High Court Approved Judgment: Leech J SRA v Khan BL-2021-001519 & BL-2021-001684

BL-2021-001519 & BL-2021 -001684

Neutral Citation Number: [2022] EWHC 45 (Ch)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES

Wednesday 12th January 2022

Before:

MR JUSTICE LEECH
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B E T W E E N:

SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY Claimant

LIMITED

- and –

(1) SOOPHIA KHAN Defendant

(2) SOPHIE KHAN & CO LIMITED
(3) JUST FOR PUBLIC LIMITED

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---------------------

MR RUPERT ALLEN (instructed by Capsticks Solicitors LLP) appeared on behalf of the

Claimant
MR TIMOTHY GREY (instructed by Janes Solicitors LLP) appeared on behalf of the First
Defendant.

Hearing dates: 17 December 2021

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APPROVED JUDGMENT
I direct that no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of
this version as handed down may be treated as authentic

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 High Court Approved Judgment: Leech J SRA v Khan BL-2021-001519 & BL-2021-001684

Mr Justice Leech:

A. The Application

1. This is the judgment of the court following the hearing of two applications for an
order for the committal of the First Defendant on the basis that she failed to comply
with two orders dated 7 September 2021 and 21 September 2021. It was a hybrid
hearing with counsel, solicitors and the First Defendant present before the court in
the Royal Courts of Justice. It was listed for hearing in the court list and access was
also given by video link with an opportunity for any interested person to access the
hearing by CVP link. It was accordingly a public hearing in conformity with CPR
Part 81.8(1).

B. Background

2. The background to the present application is set out in the second and third
affidavits of Ms Claire Crawford, a solicitor in the firm Capsticks Solicitors LLP
(“Capsticks”), which I now summarise. The Claimant (the “SRA”) exercises the
regulatory functions and powers conferred on the Law Society including its powers
under the Solicitors Act 1974 to suspend solicitors and to intervene in their
practices. Until June 2021 the SRA exercised those powers and functions as a
delegated body. Since 1 June 2021, however, it has been a separate legal entity and
has been entitled to exercise all of those powers in its own right.

3. The First Defendant, Ms Khan, was admitted to the Roll of Solicitors on 1

November 2006. Until the intervention of the SRA she was a solicitor advocate and
the sole principal and director of the Second Defendant (the “Firm”). Until 17
September 2021 the Firm’s head office and registered address was at 9 Portland
Towers Portland House Leicester LE2 2PG. It had also registered a branch office
at Wimbledon Village Business Centre Thornton Road Wimbledon SW19 4NG. On
17 September 2021 the Firm moved its registered office to the First Floor Flat 8
Ridgway Wimbledon SW19 4QN. This address was recorded as Ms Khan’s
residential address in her “My SRA Account”.

4. On 19 August 2021 an adjudication panel of the SRA (consisting of three members)

issued a decision in which it recorded that it had decided to intervene in Ms Khan’s
practice on the grounds: first, that there was reason to suspect dishonesty in
connection with the Firm’s business; and, secondly, that she had failed to comply
with the SRA Principles 2011 and 2019 and the SRA Accounts Rules 2011 and
2019. In particular:

(1) The panel exercised the power under paragraphs 6(1) and 6(2) of the
Solicitors Act 1974, Schedule 1, Part II to direct that the right to recover and
receive money in connection with the Firm should vest in the Law Society.

(2) It also exercised the power under paragraph 9(1) to appoint a person to take
possession of documents and otherwise to act as the Law Society’s agent in
relation to the intervention.

(3) It also suspended Ms Khan’s practising certificate.

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5. Paragraph 9(1) is of particular importance in the present case. It provides that where
the Law Society’s powers to intervene are exercisable, it may give notice to the
solicitor or her firm requiring the production or delivery to any person appointed of
“all documents in the possession or under the control of the solicitor or his firm in
connection with his practice or former practice or with any trust of which the
solicitor is or was a trustee”. Paragraph 9(4) also provides that the High Court may,
on the application of the Society, order a person required to produce or deliver
documents under paragraph 9(1) to produce or deliver them to the person appointed
by the Society.

6. By letter dated 19 August 2021 the SRA wrote to Ms Khan giving her notice of the
intervention and requiring her to provide all practice documents to the appointed
agent, who was identified at that stage as Ms Victoria Davey of Gordons LLP. The
letter also drew Ms Khan’s attention to her right to apply to the High Court for the
intervention to be withdrawn. Ms Crawford exhibits an attendance note of a
conversation which also took place on 19 August 2021 between Ms Heather
Andersen, the SRA’s Intervention Officer, and Ms Khan in which Ms Khan refused
to attend the Leicester office the following day.

7. In the event Mr John Owen of Gordons was appointed by the SRA as the
intervention agent. By email dated 19 August 2021 Ms Andersen wrote to Ms Khan
confirming the content of their earlier conversation and notifying her that she would
attend the Leicester office on 25 August 2021 to put the intervention into effect. By
email dated 20 August 2021 Ms Anderson informed Ms Khan that the intervention
would take place on 23 August 2021 and that she would be attending the Leicester
office on that day to put the intervention into effect with Mr Owen and a small team
from Gordons.

8. On 23 August 2021 Ms Andersen and Mr Owen went to the Leicester office and
whilst they were waiting outside Ms Andersen sent an email to Ms Khan informing
her that they were there. Gordons’ attendance note of the visit also records that Ms
Andersen and the team from Gordons waited for two hours at the Leicester office
before leaving. By email dated 24 August 2021 Mr Owen wrote to Ms Andersen
confirming that he and his team had also attended the Wimbledon office but found
no sign of Ms Khan.

9. On 27 August 2021 Ms Khan issued a Claim Form under CPR Part 8 for an order
directing that the SRA withdraw the intervention on the grounds that it was
fundamentally flawed and disproportionate. In her witness statement in support of
this application Ms Khan challenged the factual basis of the intervention as
determined by the adjudication panel.

C. The First Order

10. On 27 August 2021 the SRA issued a Claim Form itself under CPR Part 8 and an
Application Notice seeking a final order requiring Ms Khan and the Firm to deliver
up practice documents and for a search and seizure order in relation to the Leicester
office. On 7 September 2021 that application was heard by Adam Johnson J
remotely and Ms Khan attended it by telephone. Whilst on the call she stated that
she was at her residential address. Pages 8 and 9 of the transcript of the hearing on
7 September 2021 also record that when questioned by the judge Ms Khan informed

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him that there was another organisation with which she was connected conducting
reserved activities and that she identified that organisation as the Third Defendant
which I will call “JFP”.

11. The judge made the final order sought by the SRA and I will refer to it as the “First
Order”. The front sheet of the order as sealed contained a penal notice in the
standard form addressed to Ms Khan personally and also addressed to any director
or officer of the Firm. It also contained the following notice to both Defendants:

“This Order is made, in part, pursuant to paragraphs 9(4), 9(5A) and

9(6) of Schedule 1 to the Solicitors Act 1974 (‘Schedule 1’) and
paragraph 32(1) of Schedule 2 to the Administration of Justice Act 1985
and requires you, the Defendants, to deliver up to the Claimant’s
appointed Agent the articles specified in the Order and to allow the
persons mentioned in the Order to enter the premises described in the
Order and to search for, examine and remove the articles specified in
the Order……….If any of you, the Defendants, disobey this Order you
may be found guilty of contempt of court and may be sent to prison or
fined or your assets may be seized.”

12. Paragraphs 1 to 6 of the First Order were headed “Delivery Up of Documents and
Other Items” and I should set them out in full:

“1. Within 3 working days of service of this Order, the First and Second
Defendants must produce or deliver up to the Agent all Listed Items in
their possession or control (including, for the avoidance of doubt, any
emails which are Listed Items that are held by the account for the
following email addresses: sophiek@sophiekhan.co.uk and any other
email addresses used in connection with the Practices in the past 12
months). Unless otherwise agreed in writing with the Agent, the items
must be delivered to the Agent’s Address on a weekday between 9am
and 5pm and the Agent must be given 24 hours’ notice of the date and
time of delivery of the documents, by email to John.Owen
@gordonsllp.com. 2. The First Defendant must provide all necessary
usernames and passwords to give effective access to the Listed Items
that she delivers up to enable them to be searched, accessed and the
contents (or data accessible therefrom) imaged by the Claimant or on
its behalf. 3. If she knows or believes that any of the Listed Items are in
the possession or under the control of any person other than any of the
Defendants, the First Defendant must notify the Agent by e-mail to
John.Owen@gordonsllp.com, identifying such persons (together with
(if known) their addresses and contact information). Further, the First
Defendant shall, on the request of the Agent, deliver to any person in
possession of such Listed Item a letter of authority (in such terms as the
Agent may reasonably require) instructing such persons to produce and
deliver the Document to the Agent. 4. The First Defendant must use all
reasonable endeavours to obtain and provide to the Agent all such
usernames, passwords and other information, as may be necessary to
enable the Agent or members of the Agent’s Team to access the account
relating to the following email address: enquiries@sophiekhan.co.uk.

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The Claimant has liberty to apply to request that further email addresses
be added to this paragraph. 5. If the Defendants are unable to comply
with paragraphs 1 to 4 above within 3 working days of service of this
Order, the First Defendant must serve upon the Agent a signed witness
statement with a statement of truth explaining the steps that she has
taken to comply, why she has been unable to do so and when she will
be able to do so. 6. For the avoidance of doubt, neither Defendant shall
have any obligation to deliver Listed Items to the Agent if they have
already been taken into the possession of the Agent pursuant to the
Search and Seizure provisions below.”

13. Paragraphs 7 to 27 of the First Order contained a search and seizure order,
paragraphs 28 to 30 dealt with the redirection of communications and paragraphs
32 to 38 dealt with interpretation and effect of certain parts. Paragraphs 39 to 42
dealt with service and, again, I should set out the first three paragraphs of those
provisions in full:

“39. The Claimant shall serve this order personally if it is practicable to

do so within two working days of the making of this order. 40. Pursuant
to CPR 6.27 and CPR 81.4, if the Claimant is unable to serve this order
personally pursuant to paragraph 39 above on either or both of the
Defendants, the Claimant shall not be required to serve this order
personally and the Claimant shall instead serve this order: 40.1. By
sending it by first class post (or other service which provides for
delivery on the next business day) to the First Defendant’s residential
address registered with the Claimant under her ‘My SRA’ and to the
Second Defendant’s registered address; and 40.2. By sending a copy of
this order by email to sophiek@sophiekhan.co.uk, which shall be
effective as service on both Defendants. 41. If the Defendants are served
pursuant to paragraph 40 above, they shall be deemed served on the
same day as the e-mail is sent if it is sent on a business day before
4:30pm or in any other case, on the next business day after the day on
which it was sent. If the Claimant is unable to serve by email or receives
a notification that the transmission of the email has been unsuccessful,
then the Defendants shall be deemed served on the second day after the
order was posted, left with, delivered to or collected by the relevant
service provider provided that day is a business day; or if not, the next
business day after that day.”

14. Paragraph 46 of the First Order contained the definitions of defined terms which
had been used in the body of the order. The term “Listed Items” was defined by
reference to Schedule B which stated that the Listed Items should include the
following:

“All Documents and Property including, without limitation: 1. Any files

and the contents thereof relating to present or Former Clients of the
Practices; 2. Any deeds or wills or other documents relating to present
or Former Clients of the Practices; 3. Any ledgers relating to present or
Former Clients of the Practices and all other accounting records relating
to the Practices; 4. Any diaries or appointment books relating to the

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Practices and any other documents in which court dates and deadlines
are recorded by or on behalf of the Defendants; 5. Any logs of telephone
calls, incoming or outgoing correspondence or visits to the Premises
relating to the Practices; 6. Any computer records relating to present or
Former Clients of the Practices and accounting matters relating to their
Practices. 7. Any Computer, hard disk or server used in connection with
the Practice.”

15. On 8 September 2021 the Court sent the First Order to Ms Khan at the email address
identified in paragraph 40.2 which she had used that day to communicate with the
Court. On 9 September 2021 representatives of the SRA, Mr Owen, Capita and a
locksmith went to the Leicester office to execute the First Order. No-one was there
and a sign “Just for Public Limited” which had been identified as next to the door
on their earlier visit on 23 August 2021 had now been removed. The locksmith
gained entry to the premises and found that the office had been cleared. The SRA
and Mr Owen found no practice documents. They also found that lever arch files
which appeared to have contained client documents had been emptied. Having
searched the premises, the party left after sealing the letterbox and taping a notice
of the intervention to the front door. Ms Crawford exhibited a set of photographs
showing the search and ending with the taped letterbox and notice on the front door.

16. On 10 September 2021 process servers attended both the Leicester office and Ms
Khan’s residential address to serve Ms Khan personally. They received no reply at
either address and at each address the process server posted the order through the
letter box with a covering letter and a card with a contact address. Three days later,
on 13 September 2021 a local resident, Mr Nick Farmer, wrote to Mr Owen stating
that the notice and the tape on the letterbox had now been removed. He also
enclosed a photograph confirming the position (which Ms Crawford also exhibited).

17. At the hearing of the contempt applications on 17 December 2017 Ms Khan, who
was represented by both solicitors and counsel, did not challenge any of this
evidence or that she had been properly served in accordance with the provisions of
the First Order either by email or by posting it through the letter box at the Leicester
office or her residential address. But if it is necessary for me to do so, I find that the
First Order was deemed served on Ms Khan on 8 September 2021 by email or,
alternatively, on 14 September 2021 which was the second day after the First Order
was posted.

D. The Second Order

18. On 16 September 2021 the SRA issued a second Claim Form under CPR Part 8 and
a second Application Notice for a final order against all three Defendants requiring
them to deliver up the practice documents and property and also for a search and
seizure order in relation to the Wimbledon office and Ms Khan’s residential
address. On 21 September 2021 that application was heard remotely by Miles J and
without notice to Ms Khan or the other Defendants.

19. Miles J also made the final order requested by the SRA and I will refer to it as the
“Second Order”. The sealed copy contained a penal notice in the same form as the
First Order and addressed to Ms Khan personally and to the directors or officers of

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both the Firm and JFP. It also contained the same notice as I have quoted in
paragraph 11 (above) and paragraphs 1 to 6 of the Second Order were in the same
or substantially the same form as the corresponding paragraphs in the First Order.
Paragraphs 37 to 39 of the Second Order contained the same service provisions as
paragraphs 39 to 41 of the First Order, which I have quoted in paragraph 13 (above),
although the Second Order also permitted service at a second and alternative email
address: legal@justforpublicltd.org.uk. The Listed Items in Schedule B were
defined in the same terms although the term “Practices” which was used in that
schedule was extended to the practice of JFP.

20. On 23 September 2021 two teams of representatives of the SRA and of Mr Owen
went to the Wimbledon office and Ms Khan’s residential address both to execute
and to serve the Second Order. The first team was given access to the Wimbledon
office which was found to be completely empty of anything relating to clients of
the Firm. The second team could not get access to the residential address but could
see that the flat was unoccupied and a local resident informed the party that Ms
Khan lived in Leicester.

21. On 23 September 2021 Capsticks sent the second order by post by special delivery
to the Wimbledon office and to the residential address to comply with its alternative
service provisions and on 24 September 2021 the order and accompanying
documents were delivered and signed for. On 23 September 2021 Capsticks also
sent the second order by email to the email addresses identified in the alternative
service provisions. Ms Crawford’s evidence is that the documents were accessed
using both email accounts.

22. Again, at the hearing on 17 December 2021 Ms Khan did not challenge any of this
evidence or that she had been properly served in accordance with the provisions of
the Second Order either by email or by post using the special delivery service at
both the Wimbledon office or her residential address. At the subsequent hearing of
her applications to set both orders aside on 11 January 2022, Ms Khan argued that
the Second Order had not been properly served. In a witness statement dated 30
December 2021 she accepted that she had been notified of the Second Order by
email on 28 September 2021 but denied that it had been properly served because
neither she nor the Firm accepted service by email. She did not dispute that the
Order had been delivered by post or that it had been signed for.

23. I am satisfied that the Second Order was served on the Defendants in accordance
with paragraph 38 of the Second Order and if it is necessary for me to do so, I find
that the Second Order was deemed served on Ms Khan on 28 September 2021 by
email or, alternatively, on 27 September 2021 which was the second day after the
Second Order was posted by special delivery.

E. The First Set Aside Application

24. By Application Notice dated 16 September 2021 Ms Khan applied to set aside or
vary the First Order. The basis for her application (which I will call the “First Set
Aside Application”) was that on 10 August 2021 Ms Khan had sold her shares in
the Firm and its assets to JFP which had taken over all case matters, the goodwill
and the practising name “Sophie Khan & Co Solicitors and Higher Court
Advocates”. It was also her case that JFP was a not for profit organisation. I heard

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the First Set Aside Application shortly before handing down this approved
judgment and dismissed it for the reasons which I gave in a short ex tempore
judgment.

F. The Contempt Applications

25. By Application Notice dated 1 October 2021 the SRA applied to commit Ms Khan
for breach of the First Order made by Adam Johnson J. The SRA relied only on the
breach of paragraph 1 of the Order and the failure by Ms Khan to deliver up all
Listed Items both personally and in her capacity as a director of the Firm. The SRA
did not rely on any breaches of the section of the First Order relating to the search
of the Leicester office and in this judgment, therefore, I ignore any breaches of those
provisions in considering both whether Ms Khan was in contempt and in assessing
any sanction.

26. By a second Application Notice also dated 1 October 2021 the SRA applied to
commit Ms Khan for breach of the Second Order made by Miles J. Again, the SRA
relied on the breach of paragraph 1 of the Order and the failure by Ms Khan to
deliver up all Listed Items both personally and in her capacity as a director of the
Firm and of JFP. Again, the SRA did not rely on any breaches of the section of the
Second Order relating to the search of the Wimbledon office or the residential
address and in this judgment, therefore, I also ignore any breaches of those
provisions in considering both whether Ms Khan was in contempt and in assessing
any sanction.

27. In her second affidavit sworn on 1 October 2021 Ms Crawford confirmed that Ms
Khan and the Defendants had delivered up no items within the definition of Listed
Items in either the First or Second Order. Ms Khan did not challenge that evidence.
I also note that at no stage before the final hearing of the applications on 17
December 2021 did Ms Khan make a witness statement complying with paragraph
5 of each order explaining the steps which she had taken to comply with it, why she
had been unable to do so and when she would be able to comply.

28. In her third affidavit sworn on 21 October 2021 Ms Crawford dealt with the
attempts made by the SRA to serve the contempt applications. She exhibited a
witness statement made by Mr Philip Richards, a process server, who confirmed
that he had served Ms Khan personally at the Carmarthenshire Coroner’s Court with
a covering letter from Capsticks, the two Application Notices, Ms Crawford’s
second affidavit and the Skeleton Argument in support of the applications. Again,
Ms Khan did not contest this evidence.

29. On 22 October 2021 both the two contempt applications and the set aside
application were listed before Fancourt J. At the hearing the judge informed Ms
Khan of her right to apply for legal aid and to obtain representation. But Ms Khan
declined to exercise that right on the basis that she intended to represent herself.
The judge also proceeded to list all the three applications for a hearing with a
combined time estimate of one day in a three day window beginning on 23
November 2021.

G. The Third Order

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30. On 2 November 2021 the SRA issued a third application, this time to restrain Ms
Khan and JFP from unlawfully carrying on reserved legal activities under the Legal
Services Act 2009. The application was originally listed to be heard on 8 November
2021 but Fancourt J granted a short adjournment. In a witness statement dated 9
November 2021 Ms Khan opposed that application. She gave evidence that JFP was
a not for profit body within the meaning of section 207 of the Legal Services Act
2009 and asserted that she was authorised to carry out reserved legal activities. She
also gave evidence that on 10 August 2021 the Firm had been sold to JFP including
its client portfolio. Finally, she gave evidence of the client matters which she was
continuing to carry out.

31. On 11 November 2021 Fancourt J heard the application and Ms Khan was
represented by counsel. The judge granted an injunction forbidding Ms Khan to
carry out any reserved legal activity whether in her own name or through JFP. She
was also forbidden to hold herself out as being entitled to act as a solicitor or as
being authorised to conduct any reserved legal activity. This order (to which I will
refer as the “Third Order”) is not the subject of the contempt applications either.
Again, I ignore any breaches of the Third Order in considering both whether Ms
Khan was in contempt and in assessing any sanction. But I add that Mr Grey
referred me to the witness statement of Ms Khan which she made in answer to these
applications and that it is important for a reason which I explain (below).

H. The hearing on 23 November 2021

32. On 23 November 2021 the contempt applications were listed for hearing before
Fancourt J. Ms Khan applied for an adjournment on medical grounds. The judge
refused that application but he stood over the substantive hearing until the following
day. On 24 November 2021 Ms Khan did not appear and sought to vacate the
hearing on the basis that she needed to attend hospital for an urgent scan on her
hand. Fancourt J issued a bench warrant for Ms Khan’s immediate arrest.

33. On 1 December 2021 Ms Khan surrendered to the bench warrant and the two
contempt applications were listed before me on an urgent basis. At the hearing Ms
Khan was represented by solicitors and counsel and I was told that she had only
obtained legal aid that morning and that she now accepted that she could not
represent herself. I made it clear that I would not hear the substantive applications
that day because Ms Khan’s new legal team had only just been instructed and
needed time to prepare and to take instructions and I gave directions for the hearing
of both liability and sanction on 17 December 2021 with a time estimate of one day.
I directed that Ms Khan file any evidence upon which she wished to rely by 4.30
pm on 8 December 2021.

I. Janes’ Letter dated 9 December 2021

34. By letter dated 9 December 2021 Janes Solicitors (“Janes”), who were now acting
for Ms Khan, wrote to Capsticks stating that on 7 December 2021 they had met Ms
Khan and that her instructions were that she accepted that there had been non-
compliance with both the First and Second Orders and that she did not currently
intend to offer any evidence in her defence. They suggested, however, that the
hearing on 17 December 2021 should be used as a directions hearing for two
reasons: first, because Ms Khan challenged the intervention and had applied to set

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aside the first order dated 7 September 2021; and, secondly, because Mr Livingston,
her solicitor, and Mr Grey, her counsel, had concerns about her mental health and
had applied for legal aid to instruct an independent expert consultant psychiatrist.

35. On 15 December 2021 the parties exchanged Skeleton Arguments for the hearing
on 17 December 2021. In his first Skeleton Argument Mr Tim Grey, who now
appeared for Ms Khan, submitted that the court should give further directions rather
than hear the two substantive applications. The primary reason which he advanced
for that submission was that solicitors and counsel had formed the view that Ms
Khan was unable to fully comprehend the issues before the court, that evidence
should be obtained from a psychiatric expert and that the impact of the evidence
might be profound.

J. Dr Choudry’s Letter dated 16 December 2021

36. On 16 December 2021 Ms Khan provided the court with a letter which Dr Choudry
of the Al-Waqas Medical Centre in Leicester had addressed to concerned parties.
In the letter he confirmed that Ms Khan was a patient of the practice, that she was
suffering from work related stress and anxiety due to the ongoing litigation with the
SRA and that it was continuing to have a profound effect on her mental and
psychological well-being and affecting her comprehension and understanding of
that litigation. He also stated that she was unlikely to be in a mental state to be able
to fully evaluate and comprehend the issues before the court in relation to the
contempt applications. Finally, he stated that she was being referred to a private
psychiatrist in view of her current mental health condition.

K. The Hearing on 17 December 2021

37. On 17 December 2021 the contempt applications came on for hearing. Mr Rupert
Allen appeared for the SRA instructed by Capsticks and Mr Grey appeared for Ms
Khan instructed by Janes. I am grateful to both counsel and their teams for their
written and oral submissions and the assistance which they gave the court. Although
no Application Notice had been issued, I permitted Mr Grey to apply to adjourn the
hearing of the contempt applications as he had trailed in his first Skeleton
Argument. Having heard detailed argument, I dismissed the application with
reasons. In particular, I held that Dr Choudry’s letter did not justify an adjournment
but that I would give full weight to Ms Khan’s mental health and Dr Choudry’s
concerns in determining the appropriate sanction (assuming that I found liability).

38. At the conclusion of the hearing on Friday 17 December 2021 I indicated to the
parties that I would deliver judgment on Tuesday 21 December 2021. I had
originally intended to deliver judgment on Monday 20 December 2021 but Mr Grey
stated that Ms Khan was willing to comply with both orders but wanted to be
present when the SRA executed them. I therefore gave her an additional 24 hours
within which to arrange for compliance with the orders. On Monday 20 December
2021, however, I was informed that Mr Livingston, Ms Khan’s solicitor, had tested
positive for Coronavirus and that Ms Khan was currently self-isolating whilst she
took a PCR test. Both counsel submitted by email that I should either deliver
judgment remotely or hand it down in the absence of the parties. In the event, I
decided to reserve judgment until Tuesday 4 January 2022 to ensure that Ms Khan
was present but also legally represented. In email exchanges with the parties, I made

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it clear that I would receive evidence of compliance with the two orders in the
meantime. However, no evidence of compliance was filed with the Court between
20 December 2021 and hand down on 4 January 2021.

L. The Second Set Aside Application

39. On 30 December 2021, which was the last working day before the hand down, Ms
Khan issued the Application Notice to set aside the Second Order supported by a
witness statement also dated 30 December 2021 and I will refer to it as the “Second
Set Aside Application”. On 4 January 2022 Ms Khan chose to represent herself
although her former counsel, Mr Tim Grey, was present for the hand down. Despite
the lateness of the application, I decided to hear it before delivering judgment in
relation to the committal applications and, if necessary, to re-consider the judgment
which I was ready to deliver and hand down. I, therefore adjourned it to be heard
on 11 January 2022 and gave further directions for the exchange of further evidence
and Skeleton Arguments. On 11 January 2022 I heard both applications and
disposed of them in an ex tempore judgment which I gave before the hand down of
this judgment.

M. Liability

40. I turn therefore to the question of liability. In his first Skeleton Argument dated 1
October 2021 Mr Allen submitted that in order to establish a contempt of court
arising from breach of a court order it was necessary for the SRA to prove the
following three elements, namely, that:

(1) The Defendant had notice of the terms of the order;

(2) The Defendant has acted, or failed to act, in a manner which involved a breach
of the order; and

(3) The Defendant knew of the facts which made that conduct a breach.

41. Mr Allen also reminded me that the the standard of proof on each element was the
criminal standard, i.e. beyond reasonable doubt. Although there was an issue
between Mr Allen and Mr Grey about the precise state of mind required to satisfy
element (3) (which I consider below), Mr Grey did not challenge the test put
forward by Mr Allen. I therefore adopt it and deal with each element in turn. I begin
with notice.

(1) Notice

42. Ms Khan was present at the hearing on 7 September 2021 and heard Adam Johnson
J make the First Order. It was Ms Crawford’s evidence that on 10 September 2021
it was not possible to serve Ms Khan personally at the Leicester office or at her
residential address and that the SRA complied with paragraph 40 by posting it
through the letter box of each address and sending the order and accompanying
documents by email to Ms Khan. It was also Ms Crawford’s evidence that it was
not possible to serve Ms Khan personally with the Second Order and that the SRA
complied with paragraph 38 by sending it and the accompanying documents both

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by post by special delivery and also by email to Ms Khan. Finally, it was also her
evidence that at both addresses the documents were delivered and signed for.

43. Mr Grey did not challenge any of this evidence and I am satisfied that the SRA
complied with both orders and tried to serve Ms Khan personally before invoking
the alternative service provisions. I am also satisfied that Ms Khan received and
saw both orders by email. She admitted this in paragraph 18 of her witness
statement 30 December 2021 and paragraph 29 of her witness statement dated 10
January 2022. Finally, Ms Khan did not challenge Ms Crawford’s evidence and the
evidence of Mr Richards that he served Ms Khan personally with the contempt
applications at the Carmarthenshire Coroner’s Court. I am satisfied, therefore, to
the criminal standard that Ms Khan was given notice of both the First and Second
Orders and that the SRA has complied with CPR Part 81.5(1). This provides that
unless the court directs otherwise a contempt application and the evidence in
support must be served on the defendant personally.

(2) Breach of the Order

44. In their letter dated 9 December 2021 Janes wrote to Capsticks stating that Ms
Khan’s instructions were that she accepted that she had failed to comply with both
orders dated 7 and 21 September 2021 and Mr Grey confirmed those instructions
orally. I treat Janes’ letter and Mr Grey’s oral confirmation as clear and unequivocal
admissions by Ms Khan that she had failed to deliver up any of the Listed Items and
that the SRA had been unable to locate any of the Listed Items when they sought to
execute the search and seizure orders. Finally, Ms Khan made no witness statement
in compliance with paragraph 5 of either Order explaining what steps she had taken
to comply with them.

45. At the hearing of the First and Second Set Aside Applications Mr James sought to
persuade me on behalf of Ms Khan that the Listed Items were not in her possession
or control or the possession or control of the Firm because she had transferred her
shares in the Firm to JFP and the Firm had transferred its assets to JFP. I dismissed
those applications for the reasons which I gave. I am satisfied, therefore, to the
criminal standard that Ms Khan committed the breaches of both orders specified in
the Application Notices dated 1 October 2021.

(3) Knowledge

46. Finally, I turn to the mental element required for a finding of liability for contempt.
Mr Allen submitted that it was not necessary for the SRA to prove that Ms Khan
knew or believed that she was committing breaches of the orders and in support of
this proposition he relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Varma v
Atkinson [2020] Ch 180 where Rose LJ (as she then was) considered the position
taken by the editors of Arlidge, Eady and Smith on Contempt 5th ed (2017) and in
Irtelli v Squatriti [1993] QB 83. Having considered those authorities, Rose LJ then
stated this at [54]:

“In my judgment, Irtelli v Squatriti cannot stand in the light of the many
earlier and later cases which establish that once knowledge of the order
is proved, and once it is proved that the contemnor knew that he was
doing or omitting to do certain things, then it is not necessary for the

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contemnor to know that his actions put him in breach of the order; it is
enough that as a matter of fact and law, they do so put him in breach.”

47. Mr Allen also submitted that where an order is made against a company, its
directors may be held liable if they “wilfully” fail to take reasonable steps to ensure
that it is complied with. He relied upon the decision of Henshaw J in Dell Emerging
Markets (Emea) Ltd v Systems Equipment Telecommunications Services [2020]
EWHC 561 (Comm) in which the judge explained what is meant by a wilful failure
in the following passage at [25]:

“Where a company is guilty of contempt, CPR 81.4(3) provides that a

committal order may be made against "any director or other officer of
that company or corporation". The requirements for a director's liability
in contempt under that provision were set out in Attorney General for
Tuvalu v Philatetic Distribution Corporation [1990] 1 WLR 926
(Woolf LJ). In particular: i) A director is under a duty to take reasonable
steps to ensure that the court's order is obeyed. If he or she wilfully fails
to take such reasonable steps and the order is breached, he or she is
liable in contempt: p. 936F. ii) The word "wilful" is intended to
distinguish the situation in which a director reasonably believes that
some other director or officer is taking the reasonable steps required to
ensure that the court's order is obeyed: p. 936F. iii) There must be
culpable conduct on the part of a director: mere inactivity is not
sufficient. However, it is not necessary for the director to have actively
participated in the breach of the order in order to be culpable. A failure
to supervise those to whom a director has delegated responsibility can
be regarded as sufficiently culpable: p. 938A-G.”

48. Mr Grey did not challenge either of these tests as such. However, he submitted that
in the absence of psychiatric evidence, the court should give Ms Khan the benefit
of the doubt in assessing her ability to understand the two Orders. He relied upon
two authorities in urging the court to adopt this approach. First, in P v P [1999] WL
477824 the Court of Appeal considered the mental element for contempt where a
defendant had severe physical disabilities and a limited ability to understand the
importance of an injunction which required him to stay away from the former
matrimonial home. Butler-Sloss LJ considered that the court needed to be satisfied
that the alleged contemnor "understands what he must not do". Sedley LJ adopted
a similar test. He considered that: "What is necessary that a potential contemnor
should understand is that an order has been made forbidding him to do certain things
and that if he does them he may well be punished".

49. Secondly, Mr Grey also relied upon the decision of Teare J in Marketmaker
Technology (Beijing) Co Ltd v CMC Group Plc [2009] EWHC 1445 (QB) which
involved the breach of an undertaking. Teare J stated this at [14]:

“It was common ground that proof of a breach of the undertaking did
not equate to a contempt. For a contempt to be established it has to be
shown that the conduct which breached the undertaking was intentional
or deliberate and that the alleged contemnor had knowledge of the facts
which made his conduct a breach. It is unnecessary to establish that the

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alleged contemnor appreciated that his conduct was a breach of the

undertaking. The law on this point was summarised by Warrington J in
Stancomb v Trowbridge Urban District Council [1910] 2 Ch 190 at
p.194: “In my judgment, if a person or a corporation is restrained by
injunction from doing a particular act, that person or corporation
commits a breach of the injunction, and is liable for process for
contempt, if he or it in fact does the act, and it is no answer to say that
the act was not contumacious in the sense that, in doing it, there was no
direct intention to disobey the order.””

50. In my judgment, there is no inconsistency between Varma v Atkinson and either P

v P or the Marketmaker Technology decision. It is not necessary for the SRA to
prove that Ms Khan was consciously aware that she was acting in breach of the
order or that she appreciated that what the consequences might be if she failed to
deliver up the Listed Items in each Order. It is enough that she was aware of its
terms and that her failure to comply with them was deliberate rather than
inadvertent. But in any event, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms
Khan deliberately failed to comply with the orders knowing that she might be held
in contempt of court as a consequence. I say this for the following reasons:

(1) Ms Khan failed to comply with the First Order between 8 September 2021
and 17 December 2021 and the Second Order between 28 September 2021
and 17 December 2021. Although Janes admitted that she had not complied
with both orders in their letter dated 9 December 2021 and Mr Grey admitted
this at the hearing, Ms Khan offered no explanation for her failure to comply
with either Order for such sustained periods of time. Moreover, she offered
no explanation even though paragraph 5 of each Order required her to provide
such an explanation.

(2) The only inference which I am able to draw, therefore, is that Ms Khan failed
to comply with both orders deliberately and understanding full well what the
consequences might be. I draw that inference from the period during which
she was in breach of each Order, the absence of explanation and the additional
matters set out in sub-paragraphs (3) to (7) (below).

(3) Until the suspension of her practising certificate, Ms Khan was a litigation
solicitor with Higher Rights of Audience. Because of her background,
training and employment I am satisfied that on both 8 September 2021 and
28 September 2021 she fully understood the importance of court orders and
the consequences of a failure to comply with them.

(4) Ms Khan attended the hearing on 7 September 2021 and was present when
Adam Johnson J made the First Order. It contained a prominent penal notice.
It also contained the notice which I have set out in paragraph 11(above),
which expressly stated that if Ms Khan or the Firm failed to deliver up the
Listed Items and disobeyed the order, they might be found guilty of contempt
and sent to prison.

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(5) The Second Order contained the same provisions. It was made without notice
but Ms Khan accepted that she was notified of its terms on 28 September
2021. I am satisfied that Ms Khan was fully aware of those terms.

(6) Ms Khan continued to represent herself at the hearing before Fancourt J on

22 October 2021 even though the judge pointed out that she was entitled to
legally aided representation. Mr Grey also drew my attention to her witness
statement dated 9 November 2021 in answer to the SRA’s third application
to restrain her from carrying out any reserved legal activities. In my judgment,
that witness statement demonstrates quite clearly that Ms Khan understood
what the consequences would be of a finding or admission that she was acting
in breach of the First and Second Orders. In particular, she stated this at
paragraph 44.6: “The SRA Ltd has adequate powers to enforce any alleged
non-compliance of orders by bringing contempt proceedings against me (as it
is doing).”

(7) Finally, Dr Choudry’s letter dated 16 December 2021 did not suggest that Ms
Khan had been unable to comprehend the effect of the Orders when they were
made or, indeed, on 22 October when she appeared before Fancourt J or on 9
November 2021 when she made that witness statement. At its highest, the
letter suggested that Ms Khan might be unable to follow the issues and
argument on the hearing of the contempt applications given the recent
deterioration of her mental health.

(4) Proof

51. I am satisfied, therefore, that Ms Khan is liable for contempt for breach of paragraph
1 of the First Order and paragraph 1 of the Second Order on the grounds set out in
each Application Notice dated 1 October 2021. I am also satisfied that in both cases
the SRA has met the criminal standard of proof. I therefore turn to consider the
question of sanction.

N. Sanction

(1) Legal Principles

52. The parties cited a number of authorities to the court in relation to sanction. In his
second Skeleton Argument Mr Grey summarised the applicable legal principles by
reference to a series of ten propositions (supported by authority) which I understood
Mr Allen to accept as a reasonably accurate summary of the law. I therefore adopt
those submissions here:

(1) There are no formal sentencing guidelines for sentence/sanction in committal

proceedings.

(2) Sentences/sanctions are fact specific.

(3) The Court should bear in mind the desirability of keeping offenders and, in
particular, first-time offenders, out of prison: see Templeton Insurance Ltd v
Thomas [2013] EWCA Civ 35 and Otkritie International Investment
Management Ltd v Gersamia [2015] EWHC 821 (Comm).

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(4) Imprisonment is only appropriate where there is “serious, contumacious

flouting of orders of the court”: see Gulf Azov Shipping Company Ltd v Idisi
[2001] EWCA Civ 21 at [72] (Lord Phillips MR).

(5) The key questions for the Court are the extent of the Defendant’s culpability,
and the harm caused by the contempt: see Otkritie International Investment
Management Ltd v Gersamia (above).

(6) Committal to prison may serve two distinct purposes: (a) punishment of past
contempt and (b) securing compliance: see Lightfoot v Lightfoot [1989] 1
FLR 414 at 414-417 (Lord Donaldson MR).

(7) It is good practice, for the Court's sentence to include elements of both
purposes (punishment and compliance) to make clear what period of
committal is regarded as appropriate for punishment alone, i.e. what period
would be regarded as just if the contemnor were promptly to comply with the
order in question: see JSC Bank v Soldochenko (No 2) [2012] 1 WLR 350.

(8) Committal may be suspended: see CPR Part 81.9(2). Suspension may be
appropriate: (a) as a first step with a view to securing compliance with the
Court’s orders: see Hale v Tanner [2000] 1 WLR 2377 at 2381; and (b) in
view of cogent personal mitigation: see Templeton Insurance Ltd v Thomas
[2013] EWCA Civ 35.

(9) The Court may impose a fine. If a fine is appropriate punishment it is wrong
to impose a custodial sentence because the contemnor could not pay the fine:
see Re M (Contact Order) [2005] EWCA Civ 615.

(10) Sequestration is also available as a remedy for contempt: see CPR Part
81.9(2)

53. One of the examples to which Mr Grey also took me was the recent decision of
Miles J (who made, of course, the Second Order) in Law House Ltd (In
Administration) v Adams [2020] EWHC 2344 (Ch). In that case the judge applied
the following criteria (principally derived from the Crystal Mews case) in assessing
the seriousness of the contempt in question:

(a) whether the claimant has been prejudiced by virtue of the contempt and
whether the prejudice is capable of remedy;

(b) the extent to which the contemnor has acted under pressure;

(c) whether the breach of the order was deliberate or unintentional;

(d) the degree of culpability;

(e) whether the contemnor has been placed in breach of the order by reason of
the conduct of others;

(f) whether the contemnor appreciates the seriousness of the deliberate breach;

(g) whether the contemnor has co-operated;

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(h) Whether there has been any acceptance of responsibility, any apology, any
remorse or any reasonable excuse put forward.

54. I find these criteria particularly useful in the present case and I adopt them in
arriving at the appropriate sanction. I also add that in relation to the second point
Miles J reminded himself (as do I) that the Court of Appeal has recently re-
emphasised that a sentence of imprisonment should only be imposed if nothing
other than a custodial sentence is justified: see McKendrick v FCA [2019] EWCA
Civ 524. Miles J also took into account (as do I) the possible impact of the pandemic
on an immediate custodial sentence and that an immediate custodial sentence is
likely to be heavier and all the more burdensome because of conditions of detention,
lack of visits and anxiety.

(2) Application

55. I turn now to the application of those principles. I consider Ms Khan’s contempt of
the court to be serious. She has committed breaches of two court orders for three
months and fourteen weeks respectively. Both Orders were clear on their face and
I have found that Ms Khan knew that she was acting in breach of both of them and
understood the consequences of the failure to comply with them. Moreover, it was
necessary for the SRA to obtain those Orders to compel Ms Khan to comply with
her obligations to her regulator. Her failure to comply with the orders involved not
only an attack on the administration of justice – as Miles J described it in Adams at
[65] – but also defiance of her regulator. The powers of the SRA to intervene in a
solicitors practice are intended to protect both members of the public and public
confidence in the profession and there is a strong public interest in ensuring that
solicitors co-operate promptly with the SRA. Finally, Ms Khan is a solicitor and
should be held to a higher standard than an unqualified defendant. Against these
general conclusions I turn to consider the criteria applied by Miles J in Adams.

(a) Prejudice or Harm

56. Against the seriousness of the contempts, I balance the fact that the SRA was unable
to point to any prejudice or harm which the clients of the Firm have suffered
because of Ms Khan’s failure to co-operate with the intervention or comply with
both Orders. Mr Allen pointed out that the SRA is unable to assess the prejudice or
harm which those clients may have suffered until Ms Khan has delivered up the
Listed Items. I accept that submission up to a point. However, if time limits had
been missed or clients had been unrepresented, I would have expected complaints
to have been made to the SRA already. I therefore accept Mr Grey’s submission
that some discount should be made for the absence of harm or prejudice.

(b) Pressure

57. Ms Khan did not act under pressure from third parties to commit the breaches of
either Order. Indeed, she was the sole director of the Firm and a director of JFP and
took all decisions on their behalf. I can give her no discount for this reason.

(c) Nature of the Breach

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58. I have found that the breaches of the Orders were deliberate and that they continued
for significant periods of time. On any view, these were serious breaches of not just
one but two court orders.

(d) Culpability

59. For the same reasons the degree of culpability was high. Even if she had arguable
grounds to challenge either of the Orders, Ms Khan was required to comply with
them until they were set aside. Mr James accepted this without argument at the
hearing of the Set Aside Applications and I am satisfied that Ms Khan appreciated
this herself. The nature and length of the breach and the degree of Ms Khan’s
culpability suggest that an immediate custodial sentence is justified in the absence
of any other mitigating factors.

(e) Third Parties

60. Ms Khan was not placed in breach of either order by the conduct of third parties.
She was the sole director of the Firm and a director of JFP and responsible for both
their and her own breaches of the Orders. I can therefore give her no discount for
this reason either.

(f) The Seriousness of the Breach

61. Until Janes’ letter dated 9 December 2021, Ms Khan did not accept that she had
committed breaches of the two Orders. Moreover, until I had dismissed her
application for a further adjournment on 17 December 2021 she gave no indication
that she intended to comply with them. Even then, she did not accept that she had
committed the breaches deliberately or that she was in contempt of court. Her
failure to accept that she was in contempt or to recognise the seriousness of those
breaches merits no discount.

(g) Co-operation

62. Until I had dismissed her application for a further adjournment on 17 December
2021, Ms Khan made no offer to co-operate with the SRA in locating and producing
the Listed Items in each Order. Far from it, she had failed to co-operate at all. At
the conclusion of that hearing Ms Khan offered through Mr Grey to deliver up the
relevant documents at the Leicester office provided that she was present in person.
However, she did not do so. Instead, she issued the Second Set Aside Application
and renewed the First Set Aside Application. I can give her no discount for co-
operation.

(h) Admission

63. In their letter dated 9 December 2021 Janes made an admission that Ms Khan had
acted in breach of the Orders and Mr Grey repeated that admission on her behalf
both in his Skeleton Argument and orally and on 17 December 2021. However, Ms
Khan did not admit that she was in contempt. Nor did she express any remorse or
put forward any reasonable excuse for her conduct. I make no discount for the
limited admissions which Janes and counsel made on Ms Khan’s behalf because

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they led to no saving in time or costs. Indeed, having made the admission that she
was in breach of the Second Order, Ms Khan immediately applied to set it aside.

(3) Mitigation

64. I turn therefore to consider personal mitigation. I accept that Ms Khan has no
criminal record and no disciplinary findings against her. I also accept that she has
suffered a serious hand injury which has impeded her and contributed to her fragile
mental state. Finally, as I indicated on the adjournment application, I give full
weight to Dr Choudry’s assessment of Ms Khan’s mental condition and that he has
referred her to a specialist. This cannot excuse Ms Khan’s conduct but it goes some
way to explain why she adopted such a wrong-headed attitude to the intervention
and to the subsequent court orders.

65. I also take into account the effect of this litigation on Ms Khan’s personal and
professional life. Intervention is a last resort but it is very intrusive and can
effectively destroy a solicitor’s practice. Ms Khan has no current source of income
and is living with family who have had to provide personal assistance. I also make
allowance for the fact that Ms Khan has no experience of prison and that a period
of imprisonment will be extremely hard for her given her psychological condition
and the current pandemic (especially with rising hospital admissions due to the
current omicron variant).

(4) Sentence

66. I have carefully considered whether a fine would be a sufficient penalty and taken
into account the fact that a custodial sentence should only be imposed as a last
resort. But in my judgment Ms Khan’s conduct amounts to “serious, contumacious
flouting of orders of the court” and merits an immediate custodial sentence of a
significant length. Given the various factors which I have considered, the minimum
sentence which I can impose is six months. I impose three months for the breach of
each order to run concurrently and three months to secure compliance with the
orders in question.

(5) Suspension

67. I will suspend three months of the sentence conditional upon compliance by Ms
Khan with both the First and Second Orders within six weeks of the date of this
judgment as reflected in the draft order which I have circulated before handing
down this judgment. If Ms Khan fails to comply with either order during that period,
she will serve the second three months of the sentence. Ms Khan will be entitled to
unconditional release after serving half the sentence under section 258 of the
Criminal Justice Act 2003. In practice, this means that she will be released after
serving six weeks in prison if she complies with the Orders before the end of that
period and after three months if she fails to do so.

O. Striking Off

68. Mr Allen also submitted that it was appropriate for the court to order that Ms Khan
should be struck off the Roll of Solicitors in the exercise of its inherent supervisory
jurisdiction. In his oral submission Mr Allen made it clear that the only basis upon

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which the court should exercise this jurisdiction was Ms Khan’s failure to comply
with court orders in contempt of court rather than her failure to comply with her
conduct obligations as a solicitor. By email dated 23 December 2021 Capsticks also
wrote to the court to confirm this in response to additional written submissions
which Mr Grey had also filed. They stated as follows:

“The SRA does not suggest that the Court should strike Ms Khan off
the Roll on the basis of or by reference to the matters which form the
basis of the decision to intervene (cf. para 9 of the supplemental
submissions). The strike off is sought only on the basis of the findings
of contempt. This too was made clear in the SRA’s supplemental
skeleton argument and the SRA’s oral submissions.”

69. There was no issue between counsel that the court had jurisdiction to strike off Ms
Khan. Mr Grey relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in R and T Thew Ltd
v Alan Reeves (No.2) [1982] QB 1283 for the proposition that it would usually be
inappropriate for a judge to exercise this punitive jurisdiction of his own motion
and that it should be avoided in all but the most exceptional cases. Mr Allen
accepted that the court should only exercise the jurisdiction in exceptional cases
and he properly drew my attention to the following statement by Hickinbottom J in
Coll v Floreat Merchant Banking Ltd [2014] EWHC 1741 (QB) at [42]:

“The court’s summary jurisdiction over solicitors is extraordinary, and

therefore should only be exercised sparingly (i) if justice requires this
procedure to be adopted, as opposed to some other procedure (e.g.
disciplinary proceedings through the SRA, or an ordinary civil claim)
(see Geoffrey Silver & Drake (a firm) v Baines (trading as Wetherfield
Baines and Baines) (a firm) [1971] 1 QB 396 at page 405 per Megaw
LJ) and (ii) in a clear case (ibid at page 402F-G per Lord Denning
MR).”

70. Mr Allan relied, however, on the decision of Neuberger J (as he then was) in Penna
v Law Society (unreported, 18 October 2000) to exercise the jurisdiction and strike
off a solicitor. He summarised the law at page 4, line 17 of the transcript to page 5
line 20 in the following five propositions:

“An application to the court to strike a solicitor off the Roll of Solicitors
is a rare application. As Mr. Dutton says, a complainant who wishes
such an order should normally apply to the Solicitors' Disciplinary
Tribunal under section 46 of the Act. However, in exceptional cases, it
is appropriate for the application to be made to the court. In the present
case, I am quite satisfied that the application is properly made to the
court. First, it is not made with a view to avoiding a determination by
the Disciplinary Tribunal which has the primary responsibility for
control of solicitors in this connection. That is evident from the fact that
the application is by the Law Society itself. Secondly, many of the
points advanced for justifying the application concern Mr. Penna's
conduct during the trial before Jonathan Parker J. and his subsequent
conduct in connection with the three court orders to which I have
referred. Thirdly, although I am not in fact being asked to make any

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order on it, there is a perfectly proper application for a committal order

for Mr. Penna's contempt. If that application is to be made it can only
be made to the court and it is sensible to combine it with the application
under sections 50 and 51 of the Act. Fourthly, it is cost-effective to
apply to the court. Particularly in light of the seriousness of the
allegations, if the matter had gone before a tribunal they may have had
to start again, which would have involved a great deal of cost and effort.
Fifthly, the nature of this case is such that the specialist knowledge or
expertise which the tribunal might have would not lead them to a
different or differently-reasoned conclusion from the reasoned
conclusion that I have reached. That view is perhaps assisted by the fact
that Mr. Penna has accepted that he must be disqualified.”

71. Finally, Mr Allen relied on the following statement by Sir Brian Leveson P in SRA
v Farrimond [2018] EWHC 321 (Admin) at [35] (where the court struck off a
solicitor who had been convicted of the crime of attempted murder):

“In my judgment, it is beyond argument that a solicitor sentenced to any

substantial term of imprisonment should not be permitted to remain on
the Roll even if suspended indefinitely. The difference between
indefinite suspension and strike off might be limited to the period of
time before which an application to restore (or resume) can be made
and it may be that the conditions suggested by the Tribunal, if satisfied,
might permit Mr Farrimond to make an application to be restored to the
Roll if he feels that such an application is appropriate and sensible given
the mental state into which he had descended prior to the attack. It is
simply inconceivable that a prisoner, serving a sentence of 6 years’
imprisonment, should be able to describe himself as a solicitor and
officer of the court albeit suspended from practice.”

72. I am not satisfied that this is an exceptional case in which the court should exercise
its jurisdiction to strike a solicitor off the Roll. In particular, I am not satisfied that
justice requires the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to adopt a summary
procedure on the hearing of a committal application. In my judgment, it is more
appropriate for the SRA to take proceedings before the SDT in the normal way if it
wishes to secure an order that Ms Khan should be struck off. I have reached this
conclusion for three principal reasons:

(1) Ms Khan’s application to set aside the intervention has not yet been heard. I
cannot determine that her application is bound to fail and the SRA did not ask
me to do so. It is possible, therefore, that the court may set it aside. Although
this does not excuse Ms Khan’s contempt, for all I know it may have a
significant effect on any sanction imposed by the SDT.

(2) There may be other, wider grounds of mitigation bearing on the conduct of
her practice which Ms Khan may be able to put before the SDT but which
would have no bearing on the applications before me.

(3) Finally, I am satisfied that Penna was exceptional and clearly distinguishable
from the present case. In Penna the Law Society did not ask the court to

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impose a prison sentence or other sanction for contempt and the solicitor
accepted that he should be removed from the Roll. In the present case, I have
sentenced Ms Khan to a term of imprisonment on the basis that this is the
appropriate sanction for her contempt of court.

P. Disposal

73. I will therefore make an order in the terms of the draft which I have circulated to
counsel with this approved judgment. I will also issue a warrant of committal. I
remind Ms Khan that she is entitled to appeal against the findings of contempt as
of right and without permission and I will hear any application for bail or for a stay
following the hand down of this judgment.

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