DEBATES

CHINA
Is China a revisionist power or status-quo power? How do you access the nature of rivalry
between the U.S. and China: inevitable or avoidable?
Status quo – No US-China competition Rising china – US-China rivalry
ALAISTAIR IAIN JOHNSTON RANDALL L. SCHWALLER & XIAOYU PU
- at present China’s challenge to order is less Shirker
deep and/or wide than the current a hedging strategy of avoiding direct
narrative suggests confrontation with the United States but
- China participates in lots of international preparing favorable conditions for China to
institutions (mostly dominated by US) that shape an emerging world order in the long term
means China is basically accepting
international norms
- There is no single international order
- depending on the area, China’s support to
international norms varies between strong
to low
JEFFREY HORNUNG KURT M. CAMPBELL AND JAKE SULLIVAN
Adjustment coexistence means accepting competition as a
condition to be managed rather than a problem
to be solved

MICHAEL BECKLEY MICHAEL PILLSBURY

- America’s edge will endure - Hundred years marathon
- Absolute gap in technology, patents, - to avenge a century of humiliation and
students aspired to replace the United States as
the economic, military, and political
leader of the world by the year 2049
JOSEPH NYE Bernstein & Munro’s Coming conflict with
- China lacks of soft power China
Missile launches across Taiwan
JOHN IKENBERRY JOSHUA SHRINSON
- Wants to focus on its economic growth & - China is rapidly catching up; only a
leadership succession matter of time it will surpass US
- Wont likely to be aggressive as it risks its
economy
- China can assimilate in international order
bc it participates in it
- US won’t be too aggressive toward China
because its alliances won’t support it

QUIN YAQING & WEI LING GRAHAM ALLISON

- China becomes increasingly socialized into - Thucydides’ Trap
the norms of consultations and consensus
- They don’t want to kick out and bail out of
the door
TAYLOR FREVEL ROBERT GILPIN
- China takes long-term goal; try to solve - The history of world politics is the
territorial dispute peacefully with repetition of the rise and fall of hegemon
 negotiation
ZHU FENG JOHN MEARSHEIMER
- China lacks domestic resources for - Don’t rely on international too much, it
international balancing reflects national interest of great power
- China doesn’t have strong ally
ROBERT ROSS
- China’s nationalism is getting stronger and
it tried to develop navy much more
assertively than before
- China is trying to become maritime power
ROBERT KAPLAN
- It is natural for China to potentially expand
the sphere of influence, especially bc it’s
trade is growing and it has the interest to
keep those maritime and global interests
much more assertively
AARON FRIEDBERG
- There’s a contest for supremacy between
US and China
EVIDENCE
Geopolitical: South China Sea, Diayou/Senkaku,
THAAD
- China made artificial land in SCS for
military bases; sent militias in fishing
boats
 China’s retaliation to SK and Japan
Wang Yi: there are many countries outside US
Geoeconomic: US-China trade war
Geotechnical: AI, 5G, Huawei, cyber spaces
- US-China conflict over who’s responsible for
COVID19 spread
China is politically stable, economically vibrant, militarily strong, technologically advance
It continues to show increasing assertiveness: South China Sea, Senkaku/Diayou, maritime power
expansion (economy depends on sea transportation and access; 1/3 total world trade sails)
their economy has grown at 10 percent every year and eventually took over Japan’s position as
second largest economy in the world in 2010.

US has been relatively declining (evidence?) relative gap with China is shrinking
Under Trump, US increased Korea and Japan’s doubts and insecurities the former’s commitment
in the region

There are two perspectives in seeing the nature of the rise of China. The first one sees China’s rise
as a peaceful one which will not pose a threat or competition to US hegemony. Scholars like
Alaistair Johnston and John Ikenberry supported this argument. Johnston, for example, argued
that in order to claim that China is a revisionist power, we have to analyze China’s decisions and
behaviour in international order. Generally, the fact that China is participating in many
international orders already shows that China is basically accepting the existing international
norms. He further argued that there is no single international order and depends on which area it
is, China’s level of support towards international norms varies, in some orders such as constitutive
order, China showed strong support, but in other orders like international financial, China’s
assimilation to the norms is still very low. Likewise, Ikenberry also argued that because China is
participating in international organizations, it is capable of assimilating to international order. The
country also won’t try to challenge the status quo because it might pose risks for their economic
growth.
However, the second perspective takes the opposite stance. For some scholars like Michael
Pillsbury, China is considered as a revisionist state. He came up with the concept of “Hundred
Years Marathon” – a secret strategy of China to replace US as economic, military, and political
leader by 2049. The assumptions that China is a fragile power who will follow US policies are all
false. China is a robust economy who is continuously catching up with US capabilities. It has
different strategy with US that is it prefers ambiguity and deception and hasn’t showed significant
progress to adopt Western type of democracy in their country. He concluded that China is aiming
to create a world order in which they will become one of—if not the only—the superpowers who
will be able to replace American values with Chinese values.
Between these two contending views, I believe that the latter—that is China is a revisionist power
which has the chance and capability to surpass US—can explain the recent Chinese foreign
policies better than the former. I base my position on two main arguments. First, in the past two
decades, China has shown increasingly assertive moves, especially towards its neighbours. It has
made many territorial claims in the surrounding area, particularly in East China Sea and South
China Sea. These claims were accompanied by menacing moves, such as creating military bases in
South China Sea and posing trade barriers to Japan after Senkaku boat collision. Additionally,
direct conflicts between China and US have been increasing, from trade war in 2018 to blame
game on the spreading of COVID-19 in 2020.
Second, China’s capabilities have been continuously increasing and thus, narrowing the gap of its
relative power with US. For example, in terms of economy, China has rose to the second biggest
economy replacing Japan in 2010. During the pandemic, China was one of few countries whose
economy showed grow. Recently, some professionals even predicted that China would replace US
as the biggest economy in late 2020s or early 2030s. The fact that China’s trade surplus with US
increased despite tariffs posed by the latter also showed how robust and important China is in
international economy. In the area of technology and innovation, China also has advanced
significantly and even becomes the lead in 5G technology.

SK: CHINA V US
what kind of strategic choice should South Korea make: continued alignment with the US,
bandwagoning with rising China, hedging between the two, or autonomous pathway?
CHINA US
HAN SUKHEE: KIM SUNGHAN
The relations between SK and China cannot be US remains as the only indispensable balancer
restored as: i) they’ve lost faith on each other; in the region
ii) Koreans lost confidence in Chinese market; - It’s important to assure all major
iii) approach to secure indirect influence over powers that unification wont hurt them
NK no longer evident
DAVID KANG SCOTT SNYDER
- East Asia IR: rather than balancing the only viable way forward for the foreseeable
against each other, they adapt to great future is for South Korea to continue to rely on
 powers in a much more hierarchical the United States to meet its security needs
way and try to bandwagon rather than and to take further measures to strengthen
balance against it alliance cooperation with the United States
- If Chinese hegemony is firmly
established in the region and all the South Korean pragmatism and realpolitik
countries are plugged into that assessments are likely to keep the country on
hegemony, it could possibly create a the side of the United States until South Korea
hierarchical peace in the region is able to find a clear alternative to the U.S.-
ROK alliance as a primary means for achieving
However certain conditions should exist security
- China should play as benevolent
hegemony (provide security and open Prevent sk quick distancing: sunk cost,
up market) institutionalization, democratic values
- Japan be subordinate into Chinese orbit
- US retreat from the region + us still rules intl rules

EVIDENCE
HEDGING: remains neutral over south china NSP - diversify economy
sea; refused to ban Chinese at the burst of
COVID; refused associated with either FOIP or
OBOR
THAAD: no shifting toward SK THAAD
 Relatiation: easy turn back on SK
THAAD: detects and intercepts incoming Asymmetric deterrence with North Korea (+
missiles at high altitudes, is actually to track China)  required US security back up
missiles launched from China" not from North
Korea.
Wang Yi visit to Korea 2020:
- Emphasize the importance of THAAD
and denuclearization
- But agreement on denuclearization is
not the first time, even under Park it’s
Under the increasing competition between China and US, I believe that the best choice for South
Korea is to hedge between the two superpowers. The first reason is because continuing the
alignment with US while alienating China might cost South Korea economic burden and possibly
creating larger security threat from China than what it already has right now. In terms of
economic relations, China is the biggest trade partner for South Korea; it owns the market for a
quarter of total export of South Korea. When the issue of THAAD was received as a betrayal to
China and resulted to economic restrictions against South Korea, the economic loss the latter had
to bear was significant. Tourists from China dropped almost 50 percent and big retail company,
Lotte, eventually had to withdraw from the country. China also has significance influence over
North Korea. It is North Korea’s biggest trading partner and even under UN sanctions, UNSC
reported that China still secretly provided coal to North Korea. This makes China an important
partner for South Korea since one of South Korea’s foreign policy priorities is to resolve the
Korean Peninsula issue.
But even though China is an important partner for South Korea, this does not necessarily mean
the latter will change its alignment from US to China. This becomes the second reason why South
Korea should maintain hedging. Bandwagoning with the rising China can be very costly for South
Korea because this means they must let go the alliance with US which they have built for more
than half a century and start from zero. Moreover, there has no strong evidence yet that China
can provide resilient security assistance and become the ‘benevolent leader’ like US. In addition,
China has centralistic communist government while South Korea adopted democracy. This
difference might contribute to the lack of essential element for alliance—trust.
Third reason is South Korea is not strong or big enough to go autonomous. First, they have
asymmetric deterrence with North Korea, making them vulnerable to nuclear threat from the
North. Second, East Asian region is heavily influenced by US and China, and compared to those
two superpowers, South Korea has limited capabilities and power. It is unlikely that South Korea
can pursue its national interests in international level without cooperating with either of those
superpowers.
These three reasons lead to the conclusion that it will be the best strategy for South Korea to
hedge between the two. Hedging here means maintaining good relations with both superpowers
and delaying full commitment to one of them. South Korea has shown this by refusing to join One
Belt One Road initiated by China or US initiative of Free and Open Indo-Pacific. While avoiding
choosing between US and China, South Korea has also balanced its hedging strategy by engaging
more actors so as to reduce the tensions and bring more stakeholders into the discussion. One of
these efforts is New Southern Policy initiative which aims to improve and solidify South Korea’s
relation with Southeast Asian countries.

Fully committed to US while alienating China might cost Korea economic burden and possibly
creating larger security threat from China that what it already has right now
- China’s retaliation to THAAD (25% export went to China)
- China’s influence over North Korea
1. Bandwagoning with rising China will be very costly for Korea bc this means they have to
let go alliance with US which they’ve built for more than half a decade
- SK’s investment in the alliance
- Is China a stronger partner compared to US for SK?
- Intransparency; different ideology
2. Korea is not that strong to go autonomous, they have asymmetric deterrence with North
Korea; comparably small with China and US

 Refuse to join either OBOR or FOIP

 Developed new southern policy


SK’s interests
- Security
- Dismantling cold war structure
- Preventing regional hegemony  regional balance with regional cooperation
- Global power and industrial hedge
 NORTH KOREA
What is the best way to keep peace on the Korean peninsula while making utmost efforts to
denuclearize North Korea? Strengthening security ties or building peace regime?
ENGAGEMENT COERCIVE
MOON CHUNGIN: KIM SUNGHAN AND SCOTT SNYDER
Peace keeping, peace making, peace building - Strengthen US extended deterrence
- Strengthen economic sanctions
Strategic offensive, flexible dualism, military - Reaffirm US onshore strategic posture
deterrence, international collaboration,
domestic consensus
PARK CHEOLHEE
Conditional engagement: engage and verify
- Timeline
- Full denuclearization
- Sot to hard compensation
- Thorough verification
VICTOR CHA – KATRIN FRASER KATZ
Comprehensive coercive
- Strengthen global coalition +
counterprofileration
- Upgrade alliance with SK and Japan
EVIDENCE
Inter-Korean Summits "three-axis" defense system,
US-NK summit in SG, Hanoi - Korea Massive Punishment and
Retaliation (KMPR), an operational plan
to incapacitate the North Korean
leadership in a major conflict;
- Kill Chain pre-emptive strike platform;
- the Korea Air and Missile Defense
system (KAMD).
 THAAD Launchers after ICBM test

There are at least two different views on how South Korea should respond to the threats coming
from North Korea. The first view believed that priority should go to strengthen security and
pursue a more coercive approach to the North. Scholars like Kim Sunghan and Scott Snyder, for
example, suggested that it is time to take plan B in dealing with North Korea. The plan B they
suggested called “proactive containment strategy” meaning that in order to reduce the threat
from North Korea and prepare for the worst scenario, it is important to strengthen deterrence
particularly through US-Japan-South Korea alliance and to extend economic sanctions to give
pressures to the North. Other scholars such as Victor Cha and Katrin Fraser Katz also supported
the same idea which they called as “comprehensive coercive”. According to them, the best way to
deal with North Korea is to continue the sanctions program and involve more countries so as to
increase the effectiveness of the sanctions and also to enhance US alliance with Japan and South
Korea.
The second view, mostly supported by progressive policymakers in South Korea, asserted the idea
that South Korea should embrace the North with peaceful moves. By peaceful, they believed it
would be more beneficial for South Korea to engage the North so as to develop deep trust
between them. They believed that trust would be the underlying requirement for building
reconciliation with North Korea. This view was held by former President Kim Daejung with his
infamous Sunshine Policy and also by his predecessor former President Roh Moohyun. However,
as history revealed, North Korea continued to develop nuclear weapons even after these
engagement efforts were done by the two former leaders.
Personally, I believe that the issue of security and peace-building are not a yes or no question in
which one can only choose one and sacrifice the other. Both aspects are important in dealing with
Korean Peninsula issues and must be taken as priorities in a parallel way. On the one hand, peace-
building through engagement is important because it’s one of the primary means to open
negotiation with the North. Depending solely on sanctions program might not be that effective
especially when China does not fully commit to it. The fact is even though US and its allies have
been applying sanctions to North Korea, the latter’s regime still exists until today, mostly because
China often turns a blind eye to the smuggling and illegal trade between them. Thus, engagement
strategy should be sought by the South involving important stakeholders especially US and China
in the process.
The engagement, however, should come with conditions. As Park Cheol Hee’s conditional
engagement explained that engagement should be accompanied with continuous verification.
This means that first, the engagement should be based on reciprocity. The demand for
denuclearization must come at the same time South Korea offer sanctions relief or aid. Sunshine
policy in which the South gave lots of aids but did not strictly demand change for denuclearization
from the North has provided evidence that asymmetric reciprocity couldn’t work for solving North
Korean issues. Second, the promises, commitments, and claims made by the North in turn of aids
or sanctions lift must be verifiably. Reports and field HOW TO VERIFY. Third, carrot and stick
approach must be taken to deal with North Korea’s compliance. If it verifiably manages to comply
with the agreement, then carrot should be given i.e., aids provision or sanctions relief. But if it
violates the deal then South Korea and US should take a step back and give the punishment they
have lifted before.
At the same time this engagement approach is taken, South Korea also needs to continue
enhancing its military capability and strengthening alliance with US. … Maintaining and
strengthening alliance with US is especially importance as the latter gives nuclear deterrence to
the South against the North. With Biden taking the office, the prospect for a more robust alliance
might be greater for South Korea. On the other hand, it will be very essential for Korea make sure
that strengthening alliance with US won’t alienate China. China plays a central part in Korean
Peninsula because it has significant influence over the North as it’s the biggest trading partner for
the latter. Thus, getting China to fully commit in the process of North Korea denuclearization will
be crucial. South Korea has to bring China in the negotiation and ensure them that
denuclearization of North Korea will be in their interest and it won’t pose a security threat to
them.

- Sanctions could make NK difficult but it didn’t make the regime collapse (could be used as
justification to unite against external power)
- Sanctions not fully function as long as China is not fully committed to it
- Sunshine policy: denuclearization put at last exit + no guarantee nk would change
(asymmetric reciprocity)
- Peace-building – along with denuclearization  peace should be built reciprocately

- Neither engagement or pressure worked

- What are the conditions to engage NK? Verifying claims and promises (can they report all
nuclear powerS? Can they give access to verify?)

1. NK commitment to denuclearization is true and effective: can they freeze the program
verifiably
2. Reciprocal basis (give if we get sth – doesn’t have to be 100% equal)
3. Violations should lead to the previous stage (cant keep promise  pose sanctions)
 + security guarantee: alliance with US + sthrengten military

Security and peace in parallel process – not black and white

- Short term: engage – denuclearization (at least freeze)

- Long term: engage china to fully commit in peace building

- Kim Jongun hasn’t made any full strategic decision to denuclearize the country; only
under certain condition (heavy price) for them to denuclearize
 NORMAL JAPAN
Does Japan take radical shift in its security policy or does it maintain its essential security policy?
NOT NORMAL NORMAL
ERIC HEGINBOTHAM AND RICHARD SAMUELS CHRISTOPTHER HUGHES
Active denial Radical shift
Three conditionalities are toothless
- Conditionless conditionalities
- Enhanced deterrence as enhanced
entrapment
- lowering constraints on executive
control
“many of the constraints are so flexible and
open to interpretation as to be potentially
hollow in effect”
JEFFREY HORNUNG SHEILA SMITH
- the conditions under which collective - Japan has been a major military power
self-defense can be exercised are still for decades despite debate on its
very restrictive constitution and hesitancy in the use of
- Japan’s policy will still be based on the force offshore the territory
decades-old metric of minimal force - Even under the article 9, Japan could
necessary for exclusively defensive participate in UN Peacekeeping and do
defense military cooperation with neighbors
- major role of the SDF in the U.S.-Japan - 2012: Japan’s fear of US abandonment
alliance will remain logistical support
and defensive missions such as missile
defense or anti-submarine warfare.
- CSD is a strictly defensive measure
adhering to senshu boei (exclusive
defense)
- Revision of the constitution is a
completely different act that requires
majorities in both houses of parliament
as well as a public referendum
supporting the change.
- given the split in the public as well as
opposition amongst politicians in both
houses, it is unlikely that constitutional
revision is possible in the near future
- the CSD change does not authorize
Japan to launch wars against other
countries. it expand areas of
cooperation for the SDF with its
American allies, although these roles
and missions will remain severely
constrained to circumstances under
which Japan is threatened
ANDREW OROS
-
EVIDENCE
2014 CSD
 2013 National Security Strategy
 Sending more SDF to PKO
Former ambassador to US maybe its important
to start the talks on nuclear
Abe’s proposal to revise constitution
Japan was known as an abnormal country due to its constitution, particularly Article 9 which limit
their capability to use force in resolving international disputes. However, in 2014, Japanese
cabinet adopted a decision on security policy. The decision which was later passed by Diet in 2015
created a reinterpretation of Japanese defense capability regulated in the constitution. According
to this reinterpretation, Japan now might be able to exercise collective self-defense—a right
prohibited by Constitution in 1947. Japan could exercise force even when it’s not under direct
attack because threat against other territories might also pose indirect threat to Japan.
Some argue that this reinterpretation won’t make significant change to Japanese defense system.
Jeffrey Hornung, for example, argued that the reinterpretation came with conditionalities which
make the exercise of collective self-defense remain restrictive. The right for collective self-defense
will also be strictly limited to the goal of exclusive defense and thus the reinterpretation does not
mean that Japan has the right to attack or start a war with other states.
However, other scholars including Christopher Hughes argue that this is a radical shift in Japan’s
security policy. He believed that this reinterpretation of Constitution would shift the use of force
Japan’s exclusive defense into collective self-defense. This means Japan would be likely to be
pulled into US alliance operations, specifically those which are carried to protect the security of
other nations. Hughes argued that even though Abe introduced conditionalities which could
prevent Japan to use force, these conditionalities were very open to interpretation and thus,
would be easy for Japanese government to get around it.
Between these two contending views, I argued that Japan has indeed shown radical shift in its
security policy, especially after Abe’s leadership. First, I agree with Hughed that the
conditionalities which came with the 2014 reinterpretation of constitution were very vague. There
is no specific benchmark which can limit or restrict the exercise of collective self-defense. For
example, one of the conditionalities is that Japan might use force when an armed attack against
Japan or a foreign country that is in a close relation with Japan occurs and result in threats to
Japan’s survival. There was no explanation on how Japan’s relation with other country can be
considered as “close” enough for Japan to join their defense force. There was also no detail on
how to measure indirect threats coming as results of attack on other countries. In short, these
conditionalities are not very restrictive on their own.
Second, Japan has made many changes under Abe. In terms of military budget, the downward
trend changed when Abe took the office again in 2012. Since he’s in charge, Japan’s military
budget had continuously increased for eight years. The trend was also continued by his
predecessor Yoshihide Suga who marked ninth consecutive rise in military budget for 2021. Abe
also initiated the National Security Strategy – the first strategic report which outlined Japan’s
security policy and objectives in a decade. The document emphasized the policy of “Proactive
Contribution to Peace” which means that Japan would be an active player in contributing to peace
and stability of international community. In this sense, Abe was trying to link global security with
national security—instability outside the border might bring security threat to Japan.
Third, the increasing tensions in East Asia have made Japan more concerned about whether they
are able to secure their survival against security threats coming from its neighbors. Japan has at
least three weighty territorial disputes with its neighbors, China, South Korea and Russia. It also
has an aggressive neighbor which owns nuclear weapons that is North Korea. Additionally,
Trump’s retrenchment foreign policy had increased insecurity over US abandonment to Japanese.
The combination between increasing threats and fear over abandonment has created greater
pressure on Japanese policymakers to ensure their security on their own.

For example, US didn’t show active during Senkaku/DIayou dispute in 2010-2012,

- Prior to 2014, the interpretation of Article 9 is that Japan owns collective self-defense but
cant exercise it due to constitution  Abe reinterpret

- Significantly change the room of options

- But japan will remain reluctant to use force/change article 9 unless there is significant
crisis i.e. attack on their territory
For example in 2003, when the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian
and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq was presented to Diet, it was originally debated but
after two Japan diplomats were killed in Iraq, the law was immediately passed
- 2015 revision of guidelines for US-Japan Defense cooperation: expand the scope of
Japanese support to include BMD

- National security strategy

- Increasing military budget

- Maintaining and participating in intl security is important for Japanese security (Abe)
WHAT DID HE DO? SDF now functions as global defense/security

- The Antiterrorism Special Measures Law pushed this further, allowing those who
deployed abroad in coalition forces to use their weapons on behalf of anyone working
alongside the SDF

- Japan has increasingly exercised its BMD abilities in response to Pyongyang’s missiles. The
BMD system Japan has in place can track North Korea’s missiles, but whether it can
handle a large-scale attack against Japan is unclear

- 2006 In addition to BMD, the ministry considered a longer-range missile that could
destroy. The Ministry of Defense began to consider its next procurement plan for 2019–
2023, and the LDP National Security Subcommittee issued a proposal for acquiring strike
capability

- With Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam, Japan is providing
assistance in building maritime defense capacity

- Dynamic force: reduce ground increase maritime and air force + defend space and cyber

- NO STRATEGIC WEAPONS: ICBM, aircraft carriers, nuclear weapons, nuclear submarines

 EAST ASIA REGIONALISM
What is the prospect for cooperation in East Asia?
COOPERATION RIVALRY
PARK CHEOLHEE (Constructivist) AARON FRIEDBERG (Realist)
- National identity can be changed by: Rivalry
historical change; plural contention (ex. - Multipolar regimes: Europe can
Progressive v. conservative); complex cooperate while Asia can’t
interaction among countries (ex. - Various regimes, different level of
THAAD worsen China-Kor relations) development, diversities (lack of
- Prospect for cooperation depends on mitigating factors)
national identity - Less tied economy
- Japan – post cold war – - Too much nuclear
neoconservatists: refused apology
diplomacy + national identity: pride
- Korea – post cold war – progressives:
engagement with NK
- Korea – conservatives: punishment to
NK
T.J. PEMPEL (Liberalist) SHEILA SMEITH:
- Economic and social link create Contending Japan-China
independence, connection and - Increasing voices in debate
cohesiveness - Japan’s choice is affected by Beijing
- Connectedness driven by private sector
- Economic interdependence prevent
conflicts to escalate into war
- National power defined by economic
rather than military capabilities
- The increasing importance of economic
will make these countries prefer peace
over war
- Arguments that EAS lacks of integration
are mostly based on the actions of the
governments
- If one sees beneath the level of state
actions, one can see that EAS has
become more interdependent,
connected, and cohesive
- Not only states, non-state actors can
lead the development of greater
regional cohesiveness
- Using EU experiences to criticise EAS is
impractical and a mistake
- Three drivers for regional cooperation:
governments, corporations, ad hoc
problem-oriented coalitions
- To focus only on one driver and ignore
the others is to miss the greater
multiplicity and complexity of ties that
are emerging
- Regionalism: process of institution
creation; governments conclude that
 their interests are sufficiently
congruent with one another (top down,
formal agreement, semipermanent
structures)
- Regionalization: bottom up, social
construction,
YUICHI HOSOYA JOHN MEARSHEIMER
FOIP 1.0  isolate China Don’t rely on international too much, it reflects
FOIP 2.0  accommodate OBOR national interest of great power
PETER KATZENSTEIN
- Regions are, among other things, social
constructions created through politics
PAUL EVANS
- Regionalism: expression of common
sense of identity and destiny combined
with the creation of institutions that
express that identity and shape
collective action
- Regionalization: increased commercial
and human transactions in a defined
geographical space
EVIDENCE
APT Territorial and historical conflicts
Trilateral Cooperation
Increasing economic interdependence
There are different views on the prospect for cooperation among East Asian Countries. Scholars
who based their argument on neorealism, such as Aaron Friedberg, argued that the tendency to
rival each other is greater than the prospect of cooperation. He called the East Asian region as
“ripe for rivalry” meaning that the region lacked mitigating factors which would prevent them
from getting into conflicts. Unlike Europe, East Asia don’t have shared identity. They had different
cultures and regimes. He also claimed that the level of interdependence between these countries
was still low and thus, they didn’t have institutional order to cooperate. Friedberg concluded that
the pace of conflict escalation would be faster than the pace of development of mitigating factors,
and this would lead to rivalry instead of cooperation in the region.
Other scholars who used liberalist perspective argued that there is prospect for cooperation in
East Asia, and in fact, these countries have been showing cooperative efforts in the post-Cold War
era. T.J. Pempel, for example, argued that East Asia today is very different with East Asia in the
20th century. They have enhanced economic ties among themselves and with the increasing
importance of economy, these countries were able to maintain peace and reduce security
tensions in the region. Unlike Friedberg who focused on states’ actions, Pempel analysed the ties
between actors beneath state level, those were corporations and other non-state actors. He
argued that even though on the state level, East Asian countries haven’t been able to establish a
solid regionalism, but private sectors in these countries have built ties which indirectly increased
interdependency among these states. …
Constructivist offered different views. According to these scholars, the prospect for cooperation
among East Asian countries depends on their identity and interactions. Park Cheol-hee, for
example, argued that tendency for cooperation or conflict in the region changed as these
countries changed their national identity. This national identity is developed and can be changed
by historical backgrounds, plural contention, and complex interactions among these countries. For
example, when Japan was ruled by progressives, it was more cooperative towards South Korea,
adopting ‘apology’ diplomacy to create a better relationship with its neighbors. But after Gulf War
and the rise of neoconservatives in Japan, its national identity changed into one which
emphasized national pride, resulting a more offensive foreign policy approach towards South
Korea and China.
Among these three views, I incline more to the view that there is prospect for cooperation in East
Asia. First, I agree with Pempel’s argument that focusing only on state level while ignoring the
enhancing ties on private sector could lead to a fallacy that there is no regionalization in the
region. For example, in terms of economy, China, Japan, and South Korea have been the top
trading partners for each other. The share of intra-regional trade in East Asia has reached more
than 50 percent of total trade. This deepening economic interdependence, accompanied with the
importance of economic growth, has helped the three countries to keep the region relatively
peaceful. In most of cases, this could prevent conflicts to escalate into military battle and instead,
led the countries to negotiating table.
Second, even on the state level, there has been progress with institutionalization process in East
Asia. Starting in late 1990s, East Asia has developed regional forum by riding on ASEAN. It started
with ASEAN Plus Three in 1999 and then in 2008, China, Japan, and South Korea eventually
established Trilateral Cooperation as regional forum outside of ASEAN. Obviously, these
institutions are not comparable with European Union which has supranational power. However,
their establishment provides a forum for the three countries to sit together and negotiate their
interests which increase the possibility of cooperation among them. Additionally, even though
East Asian countries have conflict with each other, the three countries have been showing efforts
to resolve the issue through negotiation. For example, when China-South Korea relations went
south in 2016 due to THAAD issues, the two countries eventually managed to resolve the issue –
though not completely – in 2017 and continue their cooperation afterwards.
Third, East Asian countries have been showing cooperative tendencies, especially when they’re
facing the same issues. For example, one of the reasons behind the establishment of Trilateral
Summit in 2008 was because the three countries wanted to strengthen their economic
cooperation in the face of US economic slowdown. Recently, South Korea has also managed to
launch cooperation initiative to tackle the issue of pandemic and health issues in East Asia
through ‘Northeast Asia Cooperation Initiative for Infectious Disease Control and Public Health’.
My argument does not ignore the fact that conflicts and tensions among East Asian countries still
exist even until today. However, reflecting from the experiences of these three countries in the
past twenty years, the prospect for cooperation presents at the moment. This prospect is mostly
supported by the bottom-up process led by multinational corporations and other non-state
economic actors in the region.

1. Enhanced economic and social ties

2. Establishment of institutions
3. Efforts to resolve issues through negotiation

Regionalism: shared identity, sense of destiny  might not be possible

Regionalizaiton: increased commercial and human interactions  possible and might’ve going on