unjustified seizure and destruction of people’s property.

7. In addition to their primary claims on behalf of the Class for injunctive and

declaratory relief, the named Plaintiffs seek actual and punitive damages resulting from

Defendants’ intentional destruction of their personal property.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

8. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to G.L. c. 214, § 1, G.L. c.

231A, G.L. c. 12, §§ 11I, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Venue is appropriate pursuant to G.L. c. 214, § 5.

THE PARTIES

9. Plaintiff Ronald (“Ronnie”) Geddes is experiencing homelessness in part because

of the ongoing collateral consequences of having a criminal history and because he lost his job

because of the COVID-19 global health pandemic. He has bipolar disorder and post-traumatic

stress disorder (“PTSD”), related in part to having been sexually abused as a child. He is in

recovery for substance use disorder—for which he receives a regular course of methadone

treatment. Over the course of the past year or so, he has resided at Mass & Cass, in a tent with his

possessions neatly arranged.

10. Plaintiff RAR is experiencing homelessness and has been living in the Mass & Cass

area over the past year in a tent with his long-term partner AC. Mr. RAR’s primary language is

Spanish; he speaks and reads limited English. He has numerous disabilities and health conditions,

4
 
 
including HIV, Hepatitis-C, a seizure disorder, a heart condition, and PTSD. His vision is often

impaired because of the impact of his seizures and he relies on the assistance of Ms. AC to navigate

the activities of his daily life. In the past he has stayed in congregate shelters, 4 but they exacerbated

his PTSD and his vital medications were often stolen while there. In addition, staying in a

congregate shelter is unsafe because of the risks of contracting COVID-19, which are particularly

acute given his immunocompromised status and underlying health conditions.

11. Plaintiff AC is experiencing homelessness and has been living in Mass & Cass over

the past year in a tent with her long-term partner, Plaintiff RAR. Ms. AC has numerous medical

conditions, including PTSD, anxiety disorder, depression, asthma, bipolar disorder and a seizure

disorder. Staying in congregate settings exacerbates her PTSD and anxiety, and she is very

concerned about contracting COVID-19 in such a setting, particularly because she worries she

could then infect Mr. RAR. She relies heavily on Mr. RAR for support during times her depression

and anxiety are particularly high, as they are today because of the City’s actions described in this

Complaint.

12. Defendant City of Boston is a municipal corporation of the State of Massachusetts.

13. Defendant Kim M. Janey is the acting Mayor of the City of Boston. She supervises

and exercises control over the Boston Police Department and the Boston Department of

Environmental Protection. At all times pertinent to the subject matter of this litigation, she was a

citizen of the United States and a resident of and domiciled in Massachusetts. At all times

pertinent, she was acting under color of state law in her capacity as the Mayor of Boston. She is

 
4
Congregate housing facilities are also known as “shared” housing facilities, where a number of
people reside in close proximity to one another.
5
 
 
sued in her official capacity and, for purposes of the claim under G.L. c. 12, § 11H, in her personal

capacity.

14. Defendant Gregory P. Long is the Acting Commissioner of the Boston Police

Department. At all times pertinent to the subject matter of this litigation, he was a citizen of the

United States and a resident of and domiciled in Massachusetts. At all times pertinent, Defendant

Long was acting under color of state law in his Capacity as the Acting Commissioner of the Boston

Police Department. He is sued in his official capacity and, for purposes of the claim under G.L. c.

12, § 11H, in his personal capacity.

15. Defendant Bisola Ojikutu is the Executive Director of the Boston Public Health

Commission. At all times pertinent to the subject matter of this litigation, she was a citizen of the

United States and a resident of and domiciled in Massachusetts. At all times pertinent, Defendant

Ojikutu was acting under color of state law in her capacity as Executive Director of the Boston

Public Health Commission. She is sued in her official capacity and, for purposes of the claim

under G.L. c. 12, § 11H, in her personal capacity.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

16. The situation at Mass & Cass has been brewing for years and is a manifestation of

the housing, substance use disorder, and mental illness crises that have upended the lives of

countless individuals and families in the City of Boston and across the Commonwealth and the

nation. The COVID-19 pandemic has only made matters worse—in some cases, layering on top

of, and accelerating, an existing crisis, and in others, creating a whole new plight for individuals

and families to navigate.

6
 
 
 17. Marginalized and shunned by mainstream society and with nowhere else to go,

Plaintiffs and those similarly situated have encamped at Mass & Cass. As of last week, the

encampment consisted of approximately 150 tents and an estimated 350 people. Plaintiffs and

those similarly situated encamp in the area because they cannot stay in most homeless shelters and,

in some cases, receive health care, such as substance use treatment.

18. There is a well-documented lack of affordable housing in Boston and available

shelter space is limited. On any given night, the City may not have sufficient shelter space to

adequately house its homeless or unsheltered population. Moreover, and just as importantly,

congregate shelters are not viable options for many people, including because of their individual

medical and family needs.

19. Congregate shelters not only generally require abstinence and prohibit the

possession of controlled substances and harm reduction items—thereby effectively banning

individuals suffering with active substance use disorder—but the congregate nature of such

shelters is also often inconsistent with the needs of people with other physical and mental health

disabilities as well.

20. For example, as noted by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, PTSD can cause

a person to be startled by loud noises, to have difficulty sleeping, and to fear crowds because they

feel dangerous.5 These symptoms can render a congregate shelter non-viable for people with

diagnosed PTSD like Ronnie Geddes and AC, whose PTSD is frequently activated when in close

quarters with others.

 
5
See PTSD: National Center for PTSD, U.S. Dep’t of Vets. Affs.,
https://www.ptsd.va.gov/understand/what/ptsd_basics.asp.
7
 
 
 21. In addition, as recognized by the CDC, people who are HIV positive are more likely

to become severely ill with COVID-19.6 Indeed, the World Health Organization has concluded

“HIV infection is a significant independent risk factor for both severe/critical COVID-19

presentation at hospital admission and in-hospital mortality. Overall, nearly a quarter (23.1%) of

all people living with HIV who were hospitalized with COVID-19 died.”7 As a result, for some

people with who are HIV-positive, like RAR, congregate shelters are not viable options because

they pose too great a risk of COVID-19 infection. 8

22. In addition, congregate shelters are not viable for other homeless people because,

for instance, such shelters: (i) generally do not allow couples of different sex to stay together, (ii)

may prohibit some people based on occurrences during their prior stays; and (iii) provide only

night-time shelter, requiring people to leave during the day.

The Mayor’s Executive Order & Implementing Protocol

23. On October 19, 2021, Defendant Janey, in her capacity as the Acting Mayor of

Boston, issued an “Executive Order Establishing a Coordinated Response to Public Health and

 
6
See People with Certain Medical Conditions, CDC (Oct. 14, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-with-medical-
conditions.html.
7
See WHO Warns That HIV Infection Increases Risk of Severe and Critical COVID-19, WHO
(July 15, 2021), https://www.who.int/news/item/15-07-2021-who-warns-that-hiv-infection-
increases-risk-of-severe-and-critical-covid-19.
8
Noting the recent outbreak of 113 new cases of HIV that has mainly erupted among people
without homes who are using drugs in Boston, the medical director of the Boston Public Health
Commission Dr. Jennifer José Lo stated “[i]t is astounding that we have as many cases as we do”
and underscored “[i]t’s impacting a community that is already encountering many significant
challenges.” Felice Freyer, Health Officials Struggle to Contain Boston HIV Outbreak, The
Boston Globe (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/04/20/metro/health-officials-
struggle-contain-boston-hiv-outbreak/
 
8
 
 
Encampments in the City of Boston.” Ex. A. This was issued on the same day the Boston Public

Health Commission issued a “Temporary Order Relative to Substance Use Disorder, Unsheltered

Homeless, and Related Issues in the City of Boston.” Ex. B. Following the Executive Order’s

directive, nine days later the City released the “Boston Homeless Encampment Liaison Protocol

as of October 28, 2021.” Ex. C.

24. Together, the Executive Order and the Protocol emphasize that the threat of

criminal enforcement undergirds the City’s displacement policies and detail the City’s approach

for directing the displaced to alternative housing and for handling their property.

A) Criminal Enforcement

25. The Executive Order “dictate[s] that tents and temporary shelters will no longer be

allowed on the public ways in the City of Boston.” The Order does not define the term “temporary

shelter.”

26. It further makes clear that these displacement activities will be effectuated against

the threat of arrest and prosecution, and mandates that “all City agencies will now prioritize

enforcement of existing laws and the exercise of existing powers to prevent the placement and

maintenance of these encampments in the [C]ity.” Ex. A, at II(1).

27. Moreover, both the Executive Order and the Protocol clearly provide that a person’s

refusal to remove their belongings “may be considered disorderly conduct and subject to

enforcement of the existing laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.” Ex. A., at V(D)(i)(3);

Ex. C, at II(3).

B) Alternative Housing and Property

28. The Executive Order explicitly “recognize[s] that unsheltered individuals have a

property interest in their belongings;” states that prior to any enforcement actions the City will

9
 
 
“give people appropriate notice and the opportunity to remove their tent; offer individuals

substance use and mental health treatment; and offer people alternative shelter,” and requires that

the “Protocol will clearly state that no City of Boston employee will require an unsheltered

individual to remove their encampment from public property unless there is shelter available for

that individual.” Ex. A, at 4 (emphasis added).

29. In response, the Protocol created a Coordinated Response Team (“CRT”) to execute

displacements pursuant to two different procedures, referred to as “the Standard Site Resolution

Protocol” (“Standard Protocol”) and the “Immediate Site Resolution Protocol” (“Immediate

Protocol”). Ex. C.

i) Standard Protocol.

30. The Standard Protocol requires City employees to post notices at least 48 hours

before people at an impacted encampment location must remove their tents or other temporary

shelters from City property. Ex. C, at 3–4.

31. The notices are supposed to provide information, including contact numbers and

addresses, about agencies that provide a range of recovery support services and shelter and housing

services, specifically where the City has identified shelter beds, low-threshold housing options, or

other reserved shelter options. Ex. C, at 4.

32. In the circumstance where a person is precluded from accessing an identified shelter

due to active substance use, the Standard Protocol purports to require City employees to offer the

individual the option of seeking treatment before displacing the individual. Ex. C, at 4.

Specifically, the Standard Protocol states “[w]here an individual may have barriers that preclude

compliance with rules and requirements related to certain housing and shelter placements, the

individual must have been offered the opportunity to go to any available low-threshold housing or

10
 
 
other shelter, to enter an inpatient detoxification program, or to engage in other drug treatment

programming at least 48 hours before being required to move.” Ex. C, at 5.

33. The Standard Protocol does not define “low-threshold housing or other shelter” and

does not clarify that a person must be offered a low-threshold option if they are not ready to enter

treatment.

34. The Standard Protocol does not include a process to identify or accommodate those

people who cannot use congregate shelters because of disabilities other than substance use

disorder.

35. If an individual refuses to remove their belongings when ordered, the Standard

Protocol expressly authorizes BPD officers to arrest the non-compliant individual for disorderly

conduct. Ex. C, at 6.

36. For displaced individuals wishing to retain their personal property, the Standard

Protocol specifies that only “Eligible Property” that fits within a 27-gallon bin can be stored, unless

it is “a functional, empty, and disassembled tent … contained in a bag or neatly tied bundle,” “[a]

non-commercial and functional bicycle, walker, crutches, other forms of individual motorized

transit such as a mobility scooter, or a wheelchair not clearly identified as property of a medical

facility,” or items such as identification papers, eyeglasses, prescription medication, or jewelry.

Ex. C, at 7.

37. An item is ineligible for storage if it is, among other things, wet (unless removal

occurs while raining) or deemed unsafe to store by City officials—a category including “locked or

sealed containers.” Ex. C, at 7–8. All unattended items are subject to immediate disposal at the

scheduled time of the “cleanup.” Ex. C, at 8. The Standard Protocol leaves the determination as

11
 
 
to what is considered “Eligible Property” to the discretion of “the relevant staff member.” Ex. C,

at 7.

38. For property deemed eligible, the Standard Protocol states that it must be moved

into storage prior to the scheduled cleanup date,9 and individuals will have 90 days from the date

of storage to retrieve it. Ex. C, at 8. Under the Standard Protocol, information about the

availability of storage for eligible property must be given at least 48 hours in advance of a

displacement action. Ex. C, at 4; see also Ex. C, at 6. Individuals can also contact the City to

arrange storage options. Ex. C, at 8.

ii) Immediate Protocol

39. The Immediate Protocol allows city employees to immediately remove

individuals and destroy their property without any prior notice if the CRT determines the

property “poses an imminent risk to public health, safety, or security.” Ex. C, at 6.

40. Under these circumstances, the Immediate Protocol does not require the City to

provide any alternative housing options. Ex. C, at 6.

41. The Immediate Protocol does not include criteria to define or limit an “imminent

risk.”

The City’s Enforcement Actions Pursuant to the Executive Order

42. After the issuance of the Executive Order but before the issuance of the Protocol,

the City and its agents began dispersing people encamped at Mass & Cass under threat of arrest,

and destroying many of their possessions, contrary to basic constitutional guarantees.

 
9
Per the Standard Protocol, the City will only provide “at least one 27-gallon storage container
for use of storing Eligible Property” on “the morning of a scheduled clean-up.” Ex. C, at 8.
12
 
 
 43. On or about October 23, 2021, paper signs were posted by the City at and near

Plaintiff Mr. Geddes’s tent informing residents in the area—in English only—that they needed to

remove all of their possessions by Monday, October 25. But, of course, since he and others had

no viable options for going anywhere else and no way to move all of their possessions in only 48

hours, Mr. Geddes and others remained.

44. On October 25, against the background threat of arrest, the City conducted sweeps

and ordered people to vacate their encampment sites at Mass & Cass. BPHC personnel, with the

assistance of the Executive Director of the local business association, directed the action, with

BPD officers in the background. On information and belief, the City did so without providing

adequate alternative housing. For example, the City failed to institute any process to determine

whether a congregate shelter, even if available, might be unsuitable for an affected person. Further,

the City unlawfully seized, discarded, and destroyed unabandoned personal property.

45. For example, City officials approached Plaintiff Mr. Geddes and told him he would

need to leave his shelter. Without inquiring about his individual circumstances, City officials told

him that he could go to Pine Street Inn and that, if he did, he could store some of his personal

belongings in a plastic bin. However, Pine Street Inn is not a suitable shelter for Mr. Geddes for

a variety of reasons, including his PTSD. Mr. Geddes has stayed at Pine Street Inn once before,

where he was given a mattress to sleep within inches next to another person. Because of concerns

about COVID-19, Mr. Geddes is concerned about staying close to people, including those who

may not be vaccinated. Mr. Geddes is also concerned as he knows that sexual assaults sometimes

occur in shelters. Due to his past history being sexually abused as a child, this triggers his PTSD.

After Mr. Geddes explained he could not stay at Pine Street, City officials took back the offer of

13
 
 
the bin and storage. City workers did not displace him that day and moved on to approach others

living nearby.

46. Other people were not given any reprieve. On information and belief, on October

25, the City ordered a large number of people to vacate their encampments at Mass & Cass despite

being offered no alternative housing options other than being told to go to the Pine Street Shelter.

The City implemented no process to determine whether Pine Street was a suitable shelter for

people with underlying medical conditions.

47. Further, on information and belief, on October 25, the City unlawfully seized,

discarded, and destroyed people’s personal property. For example, any personal property that did

not fit into a small City-provided plastic bin was thrown into a City trash truck. In addition, even

though the removal occurred in the rain, on information and belief, City representatives refused to

permit storage of any personal possessions that were wet.

48. Additional enforcement activities occurred on October 28. Without any additional

advance notice beyond what if any had been given for the October 25 action, persons at Mass &

Cass were forced to leave their encampments under threat of arrest, according to an eyewitness of

the events. With police officers not far away and a BPD transport van parked nearby, people were

ordered to vacate their encampment sites. Upon information and belief, the City did not provide

affected people with any specific housing options other than informing them that they could go to

“a shelter.” As before, other than what people could carry by hand if they were physically present,

the property of affected people was seized and thrown into the City trash truck. Upon information

and belief, no small plastic bins and no storage options were offered.

49. When City officials arrived at the Mass & Cass area on October 28, Mr. Geddes

was at the methadone clinic for his prescribed treatment. When he returned to his tent site, all his

14
 
 
possessions except a wet blanket, a few clothes, and a hockey stick had been seized and discarded

in a City trash truck. Without inquiring about his individual circumstances, Boston Public Health

Commission employees—told him that he could only go to Pine Street. Those BPHC employees

did not confirm whether beds were in fact available at the Pine Street Inn men’s shelter, nor did

they even ask whether there were any barriers, such as his PTSD, that would make such an option

not viable for him. Mr. Geddes observed similar conduct by the City involving others at Mass &

Cass who were similarly situated to Mr. Geddes.

50. The paper signs posted before each of these removal actions were only in English,

even though numerous people living in the area, like Plaintiff Mr. RAR, read limited English.

51. By the evening of Friday, October 29, more English-only paper signs were posted

near certain encampments located close to 112 Southampton Street that residents would be forced

to leave at or after 7 a.m. Monday, November 1, 2021. However, many of the paper signs had

disappeared by Saturday morning – possibly because they had been destroyed in the pouring rain.

52. On November 1, a substantial displacement action occurred on Southampton Street.

This action was much more intensive than the October 25 and October 28 enforcement actions and

seemingly aligned with the opening of the new “Jail-Court” at the Suffolk County House of

Correction.10 Large numbers of BPHC employees—including BPHC police officers—were

present, along with large numbers of BPD officers.

 
10
On October 30, 2021, Chief Justice Roberto Ronquillo Jr issued a standing order that
“[e]ffective November 1, 2021, all BMC criminal cases involving defendants arrested on
warrants or criminal charges in the area commonly known as ‘Mass and Cass,’ as well as all
BMC mental health cases initiated pursuant to G.L. c. 123 where the Respondent is apprehended
in the Mass & Cass area, shall be heard in the BMC Community Response Session” in the
Suffolk County House of Correction. BMC Admin Order 01-21; 02-21.
15
 
 
 53. The City employees approached people at approximately 15 different tent sites and

directed them to leave the area. Many people were told that their only housing option was to go

to one of the congregate shelters at Pine Street, Woods-Mullen or Southampton Street. There was

no apparent process for determining whether individual people might be unsuited for or unable to

stay in congregate shelters, or to adjust housing suggestions based on what people told City

employees about their individual needs.

54. On November 1, the City seized, discarded, and summarily destroyed large

amounts of personal property. Initially, the BPHC staff had 27-gallon bins that the targeted people

could potentially use to store the few items that might fit, but those who told City representatives

that they could not go to the congregate shelters were told they could not use the bins. Whatever

personal belongings they could not carry away by hand was thrown into the street and picked up

by City workers, presumably for disposal.

55. Mr. RAR and Ms. AC’s tent was located in an area in which signs were posted

(only in English) indicating it would be the target of removals on November 1.11 To avoid their

possessions being taken, on October 31, Mr. RAR and Ms. AC packed up and hid their tent, put

their belongings in a friend’s tent, and slept outside of it in the open. On the afternoon of November

1, City officials, who appeared to be BPHC and BPD employees, descended on the area of the tent

where Mr. RAR and Ms. AC were staying. The City officials ordered Mr. RAR and Ms. AC to

leave the area and informed them that their possessions were being removed. Despite being

informed that Mr. RAR and Ms. AC had no place to store their possessions, City officials did not

present any storage options to Mr. RAR and Ms. AC. Ms. AC quickly salvaged a couple of

personal belongings as City employees and their agents seized the tent and all that was in it. Other

 
11
Only as of November 1 did the City begin posting paper signs of pending removal in Spanish.
16
 
 
items were thrown into the street and picked up for disposal. Among the items of Mr. RAR and

Ms. AC that were destroyed by the City were Mr. RAR and Ms. AC’s birth certificates, Social

Security cards, and copies of other forms of identification.

56. No immediate housing options other than congregate shelter were suggested to Ms.

AC or Mr. RAR. Further, the couple was informed that there were no options that would allow

them to remain together.

57. After they were displaced, Ms. AC and Mr. RAR remained in the Mass & Cass area

on November 1 because they had nowhere else to go. Because they were afraid of arrest, they did

not put up the tent that they had saved and instead stayed out in the open, without any shelter, all

night. The couple believes that safety in the area has deteriorated with the tents gone, the loss of

communal protection from the encampments, and people just wandering around.

58. Mr. Geddes, Ms. AC and Mr. RAR were all displaced by the Defendants without

being afforded any practically available and appropriate sheltering option. They have each seen

their property seized and summarily destroyed. They are all extremely anxious and frightened

about what will happen to them in the future.

59. Co-incident with plans to force people out of Mass & Cass, the City has stated that

it will arrest people with open warrants in the area. As a result of these pronouncements, people

living in the area—who often do not know whether they have outstanding warrants, since many

do not receive summonses or other written notice of court hearings precisely because of their

homelessness—are living in fear of being seized at any time.

60. These fears are well-founded. On Monday, November 1, 2021, three men arrested

during the sweep at Mass & Cass were taken before the “Jail-Court.” According to media reports,

17
 
 
only one person was sent to a treatment center; the other two were reportedly forced to undergo

withdrawal in jail.12 .

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

61. Pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiffs assert claims for declaratory and

injunctive relief on behalf of a class of all similarly situated individuals. Plaintiffs seek to represent

the following class:

All persons who, on or after October 19, 2021, are or were residing
in tents or other temporary structures in the Mass & Cass area and
who have been or will be subject to City-authorized actions to force
them to leave, whether pursuant to the Executive Order or otherwise.

62. Numerosity: This class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

According to a recent survey, the City estimated that approximately 350 individuals were at Mass

& Cass, with about 85% of the people reporting that they slept on the street the night before the

survey. Joinder is impracticable in that the putative class is inherently transitory, particularly given

the impact of the challenged actions.

63. Commonality: The relief sought is common to all putative members of the class in

that all members seek relief from the City’s policies and practices for forcibly displacing people

experiencing homelessness in Boston.

64. There are questions of law and/or fact common to the class:

i. Whether Defendants’ policies and practices for forcibly displacing

people experiencing homelessness in Boston, which are

implemented under threat of arrest and prosecution, criminalize

 
12
Tonya Alanez, ‘We Have to do Something’: Special Courts Launched to Hear Cases for Those
Arrested Near Mass. And Cass, The Boston Globe (Nov. 1, 2021),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/11/01/metro/special-courts-mass-cass-begin-hearing-cases/.
18
 
 
 unhoused people for sleeping in public when there are no viable

alternative shelter options, and therefore constitute punishment of

Plaintiffs and putative class members based on their status as

homeless persons and, as such, subject them to cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution and art. 26;

ii. Whether Defendants’ policies and practices for forcibly displacing

people experiencing homelessness in Boston discriminates against

Plaintiffs and putative class members on the basis of their

disabilities, and as such, violates federal and state discrimination

laws;

iii. Whether Defendants are unlawfully seizing or discarding

Plaintiffs’ property in violation of the United States and

Massachusetts Constitutions;

iv. Whether the Defendants and those acting as their agents or in

concert with them have violated or are violating the Massachusetts

Civil Rights Act in that they have designed and are participating

in actions that constitute “threats, intimidation or coercion” which

interfere or attempt to interfere with rights secured by state or

federal law;

65. Typicality: The claims of the representative parties are typical of the class in that

their claims arise out of the same course of conduct, namely the City’s policies and practices for

forcibly displacing people experiencing homelessness in Boston.

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 66. Additionally, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 23(b), the common questions of law

predominate over any questions affecting individual members. Specifically, the predominant

question in this case is whether the City’s policies and practices for forcibly displacing people

experiencing homelessness in Boston, and to seize and dispose of their property without adequate

notice, violates federal and state law and the Massachusetts and United States Constitutions.

Moreover, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 23(b), a class action is superior to other methods for a fair

and efficient adjudication of this matter. There is no realistic alternative for members of the

putative class to bring their claims. As unhoused people, members of the putative class are unlikely

to be able to retain counsel or file a claim pro se.

67. Adequacy: The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of

class members, in that all share the same interest in remaining free from harassment, threats, abuse,

fine, arrest, imprisonment, or the unlawful seizure and/or destruction of their property at the hands

of the City for remaining on public land.

68. The named Plaintiffs and the putative class are represented by the American Civil

Liberties Union of Massachusetts and the law firm of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr.

Plaintiffs’ counsel are experienced in class action litigation and will adequately represent the class.

CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT ONE:
Violation of Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment
(Eighth Amendment; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Article 26 of the Declaration of Rights and/or state
common law

69. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

70. Defendants have acted and continue to act under color of state law, and within the

course and scope of their employment, at all times relevant to the allegations in this Complaint.

71. Defendants are “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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 72. Plaintiffs and putative class members are under threat of arrest and prosecution if

they do not leave their encampments at Mass & Cass, even though the City has no process to

identify for them a concrete, alternative housing option that is practically available to them.

73. Wielding the threat of arrest and criminal prosecution to force displacements of

those who live on the streets and who have no actually available, viable alternative housing options

violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses of the state and federal constitutions and

Massachusetts common law.

74. The City’s policies and practices that forcibly displace Plaintiffs and members of

the class violate the Eighth Amendment, as incorporated in and applied to the states through, the

Fourteenth Amendment. Such actions also violate Article 26 of the Declaration of Rights and

Massachusetts common law. Plaintiffs seek redress for Defendants’ violation of their right to be

free from cruel and unusual punishment. Without the injunctive relief sought, Plaintiffs and others

similarly situated will be forced to leave Mass & Cass with no adequate alternative shelter—or be

arrested.

COUNT TWO:
Disability Discrimination
(42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and art. 114 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts
Constitution)

75. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous paragraphs and allegations as if fully rewritten

herein and further state as follows:

76. Under Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”): “[N]o qualified

individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be … denied the benefits of the

services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such

entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Art. 114 of the Amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution

enshrines the same protections in state law.

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 77. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants, their employees and agents, were

public entities within the meaning of Title II of the ADA and provided programs or services to the

general public including Plaintiffs or engaged in activities that impact the Plaintiffs.

78. The Defendants do not have a meaningful, individualized process by which, prior

to displacing Plaintiffs or other members of the putative class, they can and do:

i. Evaluate whether the person potentially being targeted for displacement is a

qualified individual with a disability;

ii. If so, identify whether that person’s disability-related needs render a

congregate shelter or other generally available alternatives non-viable for

them;

iii. If so, identify alternatives that meet the person’s disability-related needs that

are available on the day of the proposed displacement; and

iv. If no such options exist, refrain from displacing that person.

79. As a result of the failure to implement any such process, Defendants are failing to

identify alternative housing options prior to displacement that are actually viable for individuals,

including the named Plaintiffs, given congregate shelters cannot accommodate their particular

disabilities.

80. A large percentage of unhoused individuals suffer from some form of disability,

whether physical, cognitive, or psychological. Defendants knew, or should have known, of the

prevalence of significant disabilities among the individuals they are targeting for displacement and

that these disabilities render certain otherwise available housing options inappropriate for them.

81. Defendants committed and are committing the acts and omissions alleged herein

with intent and/or reckless disregard for the rights of the Plaintiffs and putative class members.

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 82. The Defendants’ failure to identify the disabilities of people targeted for

displacement and to identify appropriate housing alternatives necessary to accommodate the

individual person’s disability related needs before displacing them constitutes disability

discrimination, including because it (a) constitutes a failure to reasonably accommodate the needs

of those with disabilities, (b) applies eligibility requirements for the benefit of alternative housing

that screens out those with disabilities, and (c) applies a method of administration that

discriminates against those with disabilities, in violation of state and federal disability

discrimination laws, including Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102 and 12131(2); 28 C.F.R.

§ 35.130 and Amendment 114 of the Massachusetts Constitution.

83. As a result of Defendants’ acts and omissions, Plaintiffs have suffered injury and

are at substantial risk of continuing to suffer injury to their statutory rights, their persons and

property.

84. Named Plaintiffs are entitled to compensatory damages, damages according to the

provisions of the ADA, and attorneys’ fees.

85. Plaintiffs are further entitled to injunctive relief precluding removal under the threat

of citation or arrest without adequate processes to guarantee adequate shelter practically available

to Plaintiffs. Without the injunctive relief sought, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated will be

forced to leave Mass & Cass with no adequate alternative shelter—or be arrested.

COUNT THREE:
Unreasonable Search and Seizure
(42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and Article 14 of the
Declaration of Rights)

86. Plaintiffs incorporate all previous paragraphs and allegations as if fully rewritten

herein and further state as follows:

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 87. Defendants acted and are acting under color of state law, and within the course and

cope of their employment, at all times relevant to the allegations in this Complaint.

88. Defendants are “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

89. Under the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth

Amendment, Plaintiffs and the putative class have a constitutionally protected right to be secure

in their persons against unreasonable seizures. Article 14 of the Declaration of Rights under the

Massachusetts Constitution enshrines the same protections in state law.

90. During the October 25, October 28, and November 1 displacement actions at Mass

& Cass, Plaintiffs’ property was not abandoned and it was clear to Defendants that Plaintiffs’

property was not abandoned.

91. By seizing and destroying Plaintiffs’ property, Defendants and/or those acting

under their direction and control meaningfully and permanently interfered with Plaintiffs’

possessory interest in their property and unlawfully seized Plaintiffs’ property.

92. Plaintiffs’ right not to have their property seized and destroyed was clearly

established, and reasonable officials in Defendants’ position would have known that their actions

against Plaintiff’s property violated the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article

14 of the Declaration of Rights under the Massachusetts Constitution. Defendants would also have

known that such conduct violates Article 14 of the Declaration of Rights under the Massachusetts

Constitution.

93. Defendants’ actions were authorized before and during the fact, and ratified after

the fact, by final policymakers for Boston.

94. Defendants’ actions, as described herein, were motivated by malice and/or involved

reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights, and Defendants

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engaged in these actions and omissions intentionally, willfully, and/or wantonly, demonstrating

deliberate indifference to, and a reckless disregard for, Plaintiffs’ rights protected under the federal

and state constitutions.

95. As a direct and proximate cause and consequence of Defendants’ unconstitutional

acts and omissions, described above, Plaintiffs suffered injuries, damages, and losses.

96. The herein described acts or omissions of Defendants are the moving force and the

legal, direct, and proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries and losses, including but not limited to

non-economic damages, economic damages, the physical and mental pain and anguish Plaintiffs

suffered before and during the sweeps, and other compensatory and special damages.

97. Without the injunctive relief sought, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated will be

subject to the unlawful seizure and destruction of their personal property, in violation of their rights

under the state and federal constitutions.

COUNT FOUR:
Deprivation of Property Without Due Process
(42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and the
due process clause of the state constitution)

98. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set

forth herein.

99. Defendants acted and are acting under color of state law, and within the course and

scope of their employment, at all times relevant to the allegations in this Complaint.

100. Defendants are “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

101. Plaintiffs had a property interest in their possessions.

102. Plaintiffs had a property interest in their property, and an interest in being afforded

adequate notice prior to the seizure of their property, and adequate notice regarding the storage of

their property and how to reclaim it.

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 103. The due process clauses of both the state and federal constitutions require state and

local actors provide adequate advance written notice before forcing individuals to vacate. They

also require that these individuals’ property cannot be seized and/or destroyed without affording a

reasonable opportunity for them to reclaim their property.

104. The procedures established by the Executive Order and Protocol and otherwise

being implemented at Mass & Cass by city employees and other agents of the Defendants do not

comport with these fundamental requirements on their face and as-applied.

105. Defendants seized and destroyed Plaintiffs’ property without affording them

adequate advance notice that their property would be seized and/or destroyed.

106. Defendants seized and destroyed Plaintiffs’ property without affording them a pre-

deprivation process for challenging the seizure of their property.

107. Defendants seized and destroyed Plaintiffs’ property without affording them an

adequate amount of time or location to which they could move their property and/or assistance in

moving it, to avoid it being seized.

108. Defendants seized and destroyed Plaintiffs’ property without affording them an

adequate post-deprivation process for challenging the seizure of their property.

109. Defendants did not seize Plaintiffs’ property in connection with the prosecution or

investigation of any crime.

110. By seizing and destroying Plaintiffs’ property, Defendants meaningfully and

permanently interfered with Plaintiffs’ possessory interest in their property and destroyed

Plaintiffs’ property without due process of law.

111. Plaintiffs’ right to not have their property unlawfully seized and destroyed without

due process of law was clearly established, and a reasonable official in Defendants’ position would

26
 
 
have known that seizing and destroying property without due process of law violates the due

process clauses of both the state and federal constitutions.

112. Defendants’ actions were authorized before and during the fact and ratified after

the fact by final policymakers for Boston.

113. Defendants’ actions, as described herein, were motivated by malice and/or involved

reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ federally and state protected rights, and Defendants

engaged in these actions and omissions intentionally, willfully, and/or wantonly, demonstrating

deliberate indifference to, and a reckless disregard for, Plaintiffs’ rights protected under the federal

and state constitutions.

114. As a direct and proximate cause and consequence of Defendants’ unconstitutional

acts and omissions, described above, Plaintiffs suffered injuries, damages, and losses.

115. The herein described acts or omissions of Defendants are the moving force and the

legal, direct, and proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries and losses, including but not limited to

non-economic damages, economic damages, the physical and mental pain and anguish Plaintiffs

suffered before and during the sweeps, and other compensatory and special damages.

116. Without the injunctive relief sought, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated will be

subject to the unlawful seizure and destruction of their personal property pursuant to the Mayor’s

Executive Order, in violation of their rights under the state and federal constitutions.

COUNT FIVE:
(The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act – G.L. c. 12, §11I)

117. The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H and 11I (“MCRA”) forbids

any person from interfering or attempting to interfere with rights secured by state or federal law

by means of threats, intimidation or coercion. Implicitly or explicitly threatening to arrest and

27
 
 
prosecute people if they do not act contrary to their rights constitutes threats, intimidation or

coercion.

118. By threatening to arrest and prosecute people who do not leave encampments and

seizing and destroying their property, notwithstanding they have nowhere else to stay where their

needs, including their disability-related needs and familial relationships, will be accommodated,

the Defendants, by their own actions and by the actions of their employees and agents are violating

the MCRA.

PRAYERS FOR RELIEF

Plaintiffs therefore respectfully request that the Court enter judgment in their favor and

against each of the Defendants, and award them all relief allowed by law and equity, including but

not limited to the following:

1. A declaration that the Defendants’ policies and practices of forcibly displacing people

experiencing homelessness through the threat of arrest and prosecution, without first

implementing any meaningful or individualized process to ensure that the people being

forcibly displaced actually have access to practically available housing that can

accommodate their needs at the time of displacement, is unconstitutional, both facially and

as applied.;

2. A declaration that Defendants and their employees and agents may not displace people

from Mass & Cass under threat of arrest and prosecution unless and until the City

a. has a process in place to

i. evaluate whether the person potentially being targeted for displacement is

a qualified individual with a disability;

28
 
 
 ii. if so, identify whether that person’s disability-related needs render a

congregate shelter or other potential alternatives non-viable;

iii. if so, identify alternatives that meet the person’s disability-related needs that

will be available on the day of the proposed displacement; and

iv. if no such options exist, refrain from displacing that person and

b. appropriate advance notice and property storage policies are in place.

3. A declaration that the Defendants are unlawfully seizing and destroying Plaintiffs’

property.

4. An order certifying the class defined herein pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 23;

5. An order appointing the named Plaintiffs as class representatives and their undersigned

counsel as class counsel;

6. Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunctive Relief, including:

a. A short order of notice for a hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary

Injunction;

b. A Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction that restrain the

Defendants, pending further Order of the Court, from taking any further actions to

(i) displace people residing on public ways in the Mass & Cass area or (ii) seize

and destroy the property of people residing on public ways in the Mass & Cass area

in violation of law;

c. A Preliminary Injunction that requires the Defendants to allow people who have

been displaced from Mass & Cass on or after October 19, 2021 to return and remain,

unless and until Defendants identify alternative housing arrangements that take into

account their individual needs.  

29
 
 
 7. An award of monetary damages to Plaintiffs Ronald Geddes, AC and RAR.

8. An award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs Plaintiffs’ counsel;

9. Such other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: November 4, 2021 Respectfully submitted,13

  /s/ Kevin S. Prussia

Matthew R. Segal (BBO #654489) Kevin S. Prussia (BBO #666813)

Ruth A. Bourquin (BBO #552985) Arjun K. Jaikumar (BBO #691311)
Jessie J. Rossman (BBO #670685) Justin R. Metz (BBO #705658)
Jessica J. Lewis (BBO #704229) WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION HALE AND DORR LLP
FOUNDATION OF MASSACHUSETTS, INC. 60 State Street
211 Congress Street Boston, MA 02109
Boston, MA 02110 Tel: (617) 526-6000
(617) 482-3170 Fax: (617) 526-5000
msegal@aclum.org kevin.prussia@wilmerhale.com
rbourquin@aclum.org arjun.jaikumar@wilmerhale.com
jrossman@aclum.org justin.metz@wilmerhale.com
jlewis@aclum.org
Brittany R. Warren (pro hac vice
forthcoming)
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP
1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20006
Tel: (202) 663-6772
Fax: (202) 663-6363
brittany.warren@wilmerhale.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

 
13
 Verifications from the plaintiffs will be submitted in a separate filing.   
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