1.) G.R. No.

162205

REVELINA LIMSON, Petitioner,
vs.
EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Under review is the decision promulgated on July 31, 2003,  whereby the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner
1

Revelina Limson' s petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the Secretary of Justice of her petition for review vis-
a-vis the adverse resolutions of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City (OCP) of her charges for
falsification and illegal use of aliases against respondent Eugenio Juan Gonzalez.

Antecedents

The antecedents as found by the CA are as follows:

On or about December 1, 1997, Limson filed a criminal charge against Gonzalez for falsification, before the
Prosecutor's Office of Mandaluyong City.

Vice Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, who penned the decision under review, pursuant to the raffle of May 8,
2013.

The charge for [sic] falsification of [sic] Limson is based on Limson’s assertion that in the records of the
Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), a certain ‘EUGENIO GONZALEZ’ is registered as an architect
and that Gonzalez, who uses, among others, the name ‘EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ’, and who pretends to be
said architect. Registered [sic] with the PRC, is an impostor and therefore, guilty [sic] of falsification x x x."

Gonzalez filed his Counter-Affidavit, wherein he explained in detail that his full name is EUGENIO (first
given name) JUAN (second given name) GONZALEZ (father’s family name) y REGALADO (mother’s family
name). He alleges that in his youth, while he was still in grade school and high school, he used the name EUGENIO
GONZALEZ y REGALADO and/or EUGENIO GONZALEZ and that thereafter, he transferred to the University of
Santo Tomas and therein took up architecture and that upon commencement of his professional practice in 1943,
he made use of his second name, JUAN. Consequently, in his professional practice, he has identified himself as
much as possible as Arch. Eugenio Juan Gonzalez, because the surname GONZALEZ was and is still, a very
common surname throughout the Philippines and he wanted to distinguish himself with his second given name,
JUAN, after his first given name, EUGENIO. Gonzalez supposed [sic] his allegations with various supporting
documents x x x.

After receiving pertinent Affidavits and evidentiary documents from Limson and Gonzalez, respectively, the
Prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge against Gonzalez, finding that indeed EUGENIO JUAN R. GONZALES
[sic] is the architect registered in the PRC. Said Resolution was issued on March 30, 1998 x x x.

Limson elevated the Resolution of the Prosecutor x x x to the Secretary of Justice. Before the Secretary of Justice,
she utilized the basic arguments she had raised before the Prosecutor’s Office, with slight variations, in assailing
said adverse Resolution of the Prosecutor.

After Opposition by Gonzalez, the Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal of Limson. The Secretary of Justice
affirmed and even expanded the findings of the Prosecutor x x x.

Not content with said Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, Limson filed a motion for reconsideration therefrom;
which, after Opposition by Gonzalez, was dismissed by the Secretary of Justice, on September 15, 2000 x x x. Said
dismissal was with finality.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, on or about September 25, 2000, Limson filed a new letter complaint against
Gonzalez, with the Secretary of Justice. She alleged the same basic facts, evidence, and charges, as already
resolved by the Prosecutor and affirmed with finality, by the Secretary of Justice; but adding the accusation that
because Gonzalez used various combinations of his name, in different signature, on the [sic] different occasions,
Gonzalez had also violated Republic Act No. 6085 (the Anti-Alias Law). Limson, in said letter complaint of
September 25, 2000, suppressed from the Secretary of Justice, the extant before- mentioned Resolutions, already
decreed and adverse to her.

The Secretary of Justice referred this letter complaint of Limson x x x to the Prosecutor’s Office of Mandaluyong City
for investigation.

This new investigation was docketed as I.S. No. 01-44001-B and assigned to Honorable Susante J. Tobias x x x.

After submission of Affidavits, Counter-Affidavits and other pertinent pleadings, and evidences [sic], by the
respective parties, before the Prosecutor, the Prosecutor rendered a Resolution, dismissing the new complaint x x x
which Resolution reads as follows:

‘After a careful evaluation of the letter complaint of Revelina Limson dated September 25, 2000 addressed to the
Secretary of Justice and endorsed to this Office x x x and the evidence adduced by the contending parties, we find
the issues raised in the aforesaid letter to be a rehashed (sic) of a previous complaint filed by the same complainant
which has already been long resolved with finality by this Office and the Department of Justice more particularly
under I.S. No. 97-11929.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant case be considered closed and dismissed.’

Not content with said Resolution x x x, Limson filed a motion for reconsideration; [sic]which was again opposed by
Gonzalez and which was denied by the Prosecutor x x x.

Not agreeable to said Resolution x x x, Limson filed a Petition for Review with the Secretary of Justice x x x, to
which x x x Gonzalez filed an Answer/Opposition x x x.

The Secretary of Justice denied said Petition for Review of Limson, on April 3, 2002 x x x as follows:

‘Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, provides that the Secretary of
Justice may, motu propio, dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing of any reversible error in the assailed
resolution or when issued [sic] raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. We carefully examined
the petition and its attachments and we found no such error committed by the prosecutor that would justify the
reversal of the assailed resolution which is in accord with the evidence and law on the matter.

Moreover, there was no showing that a copy of the petition was furnished the Prosecution Office concerned
pursuant to Section 5 of said Department Circular. 2

Although Limson sought the reconsideration of the adverse resolution of April 3, 2002, the Secretary of Justice
denied her motion for reconsideration on October 15, 2002.

Decision of the CA

Limson assailed on certiorari the adverse resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in the CA, claiming that the
Secretary of Justice had thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for
misappreciating her evidence establishing her charges of falsification and violation of the Anti-Alias Law against
respondent.

On July 31, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision dismissing the petition for certiorari, disposing as
follows:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussions, the instant Petition is perforce DENIED. Accordingly, the
Resolutions subject of this petition are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 3

On January 30, 2004, the CA denied Limson’s motion for reconsideration.

Issues

In her petition for review, Limson avers the following errors, namely:

THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DO NOT CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD. MOREOVER, THERE WAS A MISAPPRECIATION AND/OR MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND
THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO NOTICE CERTAIN RELEVANT POINTS WHICH IF CONSIDERED
WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION

II

THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS A FINDING BASED ON SPECULATION AND/OR

SURMISE AND THE INFERENCES MADE WERE MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN. 4

Limson insists that the names "Eugenio Gonzalez" and "Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado" did not refer
to one and the same individual; and that respondent was not a registered architect contrary to his claim.
According to her, there were material discrepancies between the graduation photograph of respondent taken in
1941 when he earned his degree in Architecture from the University of Sto. Tomas, Manila,  and another photograph
5

of him taken for his driver’s license in 1996,  arguing that the person in the latter photograph was not the same
6

individual depicted in the 1941 photograph. She submits documents showing that respondent used aliases from
birth, and passed himself off as such persons when in fact he was not. She prays that the decision of the CA be set
aside, and that the proper criminal cases for falsification of public document and illegal use of alias be filed against
respondent

In his comment,  respondent counters that the petition for review should be denied due course for presenting only
7

factual issues; that the factual findings of the OCP, the Secretary of Justice, and the CA should remain undisturbed;
that he did not commit any falsification; that he did not use any aliases; that his use of conflicting names was the
product of erroneous entry, inadvertence, and innocent mistake on the part of other people; that Limson was
motivated by malice and ill will, and her charges were the product of prevarication; and that he was a distinguished
architect and a respected member of the community and society.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal has no merit.

To start with, the petition for review of Limson projects issues of fact. It urges the Court to undo the findings of fact of
the OCP, the Secretary of Justice and the CA on the basis of the documents submitted with her petition. But the
Court is not a trier of facts, and cannot analyze and weigh evidence. Indeed, Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court
explicitly requires the petition for review on certiorari to raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.
Accordingly, the petition for review of Limson is outrightly rejected for this reason.

Secondly, Limson appears to stress that the CA erred in concluding that the Secretary of Justice did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence submitted to the OCP. She would now have us reverse
the CA.

We cannot reverse the CA. We find that the conclusion of the CA about the Secretary of Justice not committing
grave abuse of discretion was fully warranted. Based on the antecedents earlier rendered here, Limson did not
persuasively demonstrate to the CA how the Secretary of Justice had been gravely wrong in upholding the dismissal
by the OCP of her charges against respondent. In contrast, the assailed resolutions of the Secretary of Justice were
quite exhaustive in their exposition of the reasons for the dismissal of the charges. And, even assuming that the
Secretary of Justice thereby erred, she should have shown to the CA that either arbitrariness or capriciousness or
whimsicality had tainted the error. Yet, she tendered no such showing. She should be reminded, indeed, that grave
abuse of discretion meant either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised by the Secretary of Justice in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the Secretary of Justice evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when the
Secretary of Justice, while exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers, acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as
to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 8

Thirdly, the discrepancy between photographs supposedly taken in 1941 and in 1996 of respondent did not support
Limson’s allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice. It is really absurd to expect
respondent, the individual depicted on the photographs, to look the same after 55 long years.

And, fourthly, on the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the Court observes that respondent’s aliases
involved the names "Eugenio Gonzalez", "Eugenio Gonzales", "Eugenio Juan Gonzalez", "Eugenio Juan
Gonzalez y Regalado", "Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez", "Eugenio J. Gonzalez", and – per Limson – "Eugenio Juan
Robles Gonzalez." But these names contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an erroneous
middle or second name, or a misspelled family name in one instance. The records disclose that the
erroneous middle or second names, or the misspelling of the family name resulted from error or
inadvertence left unchecked and unrectified over time. What is significant, however, is that such names
were not fictitious names within the purview of the Anti-Alias Law; and that such names were not different
from each other. Considering that he was not also shown to have used the names for unscrupulous
purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the charge against him was justified in fact
and in law.

An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually,
usually in business transactions, in addition to the real name by which he was registered at birth or
baptized the first time, or to the substitute name authorized by a competent authority; a man’s name is
simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they
distinguish him, but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as
aliases.  An alias is thus a name that is different from the individual’s true name, and does not refer to a
9

name that is not different from his true name.

In Ursua v. Court of Appeals,  the Court tendered an enlightening discourse on the history and objective of our law
10

on aliases that is worth including here, viz:

Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and
the evils sought to be remedied.  Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind
1âwphi1

and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the
spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would
defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.

For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly violated by petitioner,
and the surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its
amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No.142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and
before its amendment by R. A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:

Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with
which he was christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have
been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those
legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias,
and each new petition shall set forth the original name and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority
has been obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority was granted. Judicial
authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register x x x.

The above law was subsequently amended by R. A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No.
142 now reads:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and
in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was
baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon
entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose
births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the
approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall
comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally
provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial
authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person’s baptismal and family name and
the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant’s name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has
such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial
authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant’s name shall be recorded in the proper
local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same
is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.

The objective and purpose of C. A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use
in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of
Commerce And Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which
was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. The
pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow – Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or
sign, on any written or printed receipt including receipt for tax or business or any written or printed contract not
verified by a notary public or on any written or printed evidence of any agreement or business transactions, any
name used in connection with his business other than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view
in or at the place where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm name
or business name or style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or business name or style in
the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any other person having a joint or common interest
with him in such contract agreement, business transaction, or business x x x.

For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common
practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous
confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names
which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or
wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. CA. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using
an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the
civil register.

In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of
an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled –

There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner’s use of alias 'Kheng Chiau Young' in addition to his real name 'Yu
Cheng Chiau' would add to more confusion.  That he is known in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc.,
1âwphi1

by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his
associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a customer, knows him by his real
name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered certain difficulties in his transactions with government offices
which required him to explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could easily
avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real name 'Yu Cheng Chiau.'

The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his having filed a petition for
naturalization in Branch V of the abovementioned court, argues the more against the grant of his petition, because if
naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be
contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as well as business transactions.
And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to
write his name following the Occidental method, 'he can easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of
the name 'Yu Kheng Chian,' he can, abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name 'Kheng Chiau
Young.' (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July
31, 2003; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
2.) G.R. Nos. 164368-69               April 2, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 to seek the reversal of the
Sandiganbayan’s Joint Resolution dated July 12, 2004, granting respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s (Estrada)
demurrer to evidence in Crim. Case No. 26565.2

THE FACTS

On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No. 26558) was filed with the Sandiganbayan
against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim.
Case No. 26565, was likewise filed against Estrada. The Amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 reads:

That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then President of the Republic of
the Philippines, without having been duly authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position
and committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED
during his tenure and his true identity as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE VELARDE’ IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS
AND use and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal
name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated for joint trial. Still another Information, this time
for perjury and docketed as Crim. Case No. 26905, was filed with the Sandiganbayan against Estrada. This was
later consolidated, too, with Crim. Cases No. 26558 and 26565.

Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued.

On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan to try, hear, and decide
the charges of plunder and related cases (illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent Estrada.3

At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the allegations of the Informations
for plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury. The People’s evidence for the illegal alias charge, as summarized by
the Sandiganbayan, consisted of:

A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) officers Clarissa G. Ocampo
(Ocampo) and Atty. Manuel Curato (Curato) who commonly declared that on February 4, 2000, Estrada
opened a numbered trust account (Trust Account C-163) with PCIB and signed as "Jose Velarde" in the
account opening documents; both Ocampo and Curato also testified that Aprodicio Lacquian and Fernando
Chua were present on that occasion;

B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan, who declared that a certain Baby
Ortaliza (Ortaliza) transacted several times with her; that Ortaliza deposited several checks in PCIB Savings
Account No. 0160-62502-5 under the account name "Jose Velarde" on the following dates (as evidenced by
deposit receipts duly marked in evidence):
 a. 20 October 1999 (Exh. "MMMMM")

b. 8 November 1999 (Exh. "LLLLL")

c. 22 November 1999 (Exh. "NNNNN")

d. 24 November 1999 (Exh. "OOOOO")

e. 25 November 1999 (Exh. "PPPPP")

f. 20 December 1999 (Exh. "QQQQQ")

g. 21 December 1999 (Exh. "RRRRR")

h. 29 December 1999 (Exh. "SSSSS")

i. 4 January 2000 (Exh. "TTTTT")

j. 10 May 2000 (Exh. "UUUUU")

k. 6 June 2000 (Exh. "VVVVV")

l. 25 July 2000 (Exh. "WWWWW")

(2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena Ortaliza was employed in the Office of the
Vice President and, later on, in the Office of the President when Estrada occupied these positions and when
deposits were made to the Jose Velarde Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5.

The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated cases, which the Sandiganbayan admitted into
evidence in a Resolution dated October 13, 2003.4 The accused separately moved to reconsider the Sandiganbayan
Resolution;5 the People, on the other hand, filed its Consolidated Comment/Opposition to the motions.6 The
Sandiganbayan denied the motions in its Resolution dated November 17, 2003.7

After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed to file a demurrer to evidence in these
cases.8 In its Joint Resolution dated March 10, 2004,9 the Sandiganbayan only granted the defense leave to file
demurrers in Crim. Case Nos. 26565 (illegal use of alias) and 26905 (perjury).

Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26905.10 His demurrer to evidence for
Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use of alias) was anchored on the following grounds11:

1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms. Clarissa
Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000), they saw movant use
the name "Jose Velarde";

2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in late 2001 as can be
gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October 2001;

3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered by the prosecution
are banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot be revealed without
following proper procedures; and

4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.

The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated Opposition that presented the following arguments:12
 1. That the use of fictitious names in bank transaction was not expressly prohibited until BSP No. 302 is of
no moment considering that as early as Commonwealth Act No. 142, the use of alias was already
prohibited. Movant is being prosecuted for violation of C.A. No. 142 and not BSP Circular No. 302;

2. Movant’s reliance on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]) is misplaced;

3. Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended, requires publication of the alias and the habitual use
thereof, the prosecution has presented more than sufficient evidence in this regard to convict movant for
illegal use of alias; and

4. Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant case of illegal use of alias is not absorbed in plunder.

Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through a Consolidated Reply Opposition.

THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYAN’S RULING

The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now assailed in this petition. The salient points of the
assailed resolution are:

First – the coverage of Estrada’s indictment. The Sandiganbayan found that the only relevant evidence for the
indictment are those relating to what is described in the Information – i.e., the testimonies and documents on the
opening of Trust Account C-163 on February 4, 2000. The Sandiganbayan reasoned out that the use of the
disjunctive "or" between "on or about 04 February 2000" and "sometime prior or subsequent thereto" means that the
act/s allegedly committed on February 4, 2000 could have actually taken place prior to or subsequent thereto; the
use of the conjunctive was simply the prosecution’s procedural tool to guard against any variance between the date
stated in the Information and that proved during the trial in a situation in which time was not a material ingredient of
the offense; it does not mean and cannot be read as a roving commission that includes acts and/or events separate
and distinct from those that took place on the single date "on or about 04 February 2000 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto." The Sandiganbayan ruled that the use of the disjunctive "or" prevented it from interpreting the
Information any other way.

Second – the People’s failure to present evidence that proved Estrada’s commission of the offense. The
Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to present evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished under
Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142), as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals.13 It ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the context of CA 142 only if
the use of the alias is public and habitual. In Estrada’s case, the Sandiganbayan noted, the application of the
principles was not as simple because of the complications resulting from the nature of the transaction involved – the
alias was used in connection with the opening of a numbered trust account made during the effectivity of R.A. No.
1405, as amended,14 and prior to the enactment of Republic R.A. No. 9160.15

Estrada did not publicly use the alias "Jose Velarde":

a. Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde" in his dealings with Dichavez and Ortaliza after February 4,
2000 is not relevant in light of the conclusion that the acts imputed to Estrada under the Information were the
act/s committed on February 4, 2000 only. Additionally, the phrase, "Estrada did … represent himself as
‘Jose Velarde’ in several transactions," standing alone, violates Estrada’s right to be informed of the nature
and the cause of the accusation, because it is very general and vague. This phrase is qualified and
explained by the succeeding phrase – "and use and employ the said alias ‘Jose Velarde’" – which "is neither
his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or
other corporate entities." Thus, Estrada’s representations before persons other than those mentioned in the
Information are immaterial; Ortaliza and Dichavez do not fall within the "Equitable PCI Bank and/or other
corporate entities" specified in the Information. Estrada’s representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez are not
therefore covered by the indictment.

b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the principle in the law of libel that mere communication to
a third person is publicity; it reasoned out that that the definition of publicity is not limited to the way it is
defined under the law on libel; additionally, the application of the libel law definition is onerous to the
 accused and is precluded by the ruling in Ursua that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed
strictly against the State and favorably for the accused. It ruled that the definition under the law on libel, even
if it applies, considers a communication to a third person covered by the privileged communication rule to be
non-actionable. Estrada’s use of the alias in front of Ocampo and Curato is one such privileged
communication under R.A. No. 1405, as amended. The Sandiganbayan said:

Movant’s act of signing "Jose Velarde" in bank documents being absolutely confidential, the witnessing
thereof by bank officers who were likewise sworn to secrecy by the same law cannot be considered as
‘public’ as to fall within the ambit of CA 142 as amended. On account of the absolute confidentiality of the
transaction, it cannot be said that movant intended to be known by this name in addition to his real name.
Confidentiality and secrecy negate publicity. Ursua instructs:

Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance
without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name
from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition in C.A. No. 142 as amended.

c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention not to be publicly known by the name "Jose Velarde"
is shown by the nature of a numbered account – a perfectly valid banking transaction at the time Trust
Account C-163 was opened. The opening, too, of a numbered trust account, the Sandiganbayan further
ruled, did not impose on Estrada the obligation to disclose his real identity – the obligation R.A. No. 6713
imposes is to file under oath a statement of assets and liabilities.16 Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and
R.A. No. 6713 together, Estrada had the absolute obligation to disclose his assets including the amount of
his bank deposits, but he was under no obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of the bank account
(such as the name he used to open it).

Third – the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.17 The Sandiganbayan said that the absolute prohibition in R.A.
No. 9160 against the use of anonymous accounts, accounts under fictitious names, and all other similar accounts, is
a legislative acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously existed in our laws that allowed depositors to hide their
true identities. The Sandiganbayan noted that the prohibition was lifted from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
Circular No. 251 dated July 7, 2000 – another confirmation that the opening of a numbered trust account was
perfectly legal when it was opened on February 4, 2000.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as interpreted in Ursua, must necessarily be
harmonized with the provisions of R.A. No.1405 and R.A. No. 9160 under the principle that every statute should be
construed in a way that will harmonize it with existing laws. A reasonable scrutiny, the Sandiganbayan said, of all
these laws in relation to the present case, led it to conclude that the use of an alias within the context of a bank
transaction (specifically, the opening of a numbered account made before bank officers) is protected by the secrecy
provisions of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus outside the coverage of CA No. 142 until the passage into law of R.A. No.
9160.

THE PETITION

The People filed this petition raising the following issues:

1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and
in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias "Jose Velarde" was not public despite the
presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua on 4 February 2000;

2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and
in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias "Jose Velarde" was allowable under
banking rules, despite the clear prohibition under Commonwealth Act No. 142;

3. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and
in applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of alias punishable under Commonwealth Act
No. 142;
 4. Whether the alleged harmonization and application made by the court a quo of R.A. No.1405 and
Commonwealth Act No. 142 were proper;

5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended
Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the alias "Jose Velarde" by respondent Joseph Estrada
on February 4, 2000;

6. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in departing from its earlier final finding
on the non-applicability of Ursua v. Court of Appeals and forcing its application to the instant case.

THE COURT’S RULING

The petition has no merit.

The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling

Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read:

Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and
in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was
baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon
entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose
births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the
approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall
comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally
provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial
authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and
the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has
such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial
authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper
local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same
is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.

How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an alias – "a name or names used by
a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition
to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by
a competent authority." There must be, in the words of Ursua, a "sign or indication that the user intends to
be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth … [for the use of alias to]
fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended." 18

Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale that led to the enactment of CA No. 142, as follows:

The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting
scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice
almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully
maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A.
No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial
proceedings and recorded in the civil register.19

Following the doctrine of stare decisis,20 we are guided by the Ursua ruling on how the crime punished under CA No.
142 may be committed. Close adherence to this ruling, in other words, is unavoidable in the application of and the
determination of criminal liability under CA No. 142.
Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application of the Ursua ruling proceeds from Estrada’s
position in the government; at the time of the commission of the offense, he was the President of the Republic who
is required by law to disclose his true name. We do not find this argument sufficient to justify a distinction between a
man on the street, on one hand, and the President of the Republic, on the other, for purposes of applying CA No.
142. In the first place, the law does not make any distinction, expressly or impliedly, that would justify a differential
treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to Estrada, in fact allows him to use his cinema or screen name of Joseph
Estrada, which name he has used even when he was already the President of the Philippines. Even the petitioner
has acquiesced to the use of the screen name of the accused, as shown by the title of the present petition.
Additionally, any distinction we make based on the People’s claim unduly prejudices Estrada; this is proscribed by
the Ursua dictum that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of
the accused.21 The mode of violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same whoever the accused may be.

The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling (Resolution dated February 6, 2002) denying
Estrada’s motion to quash the Information. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected the application of Ursua under
the following tenor:

The use of the term "alias" in the Amended Information in itself serves to bring this case outside the ambit of the
ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]), on which the accused heavily relies in his
motion to quash. The term "alias" means "otherwise known as" (Webster Third New International Dictionary, 1993
ed., p. 53). The charge of using an "alias" logically implies that another name has been used publicly and habitually.
Otherwise, he will not be known by such name. In any case, the amended information adverts to "several
transactions" and signing of documents with the Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities where the
above-mentioned alias was allegedly employed by the accused.

The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from facts established in the Ursua case where another
name was used by the accused in a single instance without any sign or indication that that [sic] he intended to be
known from that day by this name in addition to his real name.22

The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in applying Ursua notwithstanding this
earlier final ruling on its non-applicability – a ruling that binds the parties in the present case. The People thus claims
that the Sandiganbayan erred to the point of gravely abusing its discretion when it resurrected the application of
Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its earlier final ruling.

We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory
order – a ruling denying a motion to quash23 – that cannot be given the attributes of finality and immutability that are
generally accorded to judgments or orders that finally dispose of the whole, of or particular matters in, a case.24 The
Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order because its effects would only be provisional in character,
and would still require the issuing court to undertake substantial proceedings in order to put the controversy to
rest.25 It is basic remedial law that an interlocutory order is always under the control of the court and may be
modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment.26 Perez v. Court of
Appeals,27 albeit a civil case, instructively teaches that an interlocutory order carries no res adjudicata effects. Says
Perez:

The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only an interlocutory matter, the principle of res judicata cannot
be applied in this case. There can be no res judicata where the previous order in question was not an order or
judgment determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but was only an interlocutory order because it
required the parties to perform certain acts for final adjudication. In this case, the lifting of the restraining order
paved the way for the possession of the fishpond on the part of petitioners and/or their representatives pending the
resolution of the main action for injunction. In other words, the main issue of whether or not private respondent may
be considered a sublessee or a transferee of the lease entitled to possess the fishpond under the circumstances of
the case had yet to be resolved when the restraining order was lifted.28

Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the Information to
determine the sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any evidence aliunde. This is far different from
the present demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of the prosecution’s case, and was
faced with the issue of whether the prosecution’s evidence was sufficient to prove the allegations of the Information.
Under these differing views, the Sandiganbayan may arrive at a different conclusion on the application of Ursua, the
leading case in the application of CA 142, and the change in ruling is not per se indicative of grave abuse of
discretion. That there is no error of law is strengthened by our consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the
application of Ursua.

In an exercise of caution given Ursua’s jurisprudential binding effect, the People also argues in its petition that
Estrada’s case is different from Ursua’s for the following reasons: (1) respondent Estrada used and intended to
continually use the alias "Jose Velarde" in addition to the name "Joseph Estrada"; (2) Estrada’s use of the alias was
not isolated or limited to a single transaction; and (3) the use of the alias "Jose Velarde" was designed to cause and
did cause "confusion and fraud in business transactions" which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to
prevent. The People also argues that the evidence it presented more than satisfied the requirements of CA No. 142,
as amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or established that Estrada’s use of the alias was public.

In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties’ expressed positions, we shall now examine within the
Ursua framework the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the demurrer to evidence. The prosecution has
the burden of proof to show that the evidence it presented with the Sandiganbayan satisfied the Ursua
requirements, particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality in the use of an alias.

What is the coverage of the indictment?

The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of the
amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde" on February 4, 2000. It
posits that there was a main transaction – one that took place on February 4, 2000 – but there were other
transactions covered by the phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto; the Information specifically referred to "several
transactions" … "with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities." To the People, the restrictive finding –
that the phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto" is absorbed by the phrase "on or about 04 February 2000" –
drastically amends the succeeding main allegations on the constitutive criminal acts by removing the plurality of both
the transactions involved and the documents signed with various entities; there is the undeniable essential
relationship between the allegations of the multiplicity of transactions, on one hand, and the additional antecedent of
"prior to or subsequent thereto," on the other. It argues that the Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase "prior to or
subsequent thereto" into a useless appendage, providing Estrada with a convenient and totally unwarranted escape
route.

The People further argues that the allegation of time is the least exacting in satisfying the constitutional requirement
that the accused has to be informed of the accusation against him. Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that an allegation of the approximate date of the commission of the offense will suffice, while Section
11 of the same Rule provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the
offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the crime. This liberality allegedly shaped the time-
tested rule that when the "time" given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, the time of the
commission of the offense does not need to be proven as alleged, and that the complaint will be sustained if the
proof shows that the offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action (citing People v. Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited US v. Smith [3 Phil.
20, 22]). Since allegations of date of the commission of an offense are liberally interpreted, the People posits that
the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in disregarding the additional clause "prior to or subsequent
thereto"; under the liberality principle, the allegations of the acts constitutive of the offense finally determine the
sufficiency of the allegations of time. The People thus claims that no surprise could have taken place that would
prevent Estrada from properly defending himself; the information fully notified him that he was being accused of
using the alias Jose Velarde in more than just one instance.

We see no merit in these arguments.

At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature – the right of Estrada to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Under the provisions of the Rules of Court implementing this constitutional right, a complaint
or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense in the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.29 As to the cause of
accusation, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the
statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances, and for the court to pronounce judgment.30 The date of the commission of
the offense need not be precisely stated in the complaint or information except when the precise date is a material
ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the
actual date of its commission.31

The information must at all times embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and
circumstances that bear on the culpability and liability of the accused so that he can properly prepare for and
undertake his defense.32 In short, the allegations in the complaint or information, as written, must fully inform or
acquaint the accused – the primary reader of and the party directly affected by the complaint or information – of the
charge/s laid.

The heretofore cited Information states that "… on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused [did] … willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE VELARDE’ IN SEVERAL
TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither his registered name at birth
nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities."

We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayan’s reading of the Information, as this was how the accused might
have similarly read and understood the allegations in the Information and, on this basis, prepared his defense.
Broken down into its component parts, the allegation of time in the Information plainly states that (1) ON February 4,
2000; (2) OR before February 4, 2000; (3) OR sometime prior or subsequent to February 4, 2000, in the City of
Manila, Estrada represented himself as "Jose Velarde" in several transactions in signing documents with Equitable
PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or
other corporate entities all had their reference to February 4, 2000; they were all made on or about or prior or
subsequent to that date, thus plainly implying that all these transactions took place only on February 4, 2000 or on
another single date sometime before or after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the Information could have simply said
"on or about February 4, 2000" to capture all the alternative approximate dates, so that the phrase "sometime prior
or subsequent thereto" would effectively be a surplusage that has no meaning separately from the "on or about"
already expressed. This consequent uselessness of the "prior or subsequent thereto" phrase cannot be denied, but
it is a direct and necessary consequence of the use of the "OR" between the two phrases and the "THERETO" that
referred back to February 4, 2000 in the second phrase. Of course, the reading would have been very different (and
would have been clearly in accord with the People’s present interpretation) had the Information simply used "AND"
instead of "OR" to separate the phrases; the intent to refer to various transactions occurring on various dates and
occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be disputed. Unfortunately for the People, the imprecision in
the use of "OR" is the reality the case has to live with. To act contrary to this reality would violate Estrada’s right to
be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him; the multiple transactions on several separate days
that the People claims would result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has a right
to rely on the single day mentioned in the Information.

Separately from the constitutional dimension of the allegation of time in the Information, another issue that the
allegation of time and our above conclusion raise relates to what act or acts, constituting a violation of the offense
charged, were actually alleged in the Information. 1avvphi1

The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the People’s case, as it deals a fatal blow on the People’s
claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the repeated use of an alias within a
single day cannot be deemed "habitual," as it does not amount to a customary practice or use. This reason alone
dictates the dismissal of the petition under CA No. 142 and the terms of Ursua.

The issues of publicity, numbered accounts, and

the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405,
and R.A. No. 9160.

We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues.

The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo and Curato are bank officers sworn to secrecy under
the law, the presence of two other persons who are not bank officers – Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua –
when Estrada’s signed the bank documents as "Jose Velarde" amounted to a "public" use of an alias that violates
CA No. 142.

On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to premise the validity of Estrada’s prosecution for
violation of CA No. 142 on a mere banking practice is gravely erroneous, improper, and constitutes grave abuse of
discretion; no banking law provision allowing the use of aliases in the opening of bank accounts existed; at most, it
was allowed by mere convention or industry practice, but not by a statute enacted by the legislature. Additionally,
that Estrada’s prosecution was supposedly based on BSP Circular No. 302 dated October 11, 2001 is wrong and
misleading, as Estrada stands charged with violation of CA No. 142, penalized since 1936, and not with a violation
of a mere BSP Circular. That the use of alias in bank transactions prior to BSP Circular No. 302 is allowed is
inconsequential because as early as CA No. 142, the use of an alias (except for certain purposes which do not
include banking) was already prohibited. Nothing in CA No. 142 exempted the use of aliases in banking
transactions, since the law did not distinguish or limit its application; it was therefore grave error for the
Sandiganbayan to have done so. Lastly on this point, bank regulations being mere issuances cannot amend, modify
or prevail over the effective, subsisting and enforceable provision of CA No. 142.

On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its relationship with CA No. 142, that since nothing in CA No.
142 excuses the use of an alias, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that R.A. No. 1405
is an exception to CA No. 142’s coverage. Harmonization of laws, the People posits, is allowed only if the laws
intended to be harmonized refer to the same subject matter, or are at least related with one another. The three laws
which the Sandiganbayan tried to harmonize are not remotely related to one another; they each deal with a different
subject matter, prohibits a different act, governs a different conduct, and covers a different class of persons,33 and
there was no need to force their application to one another. Harmonization of laws, the People adds, presupposes
the existence of conflict or incongruence between or among the provisions of various laws, a situation not obtaining
in the present case.

The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to trust transactions, such as Trust Account No. C-163, as
it applies only to traditional deposits (simple loans). A trust account, according to the People, may not be considered
a deposit because it does not create the juridical relation of creditor and debtor; trust and deposit operations are
treated separately and are different in legal contemplation; trust operation is separate and distinct from banking and
requires a grant of separate authority, and trust funds are not covered by deposit insurance under the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation law (R.A. No. 3591, as amended).

The People further argues that the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that the transaction or communication was
privileged in nature was erroneous – a congruent interpretation of CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 shows that a
person who signs in a public or private transaction a name or alias, other than his original name or the alias he is
authorized to use, shall be held liable for violation of CA No. 142, while the bank employees are bound by the
confidentiality of bank transactions except in the circumstances enumerated in R.A. No. 1405. At most, the People
argues, the prohibition in R.A. No. 1405 covers bank employees and officers only, and not Estrada; the law does not
prohibit Estrada from disclosing and making public his use of an alias to other people, including Ocampo and
Curato, as he did when he made a public exhibit and use of the alias before Messrs. Lacquian and Chua.

Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that the use of an alias before bank officers does not
violate CA No. 142 effectively encourages the commission of wrongdoing and the concealment of ill-gotten wealth
under pseudonyms; it sustains an anomalous and prejudicial policy that uses the law to silence bank officials and
employees from reporting the commission of crimes. The People contends that the law – R.A. No. 1405 – was not
intended by the Legislature to be used as a subterfuge or camouflage for the commission of crimes and cannot be
so interpreted; the law can only be interpreted, understood and applied so that right and justice would prevail.

We see no merit in these arguments.

We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of libel – that mere
communication to a third person is publicity – does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. Our close reading of Ursua
– particularly, the requirement that there be intention by the user to be culpable and the historical reasons we cited
above – tells us that the required publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the
use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to
become generally known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have
held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to
publicly use the alias must be manifest.

To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account
No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to
Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to Estrada’s privacy and to the
confidential matters that transpired in Malacañan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with
whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath
of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not
be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian
and Chua were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with
Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estrada’s
representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.

The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of
privacy, as the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account – a transaction that R.A. No. 1405
considers absolutely confidential in nature.34 We previously rejected, in Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan,35 the People’s
nitpicking argument on the alleged dichotomy between bank deposits and trust transactions, when we said:

The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term "deposits," as used in R.A. 1405, by the mere fact
that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship between the trustor and the bank, does not lie. An examination
of the law shows that the term "deposits" used therein is to be understood broadly and not limited only to accounts
which give rise to a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank.

The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:

SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give encouragement to the people to
deposit their money in banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly
utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the country. (Underscoring supplied)

If the money deposited under an account may be used by bank for authorized loans to third persons, then such
account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank, falls
under the category of accounts which the law precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the economic
development of the country.

Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between petitioner and Urban
Bank provides that the trust account covers "deposit, placement or investment of funds" by Urban Bank for and in
behalf of petitioner. The money deposited under Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely to
remain with the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of account is not protected by R.A.
1405 would encourage private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by bank in other ventures,
contrary to the policy behind the law.

Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term "deposits" was intended to be understood
broadly:

SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with bank or banking institutions in the Philippines including

investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities,
are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by
any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of
impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in
cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)1avvphi1

The phrase "of whatever nature" proscribes any restrictive interpretation of "deposits." Moreover, it is clear from the
immediately quoted provision that, generally, the law applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those
which are invested. This further shows that the law was not intended to apply only to "deposits" in the strict sense of
the word.  Otherwise, there would have been no need to add the phrase "or invested.
lawphil.net
Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.36

We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are
statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy.37 Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of signing the
documents as "Jose Velarde" related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was
already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not even consider here the
impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy
situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy
effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly.

The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant development only because it clearly manifests
that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted banking transactions,
whether they be allowed by law or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an indictment against Estrada using
this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without violating the constitutional prohibition on the enactment and
use of ex post facto laws.38

We hasten to add that this holistic application and interpretation of these various laws is not an attempt to harmonize
these laws. A finding of commission of the offense punished under CA No. 142 must necessarily rest on the
evidence of the requisites for culpability, as amplified in Ursua. The application of R.A. No. 1405 is significant only
because Estrada’s use of the alias was pursuant to a transaction that the law considers private or, at the very least,
where the law guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to the parties to the transactions; it is at this point that
R.A. No. 1405 tangentially interfaces with an indictment under CA 142. In this light, there is no actual frontal clash
between CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 that requires harmonization. Each operates within its own sphere, but must
necessarily be read together when these spheres interface with one another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a law of
recent vintage in relation to the indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source or an influencing factor in his
indictment.

In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at the totality of the circumstances
obtaining in Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde" vis-à-vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide here
whether Estrada’s use of an alias when he occupied the highest executive position in the land was valid and
legal; we simply determined, as the Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable for the offense
charged based on the evidence the People presented. As with any other accused, his guilt must be based on the
evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal liability requires. If the People fails to
discharge this burden, as they did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that we so declare. We do so now in this
review and accordingly find no reversible error of law in the assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.

3.) G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996

CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:p

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation
of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases". 1

Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan,
Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to
conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted
benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint
was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the
involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the
area. 2

On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City
requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua
to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to
attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar
Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents
before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he
would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint.  3

When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security
officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name
"Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the
complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida
Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name
"Oscar Perez." 4

Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in
the same office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced
himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline
station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly
charged.

On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner without
leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his
supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner
argued that no document from the local civil registry was presented to show the registered name of accused which
according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction.

The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A.
No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum
as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided
for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by imposing an
indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that he
has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is
"Oscar Perez" his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another
name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he
only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position
that an essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been
complied with when the prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in
the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that
he was charged under the wrong law. 5

Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and
the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind
and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose.  The court may consider the
6

spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would
defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. 7

For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly violated by petitioner,
and the surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its
amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and
before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:

Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from
the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such
substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise the
patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate
proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name and
the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has been, obtained, specifying the
proceedings and the date on which such authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use
of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register . . . .

The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No.
142 now reads:

Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment
purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no
person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office
of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of all alien, with
which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may
have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been
registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the
approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The
name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those
legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to
secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the
person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his
immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or
real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use
of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil
registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the
same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.

The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use
in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of
Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which
was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934.  The 8

pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow —

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including
receipt for tax or business or any written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any
written or printed evidence of any agreement or business transactions, any name used in connection
with his business other than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the
place where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm
name or business name or style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or
business name or style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any other
person having a joint or common interest with him in such contract, agreement, business
transaction, or business . . . .

For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice
among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the
field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons
could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a
thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly
authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.9

In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic   the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of
10

an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled —

There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias "Kheng Chiau Young" in addition to his
real name "Yu Cheng Chiau" would add to more confusion. That he is known in his business, as
manager of the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its use.
After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo
Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he
had encountered certain difficulties in his transactions with government offices which required him to
explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could easily avoid said
difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real name "Yu Kheng Chiau."

The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his having filed
a petition for naturalization in Branch V of the above-mentioned court, argues the more against the
grant of his petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no necessity for
his further using said alias, as it would be contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using
only one name in ordinary as well as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly
observed, if he believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his name
following the Occidental method, "he can easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of
the name "Yu Kheng Chian," he can, abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name
Kheng Chiau Young."

All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown satisfactory
proper and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142
and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name.

Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or
baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the
sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but
sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases.   Hence, the use of a
11

fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or
indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth
does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.

It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the
name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of
petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which
petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner.
There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in
addition to his real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated
transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified
himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a
matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public
records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the
concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business
transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the
circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as
amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.   Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is
12

a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.   The reason for this
13

principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited.   Indeed, our mind cannot rest
14

easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by
him.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
 4.) G.R. No. 234448, November 06, 2018

PRIVATE HOSPITALS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (PHAPI) REPRESENTED BY

ITS PRESIDENT, DR. RUSTICO JIMENEZ, Petitioner, v. HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE ACTING SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, Respondents.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

On grounds of denial of substantive due process, repugnancy to the constitutional presumption of

innocence, violation of the equal protection and involuntary servitude clauses, petitioner Private
Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc., (PHAPi) - an organization of privately-owned clinics,
hospitals, and other health facilities - seeks to declare as unconstitutional and void the duty
imposed upon hospitals, medical practitioners and employees to prevent actual death or
injury under Section 1; the penal provisions under Section 4; the presumption of liability clause
under Section 5; and the reimbursement and tax deduction clause under Sections 7 and 8, all of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 109321 otherwise known as an Act Strengthening the Anti-Hospital Deposit
Law.

The Antecedents

In 1984, Batas Pambansa (BP) Bilang 702 entitled An Act Prohibiting the Demand of Deposits or
Advance Payments for the Confinement or Treatment of Patients in Hospitals and Medical Clinics in
Certain Cases was enacted. BP 702 was described as a landmark legislative measure that aimed to
stop the practice of hospitals and medical clinics of asking for deposits or advance payments for
treatment or confinement of patients in emergency and serious cases.2

Essentially, BP 702 makes it unlawful for any director, manager or any other officer of a hospital or
medical clinic to demand any deposit or any other form of advance payment for confinement or
treatment in such hospital or medical clinic in emergency or serious cases.3 BP 702 penalizes such
erring director, manager or any other officer of a hospital or medical clinic with a fine of not less than
one thousand pesos but not more than two thousand pesos or imprisonment for not less than fifteen
days but not more than thirty days, or both such fine and imprisonment.4

On August 25, 1997, BP 702 was amended by R.A. No. 8344.5 R.A. No. 8344 makes it unlawful not
only to demand, but also to request, solicit, and accept any deposit or advance payment as a
prerequisite for confinement or medical treatment in emergency or serious cases. R.A. No. 8344
further makes the refusal to administer medical treatment and support as dictated by good practice
of medicine to prevent death or permanent disability unlawful. In case the hospital or the medical
clinic has no adequate medical capabilities, R.A. No. 8344 outlines the procedure for the transfer of
the patient to a facility where appropriate care can be given.6 Under a new provision, R.A. No. 8344
allows the transfer of the patient to an appropriate hospital consistent with the latter's needs after
the hospital or medical clinic has administered medical treatment and support.7

R.A. No. 8344 also provides the following governing definitions for purposes of the law:
(a) Emergency - a condition or state of a patient wherein based on the objective findings of a
prudent medical officer on duty for the day there is immediate danger and where delay in initial
support and treatment may cause loss of life or cause permanent disability to the patient.

(b) Serious case - refers to a condition of a patient characterized by gravity or danger wherein based
on the objective findings of a prudent medical officer on duty for the day when left unattended to,
may cause loss of life or cause permanent disability to the patient.
(c) Confinement - a state of being admitted in a hospital or medical clinic for medical observation,
diagnosis, testing, and treatment consistent with the capability and available facilities of the hospital
or clinic.

(d) Hospital - a facility devoted primarily to the diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering
from illness, disease, injury or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care.
It shall also be construed as any institution, building or place where there are facilities and personnel
for the continued and prolonged care of patients.

(e) Emergency treatment and support - any medical or surgical measure within the capability of the
hospital or medical clinic that is administered by qualified health care professionals to prevent the
death or permanent disability of a patient.

(f) Medical clinic - a place in which patients can avail of medical consultation or treatment on an
outpatient basis.

(g) Permanent disability - a condition of physical disability as defined under Article 192-C and Article
193-B and C of Presidential Decree No. 442; as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines.

(h) Stabilize - the provision of necessary care until such time that the patient may be discharged or
transferred to another hospital or clinic with a reasonable probability that no physical deterioration
would result from or occur during such discharge or transfer.
R.A. No. 8344 also increased the penalties prescribed under BP 702 to imprisonment of not less than
six months and one day but not more than two years and four months, or a fine of not less than
twenty thousand pesos, but not more than one hundred thousand pesos, or both at the discretion of
the court. However, if the violation was committed pursuant to an established hospital or clinic policy
or upon the instruction of its management, the director or officer responsible for the formulation and
implementation of such policy shall suffer imprisonment of four to six years, or a fine of not less than
one hundred thousand pesos, but not more than five hundred thousand pesos, or both, at the court's
discretion.8

Sensing the need to curb the still prevalent practice of refusing to provide initial medical treatment
and support in emergency or serious cases without the corresponding deposit or advance payment,
House Bill No. 51599 was submitted by the House Committee on Health which seeks to increase the
penalties for violation of BP 702 as amended by R.A. No. 8344; expand the definition of "emergency
care" to include women in active labor and at the risk of miscarriage or fetal distress; include
reimbursement from the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) for the expenses
advanced by hospitals and medical facilities in treating poor and indigent patients; and mandate the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to provide assistance to poor and marginalized patients
on emergency treatment in hospitals.10

This development met similar support from the Senate through Senate Bill No. 135311 submitted by
its Committees on Health and Demography, Justice and Human Rights, and Ways and Means. Similar
to its lower house counterpart, Senate Bill No. 1353 aims to increase the penalties for violation of the
law; define "basic emergency care"; and include PhilHealth reimbursement of basic emergency care
incurred by the hospital or medical clinic. However, peculiar to the Senate version is the presumption
of liability imposed against the hospital, medical clinic, and the involved official, medical practitioner,
or employee in the event of death, permanent disability, serious impairment of the health condition
of the patient, or injury to or loss of the unborn child proceeding from the denial of admission to the
health facility pursuant to a policy or practice of demanding deposits or advance payments for
confinement or treatment.

A consolidation of Senate Bill No. 1353 and House Bill No. 5159 gave birth to R.A. No. 10932 which
was signed into law on August 3, 2017.
Thus, as it presently stands, R.A. No. 10932 makes it unlawful to request, solicit, demand
or accept deposit or advance payment as a prerequisite not only for confinement or
medical treatment but also for administering basic emergency care. 12 It expands the scope
of "basic emergency care" to include medical procedures and treatment administered to a
woman in active labor.13

In case a transfer to another hospital is deemed appropriate, R.A. No. 10932 further mandates the
local government unit where the hospital or medical clinic is located to allow free use of its
emergency medical vehicle. Moreover, all hospitals are required to post a notice indicating its
classification level and the list of medical services it is authorized to perform.14

R.A. No. 10932 also introduces the creation of a Health Facilities Oversight Board (Board) where
complaints against health facilities for violations of the law shall be initially filed. The Board is given
the power to investigate, adjudicate and impose administrative sanctions including the revocation of
the health facility's license.15

Further to the matter of penalties, R.A. No. 10932 imposes upon an erring official, medical
practitioner or employee of the hospital or medical clinic the penalty of imprisonment of not less than
six (6) months and one (1) day but not more than two (2) years and four (4) months, or a fine of not
less than P100,000.00, but not more than P300,000.00, or both at the court's discretion. However,
when the violation was made pursuant to an established hospital policy or upon instructions of its
management, the penalties are increased as against the director or officer formulating and
implementing such policy to four (4) years to six (6) years, or a fine of not less than P500,000.00,
but not more than P1,000,000.00, or both, without prejudice to an award for damages.16

In addition, R.A. No. 10932 introduces the three-strike rule, or when upon 3 repeated violations
committed pursuant .to an established policy or upon instruction of the management, the health
facility's license to operate shall be revoked by the Department of Health (DOH). The law also makes
the president, chairman, board of directors, or trustees and other officers of the health facility
solidarily liable for damages.17

Apart from the foregoing, R.A. No. 10932 presumes liability against the hospital, medical clinic, and
the official, medical practitioner, or employee involved, in the event of death, permanent disability,
serious impairment or permanent injury to or loss of an unborn child, proceeding from the denial of
admission to a health facility pursuant to a policy of requiring deposits or advance payments for
confinement or treatment.18

R.A. No. 10932 also mandates that the PhilHealth reimburse the cost of the basic emergency care
and transportation services rendered by the hospital or medical clinic to poor and indigent patients
and that the PCSO provide medical assistance for the basic emergency care needs of the poor and
marginalized groups. Expenses incurred in giving basic emergency care to poor and indigent patients
not reimbursed by PhilHealth are allowed to be treated as tax deductions.19

Meanwhile, pending resolution of the instant petition or on April 4, 2018, the DOH issued
Administrative Order No. 2018-0012 implementing R.A. No. 10932.

The Arguments for the Petitioner

Petitioner claims locus standi to file the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it stands to
be directly injured by the implementation of R.A. No. 10932 insofar as the law regulates the conduct
of its members and places the latter's management and staff at the risk of administrative, civil, and
criminal sanctions.20 At any event, petitioner claims that the issues herein presented specifically on
the denial of due process and to equal protection of laws are of transcendental importance that
should allow the present petition to prosper despite the absence of direct injury.21

Petitioner further claims that the issues raised in the instant petition are ripe for adjudication given
the imminent threat of the imposition of the unconstitutional duties and the corresponding
unconstitutional sanctions under R.A. No. 10932 against petitioner's members with the impending
approval of the rules implementing R.A. No. 10932.22 Petitioner also argues that an allegation that
R.A. No. 10932 infringes upon the constitutional rights to due process, equal protection of laws and
the presumption of innocence, is sufficient to invoke the Court's power of review.23

Claiming exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, petitioner also advances the view that
direct resort to the Court is justified given the genuine issues of constitutionality posed by the
present petition.24

Going into the merits of the petition, petitioner seeks to strike down as unconstitutional R.A. No.
10932 for being unduly oppressive and thus violative of substantive due process. Elaborating,
petitioner argues that Section 1 of BP 702 as amended by R.A. No. 8344 and R.A. No.
10932 imposes upon the proprietor, president, director, manager or any other officer,
medical practitioner or employee of a health care institution the duty to administer basic
emergency care or medical treatment and support as dictated by good practice of medicine
to prevent death, or permanent disability, or in the case of a pregnant woman, permanent
injury or loss of her unborn child, or non-institutional delivery in emergency or serious
cases.25

Petitioner argues that "basic emergency care" and "emergency treatment and support" as
defined under R.A. No. 10932 imposes upon the physician, the hospital, its management
and staff the untenable duties to actually prevent death, permanent disability, permanent
injury to or loss of an unborn baby or its non-institutional delivery and to sufficiently
address an emergency situation and in case of a woman in active labor, to ensure the safe
delivery of the baby.26 Echoing Lucas, et al. v. Dr. Tuaño,27 petitioner emphasizes that a physician
is not an insurer of the good result of treatment.28 Petitioner thus argues that the duty imposed
by R.A. No. 10932, being predicated on the achievement of an end that is impossible to
guarantee, amounts to a denial of due process.29

Further, petitioner aims to strike down the fines imposed under Section 4 for being unjust, excessive,
and oppressive as they are not commensurate to the act or omission that is being
penalized.30 Petitioner also questions the solidary liability for damages under Section 4 insofar as it
generally makes "other officers" of the health facility solidarily liable with the president, chairman,
members of the board of directors or trustees.31

The presumption of liability spelled under Section 5 of R.A. No. 10932 is also being
assailed for being repugnant to the constitutional presumption of innocence. It is the
contention of petitioner that the presumption of liability clause allows for a presumption of
generalized liability, i.e., administrative, civil and criminal, upon the occurrence of death, permanent
disability and serious impairment of the health condition of the patient or her unborn child after the
denial of the patient's admission due to a hospital policy of demanding deposits or advance
payments.32

Also, petitioner emphasizes that the presumption of liability clause necessarily presumes that there
is, at all times, a causal connection between the injury and the acts or omissions complained
of.33 Expounding on this argument, petitioner argues that the offense defined under R.A. No. 10932
involves medical malpractice. As such, the causation between the injury and the medical action are
determinable only through the technical and scientific competence of physicians and thus, cannot be
presumed by law.34

Finally, petitioner seeks to strike down as unconstitutional the exclusion of the basic emergency care
of patients not classified as poor, indigent or marginalized from PhilHealth reimbursement, PCSO
assistance and tax deductibility under Sections 7 and 8 of R.A. No. 10932 for being violative of the
equal protection clause.
Illustrating its argument, petitioner contends that these provisions would allow a hospital who treats
a poor patient to receive PhilHealth reimbursement, PCSO assistance and tax deduction, and yet the
hospital who treats a patient not classified as poor, indigent or marginalized will not be allowed a
similar PhilHealth reimbursement, PCSO assistance and tax deduction.35 It is likewise the view of
petitioner that the law, insofar as it obliges hospitals, its staff and management to render services to
patients not classified as poor, indigent, or marginalized without the corresponding reimbursement,
assistance and tax deduction, amounts to involuntary servitude.36

The Arguments for the Respondents

Respondents Hon. Salvador Medialdea, Executive Secretary, and the Acting Secretary of Department
of Health, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seek to dismiss the instant petition for
being procedurally infirm on the ground that certiorari and prohibition are proper only against
judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial act. Like so, respondents seek a dismissal of the petition for lack
of a justiciable controversy in the absence of an actual governmental act which directly causes or will
imminently cause injury to the alleged right of petitioner.37 Respondents also attacks petitioner's
standing to file the present petition for lack of personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, it
being neither a hospital or health facility itself.38 Further, respondents assert that the issues raised by
petitioner being speculative are not matters of transcendental importance that would justify a
disregard of the rule on locus standi and the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.39

Contrary to petitioner's claims, respondents contend that R.A. No. 10932 does not impose upon the
hospital, medical facility, its staff or management the duty to guarantee that death, permanent loss
or injury is prevented, neither does it penalize the failure of the physician or the hospital staff to
prevent such occurrences. Rather, respondents argue that what R.A. No. 10932 prohibits is the act of
requesting any form of advance payment as a prerequisite for administering basic emergency care or
medical treatment, or the act of refusing to administer such as dictated by good practice to prevent
death, permanent loss or injury.40

Also, respondents maintain that the fines imposed under R.A. No. 10932 are reasonable, and that in
any case, the determination of the propriety of fines for violation of offenses lies within the discretion
of the legislature.41 Respondents add that neither is the solidary liability imposed by law
unreasonable because such arises only from the participatory acts of the directors and officers who
are responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies contrary to the mandates of R.A.
No. 10932 and pertains only to damages which may be awarded to the patient-complainant.42

Respondents likewise defend the validity of the presumption of liability clause on the argument that
the liability therein mentioned pertains to the liability for the death, permanent disability, serious
impairment, injury or loss of the unborn child and that such presumption arises only upon prior proof
that there was denial of admission to the health facility and that such denial was made pursuant to a
policy of demanding deposits for confinement or treatment.43

Addressing the supposed violation of the equal protection clause, respondents maintain that patients
classified as "poor", "indigent", or "marginalized" substantially differ from those who are not
categorized as such, hence the provision on PhilHealth reimbursement, PCSO assistance and tax
deduction must be upheld in the face of the equal protection challenge.44

Issues

Before the Court addresses the questions of constitutionality raised against certain provisions of R.A.
No. 10932, it is imperative to first determine whether the Court, in fact, can discharge its power of
judicial review. This is, in turn, determined by addressing the following issues: (a) are petitions
for certiorari and prohibition proper to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 10932; (b) is direct
resort to the Court proper; (c) has petitioner, as an association of privately-owned hospitals, clinics
and other health facilities, the requisite legal standing; and (c) is the petition ripe for adjudication.
 Ruling of the Court

We dismiss the petition. While the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are proper legal vehicles to
assail the constitutionality of a law, the requirements for the exercise of the Court's judicial review
even under its expanded jurisdiction must nevertheless first be satisfied.

Propriety of Certiorari and Prohibition

Petitioner seeks to declare as unconstitutional certain provisions of R.A. No. 10932 and for this
purpose, availed of the remedy of certiorari and prohibition. Respondents counter that certiorari and
prohibition are available only against judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions and not against
legislative acts, as in the instant case.

The rule is settled that the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought
determine the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over it.45 The present petition
specifically alleges that R.A. No. 10932 is unconstitutional for being violative of substantive due
process, the presumption of innocence, and the equal protection of laws and as such, seeks that the
enforcement and implementation thereof be prohibited.

Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the ground for review in certiorari and prohibition is grave abuse
of discretion, and there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the Constitution,
the law or jurisprudence or executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or
personal bias.46 Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are thus appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional questions.47

Grave abuse of discretion as a ground for review does not only appear under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court but also under Section 1,48 Article VIII of the Constitution defining judicial power. As
constitutionally defined, judicial power includes not only the duty to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also, the duty to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Such innovation under the 1987
Constitution later on became known as the Court's "traditional jurisdiction" and "expanded
jurisdiction," respectively.49

Given the commonality of the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the Court has allowed the use of a
Rule 65 petition to invoke this Court's expanded jurisdiction.50

As expressly granted by the Constitution, the Court's expanded jurisdiction when invoked permits a
review of acts not only by a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, but also by any branch or instrumentality of the Government. "Any branch or
instrumentality of the Government" necessarily includes the legislative and the executive, even if
they are not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.51

In Pedro Agcaoili, Jr., et al. v. The Honorable Representative Rodolfo C. Fariñas, et al.,52 we affirmed
the availability of the extraordinary writs for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the legislative and executive branches
following Judge Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council,53 as follows:
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader
in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This
application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues

and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive
officials.54 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
Accordingly, we held as proper remedies the writs of certiorari and prohibition in Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK), et al. v. Quezon City, as represented by Mayor Herbert Bautista, et
al.,55 assailing the constitutionality of curfew ordinances and in Agcaoili questioning the contempt
powers of the Congress in the exercise of its power of inquiry in aid of legislation. Following this trend
in jurisprudence, petitioner therefore correctly availed of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 10932 and enjoin its enforcement,
notwithstanding that these governmental actions do not involve the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions.

Direct Resort to the Court

Jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition are shared by this Court, the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Courts.56 Since the remedies of certiorari and prohibition
are available to assail the constitutionality of a law, the question as to which court should the petition
be properly filed consequently arises given that the hierarchy of courts "also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs."57

Respondents argue that direct resort to this Court is unjustified and thus violates the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts.

Under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, "recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court
exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court."58 As a rule, "direct recourse to this Court is
improper because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it
to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and
attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its docket."59

Nevertheless, we cautioned in The Diocese of Bacolod, et al. v. COMELEC, et al.,60 that the Supreme
Court's role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional rights when these
become exigent is never meant to be emasculated by the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. As such,
this Court possesses full discretionary authority to assume jurisdiction over extraordinary actions
for certiorari filed directly before it for exceptionally compelling reasons, or if warranted by the
nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.61

As developed by case law, the instances when direct resort to this Court is allowed are enumerated
in The Diocese of Bacolod62 as follows: (a) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that
must be addressed at the most immediate time;63 (b) when the issues involved are of transcendental
importance;64 (c) in cases of first impression;65 (d) the constitutional issues raised are better decided
by the Supreme Court;66 (e) the time element or exigency in certain situations;67 (f) the filed petition
reviews an act of a constitutional organ;68 (g) when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law;69 (h) the petition includes questions that are dictated by public
welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the
orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy.70

The present petition, while directed against an act of a co-equal branch of the government and
concerns a legislative measure directly affecting the health and well-being of the people, actually
presents no prima facie challenge, as hereunder expounded, as to be so exceptionally compelling to
justify direct resort to this Court.

Requisites of Judicial Review

Notwithstanding the propriety of the legal vehicle employed, the Court cannot exercise its power of
judicial review, even under its expanded jurisdiction, when the requisites for the exercise thereof are
not satisfied.
"The power of judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and
legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution."71 When exercised, the judiciary does not
arrogate upon it a position superior to that of the other branches of the government but merely
upholds the supremacy of the Constitution.

In Congressman Garcia v. The Executive Secretary,72 the Court held that, for a proper exercise of its
power of review, certain requisites must be satisfied, namely:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.73
Arguing the absence of the first and second requisites, respondents seek an outright dismissal of the
instant petition. We agree.

Actual Case or Controversy

"[A]n actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute."74 To be justiciable, the case or controversy must present a contrariety
of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.
Regardless of whether the Court's power of review is invoked under the traditional or expanded
concept, the presence of an actual case or controversy remains a requisite before judicial power is
exercised.75 However, when the Court's expanded jurisdiction is invoked, the requirement of an
actual case or controversy is satisfied upon a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the
assailed governmental act.76Alexander A. Padilla, et al. v. Congress of the Philippines 77 emphasized
that for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review and give due course to a petition
for certiorari, the petitioners should set forth their material allegations to make out a prima
facie case for certiorari.

Interrelated with the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.
Consistently, a question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual or entity challenging it. The question of ripeness asks whether
a case involves contingent events that may not occur as anticipated and whether there is actual
injury to the party being suit.78 Thus, it is required that an act had been accomplished or performed
by either branch of the government and that there is an immediate or threatened injury to the
petitioner as a result of the challenged action before courts may interfere.79 In Province of North
Cotabato, et al. v. Gov't. of the Rep. Of the Phils. Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), et
al.,80 we held that "[w]hen an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute."81

The allegations set forth in the petition failed to meet the requirement of a prima facie showing of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Congress relative to the provisions of R.A. No. 10932.
While R.A. No. 10932 and its implementing rules are accomplished acts of a co-equal branch of the
government, the petition is unfortunately bereft of any allegation that petitioner, nor any of its
members, had thereby suffered an actual or direct injury as a result of a discretion gravely abused.
In the absence of an actual and direct injury, any pronouncement by the Court would be purely
advisory or sheer legal opinion, in view of the mere hypothetical scenarios which the instant petition
presents.

The challenged law also enjoys the presumption of constitutionality which the Court, at the first
instance, cannot disturb in the absence of a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion and,
upon delving into the merits, in the absence of a clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction
of the Constitution.82 If the Court were to invalidate the questioned law on the basis of conjectures
and suppositions, then it would be unduly treading questions of policy and wisdom not only of the
legislature that passed it, but also of the executive which approved it.83

Legal Standing

Closely related to the constitutional mandate that the Court settle only actual cases or controversies
is the requirement of legal standing. Invariably, legal standing or locus standi is defined as a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged.84

As a rule, a party is allowed to raise a constitutional question when (1) he can show that he will
personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to
be redressed by a favorable action.85

Sans doubt, R.A. No. 10932 governs the conduct of hospitals, medical facilities, medical practitioners
and employees inasmuch as the law imposes upon the latter certain obligations and imposes
corresponding sanctions in case of violation. However, petitioner itself, is not a hospital, a medical
facility, a medical practitioner or employee, but an association thereof.

Section 1,86 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that juridical persons authorized by law may be
parties in a civil action. In turn, Article 4487 of the Civil Code enumerates the juridical persons having
capacity to sue which includes corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or
purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member. Section 4,88 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court mandates that "[f]acts
showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a
party, must be averred."

Thus, while juridical persons, like an association, are endowed with the capacity to sue or be sued, it
must demonstrate substantial interest that it has sustained or will sustain direct injury. Assuming a
hospital is found liable for violating the provisions of R.A. No. 10932, the liability or direct injury
inures not to the petitioner association itself but to the member-hospital.

To be sure, the rule on standing admits of recognized exceptions: the over breadth doctrine,
taxpayer suits, third party standing and the doctrine of transcendental importance.89 To fall under the
third party exception, an association filing a case on behalf of its members must not only show that it
stands to suffer direct injury, but also that it has been duly authorized.by its members to represent
them or sue in their behalf.90

In this case, while petitioner successfully averred that it is a non stock, non-profit organization,
existing under the laws of the Philippines and identified its members being the sole national
organization of purely privately owned clinics, hospitals or other health facilities in the Philippines,
dedicated to the management and concerns of private hospitals in the country,91 it failed to
demonstrate that ample authority had been extended to it by its members to file the instant petition.

The attached Board Resolutions92 and Secretary's Certificate93 merely state that the "members of the
[petitioner], view [R.A. No. 10932] as [unconstitutional] with respect to its penal provisions or
Section 4 thereof, the same being oppressive and confiscatory; and with respect to its provision on
'Presumption of Liability' or Section 5 thereof, which is utterly against the Constitutional provision on
'Presumption of Innocence'" without authorizing petitioner to file the necessary petition to question
the constitutionality of the law before any court. Petitioner therefore cannot benefit from the third
party exception to the requirement of locus standi.

In view of the foregoing limitations, there is no reason for the Court to take cognizance of the
present petition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED.
5.) G.R. No. 204819               April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children,
LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT
CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria
Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A.
Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M.
Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco &
Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C.
Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco &
Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor &
Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph
Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari
Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura
Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child
Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel
Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON
SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning
Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its
Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION,
represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by its President Donato Marcos, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204957

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in
his personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as
member of the school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA,
CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I.
YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty.
Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes,
Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O.
Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and
Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development
Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine
Commission on Women, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE
MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL
ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and
GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health;
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their
Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in
her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I.
GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO
L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q.
VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND
FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and
DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department
of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes
he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." 1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our
people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been
geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem
that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to
the realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the
country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact
laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement
these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant
is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on
clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary
then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that
holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and
contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates  to sticker campaigns,  from rallies by
2 3

socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy  - the clash between the seemingly
4

antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every
level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress
on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience.
Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy,
as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
 (1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,  filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C.
5

Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children;
and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);

(2) Petition for Prohibition,  filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its
6

president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche  and several others  in their personal capacities as citizens and
7 8

on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);

(3) Petition for Certiorari,  filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in
9

their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,  filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,  Rosevale
10 11

Foundation, Inc.,  a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others,  in their capacities
12 13

as citizens (Serve Life);

(5) Petition,  filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
14

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,  filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate
15

of the Philippines,  in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);

16

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,  filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,  and several
17 18

others  in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);

19

(8) Petition,  filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,  in their capacities as citizens and
20 21

taxpayers (Echavez);

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,  filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty.
22

Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F.
Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,  filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.  and several
23 24

others,  in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the
25

Bar (Pro-Life);

(11) Petition for Prohibition,  filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,  Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita
26 27

Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers
and members of the Bar (MSF);

(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,  filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,  in their
28 29

capacities as citizens (Juat) ;

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,  filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several
30

others,  in their capacities as citizens (CFC);

31

(14) Petition for Prohibition  filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as
32

citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and

(15) Petition-In-Intervention,  filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer
33

(Alcantara); and

(16) Petition-In-Intervention,  filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.
34

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the
following GROUNDS:
 • The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its
declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. 35

• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The
petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's
health, as it causes cancer and other health problems. 36

• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to
their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom. 37

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and
other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive
health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and
service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions. 38

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),  provides that
39

skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health
Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or
rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors. 40

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be
allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law
fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of
the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech. 42

• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the
RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the
PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent
women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment. 43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would
effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean
that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services. 44

• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates
against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the
RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. 45

• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing
the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of
conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law. 46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from
them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and
what kind of services they shall offer."  It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for
47

employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
 • The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning
methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The
petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups,
they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or
procedure. 48

• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended
that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional
right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH
Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on
matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a
child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives. 50

• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners
question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-
abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL). 51

• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution. 52

• The RH Law violates Natural Law. 53

• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health
measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and
the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054. 54

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of
the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the
petitions in behalf of the respondents,  Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,  former officials of the Department of
55 56

Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,  the Filipino Catholic Voices for
57

Reproductive Health (C4RH),  Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,  and Atty. Joan De Venecia  also filed their
58 59 60

respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S.
Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene. 61

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the
petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet
ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order
(SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty
(120) days, or until July 17, 2013. 62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or
identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in
the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral
argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court. 63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the
same time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties. 64
 The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act
to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although
contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale,
dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription
of a qualified medical practitioner." 65

In addition, R.A. No. 5921,  approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of
66

abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug
or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and
Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed
physician."

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the
population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted
measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth.  Among these measures
67

included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be
made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or
limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."

To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No.
79,  dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program,"
68

provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of
contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.  Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family
69

planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference
on Population and Development.  Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna
70

Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and
programs for women, including family planning and sex education. 71

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable
pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76
million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.  The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures
72

were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor
and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure
that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the
RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning
methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH
Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women's health and population control.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular,
argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to
health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that
"the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."  It explains:
73

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic
Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed
by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH
Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the
barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception
program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all
forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of,
and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies. 74

ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them
to the following principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

3] Facial Challenge

4] Locus Standi

5] Declaratory Relief

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life

2] Right to Health

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

4] The Family

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

6] Due Process

7] Equal Protection

8] Involuntary Servitude

9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve
some procedural impediments.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative
and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a
product of a majoritarian democratic process"  and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."  The
75 76

OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since
the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political
departments, in particular, with Congress.  It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern
77

Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,  the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are
78

improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.

79

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law
has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive
health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-
regulating measure. 80

In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature,
it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-
equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. 81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines;  (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;  and (c) the judicial power
82 83

shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.  The Constitution has
84

truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of
government. 85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes
upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of
government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a
harmonious blend of courtesy and caution. 86

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.  In order to address this,
87

the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its
sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a
very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null
because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.  Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions
88

of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse
of discretion results.  The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and
89

principles embodied in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution
makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social
legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective
wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as
mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort,
then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.  This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of
90

the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
[Emphases supplied]

As far back as Tanada v. Angara,  the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
91

are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,  Aldaba v. COMELEC,  Magallona v. Ermita,  and
92 93 94

countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question
thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is
raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of
intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.
95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just
any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review
is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue
of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
96

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because
the RH Law has yet to be implemented.  They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete
97

and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no
showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation.  In short, it is contended that
98

judicial review of the RH Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.  The rule is that
99

courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal
right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.
100

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.  A question is ripe for
101

adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of 102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,  where the
103

constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in
question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete
act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court
ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under
a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. 104

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They
must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH
Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure. 105

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that
is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.  These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
106

assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.  After all, the fundamental right to religious
107

freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with
some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,  it
108

has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights.  The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the
109

U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.  Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
110

vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to
life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can
indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual
case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

Locus Standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as
applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied
against them,  and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.
111 112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens
and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.  It requires a personal stake in
113

the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality
of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the
constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is
also known as the prohibition against third-party standing. 115

Transcendental Importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest." 116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,  the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where
117

serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to
prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency
Powers Cases,  ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
118

orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge,
still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals
standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional
plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may
not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v.
PAGCOR: 119

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive
influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure
are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar,
the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights.
Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep
division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right
to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away
before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution
are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to
irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.  Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so
120

the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65. 121

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of
the Constitution,  prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health
122

with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by
concealing its true intent - to act as a population control measure. 123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure,  and 124

that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are
inseparable. 125

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control
measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to
save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated
earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access
to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods,
natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of
the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-
abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and
supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH
Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.  Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are
126

related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.  As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as
127

skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of
reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women." 128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The
Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather
than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth.
As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their
right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to
health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents,
or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act." 129

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives
effectively sanctions abortion. 130

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers
contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient;
thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.

They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized
ovum which already has life. 131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction
of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man. 132

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms
that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or
administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.
133

Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the
prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law
emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies
shall be made accessible to the public. 134

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by
enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with
the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford
deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on
determined as an abortive. 135

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated
considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only
contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed. 136

The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. 137

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore,
not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any
authority or the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution
provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent
vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and
devices which prevent fertilization,  to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,  and the ratification of
138 139

numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control
through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years,
however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 140

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall
promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated.
Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has always been grounded two
cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."  As will be discussed later,
141

these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional
protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.

When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the
deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views
on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which
reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before
conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters
who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving
the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female
ovum by the male sperm.  On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the
142

"implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.

143

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and
ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council: 144

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-
settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to
be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should
ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and
defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable
zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.
145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the
male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions. 146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,  it was written:
147

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die.
Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]

In Gonzales v. Carhart,  Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has
148

respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and
promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term
"conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to
the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."

When is the moment of conception?

 xxx

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is
human life. x x x.150

xxx

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:

Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is
the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living
organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it
takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process
of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the
fertilized ovum has life.

The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the
nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23
chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I
repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.

Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive
and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human. 151

Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization"
was not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:

Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific
phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase
"from the moment of conception." 152

Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:

Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without
specifying "from the moment of conception."

Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission,
he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after
fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the
moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too. 153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I
was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed
right now states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.

When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that
we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the
rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to
travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity
for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called
contraceptives should be banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be
unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.

Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain
contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already
considered abortifacient. 154

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State
shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is,
upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers
of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when
life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision
on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a
question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence. 155

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an
abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm
and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-
abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only
to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free
world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the
unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the
interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.

I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also
actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time.
Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?

Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is
yet unshaped.

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-
uterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if
we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be
unconstitutionalized.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. 156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the
oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as
abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

Justice Bersamin:

There is no life.

Atty. Noche:

So, there is no life to be protected.

Justice Bersamin:

To be protected.

Atty. Noche:

Under Section 12, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

So you have no objection to condoms?

Atty. Noche:

Not under Section 12, Article II.

Justice Bersamin:

Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Atty. Noche:

Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12,
Article II, Your Honor, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

Alright.

Atty. Noche:

And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158

Medical Meaning

That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied
Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon
enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote." 159

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo
develops." 160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),  used by medical schools in the Philippines,
161

also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and
the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all
developmental stages that ensue.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of
male and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a
sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and
ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their
chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the
beginning, or primordium, of a human being." 162

The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology  mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a
163

continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically
distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus
results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed.
The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."

In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill
(Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:

CONCLUSION

The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that
fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are
sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the
purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately
at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a
"potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective
scientific fact.

The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human
being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent
with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or
of human embryos. 164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly,
following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human
organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception,
that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.  According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the
165

reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous."  Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical
166

authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after
implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected." 167

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to
the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a
living human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.  Implantation has been conceptualized only for
168

convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to
the RH Law but also to the Constitution.

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would
prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-
based divisiveness.

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from
conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the
Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the
unborn from conception, explained:

The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-
abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court. 169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the
Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly
mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law
is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be
afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.
170

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which
penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

1] xx x.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxx.

(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that
contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes
sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive
health care include the following:

xxx.

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

xxx.

2] xx x.

Section 4. x x x.

(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly
whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions
concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so;
and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive
health rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.

3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance,
executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed,
modified or amended accordingly.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of
the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination
of the FDA.

As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using
the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce
abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any
drug or device that either:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the
FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution,
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The
conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind),
which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized
ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
(third kind).

By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at
implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon
implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the
fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes
existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and
afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device
from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does
not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a
fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the
point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion,
that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb, is an abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included
or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available
on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise,
cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present
in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used. 171

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however,
the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any
product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and
supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent
with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:

Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive
pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination
of the FDA.

Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device,
or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized
ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as
determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those
that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb. 172

This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the
insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR  must be struck down for being ultra vires.
173

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It
contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the
insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy
the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such
qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if
its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.

For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are
actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism. 174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as
abortive. With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared
policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL
will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be
construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be
consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR
should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those
contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the
approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation
of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."
175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life
must be upheld.

2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary
and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national
hospitals.  Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical
176

cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them.
They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that
the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous
thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial
infarction.  Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)  and (w)  of the
177 178 179

RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and
satisfying sex lives.
180

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere
statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical
authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women. 181

The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with
provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:

HEALTH

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost.
There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State
shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake
appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development,
and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly
express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for
legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.  In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,  it was stated:
182 183

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as
it has always been, that –

... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless
the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary
rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions
would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and
contraceptives per se.  In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale
184

and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by
a physician - be maintained. 185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729.
There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with.
Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to
the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs
and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists
adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As
aptly explained by respondent Lagman:

D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription

108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without
prescription.

109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive
Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting
Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law
and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.

110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly
governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute
whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution
is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

 "(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the
purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female
reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.

"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of
not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in
the discretion of the Court.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved: June 18, 1966"

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:

"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of
whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made
available to the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.

112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension
of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not,
is completely unwarranted and baseless.  [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
186

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs
and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all
appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply
and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;

(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the
overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No.
4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug
store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will
done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices
must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by
Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive
drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to
their use.
187

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the
RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it
being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption.
Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the
various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be
determined as the case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-
uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they
have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine
whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the
third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from
the EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices,
injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are
in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no
predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective"
without the proper scientific examination.

3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception

While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional
proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that
contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim
that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all
things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital
chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms
true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life." 188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their
taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious
beliefs.
189

2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer

Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making
provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also
imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to
another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts
to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her
religious beliefs.
190

They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly
limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking
reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l)
and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals
to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public
officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools
referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize. 191

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter
to another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service
providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent
Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos.
Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono
reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are
required.192

Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking
reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector
to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act
on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce
neither harm nor injury to the public.193

Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious
freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how
the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education,
information, choice and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the
demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of
religious freedom.194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning
and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces
individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs.  As the
195

assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions,
the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to
contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of
contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.  They point
196

out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality
reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the
social justice health guarantees of the Constitution,  and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices,
197

which deprive others of their right to reproductive health.  They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee
198

informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will. 199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are
effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the
constitutionality of the RH Law.  In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the
200

petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning
methods and impose this on the entire citizenry. 201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee
of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on
one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to
information and who has the right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally.
For the respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to
the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.
202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration,
location and impact. 203

Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable
regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family
planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on
account of their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They
are completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of
family life without intervention of the State.
204

For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method
acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight
the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance
of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.

The Church and The State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse
ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in
practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together.
It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-
believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be,
and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the
present Constitution reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society,
and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and
develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy
under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate
this Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it
means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest
principles of morality.  Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987
205

constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church
property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs
of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.  Generally, the State cannot
1âwphi1

meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot
favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the
above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia,
or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the
religious congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the
pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article
VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:

Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Section 29.
 xxx.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as
against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."  Essentially, it prohibits the
206

establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.  Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the
207

outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.  Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in
208

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union  wrote:

209

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of
worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form
of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen
form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all
designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with
the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to
discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being
only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct
by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular
goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its
purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).

As expounded in Escritor,

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a
single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise
clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the
establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and
practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the
carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.
210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is
comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As
explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education: 211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the
freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything,
however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the
scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is
quite a stretch of road to travel.
212

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with
proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that
affect the public welfare."213

Legislative Acts and the

Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of
benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)  where it was
214

stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and
framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."  In the same case, it was further explained that"
215

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of
religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."  "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is
216

not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its
'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts." 217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is
proper.  Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that
218

laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.  In Escritor, it was written:
219

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free
Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not
employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case
then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions
of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine
that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to
accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After
Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test
and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present
danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the
"clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious speech
as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set
the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however,
which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and
immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as
explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the
"clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily
discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not
congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the
present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper
where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some
effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the
interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary.
However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a
fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all
human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an
appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an
acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a
just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a
colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over
the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to
do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In
determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide.
The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording
protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e.
refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of
the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the
original. Underlining supplied.]

The Court's Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or
one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or
whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters
dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."  The jurisdiction of the
220

Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench
should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without
authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine
whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is
replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious
convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is
the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning,
including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient,
and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered
and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government
measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote
modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of
acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they
desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to
them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ

5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance
with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various
human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]

6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society,
faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and
population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and
the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the
family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired
number of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into
account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their
religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical
practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of
benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.

The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits
what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so,
in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control
program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs.
Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the
policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and
unto God the things that are God's. 221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious
beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections
7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately
refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite
their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the
compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor,
finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption
from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state
interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors
for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been
burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side
coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a
clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical
practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking
information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A.
Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience. 222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it
makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive.
They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is
equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an
externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their
beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the
individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind.  While the RH Law seeks to
223

provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious
conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's
religion.
224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of
the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures
and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the
Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be
accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of
the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of
"the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and
Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,  that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors
225

under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff
on their labor ward who were involved in abortions.  The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined
226

according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity
and uncertainty."227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced
to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.

Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such
institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the
Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section
23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs
and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service
providers should be respected.

In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary  it was stressed:
228

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes
he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." 10

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set
consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual.
Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the
Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because
incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of
hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically
charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered
as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be
equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should
not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors
should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private
sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free
exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.

It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The
mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by
oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more
permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press,
assembly and petition, and freedom of association. 229

The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also
because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any
conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.

Justice Mendoza:

I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is
replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed
this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the RH Bill?

Congressman Lagman:

Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of
the provisions.

Justice Mendoza:

I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled
health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with
this?

Congressman Lagman:

I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.

Justice Mendoza:

In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors,
skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not
against the constitutional right to the religious belief?

Congressman Lagman:

Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230

Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject
provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their
choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least
intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent
in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious
objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG
maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:

Justice De Castro:

Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Yes, Justice.

Justice De Castro:

... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this
duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro:

What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary
health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a
regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients. 231

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the
conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government
fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable. 232

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act
according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is
prevented from acting according to one's belief. 233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived
scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their
children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the
information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the
other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a
patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious
objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also,
the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its
legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.  Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only
234

be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as
violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken
by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of
women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with
open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance
deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is
protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365
or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women,"
amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna
Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide
for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of
a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in
the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions,
the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of
responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and
substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and
nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the
primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases,
HIV, and AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;

(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be
provided with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal
interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;

(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical
standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition,
healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the
prevention of diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with
appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's
health in government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of
moral character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the
enrichment and strengthening of character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen
maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."  He, however,
235

failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate
dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008,   although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such
236

revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino
women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs
in exchange for blind conformity.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While
generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if
doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should
be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of
service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral
arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on
grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency." 237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try
to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche
explained:

Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of
Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child
is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the
mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not
necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the
other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and,
therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted
against the child because both their lives are equally valuable. 238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be
resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden
imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the life he would
be able to save.

Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15  as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court
239

finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed
provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be
spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even
mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As
correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are
not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find
unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution
by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family
rather than promote its solidarity and total development. 240

The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact,
one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood;

The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to
wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision
making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their
minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.

The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...

(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the
ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one
undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very
nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues
intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall
defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared
by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them " is equally recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the
spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive
a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the
family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to
protect marriage as an inviolable social institution. 241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just
one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the
number of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs
exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a
constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling
interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.

As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna
Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations, including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood,
as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law
should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one
spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure. 242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state
intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the
right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,  where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando,
243

held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it
is fully deserving of constitutional protection."  Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v.
244

Connecticut,  where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:

245

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in
our prior decisions.

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the
ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it
recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy." 246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a
procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided,
That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning.
Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame
population growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her
own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs
and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity
in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an
inviolable social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government."  In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
247

The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the
right of parents is superior to that of the State.  [Emphases supplied]
248

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the
right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It
would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of
the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming
the foundation of the family and society.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody
of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling
state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or
with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a
differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the
reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to
information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor
referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of
her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to
protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to
make informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information
with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their
parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their
minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already
suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It
should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to
preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)  should be struck down. By effectively
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limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents
their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the
two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of
Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To
deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family.

5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the
principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational
institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to
their students.  Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country,
250

the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce
and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of
society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth. 251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive
health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to
educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its
constitutionality or validity.

At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State
recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society.
Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that
said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.
252

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth.
Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.  Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but
253

also for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual
abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy;
physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage
behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR
and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity
and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the
assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development
of their children.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be
developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it
could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition,
it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the
Constitution is without merit.254

While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the
reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same
violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may
be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion
further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious
groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if
these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from
rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).

Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but
at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."

The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice
of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.  Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a
255

statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to
other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment. 256

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must
be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and
accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease
prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity,
or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of
medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4)
barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who
voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to function as such
by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care
service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive
health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and
exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and
modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to
include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who
intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and
services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and
access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established
rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide
with the truth.   On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is
257

intentional.  Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
258

misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health
and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in
accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from
expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must
be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.

7-Egual Protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it
discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law
introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various
provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles  and definition
259

of terms  of the law.

260

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education
program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.

In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,  the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal
261

protection. Thus:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied
in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the
equal protection clause.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst
itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In
other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover
all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of
a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane
to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of
the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who
naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be
made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics
in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the
classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other
members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of
the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the
number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which
recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority
in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost.
There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State
shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from
fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks
to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as
elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population
growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to
charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look
into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation
of government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education
program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate
attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed
provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private
educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the
teaching of reproductive health education.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government
health care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually
amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will. 262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as
forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the
manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers
of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.

The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a
power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the
legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly
involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress  to prescribe the
263

qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public
morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking
such right altogether.264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats,
intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion.  A reading of the assailed provision, however,
265

reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro
bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose
which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all.
Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will.
While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not
consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the
furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious
objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to
render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL). 266

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency
to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render
such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the
gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."

In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:

SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the
Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant
to the same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to
recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of
appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of
manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and
facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;

"x x x
 "(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate
authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers,
consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably
indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a
consumer, a patient, or any person;

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or
not registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid
for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have
caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently
injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk
management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;

x x x.

As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to
carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and
medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it
effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public
health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the
declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that
are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based
medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v.
Secretary of Justice,  as follows:
267

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved
to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the
LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and
discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions
and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic
services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have
already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services
 and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical
exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.  Thus:
268

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and
other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from
foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and
services. [Emphases supplied]

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.  A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter
269

of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. 270

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities,  the hiring of skilled health professionals,  or the training of barangay health workers,  it will be the
271 272 273

national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is
called upon to implement like the RH Law.

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There
is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory
for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the
national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.

The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the
ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No.
9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the
RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government.
These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional
government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact
legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the
Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the
relationship between the national and the regional governments.  Except for the express and implied limitations
274

imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to
legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. 275

11 - Natural Law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,  suffice it to say that the Court does not duly
276

recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every
law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute,
executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate
body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers
and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the
actual law of the past or present.  Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as
277

a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,  the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained
278

that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution
and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving
rights inherent to man where no law is applicable. 279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in
any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing
information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies

and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-
safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices,
and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled
upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a
recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose
its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As
such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist
alongside each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to
address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these
perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is
controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian
countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The
number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent
a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These
countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with
incentives, is failing.

And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is
because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be
weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This
would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per
woman. 280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like
the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court
is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.

x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as
enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in
a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question
the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation
that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that
would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must
carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful
of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial
task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body. 281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing
contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as
entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729)
and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive
provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption
of any family planning method should be maintained.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
 1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo
reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that
hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 ,
is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
6.) G.R. No. 164321               March 23, 2011

SKECHERS, U.S.A., INC., Petitioner,

vs.
INTER PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL TRADING CORP., and/or INTER PACIFIC TRADING CORP. and/or STRONG
SPORTS GEAR CO., LTD., and/or STRONGSHOES WAREHOUSE and/or STRONG FASHION SHOES
TRADING and/or TAN TUAN HONG and/or VIOLETA T. MAGAYAGA and/or JEFFREY R. MORALES and/or
any of its other proprietor/s, directors, officers, employees and/or occupants of its premises located at S-7,
Ed & Joe's Commercial Arcade, No. 153 Quirino Avenue, Parañaque City, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

TRENDWORKS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Petitioner-Intervenor,

vs.
INTER PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL TRADING CORP. and/or INTER PACIFIC TRADING CORP. and/or STRONG
SPORTS GEAR CO., LTD., and/or STRONGSHOES WAREHOUSE and/or STRONG FASHION SHOES
TRADING and/or TAN TUAN HONG and/or VIOLETA T. MAGAYAGA and/or JEFFREY R. MORALES and/or
any of its other proprietor/s, directors, officers, employees and/or occupants of its premises located at S-7,
Ed & Joe's Commercial Arcade, No. 153 Quirino Avenue, Parañaque City, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

For resolution are the twin Motions for Reconsideration1 filed by petitioner and petitioner-intervenor from the
Decision rendered in favor of respondents, dated November 30, 2006.

At the outset, a brief narration of the factual and procedural antecedents that transpired and led to the filing of the
motions is in order.

The present controversy arose when petitioner filed with Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila an application for the issuance of search warrants against an outlet and warehouse operated by
respondents for infringement of trademark under Section 155, in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No.
8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.2 In the course of its business,
petitioner has registered the trademark "SKECHERS"3 and the trademark "S" (within an oval design)4 with
the Intellectual Property Office (IPO).

Two search warrants5 were issued by the RTC and were served on the premises of respondents. As a result of the
raid, more than 6,000 pairs of shoes bearing the "S" logo were seized.

Later, respondents moved to quash the search warrants, arguing that there was no confusing similarity
between petitioner’s "Skechers" rubber shoes and its "Strong" rubber shoes.

On November 7, 2002, the RTC issued an Order6 quashing the search warrants and directing the NBI to return the
seized goods. The RTC agreed with respondent’s view that Skechers rubber shoes and Strong rubber shoes have
glaring differences such that an ordinary prudent purchaser would not likely be misled or confused in purchasing the
wrong article.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari7 with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the RTC Order. On
November 17, 2003, the CA issued a Decision8 affirming the ruling of the RTC.

Subsequently, petitioner filed the present petition9 before this Court which puts forth the following assignment of
errors:

A. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

CONSIDERING MATTERS OF DEFENSE IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT IN
 PASSING UPON THE VALIDITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE LIMITED
ITSELF TO A DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN QUASHING THE SEARCH WARRANTS.

B. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING

THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT GUILTY OF TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT IN THE CASE WHERE
THE SOLE TRIABLE ISSUE IS THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE A SEARCH
WARRANT.10

In the meantime, petitioner-intervenor filed a Petition-in-Intervention11 with this Court claiming to be the sole licensed
distributor of Skechers products here in the Philippines.

On November 30, 2006, this Court rendered a Decision12 dismissing the petition.

Both petitioner and petitioner-intervenor filed separate motions for reconsideration.

In petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the earlier decision on the
following grounds:

(a) THIS HONORABLE COURT MUST RE-EXAMINE THE FACTS OF THIS CASE DUE TO THE
SIGNIFICANCE AND REPERCUSSIONS OF ITS DECISION.

(b) COMMERCIAL QUANTITIES OF THE SEIZED ITEMS WITH THE UNAUTHORIZED

REPRODUCTIONS OF THE "S" TRADEMARK OWNED BY PETITIONER WERE INTENDED FOR
DISTRIBUTION IN THE PHILIPPINE MARKET TO THE DETRIMENT OF PETITIONER – RETURNING
THE GOODS TO RESPONDENTS WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT THE GOODWILL AND REPUTATION OF
PETITIONER.

(c) THE SEARCH WARRANT COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS BOTH ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

(d) THE SEARCH WARRANT COURT DID NOT PROPERLY RE-EVALUATE THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED DURING THE SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATION PROCEEDINGS.

(e) THE SOLID TRIANGLE CASE IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE, AS IT IS BASED ON A
DIFFERENT FACTUAL MILIEU. PRELIMINARY FINDING OF GUILT (OR ABSENCE THEREOF) MADE
BY THE SEARCH WARRANT COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS IMPROPER.

(f) THE SEARCH WARRANT COURT OVERSTEPPED ITS DISCRETION. THE LAW IS CLEAR. THE
DOMINANCY TEST SHOULD BE USED.

(g) THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERRORS OF JURISDICTION.13

On the other hand, petitioner-intervenor’s motion for reconsideration raises the following errors for this Court’s
consideration, to wit:

(a) THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SEARCH WARRANT COURT ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ADOPTING THE ALREADY-REJECTED HOLISTIC TEST IN DETERMINING
THE ISSUE OF CONFUSING SIMILARITY;

(b) THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SEARCH WARRANT COURT ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW IN
HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT; AND

(c) THE COURT OF APPEALS SANCTIONED THE TRIAL COURT’S DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL
AND ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT UPHELD THE QUASHAL OF THE
 SEARCH WARRANT ON THE BASIS SOLELY OF A FINDING THAT THERE IS NO CONFUSING
SIMILARITY.14

A perusal of the motions submitted by petitioner and petitioner-intervenor would show that the primary issue posed
by them dwells on the issue of whether or not respondent is guilty of trademark infringement.

After a thorough review of the arguments raised herein, this Court reconsiders its earlier decision.

The basic law on trademark, infringement, and unfair competition is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293. Specifically,
Section 155 of R.A. No. 8293 states:

Remedies; Infringement. — Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner of the registered mark:

155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark or
the same container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution,
advertising of any goods or services including other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or

155.2. Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a dominant feature thereof and
apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers,
receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action for infringement by the registrant for
the remedies hereinafter set forth: Provided, That the infringement takes place at the moment any of the acts stated
in Subsection 155.1 or this subsection are committed regardless of whether there is actual sale of goods or services
using the infringing material.15

The essential element of infringement under R.A. No. 8293 is that the infringing mark is likely to cause
confusion. In determining similarity and likelihood of confusion, jurisprudence has developed tests  the
Dominancy Test and the Holistic or Totality Test. The Dominancy Test focuses on the similarity of the
prevalent or dominant features of the competing trademarks that might cause confusion, mistake, and
deception in the mind of the purchasing public. Duplication or imitation is not necessary; neither is it
required that the mark sought to be registered suggests an effort to imitate. Given more consideration are
the aural and visual impressions created by the marks on the buyers of goods, giving little weight to factors
like prices, quality, sales outlets, and market segments. 16

In contrast, the Holistic or Totality Test necessitates a consideration of the entirety of the marks as applied
to the products, including the labels and packaging, in determining confusing similarity. The discerning eye
of the observer must focus not only on the predominant words, but also on the other features appearing on
both labels so that the observer may draw conclusion on whether one is confusingly similar to the other.17

Relative to the question on confusion of marks and trade names, jurisprudence has noted two (2) types of
confusion, viz.: (1) confusion of goods (product confusion), where the ordinarily prudent purchaser would
be induced to purchase one product in the belief that he was purchasing the other; and (2) confusion of
business (source or origin confusion), where, although the goods of the parties are different, the product,
the mark of which registration is applied for by one party, is such as might reasonably be assumed to
originate with the registrant of an earlier product, and the public would then be deceived either into that
belief or into the belief that there is some connection between the two parties, though inexistent. 18

Applying the Dominancy Test to the case at bar, this Court finds that the use of the stylized "S" by
respondent in its Strong rubber shoes infringes on the mark already registered by petitioner with the IPO.
While it is undisputed that petitioner’s stylized "S" is within an oval design, to this Court’s mind, the
dominant feature of the trademark is the stylized "S," as it is precisely the stylized "S" which catches the
eye of the purchaser. Thus, even if respondent did not use an oval design, the mere fact that it used the
same stylized "S", the same being the dominant feature of petitioner’s trademark, already constitutes
infringement under the Dominancy Test.
This Court cannot agree with the observation of the CA that the use of the letter "S" could hardly be considered as
highly identifiable to the products of petitioner alone. The CA even supported its conclusion by stating that the letter
"S" has been used in so many existing trademarks, the most popular of which is the trademark "S" enclosed by an
inverted triangle, which the CA says is identifiable to Superman. Such reasoning, however, misses the entire point,
which is that respondent had used a stylized "S," which is the same stylized "S" which petitioner has a registered
trademark for. The letter "S" used in the Superman logo, on the other hand, has a block-like tip on the upper portion
and a round elongated tip on the lower portion. Accordingly, the comparison made by the CA of the letter "S" used in
the Superman trademark with petitioner’s stylized "S" is not appropriate to the case at bar.

Furthermore, respondent did not simply use the letter "S," but it appears to this Court that based on the font and the
size of the lettering, the stylized "S" utilized by respondent is the very same stylized "S" used by petitioner; a stylized
"S" which is unique and distinguishes petitioner’s trademark. Indubitably, the likelihood of confusion is present as
purchasers will associate the respondent’s use of the stylized "S" as having been authorized by petitioner or that
respondent’s product is connected with petitioner’s business.

Both the RTC and the CA applied the Holistic Test in ruling that respondent had not infringed petitioner’s trademark.
For its part, the RTC noted the following supposed dissimilarities between the shoes, to wit:

1. The mark "S" found in Strong Shoes is not enclosed in an "oval design."

2. The word "Strong" is conspicuously placed at the backside and insoles.

3. The hang tags and labels attached to the shoes bears the word "Strong" for respondent and "Skechers
U.S.A." for private complainant;

4. Strong shoes are modestly priced compared to the costs of Skechers Shoes.19

While there may be dissimilarities between the appearances of the shoes, to this Court’s mind such
dissimilarities do not outweigh the stark and blatant similarities in their general features. As can be readily
observed by simply comparing petitioner’s Energy20 model and respondent’s Strong21 rubber shoes, respondent also
used the color scheme of blue, white and gray utilized by petitioner. Even the design and "wavelike" pattern of the
midsole and outer sole of respondent’s shoes are very similar to petitioner’s shoes, if not exact patterns thereof. At
the side of the midsole near the heel of both shoes are two elongated designs in practically the same location. Even
the outer soles of both shoes have the same number of ridges, five at the back and six in front. On the side of
respondent’s shoes, near the upper part, appears the stylized "S," placed in the exact location as that of the stylized
"S" on petitioner’s shoes. On top of the "tongue" of both shoes appears the stylized "S" in practically the same
location and size. Moreover, at the back of petitioner’s shoes, near the heel counter, appears "Skechers Sport Trail"
written in white lettering. However, on respondent’s shoes appears "Strong Sport Trail" noticeably written in the
same white lettering, font size, direction and orientation as that of petitioner’s shoes. On top of the heel collar of
petitioner’s shoes are two grayish-white semi-transparent circles. Not surprisingly, respondent’s shoes also have
two grayish-white semi-transparent circles in the exact same location. lihpwa1

Based on the foregoing, this Court is at a loss as to how the RTC and the CA, in applying the holistic test, ruled that
there was no colorable imitation, when it cannot be any more clear and apparent to this Court that there is colorable
imitation. The dissimilarities between the shoes are too trifling and frivolous that it is indubitable that respondent’s
products will cause confusion and mistake in the eyes of the public. Respondent’s shoes may not be an exact
replica of petitioner’s shoes, but the features and overall design are so similar and alike that confusion is highly
likely.
1avvphi1

In Converse Rubber Corporation v. Jacinto Rubber & Plastic Co., Inc.,22 this Court, in a case for unfair competition,
had opined that even if not all the details are identical, as long as the general appearance of the two products are
such that any ordinary purchaser would be deceived, the imitator should be liable, to wit:

From said examination, We find the shoes manufactured by defendants to contain, as found by the trial court,
practically all the features of those of the plaintiff Converse Rubber Corporation and manufactured, sold or marketed
by plaintiff Edwardson Manufacturing Corporation, except for their respective brands, of course. We fully agree with
the trial court that "the respective designs, shapes, the colors of the ankle patches, the bands, the toe patch and the
soles of the two products are exactly the same ... (such that) at a distance of a few meters, it is impossible to
distinguish "Custombuilt" from "Chuck Taylor." These elements are more than sufficient to serve as basis for a
charge of unfair competition. Even if not all the details just mentioned were identical, with the general appearances
alone of the two products, any ordinary, or even perhaps even a not too perceptive and discriminating customer
could be deceived, and, therefore, Custombuilt could easily be passed off for Chuck Taylor. Jurisprudence supports
the view that under such circumstances, the imitator must be held liable. x x x23

Neither can the difference in price be a complete defense in trademark infringement. In McDonald’s Corporation v.
L.C. Big Mak Burger. Inc.,24 this Court held:

Modern law recognizes that the protection to which the owner of a trademark is entitled is not limited to guarding his
goods or business from actual market competition with identical or similar products of the parties, but extends to all
cases in which the use by a junior appropriator of a trade-mark or trade-name is likely to lead to a confusion of
source, as where prospective purchasers would be misled into thinking that the complaining party has extended his
business into the field (see 148 ALR 56 et seq; 53 Am. Jur. 576) or is in any way connected with the activities of the
infringer; or when it forestalls the normal potential expansion of his business (v. 148 ALR 77, 84; 52 Am. Jur. 576,
577). x x x25

Indeed, the registered trademark owner may use its mark on the same or similar products, in different segments of
the market, and at different price levels depending on variations of the products for specific segments of the
market.26 The purchasing public might be mistaken in thinking that petitioner had ventured into a lower market
segment such that it is not inconceivable for the public to think that Strong or Strong Sport Trail might be associated
or connected with petitioner’s brand, which scenario is plausible especially since both petitioner and respondent
manufacture rubber shoes.

Withal, the protection of trademarks as intellectual property is intended not only to preserve the goodwill and
reputation of the business established on the goods bearing the mark through actual use over a period of time, but
also to safeguard the public as consumers against confusion on these goods.27 While respondent’s shoes contain
some dissimilarities with petitioner’s shoes, this Court cannot close its eye to the fact that for all intents and purpose,
respondent had deliberately attempted to copy petitioner’s mark and overall design and features of the shoes. Let it
be remembered, that defendants in cases of infringement do not normally copy but only make colorable
changes.28 The most successful form of copying is to employ enough points of similarity to confuse the public, with
enough points of difference to confuse the courts.29

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision dated November
30, 2006 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.
7.) G.R. No. 180677               February 18, 2013

VICTORIO P. DIAZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LEVI STRAUSS [PHILS.], INC., Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

It is the tendency of the allegedly infringing mark to be confused with the registered trademark that is the gravamen
of the offense of infringement of a registered trademark. The acquittal of the accused should follow if the allegedly
infringing mark is not likely to cause confusion. Thereby, the evidence of the State does not satisfy the quantum of
proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Accused Victorio P. Diaz (Diaz) appeals the resolutions promulgated on July 17, 20071 and November 22,
2007,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA), respectively, dismissed his appeal in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 30133 for the
belated filing of the appellant's brief, and denied his motion for reconsideration. Thereby, the decision rendered on
February 13, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 00-0318 and Criminal Case No. 00-0319 by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 255, in Las Pifias City (RTC) convicting him for two counts of infringement of trademark were affirmed.3

Antecedents

On February 10, 2000, the Department of Justice filed two informations in the RTC of Las Piñas City, charging Diaz
with violation of Section 155, in relation to Section 170, of Republic Act No. 8293, also known as the Intellectual
Property Code of the Philippines (Intellectual Property Code), to wit:

Criminal Case No. 00-0318

That on or about August 28, 1998, and on dates prior thereto, in Las Pinas City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with criminal intent to defraud Levi’s Strauss (Phil.) Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as LEVI’S), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, knowingly and intentionally engaged in
commerce by reproducing, counterfeiting, copying and colorably imitating Levi’s registered trademarks or dominant
features thereof such as the ARCUATE DESIGN, TWO HORSE BRAND, TWO HORSE PATCH, TWO HORSE
LABEL WITH PATTERNED ARCUATE DESIGN, TAB AND COMPOSITE ARCUATE/TAB/TWO HORSE PATCH,
and in connection thereto, sold, offered for sale, manufactured, distributed counterfeit patches and jeans, including
other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of said patches and jeans, which likely caused confusion,
mistake, and /or deceived the general consuming public, without the consent, permit or authority of the registered
owner, LEVI’S, thus depriving and defrauding the latter of its right to the exclusive use of its trademarks and
legitimate trade, to the damage and prejudice of LEVI’S.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Criminal Case No. 00-0319

That on or about August 28, 1998, and on dates prior thereto, in Las Pinas City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with criminal intent to defraud Levi’s Strauss (Phil.) Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as LEVI’S), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, knowingly and intentionally engaged in
commerce by reproducing, counterfeiting, copying and colorably imitating Levi’s registered trademarks or dominant
features thereof such as the ARCUATE DESIGN, TWO HORSE BRAND, TWO HORSE PATCH, TWO HORSE
LABEL WITH PATTERNED ARCUATE DESIGN, TAB AND COMPOSITE ARCUATE/TAB/TWO HORSE PATCH,
and in connection thereto, sold, offered for sale, manufactured, distributed counterfeit patches and jeans, including
other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of said patches and jeans, which likely caused confusion,
mistake, and /or deceived the general consuming public, without the consent, permit or authority of the registered
owner, LEVI’S, thus depriving and defrauding the latter of its right to the exclusive use of its trademarks and
legitimate trade, to the damage and prejudice of LEVI’S.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5

The cases were consolidated for a joint trial. Diaz entered his pleas of not guilty to each information on June 21,
2000.6

1.

Evidence of the Prosecution

Levi Strauss and Company (Levi’s), a foreign corporation based in the State of Delaware, United States of America,
had been engaged in the apparel business. It is the owner of trademarks and designs of Levi’s jeans like
LEVI’S 501, the arcuate design, the two-horse brand, the two-horse patch, the two-horse patch with pattern
arcuate, and the composite tab arcuate. LEVI’S 501 has the following registered trademarks, to wit: (1) the
leather patch showing two horses pulling a pair of pants; (2) the arcuate pattern with the inscription "LEVI STRAUSS
& CO;" (3) the arcuate design that refers to "the two parallel stitching curving downward that are being sewn on both
back pockets of a Levi’s Jeans;" and (4) the tab or piece of cloth located on the structural seam of the right back
pocket, upper left side. All these trademarks were registered in the Philippine Patent Office in the 1970’s, 1980’s and
early part of 1990’s.7

Levi Strauss Philippines, Inc. (Levi’s Philippines) is a licensee of Levi’s. After receiving information that Diaz was
selling counterfeit LEVI’S 501 jeans in his tailoring shops in Almanza and Talon, Las Piñas City, Levi’s Philippines
hired a private investigation group to verify the information. Surveillance and the purchase of jeans from the tailoring
shops of Diaz established that the jeans bought from the tailoring shops of Diaz were counterfeit or imitations of
LEVI’S 501. Levi’s Philippines then sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for purposes
of applying for a search warrant against Diaz to be served at his tailoring shops. The search warrants were issued in
due course. Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents searched the tailoring shops of Diaz and seized several
fake LEVI’S 501 jeans from them. Levi’s Philippines claimed that it did not authorize the making and selling of the
seized jeans; that each of the jeans were mere imitations of genuine LEVI’S 501 jeans by each of them bearing the
registered trademarks, like the arcuate design, the tab, and the leather patch; and that the seized jeans could be
mistaken for original LEVI’S 501 jeans due to the placement of the arcuate, tab, and two-horse leather patch.8

2.

Evidence of the Defense

On his part, Diaz admitted being the owner of the shops searched, but he denied any criminal liability.

Diaz stated that he did not manufacture Levi’s jeans, and that he used the label "LS Jeans Tailoring" in the jeans
that he made and sold; that the label "LS Jeans Tailoring" was registered with the Intellectual Property Office; that
his shops received clothes for sewing or repair; that his shops offered made-to-order jeans, whose styles or designs
were done in accordance with instructions of the customers; that since the time his shops began operating in 1992,
he had received no notice or warning regarding his operations; that the jeans he produced were easily recognizable
because the label "LS Jeans Tailoring," and the names of the customers were placed inside the pockets, and each
of the jeans had an "LSJT" red tab; that "LS" stood for "Latest Style;" and that the leather patch on his jeans had two
buffaloes, not two horses.9

Ruling of the RTC

On February 13, 2006, the RTC rendered its decision finding Diaz guilty as charged, disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Victorio P. Diaz, a.k.a. Vic Diaz, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of twice violating Sec. 155, in relation to Sec. 170, of RA No. 8293, as alleged in the Informations
in Criminal Case Nos. 00-0318 & 00-0319, respectively, and hereby sentences him to suffer in each of the cases the
penalty of imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS of prision correcional, as minimum, up to FIVE (5) YEARS of prision
correcional, as maximum, as well as pay a fine of ₱50,000.00 for each of the herein cases, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law.
Also, accused Diaz is hereby ordered to pay to the private complainant Levi’s Strauss (Phils.), Inc. the following,
thus:

1. ₱50,000.00 in exemplary damages; and

2. ₱222,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees.

Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.10

Ruling of the CA

Diaz appealed, but the CA dismissed the appeal on July 17, 2007 on the ground that Diaz had not filed his
appellant’s brief on time despite being granted his requested several extension periods.

Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, Diaz is now before the Court to plead for his acquittal.

Issue

Diaz submits that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED EXISTING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT APPLIED RIGIDLY
THE RULE ON TECHNICALITIES AND OVERRIDE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE BY DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF
THE PETITIONER FOR LATE FILING OF APPELLANT’S BRIEF.11

Ruling

The Court first resolves whether the CA properly dismissed the appeal of Diaz due to the late filing of his appellant’s
brief.

Under Section 7, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, the appellant is required to file the appellant’s brief in the CA "within
forty-five (45) days from receipt of the notice of the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, are attached to
the record, seven (7) copies of his legibly typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of service of two (2)
copies thereof upon the appellee." Section 1(e) of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court grants to the CA the discretion to
dismiss an appeal either motu proprio or on motion of the appellee should the appellant fail to serve and file the
required number of copies of the appellant’s brief within the time provided by the Rules of Court.12

The usage of the word may in Section 1(e) of Rule 50 indicates that the dismissal of the appeal upon failure to file
the appellant’s brief is not mandatory, but discretionary. Verily, the failure to serve and file the required number of
copies of the appellant’s brief within the time provided by the Rules of Court does not have the immediate effect of
causing the outright dismissal of the appeal. This means that the discretion to dismiss the appeal on that basis is
lodged in the CA, by virtue of which the CA may still allow the appeal to proceed despite the late filing of the
appellant’s brief, when the circumstances so warrant its liberality. In deciding to dismiss the appeal, then, the CA is
bound to exercise its sound discretion upon taking all the pertinent circumstances into due consideration.

The records reveal that Diaz’s counsel thrice sought an extension of the period to file the appellant’s brief. The first
time was on March 12, 2007, the request being for an extension of 30 days to commence on March 11, 2007. The
CA granted his motion under its resolution of March 21, 2007. On April 10, 2007, the last day of the 30-day
extension, the counsel filed another motion, seeking an additional 15 days. The CA allowed the counsel until April
25, 2007 to serve and file the appellant’s brief. On April 25, 2007, the counsel went a third time to the CA with
another request for 15 days. The CA still granted such third motion for extension, giving the counsel until May 10,
2007. Notwithstanding the liberality of the CA, the counsel did not literally comply, filing the appellant’s brief only on
May 28, 2007, which was the 18th day beyond the third extension period granted.
Under the circumstances, the failure to file the appellant’s brief on time rightly deserved the outright rejection of the
appeal. The acts of his counsel bound Diaz like any other client. It was, of course, only the counsel who was well
aware that the Rules of Court fixed the periods to file pleadings and equally significant papers like the appellant’s
brief with the lofty objective of avoiding delays in the administration of justice.

Yet, we have before us an appeal in two criminal cases in which the appellant lost his chance to be heard by the CA
on appeal because of the failure of his counsel to serve and file the appellant’s brief on time despite the grant of
several extensions the counsel requested. Diaz was convicted and sentenced to suffer two indeterminate sentences
that would require him to spend time in detention for each conviction lasting two years, as minimum, to five years, as
maximum, and to pay fines totaling ₱100,000.00 (with subsidiary imprisonment in case of his insolvency). His
personal liberty is now no less at stake. This reality impels us to look beyond the technicality and delve into the
merits of the case to see for ourselves if the appeal, had it not been dismissed, would have been worth the time of
the CA to pass upon. After all, his appellant’s brief had been meanwhile submitted to the CA. While delving into the
merits of the case, we have uncovered a weakness in the evidence of guilt that cannot be simply ignored and
glossed over if we were to be true to our oaths to do justice to everyone.

We feel that despite the CA being probably right in dismissing the excuses of oversight and excusable negligence
tendered by Diaz’s counsel to justify the belated filing of the appellant’s brief as unworthy of serious consideration,
Diaz should not be made to suffer the dire consequence. Any accused in his shoes, with his personal liberty as well
as his personal fortune at stake, expectedly but innocently put his fullest trust in his counsel’s abilities and
professionalism in the handling of his appeal. He thereby delivered his fate to the hands of his counsel. Whether or
not those hands were efficient or trained enough for the job of handling the appeal was a learning that he would get
only in the end. Likelier than not, he was probably even unaware of the three times that his counsel had requested
the CA for extensions. If he were now to be left to his unwanted fate, he would surely suffer despite his innocence.
How costly a learning it would be for him! That is where the Court comes in. It is most important for us as dispensers
of justice not to allow the inadvertence or incompetence of any counsel to result in the outright deprivation of an
appellant’s right to life, liberty or property.13

We do not mind if this softening of judicial attitudes be mislabeled as excessive leniency. With so much on the line,
the people whose futures hang in a balance should not be left to suffer from the incompetence, mindlessness or
lack of professionalism of any member of the Law Profession. They reasonably expect a just result in every
litigation. The courts must give them that just result. That assurance is the people’s birthright. Thus, we have to
undo Diaz’s dire fate.

Even as we now set aside the CA’s rejection of the appeal of Diaz, we will not remand the records to the CA for its
review. In an appeal of criminal convictions, the records are laid open for review. To avoid further delays, therefore,
we take it upon ourselves to review the records and resolve the issue of guilt, considering that the records are
already before us.

Section 155 of R.A. No. 8293 defines the acts that constitute infringement of trademark, viz:

Remedies; Infringement. — Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner of the registered mark:

155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark or the same
container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any
goods or services including other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or

155.2. Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a dominant feature thereof and apply
such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles
or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action for infringement by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter set forth: Provided, That the infringement takes place at the moment any of the acts stated in Subsection
155.1 or this subsection are committed regardless of whether there is actual sale of goods or services using the
infringing material.
The elements of the offense of trademark infringement under the Intellectual Property Code are, therefore, the
following:

1. The trademark being infringed is registered in the Intellectual Property Office;

2. The trademark is reproduced, counterfeited, copied, or colorably imitated by the infringer;

3. The infringing mark is used in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising of any goods,
business or services; or the infringing mark is applied to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers,
receptacles or advertisements intended to be used upon or in connection with such goods, business or
services;

4. The use or application of the infringing mark is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive
purchasers or others as to the goods or services themselves or as to the source or origin of such goods or
services or the identity of such business; and

5. The use or application of the infringing mark is without the consent of the trademark owner or the
assignee thereof.14

As can be seen, the likelihood of confusion is the gravamen of the offense of trademark infringement.15 There
are two tests to determine likelihood of confusion, namely: the dominancy test, and the holistic test. The contrasting
concept of these tests was explained in Societes Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Dy, Jr., thus:

x x x. The dominancy test focuses on the similarity of the main, prevalent or essential features of the competing
trademarks that might cause confusion. Infringement takes place when the competing trademark contains the
essential features of another. Imitation or an effort to imitate is unnecessary. The question is whether the use of the
marks is likely to cause confusion or deceive purchasers.

The holistic test considers the entirety of the marks, including labels and packaging, in determining confusing
similarity. The focus is not only on the predominant words but also on the other features appearing on the labels.16

As to what test should be applied in a trademark infringement case, we said in McDonald’s Corporation v. Macjoy
Fastfood Corporation17 that:

In trademark cases, particularly in ascertaining whether one trademark is confusingly similar to another, no set rules
can be deduced because each case must be decided on its merits. In such cases, even more than in any other
litigation, precedent must be studied in the light of the facts of the particular case. That is the reason why in
trademark cases, jurisprudential precedents should be applied only to a case if they are specifically in point.

The case of Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,18 which involved an alleged
trademark infringement of jeans products, is worth referring to. There, H.D. Lee Co., Inc. (H.D. Lee), a corporation
based in the United States of America, claimed that Emerald Garment’s trademark of "STYLISTIC MR. LEE" that it
used on its jeans products was confusingly similar to the "LEE" trademark that H.D. Lee used on its own jeans
products. Applying the holistic test, the Court ruled that there was no infringement.

The holistic test is applicable here considering that the herein criminal cases also involved trademark
infringement in relation to jeans products. Accordingly, the jeans trademarks of Levi’s Philippines and Diaz
must be considered as a whole in determining the likelihood of confusion between them. The maong pants
or jeans made and sold by Levi’s Philippines, which included LEVI’S 501, were very popular in the
Philippines. The consuming public knew that the original LEVI’S 501 jeans were under a foreign brand and
quite expensive. Such jeans could be purchased only in malls or boutiques as ready-to-wear items, and
were not available in tailoring shops like those of Diaz’s as well as not acquired on a "made-to-order" basis.
Under the circumstances, the consuming public could easily discern if the jeans were original or fake
LEVI’S 501, or were manufactured by other brands of jeans. Confusion and deception were remote, for, as
the Court has observed in Emerald Garments:
First, the products involved in the case at bar are, in the main, various kinds of jeans. These are not your ordinary
household items like catsup, soy sauce or soap which are of minimal cost. Maong pants or jeans are not
inexpensive. Accordingly, the casual buyer is predisposed to be more cautious and discriminating in and would
prefer to mull over his purchase. Confusion and deception, then, is less likely. In Del Monte Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, we noted that:

.... Among these, what essentially determines the attitudes of the purchaser, specifically his inclination to be
cautious, is the cost of the goods. To be sure, a person who buys a box of candies will not exercise as much care as
one who buys an expensive watch. As a general rule, an ordinary buyer does not exercise as much prudence in
buying an article for which he pays a few centavos as he does in purchasing a more valuable thing. Expensive and
valuable items are normally bought only after deliberate, comparative and analytical investigation. But mass
products, low priced articles in wide use, and matters of everyday purchase requiring frequent replacement are
bought by the casual consumer without great care....

Second, like his beer, the average Filipino consumer generally buys his jeans by brand. He does not ask the
sales clerk for generic jeans but for, say, a Levis, Guess, Wrangler or even an Armani. He is, therefore, more
or less knowledgeable and familiar with his preference and will not easily be distracted.

Finally, in line with the foregoing discussions, more credit should be given to the "ordinary purchaser." Cast in this
particular controversy, the ordinary purchaser is not the "completely unwary consumer" but is the "ordinarily
intelligent buyer" considering the type of product involved.

The definition laid down in Dy Buncio v. Tan Tiao Bok is better suited to the present case. There, the "ordinary
purchaser" was defined as one "accustomed to buy, and therefore to some extent familiar with, the goods in
question. The test of fraudulent simulation is to be found in the likelihood of the deception of some persons in some
measure acquainted with an established design and desirous of purchasing the commodity with which that design
has been associated. The test is not found in the deception, or the possibility of deception, of the person who knows
nothing about the design which has been counterfeited, and who must be indifferent between that and the other.
The simulation, in order to be objectionable, must be such as appears likely to mislead the ordinary intelligent buyer
who has a need to supply and is familiar with the article that he seeks to purchase.19

Diaz used the trademark "LS JEANS TAILORING" for the jeans he produced and sold in his tailoring shops.
His trademark was visually and aurally different from the trademark "LEVI STRAUSS & CO" appearing on
the patch of original jeans under the trademark LEVI’S 501. The word "LS" could not be confused as a
derivative from "LEVI STRAUSS" by virtue of the "LS" being connected to the word "TAILORING", thereby
openly suggesting that the jeans bearing the trademark "LS JEANS TAILORING" came or were bought from
the tailoring shops of Diaz, not from the malls or boutiques selling original LEVI’S 501 jeans to the
consuming public.

There were other remarkable differences between the two trademarks that the consuming public would easily
perceive. Diaz aptly noted such differences, as follows:

The prosecution also alleged that the accused copied the "two horse design" of the petitioner-private complainant
but the evidence will show that there was no such design in the seized jeans. Instead, what is shown is "buffalo
design." Again, a horse and a buffalo are two different animals which an ordinary customer can easily distinguish. x
x x.

The prosecution further alleged that the red tab was copied by the accused. However, evidence will show that the
red tab used by the private complainant indicates the word "LEVI’S" while that of the accused indicates the letters
"LSJT" which means LS JEANS TAILORING. Again, even an ordinary customer can distinguish the word LEVI’S
from the letters LSJT.

xxxx

In terms of classes of customers and channels of trade, the jeans products of the private complainant and the
accused cater to different classes of customers and flow through the different channels of trade. The customers of
the private complainant are mall goers belonging to class A and B market group – while that of the accused are
those who belong to class D and E market who can only afford Php 300 for a pair of made-toorder pants.20 x x x.

Moreover, based on the certificate issued by the Intellectual Property Office, "LS JEANS TAILORING" was a
registered trademark of Diaz. He had registered his trademark prior to the filing of the present cases.21 The
Intellectual Property Office would certainly not have allowed the registration had Diaz’s trademark been confusingly
similar with the registered trademark for LEVI’S 501 jeans.

Given the foregoing, it should be plain that there was no likelihood of confusion between the trademarks involved.
Thereby, the evidence of guilt did not satisfy the quantum of proof required for a criminal conviction, which is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. According to Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, proof beyond a reasonable doubt
does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty
only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Consequently, Diaz
should be acquitted of the charges.

WHEREFORE, the Court ACQUITS petitioner VICTORIO P. DIAZ of the crimes of infringement of trademark

charged in Criminal Case No. 00-0318 and Criminal Case No. 00-0319 for failure of the State to establish his guilt
by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
8.) G.R. No. 194062               June 17, 2013

REPUBLIC GAS CORPORATION, ARNEL U. TY, MARI ANTONETTE N. TY, ORLANDO REYES, FERRER
SUAZO and ALVIN U. TV, Petitioners,
vs.
PETRON CORPORATION, PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, and SHELL INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM COMPANY LIMITED, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners seeking
the reversal of the Decision1 dated July 2, 2010, and Resolution2 dated October 11, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106385.

Stripped of non-essentials, the facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

Petitioners Petron Corporation ("Petron" for brevity) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation ("Shell" for brevity)
are two of the largest bulk suppliers and producers of LPG in the Philippines. Petron is the registered owner in the
Philippines of the trademarks GASUL and GASUL cylinders used for its LGP products. It is the sole entity in the
Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell, and distribute GASUL LPG containers,
products and its trademarks.

Pilipinas Shell, on the other hand, is the authorized user in the Philippines of the tradename, trademarks, symbols or
designs of its principal, Shell International Petroleum Company Limited, including the marks SHELLANE and SHELL
device in connection with the production, sale and distribution of SHELLANE LPGs. It is the only corporation in the
Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell and distribute SHELLANE LGP containers
and products. Private respondents, on the other hand, are the directors and officers of Republic Gas Corporation
("REGASCO" for brevity), an entity duly licensed to engage in, conduct and carry on, the business of refilling,
buying, selling, distributing and marketing at wholesale and retail of Liquefied Petroleum Gas ("LPG").

LPG Dealers Associations, such as the Shellane Dealers Association, Inc., Petron Gasul Dealers Association, Inc.
and Totalgaz Dealers Association, received reports that certain entities were engaged in the unauthorized refilling,
sale and distribution of LPG cylinders bearing the registered tradenames and trademarks of the petitioners. As a
consequence, on February 5, 2004, Genesis Adarlo (hereinafter referred to as Adarlo), on behalf of the
aforementioned dealers associations, filed a letter-complaint in the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI")
regarding the alleged illegal trading of petroleum products and/or underdelivery or underfilling in the sale of LPG
products.

Acting on the said letter-complaint, NBI Senior Agent Marvin E. De Jemil (hereinafter referred to as "De Jemil") was
assigned to verify and confirm the allegations contained in the letter-complaint. An investigation was thereafter
conducted, particularly within the areas of Caloocan, Malabon, Novaliches and Valenzuela, which showed that
several persons and/or establishments, including REGASCO, were suspected of having violated provisions of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 33 (B.P. 33). The surveillance revealed that REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant in Malabon was
engaged in the refilling and sale of LPG cylinders bearing the registered marks of the petitioners without authority
from the latter. Based on its General Information Sheet filed in the Securities and Exchange Commission,
REGASCO’s members of its Board of Directors are: (1) Arnel U. Ty – President, (2) Marie Antoinette Ty –
Treasurer, (3) Orlando Reyes – Corporate Secretary, (4) Ferrer Suazo and (5) Alvin Ty (hereinafter referred to
collectively as private respondents).

De Jemil, with other NBI operatives, then conducted a test-buy operation on February 19, 2004 with the former and
a confidential asset going undercover. They brought with them four (4) empty LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks
of SHELLANE and GASUL and included the same with the purchase of J&S, a REGASCO’s regular customer.
Inside REGASCO’s refilling plant, they witnessed that REGASCO’s employees carried the empty LPG cylinders to a
refilling station and refilled the LPG empty cylinders. Money was then given as payment for the refilling of the J&S’s
empty cylinders which included the four LPG cylinders brought in by De Jemil and his companion. Cash Invoice No.
191391 dated February 19, 2004 was issued as evidence for the consideration paid.

After leaving the premises of REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant in Malabon, De Jemil and the other NBI operatives
proceeded to the NBI headquarters for the proper marking of the LPG cylinders. The LPG cylinders refilled by
REGASCO were likewise found later to be underrefilled.

Thus, on March 5, 2004, De Jemil applied for the issuance of search warrants in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
24, in the City of Manila against the private respondents and/or occupants of REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant located
at Asucena Street, Longos, Malabon, Metro Manila for alleged violation of Section 2 (c), in relation to Section 4, of
B.P. 33, as amended by PD 1865. In his sworn affidavit attached to the applications for search warrants, Agent De
Jemil alleged as follows:

"x x x.

"4. Respondent’s REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant-Malabon is not one of those entities authorized to refill LPG
cylinders bearing the marks of PSPC, Petron and Total Philippines Corporation. A Certification dated February 6,
2004 confirming such fact, together with its supporting documents, are attached as Annex "E" hereof.

6. For several days in the month of February 2004, the other NBI operatives and I conducted surveillance and
investigation on respondents’ REGASCO LPG refilling Plant-Malabon. Our surveillance and investigation revealed
that respondents’ REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant-Malabon is engaged in the refilling and sale of LPG cylinders
bearing the marks of Shell International, PSPC and Petron.

x x x.

8. The confidential asset and I, together with the other operatives of the NBI, put together a test-buy operation. On
February 19, 2004, I, together with the confidential asset, went undercover and executed our testbuy operation.
Both the confidential assets and I brought with us four (4) empty LPG cylinders branded as Shellane and Gasul. x x
x in order to have a successful test buy, we decided to "ride-on" our purchases with the purchase of Gasul and
Shellane LPG by J & S, one of REGASCO’s regular customers.

9. We proceeded to the location of respondents’ REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant-Malabon and asked from an
employee of REGASCO inside the refilling plant for refill of the empty LPG cylinders that we have brought along,
together with the LPG cylinders brought by J & S. The REGASCO employee, with some assistance from other
employees, carried the empty LPG cylinders to a refilling station and we witnessed the actual refilling of our empty
LPG cylinders.

10. Since the REGASCO employees were under the impression that we were together with J & S, they made the
necessary refilling of our empty LPG cylinders alongside the LPG cylinders brought by J & S. When we requested
for a receipt, the REGASCO employees naturally counted our LPG cylinders together with the LPG cylinders
brought by J & S for refilling. Hence, the amount stated in Cash Invoice No. 191391 dated February 19, 2004,
equivalent to Sixteen Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-Six and 40/100 (Php16,286.40), necessarily included the
amount for the refilling of our four (4) empty LPG cylinders. x x x.

11. After we accomplished the purchase of the illegally refilled LPG cylinders from respondents’ REGASCO LPG
Refilling Plant-Malabon, we left its premises bringing with us the said LPG cylinders. Immediately, we proceeded to
our headquarters and made the proper markings of the illegally refilled LPG cylinders purchased from respondents’
REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant-Malabon by indicating therein where and when they were purchased. Since
REGASCO is not an authorized refiller, the four (4) LPG cylinders illegally refilled by respondents’ REGASCO LPG
Refilling Plant-Malabon, were without any seals, and when weighed, were underrefilled. Photographs of the LPG
cylinders illegally refilled from respondents’ REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant-Malabon are attached as Annex "G"
hereof. x x x."

After conducting a personal examination under oath of Agent De Jemil and his witness, Joel Cruz, and upon
reviewing their sworn affidavits and other attached documents, Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Branch 24, in the City of Manila found probable cause and correspondingly issued Search Warrants Nos. 04-
5049 and 04-5050.

Upon the issuance of the said search warrants, Special Investigator Edgardo C. Kawada and other NBI operatives
immediately proceeded to the REGASCO LPG Refilling Station in Malabon and served the search warrants on the
private respondents. After searching the premises of REGASCO, they were able to seize several empty and filled
Shellane and Gasul cylinders as well as other allied paraphernalia.

Subsequently, on January 28, 2005, the NBI lodged a complaint in the Department of Justice against the
private respondents for alleged violations of Sections 155 and 168 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293, otherwise
known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.

On January 15, 2006, Assistant City Prosecutor Armando C. Velasco recommended the dismissal of the complaint.
The prosecutor found that there was no proof introduced by the petitioners that would show that private respondent
REGASCO was engaged in selling petitioner’s products or that it imitated and reproduced the registered trademarks
of the petitioners. He further held that he saw no deception on the part of REGASCO in the conduct of its business
of refilling and marketing LPG. The Resolution issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Velasco reads as follows in its
dispositive portion:

"WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the undersigned finds the evidence against the respondents to be insufficient
to form a well-founded belief that they have probably committed violations of Republic Act No. 9293. The
DISMISSAL of this case is hereby respectfully recommended for insufficiency of evidence."

On appeal, the Secretary of the Department of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s dismissal of the complaint in a
Resolution dated September 18, 2008, reasoning therein that:

"x x x, the empty Shellane and Gasul LPG cylinders were brought by the NBI agent specifically for refilling. Refilling
the same empty cylinders is by no means an offense in itself – it being the legitimate business of Regasco to
engage in the refilling and marketing of liquefied petroleum gas. In other words, the empty cylinders were merely
filled by the employees of Regasco because they were brought precisely for that purpose. They did not pass off the
goods as those of complainants’ as no other act was done other than to refill them in the normal course of its
business.

"In some instances, the empty cylinders were merely swapped by customers for those which are already filled. In
this case, the end-users know fully well that the contents of their cylinders are not those produced by complainants.
And the reason is quite simple – it is an independent refilling station.

"At any rate, it is settled doctrine that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its stockholders as
in the case of herein respondents. To sustain the present allegations, the acts complained of must be shown to
have been committed by respondents in their individual capacity by clear and convincing evidence. There being
none, the complaint must necessarily fail. As it were, some of the respondents are even gainfully employed in other
business pursuits. x x x."3

Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, respondents sought recourse to the CA through a petition
for certiorari.

In a Decision dated July 2, 2010, the CA granted respondents’ certiorari petition. The fallo states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition filed in this case is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution dated September 18, 2008 of the Department of Justice in I.S. No. 2005-055 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
October 11, 2010.
Accordingly, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues for our
resolution:

Whether the Petition for Certiorari filed by RESPONDENTS should have been denied outright.

Whether sufficient evidence was presented to prove that the crimes of Trademark Infringement and Unfair
Competition as defined and penalized in Section 155 and Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No.
8293 (The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines) had been committed.

Whether probable cause exists to hold INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS liable for the offense charged.5

Let us discuss the issues in seriatim.

Anent the first issue, the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a
certiorari petition may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed
to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.6

However, this rule is not absolute as jurisprudence has laid down several recognized exceptions permitting a resort
to the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration, viz.:

(a) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;

(b) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the
lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court.

(c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is
perishable;

(d) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

(e) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;

(f) Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable;

(g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;

(h) Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and,

(i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.7

In the present case, the filing of a motion for reconsideration may already be dispensed with considering that the
questions raised in this petition are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and passed upon by
the Secretary of Justice in her assailed resolution.

Apropos the second and third issues, the same may be simplified to one core issue: whether probable cause
exists to hold petitioners liable for the crimes of trademark infringement and unfair competition as defined
and penalized under Sections 155 and 168, in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293.

Section 155 of R.A. No. 8293 identifies the acts constituting trademark infringement as follows:

Section 155. Remedies; Infringement. – Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner of the registered
mark:
155.1 Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of a registered mark of the same
container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any
goods or services including other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or

155.2 Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a dominant feature thereof and apply
such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles
or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action for infringement by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter set forth: Provided, That the infringement takes place at the moment any of the acts stated in Subsection
155.1 or this subsection are committed regardless of whether there is actual sale of goods or services using the
infringing material.8

From the foregoing provision, the Court in a very similar case, made it categorically clear that the mere
unauthorized use of a container bearing a registered trademark in connection with the sale, distribution or
advertising of goods or services which is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception among the buyers
or consumers can be considered as trademark infringement.9

Here, petitioners have actually committed trademark infringement when they refilled, without the
respondents’ consent, the LPG containers bearing the registered marks of the respondents. As noted by
respondents, petitioners’ acts will inevitably confuse the consuming public, since they have no way of
knowing that the gas contained in the LPG tanks bearing respondents’ marks is in reality not the latter’s
LPG product after the same had been illegally refilled. The public will then be led to believe that petitioners
are authorized refillers and distributors of respondents’ LPG products, considering that they are accepting
empty containers of respondents and refilling them for resale.

As to the charge of unfair competition, Section 168.3, in relation to Section 170, of R.A. No. 8293 describes the acts
constituting unfair competition as follows:

Section 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulations and Remedies. x x x.

168.3 In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the
following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:

(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another
manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they
are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be
likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other
than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall
deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or
any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;

xxxx

Section 170. Penalties. Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of
imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000) to Two
hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000), shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the
acts mentioned in Section 155, Section 168 and Subsection 169.1.

From jurisprudence, unfair competition has been defined as the passing off (or palming off) or attempting to pass off
upon the public of the goods or business of one person as the goods or business of another with the end and
probable effect of deceiving the public.10

Passing off (or palming off) takes place where the defendant, by imitative devices on the general appearance of the
goods, misleads prospective purchasers into buying his merchandise under the impression that they are buying that
of his competitors. Thus, the defendant gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of his competitor with
the intention of deceiving the public that the goods are those of his competitor.11

In the present case, respondents pertinently observed that by refilling and selling LPG cylinders bearing their
registered marks, petitioners are selling goods by giving them the general appearance of goods of another
manufacturer.

What's more, the CA correctly pointed out that there is a showing that the consumers may be misled into believing
that the LPGs contained in the cylinders bearing the marks "GASUL" and "SHELLANE" are those goods or products
of the petitioners when, in fact, they are not. Obviously, the mere use of those LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks
"GASUL" and "SHELLANE" will give the LPGs sold by REGASCO the general appearance of the products of the
petitioners.

In sum, this Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution of petitioners for trademark
infringement and unfair competition, considering that petitioner Republic Gas Corporation, being a corporation,
possesses a personality separate and distinct from the person of its officers, directors and
stockholders.12 Petitioners, being corporate officers and/or directors, through whose act, default or omission the
corporation commits a crime, may themselves be individually held answerable for the crime.13 Veritably, the CA
appropriately pointed out that petitioners, being in direct control and supervision in the management and conduct of
the affairs of the corporation, must have known or are aware that the corporation is engaged in the act of refilling
LPG cylinders bearing the marks of the respondents without authority or consent from the latter which, under the
circumstances, could probably constitute the crimes of trademark infringement and unfair competition. The
existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and
intentionally caused the corporation to commit a crime. Thus, petitioners cannot hide behind the cloak of the
separate corporate personality of the corporation to escape criminal liability. A corporate officer cannot protect
himself behind a corporation where he is the actual, present and efficient actor.14

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED and the Decision dated July 2, 2010 and
Resolution dated October 11, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106385 are AFFIRMED.
9.) G.R. No. 170338             December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND
SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY,
and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.

x----------------------x

G.R. No. 179275             December 23, 2008

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,

vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE
HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.

x----------------------x

MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention

x----------------------x

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON,
LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the
President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They
captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the
present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These
recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both
Houses of Congress.1

In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero
delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted
by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and
Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the
inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director
Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the
supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on
the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the
House.2

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless,
they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource
persons.3

Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for
Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction4 docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained
from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee
reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto
be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist
from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.5

Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.

After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege
speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public
"the whole unvarnished truth – the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an
inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping
activities.

On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was referred to the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills6 seeking to
regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) from performing electoral duties.7

In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his
concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were to conduct a legislative
inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech,
articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication
of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the
Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged
illegal wiretapping of public officials.9

On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals,
filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its
scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200
and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.11

As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci"
tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.

Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon,
Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment16 on
the petition on September 25, 2007.

The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17

On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons
summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No.
179275.18

On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275.19

It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different objectives–the first
is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee
reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped
conversation.

The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.

-I-
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on the parties’ standing, argued at
length in their pleadings.

In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "‘[l]egal standing’ or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged
governmental act x x x," thus,

generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.21

The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."22

However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the
stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing
ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality
or validity of laws, regulations and rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member
of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the
acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case,
echoed the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as
impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping
with the Court’s duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given
to them."26

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging that he is the person
alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the respondent
committees as one of the voices in the recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly
injured by the House committees’ actions and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to
institute the petition for prohibition.

In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they are concerned
citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello
Garci" tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public funds that will
necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the continuous violation of the laws and
individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative
inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.28

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate
hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the
investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.29

Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge
asserts his constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.

Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners
Ranada’s and Agcaoili’s and intervenor Sagge’s allegation that the continuous conduct by the Senate of the
questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.32 It should be noted that
in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for,
as in this case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own rights–as taxpayers, members of Congress,
citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the legal profession–which were also
supposedly violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench
and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.34

Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the
more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and
intervenor Sagge.

- II -

The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior
decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and
resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for
judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an
advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A
case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a
case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of
things, cannot be enforced.38

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive
writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the same in
their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records of the House proceedings.
But the Court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. 39 There
is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed
and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been overtaken by these
events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive
remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished.41

- III -

As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue
with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended
to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.43 What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code,
which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."44

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in
1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its
members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first
opened their session.

Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability
of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
 Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21
of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of
procedure." We quote the OSG’s explanation:

The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its
rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the
one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the
Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules
of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are
therefore, procedurally infirm.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the following
rationalization:

The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The present
Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term of six years
each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of
Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires
a majority of Senators to "constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v.
Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of the
Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be
republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47

The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in the same
case, viz.:

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there
is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each
national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day
business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress
before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:

RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS

SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the
same status.

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress,
but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished
matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a
rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a
different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of
the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of
its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but
will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of
its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure)
states:
 RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES

SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall
begin their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for
amendment or revision.

The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one day
before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be
required for its approval.

RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT

SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until
they are amended or repealed.

Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after
an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in
which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term.

However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the
date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from
the Rules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such
rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate
rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress.
The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come
within the rule on unfinished business.

The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to
publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly
state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to
sufficiently put public on notice.

If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the
next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding
effectivity.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have
never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free,
and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.49

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance
of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law
instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in
accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these
rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules
prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.

Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available
at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide
that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general
 circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Tañada is
mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a
person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and
detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,50 otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A.
8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence
(for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.52 It does not make the internet
a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use
its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do
so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact,
the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions.
Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be
undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention
of the Constitution.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the consolidated
petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED.
Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its
committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
10.) G.R. No. 168338             February 15, 2008

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

A. Precis

In this jurisdiction, it is established that freedom of the press is crucial and so inextricably woven into
the right to free speech and free expression, that any attempt to restrict it must be met with an
examination so critical that only a danger that is clear and present would be allowed to curtail it.

Indeed, we have not wavered in the duty to uphold this cherished freedom. We have struck down laws
and issuances meant to curtail this right, as in Adiong v. COMELEC,1Burgos v. Chief of Staff,2Social
Weather Stations v. COMELEC,3 and Bayan v. Executive Secretary Ermita.4 When on its face, it is clear
that a governmental act is nothing more than a naked means to prevent the free exercise of speech, it
must be nullified.

B. The Facts

1. The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and local elections.
On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to
destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly
between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire-
tapping.5 Later, in a Malacañang press briefing, Secretary Bunye produced two versions of the tape,
one supposedly the complete version, and the other, a spliced, “doctored” or altered version, which
would suggest that the President had instructed the COMELEC official to manipulate the election
results in the President’s favor. 6 It seems that Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was that of
President Arroyo, but subsequently made a retraction. 7

2. On June 7, 2005, former counsel of deposed President Joseph Estrada, Atty. Alan Paguia,
subsequently released an alleged authentic tape recording of the wiretap. Included in the tapes were
purported conversations of the President, the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo, COMELEC
Commissioner Garcillano, and the late Senator Barbers.8

3. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned
reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing
its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons included Secretary
Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing
a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was
committed or was being committed in their presence.9

4. On June 9, 2005, in another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to go after media organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and
the printing of the contents of a tape” of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President
about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections. Gonzales said that he was going to start
with Inq7.net, a joint venture between the Philippine Daily Inquirer and GMA7 television network,
because by the very nature of the Internet medium, it was able to disseminate the contents of the
tape more widely. He then expressed his intention of inviting the editors and managers of Inq7.net
and GMA7 to a probe, and supposedly declared, “I [have] asked the NBI to conduct a tactical
interrogation of all concerned.” 10

5. On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued this press release: 11

NTC GIVES FAIR WARNING TO RADIO AND TELEVISION OWNERS/OPERATORS TO OBSERVE ANTI-
WIRETAPPING LAW AND PERTINENT CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM STANDARDS

xxx xxx xxx

Taking into consideration the country’s unusual situation, and in order not to unnecessarily aggravate
the same, the NTC warns all radio stations and television network owners/operators that the
conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by Government like the Provisional
Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that said companies shall not use [their]
stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. Relative
thereto, it has come to the attention of the [NTC] that certain personalities are in possession of
alleged taped conversations which they claim involve the President of the Philippines and a
Commissioner of the COMELEC regarding supposed violation of election laws.

These personalities have admitted that the taped conversations are products of illegal wiretapping
operations.

Considering that these taped conversations have not been duly authenticated nor could it be said at
this time that the tapes contain an accurate or truthful representation of what was recorded therein,
it is the position of the [NTC] that the continuous airing or broadcast of the said taped conversations
by radio and television stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the
conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to these radio and
television stations. It has been subsequently established that the said tapes are false and/or
fraudulent after a prosecution or appropriate investigation, the concerned radio and television
companies are hereby warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful
misrepresentation shall be just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the
licenses or authorizations issued to the said companies.

In addition to the above, the [NTC] reiterates the pertinent NTC circulars on program standards to be
observed by radio and television stations. NTC Memorandum Circular 111-12-85 explicitly states,
among others, that “all radio broadcasting and television stations shall, during any broadcast or
telecast, cut off from the air the speech, play, act or scene or other matters being broadcast or
telecast the tendency thereof is to disseminate false information or such other willful
misrepresentation, or to propose and/or incite treason, rebellion or sedition.” The foregoing directive
had been reiterated by NTC Memorandum Circular No. 22-89, which, in addition thereto, prohibited
radio, broadcasting and television stations from using their stations to broadcast or telecast any
speech, language or scene disseminating false information or willful misrepresentation, or inciting,
encouraging or assisting in subversive or treasonable acts.

The [NTC] will not hesitate, after observing the requirements of due process, to apply with full force
the provisions of said Circulars and their accompanying sanctions on erring radio and television
stations and their owners/operators.

6. On June 14, 2005, NTC held a dialogue with the Board of Directors of the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP).  NTC allegedly assured the KBP that the press release did not violate
the constitutional freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, and the right to information.
Accordingly, NTC and KBP issued a Joint Press Statement which states, among others, that: 12

 NTC respects and will not hinder freedom of the press and the right to information on matters
of public concern. KBP & its members have always been committed to the exercise of press
freedom with high sense of responsibility and discerning judgment of fairness and honesty.
 NTC did not issue any MC [Memorandum Circular] or Order constituting a restraint of press
freedom or censorship. The NTC further denies and does not intend to limit or restrict the
interview of members of the opposition or free expression of views.
 What is being asked by NTC is that the exercise of press freedom [be] done responsibly.
 KBP has program standards that KBP members will observe in the treatment of news and
public affairs programs. These include verification of sources, non-airing of materials that
would constitute inciting to sedition and/or rebellion.
 The KBP Codes also require that no false statement or willful misrepresentation is made in the
treatment of news or commentaries.
 The supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly
giving due consideration to the process being undertaken to verify and validate the authenticity
and actual content of the same.”

C. The Petition

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against respondents Secretary
Gonzales and the NTC, “praying for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, as
extraordinary legal remedies, to annul void proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful,
unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority by the respondents.”13

Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom on expression and of the press,
and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, 14 petitioner specifically
asked this Court:

[F]or [the] nullification of acts, issuances, and orders of respondents committed or made since June
6, 2005 until the present that curtail the public’s rights to freedom of expression and of the press,
and to information on matters of public concern specifically in relation to information regarding the
controversial taped conversion of President Arroyo and for prohibition of the further commission of
such acts, and making of such issuances, and orders by respondents. 15

Respondents16 denied that the acts transgress the Constitution, and questioned petitioner’s legal
standing to file the petition. Among the arguments they raised as to the validity of the “fair warning”
issued by respondent NTC, is that broadcast media enjoy lesser constitutional guarantees compared
to print media, and the warning was issued pursuant to the NTC’s mandate to regulate the
telecommunications industry. 17 It was also stressed that “most of the [television] and radio stations
continue, even to this date, to air the tapes, but of late within the parameters agreed upon between
the NTC and KBP.” 18

D. The Procedural Threshold: Legal Standing

To be sure, the circumstances of this case make the constitutional challenge peculiar. Petitioner, who
is not a member of the broadcast media, prays that we strike down the acts and statements made by
respondents as violations of the right to free speech, free expression and a free press. For another,
the recipients of the press statements have not come forward—neither intervening nor joining
petitioner in this action. Indeed, as a group, they issued a joint statement with respondent NTC that
does not complain about restraints on freedom of the press.

It would seem, then, that petitioner has not met the requisite legal standing, having failed to allege
“such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.” 19

But as early as half a century ago, we have already held that where serious constitutional questions
are involved, “the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside if we must, technicalities of
procedure.” 20 Subsequently, this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural
barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact
on public interest,21 in keeping with the Court’s duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether
or not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and
the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.

Thus, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a case involves an issue of
overarching significance to our society,22 we therefore brush aside technicalities of procedure and
take cognizance of this petition,23 seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all the civil
rights, the freedom of expression. The petition raises other issues like the extent of the right to
information of the public. It is fundamental, however, that we need not address all issues but only
the most decisive one which in the case at bar is whether the acts of the respondents abridge
freedom of speech and of the press.

But aside from the primordial issue of determining whether free speech and freedom of the press
have been infringed, the case at bar also gives this Court the opportunity: (1) to distill the essence
of freedom of speech and of the press now beclouded by the vagaries of motherhood statements;
(2) to clarify the types of speeches and their differing restraints allowed by law; (3) to discuss the
core concepts of prior restraint, content-neutral and content-based regulations and their
constitutional standard of review; (4) to examine the historical difference in the treatment of
restraints between print and broadcast media and stress the standard of review governing both; and
(5) to call attention to the ongoing blurring of the lines of distinction between print and broadcast
media.

E. Re-examining The law on freedom of speech,

of expression and of the press

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.24

Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of every democratic

government, and given a preferred right that stands on a higher level than substantive economic
freedom or other liberties. The cognate rights codified by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution,
copied almost verbatim from the First Amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights, 25 were considered the
necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of free speech. 26 This
preferred status of free speech has also been codified at the international level, its recognition now
enshrined in international law as a customary norm that binds all nations.27

In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental
postulate of our constitutional system. 28 This right was elevated to constitutional status in the 1935,
the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, reflecting our own lesson of history, both political and legal, that
freedom of speech is an indispensable condition for nearly every other form of freedom. 29 Moreover,
our history shows that the struggle to protect the freedom of speech, expression and the press was,
at bottom, the struggle for the indispensable preconditions for the exercise of other freedoms. 30 For it
is only when the people have unbridled access to information and the press that they will be capable
of rendering enlightened judgments. In the oft-quoted words of Thomas Jefferson, we cannot both be
free and ignorant.

E.1. Abstraction of Free Speech

Surrounding the freedom of speech clause are various concepts that we have adopted as part and
parcel of our own Bill of Rights provision on this basic freedom. 31 What is embraced under this
provision was discussed exhaustively by the Court in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 32 in which
it was held:

…At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and punishment. There is to be no previous
restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for
sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger
of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. 33

Gonzales further explained that the vital need of a constitutional democracy for freedom of
expression is undeniable, whether as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment; of attaining the
truth; of assuring participation by the people in social, including political, decision-making; and of
maintaining the balance between stability and change.34 As early as the 1920s, the trend as reflected
in Philippine and American decisions was to recognize the broadest scope and assure the widest
latitude for this constitutional guarantee. The trend represents a profound commitment to the
principle that debate on public issue should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. 35

Freedom of speech and of the press means something more than the right to approve existing
political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, and to take refuge in
the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence.36 When atrophied, the right
becomes meaningless.37 The right belongs as well—if not more—to those who question, who do not
conform, who differ.38 The ideas that may be expressed under this freedom are confined not only to
those that are conventional or acceptable to the majority. To be truly meaningful, freedom of speech
and of the press should allow and even encourage the articulation of the unorthodox view, though it
be hostile to or derided by others; or though such view “induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.” 39 To paraphrase Justice
Holmes, it is freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us. 40

The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly all forms of
communication. It protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as well as political causes,
and is not confined to any particular field of human interest. The protection covers myriad matters of
public interest or concern embracing all issues, about which information is needed or appropriate, so
as to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period. The constitutional
protection assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech and free press for religious, political,
economic, scientific, news, or informational ends, inasmuch as the Constitution’s basic guarantee of
freedom to advocate ideas is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared
by a majority.

The constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas. The protection afforded free
speech extends to speech or publications that are entertaining as well as instructive or informative.
Specifically, in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans,41 this Court stated that all forms of
media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the clause on freedom of
speech and of expression.

While all forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of freedom of expression
clause, the freedom of film, television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the
freedom accorded to newspapers and other print media, as will be subsequently discussed.

E.2. Differentiation: The Limits & Restraints of Free Speech

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right to free
speech and a free press is not susceptible of any limitation. But the realities of life in a complex
society preclude a literal interpretation of the provision prohibiting the passage of a law that would
abridge such freedom. For freedom of expression is not an absolute, 42 nor is it an “unbridled license
that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who
abuse this freedom.”
Thus, all speech are not treated the same. Some types of speech may be subjected to some
regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not be injurious to the
equal right of others or those of the community or society.43 The difference in treatment is expected
because the relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g., political speech, may vary from those of
another, e.g., obscene speech. Distinctions have therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and
evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of speech. 44 We have ruled,
for example, that in our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and obscene speech, as well as “fighting
words” are not entitled to constitutional protection and may be penalized.45

Moreover, the techniques of reviewing alleged restrictions on speech (overbreadth, vagueness, and
so on) have been applied differently to each category, either consciously or unconsciously. 46 A study
of free speech jurisprudence—whether here or abroad—will reveal that courts have developed
different tests as to specific types or categories of speech in concrete situations; i.e., subversive
speech; obscene speech; the speech of the broadcast media and of the traditional print media;
libelous speech; speech affecting associational rights; speech before hostile audiences; symbolic
speech; speech that affects the right to a fair trial; and speech associated with rights of assembly and
petition. 47

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination
of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a
rational connection has been established between the speech restrained and the danger
contemplated; 48 (b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to
balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of situation; 49 and
(c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained
because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a
right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, “extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.” 50

As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied either the dangerous tendency doctrine or clear

and present danger test to resolve free speech challenges. More recently, we have concluded that
we have generally adhered to the clear and present danger test. 51

E.3. In Focus: Freedom of the Press

Much has been written on the philosophical basis of press freedom as part of the larger right of free
discussion and expression. Its practical importance, though, is more easily grasped. It is the chief
source of information on current affairs. It is the most pervasive and perhaps most powerful vehicle
of opinion on public questions. It is the instrument by which citizens keep their government informed
of their needs, their aspirations and their grievances. It is the sharpest weapon in the fight to keep
government responsible and efficient. Without a vigilant press, the mistakes of every administration
would go uncorrected and its abuses unexposed. As Justice Malcolm wrote in United States v.
Bustos:52

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public
affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free
speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may
suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of clear
conscience.

Its contribution to the public weal makes freedom of the press deserving of extra protection. Indeed,
the press benefits from certain ancillary rights. The productions of writers are classified as
intellectual and proprietary. Persons who interfere or defeat the freedom to write for the press or to
maintain a periodical publication are liable for damages, be they private individuals or public officials.

E.4. Anatomy of Restrictions: Prior Restraint, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations

Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized four
aspects of freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from
punishment subsequent to publication; 53 (3) freedom of access to information; 54 and (4) freedom
of circulation.55

Considering that petitioner has argued that respondents’ press statement constitutes a form of
impermissible prior restraint, a closer scrutiny of this principle is in order, as well as its sub-specie of
content-based (as distinguished from content-neutral) regulations.

At this point, it should be noted that respondents in this case deny that their acts constitute prior
restraints. This presents a unique tinge to the present challenge, considering that the cases in our
jurisdiction involving prior restrictions on speech never had any issue of whether the governmental
act or issuance actually constituted prior restraint. Rather, the determinations were always about
whether the restraint was justified by the Constitution.

Be that as it may, the determination in every case of whether there is an impermissible restraint on
the freedom of speech has always been based on the circumstances of each case, including the
nature of the restraint. And in its application in our jurisdiction, the parameters of this principle have
been etched on a case-to-case basis, always tested by scrutinizing the governmental issuance or
act against the circumstances in which they operate, and then determining the appropriate test with
which to evaluate.

Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication or dissemination.56 Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom
from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of
whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government. Thus, it
precludes governmental acts that required approval of a proposal to publish; licensing or permits as
prerequisites to publication including the payment of license taxes for the privilege to publish; and
even injunctions against publication. Even the closure of the business and printing offices of certain
newspapers, resulting in the discontinuation of their printing and publication, are deemed as previous
restraint or censorship. 57 Any law or official that requires some form of permission to be had before
publication can be made, commits an infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can be had
at the courts.
Given that deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility against all prior restraints on
speech, and any act that restrains speech is presumed invalid, 58 and “any act that restrains speech is
hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows,” 59 it is
important to stress not all prior restraints on speech are invalid. Certain previous restraints may be
permitted by the Constitution, but determined only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act as
against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against.

Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of restraint
on freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content-
neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls
the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; 60 or (2) a content-based restraint or
censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. 61 The cast
of the restriction determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed with.

When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial
governmental interest is required for its validity.62 Because regulations of this type are not designed
to suppress any particular message, they are not subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but
an intermediate approach—somewhere between the mere rationality that is required of any other
law and the compelling interest standard applied to content-based restrictions.63 The test is
called intermediate because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the validity of a law but also
require that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or significant governmental
interest that is unrelated to the suppression of expression. The intermediate approach has been
formulated in this manner:

A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the

Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged
[freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 64

On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on
content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the
challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional
muster,65 with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.

Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will be struck
down.66

With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type of harm the
speech sought to be restrained would bring about—especially the gravity and the imminence of the
threatened harm—otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its
content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, “but only by showing a substantive and imminent
evil that has taken the life of a reality already on ground.” 67 As formulated, “the question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”68
The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an important or substantial
government interest, which is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. 69

Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no greater than what is essential to the furtherance
of that interest. 70 A restriction that is so broad that it encompasses more than what is required to
satisfy the governmental interest will be invalidated. 71 The regulation, therefore, must be reasonable
and narrowly drawn to fit the regulatory purpose, with the least restrictive means undertaken. 72

Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral regulation, it is subjected to an

intermediate review. A content-based regulation, 73 however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity
and is measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster
only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor
vague. 74

Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to be subjected to
the clear and present danger rule, as they are content-based restrictions. The acts of respondents
focused solely on but one object—a specific content—fixed as these were on the alleged taped
conversations between the President and a COMELEC official. Undoubtedly these did not merely
provide regulations as to the time, place or manner of the dissemination of speech or expression.

E.5. Dichotomy of Free Press: Print v. Broadcast Media

Finally, comes respondents’ argument that the challenged act is valid on the ground that broadcast
media enjoys free speech rights that are lesser in scope to that of print media. We next explore and
test the validity of this argument, insofar as it has been invoked to validate a content-based restriction
on broadcast media.

The regimes presently in place for each type of media differ from one other. Contrasted with the
regime in respect of books, newspapers, magazines and traditional printed matter, broadcasting, film
and video have been subjected to regulatory schemes.

The dichotomy between print and broadcast media traces its origins in the United States. There,
broadcast radio and television have been held to have limited First Amendment protection,75 and U.S.
Courts have excluded broadcast media from the application of the “strict scrutiny” standard that they
would otherwise apply to content-based restrictions. 76 According to U.S. Courts, the three major
reasons why broadcast media stands apart from print media are: (a) the scarcity of the frequencies
by which the medium operates [i.e., airwaves are physically limited while print medium may be
limitless]; 77 (b) its “pervasiveness” as a medium; and (c) its unique accessibility to
children. 78 Because cases involving broadcast media need not follow “precisely the same approach
that [U.S. courts] have applied to other media,” nor go “so far as to demand that such regulations
serve ‘compelling’ government interests,”79they are decided on whether the “governmental
restriction” is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest,” 80 or the intermediate
test.

As pointed out by respondents, Philippine jurisprudence has also echoed a differentiation in

treatment between broadcast and print media. Nevertheless, a review of Philippine case law on
broadcast media will show that—as we have deviated with the American conception of the Bill of
Rights81—we likewise did not adopt en masse  the U.S. conception of freespeech as it relates to
broadcast media, particularly as to which test would govern content-based prior restraints.

Our cases show two distinct features of this dichotomy. First, the difference in treatment, in the main,
is in the regulatory scheme applied to broadcast media that is not imposed on traditional print media,
and narrowly confined to unprotected speech (e.g.,  obscenity, pornography, seditious and inciting
speech), or is based on a compelling government interest that also has constitutional protection,
such as national security or the electoral process.

Second, regardless of the regulatory schemes that broadcast media is subjected to, the Court has
consistently held that the clear and present danger test applies to content-based restrictions on
media, without making a distinction as to traditional print or broadcast media.

The distinction between broadcast and traditional print media was first enunciated in Eastern
Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans,82 wherein it was held that “[a]ll forms of media, whether print
or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The
test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule…”83

Dans was a case filed to compel the reopening of a radio station which had been summarily closed
on grounds of national security. Although the issue had become moot and academic because the
owners were no longer interested to reopen, the Court still proceeded to do an analysis of the case
and made formulations to serve as guidelines for all inferior courts and bodies exercising quasi-
judicial functions. Particularly, the Court made a detailed exposition as to what needs be considered
in cases involving broadcast media. Thus:84

xxx xxx xxx

(3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression
continues to be the clear and present danger rule,that words are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent, In his Constitution of the Philippines  (2nd Edition, pp.
569-570) Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions which apply the test.
More recently, the clear and present danger test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in behalf of the Anti-
Bases Coalition v. Bagatsing. (4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a
simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.

Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A
broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government
regulation or for the rights of others.

All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression
clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser
in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation  (438 U.S. 726),
confronted with a patently offensive and indecent regular radio program, explained why radio
broadcasting, more than other forms of communications, receives the most limited protection from
the free expression clause. First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in
the lives of all citizens, Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public,
but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores
and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children, but
the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly
tuning in and out.

Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.

The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos.
Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of
municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses
who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs
like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.

On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming
universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of
listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or
television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of
varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons
whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The
impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio
audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject the utterance.

(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of
broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether by government or through
self-regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.

The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently
overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of
widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television
would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly
entertaining utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating
varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection.

(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative
democracy. In the 1918 case of United States v. Bustos  (37 Phil. 731) this Court was already
stressing that.

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public
affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free
speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may
suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official
acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.

(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process
and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. [Citations omitted]

It is interesting to note that the Court in Dans adopted the arguments found in U.S. jurisprudence to
justify differentiation of treatment (i.e., the scarcity, pervasiveness and accessibility to children), but
only after categorically declaring that “the test for limitations on freedom of expression continues
to be the clear and present danger rule,” for all forms of media, whether print or broadcast. Indeed, a
close reading of the above-quoted provisions would show that the differentiation that the Court
in Dans referred to was narrowly restricted to what is otherwise deemed as “unprotected speech”
(e.g., obscenity, national security, seditious and inciting speech), or to validate a licensing or
regulatory scheme necessary to allocate the limited broadcast frequencies, which is absent in print
media. Thus, when this Court declared in Dans that the freedom given to broadcast media was
“somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media,” it was not as
to what test should be applied, but the context by which requirements of licensing, allocation of
airwaves, and application of norms to unprotected speech. 85

In the same year that the Dans case was decided, it was reiterated in Gonzales v. Katigbak,86 that the
test to determine free expression challenges was the clear and present danger, again without
distinguishing the media.87Katigbak, strictly speaking, does not treat of broadcast media but motion
pictures. Although the issue involved obscenity standards as applied to movies, 88 the Court concluded
its decision with the following obiter dictum that a less liberal approach would be used to resolve
obscenity issues in television as opposed to motion pictures:

All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to
motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a less liberal
approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to
pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. Children then will likely be among
the avid viewers of the programs therein shown…..It cannot be denied though that the State as parens
patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.

More recently, in resolving a case involving the conduct of exit polls and dissemination of the results
by a broadcast company, we reiterated that the clear and present danger rule is the test we
unquestionably adhere to issues that involve freedoms of speech and of the press. 89

This is not to suggest, however, that the clear and present danger rule has been applied to all cases
that involve the broadcast media. The rule applies to all media, including broadcast, but only when
the challenged act is a content-based regulation that infringes on free speech, expression and the
press. Indeed, in Osmena v. COMELEC,90which also involved broadcast media, the Court refused to
apply the clear and present danger rule to a COMELEC regulation of time and manner of advertising
of political advertisements because the challenged restriction was content-neutral. 91 And in a case
involving due process and equal protection issues, the Court in Telecommunications and Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines v. COMELEC 92 treated a restriction imposed on a broadcast media as a
reasonable condition for the grant of the media’s franchise, without going into which test would
apply.

That broadcast media is subject to a regulatory regime absent in print media is observed also in other
jurisdictions, where the statutory regimes in place over broadcast media include elements of
licensing, regulation by administrative bodies, and censorship. As explained by a British author:

The reasons behind treating broadcast and films differently from the print media differ in a number of
respects, but have a common historical basis. The stricter system of controls seems to have been
adopted in answer to the view that owing to their particular impact on audiences, films, videos and
broadcasting require a system of prior restraints, whereas it is now accepted that books and other
printed media do not. These media are viewed as beneficial to the public in a number of respects,
but are also seen as possible sources of harm.93

Parenthetically, these justifications are now the subject of debate. Historically, the scarcity of

frequencies was thought to provide a rationale. However, cable and satellite television have
enormously increased the number of actual and potential channels. Digital technology will further
increase the number of channels available. But still, the argument persists that broadcasting is the
most influential means of communication, since it comes into the home, and so much time is spent
watching television. Since it has a unique impact on people and affects children in a way that the print
media normally does not, that regulation is said to be necessary in order to preserve pluralism. It has
been argued further that a significant main threat to free expression—in terms of diversity—comes not
from government, but from private corporate bodies. These developments show a need for a
reexamination of the traditional notions of the scope and extent of broadcast media regulation. 94

The emergence of digital technology—which has led to the convergence of broadcasting,

telecommunications and the computer industry—has likewise led to the question of whether the
regulatory model for broadcasting will continue to be appropriate in the converged
environment.95 Internet, for example, remains largely unregulated, yet the Internet and the broadcast
media share similarities, 96 and the rationales used to support broadcast regulation apply equally to
the Internet.97 Thus, it has been argued that courts, legislative bodies and the government agencies
regulating media must agree to regulate both, regulate neither or develop a new regulatory framework
and rationale to justify the differential treatment. 98

F. The Case At Bar

Having settled the applicable standard to content-based restrictions on broadcast media, let us go
to its application to the case at bar. To recapitulate, a governmental action that restricts freedom of
speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having
the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger
rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.

This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells out the following:
(a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden; and (e)
the quantum of evidence necessary. On the basis of the records of the case at bar, respondents who
have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press failed to
hurdle the clear and present danger test. It appears that the great evil which government wants to
prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records
of the case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and respondents’ evidence falls short of
satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary
obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped
conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed
to be a “complete” version and the other, an “altered” version. Thirdly, the evidence of the
respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering
the tape’s different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and
other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these
unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping
law.

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech
and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of
conduct which even if violated have only an adverse effect on a person’s private comfort but does not
endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and
without more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is
just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom
of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and public
interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related
international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and
calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with the
clear and present danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law.
By all means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own
evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise
of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this
failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court
has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the
feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.

This is not all the faultline in the stance of the respondents. We slide to the issue of whether the  mere
press statements of the Secretary of Justice and of the NTC in question constitute a form of content-
based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. In resolving this issue, we hold that it is
not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up
with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents
while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his
statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of
media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official
capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts
already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act
into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior
restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute
impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.
There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on record. The warnings given to
media came from no less the NTC, a regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of
the radio and broadcast media. They also came from the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of the
Executive, who wields the awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be violating the laws of
the land. After the warnings, the KBP inexplicably joined the NTC in issuing an ambivalent Joint Press
Statement. After the warnings, petitioner Chavez was left alone to fight this battle for freedom of
speech and of the press. This silence on the sidelines on the part of some media practitioners is too
deafening to be the subject of misinterpretation.

The constitutional imperative for us to strike down unconstitutional acts should always be exercised
with care and in light of the distinct facts of each case. For there are no hard and fast rules when it
comes to slippery constitutional questions, and the limits and construct of relative freedoms are
never set in stone. Issues revolving on their construct must be decided on a case to case basis,
always based on the peculiar shapes and shadows of each case. But in cases where the challenged
acts are patent invasions of a constitutionally protected right, we should be swift in striking them
down as nullities per se. A blow too soon struck for freedom is preferred than a blow too late.

In VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are hereby issued,
nullifying the official statements made by respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005 warning the media on
airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and other personalities, for
constituting unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press
11.) G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging
that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's
fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs
awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a
tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.  The transcript reads as follows:
2

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na

kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang
gagawin ko sa 'yo.

CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon —

ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi
hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa
'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang
certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.

CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00
p.m.

ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.

Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).

CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.

ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own

merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam
kong hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

 ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —

ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba
makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.

CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.

ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka
puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang
mga magulang ko.

ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka
ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.

CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok
kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.

CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
nilapastangan mo ako.

CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?

ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka

na. Magsumbong ka. 3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging petitioner of violation of the said
Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:

INFORMATION

The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act
No. 4200, committed as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named
accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the
latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and
thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other person.

Contrary to law.

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

 MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court
granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under
R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a
person other than a participant to the communication. 4

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which
forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order
of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus
quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the
respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of
Appeals denied in its Resolution  dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
6

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"  that the applicable provision of Republic
7

Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a
party other than those involved in the communication.  In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or
8

content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a
violation of R.A. 4200.  Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication,"
9

not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private
respondent was not illegal under the said act.  10

We disagree.

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to
only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible   or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 
11 12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device
or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the
parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a
party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize
all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator"   under this provision
13

of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in
enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear
to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but by some
parties and involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for
example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the
parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of
the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their
intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to
cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?

Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.

Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence
to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?

Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without
the authorization of all the parties.

Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?

Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of one
without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the
purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should
know that the observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors where
a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the
people whose remarks and observations are being made should know that the observations are
being recorded.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed that
whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand.
Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he
cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks
of a person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is
being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)

Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a
party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech
is public, but the recording is done secretly.
 Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the communication
between one person and another person — not between a speaker and a public.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)

xxx xxx xxx

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the
Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to
penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by
means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that
before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third
person should be professed."  14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
"private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation,   or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
15

individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)"   These definitions are broad
16

enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are
likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase
"private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication"
were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard.
But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if
not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose.
Free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and
the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to
the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution.
Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature
of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to
be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication between individuals — free from
every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,   a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held
18

that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did
not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)"
enumerated therein,   following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
19

accused."  The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a
20

violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording"
of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no
discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
12.) G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-
Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in
Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful
interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.

The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not disputed by the
petitioner.

In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel
Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City
Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions,
complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).

That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and
advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon
Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of
Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).

When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed
conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.

(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to P8,000.00. A
breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no
longer for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to
withdraw the case for Direct Assault against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;

(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical High
School;

(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;

(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco Technical
High School;

(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against Manuel
Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of desistance on the Direct
Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;

(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;

(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media;

(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).
 Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions
on where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).

Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of
the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta
of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that
complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he
received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of
appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since
appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico
guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment
with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the appellate court.

On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the
communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore, covered by
Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of the
complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone
conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.

In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and raises the following
issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and accused Laconico was
private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement"
under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said telephone
conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in
favor of the petitioner.

Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device
or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other
such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after
the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, that the use of
such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

We rule for the petitioner.

We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence. The issue is not
the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a telephone by a third party. The issue is
whether or not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an
extension line should both face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to
both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.

There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico
was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between one person and another as distinguished from
words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the
authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously,
complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00
consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu
City Fiscal's Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that affirmance
of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the listener
to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against
the listener's.

Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads
which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are called
"crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime
might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his
own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never
intended for such mischievous results.

The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any
other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would subject
the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their
bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record business conversations
between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss be a
proscribed offense? or for that matter, would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under the law?

The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of
"commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated
electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act
No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already widely
used instruments, probably the most popularly known communication device.

Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor of the Senate.
Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the enumeration of devices
"commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however
otherwise described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from
the provisions of the Act.

The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device"
within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a
telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable apparatus consisting of a wire and
a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main telephone set which can be detached or removed and
can be transferred away from one place to another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line
to get the desired communication corning from the other party or end.

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of
secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear,
intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other
devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the
wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It
just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine
the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of
its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).

In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:

Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms of a contract may
be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different
from those upon which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the same Code
provides that 'the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the
doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.

xxx xxx xxx

Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph 5(c) and
7(d) should be then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should not be construed as to
comprehend all other obligations of the decedent. The rule that 'particularization followed by a
general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former' is based on the fact in human
experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed specially to the particularization, and that
the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are used in
contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern
Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court
(Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is,
instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to
instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard
because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not
have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a
kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably
has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone
unit which shares its line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed
2d 137-138):

Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to ring
in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk
that the other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the
conversation. When such takes place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the parties
may complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not occurred.

In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead of repeating
the message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no distinction between
that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for the same purpose.

Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case
of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or
arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. In the case of People
v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the rule:

American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of the law of the
rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be
safe, and the discretion of the court limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S
Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d; Jennings
v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452). The purpose is not to
 enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition
of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's Handbook on Statutory
Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).

In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the
primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional
Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a
prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the act of
recording than the act of merely listening to a telephone conversation.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Tañada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is certainly

objectionable. It is made possible by special amendment which Your Honor may
introduce.

Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less possible with
the amendment than without it, because with the amendment the evidence of
entrapment would only consist of government testimony as against the testimony of
the defendant. With this amendment, they would have the right, and the government
officials and the person in fact would have the right to tape record their conversation.

Senator Tañada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.

Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party could record
and, therefore, the court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is more credible, the
police officers or the defendant?" In these cases, as experienced lawyers, we know
that the Court go with the peace offices.

(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions, with an
agent outside listening in, he could falsify the testimony and there is no way of
checking it. But if you allow him to record or make a recording in any form of what is
happening, then the chances of falsifying the evidence is not very much.

Senator Tañada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the presentation of
false testimony. If we could devise a way by which we could prevent the presentation
of false testimony, it would be wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the
use of tape record and other electronic devices to intercept private conversations
which later on will be used in court.

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p. 629).

It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as
government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather
evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the
telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the
use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an
extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16,
1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No.
4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
13.) G.R. No. 219581

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
MAXIMO DELA PEÑA, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Maximo De La Peña (appellant) filed this appeal assailing the December 16, 2014 Decision  of the Court of Appeals
1

(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 00834 which affirmed with modification the October 22, 2007 Decision  of the Regional
2

Trial Court (RTC) of Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. CC-2006- 1608 finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of piracy.

Appellant was charged, with the crime of piracy defined under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 532 allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of September 2005, at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, a1ong the
river bank of Barangay San Roque, Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one
another, with deliberate intent to gain, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away the following items, to wit:

* 13 sacks of dried coconuts (copra) valued at ₱7,537.00[;]

* 2 pieces automatic watch (Seiko and citizen) valued at ₱6,796.00[:]

* 1 piece ([S]audi gold) valued at ₱4,731.00[;]

* 1 [N]okia cellphone 3350 valued at ₱3,615.00[;]

* 1 unit Briggs and [Stratton] 16 horse power with propeller valued at ₱26,000.00[;]

* cash money worth [₱] 1,000.00.

all in the amount of Forty Nine Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-Nine Pesos (₱49,679.00)to the damage and
prejudice of the said owner.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. His co-accused, Romy Real (Romy), Danny Real (Danny), and
Onyong Reyes (Onyong), have not been an-ested and remain fugitives from justice.

Version of the Prosecution

On September 24, 2005; at around 1:00 a.m., Julita Nacoboan (Julita), her husband, Jose Nacoboan (Jose), and
their son, Marwin Nacoboan (Marwin) were about to board their pump boat loaded with 13 sacks of copra. These
sacks of copra were supposed to be loaded and transferred to a bigger passenger boat that would ferry the copra to
Catbalogan, Samar. Their barangay is situated along a river which opens to the sea. When the tide is low, the
bigger passenger boat cannot dock along the shore so a smaller pump boat has to be used to ferry the cargo to a
bigger passenger boat.

As the Nacoboan's pump boat was about to depart, a smaller boat suddenly blocked its path. For fear of collision,
Jose stopped the engine of their pump boat Three armed men then immediately ordered the pump boat. One of the
armed men pointed a firearm at Jose arid ordered him to proceed to the aft or the rear side of the boat. Julita
identified him as the appellant. Jose's hands were tied and his head covered.

Another armed person grabbed Julita’s bag and took the following items:

1) ₱1,000.00 Cash; 2) Earrings; 3) Cellular phone; and 4) Necklace.

Another person operated the pump boat and docked it on a small island after nearly two hours of travel. During the
trip, Marwin’s shirt was taken off and used to blindfold Julita. When they arrived at the small island, the appellant
unloaded the 13 sacks of copra.

The appellant and his armed companions then brought the pump boat to another island where its engine,
prope1lertube, and tools were taken and loaded on appellant's boat. Consequently, the Nacoboan’s boat was left
without an engine and they had to paddle to safety. They discovered that they were already in Equiran, Daram,
Samar.

The following day, Julita went to the police authorities in Villareal, Samar to report the incident. She reported that the
value of the copra was then ₱15.00 per kilo and that the engine and other equipment lost were valued at
₱30,000.00. She identified the appellant as one of the armed men who took control of their boat and took away its
engine, propeller tube, and tools since she had known him for 16 years already arid she recognized him when he
boarded their boat.

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied the accusa6on against him and testified that he was a resident of Brgy. San Roque, Villareal,
Samar for 15 years. He had been engaged in fishing for l0 years as a source of livelihood. He claimed that from
September ), 2005 up to December 5, 2005 he was fishing in Daram, Samar with Edgar Pojas, Jose Dacletan
(bacletan), Tope Dacletan, Nestor Bombay, and Esok Pojas. During the said period, he smyed at the house of
Barangay Kagawad Edgar Pojas and used the boat of Dacletan to fish.

After their fishing activity, appellant went home to Brgy. San Roque, Villareal, Samar. On December 6, 2005, four
soldiers arrested and beat him up. He was brought to the Municipal Hall thereafter and was imprisoned. He declared
that he knew the complainants who were also residents of Brgy. San Roque; Villareal, Samar but did not knew his
co-accused Romy, Onyong, and Danny.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 22, 2007, the RTC of Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33 rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of piracy
under PD 532. The RTC was convinced that the testimonies of Julita and Marwin positively identifying the appellant
as the one who boarded their boat and took away their cargo through violence or intimidation were credible. The
RTC ruled that appellant's denial and alibi could not prevail over the positive identification made by the victims.

The dispositive portion of the RTC’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, AND IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the accused MAXIMO DE LA PEÑA is sentenced to the
penalty of imprisonment or RECLUSION PERPETUA, without [eligibility for] parole, and to pay the victims the
following:

1. ₱49,679.00, total amount lost;

2. ₱30,000.00 in exemplary damages;

3. ₱15,000.00 in moral damages;

4. ₱25,000.00 in nominal damages;

5. and to pay the costs.

Let the continued detention of the accused be transferred to the Leyte Regional Prison, as soon as possible.

Issue an alias order for the arrest of Onyong Reyes, Romy Real and Danny Real, accordingly.

Furnish copies of this decision to [the] PNP station, PNP Regional Office and its Directorate for operations. 4

Aggrieved by the RTC's Decision, appellant filed an appeal to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On December 16, 2014, the CA affirmed appellant’s conviction for the crime of piracy under PD 532 and held as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October 22, 2007, convicting accused-appellant
for the crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without (eligibility for) parole is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as follows:

a. [₱]30,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages;

b. the award of moral damages, nominal damages, and exemplary damages are deleted; and.

c. interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until such
amounts shall have been fully paid.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED. 5

Dissatisfied with the CA's Decision, and after denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, appellant filed a Notice of
Appeal.6

Issue

The issue in this case is whether appellant is guilty of piracy. According to appellant, the prosecution failed
to prove the elements of piracy under PD 532. Appellant insists that the RTC erroneously convicted him
since the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Our Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

Section 2(d) of PD 532 defines piracy as follows:

Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or
the personal belongings of its complement or pa5sengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member
of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters shall be considered as piracy. x x x

In his Appellants Brief, appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of piracy under PD 532.
He posits that the Information failed to allege the elements of the crime of piracy. Appellant maintains that the
Information did not state that the vessel in question was in Philippine waters and that its cargo, equipment,
or personal belongings of the passengers or complement were seized.

The Court disagrees.

The Information  charged appellant of the crime of piracy to wit:
7

That on or about the 24th day of September 2005, at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, along the river
bank of Barangay San Roque. Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable court; the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, with
deliberate intent to gain, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take and carry away the following items, to wit:

* 13 sacks of dried coconuts (copra) valued at ₱7.537.00[;]

* 2 pieces automatic watch (Seiko and citizen) valued at ₱6,796.00[;]

* 1 piece ([S]audi gold] valued at ₱4,731.00[;]

* 1 [N]okia cellphone 3350 valued at ₱3,615.00[;]

* 1 unit Briggs and [Stratton] 16 horse power with propeller valued at ₱26,000.00[;]

* Cash money worth [₱]1,000.00.

all in the amount of Forty Nine Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Nine Pesos (₱49,679.00) to the damage and
prejudice of the said owner.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The Information categorically alleged that the incident happened along the river bank of Brgy. San Roque,
Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar. Under Section 2(a) of PD 532, "Philippine waters''' is defined as
follows:

[A]ll bodies of water, such as but not limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting each of
the Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth, length or dimension, and all
other waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or Iegal title, including territorial sea, the sea-bed, the
insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.
(Emphasis supplied)

From this definition, it is clear that a river is considered part of Philippine waters.

The Information also clearly alleged that the vessel's cargo, equipment, and personal belongings of the passengers
were taken by the appellant and his armed companions. It stated, in no uncertain terms, that 13 sacks of copra were
taken by the appellant through force and intimidation. Undoubtedly, these sacks of copra were part of the vessel's
cargo. The Information also stated that the vessel's equipment which consisted of the engine, propeller tube, and
tools were taken and carried away by the appellant. Furthermore, the Information also stated that the personal
belongings of the passengers consisting of two watches, jewelry, cellphone, and cash money were taken by the
appellant and his armed companions. The appellant was able to seize these items when he, along with armed
companions, boarded the victims' pump boat and seized control of the same. Armed with firearms, appellant and his
companions tied Jose's hands, covered his head, and operated their pump boat. They travelled to an island in
Samar where they unloaded the sacks of copra. Thereafter, appellant and his armed companions travelled to
another island where the engine, propeller tube, and tools of the pump boat were taken out and loaded on
appellant's boat.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to establish that the victims' pump boat was in
Philippine waters when appellant and his armed companions boarded the same and seized its cargo, equipment,
and the personal belongings of the passengers.

The Court finds no merit in appellant's contention that he was not positively identified by the prosecution's
witnesses. Fron1 the testimony of Julita, she positively identified the appellant as follows:
Q: Among the three (3) accused, can you recall who particularly pointed and levelled at your husband with his knife?

A: It was Maximo De la Peña, ma'am

xxxx

Q: Who [among the three (3) accused unloaded the 13 sacks of copra]?

A: The [ones] who unloaded our [copra] were Maximo De la Peña and the person who was guarding me with a short
[fire]arm [whom] I do not know x x x. [T]he other one who was carrying a long [fire]arm [was] in charge of the
engine.8

The Court finds no reason to doubt the testimony of Julita identifying appellant as one of the assailants who boarded
their vessel and seized its cargo, equipment, and the passengers' personal belongings. Julita testified that she was
able to identify appellant because of the moonlight that illuminated the area. Further, she testified that she then had
a flashlight that allowed her to see who boarded the vessel. More importantly, Juljta had known the appellant for 16
years since they reside in the same barangay.  Appellant's bare denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive
9

identification made by Julita. "Time and again, this Court has consistently ruled that positive identification prevails
over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable."  Since both the RTC and CA found
10

Julita's testimony to be credible and straightfo1ward, the Court thus finds no reason to disturb the same.

Lastly, appellant argues that the proper penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum: periods
and not reclusion perpetua as imposed by the RTC.

Appellant's contention is incorrect, Section 3 of PD 532, provides:

Section 3. Penalties. Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon
conviction by competent court be punished by:

a. Piracy. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium ai.1d maximum periods shall be imposed.  If physical
1âwphi1

injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof: the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed. If rape murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders
abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves or when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or
boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, it was established that the appellant and his armed companionsboarded the victims’ boat and seized 13
sacks of copra, the boat's engine, propeller tube, and tools, as well as the contents of Julita’s bag. Hence, from the
provision above, the proper imposable penalty should be death. However, due to Republic Act No. 9346, which
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the Court thus finds. that the penalty imposed by the RTC, which
was reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, was correct since the seizure of the vessel and its cargo was
accomplished by boarding the vessel.

Anent the award of damages, the Court sustains the modification made by the CA in deleting the amount of
₱49,679.00 as actual damages and instead, awarding Julita temperate damages since she failed to substantiate her
losses with the necessary receipts. As we explained in Tan v. OMC Carriers. Inc.: 11

Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining
the fact and amount of damages. To justify an award of actual damages there must be competent proof of the actual
amount of loss, credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts.

The award of temperate damages is proper since under .Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperature damages may
be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss had been suffered but its amount cannot, from the
nature of the case, be proved with certainty. Likewise, the Court finds the deletion of nominal damages proper. The
CA is correct in holding that temperate and nominal damages arc incompatible and thus, cannot be granted
concurrently. Under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages are given in order that a right of the plafr1tift:
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may he vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Last1y, the deletion of the awards of moral and exemplary
damages are also proper for lack of factual and legal basis.

All told, based on the evidence on record, the Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of both the RTC and the
CA that appellant was guilty of piracy under PD 532.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The December 16, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC. No. 00834 finding appellant Maximo De La Peña GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of piracy
defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 532 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole is AFFIRMED.
14.) G.R. No. 161970             June 30, 2006

DUNDEE A. VIERNES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30 convicted the accused-herein petitioner Dundee Viernes y
Asio of violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 532 (the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974).1 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision2 of July 31, 2003, modified the trial court decision by finding petitioner
guilty of simple robbery under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.

On November 15, 1992, at around 7:00 in the evening, while Josefina dela Cruz (Josefina) and her husband
Ronaldo Lopango (Lopango) were on board a passenger jeepney along 1st Avenue, R. Papa St., Manila, four of
eight co-passengers declared a hold-up.3 Lopango resisted the attempt to hold him up by one of the four by kicking
him, but another stabbed him three times causing him to fall from the jeepney. Josefina also fell from the
jeepney4 upon which she brought Lopango to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where he died5 after a few
minutes.6

About three hours and twenty five minutes after the incident or at around 10:25 in the evening of November 15,
1992, Josefina repaired to the Caloocan Police Station where she gave a sworn statement before PO3 Ricardo
Concepcion.

xxxx

03. T: Bakit ka naririto ngayon sa aming tanggapan at nagpapaimbistiga?

S: Tungkol po sa naganp (sic) na hold-up sa sinasakyan namin ng asawa kong si RONALDO LOPANGO na
pampasaherong jeep, na ikinamatay niya.

04. T: Anong oras, petsa at lugar ba nangyari itong insidenteng sinasabi mo?

S: Pagitan po ng alas-6:30 at alas-7:00 ng gabi, ngayong, Nobyembre 15, 1992 duon po sa Avenida malapit sa
kanto ng Sta. Catalina, 1st Avenue, lungsod ng Kalookan.

05. T: Bukod sa inyo ng asawa mo, ilan pa’ng pasahero ng jeep na sinasakyan ninyo?

S: Bukod po doon sa apat (4) na hold-uppers ay punuan ang jeep na sinasakyan naming, mga sampu (10) ang
sakay.

06. T: Saan kayo patungo?

S: Pauwi na po kami ng Oroquieta, Sta. Cruz, Maynila kaya biyaheng Recto ang sinakyan namin.

07. T: Magkano ang particular na na-hold-up sa inyo?

S: Wala pong naholdap sa amin dahil lumaban nga ang asawa ko.

x x x x 7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Three days later or on November 18, 1992, Josefina repaired to the WPDC-PN, Manila before which she executed a
sworn statement taken by SPO1 Rey Mira and SPO1 Ernesto Agustin alleging that the robbers took her bag
containing used clothes and P3,000 cash "inserted" therein.8

On December 9, 1992, petitioner was charged before the Manila RTC by the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office
with violation of P.D. No. 532 alleged to have all been committed as follows:

That on or about November 15, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together with three others whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and helping one another with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by
then and there pointing a knife (beinte nueve) to one Josefina dela Cruz and grabbing her plastic bag containing
P3,000.00 along R. Papa St., Tondo, this City, a street/s used by persons or vehicles for the movement or
circulation of persons or transportation of goods, articles or property or both, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, rob and carry away a plastic bag containing P3,000.00 belonging to Josefina dela Cruz against
her will, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of P3,000.00, Philippine
Currency.9 (Underscoring supplied)

When arraigned, the accused pleaded not guilty.

Testifying as the lone witness for the prosecution, Josefina described how the robbery and the stabbing of her
husband took place. And she narrated that on the night of the incident, by-standers apprehended petitioner whom
she recognized as one of the malefactors since the jeepney was lighted10 and from whom she recovered her
belongings except the P3,000 cash.11

On cross-examination, Josefina admitted that she did not know what transpired after she fell off the jeepney,12 and
that when she executed a sworn statement before the Caloocan police, she forgot to report the loss of her bag as "it
slipped from [her] mind already because of [her] husband."13

On the other hand, petitioner, proffering alibi, gave the following testimony: At about 7:00 p.m. of November 15,
1992, on the request of his mother who was celebrating her birthday, he went to Tambunting Compound at
Blumentritt to fetch his cousin Rudy Asio. His cousin having already left the compound, he decided to walk home. As
he was passing along Lico Street, a Ford Fiera and a jeep bearing several policemen who, pointing to him, asked a
passenger thereof "Ito ba? Ito ba?" after which he was arrested.14 He was brought to Precinct 7 of the Manila police
where he was told that he was the "hold-upper" and was tortured to make him confess to the crime.15

Petitioner further narrated that after two days of detention, a woman who turned out to be Josefina arrived at his
place of detention and on seeing him, she told the police that he was not the culprit but the police went on to maul
him, and continued to detain him for nine days;16 and the case filed against him, together with a certain Edward
Paler y Villanueva and two others for attempted robbery with homicide before the Caloocan RTC had already been
dismissed by Branch 125 thereof.17

On cross-examination, petitioner denied having been mobbed by bystanders18 and investigated at the police
station.19

Petitioner submitted a certification from the Records Management and Archive Office of Manila stating that his
mother, Elisa Asio, was indeed born on November 15, 1937.20 lawphil.net

Corroborating petitioner’s testimony, his sister Elizabeth Mones testified as follows: Petitioner was asked to fetch
their cousin at Blumentritt for their mother’s birthday at around 7:00 to 7:30 in the evening of November 15,
1992.21 He failed to return, however, on that night so she, accompanied by her mother and her uncle, searched for
him the following day at nearby hospitals.22 They later found him detained as a suspect in a robbery charge at
Precinct 7 at Abad Santos, Manila,23 with injuries allegedly due to the mauling he suffered for refusing to confess to
the charge.24 At the police precinct, she saw Josefina who denied before the police25 that petitioner participated in
the commission of the crime. Also at the precinct, the police, who asked for the amount of P2,000 for the transfer of
petitioner to the City Jail,26 prohibited subjecting petitioner to medical examination.27
On cross-examination, she admitted that she did not file any complaint against the police even if her brother was
tortured by the police. 28

By decision of October 12, 1995, the trial court found petitioner guilty of highway robbery under P.D. No. 532. The
dispositive portion of the judgment reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
P.D. 532, and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
TWELVE (12) YEARS and TEN (10) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal and to indemnify private complainant
Josefina dela Cruz the sum of P3,000.00 with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until fully paid
and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED."29

As stated early on, the crime for which petitioner was convicted by the trial court was modified on appeal by the
Court of Appeals to simple robbery. The decretal text of the appellate court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated October 12, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30 in
Criminal Case No. 113008 is hereby MODIFIED. Accused DUNDEE VIERNES is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Simple Robbery penalized under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years, 10 months and 20 days of prision correccional as minimum and 8
years and 20 days of prision mayor as maximum and all its accessory penalties. (Emphasis and italics in the
original)

SO ORDERED.30

Hence, the present appeal.

Petitioner argues that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.31 He invites attention to the failure of the
prosecution to show that the illumination of the jeepney which allegedly bore Josefina and her husband was
adequate enough to enable one to identify him with certainty as in fact Josefina was patently hesitant to identify him
as one of the malefactors, as discerned from the fact that the case filed against him for attempted robbery with
homicide before the RTC of Caloocan was dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute.32 He likewise invites attention
to the failure of the prosecution to present any of the police officers who apprehended and investigated him.33

Petitioner further draws attention to inconsistencies which to him taint Josefina’s credibility, to wit: In her affidavit
executed before the Caloocan police more than three hours after the incident, she categorically stated that the
alleged robbery was committed at Sta. Catalina, Caloocan City and that no valuables were taken from her. Whereas
three days after the incident, she again reported the same alleged robbery to the Manila police before which she
declared that the incident occurred at R. Papa Street in Manila and that she lost P3,000 on the occasion thereof.34

Petitioner in fact charges Josefina to have even conspired with the police officers in torturing him so as to force him
to admit his participation in the crime.35

After a considered review of the records of the case, this Court finds that the guilt of petitioner has not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. 1avvphi1.net

On top of the inconsistencies attention to which petitioner has drawn, Josefina, in her sworn statement given before
the Manila Police on November 18, 1992, narrated that the clothes and the money taken from her were not
recovered.

06. T: Maaari bang sabihin mo sa akin kung ano ang mga nahold up sa iyo?

S: Yung pong aming mga damit na kung saan nakalagay sa loob ang aming pera na nagkakahalaga ng P3,000.00.

07. T: Ito ba namang mga damit ninyo at yung pera na nakalagay doon ay nabawi mo?
S: Hindi na po.36 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At the witness stand, however, Josefina declared that the things petitioner took from her were returned to her "one
by one."

Q How do you know that the accused has a companion who announced that there was a hold-up?

A Because I can recognize and the things the accused were able to get were returned to us one by one,
sir. 37 (Emphasis supplied)

In her sworn statement before the Caloocan police given on November 15, 1992, Josefina declared:

xxxx

08. T: Isalaysay mo nga ang mga pangyayaring may kinalaman dito sa insidenteng sinasabi mo?

S : x x x Ang ginawa naman ng asawa ko na nasa dulong upuan ay lumaban at pinagsisipa ang hold-upper sa
estribo pero pinagsasaksak siya at hindi niya naagaw ang patalim nuong mama. Iyong tatlong kasama nuong hold-
upper na nakasabit ay naglabas din ng kutsilio at abala duon sa ibang pasahero na pulos babae, pagkahulog
nuong nasa estribo ay sumabit kaming mag-asawa para bumaba pero tuloy-tuloy ang takbo ng jeep dahil
natutukan din ang driver. Nuong mahulog ang mister ko ay nakabitaw na rin ako sa jeep kaya pulos gasgas din
ako. Ang mister ko pa ang nagpapara ng tricycle na naghatid sa amin sa Jose Reyes Hospital pero pagdating doon
ay namatay ang asawa ko dahil sa tatlong (3) tama ng saksak sa katawan, bandang dibdib.

x x x x38 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At the witness stand, however, Josefina declared that petitioner "pushed" her off the jeepney.

Q Under what circumstances did you come to know a person by the name of Dundee Viernes?

A I saw him carrying my things, sir.

Q How did [sic] the accused able to carry your things?

A We fell from the jeep because Dundee Viernes pushed us, he carried our things and the hold-up continued inside
the jeepney, sir.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In crimes of robbery, the offender must be proven to have unlawfully taken personal property belonging to
another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything. 40

While the general rule is that contradictions and discrepancies between the testimony of a witness and his sworn
statement do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte statements are generally incomplete, the rule is not
without exception as, e.g., when the omission in the sworn statement refers to a very important detail of the
incident which the one relating the incident as an eyewitness would not be expected to fail to mention,
or when the narration in the sworn statement substantially contradicts the testimony in court.41

Where a trial court overlooks certain facts of consequence or circumstances of significance which may affect the
result of the case, its assessment of the credibility of a witness may be set aside.42

Josefina’s assertion that the taking of her bag "slipped from [her] mind because of [her] husband"43 taxes credulity as
the hold-up occurred only three hours earlier. To forget to mention the loss of the bag maybe excusable, but to
categorically state that nothing was taken from them when she was asked, thus:

xxxx

07. T: Magkano ang particular na na-hold-up sa inyo?

S: Wala pong naholdap sa amin dahil lumaban nga ang asawa ko.

x x x x,44 (Underscoring supplied)

infirms Josefina’s overall credibility.45

While the rule is settled that the conviction of an accused may be based on the testimony of one witness alone,
provided it is positive and credible, testimonies being weighed, not numbered,46 Josefina’s uncorroborated testimony
is, as shown above, tainted with inconsistencies on material points to thus lead this Court to discredit it and uphold
the constitutional presumption of innocence of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, accused-petitioner Dundee Viernes y Asio is, on reasonable doubt, ACQUITTED of the charge of
violation of P.D. No. 532.
15.) G.R. No. 139670            January 21, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AHMAD LANGALEN y DEMALEN a.k.a. "KUMANDER KAMLON," HASIM UPAM y ABUBACAR, SAMSUDIN
TALIB y LIMBA, and ABUBAKAR DAGADAS y ANGGUBALA, accused-appellants.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Under automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No.
1 

95-145780, finding accused-appellants Ahmad Langalen y Demalen (hereafter AHMAD), Hasim Upam y Abubacar
(hereafter HASIM), Samsudin Talib y Limba (hereafter SAMSUDIN) and Abubakar Dagadas y Anggubala (hereafter
ABUBAKAR) guilty of violation of Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death.

The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 95-145780, under which accused-appellants were
2 

tried and convicted, reads as follows:

That at about 3:15 o’clock [sic] in the afternoon of September 8, 1995 along Palacio and Orosa Streets,
Intramuros, Manila, a street or road used by persons or vehicles for movement, circulation or transportation
of persons, goods or articles, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
together with MOHAMAD MAMISON whose case is still pending preliminary investigation with the
Department of Justice, and other persons whose identities are still unknown and are at large, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack with firearms the four (4) vehicles convoy which were then traveling towards the
general direction of Ermita, Manila and which occupants were then carrying money owned by
proprietors/owners of VMG Money Changer amounting to Fourteen Million Seven Hundred Thousand
(₱14,700,000.00) Pesos, more or less, (Philippine Currency) and thereafter carted away said money
contained in two (2) duffle [sic] bags and one (1) paper bag and on the occasion of such robbery, three (3)
persons were killed and several others injured.

No bail was recommended for the temporary liberty of accused-appellants.

Upon their arraignment on 25 October 1995, accused-appellants entered a plea of not guilty and waived their right
to a pre-trial. On even date, they filed a motion for bail on the ground that the evidence against them was weak. No
action thereon was taken by the trial court. Trial on the merits proceeded on various dates.

The trial court summarized the evidence for the prosecution as follows:

The record shows that on September 8, 1995, at around 3:00 p.m. a convoy of nine male employees and/or
private security guards of VMG Money Changer, which holds office in Ermita, Manila, together with two
police escorts, SPO2 Romeo and SPO3 Ricardo Gonzales, were on board four cars travelling southward
along Palacio Street. Loaded in the lead car driven by Zeny Santillan with Dante Castro and Gilbert Yu as
passengers were two leather bags and one paper bag of money in the total sum [sic] of ₱13,600,000.00.
The money was earlier withdrawn from the Metrobank (₱7,000,000.00) and the Equitable Bank
(₱6,600,000.00) in Binondo, Manila. Of the three occupants of the lead car, only Castro was armed with
a .45 cal. pistol.

On nearing the intersection of P. Burgos and Gen. Luna Streets, the convoy stopped, because the traffic
lights [sic] turned red. At this point, several men in fatigue uniform with bonnets covering their faces, (only
their eyes and noses were exposed) and armed with rifles and handguns, suddenly appeared and fired at
the convoy. Castro was able to return fire and so did the two police escorts. Later, Castro and his
companion jumped from their car to seek cover across the street, but while running, Castro sustained
gunshot wounds in his right thigh and left buttock, which rendered him unconscious for a few minutes. SPO3
Gonzales, who was inside the last car of the convoy, died on the spot due to gunshot wounds, while SPO2
Romeo suffered gunshot wounds in his right thigh, right leg and right armpit. Two other members of the
 convoy, Tiborcio Tomas and Tony Diquit also suffered gunshot wounds. The gunmen swiped the
₱13,600,000.00 from the lead car of the ambushed convoy and drove away in their vehicles.

[National Bureau of Investigation] Agent Moises Tamayo was assigned to investigate the robbery. On
September 10, 1995, Hasam Mohammad was introduced to Agent Tamayo by the latter’s friend, Allan
Sulaybar. Mohammad revealed that his common-law wife, Halina Gulam, knew some of the people involved
in the robbery. On September 15, Agent Tamayo met Gulam, who confided to him that Mohammad
Mamison was one of those involved in the robbery and she executed a written statement on the matter,
Exhibit "1". On the basis of this information, the NBI procured a search warrant from Hon. Executive Judge
William Bayhon of the RTC of Manila, against Mamison and raided his house on No. 158 24th Avenue,
Rembo Fort Bonifacio, Makati, on the early morning of September 19, 1995. The NBI operatives led by Atty.
Artemio Sacaging did not find any illegal firearms in the house of Mamison, but nevertheless invited the
latter to their office for investigation. And after about three hours of questioning and friendly persuasion by
Agent Tamayo, Senior Agents Serafin Gil and NBI Special Investigators Gregorio Tumagan and Rene
Sagun, Mamison finally admitted in the presence of his lawyer, Atty. Perfecto Caparas, and wife, Normina
Kamid, his participation in the robbery and implicated the four accused as among those involved. And the
declaration of Mamison was reduced into writing, Exhibit "B".

On September 22, 1995, the NBI operatives armed with a search warrant, raided the house of Accused
Ahmad Langalen on RIN, Maharlika, Taguig, Metro Manila, where the operatives found and confiscated
one .38 cal. revolver; one .45 cal. pistol, (both unlicensed), and live ammunitions for the two handguns. The
four accused, Langalen, Upam, Talib and Daganas, who were all in the house of accused Langalen at the
time of the raid, were arrested for illegal possession of firearms. At the NBI Headquarters, the four accused
were positively identified in a police line- up by Mamison as participants in the robbery, and in connection
therewith, Mamison executed a supplemental sworn statement, Exhibit "C".

In the trial of the case, Mamison, who is in the custody of the NBI under the witness protection program, was
presented as a prosecution witness. He affirmed the truthfulness of the two sworn statements he had given
to the NBI, Exhibits "B" and "C", and he declared that he is from Cotabato City, Mindanao, where he was a
farmer before he took up residence in Metro Manila. From his testimony, the court has gathered that on
September 8, 1995, at around 8:00 a.m., Mamison visited Accused Langalen (alias Kumander Kamlon) at
the latter’s house in Taguig, Metro Manila. The two have known each other for a long time when they were
both residing in Cotabato. Mamison asked Accused Langalen for a loan of P100.00, but he rejoined that he
has [sic] no money and suggested that Mamison instead go with his (Langalen’s) men who were about to
leave. Mamison asked Accused Langalen where his men were going, but he was told by the latter to just go
with his men and he (Mamison), would later know their destination. Wanting to earn some money, Mamison
accepted the offer of Accused Langalen and boarded an owner type jeep together with Accused Upan,
Langalen and Daganas, and two other men, Nortin Ismael and Ibrahim Usman. Mamison saw Accused Talib
board an L-300 Van together with [the] other men of accused Langalen. Except (for) Mamison who is [sic] to
act as look out, the men in the jeep were all equipped with firearms.

On reaching Intramuros, Mamison was made to get off from the jeep at a street corner near the Round
Table Restaurant on Gen. Luna Street. Accused Upam instructed Mamison to inform them if he would see
[sic] any policeman. Thereupon the jeep parked 20 meters away where the L300 Van later followed and also
parked. Mamison saw the occupants of the jeep and the L-300 Van get off from the vehicles armed with
handguns and rifles. Then suddenly he heard rapid gunfire and he saw his companions shooting at the
occupants of the convoy of four cars that were on standstill. Alarmed and scared, Mamison ran to the
direction of the City Hall, where he boarded a passenger jeepney and went home. 3

The trial court did not recount the testimonies of the other witnesses for the prosecution, nor did it consider the
testimonies of some defense witnesses. This decision, consisting of slightly more than four (4) pages, is perhaps
one of the shortest ponencias we have reviewed where the death penalty has been imposed. This is rather
lamentable in light of the gravity of the offense charged and the number of witnesses presented by the prosecution
and the defense.

We are thus constrained to painstakingly examine and assess the evidence the parties presented and offered. In
the process, and for moral certainty, we deem it necessary to summarize the testimonies of the other witnesses in
the case at bar.
Witness Luis Gelvez was a bank representative of Montes Moveo Corporation. Among his duties was to withdraw
money from the bank. In the afternoon of 8 September 1995, he was with his co-worker Bong Canapi, and he was
instructed to withdraw ₱7,000,000 from the Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank) and P1,000,000 from
the Citytrust Banking Corporation, both at the Plaza Lorenzo Ruiz branch in Binondo, Manila. Canapi was tasked to
withdraw ₱6,600,000 from the nearby Equitable Bank & Trust Company (Equitable Bank). After these transactions,
Gelvez informed his office that the money was ready for pick-up at Metrobank. He eventually turned over the
₱8,000,000 to Dante Castro and Gilbert Chua, his co-employees who met him at the bank. He remained in the bank
to settle the balance of the office account. In the meantime, Canapi confirmed that the ₱1,000,000 he withdrew from
Equitable Bank had also been handed to Castro and Chua. The entire collection was to be delivered to the VMG
Money Changer branches at M.H. del Pilar Street, Ermita, Manila and Dian Street, Makati. 4

Gelvez called up his wife, the cashier of VMG Money Changer, to inquire if Castro had already arrived. Instead, she
asked where he was since she heard from the office’s two-way radio that there were fatalities. He and Canapi
immediately proceeded to the VMG Money Changer. On the way, they encountered heavy traffic near the city hall.
He told Canapi to check the situation while he opted to park the car and walk toward Intramuros. There he saw the
convoy of four cars used by Castro. All four vehicles were riddled with bullets and the police were already at the
scene of the incident. He immediately checked the compartment of each car and discovered that all the money was
gone. He also saw the dead body of their police escort inside a vehicle. There were five others who were wounded,
all members of the convoy team. From there, he went back to the VMV Money Changer. 5

Witness Dante Castro, a member of the security force of the VMG Money Changer, testified that he was at their
office in the afternoon of 8 September 1995 when he received a call from Luis Gelvez, who instructed him to fetch
the money the latter had just withdrawn. Along with ten companions in a convoy of four cars, they proceeded to
Metrobank, Binondo branch, where Gelvez was waiting. He received the money contained in a knapsack and a
brown paper bag and kept it inside the car compartment, before proceeding to the Equitable Bank to get the money
withdrawn by Bong Canapi. On their way back to the office, while waiting for a green light at the corner of P. Burgos
and Palacio Streets in Intramuros, he saw at least four men in green and brown fatigue uniforms who suddenly fired
at them with their rifles. He immediately took cover under the dashboard of the car, opened the door, and returned
fire, hitting one of their assailants. Before he ran out of bullets, he saw three other men in fatigue uniform and
wearing bonnets. He reloaded his gun then jumped out of the car to seek cover, but he was hit in the right thigh,
which rendered him unconscious. 6

The money Castro collected from Gelvez and Canapi allegedly amounted to ₱15,000,000, which were stored in two
bags and a paper bag. The two bags were kept in the car’s compartment while the paper bag was hidden under his
seat. The entire collection was taken by their assailants. He also learned that their police escort, SPO3 Ricardo
Gonzales, died on the spot, while another police escort received three gunshots wounds. One of their drivers was
also injured. He categorically denied that any of their assailants were inside the courtroom. Neither could he identify
them as their faces were concealed. 7

Witness Senen Santillan, a driver at the Montes Moveo Corporation, recalled that in the afternoon of 8 September
1995, he was assigned to drive for Castro and his companion to Binondo. A convoy of four cars left the office and
proceeded to Metrobank, Binondo branch. Castro and his companion alighted to go inside the bank and they
returned after a couple of minutes with Castro toting a bag. He was told to open the compartment of the car, where
Castro placed the bag. They proceeded to Equitable Bank, where the two obtained another bag, which was also
placed in the car’s compartment. Before boarding the car, Castro also received from a bank representative a paper
bag which he placed beside his leg. On their way to Ermita, they were ambushed. He saw four men get off a green
car in front of them. The men, wearing green fatigue uniforms and bonnets, immediately fired at them. He dove for
cover, alighted from the car, and crawled under it. The gunfire went on for about five minutes. After the shootout, he
saw that some of his companions had been wounded. He also discovered that the money was gone. However, he
denied if he could still identify the malefactors.
8

Witness PO3 Rodolfo de Castro was in the vicinity of the incident when he heard the gunshots. At the scene of the
shootout, he saw a man in a long-sleeved brown barong tagalog armed with a baby armalite. They exchanged fire.
He described the suspect as between 40 and 45 years old, about 5’6" and 150 pounds, with fair complexion and
chinky eyes. The suspect escaped in a red car, which he chased in vain. He was certain that there was no owner-
type jeep or L-300 van involved in the shootout. 9
Witness SPO3 Pio Inocencio was another policeman who arrived at the crime scene after the incident. He saw four
cars parked one after the other, all with multiple bullet holes. In the last car was an unidentified person, who
apparently died on the spot. His team made an ocular inspection, took pictures and gathered available evidence for
laboratory analysis. Investigation revealed that the suspects used four cars. He prepared a police report and a
sketch of the crime scene. Altogether, he submitted five progress reports on the case.
10  11  12

The gist of the testimony of Mohammad Mamison is contained in the factual findings of the trial court which was
earlier quoted.

Witness Moises Tamayo was the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent who took the statement of
Mohammad Mamison in relation to the incident of 8 September 1995, after the NBI assumed jurisdiction over the
investigation of the case and Mamison’s involvement therein was determined. Tamayo was able to persuade
Mamison to give a statement with the assistance of counsel, whom Tamayo recommended. Mamison eventually
signed two sworn statements which also bore counsel’s signature, where he identified accused-appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime under investigation. Subsequently, AHMAD’s home was raided, resulting in the
confiscation of unlicensed .38 and .45 revolvers and ammunition. Accused-appellants were eventually arrested and
were properly identified by Mamison. 13

On cross-examination, Tamayo admitted investigating a certain Halima Gulam a week after the shootout. She had
informed him that the participants of the crime were Mamison, Datu Jimmy and Datu Aries. Accused-appellants
were apparently never mentioned by her. She had also disclosed that on the day after the shootout, Mamison
returned to his residence carrying a large brown envelope. Accordingly, Gulam overheard Mamison and his
companions discussing the division of their loot. He also confirmed that during his investigation, Mamison never
mentioned the names of accused-appellants. 14

In the course of the trial, accused-appellants moved for the inhibition of Presiding Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr.,
whom they accused of being biased against people charged with theft and robbery. They alleged that the questions
he addressed to the witnesses were primarily aimed at assisting the prosecution and securing the accused-
appellants’ conviction. Under the circumstances they could not be afforded a fair trial. The trial court, however,
denied the motion for lack of merit.

After the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, accused-appellants filed their demurrer to evidence,
arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the perpetrators of the crime and that the testimony of
state witness Mohammad Mamison was not credible as to warrant their conviction. The trial court likewise denied
the same for lack of merit.

On the other hand, accused-appellants all raised the defense of alibi and established the following facts:

AHMAD was the administrator of a mosque in Bicutan, Taguig. In the afternoon of 8 September 1995, he went to
Union Bank, United Nations Avenue branch, Manila, to deposit ₱40,000, representing the church collection. He
arrived at 2:30 p.m. and stayed until 3:20 p.m. He presented the bank’s copy of the deposit slip made in his name
15 

and under Savings Account No. 002-103895-8. The lower portion of the deposit slip bore the bank’s machine
validation imprint "08SEP95 14:38:09." After making the deposit, he exchanged pleasantries with Reynaldo Bandali,
Union Bank Assistant Vice-President, as was his habit whenever he visits the bank. Thereafter, he went home,
arriving thereat at 5:00 p.m.
16

AHMAD acknowledged that HASIM and ABUBAKAR are his relatives, whereas SAMSUDIN was a complete
stranger to him. On 22 September 1995, he, HASIM and ABUBAKAR were arrested at his home and brought to the
NBI for investigation. It was there that he first met Mamison, who identified them as the perpetrators of a robbery
committed in Intramuros, Manila, on 8 September 1995. His second and last confrontation with Mamison was on the
day the latter testified against them in court. He did not know Mamison and he had no misunderstanding with him,
so there was no reason why Mamison would implicate them in the crime. 17

AHMAD’s testimony was corroborated by Reynaldo Bandali, Assistant Vice President of Union Bank. Bandali joined
the bank in 1990 as the bank’s overseas remittance manager. In the afternoon of 8 September 1995, he was in the
bank’s United Nations Avenue branch, Manila. He had just come from a meeting at about 2:30 p.m. when he saw
AHMAD waiting by his office. AHMAD sought his assistance in making a deposit since the queue was long. He
accommodated AHMAD’s request and even entertained him in his office. AHMAD left the bank at about 3:20 p.m.
He confirmed the bank’s copy of the deposit slip for that particular transaction. He gave said copy to AHMAD’s
18 

nephew upon learning that AHMAD was accused of the robbery that occurred that same afternoon. He knew that it
could help AHMAD prove his innocence. 19

Accused-appellant HASIM was a security guard employed by the Action Force Security Agency. From 1993 to 1995
he was assigned at the Manila Galleria Suites, located at the Ortigas Center, Pasig City. On the day of the incident
in question, he was on duty, signing in at 6:00 a.m. and only leaving at 7:30 p.m. Officer-in-Charge Pepito Alapatin,
Chief Security Conrad Banal, Security Inspector Harold Garcia as well, as his co-security guard Nicanor Armisa
saw, him on duty that whole day. He acknowledged that AHMAD is his uncle, with whom he lived. As to state
witness Mamison, he admitted that he had known him for about a year since Mamison used to live with his uncle.
They never had any misunderstanding with him, so he cannot explain why he was linking them to the robbery. 20

The testimony of HASIM was confirmed by Pepito Alapatin, Harold Garcia and Nicanor Armisa.

In the afternoon of 8 September 1995, Alapatin was at the Manila Galleria Suites to inspect the security force of
which HASIM was a member. He was certain that HASIM was at his post of assignment as his duty was from 7:00
a.m. to 7:00 p.m. on 8 September 1995. It was routine for the security force to assemble 30 minutes prior to the
assumption of their duty to verify their attendance. On the date in question, HASIM was present for the assembly. 21

As Internal Security Officer of the Manila Galleria Suites, Harold Garcia was tasked to inspect every two hours if the
guards were at their posts. HASIM was among the guards detailed at the hotel. Garcia attested that on 8 September
1995, HASIM arrived at the hotel before 7:00 a.m. in time for the assembly briefing of the security force. He was
certain that between 3 and 4 in the afternoon, HASIM was at his post at the guest floor level after conducting his
routine inspection. HASIM left the hotel only after 7:00 p.m. He distinctly recalled that day because when he learned
from the news that HASIM had been arrested, he knew it was impossible for him to have been involved in the crime
because HASIM was on duty the whole day of 8 September 1995. HASIM continued reporting for work until the time
of his arrest on the third week of September. 22

On cross-examination, Garcia declared that it was impossible for HASIM to have left his post without the knowledge
of hotel personnel. He explained that apart from the two-hour routine inspection he conducted, each guard was
required to make a personal call every fifteen to thirty minutes to the security office. A missed call would alert the
security office for an immediate investigation. In addition, roving guards of the hotel conducted supplementary
inspection.23

Nicanor Armisa, a house detective of the Manila Galleria Suites, affirmed that HASIM was in Levels 23 and 24 of the
hotel the whole day of 8 September 1995. 24

Accused-appellant ABUBAKAR, a resident of Taguig, was a water delivery boy for the mosque in their
neighborhood. He lived with his uncle AHMAD. HASIM is also his uncle. At about the time of the shootout in
Intramuros, he was in the mosque with other churchgoers. On 22 September, he was arrested by NBI agents for his
alleged involvement in a recent hold-up. At the NBI headquarters, he was identified as one of the perpetrators of the
crime by Mamison, a stranger as far as he was concerned. He could not offer any reason why Mamison would
accuse him of a crime. He denied the accusation but he later opted to keep quiet after he saw one of his
companions being kicked by the agents. He recalled that AHMAD left the house at around 2:00 that afternoon and
25 

returned only at about 6:00 p.m.26

The defense presented Mosaydin Mamalangakay, Abdul Sisay and Kutin Gudal, barangay officials and neighbors of
ABUBAKAR, to corroborate the latter’s alibi. 27

On the other hand, accused-appellant SAMSUDIN testified that he was playing basketball in his hometown in
Maguindanao in the afternoon of 8 September 1995. Among the spectators were Barangay Captain Oti Lumpaw
and a teacher, Zainudin Ampang. On 17 September 1995, he made his first trip to Manila. He presented an Aboitiz
Superferry ticket issued in his name and dated 17 September 1995. The ship left in the morning of said date and
28 

arrived in Manila on 19 September. Five days later, he was arrested in his aunt’s home in Taguig and brought to the
NBI for his alleged participation in a robbery committed on 8 September 1995 in Intramuros, Manila. It was there
that he first met the rest of accused-appellants. 29
Zainudin Ampang, a public high school teacher and resident of Maguindanao, corroborated SAMSUDIN’s
30 

testimony. SAMSUDIN was his neighbor. In the afternoon of 8 September 1995, he saw SAMSUDIN playing
basketball at the plaza. There were about a hundred spectators then. Even in the succeeding days he would see
SAMSUDIN playing basketball at the plaza. He denied knowing the other accused-appellants. 31

After the defense rested its case, the trial court rendered its decision on 4 August 1999, the decretal portion of
32 

which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Ahmad Langalen y Demalen, Hasim Upam y Abubacar,
Samsudin Talib y Limba and Abubakar Daganas y Anggubala, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of highway robbery under PD 532 and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.
The four accused are also ordered to pay the legal heirs of SPO3 Ricardo Gonzales death compensation
and moral damages in the respective sums of ₱50,000.00 and ₱500,000.00, and ₱13,600,000.00 actual
damages to the owner/s of VMG Money Changer with interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of this
case on October 16, 1995 until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

The trial court gave credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Mamison, who testified in a "straightforward,
positive and credible" manner. It further held that no improper motive could be ascribed to him to falsely testify
against accused-appellants. On the other hand, it rejected the latter’s defense of alibi because it could not prevail
over the positive testimony of Mamison. Finally, the trial court opined that conspiracy among accused-appellants
was properly established when they left together in Taguig and proceeded to Manila to commit the heist.

The case is now before this Court for automatic review, pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659.

In their Appellants’ Brief, accused-appellants raise the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:

I. … IN FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION’S SOLE "EYE-WITNESS" MAMISON, AS

BEING STRAIGHT-FORWARD, POSITIVE AND CREDIBLE; AND, THAT, MAMISON HAD NO IMPROPER
MOTIVE TO FALSELY IMPLICATE THE FOUR (4) ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN THE CRIME CHARGED,
OR HATCH UP THE STORY HE NARRATED TO THE COURT;

II. … IN NOT APPRECIATING THE TESTIMONY OF NBI AGENT MOISES B. TAMAYO AND THE
AMBUSHED GUARDS WHICH CLEARLY CONTRADICTS THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION’S
"EYE-WITNESS" MAMISON; and

III. … IN NOT APPRECIATING THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS,

CONSISTING OF NUMEROUS CREDIBLE WITNESSES WHO ARE OF GOOD REPUTATION,
UNQUESTIONED PROBITY, UNBIASED AND DISINTERESTED.

Accused-appellants assail the testimony of state witness as being inconsistent with the testimonies of the other
witnesses for the prosecution. In fact, it was Mamison who had a motive in implicating them to the crime. Mamison
admitted that he acted as a look-out. NBI Agent Tamayo, however, testified that based on his investigation,
Mamison was among the plotters of the robbery along with other named conspirators, none of whom included any of
the accused-appellants. He also found out that after the shootout, Mamison fled his residence, and an informant told
him (Tamayo) that Mamison and his cohorts were discussing in Quiapo the division of some loot. Accused-
appellants argue that Mamison had to concoct a story and offer himself as a state witness to extricate himself from
being charged for the offense.

Accused-appellants further assert that there were other details Mamison mentioned in his testimony that were in
conflict with the testimony of the victims. Mamison claimed that the vehicles used by the malefactors were an owner-
type jeep and an L-300 van; that they were armed with hand guns and one rifle; and that they were wearing long-
sleeved shirts and denim pants. On the other hand, the victims testified that there were about seven assailants who
33 

wore black bonnets and fatigue uniforms, all armed with rifles. A red car and a green car were used as getaway
vehicles. One witness even positively declared that none of the assailants was in the courtroom. Another witness
particularly described a suspect as in his early forties, with a huge belly, about 150 pounds, with fair complexion and
chinky eyes. He categorically denied in the presence of accused-appellants that said suspect was in the courtroom.

Thus, accused-appellants conclude that the glaring inconsistencies between the testimonies of the victims and that
of Mamison put the latter’s credibility in question. It was only Mamison who alluded to them as the alleged
perpetrators of the crime. Other than his testimony, no other link was established by the prosecution to pin the crime
on them. Therefore, accused-appellants invoke an urgent need to reexamine the factual findings of the trial court,
especially considering the penalty imposed.

Finally, accused-appellants maintain that their defense of alibi was sufficiently established by the testimonies of
disinterested persons of good reputation and unquestioned probity, as well as by the documentary evidence. The
inevitable conclusion is that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They must,
therefore, be accorded their constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond moral
certainty.

After a meticulous review of the records of this case and the evidence presented by the parties, we are convinced
that the prosecution, indeed, failed to prove by the required quantum of evidence the guilt of accused-appellants.
Thus, we reverse the challenged judgment and accordingly acquit them.

It bears emphasis that of the seven witnesses for the prosecution, only Mohammad Mamison implicated accused-
appellants to the crime charged. It has long been settled that when the issue is one of credibility of the witnesses,
the appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to resolve the
question after actually hearing the witnesses and observing their deportment during the trial. This rule, however,
admits of exceptions, such as when the evaluation was reached arbitrarily or when the trial court ignored or failed to
appreciate certain facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could affect the result of the case. 34

The exception exists in this case, and a scrutiny of Mamison’s testimony easily confirms it. He was not a party in the
plotting of the heist; he only allegedly chanced upon accused-appellants as they were on their way to commit the
crime. He was casually invited by AHMAD to join them although he had no idea what they were up to. He was
instructed to warn AHMAD of the presence of any police from where he was dropped off. It was only later he
realized that accused-appellants waylaid a convoy of vehicles. However, he did not see the actual robbery as he
immediately fled after hearing the gunshots. He was not heard from nor seen again until he was called to an
investigation. Yet, although he was the first to be investigated of those whom the law enforcers believed to be the
authors of the crime, the information in this case, which was filed on 16 October 1995, states that the cases against
"MOHAMAD MAMISON … is still pending preliminary investigation with the Department of Justice." The records fail
to disclose that Mamison was ever accused of the crime and later discharged as such on account of his utilization
as a state witness.

Among Mamison’s observations was that only two vehicles were used by accused-appellants, an owner-type jeep
driven by AHMAD and an L-300 van. But prosecution witness Senen Santillan declared that the four men who
ambushed them got off from a green car. Also prosecution witness Dante Castro described the assailants as
wearing green fatigue uniforms with their faces concealed by bonnets. Prosecution witness SPO3 Pio Inocencio was
certain that no owner-type jeep or L-300 van was used in the heist. Finally, Castro and Santillan candidly testified
that none of those who ambushed them and ran away with the money were in the courtroom. When they testified, all
accused-appellants were inside the courtroom.

The foregoing observations strengthen the defense of alibi put up by accused-appellants.

We have time and again ruled that alibi is the weakest defense as it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. For
alibi to prosper, the accused must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time the same was committed. Moreover, it cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the accused. 35

In the case before us, accused-appellants, particularly AHMAD and HASIM, had sufficiently established that it was
impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its occurrence. Their alibi was corroborated
by credible witnesses. Very revealing is AHMAD’s alibi that he was at the bank at the time of the robbery and
shootout. He had the bank’s deposit slip indicating the date and time the deposit was made, which was
36 

strengthened by the testimony of Union Bank Assistant Vice President Reynaldo Bandali. We see no cogent reason
why a high-ranking bank official would falsely testify in favor of an accused. Moreover, no improper motive could be
attributed to Banaldi.

The same can be said of HASIM, who was in his work station on the day of the robbery and shootout. His superiors
attested to such fact. Again, these are disinterested witnesses to whom no improper motive could be imputed.

Based on the testimony of Mamison, it was AHMAD who was the mastermind of and a direct participant in the
robbery. Yet, based on the evidence on record it is crystal clear that the alibi of AHMAD has been sufficiently
established. This raises doubt on the credibility of Mamison. His implication of AHMAD is definitely disputable.

Other than MAMISON’s testimony, no other evidence was offered to further demonstrate the culpability of accused-
appellants. Indeed, we cannot affirm the conviction of accused-appellants when their guilt has not been established
beyond reasonable doubt.

On a final note, we deplore some of the trial court’s procedural omissions. There is an inexplicable neglect in
accounting a thorough summary of the versions of the evidence for the prosecution and the defense. The
prosecution had seven witnesses while the defense had eleven witnesses. Yet, the gist of its appreciation of facts of
the shootout was primarily dependent on the testimony of state witness Mamison. It disregarded certain details
declared by the victims of the shootout which cast doubt on the accuracy of Mamison’s account. Moreover, the trial
court peremptorily dismissed the defense of alibi of accused-appellants without disclosing that their alibi was
corroborated by several disinterested witnesses. In this regard, the trial court was either neglectful of its duty or
evidently lackadaisical or unmindful of the gravity of the offense. The trial court should have been more diligent and
circumspect in judging this case and meting out the death penalty.

WHEREFORE, the decision of 4 August 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No.
95-145780, convicting accused-appellants AHMAD LANGALEN y DEMALEN a.k.a. "Kumander Kamlon," HASIM
UPAM y ABUBACAR, SAMSUDIN TALIB y LIMBA and ABUBAKAR DAGANAS y ANGGUBALA of violation of
Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. They are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged
and ORDERED immediately released from confinement unless their further detention is warranted by virtue of any
lawful cause. The Director of Bureau of Corrections is directed to submit a report of such release within five (5) days
from notice hereof.
16.) G.R. No. 118075 September 5, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were charged with violation of PD No. 532
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while
armed with a firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in conspiracy with one another, by means of violence and
intimidation, wilfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil
and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing boat,
to their damage and prejudice. 1

The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y Tayong and Jose Macven
Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua.  Of the duo only Emiliano
2

Catantan appealed.

In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of piracy as the facts
proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code and not piracy under
PD No. 532.

The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27 June 1993, the Pilapil brothers Eugene,
21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly,
another boat caught up with them. One of them, later identified as the accused Emiliano Catantan, bearded the
pump boat of the Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan struck Eugene on the left
cheekbone and ordered him and Juan Jr. to "dapa."  Then Catantan told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat of the
3

Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the bottom of the boat, covered him with a tarpaulin
up to his neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other
pumpboat which the accused had earlier used together with its passengers one of whom was visibly tied.

Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan that they were now off-course but
Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he would be killed. Later, the engine conked out and Juan Jr. was directed to
row the boat. Eugene asked to be set free so he could help but was not allowed; he was threatened with bodily
harm instead.

Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into the open sea the engine stalled
again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist his brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his legs were tied to
the outrigger. At the point of a tres cantos  held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.
4

As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked whose boat that was and the Pilapils
told him that it was operated by a certain Juanito and that its engine was new. Upon learning this, Catantan ordered
the Pilapil brothers to approach the boat cautioning them however not to move or say anything.

On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new" pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered the
operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, another town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he
would still pull up his net and harvest his catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose between the two,
or I will kill you."  Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal hopped in from the other pumpboat and
5

joined Catantan.

But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front part of the pumpboat of the
Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt threw Eugene into the sea and he landed on the water
headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brother's legs and the two swam together clinging to their boat. Fortunately
another pumpboat passed by and towed them safely ashore.

Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of
the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of the complement or passengers,
irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,
committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters,
shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided."
And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree as "any vessel or watercraft used for transport of
passengers and cargo from one place to another through Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds and types of
vessels or boats used in fishing (emphasis supplied).

On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any person
who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by
law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong."

Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential that there be an attack
on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the
Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they were
already on board that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant also
insists that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking possession or depriving complainants of their boat.
As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the brothers right away to approach that boat so
they could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply committed grave coercion
and not piracy.

We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art.
286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that
Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was
obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the appellant
actually seized the vessel through force and intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene is significant and
enlightening —

Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the seawaters of
Tabogon at that time, was there anything unusual that happened?

A: Yes.

Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was?

A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and the passengers
of that pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.

Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many were riding in
that pumpboat?

A: Four.

Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your pumpboat, how
did they do that?

A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard the pumpboat (emphasis

supplied).

Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?

A: Only one.
 Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat?

A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us (emphasis supplied).

Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything to you?

x x x           x x x          x x x

A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (emphasis supplied).

COURT:

Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?

A: He aimed the revolver on me.

TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:

Q: What else did he do?

A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat.

Q: What did he do with his revolver?

A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my left eye.

Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these persons do?

A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place.

Q: To what place did he order you to go?

A: To Daan Tabogon.  6

To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave coercion would be to ignore the
fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly approached them and
boarded their pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered complaining witness Eugene Pilapil
to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and then struck his face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his
left eye, after which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon.

The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden appearance of another pumpboat with four
passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated the Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to submit in
complete surrender to the marauders. The moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full control of
his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence the issuance of PD No. 532
designed to avert situations like the case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters. Thus we
cite the succeeding "whereas" clauses of the decree —

Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing
acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who
travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and
stunting the economic and social progress of the people;

Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway robbery/brigandage which
are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries; and,
 Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts of
depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all
obstacle to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people.

The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in sea waters. They brave the
natural elements and contend with the unknown forces of the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these
small fishermen that the townspeople depend for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood would be to deprive
them of their very subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to the
"economic, social, educational and community progress of the people." Had it not been for the chance passing of
another pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone helpless in a floundering, meandering outrigger with a
broken prow and a conked-out engine in open sea, could not be ascertained.

While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils permanently of their boat, proof of
which they left behind the brothers with their boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only
because their pumpboat broke down and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that would take them
back to their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas so they were apprehended by the
police soon after the Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities.

The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in evidence cannot exculpate
him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it again, that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through
force and intimidation the pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the conviction of accused-appellant
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him
accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
17.) G.R. No. 111709            August 30, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN
HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.

MELO, J.:

This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court for sometime. It was
reassigned, together with other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated
February 27, 2001.

In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel
oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.

The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second Mate Christian Torralba,
and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed
pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns,
and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola
ordered three crew members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and
rear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then
painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to
Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.

PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast
Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue
operations yielded negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised
around the area presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to
return to the Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained
at sea.

On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from
Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the
crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San
Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both
vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30, 1991.

On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."

On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel remained at sea. On April 10,
1991, the members of the crew were released in three batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to
government authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The first batch
was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco,
brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of
the crew in proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accused-appellant Changco at
midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to different places in Metro Manila.

On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for
investigation. The incident was also reported to the National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and
members of the crew executed sworn statements regarding the incident.

A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:

a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were present at U.K. Beach, Balibago,
Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI
headquarters in Manila.

b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as the
latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.

c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas
City.

On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in
Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:

The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O.
CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of
qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as follows:

That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates inclusive, and for
sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, then manning a motor launch and armed with high powered guns, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fire upon, board and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded
with petroleum products, together with the complement and crew members, employing violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the vessel to proceed to
Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned to the Philippines on April 10,
1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)

This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial thereupon ensued.

Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some inconsistencies in their testimony as to
where they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the
transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them claimed having their own respective
sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a
red speedboat with Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the
seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They were told that the work
was light and that each worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if they worked
beyond that period. They agreed even though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked, cleaned
the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They denied having gone to Singapore, claiming that
the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00
each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be remitted to their addresses.
There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the parties.

Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at home sleeping on April 10,
1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.

Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that he studied in Sydney,
Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel,
working as such for two years on board a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port
Captain. The company was engaged in the business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and
petroleum to domestic and international markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and his cohorts, Hiong's name
was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the Maritime Department of the Singapore
government as the radio telephone operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma."

The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who offered to sell to the
former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the company paid over one-half of the
aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm,
proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the contact vessel.

The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon his return on board the
vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the
contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and
was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the
surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T
Galilee" would be making the transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the port authorities
before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port clearance upon submission of General
Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not pass
through the immigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel carried 11,900 tons.

On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers then told the Captain of the
vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met
the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed
that he did not ask for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.

Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Pride" and took samples of the
cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report which "Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo."
Hiong then handed the payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of March
29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.

Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to
"Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there
were food and drinks, including beer, purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten
hours and was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the transfer.

On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels and wanted to offer its cargo to
cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong
went to the Philippines to discuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer, this
time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of
Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the
name "SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio Changco
himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel
was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.

After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the crime charged. The dispositive
portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court finding
the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree
No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said
law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory death. However, considering that, under the
1987 Constitution, the Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola,
Andres Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD
532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered
to return to the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no
longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly and severally, to said
 corporation the value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with interests thereon,
at the rate of 6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the accused
including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the
"M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said cargo to said corporation, all the accused
are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in
the amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After the
accused Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.

All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National Bureau of Investigation
and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case provided that they agreed in writing to abide by
and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of
Investigation. With costs against all the accused.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)

The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants may be summarized as follows:

Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco

Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial court erred in allowing them
to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer,
thereby depriving them of their constitutional right to procedural due process.

In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance as counsel for all of them.
However, in the course of the proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was
not a member of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and examined seven witnesses for
the accused.

Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly contend that during the custodial
investigation, they were subjected to physical violence; were forced to sign statements without being given the
opportunity to read the contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed of their
rights, in violation of their constitutional rights.

Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered
by the crew who totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-appellants
conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates.

Cheong San Hiong

In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the crime committed by him;
(2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he had no knowledge that Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T
Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3) the
trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him
as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and
territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court
erred in making factual conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which in fact are contrary to
the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by direct participation under said decree, thus
violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not prove any participation on his part
in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further argues that he had not in any way participated in the
seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the
vessel and its cargo were pirated.

As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information with qualified piracy as
principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at
bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State to
have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its territory.

We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.

The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal effects and implications of the
fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellants during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and
implications of the absence of counsel during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding that
the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime
of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant
Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as
such and when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and
territory?

On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was executed by accused-
appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the
evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation
during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona
fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical
manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the subject
manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its
contents when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59).

It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in person and by counsel at
every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However,
it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of
the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to
defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the
assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of
law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the
appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he knew the technical rules of
procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial,
considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona
fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid
waiver of rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680
[1988]).

However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation may not be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:

SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
 (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation
to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda
doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning during custodial investigation, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the
more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel.

Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused-appellants make
them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph
[3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by
Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According
to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence
illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case,
the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are
inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence
against them.

However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is sufficient evidence to convict accused-
appellants with moral certainty. We agree with the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco
(Exhibits "U" and "UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to
commit the crime charged. In the words of then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals —

. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and members of the crew of the
"M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to the said Accused as among those who attacked and
seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island,
Mindoro, with its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew of the vessel,
in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of Singapore and
sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T
Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30,
1991. . .

xxx           xxx           xxx

The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on board the vessel with the
Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There
can be no scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see
and identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately after the Accused were taken into custody
by the operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian
Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said
Accused as some of the pirates.

xxx           xxx           xxx

 Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accused admitted to the Court
that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the evening of March 2, 1991 and remained on board when the
vessel sailed to its destination, which turned out to be off the port of Singapore.

(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)

We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial is not supported by any hard
evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime (People v.
Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently
desperate tale that they were hired by three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate
Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were conversing with one another along the
seashore at Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then
anchored off-shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite
period of time without even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing their destination or the details of
their voyage, without the personal effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly
not in accord with human experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second
Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a
completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."

Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 and 17, he was at his place of
work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is
fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v.
Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-
appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically
impossible for him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he was likewise unable
to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.

It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for trial
courts have an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine
whether a certain witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).

We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a
conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act or need
not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial
court, there are times when conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to
one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a common criminal design.

We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others,
were the ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant
Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas
after the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with money
for their fare and food provisions on their way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant
Cecilio Changco need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed
his task in view of an objective common to all other accused-appellants.

Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco
is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of
Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences are approximately six
or seven kilometers away from each other. Their families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has
known Cecilio since their parents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant
Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by affinity. Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been
accused in a seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol
in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that time remained at
large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine
waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532
because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994), which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal
Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No.
532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that
in order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree
No. 532 must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are
members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to
offenders who are neither members of the complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him
from the coverage of the law.

Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:

ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be
inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its
complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or
personal belongings of its complement or passengers.

(Italics supplied.)

Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:

ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. — The penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall
attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or
part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.

(Italics ours)

On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — The following shall mean and be understood, as follows:

d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its
cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any
person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be
considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided
(Italics supplied).

To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be
committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its
amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses
committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the
coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said
vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered
by the law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No.
532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to
construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with
the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed
in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and
piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong
since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine
waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded,
transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although
Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in
Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy,
hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the
rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not
with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which
penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here
since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA
761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime
against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).

However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 even though he was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of
said law?

The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:

(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b)
that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and
that his act was indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial
court found that accused-appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio
Changco and his band of pirates in the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
532 which provides:

SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway robbery brigandage.
— Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such
as giving them information about the movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or
acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit
therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or
brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal officers and be punished in accordance
with Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has performed them
knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.

The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete evidence of
conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any
doubt as to the participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser
responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v.
Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).

Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which presumes
that any person who does any of the acts provided in said section has performed them knowingly, unless the
contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that he
knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property taken by such pirates and derived benefit
therefrom.

The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the stolen cargo by personally
directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for
Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified the quantity
of the petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and
Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied,
the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).

We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and Crew List was accomplished
and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to
avert detection by Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the
Singapore Port Authorities could have easily discovered the illegal activities that took place and this would have
resulted in his arrest and prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to
"Navi Pride" could not have been effected.

We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accused-appellant Hiong's role in the
disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos
boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm
submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port authorities, excluding the name of Hiong;
that the "General Declaration" (for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH"
and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening),
that there were no passengers on board, and the purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the
vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with
Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor prepared the "Quantity
Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic
meters; that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the "Certificate" above the
word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid P150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the
amount; that Emilio Changco also did not issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival
at Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it was made to
falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high seas during said voyage when in fact it
acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the same
irregularities as discussed above. It was likewise supervised by accused-appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio
Changco supervised the transfer from his end.

Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his superiors and that he has no
knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.

First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source and nature of the cargo since he
himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second, considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he
should have avoided any participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious circumstances under which it
was acquired. He failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any contract of
sale for the purchase by the firm; he never bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative
to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met for the first time nor
did he check the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the
dead of the night which a marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine
transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued therefor; he was not even
aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It should also be noted that the value of
the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$1,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange
rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should
have been aware of this irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and
money for transportation — only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved. This, in addition to
the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that his firm
was acquiring was purloined.

Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the orders of his superiors." An
individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some
lawful purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal
Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent
violation not only of Philippine, but of international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-
operated vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled
port and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts. During
the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port
Captain. These circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and the implications of the order of Chua
Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer
of the cargo to the "Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the consequences of his
actions.

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby
AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.
18 TO 23 READ .)
 24.) G.R. No. 232624, July 09, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RENATO CARIÑO Y GOCONG AND ALVIN

AQUINO Y RAGAM*, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

REYES, JR., J.:

This treats of the Notice of Appeal1 under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure filed by Renato
Cariño y Gocong (Cariño), and Alvin Aquino y  Ragam (Aquino) (collectively referred as accused-
appellants), seeking the reversal of the Decision2 dated September 14, 2016, rendered by the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06217, convicting them of Robbery with Homicide under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and Carnapping under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539,3 as
amended.

The Antecedents

An Information was filed against the accused-appellants, charging them with Robbery with Homicide
under Article 294 of the RPC, committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent of
gain, by means of force, violence and/or intimidation against person, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob one MIRKO MOELLER of the following personal items:

One (1) cellphone, wallet, small camera, video camera and VCD player, and by reason and on the
occasion of the said robbery, said accused pursuant to their conspiracy, with intent to kill, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of MIRKO MOELLER by then and there mauling
him with the use of a dumbbell, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Another Information was also filed against the accused-appellants for the crime of Carnapping as
defined and penalized under R.A. No. 6539, as amended, committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain
and without knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) Unit of Nissan Sentra with Plate No. PN-USD-666
colored silver/pink, of undetermined amount belonging to MIRKO MOELLER, to the damage and
prejudice of the said owner thereof.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

The accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges. Trial ensued thereafter.6

Evidence of the Prosecution

On August 28, 2002, Leonardo Advincula (Advincula) was driving an R&E Taxi with plate number TVH
298, and traversing through East Avenue, Quezon City, when he was flagged down by Cariño in front
of the Social Security System building. Cariño asked Advincula to take him to Ortigas. Upon arriving
at Ortigas, Cariño asked Advincula to stop along the comer of Julia Vargas and Meralco Avenue.
While parked thereat, a silver Nissan Sentra with plate number USD 666 arrived. Cariño alighted and
approached the Nissan Sentra. Upon returning to the taxi, Cariño asked Advincula to follow the
Nissan Sentra. After driving for a short distance, the Nissan Sentra entered Gate 1 of the Corinthian
Gardens Subdivision in Quezon City.7

At around 10:39 p.m. of August 28, 2002, Jimmy Caporado (Caporado), a security guard at the
Corinthian Gardens Subdivision was manning Gate 1 of the said subdivision. Caporado noticed a
Nissan Sentra with plate number USD 666, pass through Gate 1. Trailing behind the Nissan Sentra
was an R&E taxi with plate number TVH 298. Upon passing through the gate, the driver of the Nissan
Sentra, who Caporado recognized as Mirko Moeller (Moeller), a resident of the said subdivision,
opened the car window to inform the former that the passenger inside the taxi was his visitor. During
this time, Caporado noticed that Moeller was with Aquino. Obeying Moeller's instructions, Caporado
flagged down the taxi cab to take the driver's license, and then let the taxi pass.8 Caporado identified
the passenger of the taxi as Cariño, who he pointed to in open court.9

Meanwhile, Advincula dropped off Cariño at No. 11 Young Street, Corinthian Gardens Subdivision.
Cariño alighted from the taxi and asked Advincula to wait for his payment. Moeller, the victim,
alighted from the Nissan Sentra and approached the taxi to pay for Cariño's fare.10 Advincula drove
away without a passenger.

Subsequently, at around 7:30 a.m. of August 29, 2002, Nena Taro (Taro), the housemaid of Moeller
arrived at the latter's home. Taro noticed that the main gate and the door of the house were
unlocked. Upon entering the house, she was surprised to see dried blood on the wall beside the light
switch. She walked to the backdoor leading to the swimming pool to look for Moeller. There, she was
horrified to see him lying face down in front of the swimming pool. Shocked by what she had seen,
she rushed out of the house to ask for help. Moments later, the security guards and the police
arrived.11

Months after the incident, on September 4, 2002, Senior Police Officer 4 Celso Jeresano (SPO4
Jeresano), together with other police officers, arrested the accused-appellants in Bagaquin, Baguio
City. They were tipped off by an informant about the whereabouts of the said accused-appellants.
During the arrest, the police recovered a camera, video camera, and charger from the accused-
appellants. The police also tracked down the stolen Nissan Sentra in Isabela, after Cariño pointed to
its location.12 Cariño also surrendered the keys of the Nissan Sentra.

During the trial, Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez (Dr. Marquez), Medico-Legal Officer, testified that the
victim's cause of death was intracranial hemorrhage, as a result of traumatic injuries in the head.13

Version of the Defense

The accused-appellants vehemently denied the charges leveled against them.

Aquino claimed that on September 4, 2002, while he was waiting for a jeepney bound for Manila, a
tinted Tamaraw FX suddenly stopped in front of him. He was forced to board the said vehicle. While
inside, he was handcuffed and shown a cartographic sketch, and was asked if the image was familiar.
He said that he did know who the person in the sketch was. Suddenly, he was hit on his right temple
and on the back of his head. This caused him to pass out. When he regained consciousness, he found
himself inside an unfamiliar small house, with his t-shirt bearing blood stains. Thereafter, he was
placed inside a van, where he was subjected to physical abuse. Later on, he was brought to Camp
Karingal, where he was again physically abused by the police officers. He was later on brought for
inquest proceedings, where he learned that he was being charged with Robbery with Homicide.14
In the same vein, Cariño claimed that on September 19, 2002, between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m., a group
of police officers suddenly barged inside the house where he and his girlfriend were staying. He was
arrested and brought to Isabela. He was photographed while seated in a car, and was told that he
stole the same. Then, he was brought to Camp Karingal where he was accused of killing a German
national. Cariño denied knowing Aquino.15

Ruling of the Trial Court

On April 29, 2013, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a Decision16 convicting the accused-
appellants for the crimes of Robbery with Homicide, and Carnapping. The RTC concluded that there
was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict them. In particular, the RTC noted that the
prosecution witnesses confirmed that the accused-appellants were the last persons to be seen with
the victim.17 Added to this, the RTC observed that the victim's stolen properties were recovered from
the accused-appellants.18 Also, when the police officer asked them about the stolen car, they were
able to pinpoint its exact location.19 Finding these as sufficient proof of their guilt, the RTC sentenced
them to a penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of robbery with homicide; and the maximum
sentence of life imprisonment for the carnapping, considering that Moeller, the owner of the vehicle,
was killed on the occasion of the carnapping.20

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-02-111947, judgment is hereby rendered finding [the accused-
appellants] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide, and imposing on said accused
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Court likewise adjudges [the accused-appellants] jointly and severally liable to pay the heirs of
the victim Mirko Moller,21 represented by Anthony Q. Paguio, the following amounts:

1. P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto.

2. P75,000.00 as moral damages.
3. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. 75,000.00 as temperate damages.
5. The costs of suit.

In Criminal Case No. Q-02-111948, judgment is also rendered finding [the accused-appellants] guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping, in violation of [R.A.] No. 6539, and imposing on said
accused the penalty of life imprisonment.

The accused shall be fully credited with their respective periods of preventive detention, pursuant to
Article 29 of the [RPC]. They shall henceforth be committed to the National Penitentiary in
Muntinlupa City to commence the service of their sentence.

SO ORDERED.22

Dissatisfied with the ruling, the accused-appellants filed an appeal with the CA.

Ruling of the CA

On September 14, 2016, the CA rendered the assailed Decision,23 affirming the RTC's conviction
against the accused-appellants for Robbery with Homicide, and Carnapping. Echoing the trial court's
findings, the CA affirmed that all the facts proven, and taken together, created an unbroken chain of
circumstances proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.24 The CA held that their defense of alibi
was unavailing, and faltered against the positive identification of the prosecution
witnesses.25 Likewise, the CA found that the results of the police investigation revealed that violence
was employed against the victim, which resulted to the latter's death. Also, the camera, video
camera and charger, which all belonged to the victim, were found in the possession of the accused-
appellants when they were arrested in Baguio City.26 They were not able to explain the reason why
they possessed the said items.27 Added to this, they knew the location of the stolen
vehicle.28 Consequently, the CA concluded that all these established circumstances show that the
accused-appellants conspired with each other to commit the crimes charged.29

As for the penalties, the CA affirmed the sentence of reclusion perpetua for the charge of Robbery
with Homicide, but modified the amount of damages awarded by the RTC. Specifically, the CA
deleted the award of exemplary damages finding that there were no aggravating circumstances that
attended the commission of the crime. Also, the CA reduced the amount of temperate damages to
Php 50,000.00, to conform with recent jurisprudence.30

As for the crime of Carnapping, the CA found that the RTC erred in imposing the maximum penalty
for the said crime. The CA pointed out that the Information charging the accused-appellants of
carnapping, failed to indicate that the victim was killed in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof. Neither was there an allegation that the carnapping was
committed with violence or intimidation of persons. The CA surmised that based on the attendant
circumstances, the victim was presumably dead when the accused-appellants unlawfully took the
vehicle as a means to escape the crime scene. Thus, there being no causal connection between the
carnapping and the killing, the accused-appellants should be meted with the lesser sentence of
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and not more than seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months, for the crime of carnapping.31

The decretal portion of the assailed CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated April 29, 2013 of
the Quezon City [RTC], Branch 219, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-111947 and Q-02-111948
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that:

1.) In Criminal Case No. Q-02-111947, the award of exemplary damages is DELETED and the award
of temperate damages is hereby REDUCED to Php 50,000.00.

In addition, accused-appellants are jointly and severally ORDERED to PAY interest on all the

damages imposed at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this decision
until fully paid.

2.) In Criminal Case No. Q-02-111948, the accused-appellants are sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8) months, as minimum, to Seventeen
(17) years and Four (4) months, as maximum.

All other aspects of the fallo  of the assailed Decision STAND.

SO ORDERED.32

Aggrieved, the accused-appellants filed the instant Notice of Appeal under Rule 124 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure.

The Issue

The main issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not the prosecution proved the guilt of
the accused-appellants for the crimes of Robbery with Homicide, and Carnapping.
In a Manifestation33 dated January 25, 2018, the accused-appellants dispensed with the filing of their
Supplemental Brief, and prayed that their respective Appellant's Brief filed before the CA, be
considered in lieu of their Supplemental Brief.

In support of their plea for exoneration, the accused-appellants assert that the trial court erroneously
convicted them on the basis of insufficient circumstantial evidence. They point out that none of the
prosecution witnesses specifically identified them as the ones who actually robbed and killed the
victim, and carnapped the latter's vehicle.34 In fact, they stress that no less than the trial court stated
that no one witnessed the killing of the victim or the taking of the latter's properties.35 They harp on
the fact that the absence of any eyewitness engenders doubt on their culpability.36

Second, the accused-appellants claim that the trial court erred in concluding that they took the stolen
articles, simply because they were found in possession thereof. Added to this, they point out that the
ownership of the personal items was not even definitely determined.37

Third, anent their conviction for carnapping, they aver that the prosecution failed to prove the
presence of all the elements of the said crime. The trial court erred in concluding that the act of
changing the vehicle's plate number constitutes proof of intent to gain.38 They posit that at most, the
vehicle was merely used as a means to escape.39 Also, they question how they could be convicted of
carnapping with homicide, when the victim was already dead when the car was taken.40

Finally, the accused-appellants bewail that there was no evidence proving that they conspired to
commit the crimes. There was no showing that they were in fact motivated by a common purpose to
perpetrate the crimes.41

On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, (OSG) counters that the
prosecution sufficiently proved the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The
OSG avers that the trial court correctly found the nexus between the robbery and the killing of the
victim. There is no doubt that Moeller was killed. The fact of death was established through the
Medico-Legal Report, and the testimony of Dr. Marquez, who described the killing of Moeller as brutal
and intentional. Likewise, the OSG points out that Aquino admitted to SPO4 Jeresano that he killed
Moeller.42

In the same vein, the OSG maintains that the trial court also correctly found Aquino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of carnapping. Records show that all the elements of carnapping were present in
the instant case. Aquino, in conspiracy with Cariño, without the consent of Moeller, and with intent to
gain, and by means of violence against the person of the victim, took the latter's Nissan Sentra. The
OSG posits that intent to gain is evident when one takes property belonging to another against the
latter's will.43

Ruling of the Court

The instant appeal is bereft of merit.

The Prosecution Established

Beyond Reasonable Doubt the Guilt
of the accused-appellants for the
Crime of Robbery with Homicide

The RPC defines and penalizes the crime of robbery as follows:

Article 293. Who are guilty of robbery.  - Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any
personal property belonging to another, by means of violence or intimidation of any person, or using
force upon anything shall be guilty of robbery.
Article 295. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties.  - Any person guilty
of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed.

Parenthetically, to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the RPC, the
prosecution must prove the existence of the following elements, namely, (i) "the taking of personal
property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (ii) the property taken belongs
to another; (iii) the taking is [with] animo lucrandi;  and (iv) by reason of the robbery or on the
occasion thereof, homicide is committed."44

Notably, the phrase "by reason of the robbery," covers a situation where the killing of the person is
committed either before or after the taking of personal property.45 It is imperative to establish that
"the intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or
after the robbery."46 Remarkably, homicide is said to be committed: (i) "to facilitate the robbery or
the escape of the culprit; (ii) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (iii) to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (iv) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the
crime."47 Thus, a conviction for robbery with homicide requires certitude that the robbery is the main
purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the
robbery.48 Consequently, once it has been established with certainty that a person was killed on the
occasion of the robbery, the accused may be convicted of robbery with homicide.

It is equally important to note that a conviction for robbery with homicide need not be proven solely
through direct evidence of the malefactor's culpability. Rather, the offender's guilt may likewise be
proven through circumstantial evidence, as long as the following requisites are present: (i) there
must be more than one circumstance; (ii) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (iii) the
combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the
accused.49 Imperatively, all the circumstances taken together must form an unbroken chain of events
leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as
the author of the crime.50 To rule otherwise, would lead to the pernicious situation wherein felons
would be set free to the detriment of the judicial system, and thereby cause danger to the
community.51

In the case at bar, the circumstances surrounding the fateful day of August 28, 2002, when the
victim was robbed and killed, lead to an unbroken chain of facts, which establish beyond reasonable
doubt the accused-appellants' culpability, to wit:

i. At 10:39 p.m. of August 28, 2002, security guard Caporado saw Moeller pass through Gate 1
of Corinthian Gardens Subdivision in his Nissan Sentra. Moeller was accompanied by Aquino,
who Caporado recognized and identified in open court.
ii. The Nissan Sentra was trailed by the R&E taxi driven by Advincula.
iii. Caporado recognized Cariño as the passenger of the taxi.
iv. Advincula, the driver of the taxi, confirmed that Cariño was his passenger. He testified that he
dropped off Cariño at the house of a foreigner in Corinthian Gardens Subdivision.
v. Moeller's Nissan Sentra was seen to have exited Gate 4 of Corinthian Gardens Subdivision at
around 12:00 midnight on August 29, 2002.
vi. In the morning of August 29, 2002, Taro, the victim's housemaid, found the latter at the
backyard of his home, lifeless.
vii. A dumbbell was found near the body of the victim.
viii. The Medico-Legal Report showed that Moeller died due to intra-cranial hemorrhage, which was
caused by a blow inflicted using a hard and blunt object.
ix. During their arrest, Cariño and Aquino were caught in possession of a camera, video camera
and charger.
x. Taro confirmed that the said items belonged to Moeller.
 xi. Cariño admitted to the police officers that the Nissan Sentra was in Isabela. True enough, the
said vehicle was recovered in the said location.
xii. SPO4 Jeresano testified that the accused-appellants admitted that the Nissan Sentra belonged
to Moeller.
xiii. Aquino even surrendered the keys of the Nissan Sentra to the police.

The fact that the accused-appellants were the last persons seen with Moeller prior to his demise was
clearly confirmed through the testimony of the prosecution witnesses Caporado and Advincula.

Moreover, the accused-appellants' unexplained possession of the stolen articles gave rise to the
presumption that they were the taker and the doer of the robbery.52 This presumption applies
considering that (i) the property was stolen; (ii) the crime was committed recently; (iii) the stolen
property was found in their possession; and (iv) they were unable to explain their possession
satisfactorily.53 It must be noted that during their arrest, the police officers found Moeller's camera,
video camera and charger in their hideout. They were unable to offer any satisfactory and believable
explanation justifying their possession of the subject articles. All that they did to rebut this
presumption was to question the ownership of the said articles. This defense fails considering that
Taro identified the said items and confirmed that they indeed belonged to Moeller. Her familiarity
with the said items cannot be doubted considering that she was the personal maid of the victim for
several years, and had cleaned the said items on a regular basis.

The accused-appellants are also

Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt
for the Crime of Simple Carnapping

Carnapping is defined and penalized under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972, as amended, as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using
force upon things."

Notably, the elements of carnapping are: (i) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another;
(ii) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or by using force upon things; and (iii) the taking is done with intent to gain. Essentially,
carnapping is the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle.54

Significantly, the taking of the motor vehicle is deemed complete from the moment the offender
gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.55 The intent to
gain or the animus lucrandi, being an internal act, is presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor
vehicle.56 Notably, " [a]ctual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to
gain."57 Likewise, the term gain is not limited to a pecuniary benefit, but also includes the benefit
which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the
mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner's consent already constitutes gain.58

In the case at bar, the prosecution proved the existence of all the elements of carnapping beyond
reasonable doubt. The Nissan Sentra, which was owned by Moeller, was stolen by the accused-
appellants from the victim's house, and brought to Isabela. To eradicate all traces of its previous
ownership, the accused-appellants even changed the vehicle's plate number. However, despite their
attempt to conceal their crime, the police discovered that the retrieved vehicle bore the same engine
and chassis number as the victim's stolen vehicle.

Likewise, the police found the stolen vehicle in Isabela, no less from the information supplanted by
Cariño himself. Certainly, Cariño's knowledge about the vehicle's exact location shows his complicity
in its taking. Added to this, Cariño was in possession of the car keys, which he surrendered to the
police.
The accused-appellants Conspired
and Confederated with Each Other
to Commit the Said Crimes.

It becomes all too apparent that all the interwoven circumstances form a chain of events that lead to
the inescapable conclusion that the accused-appellants robbed and killed Moeller, and took his Nissan
Sentra. It is evident that the accused-appellants conspired and confederated with each other to
commit the said horrid crimes.

It bears stressing that direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not indispensable in
conspiracy. Rather, conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint purpose
and design.59 Undoubtedly, from the moment the accused-appellants met in Ortigas, went to
Moeller's home, took his valuables and car, up to the time when they were both arrested in
possession of the said valuables, lead to no other conclusion than that they hatched a criminal
scheme, synchronized their acts for unity in its execution, and aided each other for its
consummation. Consequently, once a conspiracy has been established, the act of one malefactor, is
the act of all.60

The Defenses of Denial and Alibi

are Weak and Easily Crumble
Against the Positive Identification
Made by Reliable and Credible
Witnesses

In seeking exoneration from the charges filed against them, the accused-appellants interpose the
defenses of denial and alibi.

The Court is not convinced.

Time and again, the Court has consistently ruled that a denial and alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the assailants made by a credible witness.61 In fact, a denial is often viewed
with disfavor especially if it is uncorroborated.62 Also, an alibi will only prosper, if the accused can
show that it was physically impossible for him/her to be at the scene of the crime.63 Thus, as between
the categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on the one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on
the other, the former is generally held to prevail.64

This said, the accused-appellants' defenses of denial and alibi falter in light of the positive
identifications made by Caporado and Advincula, who saw them at the house of Moeller on the night
that the latter was killed. It bears noting that Caporado confirmed that he saw Aquino riding with
Moeller in his Nissan Sentra on the fateful night of August 28, 2002. Similarly, Caporado confirmed
that he saw Cariño on board the taxi that trailed the Nissan Sentra. There was no reason for
Caporado, a disinterested witness, to falsely testify against the accused-appellants.

Equally telling is the fact that Advincula corroborated Caporado's testimony, by affirming that he
dropped off Cariño at the victim's home in Corinthian Gardens Subdivision. In fact, Advincula related
that the driver of the Nissan Sentra was a foreigner, which fit the description of the victim.

Moreover, the Court finds that Cariño lied about not knowing the victim. Taro affirmed on the witness
stand that she saw Cariño one month before the victim's death, at the latter's home.65 This fact is
significant because it established the relationship between Cariño and the victim, which the former
denied. Clearly, Cariño's denial is nothing but a vain attempt to exculpate himself from liability.

All told, there was no reason for the prosecution witnesses to lie and falsely testify against the
accused-appellants. Hence, absent any proof of ill-motive on their part, there can be no doubt that
their testimonies certainly bear the earmarks of truth and candor.

The Penalty for Robbery with Homicide

The trial court correctly sentenced the accused-appellants with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua,  pursuant to Article 294, paragraph 1 of the RPC,66 for their crime of robbery with homicide.

As for the amount of damages imposed, the Court affirms the awards of civil indemnity of Php
75,000.00, and moral damages of Php 75,000.00.67 The Court likewise agrees that the victim's heirs
should be awarded temperate damages of Php 50,000.00. Temperate damages may be recovered
when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but definite proof of its amount was not presented in
court.68

However, the Court finds that the CA erred in deleting the award of exemplary damages.
Remarkably, exemplary damages should be granted as a punishment for the reprehensible act
committed against the victim. This is in consonance with the Court's ruling in People v.
Jugueta,69 where exemplary damages worth to Php 75,000.00 was awarded to the victim's heirs.

The Penalty for Carnapping

R.A. No. 6539, as amended by Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659, provides the penalties for carnapping, as
follows:

SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken,
be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not
more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things, and by
imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,
when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or intimidation of any person, or force upon
things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)

It must be noted that the Information charging the accused-appellants with carnapping under R.A.
No. 6539, as amended, failed to allege that the carnapping was committed by means of violence
against, or intimidation of, any person, or force upon things. While these circumstances were proven
at the trial, they cannot be appreciated because they were not alleged in the Information. Hence,
pursuant to the strict constitutional mandate that an accused must always be informed of the nature
and the cause of the accusation against him,70 the accused-appellants may only be convicted of
simple carnapping. Accordingly, the CA was correct in modifying the maximum sentence of life
imprisonment originally imposed by the RTC, and reducing the same to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum. This term of
imprisonment imposed by the CA is likewise in consonance with Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law which ordains that if the offense committed is punishable by a special law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty expressed at a range whose maximum term
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the special law, and the minimum term not be less than the
minimum prescribed.71

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of

merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated September 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 06217, convicting accused-appellants Renato Cariño y Gocong and Alvin Aquino y Ragam of
the crimes of Robbery with Homicide, and Carnapping, are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case No. Q-02-111947 for Robbery with Homicide, the accused-
appellants are ordered to pay exemplary damages worth Php 75,000.00 to the heirs of victim Mirko
Moeller. All the amounts due shall earn a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this ruling until the full satisfaction thereof. The assailed decision is affirmed in all other
respects.
 25.) G.R. No. 223833, December 11, 2017

JOSHUA CASANAS Y CABANTAC A.K.A. JOSHUA

GERONIMO Y LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated July 28, 2015 and the
Resolution3 dated January 11, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35835, which
affirmed the Decision4 dated May 15, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 269
(RTC-Valenzuela) in Criminal Case No. 874-V-12 finding petitioner Joshua Casanas y  Cabantac,
a.k.a. Joshua Geronimo y Lopez (Casanas) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Carnapping, defined and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6539, otherwise known
as the "Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972," as amended.

The Facts

On August 22, 2012, an Information5 was filed before the RTC Valenzuela charging Casanas of the
crime of Carnapping, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about August 12, 2012, in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take and carry away with him one (1) Racal motorcycle with plate number 7539IJ without
the consent of its owner CHRISTOPHER CALDERON y DORIGON, to the damage and prejudice of the
said complainant.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

The prosecution alleged that at around 9 o'clock in the evening of August 14, 2012, private
complainant Christopher Calderon (Calderon) was about to go inside the public market in Marilao,
Bulacan when a passenger arrived and wanted to ride his tricycle, made up of a Racal motorcycle
with plate number 7539IJ (subject motorcycle) and a sidecar.7 Casanas volunteered to drive
Calderon's tricycle for the passenger, to which Calderon obliged. However, Casanas no longer
returned the tricycle to Calderon, prompting the latter to report the incident to police authorities in
the afternoon of the next day.8

A few days later, or on August 19, 2012, the Valenzuela Police Station received a report that a
suspected stolen motorcycle was being sold in Karuhatan, Valenzuela City.9 When Police Officer 2
Harvy Arañas (PO2 Arañas) and Police Officer 1 Elbern Chad De Leon (PO1 De Leon) responded to
the report, they saw a man, later on identified as Casanas, standing beside what turned out to be the
subject motorcycle.10 The police officers introduced themselves to Casanas and asked for proof of
ownership of the motorcycle, but Casanas could not provide any. PO1 De Leon then frisked Casanas
and found a knife in the latter's possession.11 Thereafter, they brought Casanas, the subject
motorcycle, and the knife to the police station. Upon further investigation, the police officers
discovered that the subject motorcycle was registered under Calderon's name. The next day,
Calderon went to the police station and recovered the subject motorcycle.12

For his part, while Casanas admitted that Calderon owned the subject motorcycle, he denied stealing
the same. He averred that he only borrowed the subject motorcycle on August 18, 2012, but he was
unable to return it on that date as he had a drinking session with his friends.13 The next day, he was
on his way home onboard the subject motorcycle when policemen blocked his way and forcibly took
him to the police station. Thereat, a police officer purportedly took a knife from his drawer, which led
petitioner to believe that he was being investigated and detained because of the said knife.14

The RTC-Valenzuela Ruling

In a Decision15 dated May 15, 2013, the RTC-Valenzuela found Casanas guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
the indeterminate period of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to fifteen (15)
years, as maximum.16

The RTC-Valenzuela held that the prosecution had established all the elements of the crime charged,
considering that: (a) Calderon allowed petitioner to drive the subject motorcycle, which was then
attached to a sidecar; (b) Casanas did not return the subject motorcycle within the agreed period;
and (c) Casanas continued to use the same for his personal use, thereby exhibiting his intent to gain.
In this regard, the RTC-Valenzuela ruled that while Casanas's possession of the subject motorcycle
was lawful in the beginning, such possession became unlawful when he failed to return the same to
Calderon in accordance with their agreement.17

Aggrieved, Casanas appealed 18 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision19 dated July 28, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC Valenzuela ruling in toto. Aside from
upholding the RTC-Valenzuela's findings, the CA likewise pointed out that initially, Casanas borrowed
a tricycle from Calderon; but when he was apprehended, only the subject motorcycle without the
sidecar was recovered from him.20 In this regard, the CA ruled that such removal of the sidecar from
the subject motorcycle bolsters the conclusion that Casanas indeed intended to appropriate for
himself the subject motorcycle. Further, the CA disregarded Casanas's excuses for failing to return
the subject motorcycle on time, as he did not bother to get in touch with Calderon either to ask
permission for an extended possession of the subject motorcycle, or for assistance when the police
officer apprehended him for being unable to present the motorcycle's registration papers.21

Undaunted, Casanas moved for reconsideration22 but the same was denied in a Resolution23 dated
January 11, 2016; hence, this petition.24

The Issues Before the Court

The issues for the Court's resolution are whether or not: (a) the RTC-Valenzuela had jurisdiction over
the case; and (b) the CA correctly upheld Casanas's conviction for the crime of Carnapping.

The Court's Ruling

In the petition, Casanas primarily argues that the RTC-Valenzuela had no jurisdiction over the case,
as the alleged carnapping happened in Marilao, Bulacan, and not in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila
where he was arrested, charged, and tried.25 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General
maintains that Casanas is already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC-Valenzuela
as he not only failed to move for the quashal of the Information based on such ground, he also
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC-Valenzuela by freely participating in the
trial of the instant case.26

The petition is meritorious.

Time and again, it has been held that "the jurisdiction of a court may be questioned at any stage of
the proceedings. Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a
claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of
those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. So that,
whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be
dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final judgment.
Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let
alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside."27

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional in that a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory.28 As such, when it becomes apparent
that the crime was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, the case must be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.29 In Navaja v. De Castro,30 the Court held:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the

offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.31 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In this relation, Sections 10 and 15 (a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
also state that:

Section 10. Place of commission of the offense.- The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be
understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was
committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its
identification.

xxxx

Section 15. Place where action is to be instituted. -

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred.

The venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases shall be placed either where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential ingredients took place. Otherwise stated, the venue of action
and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was
committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court.32

In this case, the Information33 alleges that Casanas committed the crime of Carnapping within the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Valenzuela. However, such allegation in the Information was belied
by the evidence presented by the prosecution, particularly, Calderon's own statements in
the Sinumpaang Salaysay34 dated August 21, 2012 he executed before the Valenzuela City Police
Station as well as his testimony during trial. Pertinent portions of the Sinumpaang Salaysay read:

TANONG: Bago ang lahat ay maari mo bang sabihin sa akin ang iyong tunay na pangalan at iba pang
mapapagkakilanlan sa iyong tunay na pagkatao?
SAGOT: Ako po si Christopher Calderon y Doligon, 25 taong gulang, may-asawa, tricycle driver,
nakatira sa B3 L5 Northville 4B Lamabakin, Marilao, Bulacan.
T: Bakit ka naririto ngayon sa aming tanggapan at nagbibigay ng salaysay?
S: Para po magsampa ng demanda.

T: Sino naman ang idedemanda mo?

S: Siya po. (At this juncture, affiant is pointing to [a] male person who when asked replied as Joshua
Casanas y Cabantac, 21 years old, tricycle driver, of Manzano Subdivision, Ibayo, Marilao, Bulacan)

T: Kailan at saan naman ninakaw nitong si Joshua ang tricycle mo?

S: Noon pong ika 14 ng Agosto 2012 sa ganap ng ika 9:00 ng gabi sa palengke ng Marilao,
Bulacan.

T: Sa ikaliliwanag ng pagsisiyasat na ito, maari mo bang isalaysay ang tunay na pangyayari?

S: Bale ganito po kasi iyon, sa oras, lugar at petsa na nabanggit ko sa itaas ay bumili ako ng ulam sa
loob ng palengke, nakaparada ang tricycle ko sa labas ng palengke. Nilapitan ako ni Joshua at
hiniram sa akin ang susi ng aking tricycle at sinabi na mayroon daw sasakay kaya ang ginawa ko ay
ipinahiram ko sa kanya at umalis na siya at magmula noon ay hindi na siya muling bumalik dala ang
aking tricycle.

T: Ano ang ginawa mo pagkatapos kung meron man?

S: Hinanap ko po siya at nang hindi ko na siya makita sa lugar narnin ay nagreport ako sa himpilan
ng pulisya sa Marilao, Bulacan kung saan naiblotter ang pangyayari.35 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

During his direct examination, Calderon similarly stated:

Q: Do you still remember where you were on August 14, 2012 at around 9:00 in the evening?
A: In a market.

Q: In what market where (sic) you then?

A: Marilao, sir.

Q: What happened when you were in Marilao?

A: I was about to go to the market to buy something.

Q: What happened next when you were at the market to buy something?
A: There is a passenger.

Q: Who is that passenger?

A: About to board the tricycle.

Q: What happened next when the passenger was about to board the tricycle?
A: I lend the key of my motorcycle.

Q: To whom did you lend the key of your motorcycle?

A: To Joshua, sir.

Q: Could you tell us the full name of this Joshua?

A: Joshua Casanas.

Q: If this Joshua Casanas to whom you lend the key of your motorcycle would be shown to you,
would you be able to identify Joshua?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Could you please point to this Joshua?

A: Him, sir.
xxxx

Q: What happened next after you lend the key to Joshua Casanas?
A: I waited for him, sir.

Q: Where did you wait?

A: In the market, sir.

Q: What happened next when you were waiting for Joshua Casanas in the same market?
A: He did not return, sir.

Q: How long did you wait?

A: The whole night, sir.

Q: When Joshua did not return anymore, what did you do next?
A: The following day in the afternoon I went to the city hall.

Q: Of what town or city did you go to?

A: Marilao, sir.

Q: What happened when you went to the City Hall of Marilao?

A: I gave a statement, sir.36 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

From the foregoing, it is evident that the crime of Carnapping, including all the elements thereof -
namely, that: (a) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (b) the vehicle belongs to a person other
than the offender himself; (c) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or that the
taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things; and (d) the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle37 - did not occur in
Valenzuela City, but in Marilao, Bulacan. While the Court notes that Casanas was indeed arrested in
Valenzuela City while in the possession of the subject motorcycle, the same is of no moment, not
only because such is not an element of the crime, but more importantly, at that point in time, the
crime had long been consummated. Case law provides that '"unlawful taking' or  apoderamiento is the
taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. It is deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the
same."38

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the RTC-Valenzuela had no authority to take cognizance of
the instant case as the crime was committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, the
RTC-Valenzuela ruling convicting Casanas of the crime charged, as well as the CA ruling upholding
the same, is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that "where there is want of
jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal
effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no right can be obtained, which
neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out are
void. It is not a decision in contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become executory. It also
follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res
judicata,"39 as in this case.

In fine, Criminal Case No. 874-V-12 is hereby dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The
dismissal of this case, however, shall not preclude the re-filing of the same criminal case against
Casanas before the proper tribunal which has territorial jurisdiction over the same,  i.e., the courts in
Marilao, Bulacan.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 28, 2015 and the Resolution dated
January 11, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35835 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, Criminal Case No. 874-V-12 filed in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch
269 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its re-filing in the proper
court having territorial jurisdiction over the case.
 26.) G.R. No. 172193, September 13, 2017

CELERINO CHUA ALIAS SUNTAY, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The violence against or intimidation of persons perpetrated by the accused to commit a robbery
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code renders the accused also liable for carnapping committed
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons as defined and punished by Section 14 of
Republic Act 6539 involving the taking of a vehicle to transport the stolen goods.

The Case

Celerino Chua alias Suntay (Chua) seeks to reverse the decision promulgated on October 20,
2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his convictions for carnapping in violation of
Republic Act 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) and for robbery as defined and punished by Article
294(5) of the Revised Penal Code handed down by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, in Malolos,
Bulacan (RTC) through its decision of September 25, 2002.2

Antecedents

On January 25, 1994, Chua, along with Leonardo Reyes alias Leo and Arnold Lato y
Baniel alias Arnold or Rodel, was charged in Criminal Case No. 397-M-94 of the RTC with the crime of
carnapping under the information alleging as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of October, 1993, in the municipality of Bocaue, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry
away with them one owner type jeep (stainless) bearing Plate No. CFC-327, belonging to Sps.
Reynaldo Ravago and Teresa Ravago, to the damage and prejudice of the said owners in the amount
of P170,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On January 27, 1994, the same accused were charged with robbery under the information filed in
Criminal Case No. 428-M-94, to wit:
That on or about the 24th day of October, 1993 in the municipality of Bocaue, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of force and intimidation, take, rob and carry away with
them the following, to wit:
one (1) colored TV set (Sony)--------------- P 15,000.00  
one (1) TV set B & W (Hitachi/Union)--- P 5,000.00  
two (2) Betamax (Sony)---------------------- P 18,000.00  
one (1) VHS record (Toshiba)-------------- P 12,000.00  
one (1) Sansui compact disc---------------- P 25,000.00  
assorted jewelries (sic)------------------------- P 30,000.00  
six (6) pcs. of assorted wristwatches----- P 10,000.00  
 cash----------------------------------------------- P 7,000.00  
TOTAL P122,000.00  
belonging to Sps. Reynaldo Ravago and Theresa Ravago, to the damage and prejudice of the said
spouses in the total amount of P122,000.00; and by reason of and on the occasion of the commission
of the said robbery, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating together and helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with bladed
instrument, said Reynaldo E. Ravago thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which
required medical attendance and incapacitated him from his customary labor for a period of not more
than thirty (30) days.4
Reyes and Lato remained at large; hence, only Chua was arraigned and tried for the crimes.

The CA synthesized the procedural and factual antecedents adduced by the Prosecution and the
Defense as follows:
The prosecution presented eight (8) witnesses, namely: Teresa Legaspi-Ravago, Reynaldo Ravago,
Valentina Legaspi, Juanito Olivario, Gerry Ormesa, Moises Legaspi, Jessie Tugas and John Laguidao.

The facts established by prosecution witness Teresa Ravago as follows:

On October 24, 1993 at around 2:50 o'clock in the morning, Teresa Legaspi-Ravago, accompanied by
a helper, was about to leave for work at the Maymart Market in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Upon opening
the door, she was immediately pushed inside the house by accused Arnold Lato. Lato was followed by
accused Leonardo Reyes. Arnold tied the hands of Teresa and the helper with straw. Leonardo on the
other hand went to the master's bedroom where Reynaldo was sleeping. Reynaldo was stabbed four
times but was able to run to the bathroom and lock himself in.

The accused demanded jewelry and cash that the Ravagos earned as broker's commission from the
sale of a fishpond. The two robbers wore stockings on the head to conceal their identities. Teresa was
able to recognize the face of Arnold when the latter removed the stocking off his face as he searched
for jewelry.

Said two (2) accused carted off their television sets, Sony Betamax sets, Karaoke, compact disc,
assorted pieces of jewelry, VHS player and cash. The said stolen items were loaded in a stainless
owner type jeep registered in the name of Teresa's mother, Valentina Legaspi, but given to the
private complainants in 1990.

The robbery was immediately reported to the Bocaue Police Station. In the course of the
investigation, Teresa was able to identify Arnold through photographs shown to her.

The robbers were later on identified as Arnold Lato and Leonardo Reyes. Arnold Lato was about her
height, 5'2", dark and had earring on his right ear. The other, Leonardo Reyes, was 5'7" or 5'8", fair
complexioned, thin and lanky. Both accused who were still at large were workers of Gerry Ormesa.
Appellant Chua referred both accused to Gerry Ormesa. The straw ropes that were used to tie Teresa
and her helper were being used by Arnold and Leo in their work. The built and height of the accused
as described by Teresa fit the description of aforenamed workers of Gerry Ormesa. The clothes the
robbers wore as described by Teresa were recognized by their employer Gerry as among those few
clothings his two workers owned. Arnold and Leonardo stopped working after the October 24
incident. They left without waiting to receive the salaries due them.

Prior to the incident appellant Celerino Chua, together with his legitimate family resided about twenty
(20) meters away from complainants' house. After the incident, they left. Before Chua went into
hiding he wrote the Ravagos to keep quiet about the incident, otherwise, harm would befall their
family.

A couple from the place where the appellant resided gave information that the jeep was brought by
the appellant Chua to Bani, Pangasinan. The jeep was recovered at Jessie Tugas' motor shop in
Pangasinan. Appellant Chua and his live-in partner then resided in a nipa hut near the motor shop
from November to December 1993. One Betamax unit was recovered in the nipa hut where appellant
Chua and his girlfriend stayed.

Appellant Chua told Tugas that he is the owner of the jeep. Chua approached John Alden Laguidao, a
friend of Tugas, who agreed to purchase the vehicle for Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).
Laguidao made a partial payment of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) on the condition that the
balance shall be paid upon the presentation of the certificate of registration.

Teresa was shocked by the incident. She was unable to return to work for sometime because of fear
to step outside in the morning. She even received threats. She left the amount of damages to the
discretion of the court.

Reynaldo Ravago corroborated Teresa's testimony. He added that he was stabbed four (4) times by
the taller malefactor. He (Reynaldo) ran to the bathroom and locked himself in to avoid further harm.
He heard the two robbers asking for their jewelry and cash which they earned as commission from
the sale of a fishpond which they brokered. Appellant Celerino Chua knew of said transaction.
Reynaldo stayed inside the bathroom for as long as the two (2) robbers had not yet left. After
Reynaldo's wife opened the bathroom door, he was brought for treatment to Yanga Clinic. He was
confined for five (5) days. He incurred expenses of about P17,000.00.

They were able to recover the vehicle in Jessie Tugas' shop in Bani, Pangasinan. It had already been
sold to one John Aldrin Laguidao for P40,000.00. He saw the terms of the sale on a yellow pad which
showed the seller to be Celerino Chua and one Meann (Chua's live-in partner). Pictures of the vehicle
already dismantled (Exhibits "J", "J-1" to "J-19") and taken in Jessie's shop were presented. An
inventory of the jeep's parts (Exhibits "M", and "M-1") were offered. Picture (Exhibit "J-13") of the
nipa hut where Chua and MeAnn stayed was taken. The Betamax, among those stolen from the
Ravagos, was recovered from the same nipa hut where Chua and his companion stayed.

Valentina Legaspi, Teresa's mother, confirmed that the jeep, although registered in her name, was
given to the spouses Ravago in 1991.

Juanita Olivario, the husband of Reynaldo Ravago's sister, accompanied Reynaldo to Bani,
Pangasinan. They went first to the police station and requested for an escort to the shop of Jessie
Tugas. Laguidao, the buyer of the jeep, was no longer in Bani. Reynaldo requested for a copy of the
deed of sale between Chua and Laguidao. They were told it was missing.

Gerry Ormesa identified Celerino Chua in court. Chua is his sister's compadre. He identified the straw
ropes to belong to him but used by the two accused, Arnold and Leo, in their work. He also admitted
that the clothes shown him belonged to the two (2) accused.

Moises Legaspi, Teresa's father, identified the pictures of the subject vehicle (Exhibit "J", "J-1" to "J-
16").

Jessie Tugas, a resident of Bani, Pangasinan, identified Chua in court. He came to know him when
introduced by a nephew. He had an auto repair shop then. Chua was with MeAnn and two (2) men.
He admitted that the jeep in question was repaired in his shop. Chua represented that he owned the
jeep. He was offering it for sale. A "For Sale" sign was even posted at the back of the jeep. Tugas
identified the pictures of the jeep (Exhibits "J", "J-1" to "J-16"). He also admitted that the picture
(Exhibit "J-13") showed the nipa hut where Chua, MeAnn and his nephew stayed. Laguidao, his
brother-in-law, bought the jeep. Laguidao gave a down payment of P20,000.00. Before the balance
was paid, Reynaldo Ravago came to recover the vehicle.

John Laguidao identified Celerino Chua in court. He identified the pictures of the jeep. It was sold to
him. Before he could pay the balance in full, the real owner came and showed him the certificate of
registration. Upon verification of the chassis and engine numbers, the owner took the vehicle.
Laguidao's receipt for the transaction could not be located anymore.

The accused thereafter presented defense evidence.

Accused Celerino Chua testified that he has no knowledge about the charges against him. He did not
know personally the other accused, Leonardo and Arnold. He drove part time for Reynaldo. In the
early morning of October 24, 1993, he agreed to drive for Reynaldo but the vehicle he was supposed
to drive was under repair. He went home and drove a passenger jeep instead. He started at 9:00
o'clock in the morning and went home at 6:00 o'clock in the evening. He proceeded to Sapang Palay,
San Jose del Monte where he had a live-in partner, Mary-Ann Rodrigesa. He learned that the house
of Reynaldo Ravago was robbed when the policemen came to Sapang Palay to ask him questions. He
hid in Malolos because he was afraid that he might be killed. He also denied knowing John Laguidao
and Jessie Tugas. He hid in his father's house in Malolos, Bulacan for three (3) years. He had not
been to Bani, Pangasinan.

A barriomate and childhood playmate, Manuel Calumpang, testified in behalf of appellant Chua.
Sometime in 1994, upon a chance meeting with the appellant, he heard two (2) persons talking to
the former threatening him not to point to them otherwise he and his family would be killed. He was
also told by the appellant that he had a case. Of the two who made the threats, one was short and
the other was tall.5
Ruling of the RTC

As stated, the RTC convicted Chua for the crimes charged, decreeing:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, finding accused CELERINO CHUA alias SUNTAY guilty
under Criminal Case No. 397- M-94 for violation of Republic Act 6539 otherwise known as the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of fourteen
years (14) and eight (8) months as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as
maximum.

Further, finding accused CELERINO CHUA alias SUNTAY guilty in Criminal Case No. 428-M-94 for
Robbery under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty
of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to eight (8) years
and twenty one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum and to indemnify the complainants Spouses
Teresa Ravago and Reynaldo Ravago the amount of Php One Hundred Thirteen Thousand (less the
value of (1) recovered Betamax Sony).

With accused preventive imprisonment credited in his favor.

Accused Celerino Chua is likewise directed to pay complainant Teresa Ravago the amount of Php Two
Hundred Thousand as and for actual damages.

Costs against accused CELERINO CHUA.

Let the records of the case be sent to archive as against accused LEONARDO REYES alias "LEO" and
ARNOLD LATO y BANIEL @ Arnold or Rodel who are still at large.

SO ORDERED.6
Decision of the CA

On appeal, Chua contended that the RTC had erred:

I

xxx IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

II
xxx IN RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.7
On October 20, 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed decision affirming the findings and
conclusions of the RTC, pertinently observing:
Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not only the matrix from which a trial court may
draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is like a rope composed of many
strands and cords one strand might be insufficient, but five together may suffice to give it strength.

The requisite of circumstantial evidence to be sufficient basis for conviction are: (a) There is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstance is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

This Court is convinced that the three (3) accused conspired to commit the crime. The circumstances
before, during and after the incident point to the appellant as the mastermind. Direct proof is not
essential to the establishment of conspiracy, as it may be inferred from the acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime.

The circumstances in this case that point to appellant Chua as the mastermind are:

First, the day before the incident, Reynaldo Ravago told his compadre about the broker's commission
he received in the sale of a fishpond. Appellant Chua eavesdropped and intently listened to the
conversation.

Second, on the day of the robbery, Leonardo and Arnold, the two (2) other accused, asked for the
said broker's commission. Only Celerino Chua could have told Arnold and Leo About said commission.

Third, subsequent to the commission of the crime, Celerino Chua disappeared. He left the place
where he stayed. He hid in his father's house in Malolos Bulacan. Flight in jurisprudence has always
been a strong indication of guilt, betraying a desire to evade responsibility.

Fourth is the sale of the owner type jeep. The seller was Celerino Chua. Both Jessie Tugas and John
Laguidao categorically identified him as the person who sold and received the partial payment for the
vehicle. During the recovery of the vehicle, another stolen item, the Betamax, was found in the place
where Chua and his live-in partner had stayed. A disputable presumption exists that a person found
in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act. Appellants offered no evidence to overcome or contradict such presumption.

It is also noted by this Court that appellant denied any knowledge in the commission of the crime as
well as the fact that he knows the other accused. However, it was testified that appellant Chua was
the one who referred Leonardo and Arnold to their employer. Being evidence that is negative and
self-serving in nature, disavowals cannot secure more worthiness than the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who testified on clear and positive evidence.

Furthermore, the defense of the accused is alibi and denial. Alibi and denial are intrinsically weak
absent material evidence of nonculpability.

The defense also failed to prove any reason for the filing of a case against the appellant. Settled is
the doctrine that when there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a
prosecution would testify falsely against the accused or implicate him in a serious offense the
testimony deserves full faith and credit.

A judgment of conviction by the lower court is upheld on the basis of the circumstantial evidence that
constitutes an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the defendant is
guilty.
This Court affirms the conviction of Celerino Chua in Criminal Case No. 397-M-94 without
modification of the penalty imposed by the trial court.8
The CA modified the penalty meted on Chua for the robbery stating thusly:
However, this Court finds the penalty in Criminal Case No. 428- M-94 for Robbery under Article
294(5) of the Revised Penal Code inaccurate. Though this Court agrees with the trial court that there
was no evidence that Celerino Chua was part of any plan to inflict physical injury in the course of the
robbery which justified imposition of the penalty under paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, yet, the penalty actually imposed was not accurate.

Since there is no mitigating and aggravating circumstance, the maximum penalty should have
been prision mayor in its minimum period and the minimum penalty should have been the penalty
next lower prescribed by the code. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty is left to the sound
discretion of the court, to fix from within the range of the penalty next lower without reference to the
periods into which it may be subdivided.9
The CA then accordingly disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The decision of Branch 81 of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 397-M-94 is AFFIRMED in toto.

Conviction in Criminal Case No. 428-M-94 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant

Chua is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of Four (4) years and Two (2) months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Eight (8) years of Prision Mayor as maximum.

Preventive imprisonment is credit(ed) in favor of the accused. Accused Celerino Chua is likewise
directed to pay complainant Teresa Ravago the amount of Php Two Hundred Thousand for actual
damages.

Costs against accused Celerino Chua.

SO ORDERED.10
Issue

In his petition, Chua submits that the CA committed reversible errors in finding the existence of a
conspiracy between him and the two other accused despite the failure of the State to establish his
actual participation in the commission of the crimes charged; in finding him guilty of the crimes
charged despite the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence; and in holding him guilty as a
principal in the commission of the crimes charged even assuming that he had sold the motor vehicle
of the victims and that the betamax machine had been found in his place.

Was Chua's guilt for robbery and carnapping established beyond reasonable doubt?

Ruling of the Court

The Court UPHOLDS the decision of the CA.

1.
The State presented sufficient and reliable circumstantial evidence to establish the guilt of
Chua beyond reasonable doubt for robbery and carnapping, as charged

Direct evidence was not the sole means of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The lack or absence of direct evidence putting the accused at or near the scene of robbery
and carnapping at the time of their commission did not necessarily mean that his guilt could not be
proved by evidence other than direct evidence. Conviction could also rest purely on circumstantial
evidence, which is that evidence that proves a fact or series of facts from which the fact in issue may
be established by inference. Circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, could supplant the lack or absence
of direct evidence. It may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would ultimately lead to
setting felons free.11

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides when circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if the conditions enumerated therein are shown to exist, to wit:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
With respect to the third requisite, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must
constitute an unbroken chain that leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.12

Circumstances that fully warranted the inference of Chua's having been the mastermind in the
commission of the carnapping and the robbery incriminated him beyond reasonable doubt in the
crimes for which he was convicted. It is relevant to note that the CA listed the several circumstances
that, taken together, proved the complicity of Chua in the robbery and carnapping, as follows:
First, the day before the incident, Reynaldo Ravago told his compadre about the broker's commission
he received in the sale of a fishpond. Appellant Chua eavesdropped and intently listened to the
conversation.

Second, on the day of the robbery, Leonardo and Arnold, the two (2) other accused, asked for the
said broker's commission. Only Celerino Chua could have told Arnold and Leo About said commission.

Third, subsequent to the commission of the crime, Celerino Chua disappeared. He left the place
where he stayed. He hid in his father's house in Malolos Bulacan. Flight in jurisprudence has always
been a strong indication of guilt, betraying a desire to evade responsibility.

Fourth is the sale of the owner type jeep. The seller was Celerino Chua. Both Jessie Tugas and John
Laguidao categorically identified him as the person who sold and received the partial payment for the
vehicle.

During the recovery of the vehicle, another stolen item, the Betamax, was found in the place where
Chua and his live-in partner had stayed. A disputable presumption exists that a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act. Appellants offered no evidence to overcome or contradict such presumption.

It is also noted by this Court that appellant denied any knowledge in the commission of the crime as
well as the fact that he knows the other accused. However, it was testified that appellant Chua was
the one who referred Leonardo and Arnold to their employer. Being evidence that is negative and
self-serving in nature, disavowals cannot secure more worthiness than the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who testified on clear and positive evidence.13
Chua's complicity in the commission of robbery and carnapping is beyond dispute. It was he who had
earlier referred his co-accused Lato and Reyes to Gerry Ormesa for purposes of employing them. But
Lato and Reyes stopped working for Ormesa immediately after the commission of the crimes on
October 24, 1993, and left even without receiving the salaries due to them. After the commission of
the crimes, Chua himself, along with his common-law spouse, left his residence in the neighborhood
where the house of complainant Reynaldo Ravago was (being only about 20 meters away from the
latter's residence). Before he transferred, however, he warned Ravago to keep quiet about the
robbery, or else harm would befall him and his family. Chua was also the person who later on sold
the vehicle subject of the carnapping for P40,000.00 to one John Alden Laguidao who partially paid
him P20,000.00 with the balance of P20,000.00 to be given upon Chua's presentation of the
certificate of registration. In the meantime, Ravago learned from a couple who were residing in the
place where Chua had transferred that the latter had brought the vehicle subject of the carnapping to
Bani, Pangasinan. Thus, Ravago, with the help from the local police station, successfully recovered
the vehicle, already dismantled, from the motor shop of one Jessie Tugas located in that place.
Laguidao, Chua's buyer, was the brother-in-law of Tugas, who himself recalled that Chua, in the
company of two men, had brought the vehicle to his shop claiming to be the owner of the vehicle.
Chua and his common-law spouse then lived in a nipa hut near the motor shop. It was hardly
coincidental that at the time of the recovery of the vehicle, Ravago's Betamax unit was recovered
from Chua's nipa hut.

2.
Despite his physical absence from the scene of the crime, Chua was liable as a principal by
inducement, and also for the violence committed by Lato and Reyes during the execution
of the crimes

The foregoing circumstances were sufficient and competent to prove that Chua masterminded the
robbery and carnapping. As the mastermind, he directly induced Lato and Reyes to commit the
robbery and the carnapping. His inducement of them was not merely casual but influential and
controlling. Lato and Reyes could not have committed the crimes without Chua's inducement and
plotting. In that capacity, Chua was a principal by inducement within the context of Article 17 of
the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Article 17. Principals. - The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;

2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;

3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not
have been accomplished.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
crime, and decide to commit it.14 For an accused to be validly held to conspire with his co-accused in
committing the crimes, his overt acts must tend to execute the offense agreed upon, for the merely
passive conspirator cannot be held to be still part of the conspiracy without such overt acts, unless
such passive conspirator is the mastermind. In that respect, it is not always required to establish that
two or more persons met and explicitly entered into the agreement to commit the crime by laying
down the details of how their unlawful scheme or objective would be carried out.15 Conspiracy can
also be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense is perpetrated, or can be inferred
from the acts of the several accused evincing their joint or common purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest.16 Clearly, the State successfully proved the existence of a
conspiracy among the three accused.

3.
Robbery committed was that under Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code

Robbery is defined and punished under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. - Any person guilty
of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed.17

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua when the robbery
shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by reason or on occasion of such
robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have been
inflicted; Provided, however, that when the robbery accompanied with rape is committed with a use
of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death (As
amended by PD No. 767).

3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, any of the
physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next preceding paragraph,
shall have been inflicted.

4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, if
the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been carried to a
degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or in the course of its execution, the
offender shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the physical
injuries covered by sub-divisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263.

5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in
other cases. (As amended by R. A. 18).
The CA properly convicted Chua of robbery as defmed and punished under Article 294(5) of
the Revised Penal Code.

During the commission of robbery, Reyes, the taller between him and Lato, stabbed Ravago four
times. Ravago escaped further harm only by running to the bathroom and locking himself in. In that
time, the robbers demanded to know from him the hiding place of the jewelry and the commission
earned from the sale of a fishpond that Ravago had brokered. The latter ignored the demand and
just stayed inside the bathroom until after they had left, and his wife opened the bathroom door. She
rushed him to the Yanga Clinic for treatment. He was confined in the Yanga Clinic for five days, and
incurred expenses of about P17,000.00.

Yet, the physical injuries inflicted by the stabbing in the course of the execution of the robbery did
not constitute any of the serious physical injuries mentioned under Article 263 of the Revised Penal
Code as required by Article 294(2)(3) and (4) of the Revised Penal Code. Specifically, the physical
injuries inflicted on him did not render him insane, imbecile, impotent or blind; he did not also lose
the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm or a leg; or the
use of any of such member; he did not also become incapacitated for the work in which he was
theretofore habitually engaged; he did not become deformed; he did not lose any other part of his
body, or the use thereof; he did not become ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in
which he was habitually engaged for a period of more than 90 days; or he did not become ill or
incapacitated for labor for more than 30 days. The crime is simple robbery under Article 294(5) of
the Revised Penal Code.

The CA modified the penalty meted by the RTC after observing that "there was no evidence that
Celerino Chua was part of any plan to inflict physical injury in the course of the robbery."18 Although
both lower courts agreed that there was no evidence showing that Chua had been part of any plan to
inflict physical injury in the course of the robbery, the Court deems it necessary to issue a
rectification lest such observation be unduly taken as sanctioned with concurrence.

Being the mastermind, Chua was as responsible for the consequences of the acts committed by Lato
and Reyes, the principals by direct participation. This is because of the conspiracy among the three of
them. The informations had properly charged them as co-conspirators in robbery and carnapping.
Once their conspiracy was established, the act of each of the conspirators became the act of all.
Indeed, Chua could not escape responsibility for the acts done by his co-conspirators. The very
nature of the planned robbery as a crime that entailed violence against persons warranted holding
Chua fully responsible for all the consequences of the criminal plot.

In People v. Pareja,19 the trial court had appreciated one of two aggravating circumstances (price or
reward) as the qualifying circumstance but had refused to consider the other (treachery) as a generic
aggravating circumstance against the accused, who was the mastermind, on the ground that he had
not been present when the crime was being actually committed, having left the means, modes or
methods of its commission to a great extent to the discretion of the others. The trial court cited as its
authority the ruling in People v. De Otero (51 Phil. 201). The Court, on appeal, disagreed with the
lower court, and opined per curiam as follows:
The citation is not in point. It refers to a case where the accused was convicted as principal by
inducement per se under paragraph 2 of Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, without proof of
conspiracy with the other accused. In the case at bar, however, there was conspiracy among the
defendants, and the rule is that every conspirator is responsible for the acts of the others in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Treachery - evident in the act of the gunman in suddenly firing his
revolver, preceded as it was by a false showing of courtesy to the victim, thus insuring the execution
of the crime without risk from any defense or retaliation the victim might offer should be appreciated
as a generic aggravating circumstance against appellant.20
For the robbery, the RTC set the indeterminate sentence at four years, two months and one day
of arresto mayor, as the minimum, and eight years and 21 days of prision mayor, as the maximum.
The CA modified the indeterminhte sentence by imposing four years and two months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor, as maximum.

The imposable penalty for robbery under Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code is prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, which ranges from four
years, two months and one day to 10 years. In the absence of modifying circumstances, the penalty
is imposed in its medium period, that is, six years, one month and 11 days to eight years and 20
days. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is taken from the penalty next lower, which
is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period (that is, four
months and one day to four years and two months). The CA correctly fixed the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence. On the other hand, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence should be
from the medium period of the penalty as stated herein.

In its judgment, the CA applied the ceiling of the penalty but did not tender any justification for doing
so. Such justification was required by the seventh rule enunciated in Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code on the application of penalties containing three periods. The need for the justification is
explained in Ladines v. People,21 to wit:
x x x although Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which has set the rules "for the application of
penalties which contain three periods," requires under its first rule that the courts should impose the
penalty prescribed by law in the medium period should there be neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, its seventh rule expressly demands that "[w]ithin the limits of each period,
the courts shall deterff!ine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature
of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the
evil produced by the crime." By not specifying the justification for imposing the ceiling of
the period of the imposable penalty, the fixing of the indeterminate sentence became
arbitrary, or whim ical, or capricious. In the absence of the specification, the maximum of
the indeterminate sentence for the petitioner should be the lowest of the medium period
of reclusion temporal, which is 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal.
(Bold under coring supplied for emphasis; italicized portions are part of the original text)
Although the CA should not have fixed the ceiling of the penalty without tendering the justification for
doing so, we nonetheless note that such ceiling of eight years as the maximum of the indeterminate
penalty was warranted. The appeal by Chua threw the records open for review, such that the penalty
meted on him could be reviewed as a matter of course and rectified, if necessary, without infringing
on his right as an accused. Thus, the Court will itself now tender the justification for imposing the
ceiling of the penalty. Chua's masterminding of the robbery and carnapping against his own neighbor
manifested the high degree of his criminality.

4.
Carnapping committed with violence or intimidation of persons was established beyond
reasonable doubt; hence, Chua's proper penalty should be higher

Carnapping is defined as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using
force upon things."22 Under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, the penalty for carnapping
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things is imprisonment of not
less than 14 years and eight months and not more than 17 years and four months; if committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things, the penalty is
imprisonment of not less than 17 years and four months and not more than 30 years.

The taking of the motor vehicle (owner-type jeep) belonging to the Ravagos by Lato and Reyes
constituted carnapping. But it was clear error for the lower courts to punish Chua with the penalty for
carnapping committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things. Even ifthe
robbers took the motor vehicle after consummating the robbery in the course of the execution of
which one of them stabbed Ravago four times, the taking of the motor vehicle in order to carry the
stolen articles out was still attended by the same violence and intimidation of the owner and his wife,
as well as of the rest of their household. As such, the correct imposable penalty is imprisonment of
not less than 17 years and four months and not more than 30 years. Accordingly, the indeterminate
sentence is imprisonment for 18 years, as minimum, to 22 years, as maximum.

5.
Civil liability

We affirm the civil liability awarded to Ravago considering that Chua did not assail the award. Yet, we
have to direct the payment of legal interest of 6% per annum on the P200,000.00 awarded as actual
damages reckoned frorri the finality of this decision until full satisfaction.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS in all respects the
decision promulgated on Octobe 20, 2005, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:

(1) Petitioner CELERINO CHUA ALIAS SUNTAY is punished in Criminal Case No. 397-M-94, for

carnapping, with the indeterminate sentence of 18 years, as minimum, to 22 years, as maximum;
and

(2) The actual damages of P200,000.00 shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the
finality of this decision until full satisfaction.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit

27.) G.R. No. 187044               September 14, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RENATO LAGAT Y GAWAN A.K.A. RENAT GAWAN AND JAMES PALALAY Y VILLAROSA, Accused-
Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This appeal was filed by accused-appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan (Lagat), also known as Renat Gawan, and
James Palalay y Villarosa (Palalay) to challenge the Court of Appeals’ October 8, 2008 Decision1 in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 02869, for affirming with modification the March 19, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 21, Santiago City, wherein they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Carnapping in
Criminal Case No. 21-4949.

Accused-appellants Lagat and Palalay were charged with the crime of Carnapping as defined under Section 2 and
penalized under Section 143 of Republic Act No. 6539. The accusatory portion of the Information,4 reads:

That on or about the 12th day of April 2005, at Santiago City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, conniving with each other, and mutually helping one
another and with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) unit YASUKI tricycle bearing Engine No. 161FMJ41535420 and
Motor No. LX8PCK0034D002243 then driven and owned by JOSE BIAG, valued at ₱ 70,000.00, to the damage and
prejudice of the owner thereof.

That in the course of the commission of carnapping, or on occasion thereof, the above-named accused, conspiring,
conniving confederating and helping each other, and with intent to kill, did then and there assault, attack and wound
the said JOSE BIAG with sharp and pointed instrument directing blows against the vital parts of the body of the
latter thereby inflicting upon him multiple stab and hacking wounds which directly caused the death of the said JOSE
BIAG.

Lagat pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on June 16, 2005.5 Palalay, on the other hand, did not enter any plea;
hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the RTC for him.6

On August 1, 2005, both accused proposed to plead guilty to a lesser offense.7 In their plea-bargaining
proposal,8 they asked that they be allowed to plead guilty to the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code and that the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and/or no intention to commit so grave a wrong
be considered in their favor. They also asked that damages be fixed at ₱ 120,000.00. This proposal was rejected9 by
the prosecution; thus, the pre-trial conference proceeded. The pre-trial Order contained the following facts as
admitted by the parties:

1. That the cadaver of Jose Biag was recovered along Angadanan and Sn. Guillermo road by members of
the police together with Barangay Captain Heherson Dulay and Chief Tanod Rumbaoa, Sr.

2. That the two accused were arrested in possession of palay allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.

3. That the cause of death of Jose Biag was multiple stab and hack wounds as described in the Autopsy
Report and death certificate which shall be submitted during trial.10

After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution first presented Florida Biag (Florida), the wife of the victim Jose Biag (Biag), to testify on the
circumstances leading to Biag’s disappearance and the discovery of his body, the recovery of Biag’s tricycle, and
the expenses she incurred and the income she had lost as a result of her husband’s death. Florida testified that her
husband was a farmer, a barangay tanod, and a tricycle driver.11 On April 12, 2005, at around two o’clock in the
morning, her husband left to operate his tricycle for public use. It was around 11:00 a.m. of April 13, 2005, when
news reached her that their tricycle was with the Philippine National Police (PNP) of the Municipality of Alicia and
that her husband had figured in an accident. After learning of the incident, Florida sought the help of their Barangay
(Brgy.) Captain, Heherson Dulay, who immediately left for Angadanan without her. At around 2:00 p.m., Brgy.
Captain Dulay informed12 Florida of what had happened to her husband.13 Florida then presented in court the
receipts14 evidencing the expenses she had incurred for her husband’s wake and funeral and for the repair of their
tricycle, which was recovered with missing parts. She also testified as to the income Biag was earning as a farmer, a
tanod, and a tricycle driver, and claimed that his death had caused her sleepless nights.15

The second witness for the prosecution was the Chief Tanod of Barangay Rizal, Poe Rumbaoa, Sr. (Rumbaoa). He
testified that on April 13, 2005, after he and Brgy. Captain Dulay received Florida’s report, they immediately went to
the Alicia Police Station, wherein they found Biag’s tricycle. The PNP of Alicia showed them the identification card
recovered in the tricycle and told them that the tricycle was used in stealing palay from a store in Angadanan,
Isabela that belonged to a certain Jimmy Esteban (Esteban). Rumbaoa and Brgy. Captain Dulay were also told that
the owner of the tricycle was killed and dumped along the Angadanan and San Guillermo Road. They were
thereafter shown the two suspects and the place where Biag’s body was dumped. Rumbaoa said that he was able
to identify the body as Biag’s, which was almost unrecognizable because it was bloated all over, only because Biag
had a mark on his right shoulder, which Rumbaoa knew of.16

Police Officer 2 (PO2) Arthur Salvador, a member of the PNP in Alicia, took the witness stand next. He testified that
on April 13, 2005, he was on duty along with other colleagues at the Alicia PNP Station, when they received a report
from Esteban that the cavans of palay stolen from him were seen at Alice Palay Buying Station in Alicia, Isabela, in
a tricycle commandeered by two unidentified male persons. PO2 Salvador said that upon receipt of this report, their
Chief of Police composed a team, which included him, PO2 Bernard Ignacio, and PO2 Nathan Abuan, to verify the
veracity of the report. At Alice Palay Buying Station, they saw the tricycle described to them by their chief, with the
cavans of palay, and the two accused, Lagat and Palalay. PO2 Salvador averred that he and his team were about to
approach the tricycle when the two accused "scampered"17 to different directions. After "collaring" the two accused,
they brought them to the Alicia PNP Station together with the tricycle and its contents. PO2 Salvador asseverated
that when they reached the station, they asked the two accused if they had any papers to show for both the tricycle
and the palay, to which the two accused did not answer. They allegedly kept silent even after they were informed of
their rights not only to remain as such, but also to have counsel, either of their own choosing, or to be assigned to
them if they cannot afford one. PO2 Salvador then continued that when they unloaded the tricycle, they discovered
bloodstains inside and outside the sidecar. He also personally found a wallet containing the tricycle’s Certificate of
Registration and Official Receipt18 issued by the Land Transportation Office in the name of Jose Biag. When they
asked the two accused about their discoveries, Lagat and Palalay voluntarily answered that the name in the papers
is that of the owner of the tricycle, whom they killed and dumped along Angadanan and San Guillermo Road, when
they carnapped his tricyle. PO2 Salvador alleged that upon hearing this revelation, they again informed Lagat and
Palalay that anything they say would be used against them, and that they had a right to counsel. Thereafter, they
coordinated with the PNP of Angadanan Police Station, and together with the two accused, they proceeded to
Angadanan-San Guillermo Road, where they found Biag’s body in a ravine just after the bridge near the road.19

The prosecution’s last witness, PO2 Ignacio corroborated PO2 Salvador’s testimony on the events that led them to
the tricycle, the palay, the two accused, and the body of Biag. He also confirmed PO2 Salvador’s claim that they had
informed the two accused of their rights but the latter just ignored them; hence, they continued with their
investigation.20 PO2 Ignacio added that the two accused also told them how they killed Biag, to wit:

A- They rented a tricycle from Santiago to Alicia but they proceeded to Angadanan. And upon arrival at the site, they
poked a knife to the driver and the driver ran away. They chased him and stabbed him, sir.21

Upon cross-examination, PO2 Ignacio averred that they were not able to recover the murder weapon despite
diligent efforts to look for it and that they had questioned the people at Alice Palay Buying Station and were told that
the two accused had no other companion. PO2 Ignacio also admitted that while they informed Lagat and Palalay of
their constitutional rights, the two were never assisted by counsel at any time during the custodial investigation.22

The prosecution also submitted the Post-Mortem Autopsy Report23 on Biag of Dr. Edgar Romanchito P. Bayang, the
Assistant City Health and Medico-Legal Officer of Santiago City. The Report showed that Biag was likely killed
between 12:00 noon and 2:00 p.m. of April 12, 2004, and that he had sustained three stab wounds, an incise
wound, two hack wounds and an "avulsion of the skin extending towards the abdomen."24

After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence25 without leave
of court26 on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Lagat and Palalay
averred that their constitutional rights on custodial investigation were grossly violated as they were interrogated for
hours without counsel, relatives, or any disinterested third person to assist them. Moreover, the admissions they
allegedly made were not supported by documentary evidence. Palalay further claimed that Rumbaoa’s testimony
showed that he had a "swelling above his right eye" and "a knife wound in his left arm," which suggests that he was
maltreated while under police custody.27

The accused also claimed that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was not sufficient to
convict them. They averred that aside from the alleged admissions they had made, the prosecution had nothing
else: they had no object evidence for the bloodstains allegedly found in the tricycle; the murder weapon was never
found; and no eyewitness aside from the police officers was presented to show that they were in possession of the
tricycle at the time they were arrested. Lagat and Palalay argued that the prosecution failed to establish an
unbroken chain of events that showed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, thus, they were entitled to enjoy the
constitutional presumption of innocence absent proof that they were guilty beyond reasonable doubt.28

As the accused filed their Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court, they in effect waived their right to present
evidence, and submitted the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.29

On March 19, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE in the light of the foregoing considerations the Court finds the accused Renato Lagat y Gawan and
James Palalay y Villarosa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of qualified carnapping and hereby sentences each of
them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are also ORDERED TO PAY Florida Biag the sum of Twelve
thousand three hundred pesos (₱ 12,300.00) as actual damages plus Fifty thousand pesos (₱ 50,000.00) for death
indemnity and another Fifty thousand pesos (₱ 50,000.00) for moral damages.30

After evaluating the evidence the prosecution presented, the RTC agreed with the accused that their rights were
violated during their custodial investigation as they had no counsel to assist them. Thus, whatever admissions they
had made, whether voluntarily or not, could not be used against them and were inadmissible in evidence.31

However, the RTC held that despite the absence of an eyewitness, the prosecution was able to establish enough
circumstantial evidence to prove that Lagat and Palalay committed the crime, to wit:

1. The accused were caught by the Alicia PNP in possession of Biag’s tricycle, loaded with stolen palay;

2. The accused ran immediately when they saw the Alicia PNP approaching them;

3. The Alicia PNP found bloodstains on the tricycle and Biag’s wallet with documents to prove that Biag
owned the tricycle;

4. The Alicia PNP contacted the PNP of Santiago City to inquire about a Jose Biag, and this was how the
barangay officials of Santiago City and Florida found out that Biag’s tricycle was with the Alicia PNP;

5. Biag left early morning on April 12, 2005 and never returned home;

6. The accused themselves led the Alicia PNP and Barangay Captain Dulay and Rumbaoa to where they
dumped Biag’s body.32

The RTC convicted Lagat and Palalay of the crime of carnapping, qualified by the killing of Biag, which, according to
the RTC, appeared to have been done in the course of the carnapping.33
Lagat and Palalay asked the RTC to reconsider its Decision on the grounds that it erred in giving full credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses and in relying on the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution.34

On May 29, 2007, the RTC denied35 this motion, holding that the testimonies of the witnesses were credible and
supported by the attending facts and circumstances, and that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict
the accused.

Lagat and Palalay went36 to the Court of Appeals, asserting that their guilt was not established beyond reasonable
doubt.37 They averred that circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient for a judgment of conviction, "must exclude each
and every hypothesis consistent with innocence,"38 which was allegedly not the case in their situation. They
elaborated on why the circumstantial evidence the RTC enumerated could not be taken against them:

1. The accused’s possession of the tricycle cannot prove that they killed its owner;

2. Their act of fleeing may be due to the stolen palay (which is not the subject of this case), and not the
tricycle;

3. No evidence was given that would link the bloodstains found in the tricycle to Biag himself. They could
have easily been Palalay’s, who was shown to have a knife wound; and

4. The accused’s act of pointing to the police and the barangay officials the ravine where Biag’s body was
dumped was part of their interrogation without counsel, which the RTC itself declared as inadmissible in
evidence.39

On October 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 19, 2007 of the RTC, Branch 21, Santiago City, in Criminal Case No. 21-
4949, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y
Villarosa are ordered to pay to private complainant the increased amount of ₱ 14,900.00 as actual damages.40

In affirming the conviction of the accused, the Court of Appeals held that the elements of carnapping were all
present in this case. The Court of Appeals pointed out that Lagat and Palalay were in possession of the missing
tricycle when they were apprehended by the Alicia PNP. Moreover, they failed to offer any explanation as to how
they came to be in possession of the tricycle. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the RTC that whatever
confession or admission the Alicia PNP extracted out of the accused could not be used in evidence for having been
done without the assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals nonetheless affirmed the RTC’s judgment as it was
"convinced" that the following circumstantial evidence supported the conviction of the accused for qualified
carnapping:

1. Biag and his tricycle went missing on April 12, 2005;

2. Lagat and Palalay were found in unauthorized possession of the tricycle on April 13, 2005;

3. The Alicia PNP, upon inspection of the tricycle, found traces of blood inside it, together with the original
receipt and certificate of registration of the vehicle in the name of Jose Biag;

4. Palalay had a stab wound on his left arm when the Alicia PNP presented him and Lagat to Brgy. Capt.
Dulay and prosecution witness Rumbaoa;

5. Biag bore five (5) hack wounds on his body when the Alicia PNP recovered his corpse in a ravine; and

6. Lagat and Palalay failed to account for their possession of the bloodstained tricycle immediately after their
arrest.41
The accused are now before us with the same lone assignment of error they posited before the Court of Appeals, to
wit:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.42

Ruling of the Court

Lagat and Palalay have been charged and convicted of the crime of qualified carnapping under Republic Act. No.
653943 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. Section 2 of the Act defines "carnapping" and "motor vehicle" as follows:

"Carnapping" is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.

"Motor vehicle" is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power using the public highways, but
excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts,
amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles, which run only on rails or tracks, and
tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any
number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be classified
as separate motor vehicle with no power rating.44

The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 are the following:

1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;

2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;

3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and

4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.45

The records of this case show that all the elements of carnapping are present and were proven during trial.

The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as evidenced by the registration papers, was
found in Lagat and Palalay’s possession. Aside from this, the prosecution was also able to establish that Lagat and
Palalay fled the scene when the Alicia PNP tried to approach them at the palay buying station. To top it all, Lagat
and Palalay failed to give any reason why they had Biag’s tricycle. Their unexplained possession raises the
presumption that they were responsible for the unlawful taking of the tricycle. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court states that:

[A] person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him.

In Litton Mills, Inc. v. Sales,46 we said that for such presumption to arise, it must be proven that: (a) the property was
stolen; (b) it was committed recently; (c) that the stolen property was found in the possession of the accused; and
(d) the accused is unable to explain his possession satisfactorily.47 As mentioned above, all these were proven by
the prosecution during trial. Thus, it is presumed that Lagat and Palalay had unlawfully taken Biag’s tricycle. In
People v. Bustinera,48 this Court defined "unlawful taking," as follows:

Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.49
Lagat and Palalay’s intent to gain from the carnapped tricycle was also proven as they were caught in a palay
buying station, on board the stolen tricycle, which they obviously used to transport the cavans of palay they had
stolen and were going to sell at the station. In Bustinera, we elucidated on the concept of "intent to gain" and said:

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual
gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act
which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.50

Having established that the elements of carnapping are present in this case, we now go to the argument of the two
accused that they cannot be convicted based on the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution.

Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of
all others, is the one who has committed the crime.

In People v. Mansueto,51 we said:

Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference. Such evidence is founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences
establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.52

Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.53

A careful and exhaustive examination of the evidence presented, excluding those that are inadmissible, show that
the circumstantial evidence, when viewed as a whole, effectively establishes the guilt of Lagat and Palalay beyond
reasonable doubt. We considered the following pieces of evidence as convincing:

First, Lagat and Palalay were found in possession of the tricycle the same day that it, together with its owner Biag,
was reported missing.

Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a palay buying station, with the stolen tricycle packed with cavans of palay
allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.

Third, Lagat and Palalay who were then on board the tricycle, jumped and ran the moment they saw the Alicia PNP
approaching them.

Fourth, Lagat and Palalay could not explain to the Alicia PNP why they were in possession of Biag’s tricycle.

Fifth, Biag’s wallet and his tricycle’s registration papers were found in the tricycle upon its inspection by the Alicia
PNP.

Sixth, Biag’s body bore hack wounds as evidenced by the post-mortem autopsy done on him, while his tricycle had
traces of blood in it.

The foregoing circumstantial evidence only leads to the conclusion that Lagat and Palalay conspired to kill Biag in
order to steal his tricycle. Direct proof that the two accused conspired is not essential as it may be inferred from their
conduct before, during, and after their commission of the crime that they acted with a common purpose and
design.54 The pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution are consistent with one another and the only rational
proposition that can be drawn therefrom is that the accused are guilty of killing Biag to carnap his tricycle.
When a person is killed or raped in the course of or on the occasion of the carnapping, the crime of carnapping is
qualified and the penalty is increased pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended:

Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section
Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than
fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course
of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (As amended by R.A. No. 7659.) (Emphasis ours)

As there was no aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, the RTC properly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of ₱ 50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto for the
death of Jose Biag and ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages for the proven mental suffering of his wife as a result of his
untimely death. However, when actual damages proven by receipts during trial amount to less than ₱ 25,000.00, as
in this case, the award of temperate damages for ₱ 25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser
amount.55 Thus, an award of ₱ 25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the amount of ₱ 14,900.00 that the Court
of Appeals awarded as actual damages is proper in this case.

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider that under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the accused are
also jointly and severally liable for the loss of the earning capacity of Biag and such indemnity should be paid to his
heirs.56 In People v. Jadap,57 this Court said:

As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, in which case judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws. In this case, no documentary evidence was presented to prove the claim of
the victim’s heirs for damages by reason of loss of earning capacity. However, the victim’s father testified that at the
time of his son’s death, he was only 20 years old and was working as a mason with a monthly income of ₱ 3,000.00.
We find the father’s testimony sufficient to justify the award of damages for loss of earning capacity.58

Biag’s widow, Florida, testified that Biag worked as a farmer, tanod, and tricycle driver, and that his income
amounted to ₱ 40,000.00 per cropping season as a farmer, ₱ 2,000.00 per month as a tanod, and ₱ 300.00 per day
as a tricycle driver. However, since the prosecution failed to present any document pertaining to Biag’s appointment
as a tanod, or that he actually worked as a farmer, we shall consider only his earnings as a tricycle driver. According
to the death certificate59 submitted by the prosecution, Biag was 56 years old at the time of his death.1âwphi1

The amount of damages recoverable for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased is based on two factors: 1) the
number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed; and 2) the rate at which the losses
sustained by the heirs of the deceased should be fixed. The first factor is based on the formula (2/3 x 80 – age of
the deceased at the time of his death = life expectancy) which is adopted from the American Expectancy Table of
Mortality.60 Net income is computed by deducting from the amount of the victim’s gross income the amount of his
living expenses. As there is no proof of Biag’s living expenses, the net income is estimated to be 50% of the gross
annual income.61 Thus, the loss of earning capacity of the deceased is computed as follows:

Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x [gross annual income – living expenses]62

= 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income - 50% of gross annual income]

= 2/3 [80-56] x [₱ 109,500.00 - ₱ 54,750.00]

= 16 x ₱ 54,750.00
= ₱ 876,000.00

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the October 8, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 02869. Accused-appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED CARNAPPING and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. They are hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Jose Biag the following: (a) ₱
50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages; (c) ₱ 25,000.00 as temperate damages; (d) ₱
876,000.00 as loss of earning capacity; and (e) interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of this judgment.
27.) G.R. No. 187044               September 14, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RENATO LAGAT Y GAWAN A.K.A. RENAT GAWAN AND JAMES PALALAY Y VILLAROSA, Accused-
Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This appeal was filed by accused-appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan (Lagat), also known as Renat Gawan, and
James Palalay y Villarosa (Palalay) to challenge the Court of Appeals’ October 8, 2008 Decision1 in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 02869, for affirming with modification the March 19, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 21, Santiago City, wherein they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Carnapping in
Criminal Case No. 21-4949.

Accused-appellants Lagat and Palalay were charged with the crime of Carnapping as defined under Section 2 and
penalized under Section 143 of Republic Act No. 6539. The accusatory portion of the Information,4 reads:

That on or about the 12th day of April 2005, at Santiago City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, conniving with each other, and mutually helping one
another and with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) unit YASUKI tricycle bearing Engine No. 161FMJ41535420 and
Motor No. LX8PCK0034D002243 then driven and owned by JOSE BIAG, valued at ₱ 70,000.00, to the damage and
prejudice of the owner thereof.

That in the course of the commission of carnapping, or on occasion thereof, the above-named accused, conspiring,
conniving confederating and helping each other, and with intent to kill, did then and there assault, attack and wound
the said JOSE BIAG with sharp and pointed instrument directing blows against the vital parts of the body of the
latter thereby inflicting upon him multiple stab and hacking wounds which directly caused the death of the said JOSE
BIAG.

Lagat pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on June 16, 2005.5 Palalay, on the other hand, did not enter any plea;
hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the RTC for him.6

On August 1, 2005, both accused proposed to plead guilty to a lesser offense.7 In their plea-bargaining
proposal,8 they asked that they be allowed to plead guilty to the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code and that the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and/or no intention to commit so grave a wrong
be considered in their favor. They also asked that damages be fixed at ₱ 120,000.00. This proposal was rejected9 by
the prosecution; thus, the pre-trial conference proceeded. The pre-trial Order contained the following facts as
admitted by the parties:

1. That the cadaver of Jose Biag was recovered along Angadanan and Sn. Guillermo road by members of
the police together with Barangay Captain Heherson Dulay and Chief Tanod Rumbaoa, Sr.

2. That the two accused were arrested in possession of palay allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.

3. That the cause of death of Jose Biag was multiple stab and hack wounds as described in the Autopsy
Report and death certificate which shall be submitted during trial.10

After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution first presented Florida Biag (Florida), the wife of the victim Jose Biag (Biag), to testify on the
circumstances leading to Biag’s disappearance and the discovery of his body, the recovery of Biag’s tricycle, and
the expenses she incurred and the income she had lost as a result of her husband’s death. Florida testified that her
husband was a farmer, a barangay tanod, and a tricycle driver.11 On April 12, 2005, at around two o’clock in the
morning, her husband left to operate his tricycle for public use. It was around 11:00 a.m. of April 13, 2005, when
news reached her that their tricycle was with the Philippine National Police (PNP) of the Municipality of Alicia and
that her husband had figured in an accident. After learning of the incident, Florida sought the help of their Barangay
(Brgy.) Captain, Heherson Dulay, who immediately left for Angadanan without her. At around 2:00 p.m., Brgy.
Captain Dulay informed12 Florida of what had happened to her husband.13 Florida then presented in court the
receipts14 evidencing the expenses she had incurred for her husband’s wake and funeral and for the repair of their
tricycle, which was recovered with missing parts. She also testified as to the income Biag was earning as a farmer, a
tanod, and a tricycle driver, and claimed that his death had caused her sleepless nights.15

The second witness for the prosecution was the Chief Tanod of Barangay Rizal, Poe Rumbaoa, Sr. (Rumbaoa). He
testified that on April 13, 2005, after he and Brgy. Captain Dulay received Florida’s report, they immediately went to
the Alicia Police Station, wherein they found Biag’s tricycle. The PNP of Alicia showed them the identification card
recovered in the tricycle and told them that the tricycle was used in stealing palay from a store in Angadanan,
Isabela that belonged to a certain Jimmy Esteban (Esteban). Rumbaoa and Brgy. Captain Dulay were also told that
the owner of the tricycle was killed and dumped along the Angadanan and San Guillermo Road. They were
thereafter shown the two suspects and the place where Biag’s body was dumped. Rumbaoa said that he was able
to identify the body as Biag’s, which was almost unrecognizable because it was bloated all over, only because Biag
had a mark on his right shoulder, which Rumbaoa knew of.16

Police Officer 2 (PO2) Arthur Salvador, a member of the PNP in Alicia, took the witness stand next. He testified that
on April 13, 2005, he was on duty along with other colleagues at the Alicia PNP Station, when they received a report
from Esteban that the cavans of palay stolen from him were seen at Alice Palay Buying Station in Alicia, Isabela, in
a tricycle commandeered by two unidentified male persons. PO2 Salvador said that upon receipt of this report, their
Chief of Police composed a team, which included him, PO2 Bernard Ignacio, and PO2 Nathan Abuan, to verify the
veracity of the report. At Alice Palay Buying Station, they saw the tricycle described to them by their chief, with the
cavans of palay, and the two accused, Lagat and Palalay. PO2 Salvador averred that he and his team were about to
approach the tricycle when the two accused "scampered"17 to different directions. After "collaring" the two accused,
they brought them to the Alicia PNP Station together with the tricycle and its contents. PO2 Salvador asseverated
that when they reached the station, they asked the two accused if they had any papers to show for both the tricycle
and the palay, to which the two accused did not answer. They allegedly kept silent even after they were informed of
their rights not only to remain as such, but also to have counsel, either of their own choosing, or to be assigned to
them if they cannot afford one. PO2 Salvador then continued that when they unloaded the tricycle, they discovered
bloodstains inside and outside the sidecar. He also personally found a wallet containing the tricycle’s Certificate of
Registration and Official Receipt18 issued by the Land Transportation Office in the name of Jose Biag. When they
asked the two accused about their discoveries, Lagat and Palalay voluntarily answered that the name in the papers
is that of the owner of the tricycle, whom they killed and dumped along Angadanan and San Guillermo Road, when
they carnapped his tricyle. PO2 Salvador alleged that upon hearing this revelation, they again informed Lagat and
Palalay that anything they say would be used against them, and that they had a right to counsel. Thereafter, they
coordinated with the PNP of Angadanan Police Station, and together with the two accused, they proceeded to
Angadanan-San Guillermo Road, where they found Biag’s body in a ravine just after the bridge near the road.19

The prosecution’s last witness, PO2 Ignacio corroborated PO2 Salvador’s testimony on the events that led them to
the tricycle, the palay, the two accused, and the body of Biag. He also confirmed PO2 Salvador’s claim that they had
informed the two accused of their rights but the latter just ignored them; hence, they continued with their
investigation.20 PO2 Ignacio added that the two accused also told them how they killed Biag, to wit:

A- They rented a tricycle from Santiago to Alicia but they proceeded to Angadanan. And upon arrival at the site, they
poked a knife to the driver and the driver ran away. They chased him and stabbed him, sir.21

Upon cross-examination, PO2 Ignacio averred that they were not able to recover the murder weapon despite
diligent efforts to look for it and that they had questioned the people at Alice Palay Buying Station and were told that
the two accused had no other companion. PO2 Ignacio also admitted that while they informed Lagat and Palalay of
their constitutional rights, the two were never assisted by counsel at any time during the custodial investigation.22

The prosecution also submitted the Post-Mortem Autopsy Report23 on Biag of Dr. Edgar Romanchito P. Bayang, the
Assistant City Health and Medico-Legal Officer of Santiago City. The Report showed that Biag was likely killed
between 12:00 noon and 2:00 p.m. of April 12, 2004, and that he had sustained three stab wounds, an incise
wound, two hack wounds and an "avulsion of the skin extending towards the abdomen."24

After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence25 without leave
of court26 on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Lagat and Palalay
averred that their constitutional rights on custodial investigation were grossly violated as they were interrogated for
hours without counsel, relatives, or any disinterested third person to assist them. Moreover, the admissions they
allegedly made were not supported by documentary evidence. Palalay further claimed that Rumbaoa’s testimony
showed that he had a "swelling above his right eye" and "a knife wound in his left arm," which suggests that he was
maltreated while under police custody.27

The accused also claimed that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was not sufficient to
convict them. They averred that aside from the alleged admissions they had made, the prosecution had nothing
else: they had no object evidence for the bloodstains allegedly found in the tricycle; the murder weapon was never
found; and no eyewitness aside from the police officers was presented to show that they were in possession of the
tricycle at the time they were arrested. Lagat and Palalay argued that the prosecution failed to establish an
unbroken chain of events that showed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, thus, they were entitled to enjoy the
constitutional presumption of innocence absent proof that they were guilty beyond reasonable doubt.28

As the accused filed their Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court, they in effect waived their right to present
evidence, and submitted the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.29

On March 19, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE in the light of the foregoing considerations the Court finds the accused Renato Lagat y Gawan and
James Palalay y Villarosa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of qualified carnapping and hereby sentences each of
them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are also ORDERED TO PAY Florida Biag the sum of Twelve
thousand three hundred pesos (₱ 12,300.00) as actual damages plus Fifty thousand pesos (₱ 50,000.00) for death
indemnity and another Fifty thousand pesos (₱ 50,000.00) for moral damages.30

After evaluating the evidence the prosecution presented, the RTC agreed with the accused that their rights were
violated during their custodial investigation as they had no counsel to assist them. Thus, whatever admissions they
had made, whether voluntarily or not, could not be used against them and were inadmissible in evidence.31

However, the RTC held that despite the absence of an eyewitness, the prosecution was able to establish enough
circumstantial evidence to prove that Lagat and Palalay committed the crime, to wit:

1. The accused were caught by the Alicia PNP in possession of Biag’s tricycle, loaded with stolen palay;

2. The accused ran immediately when they saw the Alicia PNP approaching them;

3. The Alicia PNP found bloodstains on the tricycle and Biag’s wallet with documents to prove that Biag
owned the tricycle;

4. The Alicia PNP contacted the PNP of Santiago City to inquire about a Jose Biag, and this was how the
barangay officials of Santiago City and Florida found out that Biag’s tricycle was with the Alicia PNP;

5. Biag left early morning on April 12, 2005 and never returned home;

6. The accused themselves led the Alicia PNP and Barangay Captain Dulay and Rumbaoa to where they
dumped Biag’s body.32

The RTC convicted Lagat and Palalay of the crime of carnapping, qualified by the killing of Biag, which, according to
the RTC, appeared to have been done in the course of the carnapping.33
Lagat and Palalay asked the RTC to reconsider its Decision on the grounds that it erred in giving full credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses and in relying on the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution.34

On May 29, 2007, the RTC denied35 this motion, holding that the testimonies of the witnesses were credible and
supported by the attending facts and circumstances, and that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict
the accused.

Lagat and Palalay went36 to the Court of Appeals, asserting that their guilt was not established beyond reasonable
doubt.37 They averred that circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient for a judgment of conviction, "must exclude each
and every hypothesis consistent with innocence,"38 which was allegedly not the case in their situation. They
elaborated on why the circumstantial evidence the RTC enumerated could not be taken against them:

1. The accused’s possession of the tricycle cannot prove that they killed its owner;

2. Their act of fleeing may be due to the stolen palay (which is not the subject of this case), and not the
tricycle;

3. No evidence was given that would link the bloodstains found in the tricycle to Biag himself. They could
have easily been Palalay’s, who was shown to have a knife wound; and

4. The accused’s act of pointing to the police and the barangay officials the ravine where Biag’s body was
dumped was part of their interrogation without counsel, which the RTC itself declared as inadmissible in
evidence.39

On October 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 19, 2007 of the RTC, Branch 21, Santiago City, in Criminal Case No. 21-
4949, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y
Villarosa are ordered to pay to private complainant the increased amount of ₱ 14,900.00 as actual damages.40

In affirming the conviction of the accused, the Court of Appeals held that the elements of carnapping were all
present in this case. The Court of Appeals pointed out that Lagat and Palalay were in possession of the missing
tricycle when they were apprehended by the Alicia PNP. Moreover, they failed to offer any explanation as to how
they came to be in possession of the tricycle. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the RTC that whatever
confession or admission the Alicia PNP extracted out of the accused could not be used in evidence for having been
done without the assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals nonetheless affirmed the RTC’s judgment as it was
"convinced" that the following circumstantial evidence supported the conviction of the accused for qualified
carnapping:

1. Biag and his tricycle went missing on April 12, 2005;

2. Lagat and Palalay were found in unauthorized possession of the tricycle on April 13, 2005;

3. The Alicia PNP, upon inspection of the tricycle, found traces of blood inside it, together with the original
receipt and certificate of registration of the vehicle in the name of Jose Biag;

4. Palalay had a stab wound on his left arm when the Alicia PNP presented him and Lagat to Brgy. Capt.
Dulay and prosecution witness Rumbaoa;

5. Biag bore five (5) hack wounds on his body when the Alicia PNP recovered his corpse in a ravine; and

6. Lagat and Palalay failed to account for their possession of the bloodstained tricycle immediately after their
arrest.41
The accused are now before us with the same lone assignment of error they posited before the Court of Appeals, to
wit:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.42

Ruling of the Court

Lagat and Palalay have been charged and convicted of the crime of qualified carnapping under Republic Act. No.
653943 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. Section 2 of the Act defines "carnapping" and "motor vehicle" as follows:

"Carnapping" is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.

"Motor vehicle" is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power using the public highways, but
excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts,
amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles, which run only on rails or tracks, and
tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any
number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be classified
as separate motor vehicle with no power rating.44

The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 are the following:

1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;

2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;

3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and

4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.45

The records of this case show that all the elements of carnapping are present and were proven during trial.

The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as evidenced by the registration papers, was
found in Lagat and Palalay’s possession. Aside from this, the prosecution was also able to establish that Lagat and
Palalay fled the scene when the Alicia PNP tried to approach them at the palay buying station. To top it all, Lagat
and Palalay failed to give any reason why they had Biag’s tricycle. Their unexplained possession raises the
presumption that they were responsible for the unlawful taking of the tricycle. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court states that:

[A] person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him.

In Litton Mills, Inc. v. Sales,46 we said that for such presumption to arise, it must be proven that: (a) the property was
stolen; (b) it was committed recently; (c) that the stolen property was found in the possession of the accused; and
(d) the accused is unable to explain his possession satisfactorily.47 As mentioned above, all these were proven by
the prosecution during trial. Thus, it is presumed that Lagat and Palalay had unlawfully taken Biag’s tricycle. In
People v. Bustinera,48 this Court defined "unlawful taking," as follows:

Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.49
Lagat and Palalay’s intent to gain from the carnapped tricycle was also proven as they were caught in a palay
buying station, on board the stolen tricycle, which they obviously used to transport the cavans of palay they had
stolen and were going to sell at the station. In Bustinera, we elucidated on the concept of "intent to gain" and said:

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual
gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act
which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.50

Having established that the elements of carnapping are present in this case, we now go to the argument of the two
accused that they cannot be convicted based on the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution.

Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of
all others, is the one who has committed the crime.

In People v. Mansueto,51 we said:

Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference. Such evidence is founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences
establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.52

Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.53

A careful and exhaustive examination of the evidence presented, excluding those that are inadmissible, show that
the circumstantial evidence, when viewed as a whole, effectively establishes the guilt of Lagat and Palalay beyond
reasonable doubt. We considered the following pieces of evidence as convincing:

First, Lagat and Palalay were found in possession of the tricycle the same day that it, together with its owner Biag,
was reported missing.

Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a palay buying station, with the stolen tricycle packed with cavans of palay
allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.

Third, Lagat and Palalay who were then on board the tricycle, jumped and ran the moment they saw the Alicia PNP
approaching them.

Fourth, Lagat and Palalay could not explain to the Alicia PNP why they were in possession of Biag’s tricycle.

Fifth, Biag’s wallet and his tricycle’s registration papers were found in the tricycle upon its inspection by the Alicia
PNP.

Sixth, Biag’s body bore hack wounds as evidenced by the post-mortem autopsy done on him, while his tricycle had
traces of blood in it.

The foregoing circumstantial evidence only leads to the conclusion that Lagat and Palalay conspired to kill Biag in
order to steal his tricycle. Direct proof that the two accused conspired is not essential as it may be inferred from their
conduct before, during, and after their commission of the crime that they acted with a common purpose and
design.54 The pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution are consistent with one another and the only rational
proposition that can be drawn therefrom is that the accused are guilty of killing Biag to carnap his tricycle.
When a person is killed or raped in the course of or on the occasion of the carnapping, the crime of carnapping is
qualified and the penalty is increased pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended:

Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section
Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than
fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course
of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (As amended by R.A. No. 7659.) (Emphasis ours)

As there was no aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, the RTC properly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of ₱ 50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto for the
death of Jose Biag and ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages for the proven mental suffering of his wife as a result of his
untimely death. However, when actual damages proven by receipts during trial amount to less than ₱ 25,000.00, as
in this case, the award of temperate damages for ₱ 25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser
amount.55 Thus, an award of ₱ 25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the amount of ₱ 14,900.00 that the Court
of Appeals awarded as actual damages is proper in this case.

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider that under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the accused are
also jointly and severally liable for the loss of the earning capacity of Biag and such indemnity should be paid to his
heirs.56 In People v. Jadap,57 this Court said:

As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, in which case judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws. In this case, no documentary evidence was presented to prove the claim of
the victim’s heirs for damages by reason of loss of earning capacity. However, the victim’s father testified that at the
time of his son’s death, he was only 20 years old and was working as a mason with a monthly income of ₱ 3,000.00.
We find the father’s testimony sufficient to justify the award of damages for loss of earning capacity.58

Biag’s widow, Florida, testified that Biag worked as a farmer, tanod, and tricycle driver, and that his income
amounted to ₱ 40,000.00 per cropping season as a farmer, ₱ 2,000.00 per month as a tanod, and ₱ 300.00 per day
as a tricycle driver. However, since the prosecution failed to present any document pertaining to Biag’s appointment
as a tanod, or that he actually worked as a farmer, we shall consider only his earnings as a tricycle driver. According
to the death certificate59 submitted by the prosecution, Biag was 56 years old at the time of his death.1âwphi1

The amount of damages recoverable for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased is based on two factors: 1) the
number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed; and 2) the rate at which the losses
sustained by the heirs of the deceased should be fixed. The first factor is based on the formula (2/3 x 80 – age of
the deceased at the time of his death = life expectancy) which is adopted from the American Expectancy Table of
Mortality.60 Net income is computed by deducting from the amount of the victim’s gross income the amount of his
living expenses. As there is no proof of Biag’s living expenses, the net income is estimated to be 50% of the gross
annual income.61 Thus, the loss of earning capacity of the deceased is computed as follows:

Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x [gross annual income – living expenses]62

= 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income - 50% of gross annual income]

= 2/3 [80-56] x [₱ 109,500.00 - ₱ 54,750.00]

= 16 x ₱ 54,750.00
= ₱ 876,000.00

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the October 8, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 02869. Accused-appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED CARNAPPING and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. They are hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Jose Biag the following: (a) ₱
50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages; (c) ₱ 25,000.00 as temperate damages; (d) ₱
876,000.00 as loss of earning capacity; and (e) interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of this judgment.
 28.) [ G.R. No. 207662, April 13, 2016 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FABIAN URZAIS Y
LANURIAS, ALEX BAUTISTA, AND RICKY BAUTISTA ACCUSED.

FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us for review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04812 dated 19 November 2012 which
dismissed the appeal of accused-appellant Fabian Urzais y Lanurias and affirmed with modification the Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 13155 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of carnapping with homicide through the use of unlicensed firearm.

Accused-appellant, together with co-accused Alex Bautista and Ricky Bautista, was charged with Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, with homicide through the use of an
unlicensed firearm. The accusatory portion of the Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of November, 2002, or prior thereto, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating with and abetting one another, with intent to
gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away,
a Isuzu Highlander car, colored Forest Green, with Plate No. UUT-838 of one MARIO MAGDATO, valued at FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) Philippine Currency, owned by and belonging to said MARIO MAGDATO, against his will and
consent and to his damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount of P500,000.00, and on the occasion of the carnapping, did assault
and use personal violence upon the person of one MARIO MAGDATO, that is, by shooting the latter with an unlicensed firearm, a
Norinco cal. 9mm Pistol with Serial No. 508432, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on the head which caused his death.[3]
At his arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The trial proceeded against him. His two co-accused remain at large.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Shirley Magdato (Shirley), Senior Police Officer 2 Fernando Figueroa (SPO2 Figueroa) and
Dr. Jun Concepcion (Dr. Concepcion).

Shirley, the widow of the victim, testified mainly regarding her husband's disappearance and discovery of his death. She narrated
that her husband used to drive for hire their Isuzu Highlander with plate number UUT-838 from Pulilan, Bulacan to the LRT Terminal in
Metro Manila. On 12 November 2002, around four o'clock in the morning, her husband left their house in Pulilan and headed for the
terminal at the Pulilan Public Market to ply his usual route. When her husband did not return home that day, Shirley inquired of his
whereabouts from his friends to no avail. Shirley went to the terminal the following day and the barker there told her that a person had
hired their vehicle to go to Manila. Shirley then asked her neighbors to call her husband's mobile phone but no one answered. At
around 10 o'clock in the morning of 13 November 2002, her husband's co-members in the drivers' association arrived at their house
and thereafter accompanied Shirley to her husband's supposed location. At the Sta.Rosa police station in Nueva Ecija, Shirley was
informed that her husband had passed away. She then took her husband's body home.[4] Shirley retrieved their vehicle on 21 November
2002 from the Cabanatuan City Police Station. She then had it cleaned as it had blood stains and reeked of a foul odor.[5]

SPO2 Figueroa of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Cabanatuan City, testified concerning the circumstances surrounding accused-
appellant's arrest. He stated that in November 2002, their office received a "flash alarm" from the Bulacan PNP about an alleged
carnapped Isuzu Highlander in forest green color. Thereafter, their office was informed that the subject vehicle had been seen in the
AGL Subdivision, Cabanatuan City. Thus, a team conducted surveillance there and a checkpoint had been set up outside its gate.
Around three o'clock in the afternoon of 20 November 2002, a vehicle that fit the description of the carnapped vehicle appeared. The
officers apprehended the vehicle and asked the driver, accused-appellant, who had been alone, to alight therefrom. When the officers
noticed the accused-appellant's waist to be bulging of something, he was ordered to raise his shirt and a gun was discovered tucked
there. The officers confiscated the unlicensed 9mm Norinco, with magazine and twelve (12) live ammunitions. The officers confirmed
that the engine of the vehicle matched that of the victim's. Found inside the vehicle were two (2) plates with the marking "UUT-838" and
a passport. Said vehicle contained traces of blood on the car seats at the back and on its flooring. The officers detained accused-
appellant and filed a case for illegal possession of firearm against him. The subject firearm was identified in open court.[6]

Dr. Concepcion testified about the wounds the victim sustained and the cause of his death. He stated that the victim sustained one (1)
gunshot wound in the head, the entrance of which is at the right temporal area exiting at the opposite side. The victim also had several
abrasions on the right upper eyelid, the tip of the nose and around the right eye. He also had blisters on his cheek area which could
have been caused by a lighted cigarette.[7]

Accused-appellant testified in his defense and interposed the defense of denial.

Accused-appellant testified that he had ordered in October 2002 from brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista, an owner-type jeepney worth
P60,000.00 for use in his business. The brothers, however, allegedly delivered instead a green Isuzu Highlander around half past three
o'clock in the afternoon of 13 November 2002. The brothers told accused-appellant that his P60,000.00 would serve as initial payment
with the remaining undetermined amount to be paid a week after. Accused-appellant agreed to this, amazed that he had been given a
new vehicle at such low price. Accused-appellant then borrowed money from someone to pay the balance but the brothers never
replied to his text messages. On 16 November 2002, his friend Oscar Angeles advised him to surrender the vehicle as it could be a "hot
car." Accused-appellant was initially hesitant to this idea as he wanted to recover the amount he had paid but he eventually decided to
sell the vehicle. He removed its plate number and placed a "for sale" sign at the back. On 18 November 2002, he allegedly decided to
surrender the vehicle upon advice by a certain Angie. But when he arrived home in the afternoon of that day, he alleged that he was
arrested by Alex Villareal, a member of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija.[8] Accused-
appellant also testified that he found out in jail the owner of the vehicle and his unfortunate demise.[9] On cross-examination, accused-
appellant admitted that his real name is "Michael Tapayan y Baguio" and that he used the name Fabian Urzais to secure a second
passport in 2001 to be able to return to Taiwan.[10]

The other defense witness, Oscar Angeles (Angeles), testified that he had known the accused-appellant as Michael Tapayan when they
became neighbors in the AGL subdivision. Accused-appellant also served as his computer technician. Angeles testified that accused-
appellant previously did not own any vehicle until the latter purchased the Isuzu Highlander for P30,000.00 from the latter's friends in
Bulacan. Angeles advised accused-appellant that the vehicle might have been carnapped due to its very low selling price. Angeles
corroborated accused-appellant's testimony that he did not want to surrender the car at first as he wanted to recover his payment for it.
[11]

On 18 October 2010, the RTC rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged. The RTC anchored its ruling
on the disputable presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and
the doer of the whole act.[12] It held that the elements of carnapping were proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt through
the recovery of the purportedly carnapped vehicle from the accused-appellant's possession and by his continued possession thereof
even after the lapse of one week from the commission of the crime.[13] The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Fabian Urzais alias Michael Tapayan y Lanurias GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping as defined and penalized by Republic Act 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) as
amended by R.A. 7659 with homicide thru the use of unlicensed firearm. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua.

In the service of the sentence, accused shall be credited with the full time of his preventive detention if he agreed voluntarily and in
writing to abide by the disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

Accused is further sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Mario Magdato the sum of Php50,000.00 as death indemnity, Php50,000.00 as
moral damages, and Php672,000.00 as loss of earning capacity.[14]
Accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 22 December 2010.[15]

On 19 November 2012, the CA rendered the assailed judgment affirming with modification the trial court's decision. The CA noted the
absence of eyewitnesses to the crime yet ruled that sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented to prove accused-appellant's guilt,
solely, accused-appellant's possession of the allegedly carnapped vehicle.

Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before this Court. In a Resolution[16] dated 12 August 2013, accused-appellant and the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) were asked to file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desired. Accused-appellant filed a
Supplemental Brief[17] while the OSG manifested[18] that it adopts its Brief[19] filed before the CA for the purpose of the instant appeal.

Before the Court, accused-appellant vehemently maintains that there is no direct evidence that he robbed and murdered the victim; and
that the lower courts erred in convicting him based on circumstantial evidence consisting only of the fact of his possession of the
allegedly carnapped vehicle. Accused-appellant decries the appellate court's error in relying on the disputable presumption created by
law under Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court to conclude that by virtue of his possession of the vehicle, he is considered the
author of both the carnapping of the vehicle and the killing of its owner. Accused-appellant asserts that such presumption does not hold
in the case at bar.

The Court agrees.

Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two (2) things: 1. The fact of the crime, i.e. the presence of all the elements
of the crime for which the accused stands charged; and (2) the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The Court finds the
prosecution unable to prove both aspects, thus, it is left with no option but to acquit on reasonable doubt.

R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor
vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation against persons, or by using
force upon things.[20] By the amendment in Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659, Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act now reads:
SEC. 14. Penally for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and
not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force
upon things, and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the
carnapping is committed by means of violence or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act: (1) the penalty of life imprisonment was
changed to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." This third amendment clarifies the law's intent to make the
offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution has to prove
the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must show that the original
criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or
on the occasion thereof." Consequently, where the elements of carnapping are not proved, the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act
would cease to be applicable and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be punishable under the Revised Penal Code.[21]

In the instant case, the Court finds the charge of carnapping unsubstantiated for failure of the prosecution to prove all its elements. For
one, the trial court's decision itself makes no mention of any direct evidence indicating the guilt of accused-appellant. Indeed, the CA
confirmed the lack of such direct evidence.[22] Both lower courts solely based accused-appellant's conviction of the special complex
crime on one circumstantial evidence and that is, the fact of his possession of the allegedly carnapped vehicle.

The Court notes that the prosecution's evidence only consists of the fact of the victim's disappearance, the discovery of his death and
the details surrounding accused-appellant's arrest on rumors that the vehicle he possessed had been carnapped. Theres is
absolutely no evidence supporting the prosecution's theory that the victim's vehicle had been carnapped, much less that the accused-
appellant is the author of the same.

Certainly, it is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted, but for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction,
following are the guidelines: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is as such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[23] Decided cases
expound that the circumstantial evidence presented and proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. All the circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rationale except that of guilt.[24]

In the case at bar, notably there is only one circumstantial evidence. And this sole circumstantial evidence of possession of the vehicle
does not lead to an inference exclusively consistent with guilt. Fundamentally, prosecution did not offer any iota of evidence detailing
the seizure of the vehicle, much less with accused-appellant's participation. In fact, there is even a variance concerning how accused-
appellant was discovered to be in possession of the vehicle. The prosecution's uncorroborated evidence says accused-appellant was
apprehended while driving the vehicle at a checkpoint, although the vehicle did not bear any license plates, while the latter testified he
was arrested at home. The following testimony of prosecution witness SPO2 Figueroa on cross-examination raises even more
questions:
Q: You mentioned the car napping incident, when was that, Mr. witness?

ATTY. GONZALES:

Your Honor, I noticed that every time the witness gave his answer, he is looking at a piece of paper
and he is not testifying on his personal knowledge.

xxx
x

COURT:

The witness is looking at the record for about 5 min. now. Fiscal, here is another witness who has
lapses on the mind.

FISCAL MACARAIG:

I am speechless, Your Honor.

WITNESS:
 It was not stated in my affidavit, sir the time of the carnapping incident.

ATTY. GONZALES:

Your Honor, if he can no longer remember even the simple matter when this car napping incident
happened then he is an incompetent witness and we are deprive (sic) of the right to cross examine
him. I move that his testimony would be stricken off from the record.

xxx
x

Q: Mr. Witness, what is the date when you arrested the accused Fabian Urzais?
A: It was November 20, 2002 at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, sir.

Q: You said earlier that on November 3, 2002 that you met the accused is that correct, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Why did you see the accused on November 3, 2002, Mr. Witness?
A: During that time, we conducted a check point at AGL were (sic) the Highlander was often seen, sir.

Q: So, since on November 3, 2002, you were conducting this check point at AGL, it is safe to assume that the
carnapping incident happened earlier than November 3, 2002?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Were you present when this vehicle was car napped, Mr. Witness?
A: No, sir.

Q: Since you were not present, you have no personal knowledge about this car napping incident, right, Mr.
Witness?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: No further question, Your Honor.[25]

Considering the dearth of evidence, the subject vehicle is at best classified as "missing" since the non-return of the victim and his
vehicle on 12 November 2002. Why the check-point had begun before then, as early 3 November 2002, as stated by the prosecution
witness raises doubts about the prosecution's version of the case. Perhaps, the check-point had been set up for another vehicle which
had gone missing earlier. In any event, accused-appellant's crime, if at all, was being in possession of a missing vehicle whose owner
had been found dead. There is perhaps guilt in the acquisition of the vehicle priced so suspiciously below standard. But how this alone
should lead to a conviction for the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide/murder, affirmed by the appellate court is
downright disturbing.
The application of disputable presumption found in Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that a person found in possession of a
thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act, in this case the alleged carnapping and the
homicide/murder of its owner, is limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is
rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto.[26] In the instant case, accused-appellant set-up a defense of
denial of the charges and adhered to his unrebutted version of the story that the vehicle had been sold to him by the brothers Alex and
Ricky Bautista. Though the explanation is not seamless, once the explanation is made for the possession, the presumption arising from
the unexplained possession may not anymore be invoked and the burden shifts once more to the prosecution to produce evidence that
would render the defense of the accused improbable. And this burden, the prosecution was unable to discharge. In contrast to
prosecution witness SPO2 Figueroa's confused, apprehensive and uncorroborated testimony accused-appellant unflinchingly testified
as follows:
Q: Will you please tell us how you came into possession of this Isuzu Highlander with plate number UTT
838?
A: That vehicle was brought by Ricky Bautista and Alex Bautista, sir.

xxx
x

Q: Do you know why Alex and Ricky Bautista gave you that Isuzu Highlander?
A: Actually that was not the vehicle I ordered form (sic) them, I ordered an owner type jeep worth Php60,000
but on November 13, 2002 they brought that Isuzu Highlander, sir.

Q: Why did you order an owner type jeep from them?

A: Because I planned to install a trolley, cause I have a videoke for rent business, sir.

xxx
x

Q: What happened upon the arrival of this Alex and Ricky Bautista on that date and time?
A: I was a little bit surprise (sic) because Alex alighted from an Isuzu Highlander colored green, sir.

Q: What happened after that?

A: I told them that it was not I ordered from you and my money is only Php60,000, sir.

Q: What did he told (sic) you?

A: He told me to give them the Php60,000 and they will leave the vehicle and when I have the money next
week I will send text message to them, sir.

Q: What was your reaction?

A: I was amazed because the vehicle is brand new and the price is low, sir.

xxx
x

Q: Did you find out anything about the Isuzu highlander that they left to you?
A: When I could not contact them I went to my friend Oscar Angeles and told him about the vehicle then he
told me that you better surrender the vehicle because maybe it is a hot car, sir. "Nung hindi ko na po sila
makontak ay nagpunta ako sa kaibigan kong si Oscar Angeles at sinabi ko po yung problema tungkol sa
sasakyan at sinabi nya sa akin na isurrender na lang at baka hot car yan"[27]

xxx
x

Q: Mr. Witness, granting for the sake that what you are saying is true, immediately on the 16th, according to
your testimony, and upon confirming it to your friend, you then decided to surrender the vehicle, why did
you not do it on the 16th, why did you still have to wait until you get arrested?
A: Because I was thinking of my Sixty Thousand Pesos (Php60,000.00) at that time, and on how I can take it
back, sir. ("Kasi nanghinayang po ako sa Sixty Thousand (Php60,000.00) ko nung oras na un ... pano ko
po yun mabawi sabi ko".)

xxx
x

Q: So Mr. Witness, let us simplify this, you have purchased a carnapped vehicle, your intention is to
surrender it but you never did that until you get caught in possession of the same, so in other words, that is
all that have actually xxx vehicle was found dead, the body was dumped somewhere within the vicinity of
Sta. Rosa, those are the facts in this case?
A: I only came to know that there was a dead person when I was already in jail, sir.

Q: What about the other facts that I have mentioned, are they correct or not?
A: When I gave the downpayment, I do not know yet that it was a hot car and I came to know it only on the
16th, sir.[28]
Significantly, accused-appellant's testimony was corroborated by defense witness Angeles who had known accused-appellant by his
real name "Michael Tapayan y Baguio," to wit:
Q: Do you know if this Michael Tapayan owns any vehicle sometime in 2002?
A: At first none, sir, he has no vehicle.

Q: What do you mean when you say at first he has no vehicle?

A: Later, sir, I saw him riding in a vehicle.

xxx
x
Q: Did Michael Tapayan tell you how much he bought that vehicle?
A: I remember he told me that he bought that vehicle for Thirty Thousand (Php30,000.00) Pesos, sir.

Q: What was your reaction when you were told that the vehicle was purchased for only Thirty Thousand
Pesos (Php30,000.00)?
A: I told him that it's very cheap and also told him that it might be a carnap (sic) vehicle.

Q: What was the reaction of Michael Tapayan when you told him that?
A: He thought about it and he is of the belief that the person who sold the vehicle to him will come back and
will get the additional payment, sir.

Q: Aside from this conversation about that vehicle, did you have any other conversation with Michael
Tapayan concerning that vehicle?
A: After a few days, sir, I told him to surrender the said vehicle to the authorities because the persons who
sold it to him did not come back for additional payment.

Q: What was the reaction of Michael Tapayan to this suggestion?

A: He told me that he will think about it because he was thinking about the money that he already gave to
them.[29]
Evidently, the disputable presumption cannot prevail over accused-appellant's explanation for his possession of the missing vehicle.
The possession having been explained, the legal presumption is disputed and thus, cannot find application in the instant case. To hold
otherwise would be a miscarriage of justice as criminal convictions necessarily require proof of guilt of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt and in the absence of such proof, should not be solely based on legal disputable presumptions.

The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of the victim may not be treated as an incident of carnapping. Nonetheless, even
under the provisions of homicide and murder under the Revised Penal Code, the Court finds the guilt of accused-appellant was not
established beyond reasonable doubt.

There were no eyewitnesses to the killing of the victim, Mario Magdato. Again, both courts relied only on the circumstantial evidence of
accused-appellant's possession of the missing vehicle for the latter's conviction. Shirley, the widow, testified that her husband and their
vehicle went missing on 12 November 2002. Dr. Concepcion gave testimony on the cause of death of Mario Magdato and the injuries
he had sustained. Most glaringly, no connection had been established between the victim's gunshot wound which caused his death and
the firearm found in the person of accused-appellant. Only SPO2 Figueroa's testimony gave light on how allegedly accused-appellant
was found to have been in possession of the missing vehicle of the victim. But even if this uncorroborated testimony was true, it does
not link accused-appellant to the carnapping, much less, the murder or homicide of the victim. And it does not preclude the probability
of accused-appellant's story that he had merely bought the vehicle from the Bautista brothers who have themselves since gone
missing.

The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfil the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly
balanced, the constitutional, presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.[30]

The basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to sustain the
guilt of accused-appellant beyond the point of moral certainty. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, however, is a burden particular to the
prosecution and does not apply to exculpatory facts as may be raised by the defense; the accused is not required to establish matters
in mitigation or defense beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is he required to establish the truth of such matters by a preponderance of the
evidence, or even to a reasonable probability.[31]

It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and
inevitable conclusion. What is required of it is to justify the conviction of the accused with moral certainty. Upon the prosecution's failure
to meet this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the thought that it has imprisoned
an innocent man for the rest of his life.[32] The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.[33]
In the final analysis, the circumstances narrated by the prosecution engender doubt rather than moral certainty on the guilt of accused-
appellant.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 November 2012 in C.A. G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04812 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS alias Michael Tapayan y Baguio is ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt of the crime of carnapping with homicide, without prejudice to investigation for the crime of fencing penalized under Presidential
Decree 1612. His immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.
29.) G. R. No. 148233             June 8, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
LUISITO D. BUSTINERA, appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

From the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft2 for the unlawful taking of a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, he comes to this Court on appeal.

In an information3 dated June 17, 1997, appellant was indicted as follows:

The undersigned accuses LUISITO D. BUSTINERA of the crime of Qualified Theft, committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of December up to the 9th day of January, 1997, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused being then employed as one [of] the taxi Drivers of Elias S. Cipriano,
an Operator of several taxi cabs with business address at corner 44 Commonwealth Avenue, iliman
(sic), this City, and as such has free access to the taxi he being driven, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him by
his employer and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry
away a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi with Plate No. PWH-266 worth ₱303,000.00, Philippine Currency,
belonging to Elias S. Cipriano, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the amount
of ₱303,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment4 on March 27, 2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is established.

Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who manages ESC Transport, the taxicab business of his
father, hired appellant as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive a Daewoo Racer with plate number PWH-266. It
was agreed that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after which he would return it to ESC
Transport’s garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount of ₱780.00 per day.5

On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on the
same day as he was supposed to.

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, on December 25, 1996, did you report for work?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, since you reported for work, what are your duties and responsibilities as taxi driver of the taxi
company?

A: That we have to bring back the taxi at night with the boundary.

Q: How much is your boundary?

A: ₱780.00, sir.
 Q: On December 25, 1996, did you bring out any taxi?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, when ever (sic) you bring out a taxi, what procedure [do] you follow with that company?

A: That we have to bring back the taxi to the company and before we leave we also sign something, sir.

Q: What is that something you mentioned?

A: On the record book and on the daily trip ticket, sir.

Q: You said that you have to return your taxi at the end of the day, what is then the procedure reflect (sic) by
your company when you return a taxi?

A: To remit the boundary and to sign the record book and daily trip ticket.

Q: So, when you return the taxi, you sign the record book?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You mentioned that on December 25, 1996, you brought out a taxi?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What kind of taxi?

A: Daewoo taxi, sir.

Q: Now did you return the taxi on December 25, 1996?

A: I was not able to bring back the taxi because I was short of my boundary, sir.6

The following day, December 26, 1996, Cipriano went to appellant’s house to ascertain why the taxi was not
returned.7 Arriving at appellant’s house, he did not find the taxi there, appellant’s wife telling him that her husband
had not yet arrived.8 Leaving nothing to chance, Cipriano went to the Commonwealth Avenue police station and
reported that his taxi was missing.9

On January 9, 1997, appellant’s wife went to the garage of ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had been
abandoned in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon City.10 Cipriano lost no time in repairing to Regalado Street where he
recovered the taxi.11

Upon the other hand, while appellant does not deny that he did not return the taxi on December 25, 1996 as he was
short of the boundary fee, he claims that he did not abandon the taxi but actually returned it on January 5,
1997;12 and that on December 27, 1996, he gave the amount of ₱2,000.0013 to his wife whom he instructed to remit
the same to Cipriano as payment of the boundary fee14 and to tell the latter that he could not return the taxi as he still
had a balance thereof.15

Appellant, however, admits that his wife informed him that when she went to the garage to remit the boundary fee
on the very same day (December 27, 1996),16 Cipriano was already demanding the return of the taxi.17

Appellant maintains though that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and signed the record book,18 which was
company procedure, to show that he indeed returned it and gave his employer ₱2,500.0019 as partial payment for
the boundary fee covering the period from December 25, 1996 to January 5, 1997.
Continuing, appellant claims that as he still had a balance in the boundary fee, he left his driver’s license with
Cipriano;20 that as he could not drive, which was the only work he had ever known, without his driver’s license, and
with the obligation to pay the balance of the boundary fee still lingering, his wife started working on February 18,
1997 as a stay-in maid for Cipriano, with a monthly salary of ₱1,300.00,21 until March 26, 1997 when Cipriano told
her that she had worked off the balance of his obligation;22 and that with his obligation extinguished, his driver’s
license was returned to him.23

Brushing aside appellant’s claim that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and that he had in fact paid the total
amount of ₱4,500.00, the trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft by Decision of May
17, 2001, the dispositive portion of which is quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged,
and he is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs.

In the service of his sentence, accused is ordered credited with four-fifths (4/5) of the preventive
imprisonment undergone by him there being no showing that he agreed in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.

SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis and italics in the original)

Hence, the present appeal anchored on the following assigned errors:

I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING WITHOUT CONCRETE BASIS THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS INTENT TO GAIN WHEN HE FAILED TO RETURN THE TAXI TO ITS
GARAGE.

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED THEFT.25

It is settled that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty
of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment even if they have not been specifically
assigned.26

Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended for the unlawful
taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles,27 by Republic Act
No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING."

When statutes are in pari materia28 or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons
or things, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter,29 or have the same purpose or object,30 the rule
dictates that they should be construed together – interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi
modus.31 Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence,32 as this Court explained in City of Naga v. Agna,33 viz:

. . . When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates that they should be
construed together. This is because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject matter are
supposed to form part of one uniform system; that later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the
earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing
legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto. Having thus in mind
the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is
deemed to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in those prior
statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and they all should be construed together. In
construing them the old statutes relating to the same subject matter should be compared with the
new provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so construed that effect
 may be given to every provision of each. However, when the new provision and the old relating to
the same subject cannot be reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter expression of the
legislative will . . .34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be
taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;
(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.35

Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic
servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle,
mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5)
the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.36

On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent
to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a
motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain.37

Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle,38 the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery
and carnapping being the same.39

In the 2000 case of People v. Tan40 where the accused took a Mitsubishi Gallant and in the later case of People v.
Lobitania41 which involved the taking of a Yamaha motorized tricycle, this Court held that the unlawful taking of
motor vehicles is now covered by the anti-carnapping law and not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery.

There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery
and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of a
motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. But a careful comparison of this special law with the
crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking,
intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken without the latter's
consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor
vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain,
without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the use of force upon
things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the
purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment of said
statute.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted.)

It is to be noted, however, that while the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicles, it
excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers,
amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and
tractors, trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purposes. By implication, the
theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be covered by Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
and the provisions on robbery, respectively.43

From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-
carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall
within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.

The designation in the information of the offense committed by appellant as one for qualified theft notwithstanding,
appellant may still be convicted of the crime of carnapping. For while it is necessary that the statutory designation be
stated in the information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the offense is
not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is controlling but the facts alleged in the information which
determines the real nature of the crime.44
In the case at bar, the information alleges that appellant, with intent to gain, took the taxi owned by Cipriano without
the latter’s consent.45 Thus, the indictment alleges every element of the crime of carnapping,46 and the prosecution
proved the same.

Appellant’s appeal is thus bereft of merit.

That appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and did not return it on the same day as he was
supposed to is admitted.47

Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.48

While the nature of appellant’s possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he was hired as a taxi driver and was
entrusted possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its owner, which is contrary to company practice and
against the owner’s consent transformed the character of the possession into an unlawful one.49 Appellant himself
admits that he was aware that his possession of the taxi was no longer with Cipriano’s consent as the latter was
already demanding its return.

Q: Also you said that during your direct testimony that when you gave your wife the ₱2,500.00, you also told
her to go to the company to ask the company for permission for you to use the taxi since you were then still
short of the boundary. Alright, after telling that to your wife and after seeing your wife between December 27,
1996 and January 5, 1997, did you ask your wife what was the answer of the company to that request of
yours?

A: He did not allow me, sir, and he even [got] angry with me.

Q: So, when did you learn that the company was not agreeable to your making use of the taxicab without
first returning it to the company?

A: Before the new year, sir.

Q: When you said new year, you were referring to January 1, 1997?

A: Either December 29 or December 30, 1996, sir.

Q: So, are you telling us that even if you knew already that the company was not agreeable to your making
use of the taxicab continually (sic) without returning the same to the company, you still went ahead and
make (sic) use of it and returned it only on January 5, 1997.

A: Yes, sir.50 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Appellant assails the trial court’s conclusion that there was intent to gain with the mere taking of the taxi without the
owner’s consent. He maintains that his reason for failing to return the taxi was his inability to remit the boundary fee,
his earnings that day not having permitted it; and that there was no intent to gain since the taking of the taxi was not
permanent in character, he having returned it.

Appellant’s position does not persuade.

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.51 Actual
gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.52 The term "gain" is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act
which is performed.53 Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes
gain.54
In Villacorta v. Insurance Commission55 which was reiterated in Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v.
Fieldmen’s Insurance Co, Inc.,56 Justice Claudio Teehankee (later Chief Justice), interpreting the theft clause of an
insurance policy, explained that, when one takes the motor vehicle of another without the latter’s consent even if
the motor vehicle is later returned, there is theft, there being intent to gain as the use of the thing unlawfully taken
constitutes gain:

Assuming, despite the totally inadequate evidence, that the taking was "temporary" and for a "joy ride",
the Court sustains as the better view57 that which holds that when a person, either with the object of going to
a certain place, or learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle belonging to
another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of theft because by taking possession of the personal
property belonging to another and using it, his intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom
utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites in his work Groizard
who holds that the use of a thing constitutes gain and Cuello Calon who calls it "hurt de
uso."58 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)

Besides, the trial court did not believe appellant’s claim that he in fact returned the taxi on January 5, 1997.

The Court can not (sic) believe accused’s assertion that he returned the subject vehicle on January 5, 1997 to the
garage and that he had in fact paid the amount of ₱4,500.00 in partial payment of his unremitted "boundary" for ten
(10) days. He could not even be certain of the exact amount he allegedly paid the taxicab owner. On direct-
examination, he claimed that he paid Edwin Cipriano on December 27, 1996 the amount of ₱2,000.00 and it was his
wife who handed said amount to Cipriano, yet on cross-examination, he claimed that he gave ₱2,500.00 to his wife
on that date for payment to the taxicab owner.59

The rule is well-entrenched that findings of fact of the trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and significance which, if considered, would alter the result of the
case.60 The reason for the rule being that trial courts have the distinct advantage of having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying or their conduct and behavior during the trial.61

Other than his bare and self-serving allegations, appellant has not shown any scintilla of evidence that he indeed
returned the taxi on January 5, 1997.

Q: You said that you returned the taxi on January 5, 1997, correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, did you sign any record when you returned the taxi?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Do you have any copy of that record?

A: They were the one (sic) in-charge of the record book and I even voluntarily left my driver’s license with
them, sir.

Q: You said that you did not return the taxi because you were short of (sic) boundary, did you turn over any
money to your employer when you returned the taxi?

A: I gave them [an] additional ₱2,500.00, sir.

Q: At the time when you returned the taxi, how much was your short indebtedness (sic) or short boundary
(sic)?

A: I was short for ten (10) days, and I was able to pay ₱4,500.00.
 Q: Do you have any receipt to show receipt of payment for this ₱4,500.00?

A: They were the ones having the record of my payment, and our agreement was that I have to pay
the balance in installment.62 (Emphasis supplied)

While appellant maintains that he signed on January 5, 1997 the record book indicating that he returned the taxi on
the said date and paid Cipriano the amount of ₱4,500.00 as partial payment for the boundary fee, appellant did not
produce the documentary evidence alluded to, to substantiate his claim. That such alleged record book is in the
possession of Cipriano did not prevent him from producing it as appellant has the right to have compulsory process
issued to secure the production of evidence on his behalf.63

The trial court having convicted appellant of qualified theft instead of carnapping, it erred in the imposition of the
penalty. While the information alleges that the crime was attended with grave abuse of confidence, the same cannot
be appreciated as the suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of said
Code, cannot be invoked when there is a legal impossibility of application, either by express provision or by
necessary implication.64

Moreover, when the penalties under the special law are different from and are without reference or relation to those
under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules, for the application of penalties under
the said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions are based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies
under the Code.65

Thus, in People v. Panida66 which involved the crime of carnapping and the penalty imposed was the indeterminate
sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as maximum, this Court did not apply
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code suppletorily as the anti-carnapping law provides for its own penalties
which are distinct and without reference to the said Code.

The charge being simple carnapping, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and
8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months. There can be no suppletory effect of the rules for
the application of penalties under the Revised Penal Code or by other relevant statutory provisions
based on, or applicable only to, the rules for felonies under the Code. While it is true that the penalty
of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the
medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not
given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the
qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on
penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the
same formulation. For this reason, we hold that the proper penalty to be imposed on each of accused-
appellants is an indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months,
as maximum.67 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Appellant being then culpable for carnapping under the first clause of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months, not more than 17 years
and 4 months,68 for, as discussed above, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied suppletorily
and, therefore, the alleged aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of confidence cannot be appreciated.

Applying Section 1 of Act No. 4103,69 as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the
offense is punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall not be less
than the minimum prescribed by the same – the penalty imposed being a range.70

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, in Crim Case No. Q-97-71956,
finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and another judgment entered in its place, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539, as amended and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of Fourteen
(14) Years and Eight (8) Months, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months, as maximum.
30.) G.R. No. 181184               January 25, 2012

MEL DIMAT, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the need to prove in the crime of "fencing" that the accused knew or ought to have known that the
thing he bought or sold was the fruit of theft or robbery.

The Facts and the Case

The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law before the Manila Regional
1 

Trial Court (RTC), Branch 03, in Criminal Case 02-202338.

Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben Familara, testified
in substance that in December 2000 Delgado’s wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari
bearing plate number WAH-569 for ₱850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicle’s engine number as TD42-
126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.

On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG) spotted the Nissan
Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate number. After stopping and inspecting the
vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-
YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp
Crame office and there further learned that it had been stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla.

Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number JHM-818, which he mortgaged
to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on May 25, 1998 at Robinsons Galleria’s
parking area. He reported the carnapping to the TMG.

For his part, Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in good faith and for
value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine number as TD42-126134 and its
chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold the vehicle to Delgado. He also claimed that, although the
Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which the police officers took into custody had the same plate
number, they were not actually the same vehicle.

On July 20, 2005 the RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law and sentenced him to an
imprisonment of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal. The court also
ordered him to pay ₱850,000.00 as actual damages and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of
suit.

On October 26, 2007 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in CA-G.R. CR 29794 the RTC decision but modified the
2 

penalty to imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 17 years, 4
months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum, thus, the present appeal.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that accused Dimat knowingly sold to
Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from Mantequilla.

The Ruling of the Court

The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the
robbery or theft, "buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in
any manner deals in any article or object taken" during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have
known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for
another.3

Here, someone carnapped Mantequilla’s Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two years later in December 2000, Dimat
sold it to Delgado for ₱850,000.00. Dimat’s defense is that the Nissan Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold
to Delgado had engine number TD42-126134 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of
sale covering those transactions. The Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the other hand, had engine number
TD42-119136 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3111.

But Dimat’s defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped on the road and
inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from
Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct numbers of the vehicle’s engine and
chassis.

Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and,
therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent. Of course, the
4 

prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold
to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts. 1âwphi1

Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the Nissan Safari to him as
collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old certificate of registration and official receipt of the
vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of registration and official receipt already in his name. But
Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists that Tolentino’s failure to deliver the documents should not
prejudice him in any way. Delgado himself could not produce any certificate of registration or official receipt.

Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said
that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly could not be true
because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to
make good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came
from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers
covering her purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand accused
in the case.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 26, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR
29794.
31.) G.R. No. 179041               April 1, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARNEL NOCUM,* REY JOHNNY RAMOS, CARLOS JUN POSADAS, PANDAO POLING PANGANDAG (all at
large), Accused,
REYNALDO MALLARI, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is an appeal from the January 31, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00930,
which dismissed the appeal of appellant Reynaldo Mallari (Mallari) and affirmed with modification the December 15,
2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 276, Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case No. 00-551 finding
Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping with homicide.

Factual Antecedents

On May 25, 2000, an Information3 was filed charging Mallari and co-accused Arne! Nocum (Nocum ), Rey Johnny
Ramos (Ramos), Carlos Jun Posadas (Posadas) and Pandao Poling Pangandag alias Rex Pangandag
(Pangandag) with violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as
amended by RA 7659.4 The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about September 12, 1998 in Muntinlupa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain for
themselves and without the consent of the owner, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and
carry away one motor vehicle more particularly described as follows:

Make/Type :- Toyota Tamaraw FX

Motor No. :- 7K-0157101

Chassis No. :- KF52-011609

Plate No. :- PXT- 143

Color :- Med. Grey Net

valued at more or less Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of its owner,
Lourdes Eleccion, in the aforestated amount and in the course of the commission thereof, Erico Medel, the driver of
the said vehicle, was killed.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

When the case was called for arraignment on November 10, 2000, only Mallari appeared as his co-accused remain
at-large. He pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.6 Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Prosecution's Version

The prosecution’s lone witness was Chris Mahilac (Mahilac), a self-confessed member of "FX gang," a syndicate
notorious for carjacking Toyota FX vehicles. The modus operandi of the gang is to carnap Toyota FX vehicles,
transport them to Mindanao, and have them registered and sold to prospective buyers there. Together with Mallari
and several others, Mahilac was previously charged with carnapping7 before the RTC of Parañaque City but was
later on discharged to be a state witness.8 Consequently, Mahilac was placed under the Witness Protection Program
of the Department of Justice (DOJ).9
Mahilac testified that the "FX gang" was active in Metro Manila and Mindanao.10 Nocum led the syndicate’s criminal
activities in Metro Manila while Pangandag, who was the head of the Land Transportation Office in Lanao Del
Norte,11 led the Mindanao operations.12 Ramos, Posadas and Mallari were members of the gang.13

On September 6, 1998, while in Calamba, Laguna, Mahilac received a call from Nocum14 informing him of
Pangandag’s arrival in Manila on September 12, 1998.15 Subsequently, Mahilac, Nocum, Pangandag, Ramos,
Posadas and Mallari met in Chowking fastfood restaurant in Poblacion, Muntinlupa City.16 During the said
meeting, Pangandag demanded that their group deliver two Toyota FX vehicles to him in Lanao Del Norte by
Monday or Tuesday of the following week.17 Nocum agreed and gave Mallari ₱20,000.00 for operating expenses.
Mahilac received ₱3,500.00 and was instructed to meet the group in Cagayan de Oro City.18

As the group was departing from the restaurant, a Toyota FX taxi with plate number PXT-143 passed-by.19 Mallari
flagged it down, talked to the driver, and boarded the same together with Ramos and Posadas.20 They proceeded
south.21

On September 14, 1998, Mahilac arrived in Cagayan de Oro City and proceeded to McDonald’s Restaurant on
Limketkai Street.22 Mallari, Ramos and Posadas arrived at around 4:14 p.m. on board the same Toyota FX taxi that
Mallari flagged down in Muntinlupa City.23 They agreed to proceed to Iligan City en route to Tubod, Lanao del Norte,
where said vehicle was to be delivered to Pangandag.24 Mallari told Mahilac not to board the said vehicle because its
back portion reeked of the dried blood of the FX taxi driver, Erico Medel (Medel), who was stabbed to death
while resisting the group.25 Mallari also informed Mahilac that Medel’s corpse was dumped somewhere in Atimonan,
Quezon.26 Mahilac thus took a taxi to Iligan City.27

Upon their arrival in Iligan City, Pangandag instructed them to take the vehicle to his residence in Tubod, Lanao del
Norte.28 They arrived at Pangandag’s residence and were given ₱250,000.00 as consideration for the
vehicle.29 Mahilac received ₱20,000.00 as his share.

The gang continued to engage in this nefarious activity until Mahilac’s arrest by law enforcement officers.30

In the meantime, on September 27, 1999, a cadaver in advance state of decomposition was found along Zigzag
Road, Barangay Malinao Ilaya, Atimonan, Quezon. It was interred in the municipal cemetery of Atimonan, Quezon
but was later on exhumed for identification.31 Based on the four extracted teeth and a piece of white "FILA"
shoe,32 the mother and the wife of the victim positively identified the cadaver to be that of Medel.

Appellant's Version

Mallari denied any knowledge of the carnapping incident.33 He also denied knowing Nocum, Ramos and
Posadas.34 He testified that he was with his wife and two children in their home in Tunasan, Muntinlupa City at the
time the alleged carnapping occurred.35 He claimed that on June 25, 1999, four men in civilian clothes came to his
house and forced him to board a van36 where he was blindfolded. He was then taken to Camp Crame, Quezon
City.37

According to Mallari, Mahilac was his employer.38 He was unaware of Mahilac’s reason for implicating him in the
case.39

Mallari further testified that while in detention, he was made to sign a document which he cannot remember.40 He
was taken to the DOJ and told that his case would be studied if he signs a document the contents of which were
duly explained to him.41 Should he not sign the same, he will be charged immediately with carnapping with
homicide.42 He therefore decided to sign the documents without the assistance of a lawyer, but continued to be
detained in Camp Crame, Quezon City.43

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On December 15, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision44 finding Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
carnapping with homicide. The trial court ruled that the testimony of Mahilac that Mallari participated in the theft of
the FX taxi and the killing of its driver, Medel, cannot be negated by Mallari’s denial and uncorroborated alibi. It also
found that the commission of the crime was a result of a planned operation with Mallari and all the accused doing
their assigned tasks to ensure the consummation of their common criminal objective.45

The trial court further held that Mahilac would not have known about the killing of Medel if he had not been informed
by Mallari. He had no reason to falsely accuse Mallari and even implicated himself by: (1) admitting his presence
during the planned theft of the FX taxi; (2) admitting his presence in Cagayan De Oro City together with Mallari; (3)
directing Mallari and his co-accused to proceed with him to Pangandag in Lanao Del Norte; and (4) receiving the
sum of ₱20,000.00 as his share in the criminal operation.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, Accused Reynaldo Mallari is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
CARNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE and is hereby sentenced to die by lethal injection.

The Jail Warden of Muntinlupa City is hereby directed to bring Reynaldo Mallari to the New Bilibid Prison where he
may serve his sentence.

It Is SO ORDERED.46

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision47 affirming with modification the ruling of the trial court. The
appellate court held that Mahilac’s positive identification of Mallari as a member of the "FX gang" and his
participation in the theft of the FX taxi and killing of its driver, Medel, sufficiently established his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The discovery of the remains of Medel in the vicinity mentioned by Mallari to
Mahilac also gave credence to the latter’s testimony.

The CA further held that the trial court’s determination on the credibility of Mahilac must be given great respect and,
as a rule, will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of cogent reason. The CA also found no ill-motive on the
part of Mahilac to testify falsely against Mallari.

According to the CA, the fact that the prosecution presented Mahilac as its sole witness is of no moment. His
positive and credible testimony is sufficient to convict Mallari,48 whose defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over
the straightforward testimony of the former.49

However, the CA modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua pursuant to RA 934650 which prohibited the
imposition of the death penalty.51

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed December 15, 2003 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, in Criminal Case No. 00-551, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Republic Act No.
9346, which did away with the imposition of death penalty.

SO ORDERED.52

Mallari filed a Notice of Appeal.53 On October 15, 2007,54 we accepted the appeal and notified the parties to file their
supplemental briefs. However, Mallari opted not to file a supplemental brief in the absence of new issues to be
raised. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it is likewise adopting the Appellee’s Brief it
filed with the CA as its Supplemental Brief.55

The Assignment of Errors

The errors assigned in the Appellant’s Brief are as follows:

 I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE LACK OF MATERIAL
EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY HIS CONVICTION; and

II. GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE ACCUSED- APPELLANT COMMITTED THE CRIME
CHARGED, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
DESPITE THE LACK OF EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE MERE ALLEGATION BY THE LONE
PROSECUTION WITNESS CHRIS MAHILAC THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT PARTICIPATED IN THE
KILLING OF ERIC MEDEL.56

Mallari assails the credibility of Mahilac. He contends that as a state witness under the Witness Protection Program
of the DOJ, Mahilac would implicate just any person as his cohort to justify his inclusion in the program.57 Mallari
also argues that the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.58

On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict
Mallari.59 Finally, the prosecution sought civil indemnity and moral damages of ₱50,000.00 each.60

Our Ruling

The appeal is unmeritorious.

Carnapping defined; Burden of the prosecution in a case for Carnapping with Homicide.

Section 2 of RA 6539 defines carnapping as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things." The crime of carnapping with homicide is punishable under Section 1461 of the said law, as amended by
Section 20 of RA 7659. To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not
only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the
killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." Thus, the
prosecution in this case has the burden of proving that: (1) Mallari took the Toyota FX taxi; (2) his original criminal
design was carnapping; (3) he killed the driver, Medel; and (4) the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."62

The trial and appellate courts held that the prosecution was able to discharge its burden of proving that Mallari was
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping with homicide. These courts ruled that Mallari stole the FX taxi driven
by Medel after he agreed to illegally supply his co-accused with this type of vehicle. The trial and appellate courts
found that Mallari killed Medel in the course of the commission of the carnapping.

We find no reason to deviate from these courts’ evaluation as to Mallari’s culpability.

The crime of carnapping with homicide, as well as the identity of Mallari as one of the perpetrators of the
crime, is duly established by circumstantial evidence.

The culpability of Mallari for the complex crime of carnapping with homicide is duly established by the confluence of
circumstantial evidence. Mahilac testified that he was present when Mallari and his co-accused, all members of the
"FX Gang," gathered in Muntinlupa City to plan and conspire to steal vehicles and sell them to unscrupulous buyers
in Mindanao. Immediately after said meeting, Mahilac saw Mallari hail the FX taxi driven by Medel, talk to him, board
it together with two other conspirators, and head south towards the direction of Quezon province. A few days later,
Mallari and his companions met Mahilac in Cagayan De Oro City on board the same FX taxi they rode in Muntinlupa
City. All these show that Mallari’s original criminal design was to carnap the taxi and that he accomplished his
purpose without the consent of its owner. In addition, when the vehicle was brought to Cagayan de Oro City, its
driver, Medel, was no longer with them. The vehicle also reeked of dried human blood. Upon inquiry by Mahilac,
Mallari admitted that the dried blood belonged to Medel who had to be killed for resisting the group. Mallari also told
him that Medel’s body was dumped along Zigzag Road in Atimonan, Quezon. Mallari and his co-accused received
₱250,000.00 upon delivery of the FX taxi to its final destination. These prove that Medel was killed in the course of
the commission of the carnapping.
The identity of Medel as the driver of the taxi was established by his mother and wife who both stated that he was
the driver of the taxi on the day it was stolen by Mallari and his co-conspirators.63 The two later on identified his
corpse when it was discovered in the same vicinity which Mallari told Mahilac to be the place where they dumped
the dead body of Medel.64

In fine, all the elements of the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, as well as the identity of Mallari
as one of the perpetrators of the crime, were all proved beyond reasonable doubt. The foregoing circumstances
inevitably lead to the lone, fair and reasonable conclusion that Mallari participated in stealing the FX taxi driven by
Medel and in killing him.

Mallari’s defense of alibi deserves no credence.

Mallari’s claim that he was helping his wife with household chores at the time the crime was committed does not
deserve credence. This defense of alibi cannot prevail over the testimony of Mahilac which, taken in its entirety,
leads to the reasonable conclusion that Mallari participated in the commission of the crime.

Moreover, alibi is inherently weak, unreliable, and can be easily fabricated.65 Hence, it must be supported by credible
corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused.66 Here, Mallari could have presented
evidence to support his alibi, but oddly, he did not. Thus, such a defense fails.

The Penalty

Under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 as amended by Section 20 of RA 7659, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner or driver of the vehicle is killed in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.67 In this case, the trial court considered as
aggravating circumstance the commission of the offense by a member of an organized or syndicated crime group
under Article 62 of the RPC as amended by RA 765968 and, hence, imposed upon Mallari the death penalty.

However, under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, all aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be
alleged in the Information. This new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, but applies retroactively to pending cases
since it is favorable to the appellant.69 Here, there is no allegation in the Information that Mallari was a member of a
syndicate or that he and his companions "had formed part of a group organized for the general purpose of
committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of a syndicated or organized crime group."70 Hence, the same
cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against Mallari. Thus, in consonance with Article 63(2) of the
RPC, which provides that in the absence of any aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the
lesser penalty shall be applied. Mallari must, therefore, suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.71 Mallari is
also not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 372 of RA 9346.

The Damages

For the killing of Medel, we award to his heirs the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.73 Said heirs are also entitled to an award of moral damages in the sum of ₱50,000.00 as in all cases
of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.74 We cannot,
however, award actual damages due to the absence of receipts to substantiate the expenses incurred for Medel’s
funeral. The rule is that only duly receipted expenses can be the basis of actual damages.75 "Nonetheless, under
Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the
victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved."76 We therefore award the sum of
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages to the heirs of Medel.. "In addition, and in conformity
with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of 6o/o from
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid."77

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00930
finding appellant Reynaldo Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of carnapping with
homicide is AFFIRMED with the following modifications: ( 1) appellant Reynaldo Mallari is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole; and, (2) appellant Reynaldo Mallari is ordered to pay the
heirs of Erico Medel the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, and interest on all these damages assessed at the legal rate of 6%
from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

32.) G.R. No. 203121

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
GOLEM SOTA and AMIDAL GADJADLI, Accused-Appellants

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This resolves the appeal of Golem Sota (Sota) and Amidal Gadjadli (Gadjadli) from the Decision  dated 29 February
1

2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00801-MIN which affirmed, but modified as to the penalty
and damages, the Joint Decision  dated 19 October 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga
2

del Norte (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. L-00355 and L-00356, finding them guilty of Murder and Arson.

THE FACTS

Sota and Gadjadli were charged before the RTC with murder and arson committed as follows:

Criminal Case No. L-00355

That, in the evening, on or about the 19th day of November, 1999, in the [M]unicipality of Labason, Zamboanga del
Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-accused, armed with a handgun and a hunting knife,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another and with intent to kill, by means of treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and stab one
ARTEMIO EBA, thereby inflicting upon him multiple gunshot wounds and multiple stab wounds on the different vital
parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous death; that as a result of the commission of the said crime the
heirs of the herein victim suffered the following damages, viz:

a) Indemnity for victim's death----- ₱50,000.00

b) Loss of earning capacity---------- 30,000.00

 
₱80,000.00

CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 248, Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659), with the aggravating
circumstance of superior strength and the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. 3

Criminal Case No. L-00356

That in the evening on or about the 19th day of November 1999, in the [M]unicipality of Labason, Zamboanga del
Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping one another and with intent to destroy property and moved by hatred or resentment, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously set on fire the residential house of one ARTEMIO EBA, causing to be
totally burned including his belongings, valued at Thirty Thousand (₱30,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner.

CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 1613). 4

Sota and Gadjadli, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges against them; hence, joint trial proceeded.
To prove its cases, the prosecution called to the witness stand Jocelyn and Abelardo, the daughter and son,
respectively, of the victim, Artemio Eba (Artemio).
The Version of the Prosecution

At around 9:30 p.m. on 19 November 1999, Jocelyn woke up and found that her father, Artemio, was no longer by
her side. She peeped through a hole in the wall of their house, which was located at Sibulan, Barangay Balas,
Municipality of Labason, Zamboanga del Norte, and saw Sota and Gadjadli outside with three other persons. The
moon was bright, thus, she was able to identify Sota and Gadjadli, who were close friends of Artemio and whose
lands adjoined Artemio's land. Sota acted as the leader of the group while Gadjadli carried a pistol. The group was
demanding food from Artemio who was willing to comply on condition that he would hand the food through an
opening in the wall, being afraid to open the door because he might be harmed. The group lighted a torch made up
of coconut leaves and started to bum the house but Artemio was able to put out the fire. Artemio pleaded for them
not to bum his house and repeated his request that he would wrap the food and hand it to them through the opening
in the wall.5

The group demanded that Artemio open the door; otherwise, they would bum the house. When Artemio refused to
comply insisting that he would hand them the food through the opening in the wall, the group fired at the house, with
Gadjadli firing the first shot at Artemio. At that instance, Jocelyn jumped out of the window to escape and then ran
away. When she looked back, she saw their house burning while Artemio, who ran down the house, was fired at by
the group. Jocelyn proceeded to Eusebio's  house, which was 15 meters away from theirs, and told Eusebio, her
6

brother, what happened to their father; but Eusebio did nothing about it because he was shivering in fear. 7

Abelardo, a son of Artemio, who lived nearby, did not try to rescue Artemio when he saw that his father's house was
burning because he was prevailed upon by his wife not to leave. 8

The following day, Jocelyn, together with her brothers and sisters, found Artemio's body with stab and gunshot
wounds. Jocelyn was brought to the police station at the Municipality of Labason where she executed her
affidavit.  Abelardo reported Artemio's death to the Barangay Captain and the police detachment, and thereafter
9

executed his affidavit.  The house and everything inside it, which had a total value of ₱30,000.00, were totally
10

burned.11

The Version of the Defense

Sota, Gadjadli, Hamid Saaban (Saaban), and Tambi S. Janjali (Janjali) were presented by the accused to prove
their defenses.

When called to the witness stand, Sota admitted that he knew Gadjadli and Artemio. He and his wife had been
staying at the house of his parents at Sibulan, Barangay Balas, which was adjacent to the lot where Artemio's house
stood. On 19 November 1999, he stayed at home with his parents and siblings because he had fever and chicken
pox. He consulted a doctor at Labason hospital about his chicken pox. He came to know that Artemio, with whom he
had no misunderstanding, was killed when the policemen arrested him. He was brought to the police station where
he executed his counter-affidavit. He claimed that he did not bum the house of Artemio nor was he involved in his
killing. He did not see Gadjadli, who was living at Barangay New Salvacion, on 19 November 1999. He had
transferred to Lemon, which is the boundary of Barangays Balas and New Salvacion, Municipality of Labason. 12

Gadjadli stated that he was not responsible for the burning of the house of Artemio and his death. Before the
incident on 19 November 1999 took place, Eusebio, Artemio's son, went to his house to ask if he knew someone
who would kill Artemio for a price of ₱30,000.00. He told him that he did not know of anyone who would do that.
When he asked why he wanted Artemio killed, Eusebio told him that they were having problems with the partitioning
of their property. Eusebio then said that he would just go home since he could not find someone to kill his father. 13

At around 6:00 p.m. on 19 November 1999, Gadjadli proceeded to Artemio's house, which was adjacent to the
farmland he was tilling, to inform Artemio about Eusebio' s plan. When he reached the place, he saw Eboy, Solaydi,
and a masked person shoot Artemio. He shouted at Artemio and his daughter to run because they might be killed.
Artemio's daughter was able to run, leaving Artemio behind. Eusebio and his companions chased and fired at him
but missed. 14

Gadjali claimed he had no ill feelings towards Artemio. He averred that Jocelyn could have recognized his presence
at Artemio's house because he shouted at her and Artemio to run. He did not see Sota that fateful night.15
Saaban, a resident and a Barangay Kagawad of Barangay New Salvacion, Labason, testified that he knew Sota and
Gadjadli. On 5 November 1999, he treated Sota, whose body had been swelling, with herbal medicine. Because
Sota was not healed, he and Sota's parents brought him to Dr. Alpuerto at the Labason hospital. Dr. Alpuerto was
also not able to cure Sota so his wife and mother brought him to Dipolog. 16

Saaban continued to treat Sota when he returned to Labason from Dipolog on 18 November 1999. Because of the
enlargement of Sota's penis, he could not have walked from Balas to New Salvacion. When he went back to Sota
for treatment on 20 November 1999 at about 4:00 a.m., he was informed that Sota had been arrested. He knew
Artemio because their barangays, i.e., New Salvacion and Balas, respectively, are adjacent.17

Janjali testified that he knew both Sota and Gadjadli. On 19 November 1999, Sota, on his way to see a doctor for his
scabies, passed by Janjali's house at Barangay Salvacion, Labason. Sota proceeded to Dipolog because the
person who was supposed to treat him was not around. He was sure that Sota arrived from Dipolog three days after
Artemio had been killed because Sota passed by his (Janjali's) house.18

The RTC Ruling

In its Joint Decision  dated 19 October 2009, the RTC resolved these cases as follows:
19

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. L-00355, the [c]ourt finds the accused GOLEM SOTA and AMIDAL GADJADLI guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by Sec. 6 of Republic Act 7659 as charged in the information, and hereby sentences each of them to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased ARTEMIO EBA the sum of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs of the suit.

2. In Criminal Case No. L-00356, the court finds the accused GOLEM SOT A and AMIDAL GADJADLI guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of ARSON penalized under Section 3, Paragraph 2, of Presidential Decree No.
1613 and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years for (4)
months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor minimum as minimum to fourteen (14) years and two (2) months and
ten (10) days of the minimum of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua as maximum may be imposed on the
accused and to pay the heirs of the victim ARTEMIO EBA, the sum of Php30,000.00 representing the value of the
house that was burned.

The accused GO LEM SOT A and AMID AL GADJADLI being detention prisoners are entitled to be credited 4/5 of
their preventive imprisonment in the service of their respective sentences in accordance with Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code. 20

The CA Ruling

The CA, Twenty-First Division found Jocelyn a credible witness who held her ground even during the cross-
examination. The CA held that the requisites in order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for conviction
had been satisfied in these cases and which proved beyond reasonable doubt that Sota and Gadjadli, together with
three other unidentified individuals, killed Artemio and burned his house. The CA however modified the decision of
the RTC as to the penalties to be imposed on Sota and Gadjadli, and the damages to be awarded, viz:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with MODIFICATIONS the assailed Joint

Decision dated October 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte in Criminal
Case Nos. L-00355 and L-00356. The accused-appellant Golem Sota and Amidal Gadjadli are found GUILTY for
the crimes of MURDER and ARSON and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the
crime of Murder and an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision
mayor as minimum and twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum for the crime of Arson. Accused-
Appellants Golem Sota and Amidal Gadjadli are further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Artemio Eba the amounts
of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages and
Php30,000.00 as temperate damages, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of six percent (6%)
from the date of commission of the crimes and twelve percent (12%) from the date of finality of this decision. 21

ISSUE

The sole issue raised by Sota and Gadjadli in their Brief for AccusedAppellants  which they adopted  as their
22 23

Supplemental Brief before the Court was:

THE COURT A QUO FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The appeal has no merit.

The findings of the trial

and appellate courts as to
the credibility of Jocelyn
were final and conclusive.

Time and again, the Court has held that when the issues involve matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of
the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the
trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern
whether they are telling the truth.  The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
24

generally binding and conclusive on this Court  except on the following instances:
25

1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and conjectures;

2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

3. Where there is grave abuse of discretion;

4. When the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;

5. When the findings of fact are conflicting;

6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

7. When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

8. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and

10. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.  (italics omitted)
26

The CA, performing its sworn duty to re-examine the trial records as thoroughly as it could in order to uncover any
fact or circumstances that could impact the verdict in favor of the appellants, is presumed to have uncovered none
sufficient to undo or reverse the conviction.  The Court, on the one hand, did not find any compelling cause or
27

impetus to disturb the findings of the CA especially so that the accused-appellants failed to convincingly argue their
claim that these cases fall within the determined exclusions.
Most significantly, in every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with the same quantum of proof the
identity of the person or persons responsible therefor, because, even if the commission of the crime is a given, there
can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained.  In these cases, the
28

prosecution had undoubtedly discharged its task in accordance with the required degree of proof.

It was the position of the accused-appellants that Jocelyn failed to elucidate who were the actual perpetrators and
how the alleged crimes were carried out. The petitioners claimed that the tales of the events were all speculations
and self-serving perceptions. 29

Credible witness and credible testimony are the two essential elements for determining the weight of a particular
testimony.  Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be
30

credible in itself, such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. 31

Although Jocelyn was only twelve years old when the incident happened and when called to the witness stand, the
Court takes note of the truth that she possessed all the qualification and none of the disqualification to testify in
these cases, viz:

Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of crime unless otherwise provided by
law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.

Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. -The following persons cannot be

witnesses:

(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of
intelligently making known their perception to others;

(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which
they are examined and of relating them truthfully. 32

Jocelyn's young age had no bearing on her qualification to testify on what happened that night on 19 November
1999. As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can communicate
such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness.  Significantly, even under the crucible of an
33

intense cross-examination, Jocelyn never wavered in her narration as to the incidents that led to the killing of
Artemio and the burning of their house, and in the affirmative identification of Sota and Gadjadli as two of the five
persons who were responsible for these crimes.

In Salvador v. People,  the Court laid down the rule that direct evidence is not the only ground by which the guilt of
34

an accused may be anchored, viz:

Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of
guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference. At times, resort to circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on direct testimony
would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the community. 35

Jocelyn gave the credible testimony that on the night of 19 November 1999, Sota, Gadjadli, and three other
unidentified persons lit the torch to burn their house but Artemio was able to put out the fire. Because the moon was
bright, she vividly saw that it was Sota who acted as the leader of the group while Gadjadli carried a pistol. She
witnessed that the group started to shoot at the house when Artemio became adamant not to open the door for fear
he would be killed. It was with this burst of gunshots that made her jump out of the window and run towards the
house of her brother Eusebio. When she looked back, their house was already burning while the group was
shooting at Artemio who ran down the house.  Plainly, these circumstances as testified to by Jocelyn produced a
36
conviction beyond reasonable doubt that Sota, Gadjadli, and the three unidentified persons were responsible for the
killing of Artemio and the burning of their house.

Accused-appellants denigrate as contrary to human experience the testimony of Jocelyn that Eusebio, having been
informed of what had happened to their father, did not make any move to help him. 37

Noteworthy, in People v. Banez,  the Court ruled that it is not at all uncommon or unnatural for a witness who, as in
38

this case, having seen the killing of a person, did not even move, help, or run away from the crime scene, but simply
chose to stay and continue plowing. It explained its ruling as follows:

It is settled that there could be no hard and fast gauge for measuring a person's reaction or behavior when
confronted with a startling, not to mention horrifying, occurrence, as in this case. Witnesses of startling occurrences
react differently depending upon their situation and state of mind, and there is no standard form of human
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. The workings of the
human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react differently to shocking stimulus -
some may shout, some may faint, and others may be plunged into insensibility. 39

Jocelyn testified that Eusebio did not help Artemio because he was trembling with fear. Presumably, Eusebio had
been informed by Jocelyn that five malefactors came to Artemio's house that night. Eusebio's immediate reaction
was to cower in fear with concern for his self-preservation rather than coming to the aid of his father.

Jocelyn had no motive in

naming Sota and Gadjadli as
the perpetrators of the crime.

Sota and Gadjadli failed to attribute any ill motive on the part of Jocelyn in testifying against them. Notably, nothing
from the records can sustain a finding that Jocelyn, who was a child when called to the witness stand, was moved
by ill will against Sota and Gadjadli sufficient to encourage her to fabricate a tale before the trial court. Both Sota
and Gadjadli, according to her, were even the friends of Artemio. At her tender age, Jocelyn could not have been
able to concoct particulars on how the group killed Artemio and burned their house. Settled is the rule that the
absence of evidence as to an improper motive strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that none existed and that
the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.  Moreover, it has been observed that the natural interest of witnesses,
40

who are relatives of the victims, in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons
other than the culprits, for otherwise, the culprits would gain immunity.
41

The defenses of alibi and

denial proffered by Gota and
Gadjadli were intrinsically
weak.

Sota's alibi was that he had fever due to chicken pox on 19 November 1999; thus, he stayed with his parents and
siblings at their parents' house, located at Sibulan, Barangay Balas. Artemio's house stood on an adjacent lot. To
fortify Sota's defense, Saaban testified that he was treating Sota for the swelling in his body at New Salvacion.

The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Sota and Saaban were readily apparent. Sota stated that he was staying in
the house of his parents in Sibulan while Saaban claimed that Sota had been staying at New Salvacion where he
had been treating the latter. To bolster his claim that Sota could not have committed the crime, Saaban stated that
Sota's penis had been swollen; thus, Sota could not have walked to Sibulan. It must be stressed, however, that
Sota's defense was that he was at Sibulan at his parents' house because he had fever and chicken pox.

On the one hand, Janjali stated that he saw Sota on 19 November 1999 as the latter was on his way to Dipolog to
seek medical attention for his scabies. He claimed that it was three days thereafter when Sota came back from
Dipolog, thus, it was impossible for Sota to be at the crime scene on 19 November 1999 because Sota was still at a
hospital in Dipolog. He asserted that he was sure about this because Sota passed by his house going to and
coming from Dipolog.
The testimony of Janjali fatally weakens Sota's alibi. To stress, Sota insisted that he was at the house of his parents
on 19 November 1999 while Saaban confirmed that Sota was in Labason on that day. It was clear, therefore, that
contrary to Janjali's testimony, Sota was not in Dipolog; thus, it was not impossible for Sota to be at the scene of the
crime.

Gadjadli offered the absurd alibi that it was Eusebio who had the intention to kill Artemio. He claimed that three
nights before the incident Eusebio came to his house asking if he knew someone who could kill Artemio for
₱30,000.00.

Noteworthy, the testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety and not merely on its truncated parts. In
deciphering a testimony, the technique is not to consider only its isolated parts nor anchor a conclusion on the basis
of said parts.  The defense of Gadjadli easily amounted to nothing when assayed as to the other portions of his
42

testimony. He had stated that, on 19 November 1999 at around 6:00 p.m., he was on his way to inform Artemio
about Eusebio' s plan when he came upon Eusebio, Solaydi, and a masked man shooting at Artemio. Gadjadli failed
to consider the fact that the incident happened at 9:00 p.m. on 19 November 1999; thus, it was impossible for him to
have witnessed the shooting of Artemio at 6:00 p.m.

When compared to the alibi offered by Gadjadli to justify his presence at the scene of the crime, the Court finds
more credible Jocelyn's testimony identifying him as the one carrying the pistol and firing the first shot at Artemio.

Denial is an intrinsically weak defense that further crumbles when it comes face-to-face with the positive
identification and straightforward narration of the prosecution witnesses.  For the defense of alibi to prosper, the
43

accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he was so far away that
it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission.  The defense of denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit
44

credibility.  Sota's testimony that he was at his parents' house adjacent to the lot where Artemio's house stood,
45

while Gadjadli claimed that he was actually at the scene of the crime, clearly proves it was probable that both Sota
and Gadjadli had committed the crimes as charged.

It was the position of Sota and Gadjadli that they had no motive to kill Artemio.  Generally, the motive of the
46

accused in a criminal case is immaterial and does not have to be proven.  In these cases, the proof of motive of the
47

appellants becomes even more irrelevant considering that their identity as two of the persons responsible for the
killing of Artemio and the burning of his house was no longer in question.

Criminal Case No. L-00355

Foremost, there is a need to determine whether the crime committed by the petitioners based on the facts was
arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder using the following guidelines based on jurisprudence: 48

In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were
perpetrated - whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main
objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death
results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is
absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building
or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder
only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already
done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct
crimes committed - homicide/murder and arson. 49

According to Jocelyn, when Artemio refused to open the door, the group began shooting at the house. The group
followed Artemio when he ran under the house, and there shot him - facts that unerringly leave the conclusion that
the group's objective was to kill Artemio.

Jocelyn testified that when Artemio refused to heed the demand of the group to give them food by opening the door,
the group started to bum the house using a lighted torch of coconut leaves, which flames Artemio was able to put
out. When Artemio still refused to open the door, the group threatened that they would burn the house. They made
good their threat before they went after Artemio who ran below his house. Undoubtedly, the group's intent was also
to burn down the house of Artemio, not only to kill him.

With these established facts, the prosecution was correct in charging Sota, Gadjadli, and the three unnamed
persons with murder and arson.

Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659  as 50

follows:

Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a
railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste
and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his
person or corpse.

The RTC held that the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, and the aggravating
circumstance of superior strength that attended the killing of Artemio had been proven by the prosecution. 51

Jurisprudence dictates that, to be liable for murder, the prosecution must prove that: (1) a person was killed; (2) the
accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and
(4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide.
52

The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and is done in a swift, deliberate, and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.  In 53

treachery, the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim is without the slightest provocation on his
part.  The mode of attack, therefore, must have been planned by the offender and must not have sprung from an
54

unexpected turn of events.  What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to
55

defend himself or to retaliate. Treachery is likewise committed when the victim, although warned of the danger to his
life, is defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace.
56

Jurisprudence  defines evident premeditation as follows:

57

Evident premeditation exists when the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon
the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
Premeditation, to be considered, must be evident and so proved with equal certainty and clarity as the crime itself. It
is essential that the following elements should there concur: (1) the time when the offender has determined to
commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination and, (3) a sufficient
interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime has lapsed to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. 58

It was obvious that the group had deliberately reflected on the means to carry out their plan to kill Artemio, i.e., by
making him open the door of his house when he hands them the food they demanded and thereafter to shoot him.
They had a torch made of coconut leaves while Gadjadli was armed with a pistol which, as pointed out by the RTC,
was an effective ploy and calculation by the group, considering that if Artemio refused to come out of the house,
they would burn it. 59

There was treachery when the group made Artemio believe they would bum his house for refusing to open the door
and hand them the food they were demanding. Although Artemio knew the danger to his life if the group proceeded
with its threat to bum the house should he still refuse to open the door, the unexpected firing at his house made it
impossible for him to defend himself or to retaliate.

The circumstance of use of superior strength cannot serve to qualify or aggravate the felony at issue since it is
jurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former
is absorbed in the latter. 60

Pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, the penalty to be imposed upon the accused-appellants should be reclusion perpetua to
death.  With the effectivity of R.A. No. 9346,  murder shall no longer be punishable by death but by reclusion
1âwphi1
61

perpetua.

Following the ruling of the Court in People v. Jugueta,  appellants shall be liable for the following: civil indemnity of
62

₱100,000.00; moral damages of ₱l00,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱l00,000.00; and temperate damages of
₱50,000.00. Additionally, the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, and temperate damages shall be
subject to six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of decision until fully paid.
63

Criminal Case No. L-00356

In Criminal Case No. L-00356, accused-appellants were charged with arson under Art. 320 of the RPC, as amended
by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613. 64

Enlightened precedent  dictates the meaning of corpus delicti m arson, viz:

65

Proof of the corpus delicti is indispensable in the prosecution of arson, as in all kinds of criminal offenses. Corpus
delicti means the substance of the crime; it is the fact that a crime has actually been committed. In arson, the corpus
delicti is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire, e.g., the charred remains of a house burned
down and of its having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if
credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. 66

As testified to by Jocelyn, she and her siblings found the house and everything inside it burned to the ground the
day after the incident. Noteworthy, the fact that the house of Artemio was burned was never assailed by the
accused-appellants.

Section 3  of P.D. No. 1613 provides that the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if
67

the property burned is an inhabited house or dwelling, while Section 4 thereof states that the maximum of the
penalty shall be imposed if arson was attended by the following special aggravating circumstances:

1. If committed with intent to gain;

2. If committed for the benefit of another;

3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned;

4. If committed by a syndicate.

The offense is committed by a syndicate if it is planned or carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons.
(emphasis supplied)

The special aggravating circumstance that arson was committed by a syndicate should have been appreciated in
this case.
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide:

Section 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.

Section 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in
the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.

The above provisions requiring that the qualifying and aggravating circumstances be specified in the information are
in consonance with the constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him. The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the
trial.  Hence, even if the prosecution has duly proven the presence of the circumstances, the Court cannot
68

appreciate the same if they were not alleged in the information. 69

The information in Criminal Case No. L-00356 pertinently states that the "above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another and with intent to destroy property and moved by hatred or
resentment, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously set on fire the residential house of one ARTEMIO
EBA, causing to be totally burned including his belongings."  The information clearly informs the accused that they,
70

i.e., Sota, Gadjadli, John Doe, Peter Doe, and Richard Doe, were being charged for having set on fire Artemio's
house. The allegation that there were five accused conspiring to bum Artemio's house undoubtedly qualifies the
crime as having been committed by a syndicate. Put otherwise, the information was couched in ordinary and
concise language enough to enable the accused to know that they were being charged with arson perpetrated as a
syndicate. Hence, to further state in the information that the crime was attended by the special aggravating
circumstance that it was committed by a syndicate would only be a superfluity.

The aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed by a syndicate was confirmed by the fact that the
accused-appellants and three other unidentified persons carried a torch and assembled outside Artemio' s house
making threats to bum it. The well-coordinated movements of the group fortified their joint purpose and design, and
community of interest in burning Artemio's house. The group started to bum the house of Artemio when he refused
to open his door in order to hand them food. It was fortunate that Artemio was able to put out the fire from the torch;
but after the group had fired on the house of Artemio, they set fire to his house and thereafter ran after him to shoot
him. Noteworthy, in their respective decisions, both the RTC  and the CA  ruled that there were five persons who
71 72

killed Artemio and burned his house down.

To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to a previous agreement to commit a crime, it being
sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.  In such a case, the act of
73

one becomes the act of all and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed. 74

Considering the presence of the special aggravating circumstance, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should have
been imposed on the accused-appellants.

On damages, the CA was correct in awarding temperate damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00. In view of the
presence of the special aggravating circumstance, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱20,000.00 is likewise
appropriate.  In addition, the temperate damages and exemplary damages to be paid by the accused-appellants are
75

subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of decision until fully paid.
76

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

In Criminal Case No. L-00355, the Court finds GOLEM SOTA and AMID AL GADJADLI GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs
of ARTEMIO EBA as follows: civil indemnity of ₱100,000.00; moral damages of ₱l00,000.00; exemplary damages of
₱l00,000.00; and temperate damages of ₱50,000.00, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the time of finality of this decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and temperate damages.

In Criminal Case No. L-00356, the Court finds GOLEM SOTA and AMIDAL GADJADLI GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Arson defined and penalized under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1613; and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify
the heirs of ARTEMIO EBA the sum of ₱30,000.00 as temperate damages and ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages,
with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid.
 33.) G.R. No. 218425, September 27, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILSON CACHO Y SONGCO, Accused-

Appellant.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

For automatic review is the Decision1 dated July 1, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 06123 which affirmed the Decision2  dated October 8, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76, in Criminal Case Nos. 7522 and 7523 finding Wilson Cacho y Songco
(accused-appellant) guilty of the crimes of Murder and Destructive Arson.

Accused-appellant is charged with the crime of Murder under the following Information, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 7522

That on or about the 1st day of January 2004, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while
armed with a bladed deadly weapon, with intent to kill, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of
treachery, evident premeditation and nighttime which changes the nature of the felony to a Heinous
crime of Murder, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and hack with
said weapon and behead one MARIO BALBAO Y ADAMI, which resulted in his death soon thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Likewise, accused-appellant is charged with the crime of Destructive Arson under the following
Information:

Criminal Case No. 7523

That on or about the 1st day of January 2004, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with the
deliberate intent to cause destruction to the house of MARIO BALBAO Y ADAMI, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously set fire to and burn the said house causing its total destruction
for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of the commission of the crime of Murder with
attendant special aggravating circumstance that the offender was motivated by spite or hatred
towards the owner of the property in the commission of the felony.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Trial ensued.

The following undisputed facts as summarized by the CA are as follows:

On January 2, 2004, at around 8:10 o'clock in the morning, PO2 Emelito Salen (PO2 Salen) and SPO4
Onofre Tavas (SPO4 Tavas) of the Rodriguez Police Station received a report from a certain Willy
Cacho about a fire in Sitio Catmon, Brgy. San Rafael, Rodriguez, Rizal. PO2 Salen and SPO4 Tavas,
who were accompanied by members of the Bureau of Fire Protection, namely: SFO1 Damasa Viscara
and FO2 Casiple, went to Sitio Catmon to verify said report.

Upon arriving in Sitio Catmon, the police officers saw a burned house, which was owned by a certain
Boy who was later identified as Mario Balbao. Upon investigation, they discovered a burned body of a
headless man underneath an iron sheet. Willy Cacho informed the police officers that it was his
brother, [accused-appellant], who killed Boy. [Accused-appellant's] wife likewise told the police
officers that her husband was a patient of [the] National Center for Mental Health and has a recurring
mental illness.

Thereafter, the police officers went to the house of [accused-appellant] where they saw a shallow pit
measuring one (1) foot in diameter and five (5) inches deep with a steel peg standing at the center,
which they believed was used to bum a head because there were traces of ash and a human skull on
top of the heap of charcoal. The police officers then saw [accused-appellant] in his backyard. Upon
introducing themselves as police officers, [accused-appellant] acted strangely and exhibited signs of
mental illness. According to SPO4 Tavas, [accused-appellant] admitted killing Boy and burning the
latter's house but did not say why he did it.

When they tried to arrest him, [accused-appellant] became wild. The police officers sought help from
other people to subdue [accused-appellant] and to place him inside the mobile car. [Accused-
appellant] was then brought to the prosecutors [sic] office for inquest proceedings. After the inquest,
[accused-appellant] was brought to the National Center for Mental Health for confinement.5

After trial, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crimes of Murder and Destructive Arson, in
its Decision6 dated October 8, 2012, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 7522, finding [accused-appellant] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. No
pronoucement as to cost.

2. In Criminal Case No. 7523, finding [accused-appellant] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Destructive Arson (Article 320 par[.] 5 RPC as amended by Sec[.] 10 of R[.]A[. No.] 7659)
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. No pronouncement as to cost.

[Accused-appellant] is hereby ordered to be committed to the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa

City for service of sentence.

[Accused-appellant] is to be credited for the time spent for his preventive detention in accordance
with Art[.] 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 6127 and E.O. 214.

SO ORDERED.7

The RTC only dealt with the issue of insanity. Since the accused-appellant raised the defense of
insanity, the RTC ruled that he already admitted the commission of the crime. Thus, accused-
appellant was tried on the issue of insanity alone.

Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the judgment of conviction of the accused-appellant of the crimes
charged in its Decision8  dated July 1, 2014, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision dated October
8, 2012 of the [RTC] of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.9
 Issues

The issues to be resolved in this case are: 1) whether the accused-appellant sufficiently proved his
defense of insanity; and 2) whether the crimes of Murder and Destructive Arson were sufficiently
proved.

Ruling of the Court

At the outset, appeal in criminal cases throws the whole open for review and it is the duty of the
appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are
assigned or unassigned.10 After a careful review and scrutiny of the records, We hold that the
accused-appellant can only be convicted of Homicide and Destructive Arson.

Accused-appellant was not able to

sufficiently prove his defense of
insanity.

Accused-appellant alleges that he was diagnosed with Major Depression with Psychosis in 1996 for
which he was admitted at the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for two (2) months.
Thereafter, he was discharged when there were no longer any symptom that was observed. Then on
January 7, 2004, he was again admitted to the NCMH and it was discovered that his Major
Depression with Psychosis had already progressed to Chronic Schizophrenia. Thus, his defense of
insanity was sufficiently proved by his medical record with the NCMH as well as the expert testimony
of Dr. Sagun.11

In the case of People v. Isla,12 it stated that:

Article 12 of the [RPC] provides for one of the circumstances which will exempt one from criminal
liability which is when the perpetrator of the act was an imbecile or insane, unless the latter has
acted during a lucid interval. This circumstance, however, is not easily available to an accused as a
successful defense. Insanity is the exception rather than the rule in the human condition. Under
Article 800 of the Civil Code, the presumption is that every human is sane. Anyone who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing
evidence. It is in the nature of confession and avoidance. An accused invoking insanity admits to
have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of insanity. x x
x.13 (Citation omitted)

When the accused raised the defense of insanity, he is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found
to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt, because the
accused had already admitted committing the crime.14

However for the defense of insanity to be successfully invoked as a circumstance to evade criminal
liability, it is necessary that insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous
with the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged. Otherwise, he can be held
guilty for the said offense. In short, in order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability
under a plea of insanity, he must successfully show that: (1) he was completely deprived of
intelligence; and (2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or
immediately before the commission of the offense.15

Accused-appellant having invoked the defense of insanity, he is deemed to have admitted the
commission of the crime. As such, he is bound to establish with certainty that he is completely
deprived of intelligence because of his mental condition or illness.
After the careful review of the records of the case, We found that the accused-appellant failed to
prove that he is insane immediately prior or at the time of the commission of the crime.

Dr. Sagun testified as to accused-appellant's mental condition as follows:

Atty.
Censon:
xxxx
 
Madam Witness, do you know one Wilson Cacho or have you happened to know a person
Q.
named Wilson Cacho?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. On what occasion did you meet this person named Wilson Cacho?
I was able to examine the said patient on July 23 on his third consult at the forensic pavilion and
A.
then I was the one who admitted the patient on November 23, 2007, sir.
xxxx
Q. What was on your finding on Wilson Cacho when he consulted you on July 23, 2007?
As per our records, the patient had been ill since he was 17 years old. His first consult was on
July 15, 1996 and was admitted for two (2) months and was discharged on September 1996. A
follow up after a month, he was in the out-patient and then he was lost for follow-up for eight (8)
years. He consulted again on January 7, 2004 where he was admitted and confined for five (5)
A.
days and after that two (2) years again, he consulted at the out-patient, now at the forensic
pavilion. This was in November 24, 2006 and another consultation at our forensic pavilion on
December 18, 2006. And on July 23, was our first consult in the out-patients and in November
24, that was the time we admitted the patient, sir.
xxxx
Madam Witness, you said that Mr. Wilson Cacho has been consulting with the National Center
Q. for Mental Health since he was 17 years of age, and do you know what was the finding that
made him to be admitted for two (2) months?
Based on our records, he was diagnosed with major depression with psychosis in 1996 and then
A. after three (3) months, his first consult at the out-patient, he was diagnosed now with psychosis
and in the second admission in January 7, 2004, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia, sir.
xxxx
You said that accusd Wilson Cacho was admitted for two (2) months in the year 1996 and you
Q.
said he was discharged, for what reason he was [sic] discharged?
Basing from the presenting complaint when he was admitted there where remissions, there were
A. no symptoms seen or observed so he was discharged and was requested to have regular follow-
ups, sir.
Q. In his history was he given or recommended to take medicines?
 A. Yes, sir.
So, what medicine was recommended for him to take when he was discharged for the first time
Q.
in 1996?
A. He was given anti-psychotic and anti-depressant, sir.
xxxx
Awhile ago I asked you what will happen to a person who have been prescribed these medicines
Q.
and he fails to take them?
A. Most of them will have relapse. The symptoms would go back, sir.
Q. Do you know the cost of these medicines if you take it regularly?
At that time I cannot recall but at this present time, halluperidol can cost from P20.00 to P50.00
A.
a day and the anti-depression can cost P20.00 to P100.00 a day, sir.
Q. Can you consider that affordable to persons who even fails to eat three (3) times a day?
A. No, sir.
Q. Can you please tell the date again when this patient consulted again to your hospital?
A. He came back on January 7, 2004 after eight (8) years of follow-up, sir.
Q. For what reason was he made to consult your hospital?
A. Based on our records, the presenting complaint is that "nagwawala, nanghahabol ng itak," sir. 16

In People v. Estrada, 17 We held that to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act,
evidence as to his mind condition is necessary, thus:

To ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of
the condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony
is not required. Neither are specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense.
Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be
known by overt acts.18

Here, while Dr. Sagun testified that accused-appellant was confined at the NCMH in 1996 and that
accused-appellant was diagnosed with Major Depression with Psychosis which progressed to Chronic
Schizophrenia, no other evidence was presented to show that accused-appellant was insane
immediately prior to or at the very moment that the crime was committed. Mere prior confinement
into a mental institution does not automatically exonerate the accused-appellant from criminal
liability in the absence of any evidence showing that accused-appellant was completely deprived of
reason immediately prior or at the time of the commission of the crime. If at all, there is no evidence
showing that the mental illness of the accused-appellant, as narrated by Dr. Sagun, constitutes
insanity, in that, there is complete deprivation of his intelligence in committing the act.

We therefore find no cogent reason to reverse the RTC and the CA in its finding that accused-
appellant was not able to prove his defense of insanity. However, We hold that accused-appellant can
only be convicted of the crime of Homicide for failure of the prosecution to prove the existence of any
of the qualifying circumstance provided for under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as charged in the
Information.
Accused-appellant is liable for the
crime of Homicide.

Article 248 of the RPC provides that:

Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment

or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or
with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an

earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

Under the above provision in order that a person can be convicted of the crime of murder, the
prosecution must establish (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3)
that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.19

In the Information, it was alleged that the circumstances of treachery, and evident premeditation
qualified the crime to murder.

In People v. Zulieta, 20  the Court held that:

"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make."
"The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape." Otherwise stated, an unexpected and sudden attack which renders the victim unable and
unprepared to put up a defense is the essence of treachery.21

While, in Isla,22 the Court ruled that for evident premeditation to be considered as a qualifying
circumstance, it is necessary that:

(1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) overt act/acts manifestly indicating
that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit
the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow accused to reflect upon the consequences of his
acts. x x x The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, during
the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. x x x. 23

In the present case, all the elements of the crime of murder does not exist. It is well-settled that the
qualifying circumstances must be specifically alleged in the Information and duly proven with equal
certainty as the crime itself.24  While the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation
and nighttime were alleged in the Information, the prosecution failed to prove the same during the
trial. In fact, the prosecution failed to present any evidence showing the existence of the
circumstances which would qualify the crime to murder. The mere fact that the accused-appellant
pleaded the defense of insanity and as a consequence admitted the commission of the crime, the
same should not be construed as an abdication of the prosecution's duty to prove with certainty the
existence of the qualifying circumstances alleged in the Information.

Since the prosecution was not able to prove the existence of the qualifying circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation and nighttime, accused-appellant can only be convicted of the crime
of Homicide and not murder.

Accused-appellant is liable for a

separate crime of Destructive Arson.

Accused-appellant further claims that he should have been convicted only of the crime of murder and
not both crimes of murder and arson since the finding that the burning of the house was an attempt
to conceal the killing has no factual basis.

Arson is the malicious burning of property. Under Article 320 of the RPC, as amended, and
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613,25 Arson (Article 320); and (2) other cases of arson (P.D. No.
1613).

Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,26  contemplates the malicious
burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft,
factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of
persons.

In order to determine whether the crime committed is arson only, or murder, or arson and
homicide or murder, as the case may be, the main objective of the accused is to be
examined. If the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results
by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting
homicide is absorbed. If, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who
may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the
crime committed is murder only. Lastly, if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in
fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then
there are two separate and distinct crimes committed — homicide/murder and arson.27

Aside from the fact that accused-appellant already admitted to the commission of the crime of
destructive arson due to his plea of insanity, which as We discussed above was not successfully
proven, the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove that the accused-appellant burned the house of
the victim in order to hide or conceal the commission of the crime. It was established that accused-
appellant first beheaded the victim before setting the latter's house on fire.28  Therefore, two
separate crimes were committed by the accused-appellant, homicide and arson.

Penalty

Article 24929 of the RPC, a person convicted of the crime of homicide shall be punished with reclusion
temporal.  In this case, due to the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period, which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and for (4) months.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,30if the offense is punished by the RPC, an indeterminate
penalty shall be imposed on the accused, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the RPC, and the
minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense without first considering any modifying circumstances attendant to the
commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by the law to the sound
discretion of the court and can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree
without considering the periods into which it might be subdivided.31

The penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor.  Hence, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
accused-appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor  as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum for the crime of Homicide.

Insofar as the crime of Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the RPC as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
accused-appellant should be sentenced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the R.A. No.
9346,32 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty.

Damages

In view of the prevailing jurisprudence,33 in Criminal Case No. 7522, accused-appellant is directed to
pay the heirs of the victim with P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

In Criminal Case No. 7523, the accused-appellant is directed to pay the heirs of the victim with
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

Further, We impose a six percent (6%) legal interest on the total amounts awarded to the heirs of
the victim counted from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 1, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06123 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 7522, accused-appellant Wilson Cacho y Songco is found GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor  as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal  as maximum. Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim Mario Balbao y  Adami the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages. A legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum  is likewise imposed on
the total amount of damages counted from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

2. In Criminal Case No. 7523, accused-appellant Wilson Cacho y Songco is found GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Destructive Arson and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Mario Balbao y Adami
the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages. A legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum is likewise imposed on the total
amount of damages counted from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
34.) G.R. No. 142565               July 29, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
NESTOR G. SORIANO alias "Boy," Appellant.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

WHAT STARTED OUT AS AN ORDINARY LOVERS’ QUARREL turned out to be a nightmarish inferno for the
residents of Datu Abing Street, Calinan, Davao City. The unmitigated passion and impulses incessantly burning in
the heat of the moment ignited the series of events that resulted in the conflagration of 18 September 1998
mercilessly destroying the houses along its path. The age-old forewarning that "he who plays close to the fire shall
ultimately be consumed by its flames" fits literally and figuratively into this tragic tale of lust, love, betrayal and
isolation. After the smoke had dissipated and the heat simmered down, Nestor G. Soriano found himself charged
before the RTC of Davao City with and later convicted of Destructive Arson penalized under Art. 320 of The Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 10, par. 1, RA 7659, and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. 1

The factual backdrop: About midnight of 17 September onto the early dawn of 18 September 1998 accused-
appellant Nestor G. Soriano was having an argument with his live-in partner Honey Rosario Cimagala concerning
their son Nestor, Jr., nicknamed "Otoy." Honey worked as Guest Relations Officer (GRO) in a Metro Manila beer
house. The disagreement stemmed from the fact that Honey’s brother, Oscar Cimagala, took their child out without
the consent of accused-appellant who wanted both Honey and Otoy instead to return with him to Manila. But Honey
refused. As their discussion wore on accused-appellant intimated to Honey his desire to have sex with her, which he
vigorously pursued the night before with much success. This time Honey did not relent to the baser instincts of
Nestor; instead, she kicked him as her stern rebuke to his sexual importuning.

Incensed by her negative response, Nestor nastily retorted: "[S]he is now arrogant and proud of her brother who
now supported (sic) her and her children." He added that since he returned from Manila, the house had become
2 

"unlucky," referring to that belonging to her aunt Fe Cimagila then occupied by Honey located at Datu Abing Street,
Calinan, Davao City. 3

In the heated exchanges, Nestor struck Honey in the forehead. "You are hurting me," she snapped back, "just like
what you did to me in Manila." 4

Nestor then moved away as he muttered: "It is better that I burn this house," and then took a match from the top of a
5 

cabinet, lighted a cigarette and set fire to the plastic partition that served as divider of Honey’s room.
6

With her naked body precariously draped in a towel, Honey instinctively took off her covering and doused off the
flame with it. Then she rushed to her cabinet in the room to get a T-shirt and put it on. But Nestor did his worst; he
went to Honey’s room and set on fire her clothes in the cabinet.

Honey fled to the ground floor; Nestor followed her. As the conflagration was now engulfing the second story of the
house, Honey frantically shouted to her uncle Simplicio Cabrera, who was residing next door, "Boy is setting the
house on fire," referring to Nestor.
7

On the ground floor Nestor grappled with Honey and choked her as he dragged her towards the kitchen. She told
him that it would be better for him to kill her than to set the house on fire as it would endanger the neighboring
houses. After initially pointing a knife at Honey, Nestor finally laid down his knife and hurriedly went back to the
second floor only to see the entire area in flames. They had no choice but to leave as the fire spread rapidly to the
neighboring houses. As a result, the house occupied by Honey was totally burned together with five (5) neighboring
houses owned individually by Fructuosa Jambo, Ruth Fernandez, Orlando Braña, Simplicio Cabrera and Perla
8 

Clerigo.9
Subsequently, on 21 September 1998 an Information was filed against accused-appellant Nestor G. Soriano alias
"Boy" for Arson. On 30 October 1998, the Information was amended to specify the charge as Destructive
10 

Arson under Art. 320, Sec. 10, as amended by RA 7659 and PD 1613. Again on 18 January 1999, upon prior
11  12 

motion of accused through counsel for reinvestigation, the prosecution filed a second Amended Information
charging the accused with the same crime of arson but "under Art. 320, Sec. 10 as amended by RA 7659 and PD
1744," and adding the phrase "motivated by spite or hatred towards the occupant of the property," as a special
aggravating circumstance, further including the name of "Orlando Braña" whose house worth ₱1,000,000.00 was
also burned.

In the trial, Honey Rosario Cimagala, Oscar Cimagala, Fructuosa Jambo, Ruth Fernandez, Orlando Braña, Simplicio
Cabrera and Perla Clerigo, among others, were presented as witnesses for the prosecution.

Accused-appellant was the lone witness for his defense.

On 3 September 1999, the RTC of Davao City, Branch 17, found Nestor G. Soriano alias Boy guilty of Destructive
Arson as charged pursuant to RA 7659, Sec. 10, par. 1, as amended, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The
court a quo also ordered him to pay the complainants whose houses were likewise burned together with that of Fe
Cimagala in the following manner: Fructuosa Jambo, Simplicio Cabrera, Perla Clerigo, Orlando Braña and Oscar
Cimagala ₱1,000,000.00 each as estimated value of their respective houses, including another amount of
₱100,000.00 each as moral damages and ₱50,000.00 each by way of exemplary damages, and the costs of suit.

Arson is the malicious burning of property. Under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended, and PD 1613,
Arson is classified into two kinds: (1) Destructive Arson (Art. 320) and (2) other cases of arson (PD 1613). This
classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the
damage caused.

Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious burning of structures,
both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government
or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. The classification of this type of crime is known
13 

as Destructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason for the law is self-evident: to
effectively discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of properties and
protect the lives of innocent people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves only destruction and despair in its
wake; hence, the State mandates greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime. The exceptionally severe
punishment imposed for this crime takes into consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed by the
malicious burning of these structures; the danger to property resulting from the conflagration; the fact that it is
normally difficult to adopt precautions against its commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators; and,
the greater impact on the social, economic, security and political fabric of the nation.

If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Art. 320, death should result, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code remains the governing
law for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of
size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other cases of arson. These include
houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and
other industrial establishments. Although the purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high incidence of
14 

fires and other crimes involving destruction, protect the national economy and preserve the social, economic and
political stability of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be meted to offenders. This separate classification of
Simple Arson recognizes the need to lessen the severity of punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed,
depending on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.

Under Sec. 4 of PD 1613, if special aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of Simple Arson, the
penalty under Sec. 3 shall be imposed in its maximum period: (a) If committed with intent to gain; (b) If committed
for the benefit of another; (c) If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the
property burned; and, (d) If committed by a syndicate, or group of three (3) or more persons. If by reason, or on the
occasion of Simple Arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.
Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of Arson, it may be inferred from the acts of the accused. There is
a presumption that one intends the natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one has deliberately
set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to produce further evidence of his wrongful intent. If there is an
15 

eyewitness to the crime of Arson, he can give in detail the acts of the accused. When this is done the only
substantial issue is the credibility of the witness. In the crime of Arson, the prosecution may describe the theatre of
16 

the crime and the conditions and circumstances surrounding it. Evidence of this type is part of the res gestae. 17

It is well settled in our jurisdiction that the factual findings of the court a quo as well as the conclusions on the
credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed. We have no cogent reason to deviate from this rule in the case
at bar.

On the basis of the categorical testimony of Honey Rosario Cimagala positively identifying accused-appellant as the
one responsible for the burning of the house of Fe Cimagala in the early morning of 18 September 1998, the trial
court found the accused Nestor G. Soriano guilty as charged.

The accused’s denial of the crime cannot be an adequate defense against the charge. In People v. Mahinay we 18 

held that mere denial by witnesses particularly when not corroborated or substantiated by clear and evidencing
evidence cannot prevail over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Denial being in
the nature of negative and self-serving evidence is seldom given weight in law. Positive and forthright declarations
of witnesses are even held to be worthier of credence than a self-serving denial.

We agree with the court a quo that the quantum of proof required to convict an accused in a criminal case has been
satisfied in the present dispute. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 19

The legal basis of the trial court for convicting accused-appellant is Art. 320, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 7659, Sec. 10, par. 1. Under this provision, a person found guilty of Destructive Arson is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death where the burning affects one (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one
single act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or different occasions.

However, we believe that the applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a
20 

penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties burned by accused-
appellant are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid
law. The descriptions as alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer to the structures
as houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613,
and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that
such laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and literally in favor of the accused.

The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar.

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the
criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of
their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous
to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On 21 

the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of
perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates
crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.
However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the
qualifying circumstances present.

In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither appears to be heinous nor represents a greater
degree of perversity and viciousness as distinguished from those acts punishable under Art. 320 of The Revised
Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was established to convert the offense to Destructive Arson. The special
aggravating circumstance that accused-appellant was "motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant
of the property burned" cannot be appreciated in the present case where it appears that he was acting more on
impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded
ego. Nothing can be worse than a spurned lover or a disconsolate father under the prevailing circumstances that
22 

surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house. Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple Arson
penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited house or dwelling.

In addition, we find that there exists a mitigating circumstance that should have been appreciated by the trial court in
determining the penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant: a circumstance similar and analogous to passion
and obfuscation. An impulse of invidious or resentful feelings contemplates a situation akin to passion and
23 

obfuscation. This circumstance is mitigating since, like passion and obfuscation, the accused who acts with these
feelings suffers a diminution of his intelligence and intent, a reduction in his mental and rational faculties.

It has been satisfactorily shown by the court a quo that the lovers’ quarrel between Nestor Soriano and Honey
Rosario Cimagala ignited the chain of events that led to the conflagration that occurred in the early dawn of 18
September 1998. Passions were inflamed in the evening of 17 September 1998 due to the impending return of
Soriano to Manila the following day with the prospect of leaving behind in Davao his son Otoy who bears his
namesake "Nestor Jr." But reason, unfortunately, did not prevail; emotions took control of the events that were to
unfold. His efforts went to naught; his attempts to win back his forbidden love were likewise thwarted. Verily, the
resentment accused-appellant felt came from the realization that he may never see his son again once he left
Davao; that his utter frustration in trying to convince Honey Rosario Cimagala to return to Manila with their son
brought with it a reduction of his rational faculties within that moment in time. Although emanating from lawful
sentiments, the actuations of accused-appellant led to his criminal act of burning the Cimagala home, and other
neighboring houses. In other words, accused-appellant was in a state of extreme emotional stress.

Mr. Justice Adam C. Carson, in his concurring opinion in United States v. Butardo, gives his view on the graduation
24 

of penalties for the crime of Arson under the Spanish Penal Code. In the old law on which The Revised Penal Code
is based, he comments that the authors clearly had in mind certain considerations in imposing penalties of
exceptional severity in the various cases of arson. The observations of Mr. Justice Carson in Butardo are thus still
relevant in our contemporary interpretation of criminal law:

The authors of the Spanish Penal Code, in imposing penalties of exceptional severity in certain cases of arson,
clearly had in mind:

First. The extreme danger to which human lives may be exposed by the malicious burning of dwelling
houses and the like;

Second. The danger to property resulting from widespread conflagrations;

Third. The fact that it is extremely difficult to adopt precautions against the commission of the crime, and to
discover the perpetrators after its commission.

Formerly, where these elements marked the commission of the crime, the single penalty prescribed by law was that
of death, but this severity was finally relaxed, and while exceptionally severe penalties are still imposed in such
cases, the authors of the Penal Code appear to have endeavored to graduate these penalties in accordance with
the degree of danger to life and property, resulting from the commission of the crime.

To this end the severest penalties are prescribed for the malicious burning of edifies in which large numbers of
persons are assembled. Less harsh, but still very severe penalties are imposed on those setting fire to dwelling
houses and other buildings more or less permanently occupied. Less severe penalties on those guilty of burning
unoccupied dwellings, the penalty being more or less severe as the house appeared to be situated so as to make a
widespread conflagration more or less probable. And finally, sufficient, but not notably harsh penalties are
prescribed in cases where the property of others is set on fire under conditions which do not suggest special danger
to human life or the likelihood of considerable destruction of property.

In a concurring opinion, this time in U.S. v. Burns, Mr. Justice Ignacio Villamor explains the rationale behind the
penalties for Arson: 25
In the opinion of Groizard, one of the most famous commentators on the Spanish Penal Code, of which ours is but a
copy, "it is the potential damage that is considered here in fixing the grave penalty of cadena temporal to cadena
perpetua. The risk which a person runs who may be found in a place that is burned, whether it be a building, a farm-
house, a hut or shelter, or a vessel in port, is what constitutes the gravity which is the object of this crime; just as the
damaging intent of the agent, manifested by his setting fire to a place where he knows there is one or more
persons, gives an idea of his subjective perversity."

The same author adds: "In the classification of the crime attention must be given to the intention of the author.
When fire is used with the intent to kill a determined person who may be in a shelter, and that object is secured, the
crime committed is not that defined herein, but that of murder, penalized in article 418 (art. 403 of the Penal Code of
the Philippines), with the penalty of cadena temporal in its maximum degree to death" (Groizard, Vol. 8, p. 45).

Accused-appellant is undoubtedly responsible for the fire that occurred in the wee hours of 18 September 1998 that
razed to the ground the Cimagala home and a number of other houses in the vicinity. Still, we believe that the
record shows that the elements discussed by Mr. Justice Carson in his separate concurring opinion in Butardo are
wanting. We are therefore not adequately convinced that imposing the exceptionally severe penalty of reclusion
perpetua is proper in the case at bar.

First. There appears to be no reckless disregard for human lives indicative of a cold, calculating, wicked and
perverse intention to burn the Cimagala home. The action of accused-appellant was the result of a lovers’ tiff
between him and Honey over their son, Otoy, and concerning the future of their unbridled relationship. His
spontaneous, albeit criminal, act was carried out without any intention to exterminate human lives. His
purpose in going to Davao was to convince his lover to move back with him to Manila and bringing along
their son Otoy.

Second. Neither was there any reckless disregard for the rights of the neighboring property owners.  The
1âwphi1

criminal act of burning the Cimagala home was carried out by accused-appellant in a diminished emotional
state, which mitigates his criminal liability to a lesser degree of criminality.

Third. The testimony of Honey clearly points to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. However,
the conduct of accused-appellant after he consummated the crime, i.e., when he set fire to the clothes of
Honey, is material in determining the severity of the penalty to be imposed. After his impulsive act of setting
fire to both the plastic partition of the room and Honey’s clothes, he attempted to mend his ways immediately
by attempting to put out the flames although it was too late. His act of burning Honey’s clothes set in motion
a chain of events that spun out of control and led to the blaze that destroyed houses in its path. However,
despite the mayhem caused by accused-appellant, he never fled the scene of the crime; in fact, he watched
helplessly as the flames consumed the Cimagala home and the neighboring houses. He did not resist the
police authorities when he was invited for questioning at the police station to shed light on the incident.

Thus, applying Mr. Justice Carson’s exceptional severity standard as regards the imposition of penalties for the
crime of Arson, the degree of criminality involved in the accused-appellant’s act is lessened by the fact that he acted
on an impulse that diminished his reasoning faculties, thus mitigating the punishment to be imposed. The proper
penalty to be imposed should therefore take into consideration the analogous mitigating circumstance to passion
and obfuscation under Art. 13, par. 10, as discussed above, in relation to Art. 64, par. 2, of The Revised Penal
Code. 26

Under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, in relation to Art. 64, par. 2, of The Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for
simple arson is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree to the imposable
penalty is prision mayor the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years in any of its periods.
Under the circumstances, it is believed that an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years four (4) months and twenty
(20) days of prision mayor minimum as minimum to fourteen (14) years two (2) months and ten (10) days of the
minimum of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua as maximum may be imposed on the accused.

As to the award of damages, this Court has consistently held that proof is required to determine the reasonable
amount of damages that may be awarded to the victims of conflagration. As a rule, therefore, actual or
compensatory damages must be proved and not merely alleged. We believe that the records do not adequately
reflect any concrete basis for the award of actual damages to the offended parties. The court a quo granted the
award solely on the bare assertions of the complaining witnesses. Moral damages cannot be awarded in this case,
as there is no evidentiary basis to justify it. However, accused-appellant’s civil liability is beyond cavil; what needs to
be resolved is the amount of indemnity he should pay to the owners of the burned houses for the damage caused.
In lieu thereof, this Court may award temperate or moderate damages to the victims of the conflagration in
accordance with Art. 2224 of the Civil Code. Indeed, the records evince that the victims suffered some pecuniary
loss although the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. Consequently, temperate damages in the amount
of ₱250,000.00 which is considered reasonable under the circumstances should be awarded to each of the
complaining witnesses or their heirs as the case may be.

Exemplary or corrective damages should likewise be awarded as a way to correct future conduct of this nature and
preserve the public good. Such damages are designed to reshape behavior that is socially deleterious in its
consequences. Hence, exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for each of the above-
27 

mentioned complaining witnesses or their heirs is fair and just under the premises.

It must be noted that accused-appellant became an unwitting victim of his own extra-marital indiscretions. His flawed
emotional disposition coupled with a lapse in judgment became his own undoing as he now languishes in jail for
choosing the road to perdition. Although he has no one to blame but himself for his vicissitudes, we believe that the
lessons to be learned from this sad and miserable chapter of his life are more than adequate from which he can
gain insight and wisdom, while he sits patiently in his prison cell waiting for the day when he can once again breathe
the invigorating air of freedom.

WHEREFORE, Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City finding accused-appellant Nestor G. Soriano
guilty of Destructive Arson is MODIFIED to Simple Arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, and the penalty imposed
on him REDUCED to an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years four (4) months and twenty (20) days of prision
mayor minimum as minimum to fourteen (14) years two (2) months and ten (10) days of reclusion
temporal minimum as maximum. Temperate damages in the amount of ₱250,000.00 and exemplary damages of
₱50,000.00 are AWARDED to each of complaining witnesses Fructuosa L. Jambo, Simplicio B. Cabrera, Francisco
Clerigo, Orlando Braña and Oscar T. Cimagala. Costs against accused-appellant.
35.) G.R. No. 182460               March 9, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The subject of review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), which found appellant Jessie Villegas Murcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of arson and frustrated homicide.

In an Information dated 6 April 2004, appellant was accused of the crime of arson committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, in the Municipality of Bauang, Province of La Union, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by some evil motive, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire and burn a residential house knowing the same to be
inhabited by one FELICIDAD M. QUILATES burning and killing said FELICIDAD M. QUILATES as well as burning
and damaging nine (9) other neighboring houses in the process, to the damage and prejudice of said house-owners
in the aggregate amount of THREE MILLION PESOS (Php3,000,000.00), Philippines Currency, as well as to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of FELICIDAD QUILATES.

The charge is qualified by the resulting death of Felicidad M. Quilates.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Appellant was also charged in another Information for frustrated homicide, the accusatory portion reads:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2980-BG

That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, in the Municipality of Bauang, Province of La Union, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a knife one, Alicia Q. Manlupig inflicting upon the
latter stab wounds, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of homicide as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it be reason of causes independent of the will; that is, by the timely
medical attendance rendered to said Alicia Q. Manlupig which prevented her death, all to the damage and prejudice
of said offended party.

CONTARARY TO LAW.4

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. Trial on the merits ensued.

Based on the narration of prosecution witnesses, the facts follow. Eulogio Quilates (Eulogio) is the owner of a two-
storey house in Paringao, Bauang, La Union. Among the occupants of his house were his sister Felicidad Quilates
(Felicidad); another sister Alicia Manlupig (Alicia); and nephew Herminio Manlupig (Herminio). Appellant, who is the
adopted son of Felicidad, occupied one room in the house. At around 3:30 p.m. of 24 March 2004, appellant was
having a drinking spree with his cousin Herminio and brothers-in-law Joey Viduya and Ricky Viduya (Ricky) in front
of their house. Appellant and Herminio were arguing over the matter of caring for Felicidad while the latter was
confined in the hospital. Ricky tried to mediate between the two. Appellant was then seen going inside the house to
get a bolo. When he emerged from the house ten (10) minutes later, he ran after Herminio but the latter managed to
escape unscathed. Appellant again went back to the house. 5
Meanwhile, after pacifying appellant and Herminio, Ricky resumed drinking. A few minutes later, he saw smoke
coming from the room of appellant. As Ricky was about to enter the house, he met appellant at the door. Appellant
apparently tried to stab Ricky but was unsuccessful. Ricky witnessed appellant stab Felicidad and Alicia.6

Herminio, who had since come back to the drinking table, also saw the smoke. He peeped through the small window
of the house and witnessed appellant burning some clothes and boxes in the sala. Herminio immediately went
inside the house to save his personal belongings. Upon emerging from the house, Herminio saw his mother, Alicia,
bloodied.7

Alicia testifies that she was sitting on a chair near the toilet when she saw smoke coming out of appellant's room.
Before she could react, appellant came charging at her and stabbed her. She sustained wounds on her upper thigh,
arms, below her breast and on her ear. Alicia was still able to ask for help, and her daughter-in-law brought her to
the hospital.8

Eulogio heard a commotion while he was cooking in the second floor of the house. When Eulogio went down, he
already saw smoke coming from the room of appellant. He then saw Felicidad near the comfort room located
outside the house and was bleeding from her mouth. As he was about to help Felicidad, he met appellant who was
then holding a knife. Eulogio immediately ran away.9

Upon seeing Herminio, appellant immediately attacked him with a knife. However, Herminio and Ricky were able to
pin appellant down. Before they could retaliate, the barangay captain arrived at the scene.10 As a result, eight (8)
houses were razed.

Inspector Ferdinand Formacion responded to the fire incident and saw four (4) houses were already burned. After
putting out the fire, he and the arson investigator conducted an ocular investigation and invited witnesses to the
police station to submit their sworn statements. SPO2 Rodolfo Lomboy, chief investigator of Philippine National
Police Bauang Police Station, was told by witnesses that appellant intentionally set the boxes on fire inside the
house.11

Eulogio estimated the value of his house at ₱250,000.00,12 while another sister of Felicidad, Pacita Quilates,
presented a receipt covering the burial expenses for Felicidad, amounting to ₱10,000.00.13

An autopsy was performed on Felicidad, and it was disclosed that she died from "cardio-respiratory arrest
secondary to third degree burns involving 90% of body surface to include underlying tissues and organs."14

Appellant was the lone witness for the defense. He stated that while he was having a drinking spree, he saw
Felicidad go inside the house to get a glass of water. He followed her and gave her water. He noticed Felicidad light
a gas lamp. He then went back to his friends and resumed drinking. He got into a heated argument with Herminio.
The latter struck him in the head. He immediately went inside the house to get a weapon. He was able to get a bolo,
went back outside and hit Herminio. The latter ran away and appellant chased him. Appellant met Alicia and
confronted her about the actuations of Herminio. But Alicia cursed him. Appellant thereafter hit her with the knife.
Appellant then fell on the ground and lost consciousness because, apparently, he was struck by something in the
back.15 Appellant denied setting the house on fire.16

On 30 May 2006, decision was rendered by the RTC, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson and
frustrated homicide, thus:

WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2979-Bg., the Court FINDS and DECLARES the accused JESSIE VILLEGAS
MURCIA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson as charged and defined under Art. 320 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of
death; to indemnify the heirs of the victim Felicidad Quilates, the amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages;
Php50,000.00 as death indemnity; Php10,000.00 as actual damages and another Php10,000.00 as temperate
damages.

Further, the accused is ordered to indemnify Eulogio Quilates the amount of P250,000.00, representing the value of
the burned house.
In Crim. Case No. 2980-Bg., the Court likewise FINDS and DECLARES the accused JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide as charged and he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision
mayor as maximum; to pay the victim Alicia Q. Manlupig the amount of Php10,000.00 as temperate damages; and
to pay the costs.1avvphi1

In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited with his preventive imprisonment under the terms and
conditions, provided for by Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Let the record of Crim. Case No. 2979-Bg. be sent to the Court of Appeals for automatic review.17

The trial court found that the corpus delicti in arson, as well as the identity of the perpetrator, were established
beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. While there was no evidence to directly link appellant to the crime, the
trial court relied on circumstantial evidence.

In view of the penalty imposed, the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic review and judgment.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's findings but reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal, which was given due course by the Court of Appeals on 22 January 2008. In a
Resolution18 dated 7 July 2008, this Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective
supplemental briefs. Appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) both filed their manifestations,19 stating
that they would no longer file any supplemental briefs and instead adopt their respective briefs.

Appellant admitted to the crime of frustrated homicide, hence the review is limited to the crime of arson.

Appellant maintains his innocence of the charge of arson. He questions the credibility of some witnesses and
specifically imputes ill-motive on the part of Herminio in testifying against him, especially after their fight.20 Appellant
submits that the testimonies of witnesses, which failed to turn into a coherent whole, did not prove the identity of the
perpetrator.21

On the other hand, the OSG banks on circumstantial evidence, as relied to by the trial court, to prove the guilt of
appellant.22 The OSG vouches for the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and avers that their testimonies have
proven the corpus delicti and warrant appellant's conviction.23

In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus
delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the
crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been
intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the
corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.24

The photographs,25 evidencing the charred remains of the houses, established the occurrence of the fire. In this
case, however, there is no direct evidence to establish the culpability of appellant. At any rate, direct evidence is not
the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Established facts that form a chain of circumstances
can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction. Indeed, rules on
evidence and principles in jurisprudence have long recognized that the accused may be convicted through
circumstantial evidence.26

Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.─ Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
 (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to
leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal responsibility of the accused.27

The appellate court considered the following circumstances to establish an unbroken chain of events pointing to the
logical conclusion that appellant started the fire:

First, accused-appellant Murcia returned inside E. Quilates' house after chasing H. Manlupig with a bolo and after
being pacified by R. Viduya and J. Viduya;

Second, during the resumption of their drinking session, R. Viduya and H. Manlupig saw a thick smoke emanating
from E. Quilates' house particularly the window of accused-appellant Murcia's room in the ground floor;

Third, H. Manlupig peeped through the said window and saw accused-appellant Murcia throwing cartons of clothes
into the fire. Meanwhile, E. Quilates, who was then cooking at the second floor, went downstairs and saw the fire
coming from the room occupied by accused-appellant Murcia in the ground floor;

Fourth, R. Viduya saw accused-appellant Murcia stabbing F. Quilates and A. Manlupig, among other persons. E.
Quilates saw his sister F. Quilates with blood oozing from her mouth. Accused-appellant Murcia met him at the
ground brandishing a knife at him which prevented him from helping the wounded F. Quilates and forced him to run
away for safety. E. Quilates' other sister, A. Manlupig, was also seen wounded and lying unconscious in the canal;
and

Fifth, the houses of E. Quilates and his neighbors were razed by fire and the commission of the crime of arson
resulted in the demise of F. Quilates whose remains were burned beyond recognition.28

Indeed, appellant was last seen inside the house before the fire started. Eulogio and Ricky saw smoke emanating
from the room of appellant. Herminio testified that he saw appellant burning clothes in his room. Appellant then went
on a stabbing rampage while the house was on fire. While nobody directly saw appellant burn the house, these
circumstances would yield to a logical conclusion that the fire that gutted eight (8) houses was authored by
appellant.

Necessarily, the issue narrows down to credibility of the witnesses. Worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that on
matters involving the credibility of witnesses, the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of
witnesses since it has observed firsthand their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. Absent
any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have been overlooked and, if
considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness
made by the trial court remain binding on an appellate tribunal.29

In this case, We find no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the lower courts.

Appellant imputes ill-motive on the part of Herminio. This Court does not discount the fact that there was a fight
between appellant and Herminio which preceded the occurrence of the fire. However, it cannot be presumed that
Herminio will automatically give a false testimony against appellant. His testimony, having withstood cross-
examination, has passed the scrutiny of the lower courts and was held to be credible.

The lower courts found appellant liable under Article 320(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 10
of Republic Act No. 7659. It may not be amiss to point out that there are actually two categories of arson, namely:
Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code and Simple Arson under Presidential Decree
No. 1316. Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless
of the value of the damage caused.30 Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both
public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military,
government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. On the other hand,
Presidential Decree No. 1316 covers houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations,
railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments. 31
A close examination of the records, as well as description of the crime as stated in the information, reveals that the
crime committed is in fact simple arson because the burned properties are residential houses.

At any rate, the penalty for simple arson resulting to death, under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613,32 is
reclusion perpetua to death. With the repeal of the death penalty law through Republic Act No. 9346, the appellate
court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

This Court, however, takes exception to the trial court's award of damages.

With respect to the heirs of Felicidad, We modify the amount of temperate damages from ₱10,000.00 to ₱
25,000.00, and accordingly delete the amount of actual damages, in line with the ruling in People v. Villanueva.33 In
said case, the Court held that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than
₱25,000.00, the award of temperate damages for ₱25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser
amount.34

Anent the actual damages awarded to Eulogio amounting to ₱250,000.00, as indemnification for the burned house,
We note that said amount representing the value of the burned house was merely given by Eulogio as an estimate.
It was not substantiated by any document or receipt. For one to be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to
prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best
evidence obtainable by the injured party.35

Instead, We award temperate damages in accordance with Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, providing that temperate
damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot,
from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty.36 It is thus reasonable to expect that the value of the house
burned down amounted to at least ₱200,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding appellant JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of arson and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:

1. Appellant is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Felicidad Quilates the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages; ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity; and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.

2. The award of ₱10,000.00 as actual damages in favor of the heirs of Felicidad Quilates is deleted.

3. Appellant is ordered to pay Eulogio Quilates the amount of ₱200,000.00 as temperate damages.

The award of ₱250,000.00 as actual damages in favor of Eulogio Quilates is deleted.

36.)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G. R. No. 170470

Appellee, Present:
- versus - PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
EDNA MALNGAN y MAYO, PUNO,
Appellant. QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
September 26, 2006
x----------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
cralaw

The Case
For review is the Decision [1 ]  of the Court of Appealsin CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01139
promulgated on 2 September 2005, affirming with modification the  Judgment [2 ]  of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal Case No. 01-
188424 promulgated on 13 October 2003, finding appellant Edna Malngan  y Mayo
(Edna) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of  'Arson with Multiple
Homicide or Arson resulting to the death of six (6) people , and sentencing her to
suffer the penalty of death.
The Facts
As summarized[3 ]  by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent facts are as follows:
From the personal account of Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman in the
area, as well as the personal account of the pedicab driver named Rolando Gruta, it
was at around 4:45 a.m. on January 2, 2001 when Remigio Bernardo and his
tanods saw the accused-appellant EDNA, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto
Separa, Sr., with her head turning in different directions, hurriedly leaving the
house of her employer at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila. She was
seen to have boarded a pedicab which was driven by a person later identified as
Rolando Gruta. She was heard by the pedicab driver to have instructed that she be
brought to Nipa Street, but upon her arrival there, she changed her mind and asked
that she be brought instead to Balasan Street where she finally alighted, after
paying for her fare.
Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardo's group
later discovered that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the
 housemaid. Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods responded to the fire
upon hearing shouts from the residents and thereafter, firemen from the Fire
District 1-NCR arrived at the fire scene to contain the fire.
When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay Hall, he received a
report from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that shortly before
the occurrence of the fire, he saw a woman (the housemaid) coming out of the
house at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila and he received a call from
his wife telling him of a woman (the same housemaid) who was acting strangely
and suspiciously on Balasan Street. Barangay Chairman Bernardo, Rolando Gruta
and the other tanods proceeded to Balasan Street and found the woman who was
later identified as the accused-appellant. After Rolando Gruta positively identified
the woman as the same person who left No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo,
Manila, Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods apprehended her and brought
her to the Barangay Hall for investigation. At the Barangay Hall, Mercedita
Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was also burned,
identified the woman as accused-appellant EDNA who was the housemaid of
Roberto Separa, Sr. Upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-
appellant EDNA's bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Barangay
Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the
Barangay Hall that she set her employer's house on fire because she had not been
paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go home to her province
but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home.
Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson investigators headed by
S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta.
Cruz, Manila where she was further investigated and then detained.
When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to give her sworn
statement, she had the opportunity to ask accused-appellant EDNA at the latter's
detention cell why she did the burning of her employer's house and accused-
appellant EDNA replied that she set the house on fire because when she asked
permission to go home to her province, the wife of her employer Roberto Separa,
Sr., named Virginia Separa (sic) shouted at her: 'Sige umuwi ka, pagdating mo
maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa walis, pagdating mo maputi ka na (TSN, January 22,
2002, p.6) (Go ahead, when you arrive your color would be fair already. Ride a
broomstick, when you arrive your color would be fair already.') And when Mercedita
Mendoza asked accused-appellant EDNA how she burned the house, accused-
appellant EDNA told her: 'Naglukot  ako  ng maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng
disposable lighter at hinagis ko sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay (TSN,
January 22, 2002, p. 7.) (I crumpled newspapers, lighted them with a disposable
lighter and threw them on top of the table inside the house.')
When interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN Network, accused-
appellant EDNA while under detention (sic) was heard by SFO4 (sic) Danilo Talusan
as having admitted the crime and even narrated the manner how she accomplished
it. SFO4 (sic) Danilo Talusan was able to hear the same confession, this time at his
home, while watching the television program 'True Crime hosted by Gus Abelgas
also of ABS-CBN Network.
The fire resulted in [the] destruction of the house of Roberto Separa, Sr. and other
adjoining houses and the death of Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa together
with their four (4) children, namely: Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto, Jr.
On 9 January 2001, an Information[4 ]  was filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 41, charging
accused-appellant with the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide.The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 01-188424. The accusatory portion of said Information provides:
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
 feloniously and deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of
ROBERTO SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden materials located at No. 172
Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city, by lighting crumpled newspaper with the use
of disposable lighter inside said house knowing the same to be an inhabited house
and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a
conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining
residential houses, were razed by fire; that by reason and on the occasion of the
said fire, the following, namely,
1.            Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age
2.            Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age
3.            Michael Separa, 24 years of age
4.            Daphne Separa, 18 years of age
5.            Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age
6.            Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age
sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their death immediately
thereafter.[5]
When arraigned, accused-appellant with assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded[6] 'Not Guilty to
the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.[7]
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, SPO4[8] Danilo Talusan, Rolando Gruta,
Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza and Rodolfo Movilla to establish its charge that accused-
appellant Edna committed the crime of arson with multiple homicide.
SPO4 Danilo Talusan, arson investigator, testified that he was one of those who
responded to the fire that occurred on 2 January 2001 and which started at No. 172
Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila.He stated that the fire killed Roberto Separa, Sr. and
all the other members of his family, namely his wife, Virginia, and his children,
Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto, Jr.; the fire also destroyed their abode as well
as six neighboring houses. He likewise testified that he twice heard accused-appellant
' once while the latter was being interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-
CBN, and the other time when it was shown on channel 2 on television during the
airing of the television program entitled 'True Crime hosted by Gus Abelgas ' confess
to having committed the crime charged, to wit:
Pros. Rebagay:
Based on your investigation, was there any occasion when the
accused Edna Malngan admitted to the burning of the house of the
Separa Family?
x x x x
Witness:
Yes, sir.
cralaw

Pros. Rebagay:
When was that?
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A:On January 2 she was interviewed by the media, sir. The one who took the
coverage was Carmelita Valdez of Channel 2, ABS-CBN. They have a footage
that Edna admitted before them, sir.
Q:And where were you when Edna Malngan made that statement or admission to
Carmelita Valdez of ABS-CBN?
A:I was at our office, sir.
Q: Was there any other occasion wherein the accused made another confession
relative to the admission of the crime?
A:Yes, sir.
Q:When was that?
 A: Last Friday, sir. It was shown in True Crime of Gus Abelgas. She was interviewed
at the City Jail and she admitted that she was the one who authored the
crime, sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
And where were you when that admission to Gus Abelgas was made?
A:I was in the house and I just saw it on tv, sir.
Q:What was that admission that you heard personally, when you were present,
when the accused made the confession to Carmelita Valdez?
A:Naglukot  po  siya ng papel, sinidihan niya ng lighter at inilagay niya sa ibabaw ng
mesa yung mga diyaryo at sinunog niya.
x x x x
Q:Aside from that statement, was there any other statement made by the accused
Edna Malngan?
A:Yes, sir. 'Kaya po niya nagawa 'yon galit po siya sa kanyang amo na si  Virginia,
hindi siya pinasuweldo at gusto na po niyang umuwi na (sic) ayaw siyang
payagan. Nagsalita pa po sa kanya na, 'Sumakay ka na lang sa walis.
Pagbalik mo dito maputi ka na. (sic) 'Yon po ang sinabi  ng kanyang amo.
Atty. Masweng:
That was a statement of an alleged dead person, your Honor.
Court:
Sabi ni Valdes, ha?
Pros. Rebagay:
Sabi ni Edna Malngan kay Carmelita Valdez, Your Honor.
Court:
Double hearsay na 'yon.
Pros. Rebagay:
No, Your Honor, the witness was present, Your Honor, when that confession was
made by the accused to Carmelita Valdez.[9]
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Rolando Gruta, the pedicab driver and one of the barangay tanods in the area,
testified:
Pros. Rebagay:
Mr. Witness, what is your profession?
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A: Sidecar driver, sir.

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Q: On January 2, 2001 at around 4:45 in the morning, do you recall where were

cralaw

(sic) you?
A: I was at the corner of Moderna Street, sir.
cralaw

Pros. Rebagay:
And while you were at the corner of Moderna St., what happened if any, Mr.
Witness?
A: I saw Edna coming out from the door of the house of Roberto Separa, sir.
cralaw

Q: Do you know the number of the house of the Separa Family?

cralaw

A: 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, sir.

cralaw

x x x x
Q: And you said you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa Family.
cralaw

How far is that house from the place where you were waiting at the corner of
Moderna and Paulino Streets?
A: About three meters from Moderna and Paulino Streets where my pedicab was
cralaw

placed. My distance was about three meters, sir.

x x x x
Q: And how did you know that the house where Edna came out is that of the house
cralaw

of the Separa Family?

A: Mismong nakita  po ng dalawang mata ko na doon siya galing sa bahay ng
cralaw

Separa Family.
Q: How long have you known the Separa Family, if you know them?
cralaw

A: About two years, sir.

cralaw

Q: How about this Edna, the one you just pointed (to) awhile ago? Do you know her
cralaw

prior to January 2, 2001?

A: Yes, sir. I knew(sic) her for two years.
cralaw

Court:
Why?
cralaw

Witness:
Madalas ko po siyang maging pasahero ng aking pedicab.
cralaw

Pros. Rebagay:
How about the Separa family? Why do you know them?
cralaw

A: They were the employers of Edna, sir.

cralaw

Q: You said you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa Family. What
cralaw

happened when you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa
Family?
A: Wala  pa pong ano 'yan naisakay ko na siya sa sidecar.
cralaw

Q: And what did you observe from Edna when you saw her coming out from the
cralaw

house of the Separa family?

A: Nagmamadali po siyang lumakad at palinga-linga.
cralaw

x x x x
Q: After she boarded your pedicab, what happened, if any?
cralaw

A: Nagpahatid po siya sa akin.
cralaw

Q: Where? cralaw

A: To Nipa Street, sir.
cralaw

Q: Did you bring her to Nipa Street  as she requested?

cralaw

A: Yes, sir. cralaw

x x x x
Q: You said that you brought her to Nipa Street. What happened when you go (sic)
cralaw

there at Nipa Street, if any?

A: Nagpahinto  po  siya doon ng saglit, mga tatlong minuto po.
cralaw

Q: What did she do when she asked (you) to stop there for three minutes?
cralaw

A: After three minutes she requested me to bring her directly to Balasan Street, sir.
cralaw

x x x x
Q: What happened after that?
cralaw

A: When we arrived there, she alighted and pay (sic) P5.00, sir.
cralaw

Q And then what transpired after she alighted from your pedicab?
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Witness:
I went home and I looked for another passenger, sir.
cralaw

Pros. Rebagay:
After that, what happened when you were on you way to your house to look for
cralaw

passengers?
A Nakita ko na nga po na pagdating ko sa Moderna, naglalagablab na apoy.
cralaw

Q: From what place was that fire coming out?

cralaw

A: From the house of Roberto Separa Family, sir.

cralaw

x x x x
Pros. Rebagay:
After you noticed that there was a fire from the house of Roberto Separa Family,
cralaw

what did you do if any?

A: Siyempre po, isang Barangay Tanod po ako, nagresponde na po kami sa sunog.
cralaw

Binuksan na po ng Chairman naming 'yung tangke, binomba na po naming

'yung apoy ng tubig.
Q: After that incident, Mr. Witness, have you seen Edna Again (sic).
cralaw

A: No, sir. cralaw

 Pros. Rebagay:
And after that incident, did you come to know if Edna was apprehended or not?
cralaw

x x x x
cralaw

A: I was called by our Barangay Chairman in order to identify Edna, sir.

cralaw

x x x x[10] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Remigio Bernardo, Barangay Chairman of the area where the fire occurred, stated:
Pros. Rebagay:
On January 2, 2001, do you recall if there is a fire that occurred somewhere
in your area of jurisdiction, particularly Moderna Street?
A: Yes, sir.
cralaw

Q: Now, where were you when this incident happened?

cralaw

A: Kasi ugali ko na po tuwing umagang-umaga po ako na pupunta sa barangay Hall

cralaw

mga siguro 6:00 or 5:00 o clock, me sumigaw ng sunog

nirespondehan namin iyong  sunog  eh me dala kaming fire.
Court:
You just answer the question. Where were you when this incident happened?
Witness: cralaw

I was at the Barangay Hall, Your Honor.

cralaw

Pros. Rebagay:
And you said that there was a fire that occurred, what did you do?
Witness:
Iyon nga nagresponde kami doon sa sunog eh nakita ko iyong sunog mukha
talagang arson dahil napakalaki kaagad, meron pong mga tipong ' Iyong
namatay po contractor po iyon eh kaya siguro napakaraming kalat ng mga
pintura, mga container, kaya hindi po  namin  naapula kaagad iyong apoy,
nasunog ultimo iyong fire tank namin sa lakas, sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
Now, will you please tell us where this fire occurred?
cralaw

A: At the house of the six victims, sir.

cralaw

Q: Whose house is that?

cralaw

A: The house of the victims, sir.

cralaw

x x x x
Pros. Rebagay:
You said that you responded to the place, what transpired after you
responded to the place?
A: Iyon nga  po ang nagsabi may lumabas na isang babae po  noon  sa bahay na
cralaw

nagmamadali habang may sunog, me isang barangay tanod po akong

nagsabi may humahangos na isang babae na may dalang bag papunta po
roon palabas ng sasakyan, sir.
Q: And so what happened?
cralaw

A: Siyempre hindi  naman ako nagtanong kung sino ngayon may dumating galing
cralaw

na sa bahay naming, may tumawag, tumawag po si Konsehala Alfonso na

may isang babae na hindi mapakali doon sa Calle Pedro Alfonso, ke konsehal
na baka ito sabi niya iyong ganito ganoon nirespondehan ko po, sir.
Q: Where did you respond?
cralaw

A: At Balasan, sir, but it's not the area of my jurisdiction.

cralaw

x x x x
Q: What happened when you reached that place?
cralaw

A: Siya  po  ang nahuli ko doon, sir.

cralaw

Court:
Witness pointing to accused Edna Malngan.
cralaw

Pros. Rebagay:
And what happened?
cralaw
 A: I brought her to the barangay hall, sir.
cralaw

Q: And what happened at the barangay hall?

cralaw

A: Inembestigahan ko, kinuha naming iyong bag niya, me lighter siya eh. Inamin
cralaw

niya po sa amin na kaya niya sinunog hindi siya pinasasahod ng more or less
isang taon na eh. Ngayon sabi ko bakit eh gusto ko ng umuwi ng probinsya
ang sabi sa akin ng amo ko sumakay na lang daw po ako ng walis tingting
para makauwi, sir.
Atty. Herman:
We would like to object, Your Honor on the ground that that is hearsay.
Pros. Rebagay:
That is not a hearsay statement, Your Honor, straight from the mouth of the
accused.
Atty. Herman:
It's not under the exemption under the Rules of Court, Your Honor. He is
testifying according to what he has heard.
Court:
That's part of the narration. Whether it is true or not, that's another matter.
Let it remain.
Pros. Rebagay:
Now, who were present when the accused are telling you this?
A: Iyon  nga iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan doon nakapaligid, siyempre may
cralaw

sunog nagkakagulo, gusto nga siyang kunin ng mga mamamayan para

saktan hindi ko maibigay papatayin siya gawa ng may namatay eh anim na
tao and namatay, kaya iyong mga tao kinokontrol siya madidisgrasya siya
dahil pin-pointed po siya, Your Honor, iyong dami na iyon libo iyong
nakapaligid doon sa barangay hall napakahirap awatin.  Gustong-
gusto siyang kunin ng mga taong-bayan, nagalit dahil ang daming bahay
hong nasunog.[11]
For her part, Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of the Separa Family and whose
house was one of those destroyed by the fire, recounted:
Pros. Rebagay:
Madam Witness, on January 2, 2001, do you recall where were you residing
then?
A: Yes, sir.
cralaw

Q: Where were you residing at?

cralaw

A:  At No. 170 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, sir.

cralaw

Q: Why did you transfer your residence? Awhile ago you testified that you are now
cralaw

residing at 147 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila?

A: Because our house was burned, sir.
cralaw

Q: More or less, how much did the loss incurred on the burning of your house (sic)?
cralaw

A: More or less, P100,000.00, sir

cralaw

Q: Do you know the accused in this case Edna Malngan?

cralaw

A: Yes, sir.
cralaw

Q: Why do you know her?

cralaw

A: She is the house helper of the family who were (sic) burned, sir.
cralaw

Q: What family?
cralaw

A: Cifara (sic) family, sir.

cralaw

Q: Who in particular do you know among Cifara (sic) family?

cralaw

A: The woman, sir.

cralaw

Q: What is the name?

cralaw

A: Virginia Mendoza Cifara (sic), sir.

cralaw

Q: Are you related to Virginia Mendoza Cifara (sic)?

cralaw

A: My husband, sir.
cralaw
 Q: What is the relationship of your husband to the late Virginia Mendoza Cifara
cralaw

(sic)?
A: They were first cousins, sir.
cralaw

Q: How far is your house from the house of the Cifara (sic) family?
cralaw

A: Magkadikit  lang po. Pader lang ang pagitan.

cralaw

Q: You said that Edna Malngan was working with the Cifara (sic) family. What is the
cralaw

work of Edna Malngan?

A: Nangangamuhan  po. House helper, sir.
cralaw

Q: How long do you know Edna Malngan as house helper of the Cifara (sic) family?
cralaw

A: I cannot estimate but she stayed there for three to four years, sir.
cralaw

Q: Do you know who caused the burning of the house of the Cifara (sic) family?
cralaw

Witness:
Edna Malngan, sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
Why do you know that it was Edna Malngan who burned the house of the Cifara
cralaw

(sic) family?
A: When the fire incident happened, sir, on January 3, we went to San Lazaro Fire
cralaw

Station and I saw Edna Malngan detained there, sir.

Q: And so what is your basis in pointing to Edna Malngan as the culprit or the one
cralaw

who burned the house of the Cifara (sic) family?

A: I talked to her when we went there at that day, sir.
cralaw

Q: What transpired then?

cralaw

A: I talked to her and I told her, 'Edna, bakit mo naman ginawa 'yung ganun?
cralaw

Q: And what was the answer of Edna?

cralaw

A: She answered, 'Kasi pag nagpapaalam ako sa kanyang umuwi ng probinsya,

cralaw

nagpapaalam po siyang umuwi ng probinsya ang sinasabi daw po sa kanya ni

Baby Cifara (sic)  na, (sic)Sige  umuwi  ka, pagdating mo maputi ka na.
Sumakay ka sa walis pagdating mo maputi ka na.
Pros. Rebagay:
What is the basis there that she was the one who burned the house of the Cifara
cralaw

(sic) family?
A: I also asked her, 'Paano mo ginawa 'yung sunog? She told me, 'Naglukot ako ng
cralaw

maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng disposable lighter at hinagis niya sa

ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay. (sic)[12]
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Lastly, the prosecution presented Rodolfo Movilla, owner of the house situated beside that of
the Separa family. He testified that his house was also gutted by the fire that killed
the Separa family and that he tried to help said victims but to no avail.
The prosecution presented other documentary evidence[13] and thereafter rested its case.
When it came time for the defense to present exculpatory evidence, instead of doing so,
accused-appellant filed a Motion to Admit Demurrer to Evidence [14] and the
corresponding Demurrer to Evidence[15] with the former expressly stating that
said Demurrer to Evidence was being filed 'x x x without express leave of court x x x.
[16]
In her Demurrer to Evidence, accused-appellant asserts that the prosecution's
evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the following
reasons:[17]  (a) that she is charged with crime not defined and penalized by law; (b)
that circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt; and (c) that the testimonies given by the witnesses of the prosecution were
hearsay, thus, inadmissible in evidence against her.
The prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition to accused-appellant's Demurrer to
Evidence.
On 13 October 2003, acting on the Demurrer to Evidence, the RTC promulgated
its Judgment[18] wherein it proceeded to resolve the subject case based on the
evidence of the prosecution. The RTC considered accused-appellant to have waived her
right to present evidence, having filed the Demurrer to Evidence without leave of
court.
In finding accused-appellant Edna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Arson with Multiple Homicide, the RTC ruled that:
The first argument of the accused that she is charged with an act not
defined and penalized by law is without merit. x x x the caption which
charges the accused with the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide is
merely descriptive of the charge of Arson that resulted to Multiple
Homicide. The fact is that the accused is charged with Arson which
resulted to Multiple Homicide (death of victims) and that charge is
embodied and stated in the body of the information. What is controlling is
the allegation in the body of the Information and not the title or caption
thereof. x x x.
xxxx
The second and third arguments will be discussed jointly as they are
interrelated with each other. x x x.
xxxx
[W]hile there is no direct evidence that points to the accused in the act of
burning the house or actually starting the subject fire, the following
circumstances that show that the accused intentionally caused or was
responsible for the subject fire have been duly established:
1. that immediately before the burning of the house, the accused hurriedly
cralaw

and with head turning in different directions (palinga-linga) went out of

the said house and rode a pedicab apparently not knowing where to go x x
x;
2. that immediately after the fire, upon a report that there was a woman in
cralaw

Balasan St. who appears confused and apprehensive (balisa), the Barangay
Chairman and his tanods went there, found the accused and apprehended
her and brought her to the barangay hall as shown by the testimony of
Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo; and
3. that when she was apprehended and investigated by the barangay
cralaw

officials and when her bag was opened, the same contained a disposable
lighter as likewise shown by the testimony of the Barangay Chairman.
[T]he timing of her hurried departure and nervous demeanor immediately
before the fire when she left the house and rode a pedicab and her same
demeanor, physical and mental condition when found and apprehended at
the same place where she alighted from the pedicab and the discovery of
the lighter in her bag thereafter when investigated indisputably show her
guilt as charged.
If there is any doubt of her guilt that remains with the circumstantial
cralaw

evidence against her, the same is removed or obliterated with the

confessions/admissions of the commission of the offense and the manner
thereof that she made to the prosecution witnesses Barangay Chairman
Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza and to the media, respectively.
xxxx
 [H]er confessions/admissions are positive acknowledgment of guilt of the
crime and appear to have been voluntarily and intelligently given. These
confessions/admissions, especially the one given to her neighbor
Mercedita Mendoza and the media, albeit uncounselled and made while she
was already under the custody of authorities, it is believed, are not
violative of her right under the Constitution.
The decretal part of the RTC's Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby denied and judgment is
hereby rendered finding the accused EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide or
Arson resulting to the death of six (6) people and sentencing her to suffer
the mandatory penalty of death, and ordering her to pay the heirs of the
victims Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa and children Michael,
Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto, Jr., the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos for each victim and the amount of One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as temperate damages for their burned
house or a total of Four Hundred Thousand (P400,000.00) Pesos and to
Rodolfo Movilla the amount of One Hundred [Thousand] (P100,000.00)
Pesos.
Due to the death penalty imposed by the RTC, the case was directly elevated to this
Court for automatic review. Conformably with our decision in People v.  Efren Mateo y
Garcia,[19] however, we referred the case and its records to the CA for appropriate
action and disposition.
On 2 September 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of
the RTC, the fallo  of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed October 13, 2003
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, finding
accused-appellant Edna Malngan y Mayo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Arson with multiple homicide and sentencing her to suffer the DEATH
PENALTY is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that she is further
ordered to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages and another P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each of the victims who perished in the fire, to be
paid to their heirs. She is ordered to pay Rodolfo Movilla, one whose house
was also burned, the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damage.
Pursuant to Section 13 (a), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004,
which became effective on October 15, 2004, the Court of Appeals, after
rendering judgment, hereby refrains from making an entry of judgment
and forthwith certifies the case and elevates the entire record of this case
to the Supreme Court for review.[20]
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is the contention of accused-appellant that the evidence presented by

the prosecution is not sufficient to establish her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt as the perpetrator of the crime charged. In support of said
exculpatory proposition, she assigns the following errors [21] :
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION IS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT
THE ACCUSED; and
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING AND GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND UNCOUNSELLED ADMISSIONS ALLEGEDLY
 GIVEN BY THE ACCUSED TO THE WITNESSES BARANGAY CHAIRMAN
REMIGIO BERNARDO, MERCEDITA MENDOZA AND THE MEDIA.
THERE IS NO COMPLEX CRIME OF ARSON WITH (MULTIPLE) HOMICIDE.
The  Information  in this case erroneously charged accused- appellant with
a complex crime , i.e., Arson with Multiple Homicide . Presently, there are
two (2) laws that govern the crime of arson where death
results  therefrom  ' Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659, [22]  and  Section 5 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1613 [23] , quoted hereunder, to wit:
Revised Penal Code:
ART. 320. Destructive Arson. ' x x x x
If as a consequence of the commission  of any of the acts penalized under
this Article,  death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
Presidential Decree No. 1613:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. ' If by reason of or on the
occasion of the arson death results, the penalty of reclusion  perpetua to
death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
Art. 320 of the RPC, as amended, with respect to destructive arson, and the
provisions of PD No. 1613  respecting other cases of arson provide  only one
penalty for the commission of arson, whether considered destructive or
otherwise, where death results   therefrom . The  raison d'tre  is that arson is
itself the end and death is simply the consequence. [24] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

c Whether the crime of arson will absorb the resultant death or will have to
r a l a w

be a separate crime altogether, the joint discussion [25]  of the late Mr.
Chief Justice Ramon C.  Aquino  and Mme. Justice Carolina C.  Grio-Aquino ,
on the subject of the crimes of arson and murder/homicide, is highly
instructive:
Groizard says that when fire is used with the intent to kill a particular
person who may be in a house and that objective is attained by burning the
house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal Code declares that killing
committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be
purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without
a design to take life.[26] In other words, if the main object of the offender
is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main objective is
the burning of the building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by the
crime of arson.[27] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

x x x x
If the house was set on fire after the victims therein were killed, fire would
not be a qualifying circumstance. The accused would be liable for the
separate offenses of murder or homicide, as the case may be, and arson.
[28] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cAccordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order to

r a l a w

determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated ' whether arson,

murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is   de rigueur  to ascertain the
main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning
of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of
arson, the crime is simply  arson,  and the resulting homicide is absorbed;
(b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person
who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means
to accomplish such goal the crime committed is  murder only; lastly, (c) if
the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the
offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover
up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed
' homicide/murder and arson .
Where then does this case fall under?
From a reading of the body of the Information:
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of
ROBERTO SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden materials located at No.
172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city, by lighting crumpled newspaper with the
use of disposable lighter inside said house knowing the same to be an inhabited
house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a
conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining
residential houses, were razed by fire; that by reason and on the occasion of the
said fire, the following, namely,
1.    Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age
2.    Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age
3.    Michael Separa, 24 years of age
4.    Daphne Separa, 18 years of age
5.    Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age
6.    Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age
sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their death
immediately thereafter.[29] [Emphasis supplied.]
accused- appellant is being charged with the crime of arson. It  it is clear
from the foregoing that her intent was merely to destroy her employer's
house through the use of fire.
We now go to the issues raised. Under the first assignment of error, in
asserting the insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to establish her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused- appellant argues that the
prosecution was only able to adduce circumstantial evidence ' hardly
enough to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She ratiocinates that
the following circumstances:
1.            That immediately before the burning of the house , the accused
hurriedly and with head turning in different directions (palinga-linga)
went out of the said house and rode a pedicab apparently not
knowing where to go for she first requested to be brought to Nipa St.
but upon reaching there requested again to be brought to Balasan St.
as shown by the testimony of prosecution witness Rolando Gruta;
2.            That immediately after the fire, upon a report that there was a
woman in Balasan St. who appears confused and apprehensive
(balisa), the Barangay Chairman and his tanods went there, found
the accused and apprehended her and brought her to the barangay
hall as shown by the testimony of Barangay Chairman Remigio
Bernardo; and
 3. That when she was apprehended and investigated by the barangay
cralaw

officials and when her bag was opened, the same contained a
disposable lighter as likewise shown by the testimony of the
Barangay Chairman.[30]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

fall short of proving that she had any involvement in setting her
employer's house on fire, much less show guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
given that 'it is a fact that housemaids are the first persons in the house
to wake up early to perform routine chores for their employers , [31]  one of
which is preparing and cooking the morning meal for the members of the
household; and necessity requires her to go out early to look for open
stores or even nearby marketplaces to buy things that will complete the
early meal for the day. [32]  She then concludes that it was normal for her
to have been seen going out of her employer's house in a hurry at that
time of the day and 'to look at all directions to insure that the house is
secure and that there are no other persons in the vicinity. [33]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

c We are far from persuaded.

r a l a w

True, by the nature of their jobs, housemaids are required to start the day
early; however, contrary to said assertion, the actuations and the
demeanor of accused-appellant on that fateful early morning as observed
firsthand by Rolando Gruta, one of the witnesses of the prosecution, belie
her claim of normalcy, to wit:
Q: You said you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa Family.
cralaw

What happened when you saw Edna coming out from the house of
the Separa Family?
A: Wala  pa pong ano 'yan naisakay ko na siya sa sidecar.
cralaw

Q: And what did you observe from Edna when you saw her coming out
cralaw

from the house of the Separa family?

A: Nagmamadali  po  siyang lumakad at palinga-linga.
cralaw

x x x x
Q: After she boarded your pedicab, what happened, if any?
cralaw

A: Nagpahatid po siya sa akin.
cralaw

Q: Where? cralaw

A: To Nipa Street, sir.
cralaw

Q: Did you bring her to Nipa Street  as she requested?

cralaw

A: Yes, sir. cralaw

x x x x
Q: You said that you brought her to Nipa Street. What happened when you
cralaw

go (sic) there at Nipa Street, if any?

A: Nagpahinto  po  siya doon ng saglit, mga tatlong minuto po.
cralaw

Q: What did she do when she asked (you) to stop there for three minutes?
cralaw

A: After three minutes she requested me to bring her directly to Balasan

cralaw

Street, sir.
x x x x
We quote with approval the pronouncement of the RTC in discrediting
accused- appellant's aforementioned rationale:
[O]bviously it is never normal, common or ordinary to leave the house in
such a disturbed, nervous and agitated manner, demeanor and condition.
The timing of her hurried departure and nervous demeanor immediately
before the fire when she left the house and rode a pedicab and her same
 demeanor, physical and mental condition when found and apprehended at
the same place where she alighted from the pedicab and the discovery of
the lighter in her bag thereafter when investigated indisputably show her
guilt as charged.[34]
All the witnesses are in accord that accused-appellant's agitated appearance was out
of the ordinary. Remarkably, she has never denied this observation.
We give great weight to the findings of the RTC and so accord credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses as it had the opportunity to observe them directly. The credibility given by
trial courts to prosecution witnesses is an important aspect of evidence which appellate courts
can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe them, particularly their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude, during the direct and cross-examination by
counsels. Here, Remigio Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and Mercedita Mendoza are disinterested
witnesses and there is not an iota of evidence in the records to indicate that they are suborned
witnesses. The records of the RTC even show that Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman,
kept accused-appellant from being mauled by the angry crowd outside of the barangay hall:
Pros. Rebagay:
Now, who were present when the accused are (sic) telling you this?
A: Iyon nga  iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan doon nakapaligid, siyempre
cralaw

may sunog nagkakagulo, gusto nga siyang kunin ng mga

mamamayan para saktan hindi ko maibigay papatayin siya gawa ng
may namatay eh anim na tao and namatay, kaya iyong mga tao
kinokontrol siya madidisgrasya siya dahil pin-pointed po siya, Your
Honor, iyong dami na iyon libo iyong nakapaligid doon sa barangay
hall napakahirap awatin. Gusting-gusto siyang kunin ng mga taong-
bayan, nagalit dahil ang daming bahay hong nasunog.[35] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Accused-appellant has not shown any compelling reason why the witnesses presented
would openly, publicly and deliberately lie or concoct a story, to send an innocent
person to jail all the while knowing that the real malefactor remains at large. Such
proposition defies logic. And where the defense failed to show any evil or improper
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses, the presumption is that their
testimonies are true and thus entitled to full faith and credence. [36]
While the prosecution witnesses did not see accused-appellant actually
starting the fire that burned several houses and killed the Separa family,
her guilt may still be established through circumstantial evidence provided
that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and, (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
[37] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of

facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. [38]  It
is founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing
a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to
be proved. [39]  In order to bring about a conviction, the circumstanti al
evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of
others, as the guilty person. [40] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this case, the interlocking testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
taken together, exemplify a case where conviction can be upheld on the
basis of circumstantial evidence.  First, prosecution witness Rolando Gruta,
the driver of the  pedicab that accused- appellant rode on, testified that he
knew for a fact that she worked as a housemaid of the victims, and that he
positively identified her as the person hurriedly leaving the house of the
victims on 2 January 2001 at  4:45 a.m., and acting in a nervous manner.  That
while riding on the  pedicab, accused- appellant was unsure of her intended
destination. Upon reaching the place where he originally picked up
accused- appellant only a few minutes after dropping her off,
Rolando  Gruta  saw the  Separas  house being gutted by a blazing
fire.Second,  Remigio  Bernardo testified that he and his  tanods , including
Rolando  Gruta , were the ones who picked up accused- appellant Edna
at  Balasan Street (where Rolando  Gruta  dropped her off) after receiving a
call that there was a woman acting strangely at said street and who
appeared to have nowhere to go.  Third, SPO4  Danilo  Talusan  overheard
accused- appellant admit to Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of Channel 2
(ABS-CBN) that said accused- appellant started the fire, plus the fact that
he was able see the telecast of Gus  Abelgas  show where accused-
appellant, while being interviewed, confessed to the crime as well.  The
foregoing testimonies juxtaposed with the testimony of  Mercedita Mendoza
validating the fact that accused- appellant confessed to having started the
fire which killed the  Separa  family as well as burned seven houses
including that of the victims, convincingly form an unbroken chain, which
leads to the unassailable conclusion pinpointing accused-appellant as the
person behind the crime of simple arson.
In her second assigned error, accused-appellant questions the
admissibility of her uncounselled extrajudicial confession given to
prosecution witnesses, namely Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza, and
to the media. Accused- appellant Edna contends that being uncounselled
extrajudicial confession, her admissions to having committed the crime
charged should have been excluded in evidence against her for being
violative of Article III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution.
Particularly, she takes exception to the testimony of prosecution
witnesses Remigio Bernardo and Mercedita Mendoza for being hearsay and
in the nature of an uncounselled admission.
With the above vital pieces of evidence excluded, accused- appellant is of
the position that the remaining proof of her alleged guilt, consisting in the
main of circumstantial evidence, is inadequate to establish her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
We partly disagree.
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
cralaw

have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
 competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one.These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this Section or
cralaw

Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.

We have held that the abovequoted provision applies to the stage of
custodial investigation ' when the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as
a suspect. [41]  Said constitutional guarantee has also been extended to
situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has
merely been 'invited for questioning. [42] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial

confessions made must satisfy the following requirements:
(1)                   it must be voluntary;
(2)                   it must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel;
(3)                   it must be express; and
(4)  it must be in writing.[43]
cralaw

Arguably , the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular

instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article
III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought
to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect,
actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well as
killed the whole family of Roberto  Separa , Sr.She was, therefore, already
under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III,
Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have already been observed or
applied to her. Accused- appellant's confession to  Barangay  Chairman
Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the 'interrogation made by the
latter ' admittedly conducted without first informing accused- appellant of
her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel.  For
this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay
Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the latter in
her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in
violation of her constitutional rights.
Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellant's confession to
Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not
automatically lead to her acquittal.It should well be recalled that the
constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to
those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits to
having committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when
accused- appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of
Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in the  Separas  house. The
testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is,
unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible in evidence against her
and is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article III of
the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship
between the individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the
other; it does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another private individual ' as both accused- appellant and
prosecution witness  Mercedita  Mendoza undoubtedly are. [44]  Here, there
is no evidence on record to show that said witness was acting under police
authority, so appropriately, accused-appellant's  uncounselled  extrajudicial
confession to said witness was properly admitted by the RTC.
Accused-appellant likewise assails the admission of the testimony of
SPO4 Danilo Talusan.Contending that '[w]hen SPO4 Danilo Talusan testified in court,
his story is more of events, which are not within his personal knowledge but based
from accounts of witnesses who derived information allegedly from the accused or
some other persons x x x. In other words, she objects to the testimony for being
merely hearsay. With this imputation of inadmissibility, we agree with what the Court
of Appeals had to say:
Although this testimony of SFO4 Danilo Talusan is hearsay because he was
not present when Gus Abelgas interviewed accused-appellant EDNA, it may
nevertheless be admitted in evidence as an independently relevant
statement to establish not the truth but the tenor of the statement or the
fact that the statement was made [People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 103547, July
20, 1999, 310 SCRA 621 citing People v. Cusi, Jr., G.R. No. L-20986, August
14, 1965, 14 SCRA 944.]. In People vs. Velasquez, G.R. Nos. 132635 &
143872-75,  February 21, 2001, 352 SCRA 455, the Supreme Court ruled
that:
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements,
regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such
statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does
not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence.
Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary
but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in
issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such
a fact.[45]
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As regards the confession given by accused-appellant to the media, we

need not discuss it further for the reporters were never presented to
testify in court.
As a final attempt at exculpation, accused- appellant asserts that since the
identities of the burned bodies were never conclusively established, she
cannot be responsible for their deaths.
Such assertion is bereft of merit.
In the crime of arson, the identities of the victims are immaterial in that
intent to kill them particularly is not one of the elements of the crime. As
we have clarified earlier, the killing of a person is absorbed in the charge
of arson, simple or destructive.  The prosecution need only prove, that the
burning was intentional and that what was intentionally burned is an
inhabited house or dwelling.  Again, in the case of  People v.   Soriano ,
[46]   we explained that:

Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of Arson, it may be

inferred from the acts of the accused. There is a presumption that one
intends the natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one
has deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to
produce further evidence of his wrongful intent.[47]

The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused-appellant guilty of?
As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime of arson:
1) destructive arson, under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree No. 1613.Said
classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property burned,
regardless of the value of the damage caused,[48] to wit:
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659,
contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private,
hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other
military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group
of persons.[[49]]The classification of this type of crime is known
asDestructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The reason for the law is self-evident: to effectively discourage and deter
the commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of
properties and protect the lives of innocent people. Exposure to a brewing
conflagration leaves only destruction and despair in its wake; hence, the
State mandates greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime. The
exceptionally severe punishment imposed for this crime takes into
consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed by the malicious
burning of these structures; the danger to property resulting from the
conflagration; the fact that it is normally difficult to adopt precautions
against its commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators;
and, the greater impact on the social, economic, security and political
fabric of the nation. [Emphasis supplied.]
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under
Art. 320, death should result, the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The
Revised Penal Code remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This
decree contemplates the malicious burning of public and private
structures, regardless of size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by RA
7659, and classified as other cases of arson. These
include houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations,
railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial
establishments.[[50]] Although the purpose of the law on Simple Arson is
to prevent the high incidence of fires and other crimes involving
destruction, protect the national economy and preserve the social,
economic and political stability of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty
to be meted to offenders. This separate classification of Simple
Arson recognizes the need to lessen the severity of punishment
 commensurate to the act or acts committed, depending on the particular
facts and circumstances of each case. [Emphasis supplied.]

To emphasize:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the
degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts
committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended)
constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for
being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency
and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. [51] On the other hand,
acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a
lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a
lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less
significant social, economic, political and national security implications
than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may
nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the
qualifying circumstances present. [Emphasis supplied.][52]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Prescinding from the above clarification vis--vis the description of the crime as stated

in the accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant
was charged with the crime of Simple  Arson ' for having 'deliberately set fire upon
the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family x  x  x  knowing the
same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a
consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some
seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire. [Emphasis supplied.]
The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the case of People
v.  Soriano.[53]The accused in the latter case caused the burning of a particular
house.Unfortunately, the blaze spread and gutted down five (5) neighboring
houses.The RTC therein found the accused guilty of destructive arson under paragraph
1[54] of Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.This
Court, through Mr. Justice Bellosillo, however, declared that:
x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613,
which imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetuafor
other cases of arson as the properties burned by accused-appellant
are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or
dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the
second Amended Information particularly refer to the structures as houses
rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore be
Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In
case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that such
laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and liberally in
favor of the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is
intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited
house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar.
[55] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged with having
intentionally burned the two-storey residential house of Robert Separa.Said
conflagration likewise spread and destroyed seven (7) adjoining houses.
Consequently, if proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and
sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple arson.Such is the case 'notwithstanding
the error in the designation of the offense in the information, the information remains
effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the crime alleged therein. [56]What
is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense
charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violate, x x x, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. [57]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5 of PD No.
1613 categorically provides that the penalty to be imposed for simple arson is:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. -If by reason of or on the
occasion of arson death results, the penalty of reclusion  perpetua  to
death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information, the
imposable penalty on accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
Apropos the civil liabilities of accused-appellant, current jurisprudence [58] dictate that
the civil indemnity due from accused-appellant is P50,000.00 for the death of each of
the victims.[59] However, the monetary awards for moral and exemplary damages
given by the Court of Appeals, both in the amount of P50,000.00, due the heirs of the
victims, have to be deleted for lack of material basis. Similarly, the Court of Appeals
award of exemplary damages to Rodolfo Movilla in the amount of P50,000.00 for the
destruction of his house, also has to be deleted, but in this instance for being
improper. Moral damages cannot be award by this Court in the absence of proof of
mental or physical suffering on the part of the heirs of the victims. [60] Concerning the
award of exemplary damages, the reason for the deletion being that no aggravating
circumstance had been alleged and proved by the prosecution in the case at bar. [61] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

To summarize, accused-appellant's alternative plea that she be acquitted of the crime

must be rejected. With the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals.  It is indubitable that accused-appellant
is the author of the crime of simple arson. All the circumstantial evidence presented
before the RTC, viewed in its entirety, is as convincing as direct evidence and, as such,
negates accused-appellant's innocence, and when considered concurrently with
her admission given to Mercedita Mendoza, the former's guilt beyond reasonable doubt
is twice as evident.Hence, her conviction is effectively justified. More so, as it is
propitious to note that in stark contrast to the factual circumstances presented by the
prosecution, accused-appellant neither mustered a denial nor an alibi except for the
proposition that her guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 2 September 2005, in
CA G.R. CR HC No. 01139, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the conviction of
accused- appellant EDNA MALNGAN  Y MAYO is concerned. The sentence to
be imposed and the amount of damages to be awarded, however, are
MODIFIED. In accordance with Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613,
accused- appellant is hereby sentenced to  RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused-
appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of each of the
victims P 50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
37.) G.R. No. 188708               July 31, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ALAMADA MACABANDO, Appellant.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This is an appeal filed by appellant Alamada Macabando assailing the February 24, 2009 decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN. The CA decision affirmed in toto the August 26, 1002 judgment2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of destructive arson, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

THE CASE

The prosecution's evidence showed that at around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, the appellant broke bottles on
the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even ("manabla ko").3 Afterwards, he uttered
that he would burn his house.4

At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there was a fire. When Cornelio
went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from the appellant’s house. He got a pail of water, and poured
its contents into the fire.5 Eric Quilantang, a neighbor whose house was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran
to the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning house, the appellant,
who was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3) shots in the
air.6 The appellant also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire would be killed.7

Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save his nephews and nieces.8 Eric also returned to his
house to save his belongings.9

Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot investigation of the incident, and
concluded, among others, that the fire started in the appellant’s house; and that it had been intentional.10 Barangay
Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire gutted many houses in his barangay, and that he assisted the City
Social Welfare and Development Department personnel in assessing the damage.11

The defense, on the other hand, presented a different version of the events.

The appellant declared on the witness stand that he lived in the twostorey house in Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive,
which was owned by his sister, Madji Muslima Edemal.12 He admitted that he felt angry at around 2:00 p.m. on
December 21, 2001 because one of his radio cassettes for sale had been stolen.13 The appellant claimed that he
went to sleep after looking for his missing radio cassette, and that the fire had already started when he woke up. He
denied making a threat to burn his house, and maintained that he did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots
heard by his neighbors came from the explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use during the New Year
celebration.14

Lomantong Panandigan, the appellant’s cousin, stated, among others, that he did not see the appellant carry a
revolver or fire a shot on December 21, 2001.15 Dimas Kasubidan, the appellant’s brother-in-law, stated that he and
the appellant lived in the same house, and that the latter was asleep in his room at the ground floor before the fire
broke out.16

The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended, before the RTC.17 The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment.18 In its
judgment dated August 26, 2002, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It gave weight to the RTC’s factual findings since these
findings were based on unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence. The CA held that the totality of the
presented circumstantial evidence led to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the crime charged.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the appeal, but modify the crime committed by the appellant and the penalty imposed on him.

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

We point out at the outset that no one saw the appellant set fire to his house in Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive,
Cagayan de Oro City. The trial and appellate courts thus resorted to circumstantial evidence since there was no
direct evidence to prove the appellant’s culpability to the crime charged.

It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to sustain a conviction
provided that: "(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have
been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as
to the guilt of the accused."19

In the present case, the following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain that leads to an unavoidable
conclusion that the appellant, to the exclusion of others, set fire to his house: first, the appellant, while holding an
iron lead pipe, acted violently and broke bottles near his house at around 4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001; second,
while he was still in a fit of rage, the appellant stated that he would get even, and then threatened to burn his own
house; third, Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the appellant’s room approximately two hours after the appellant
returned to his house; fourth, the appellant prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several other people from putting out the
fire in his house; fifth, the appellant fired shots in the air, and then threatened to kill anyone who would try to put out
the fire in his house; sixth, the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire; and finally, the investigation
conducted by the fire marshals of the Bureau of Fire Protection revealed that the fire started in the appellant’s
house, and that it had been intentional.

The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that the appellant set fire to his
house. We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent his neighbors from putting out the fire in
his house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if he had nothing to do with the crime. The first impulse of an
individual whose house is on fire is to save his loved ones and/or belongings; it is contrary to human nature, reason
and natural order of things for a person to thwart and prevent any effort to put out the fire in his burning property. By
carrying (and firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant showed his determination to repel any efforts to quell the fire.
Important to note, too, is the fact that the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire which, to our mind, showed
deliberate planning and preparedness on his part to flee the raging fire; it likewise contradicted his statement that he
was asleep inside his house when the fire broke out, and that the fire was already big when he woke up. Clearly, the
appellant’s indifferent attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the people who tried to put out the fire,
coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his claim of innocence. Notably, the appellant failed
to impute any improper motive against the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against him; in fact, he admitted
that he had no misunderstanding with them prior to the incident.

The Crime Committed

The CA convicted the appellant of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC, as amended, which reads:

Article 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who
shall burn:

1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of
simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
 2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people usually
gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental function or
business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental
to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or
stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building
or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.

3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for
public use, entertainment or leisure. 1âwphi1

4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the
service of public utilities.

5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of another
violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from
insurance.

xxxx

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:

1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance, storehouse, archives
or general museum of the Government.

2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.

In sum, "Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings,
edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any
person or group of persons."20

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613,21 on the other hand, currently governs simple arson. Section 3 of this law
provides:

Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the
property burned is any of the following:

1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;

2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;

3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;

4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;

5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and

6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse. [italics and emphasis ours]

P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included
in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.22 This law punishes simple arson with a lesser
penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and national security implications than
destructive arson.23

The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what
is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements have been proven in the present
case. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited
houses. These allegations were established during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which
the trial and appellate courts found credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection
which stated that damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been intentional. Moreover, the
certification from the City Social Welfare and Development Department likewise indicated that the burned houses
were used as dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used as a
residence. That the appellant’s act affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the
appellant’s act does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when
compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established evidence only showed that the
appellant intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to the neighboring houses.

In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People24 is particularly instructive, thus:

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the
criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts
committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness
that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.

The Proper Penalty

Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613, the imposable penalty for simple arson is reclusion temporal, which
has a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, to reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the penalty imposable should be an indeterminate penalty whose minimum term should be within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, and
whose maximum should be the medium period of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, or sixteen (16) years
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, taking into account the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances that attended the commission of the crime. Taking these rules into account, we therefore impose on
the appellant the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen
(16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

As regards the award of damages, we sustain the lower courts' findings that the records do not adequately reflect
any concrete basis for the award of actual damages to the offended parties. To seek recovery of actual damages, it
is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent
proof and on the best evidence obtainable.25

WHEREFORE, the assailed February 24, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) appellant Alamada Macabando is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson under Section
3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613; and

(2) he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty often (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
38.) G.R. No. 163938               March 28, 2008

DANTE BUEBOS and SARMELITO BUEBOS, Petitioners,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

THE law on arson has always been a constant source of confusion not only among members of the bar, but also
among those of the bench. The bewilderment often centers on what law to apply and what penalty to impose.

In this case, the Court is again tasked to determine whether petitioners are liable for simple arson or arson of an
inhabited house which merits a penalty of up to reclusion perpetua.

Before the Court is a petition to review on certiorari under Rule 45 the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
affirming with modification that2 of the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco, Albay, finding petitioners Dante Buebos and
Sarmelito Buebos guilty of arson.

The Facts

On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, Adelina B. Borbe was in her house at Hacienda San
Miguel, Tabaco, Albay watching over her sick child.3 She was lying down when she heard some noise around the
house. She got up and looked through the window and saw the four accused, Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos,
Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of her hut.4 When she went out, she saw the roof of her
nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help. Instead of coming to her immediate succor, the four fled.5

At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina scream for help. Olipiano was then drinking with Pepito
Borbe to celebrate New Year’s Eve. Olipiano immediately ran to the place and saw a number of people jumping
over the fence. When he focused his flashlight on them, he was able to identify Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos
and Antonio Cornel, Jr.6 He also saw Rolando Buela running away.7

On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos, together with Rolando Buela and Antonio Cornel,
Jr., were indicted for arson in an Information bearing the following accusations:

That on or about the 1st day of January, 1994 at 3:00 o’clock in the Barangay Hacienda, Island of San Miguel,
Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to cause damage, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to
the latter’s damage and prejudice.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.8

The prosecution evidence portraying the foregoing facts was principally supplied by private complainant Adelina
Borbe and Olipiano Berjuela.

Upon the other hand, denial and alibi were the main exculpating line of petitioners and their co-accused. The trial
court summed up the defense evidence in the following tenor:

The defense contended that the accused were at different places at the time of the incident; Rolando Buela claimed
to be at sitio Tugon, Malictay, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay as there was a novena prayer at his parents’ house on
occasion of the death anniversary of his late grandfather; Dante Buebos also claimed to have been at Romeo
Calleja’s having gone there in the evening of December 30, 1993 and left the place at 12:00 o’clock noontime of
January 1, 1994; Sarmelito Buebos asserted that he was at his residence at sitio Malictay, Hacienda, San Miguel,
Tabaco, Albay on the day the incident happened and that he never left his house; Antonio Cornel, Jr. likewise
claimed to be at his residence at Añgas after having visited his in-laws; that he only came to know of the accusation
five (5) days after the incident happened when he visited his parents at Malictay; witnesses were likewise presented
by the accused to corroborate their testimonies.9

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 7, 1998, the RTC found all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson. The dispositive part of
the judgment of conviction reads:

WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing, this Court finds accused ROLANDO BUELA, DANTE BUEBOS, SARMELITO
BUEBOS and ANTONIO CORNEL, JR. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged; accordingly, each
of the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum; and to pay the cost.

SO ORDERED.10

Via a notice of appeal, the four accused elevated the matter to the appellate court. In their appeal, they contended
that (1) the trial court erred in finding them guilty of the crime of arson; (2) that the trial court erred in finding
conspiracy; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to give weight and credence to their defense of denial and alibi.

On November 13, 2003, through an eight-page decision penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos,
the CA disposed of the appeal in this wise:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Each of the accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.11

In downgrading the penalty, the CA opined that the accused could only be convicted of simple arson, punishable by
prision mayor, and not for burning of an inhabited house, which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. According to the appellate court, the information failed to allege with
specificity the actual crime committed. Hence, the accused should be found liable only for arson in its simple form.12

Issues

Dissatisfied, Dante and Sarmelito Buebos have resorted to the present recourse. The following arguments are now
raised for the Court’s consideration:

I.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE;

II.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CONSPIRACY

EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR.13

Our Ruling

Overview of the law on arson

The confusion surrounding arson has been confounded by the dearth of annotation on this part of our penal law.
Certainly, the law on arson is one of the least commented in this jurisdiction. For the guidance of the bench and bar,
a brief legislative history of the body of laws on arson is in order.

Previously, arson was defined and penalized under nine different articles of the Revised Penal Code: Article 320
(destructive arson), Article 321 (other forms of arson), Article 322 (cases of arson not included in the preceding
articles), Article 323 (arson of property of small value), Article 324 (crimes involving destruction), Article 325 (burning
one’s own property to commit arson), Article 326 (setting fire to property exclusively owned by the offender, Article
326-a (in cases where death resulted as a consequence of arson), and Article 326-b (prima facie evidence of
arson).

On March 7, 1979, citing certain inadequacies that impede the successful enforcement and prosecution of arsonists,
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D) No. 1613. P.D. 1613 supplanted the penal
code provisions on arson. The pertinent parts of the said presidential issuance read:

SECTION 1. Arson. – Any person who burns or sets fire to the property of another shall be punished by prision
mayor.

The same penalty shall be imposed when a person sets fire to his own property under circumstances which expose
to danger the life or property of another.

SECTION 2. Destructive Arson. – The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:

1. Any ammunition factory and other establishments where explosives, inflammable or combustible
materials are stored;

2. Any archive, museum, whether public or private, or any edifice devoted to culture, education or social
services;

3. Any church or place of worship or other building where people usually assemble;

4. Any train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or watercraft, or conveyance for transportation of persons or
property;

5. Any building where evidence is kept for use in any legislative, judicial, administrative or other official
proceedings;

6. Any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house, housing tenement, shopping center, public or private
market, theater or movie house or any similar place or building;

7. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a populated or congested area.

SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if
the property burned is any of the following:

1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;

2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;

3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;

4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;

5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
 6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.

SECTION 4. Special Aggravating Circumstances in Arson. – The penalty in any case of arson shall be imposed in
its maximum period:

1. If committed with the intent to gain;

2. If committed for the benefit of another;

3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned;

4. If committed by a syndicate. The offense is committed by a syndicate if it is planned or carried out by a

group of three (3) or more persons.

SECTION 5. Where Death Results from Arson. – If by reason of or on the occasion of arson death results, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.

SECTION 6. Prima Facie Evidence of Arson. – Any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima facie
evidence of arson:

1. If the fire started simultaneously in more than one part of the building or establishment.

2. If substantial amount of flammable substances or materials are stored within the building not necessary in
the business of the offender nor for household use.

3. If gasoline, kerosene, petroleum or other flammable or combustible substances or materials soaked

therewith or containers thereof, or any mechanical, electrical, chemical, or electronic contrivance designed
to start a fire, or ashes or traces of any of the foregoing are found in the ruins or premises of the burned
building or property.

4. If the building or property is insured for substantially more than its actual value at the time of the issuance
of the policy.

5. If during the lifetime of the corresponding fire insurance policy more than two fires have occurred in the
same or other premises owned or under the control of the offender and/or insured.

6. If shortly before the fire, a substantial portion of the effects insured and stored in a building or property
had been withdrawn from the premises except in the ordinary course of business.

7. If a demand for money or other valuable consideration was made before the fire in exchange for the
desistance of the offender or for the safety of other person or property of the victim.

SECTION 7. Conspiracy to Commit Arson. – Conspiracy to commit arson shall be punished by prision mayor in its
minimum period.

SECTION 8. Confiscation of Object of Arson. – The building which is the object of arson including the land on which
it is situated shall be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the owner thereof can prove that he has no
participation in nor knowledge of such arson despite the exercise of due diligence on his part.

On November 11, 1980, the law on arson was again revisited via P.D. No. 1744. The new law expanded the
definition of destructive arson by way of reinstating Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code. The amendatory
legislation also paved the way for the reimposition of the capital punishment on destructive arsonists.

When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659 (An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes) was passed
on December 13, 1993, Article 320 again underwent a revision. As it now stands, Article 320 of the Revised Penal
Code is worded, thus:
Art. 320. Destructive Arson. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who
shall burn:

1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of
simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.

2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people usually
gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental function or
business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental
to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or
stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building
or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.

3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for
public use, entertainment or leisure.

4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the
service of public utilities.

5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of another
violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from
insurance.

Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more
persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the
building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the commission or another violation of law.

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:

1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance, storehouse, archives
or general museum of the Government.

2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.

If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the mandatory
penalty of death shall be imposed.

Of course, with the repeal of the Death Penalty Law on June 24, 2006 through R.A. No. 9346, arson is no longer a
capital offense.14

We proceed to the crux of the petition.

Circumstantial evidence points to petitioners’ culpability

Petitioners score the CA for convicting them of arson based on circumstantial evidence. They argue that the
inference that they were responsible for the burning of private complainant’s hut was not duly proven by the People.

Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that "indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which
the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct testimony
would result in setting a felon free."15

At the outset, We may well emphasize that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis on
which a court draws its finding of guilt. Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind
intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction.16 Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence
is sanctioned by Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.17
The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for a conviction: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of
all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has
committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.18

After a careful review of the evidence presented by both parties, We find that the circumstantial evidence extant in
the records is sufficient to identify petitioners as the authors of the burning of the hut of private complainant Adelina
Borbe:

1. Private complainant heard some noise emanating from outside her house at around 3:00 a.m.;

2. When she went out to check the disturbance, private complainant saw petitioners, together with their two
other co-accused, standing in front of the house;

3. Moments later, the roof of her house caught fire;

4. Petitioners and their cohorts absconded while private complainant desperately shouted for help.

The facts from which the cited circumstances arose have been proved through positive testimony.19 Evidently, these
circumstances form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair conclusion – the culpability of petitioners for the
burning of the hut. The Court is convinced that the circumstances, taken together, leave no doubt that petitioner
perpetrated the arson.

Conspiracy evident from coordinated action of petitioners

Petitioners next contend that conspiracy was erroneously appreciated by both the trial and appellate courts. They
posit that the finding of conspiracy was premised on speculation and conjecture.

The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on
direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding
among them with respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that two or more
persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the
details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the
accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common design. In such a case, the act of one
becomes the act of all and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.20

In the case at bench, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of petitioners Dante and Sarmelito
Buebos. Both of them stood outside the house of private complainant Adelina. They were part of the group making
boisterous noise in the vicinity. Petitioners also fled together while the roof of Adelina’s house was ablaze. These
acts clearly show their joint purpose and design, and community of interest.

We quote with approval the CA observation along this line:

Accused-appellant’s assertion that conspiracy has not been established is belied by the accounts of the prosecution
witness. The manner by which the accused-appellants behaved after the private complainant shouted for help
clearly indicated a confederacy of purpose and concerted action on the part of the accused-appellants. Even if there
is no direct evidence showing that all of the accused had prior agreement on how to set the roof of the house on fire,
the doctrine is well settled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the
crime. Very seldom such prior agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are
only rarely documented by agreements in writing.21

Crime committed and the penalty

The RTC sentenced all four accused to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. On
appeal, the CA reduced the sentence to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as maximum. The CA ratiocinated:

The information charges accused-appellants with "violation of P.D. 1613" without specifying the particular provision
breached. The information having failed to allege whether or not the burnt house is inhabited, and not having been
established that the house is situated in a populated or congested area, accused-appellants should be deemed to
have only been charged with plain arson under Section 1 of the decree. Under Section 1 of the decree, the offense
of simple arson committed is punishable by prision mayor.

There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances in the case at bar accused-appellants should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period as provided under Article 321, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 1613. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum penalty should be anywhere within the range of prision correccional.22

The legal basis of the trial court in convicting petitioners of arson is Section 3, paragraph 2 of P.D. No. 1613. The
said provision of law reads:

SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if
the property burned is any of the following:

xxxx

2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;

The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an
inhabited house or dwelling.23 Admittedly, there is a confluence of the foregoing elements here. However, the
information failed to allege that what was intentionally burned was an inhabited house or dwelling. That is fatal.

Sections 8 and 9 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure state:

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by
the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in
the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances for the court to pronounce
judgment.

Under the new rules, the information or complaint must state the designation of the offense given by the statute and
specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances. Otherwise stated, the accused will not be convicted of
the offense proved during the trial if it was not properly alleged in the information.24

Perusing the information, there was no allegation that the house intentionally burned by petitioners and their cohorts
was inhabited. Rather, the information merely recited that "accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, with intent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire
the nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latter’s damage and prejudice."25

Although the rule took effect only on December 1, 2000, while the petitioners were convicted by the RTC on April 7,
1998, it may be applied retroactively. It is elementary that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive
application insofar as they benefit the accused.26

In fine, petitioners can be convicted only of simple arson, under Section 1, paragraph 1 of P.D. No. 1613,
punishable by prision mayor.
This is not a case of first impression. This Court has, on a number of occasions, modified the RTC and CA
judgments for having applied the wrong law and penalty on arson. In People v. Soriano,27 the accused was found
guilty of destructive arson, then a capital offense. On automatic review, the Court held that he should be held liable
only for simple arson. The explanation:

However, we believe that the applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a
penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties burned by accused-
appellant are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid
law. The descriptions as alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer to the structures as houses
rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art.
320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws
shall be construed strictly against the government, and literally in favor of the accused.

The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar.

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the
criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts
committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness
that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under
Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances
present.

In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither appears to be heinous nor represents a greater
degree of perversity and viciousness as distinguished from those acts punishable under Art. 320 of the Revised
Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was established to convert the offense to Destructive Arson. The special
aggravating circumstance that accused-appellant was "motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant
of the property burned" cannot be appreciated in the present case where it appears that he was acting more on
impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded
ego. Nothing can be worse than a spurned lover or a disconsolate father under the prevailing circumstances that
surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house. Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple Arson
penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited house or dwelling.28

An oversight of the same nature was addressed by this Court in the more recent case of People v. Malngan.29 Said
the Court in Malngan:

The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused-appellant guilty of?

As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive arson, under Art. 320 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree
No. 1613. Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the
value of the damage caused, 48 to wit:

Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious burning of structures,
both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government
or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. The classification of this type of crime is known
as Destructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason for the law is self-evident: to
effectively discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of properties and
protect the lives of innocent people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves only destruction and despair in its
wake; hence, the State mandates greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime. The exceptionally severe
punishment imposed for this crime takes into consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed by the
malicious burning of these structures; the danger to property resulting from the conflagration; the fact that it is
normally difficult to adopt precautions against its commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators; and,
the greater impact on the social, economic, security and political fabric of the nation. [Emphasis supplied]
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Art. 320, death should result, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code remains the governing
law for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of
size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other cases of arson. These
include houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves
and other industrial establishments. Although the purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high
incidence of fires and other crimes involving destruction, protect the national economy and preserve the social,
economic and political stability of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be meted to offenders. This separate
classification of Simple Arson recognizes the need to lessen the severity of punishment commensurate to the act or
acts committed, depending on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. [Emphasis supplied]

To emphasize:

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the
criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended) constituting
Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which,
by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. On
the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of
perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates
crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.
However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the
qualifying circumstances present. [Emphasis supplied.]

Prescinding from the above clarification vis-à-vis the description of the crime as stated in the accusatory portion of
the Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Simple Arson – for having
"deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family x x x knowing the
same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a
conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed
by fire." [Emphasis supplied]

The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the case of People v. Soriano. The accused in the
latter case caused the burning of a particular house. Unfortunately, the blaze spread and gutted down five (5)
neighboring houses. The RTC therein found the accused guilty of destructive arson under paragraph 1 of Art. 320 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court, through Mr. Justice Bellosillo,
however, declared that:

"x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties burned by accused-appellant
are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The
descriptions as alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer to the structures as houses rather than
as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1
of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be
construed strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of the accused.

The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar."

As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged with having intentionally burned the two-
storey residential house of Robert Separa. Said conflagration likewise spread and destroyed seven (7)
adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced
accordingly, of the crime of simple arson. Such is the case "notwithstanding the error in the designation of the
offense in the information, the information remains effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the crime
alleged therein." "What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or
the particular law or part thereof allegedly violate, x x x but the description of the crime charged and the particular
facts therein recited."
There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5 of PD No. 1613 categorically provides
that the penalty to be imposed for simple arson is:

SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. – If by reason of or on the occasion of arson death results, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied]1avvphil

Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information, the imposable penalty on accused-
appellant is reclusion perpetua.30

Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should
range from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Considering that no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period [eight (8)
years and one (1) day to ten (10) years]. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is prision correccional, which
has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, to be imposed in any of its periods.

The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence. We sustain it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in full.

39.) G.R. No. 126351           February 18, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAUL ACOSTA Y LAYGO, accused-appellant.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision1 dated August 25, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch
127, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Arson, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify private complainant the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

Appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38-year old mason, married, and a resident of Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City,
at the time of the offense charged. He used to be a good friend of Almanzor "Elmer" Montesclaros, the grandson of
private complainant, Filomena M. Marigomen.2 On February 27, 1996, a few hours before the fire, Montesclaros, in
the belief that appellant and his wife were the ones hiding his live-in partner from him, stormed the house of
appellant and burned their clothes, furniture, and appliances.3 Montesclaros lived in the house owned by said
complainant and located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights Subdivision, Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City. It was this
house allegedly set on fire by appellant.

The pertinent facts in this case, as summarized by the Solicitor General, which we find supported by the records,
are as follows:

At about 4:00 to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, the nephew of prosecution witness
Mona Aquino called the latter, simultaneously shouting that appellant Raul Acosta, their neighbor, was
carrying a stove and a kitchen knife (TSN, May 22, 1996, pp. 3-4, 7). She went out of her house and
approached appellant who, when asked why he was carrying a stove and a knife, replied that he would burn
the house of complainant Filomena M. Marigomen. (Ibid., pp. 3-4).

Complainant's house is situated at Banahaw Street, Mountain Heights Subdivision, Kalookan City and
adjacent to the house of prosecution witness Aquino. (Ibid., pp. 2, 18). Only a wall fence divides her property
from that of the complainant. (Ibid., p. 18).

Owing to the fearsome answer of appellant to witness Aquino's query, she returned immediately to her
house (Ibid., p. 7). A few minutes after closing the door, she heard the sound of broken bottles and the
throwing of chair inside the house of complainant (Ibid., p. 8). When she peeped through her kitchen door,
she saw appellant inside complainant's house, which was unoccupied at that time. (Ibid., p. 8). Thereafter,
appellant poured kerosene on the bed (papag) and lighted it with cigarette lighter (Ibid., p. 10). The fire was
easily put off by appellant's wife who arrived at the place. (Ibid., p. 10).

At around 1:00 o'clock in the morning of February 28, 1996, prosecution witness Lina Videña, likewise a
resident of Mountain Heights Subdivision, was roused from her sleep by the barking of their dogs at the back
portion of her house. (TSN, May 20, 1996, pp. 3-4). When she went out of her house, she saw complainant's
house situated at the adjacent lot near the back portion of her garage burning. (Ibid., p. 4). When she
peeped through the holes of the GI sheets separating her lot from the adjacent lot, she noticed the presence
of appellant standing alone in front of the burning house. (Ibid., p. 5) Appellant was just watching the blaze
and not doing anything to contain it. (Ibid.)

Witness Videña immediately rushed back to her house and informed her husband about the fire at the
nearby lot. (Ibid., p. 5). They called up the police detachment and alerted other members of her family to be
ready for any contingency. (Ibid., p. 6). The fire truck arrived at around 2:00 o'clock in the morning, when the
house was already razed to the ground. (TSN, May 20, 1996, p. 6; TSN, May 22, 1996, p. 11).

An on-the-spot investigation was conducted by Fire Investigator Raymundo Savare of the Kalookan Fire
Department (TSN, May 27, 1996, p. 2). After the conduct of the investigation, the investigator did not find
 any incendiary device; hence, the cause of fire remained undetermined. (TSN, May 27, 1996, p. 5). In his
Report, the investigator did not rule out the possibility of intentional burning, since there is no other source of
ignition, unless otherwise somebody lighted an illuminating object and left it unattended. (TSN, May 17,
1996, p. 8).

x x x           x x x           x x x4

On March 11, 1996, appellant was charged with the crime of Arson under the following Information:

That on or about the 28th day of February, 1996 in Kal. City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable cause, did then and there wilfully (sic),
unlawfully and feloniously burn the house of one, FILOMENA MONTESCLAROS VDA. DE MARIGOMEN,
located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights Subdivision., Bo. Makatipo, this city, said accused knowing the
same to be prohibited, by then and there setting fire to the said house thereby causing the same to be totally
burned, to the damage and prejudice of herein complainant in the estimated amount of P100,000.00.

Contrary to Law.5

On April 22, 1996, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio Atty. Juanito Crisostomo, was arraigned and entered
a plea of not guilty.

During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses (1) Mrs. Lina Videña, (2) Mrs. Mona Aquino, both
neighbors of appellant; and (3) Fire Investigator Raymundo Savare. When the defense agreed to the proposed
stipulation that the value of the burned property was P100,000.00, the State Prosecutor dispensed with the
testimony of private complainant,6 the owner of the house.

The defense presented the appellant himself, Ernesto Riolloraza and Marieta Acosta as witnesses. Appellant
claimed that at the time of the alleged arson he was sleeping at his mother's home, some five houses away from the
burned house.7 Ernesto Riolloraza testified he lived in the house behind the home of appellant's mother; that at
around 9:00 in the evening, he saw appellant and his family transferring their belongings to the house of appellant's
mother; that at around 11:00 in the evening, he saw appellant watching TV; and that at around 1:00 AM, he was
awakened by the sound of fire sirens; and that he and appellant stood by the roadside and watched the
fire.8 Marieta Acosta, common-law wife of appellant, corroborated appellant's testimony that they were sleeping in
the home of appellant's mother at the time of the incident.9

On August 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision,10 disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused with moral certainty, this Court
hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify
the offended party the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The period of the Accused's preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of his sentence if
qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.

Appellant seasonably interposed the present appeal assigning the following errors:

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BASED MERELY ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE DEFENSE OF DENIAL AND ALIBI OF
THE ACCUSED.

Appellant centers his appeal on the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence against him. He maintains that the
fact that Montesclaros lived in the house which was razed to the ground was not duly proved by the Prosecutor, and
that even the Fire Investigator could not determine the true cause of the fire. Appellant further assails the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses Mona Aquino and Lina Videña since their respective testimonies as to his presence in
the locus criminis before and after the incident remain uncorroborated, and therefore, wholly unreliable and
insufficient to sustain his conviction.

For the State, the Solicitor General rebutted the factual submissions of appellant. First, appellant himself testified
that he knew that Elmer Montesclaros lived in the house of private complainant.11 Second, the testimony of
prosecution witness Mona Aquino though uncorroborated does not impair her credibility since no ill-motive was
ascribed to her to testify falsely against appellant. Third, any inconsistency in Lina Videña's testimony that she did
not see appellant at the locus criminis could be explained by a reading of her entire testimony. She saw appellant
inside the yard of the burning house during the fire, not after the fire. Further, the Solicitor General stressed that the
determination of credibility of witnesses remains within the province of the trial court, whose finding is accorded due
respect on appeal, absent any substantial circumstance which could have been overlooked in the decision.

Arson is defined as the malicious destruction of property by fire.12 In this case, the alleged crime was committed on
February 28, 1996, after R.A. 7659 already took effect. The trial court found appellant herein liable under Article
320, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 10 of R.A. No. 7659, which provides as follows:

Art. 320. Destructive Arson. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any
person who shall burn:

1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of
simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or different occasions.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Appellant's conviction rests on circumstantial evidence. Pertinently, Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
provides:

Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.

In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to
leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal responsibility of the accused.13 But no greater degree of
certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct.14

In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following circumstances taken together constitute an
unbroken chain of events pointing to one fair and logical conclusion, that accused started the fire which gutted the
house of private complainant. Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, we agree with the
trial court holding him guilty thereof in the light of the following circumstances duly proved and on record:

First, appellant had the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary, and it is frequently impossible for
the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused for the commission of the crime charged, nevertheless in a case
of arson like the present, the existence or non-existence of a sufficient motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the
witnesses.15 It was duly proved that at around 4:30 in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, private complainant's
grandson, Elmer Montesclaros, stormed the house of appellant and his wife and burned their clothes, household
furniture and appliances, like TV and karaoke.16 When appellant arrived home at around 5:00 in the afternoon and
was informed of the incident, he got mad, and as his common-law wife testified, appellant threw a tantrum
("nagdadabog").17 Appellant had every reason to feel aggrieved about the incident and to retaliate in kind against
Montesclaros and his grandmother.
Second, appellant's intent to commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to set on fire a bed
("papag") inside the same house (private complainant's) which was burned later in the night. Prosecution witness
Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of the same day, she saw appellant carrying a gas stove
and knife. When she asked him what he was going to do with the stove, he answered that he was going to burn the
house of private complainant.18 Later, she heard the sound of somebody throwing a chair and breaking bottles next
door. When she peeped in the kitchen, she saw that appellant entered the house of private complainant and started
pouring gas on a bed ("papag") and then lighted a fire with a disposable lighter. Appellant's wife rushed in and
extinguished the fire with a broomstick. The two later left the house at around 6:00 in the evening.19

While it is true that "evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he
did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time," it may be received "to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like." In People v. Dadles, 278 SCRA
393 (1947), we held that:

In the early case of United States v. Evangelista, [24 Phil. 453 (1913)] the accused was convicted of arson
after the trial court admitted evidence that he had earlier attempted to set fire to the same premises. Ruling
on the admissibility of the said evidence, we said that:

. . . While it was not the fire charged in the information, and does not by any means amount to direct
evidence against the accused, it was competent to prove the intent of the accused in setting the fire which
was charged in the information.

xxx     xxx     xxx

. . . Where a person is charged with the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be received of other
similar acts, committed about the same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of the
accused.

Shortly thereafter, at around 9:00 in the evening, defense witness Ernesto Riolloraza who lived behind the house of
appellant's mother, saw appellant and his family transferring their belongings to said house of appellant's mother.20

Third, appellant was not only present at the locus criminis before the incident, he was seen inside the yard of the
burning house during the height of the fire. At around 1:00 in the morning of February 28, 1996, prosecution witness
Lina Videña was awakened by the barking of their dog, so she went to the back of their house to
investigate.21 Through the holes of the GI sheets, she saw appellant standing alone inside private complainant's yard
watching the house burning.22 Appellant even looked happy with a canine smile and crazy-looking expression. ("Siya
para bang ang mukha niya ay natutuwa na hindi naman humahalakhak, . . . para bang ngiting aso at mukhang
nakakaluko, your honor").23

Fourth, appellant's actions subsequent to the incident further point to his culpability. At around 12:00 noon of the
same day, private complainant went with prosecution witness Lina Videña to the place of Kagawad Tecson. They
were about to leave when appellant arrived. Private complainant asked him why he burned her house and appellant
answered, "So what if I burned your house?" Then appellant stared meanly at private complainant, who got nervous
and had to take medications.24 The following day, appellant threatened prosecution witness Mona Aquino, saying
that if she would testify against him, he would also bum her house.25

All the foregoing circumstances were duly established by the evidence on record. Inseparably linked with one
another, they point to no other conclusion than appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While nobody actually
saw appellant light the match which set the house on fire, the facts and circumstances proved make a complete
chain strongly leading, to the conclusion that it was the appellant who perpetrated the crime.26

In prosecutions for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes (1) the corpus
delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendants as the one responsible for the
crime.27 Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime, it is the fact that a crime has actually been committed. In
arson, the corpus delicti rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and of its having been
intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, if credible, may be enough to prove
the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.28
Appellant interposes the defense of all in his bid for acquittal. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is axiomatic that
the appellant must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed, but that it
was likewise physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.29 In this case,
appellant himself testified that the house of his mother where he was staying on that fateful night was merely five (5)
houses away from the locus criminis, hence considering the distance, it was not physically impossible for him to
have perpetrated the crime and then gone home to his mother's home, appearing as innocent as a lamb.

Lastly, it would not be amiss here to point out that "[i]n the crime of arson, the enormity of the offense is not
measured by the value of the property that may be destroyed but rather by the human lives exposed to
destruction."30 It is indeed a heinous crime that the law wisely seeks to suppress with the most serious penalty
because of its grave anti-social character.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify private
complainant, Filomena M. Marigomen, in the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment, is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant. 1âwphi1.nêt
40-43. Bank Secrecy Law.)
44.) G.R. No. 168644               February 16, 2010

BSB GROUP, INC., represented by its President, Mr. RICARDO BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SALLY GO a.k.a. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 876001 dated April 20, 2005, which reversed and set aside the September 13, 20042 and November
5, 20043 Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 364 in Criminal Case No. 02-202158 for
qualified theft. The said orders, in turn, respectively denied the motion filed by herein respondent Sally Go for the
suppression of the testimonial and documentary evidence relative to a Security Bank account, and denied
reconsideration.

The basic antecedents are no longer disputed.

Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic corporation presided by its herein representative,
Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go, alternatively referred to as Sally Sia Go and Sally Go-
Bangayan, is Bangayan’s wife, who was employed in the company as a cashier, and was engaged, among others,
to receive and account for the payments made by the various customers of the company.

In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutor’s Office a complaint for estafa and/or qualified theft5 against
respondent, alleging that several checks6 representing the aggregate amount of ₱1,534,135.50 issued by the
company’s customers in payment of their obligation were, instead of being turned over to the company’s coffers,
indorsed by respondent who deposited the same to her personal banking account maintained at Security Bank and
Trust Company (Security Bank) in Divisoria, Manila Branch.7 Upon a finding that the evidence adduced was
uncontroverted, the assistant city prosecutor recommended the filing of the Information for qualified theft against
respondent.8

Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, in an Information, the
inculpatory portion of which reads:

That in or about or sometime during the period comprised (sic) between January 1988 [and] October 1989,
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent [to] gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away cash
money in the total amount of ₱1,534,135.50 belonging to BSB GROUP OF COMPANIES represented by RICARDO
BANGAYAN, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of ₱1,534,135.50, Philippine
currency.

That in the commission of the said offense, said accused acted with grave abuse of confidence, being then
employed as cashier by said complainant at the time of the commission of the said offense and as such she was
entrusted with the said amount of money.

Contrary to law.9

Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned.10 The trial ensued. On the premise that respondent had
allegedly encashed the subject checks and deposited the corresponding amounts thereof to her personal banking
account, the prosecution moved for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum /ad testificandum against the respective
managers or records custodians of Security Bank’s Divisoria Branch, as well as of the Asian Savings Bank (now
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. [Metrobank]), in Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila Branch.11 The trial court granted
the motion and issued the corresponding subpoena.12
Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena dated November 4, 2003, addressed to Metrobank, noting to the
court that in the complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, there was no mention made of the said bank account,
to which respondent, in addition to the Security Bank account identified as Account No. 01-14-006, allegedly
deposited the proceeds of the supposed checks. Interestingly, while respondent characterized the Metrobank
account as irrelevant to the case, she, in the same motion, nevertheless waived her objection to the irrelevancy of
the Security Bank account mentioned in the same complaint-affidavit, inasmuch as she was admittedly willing to
address the allegations with respect thereto.13

Petitioner, opposing respondent’s move, argued for the relevancy of the Metrobank account on the ground that the
complaint-affidavit showed that there were two checks which respondent allegedly deposited in an account with the
said bank.14 To this, respondent filed a supplemental motion to quash, invoking the absolutely confidential nature of
the Metrobank account under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1405.15 The trial court did not sustain
respondent; hence, it denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.16

Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of Elenita Marasigan (Marasigan), the
representative of Security Bank. In a nutshell, Marasigan’s testimony sought to prove that between 1988 and 1989,
respondent, while engaged as cashier at the BSB Group, Inc., was able to run away with the checks issued to the
company by its customers, endorse the same, and credit the corresponding amounts to her personal deposit
account with Security Bank. In the course of the testimony, the subject checks were presented to Marasigan for
identification and marking as the same checks received by respondent, endorsed, and then deposited in her
personal account with Security Bank.17 But before the testimony could be completed, respondent filed a Motion to
Suppress,18 seeking the exclusion of Marasigan’s testimony and accompanying documents thus far received,
bearing on the subject Security Bank account. This time respondent invokes, in addition to irrelevancy, the privilege
of confidentiality under R.A. No. 1405.

The trial court, nevertheless, denied the motion in its September 13, 2004 Order.19 A motion for reconsideration was
subsequently filed, but it was also denied in the Order dated November 5, 2004.20 These two orders are the subject
of the instant case.

Aggrieved, and believing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in acting the way it did, respondent
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Finding merit in the petition,
the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the trial court in its April 20, 2005 Decision.21 The
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders dated September 13, 2004 and November 5,
2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The testimony of the SBTC representative is ordered stricken from the
records.

SO ORDERED.22

With the denial of its motion for reconsideration,23 petitioner is now before the Court pleading the same issues as
those raised before the lower courts.

In this Petition24 under Rule 45, petitioner averred in the main that the Court of Appeals had seriously erred in
reversing the assailed orders of the trial court, and in effect striking out Marasigan’s testimony dealing with
respondent’s deposit account with Security Bank.25 It asserted that apart from the fact that the said evidence had a
direct relation to the subject matter of the case for qualified theft and, hence, brings the case under one of the
exceptions to the coverage of confidentiality under R.A. 1405.26 Petitioner believed that what constituted the subject
matter in litigation was to be determined by the allegations in the information and, in this respect, it alluded to the
assailed November 5, 2004 Order of the trial court, which declared to be erroneous the limitation of the present
inquiry merely to what was contained in the information.27

For her part, respondent claimed that the money represented by the Security Bank account was neither relevant nor
material to the case, because nothing in the criminal information suggested that the money therein deposited was
the subject matter of the case. She invited particular attention to that portion of the criminal Information which
averred that she has stolen and carried away cash money in the total amount of ₱1,534,135.50. She advanced the
notion that the term "cash money" stated in the Information was not synonymous with the checks she was purported
to have stolen from petitioner and deposited in her personal banking account. Thus, the checks which the
prosecution had Marasigan identify, as well as the testimony itself of Marasigan, should be suppressed by the trial
court at least for violating respondent’s right to due process.28 More in point, respondent opined that admitting the
testimony of Marasigan, as well as the evidence pertaining to the Security Bank account, would violate the secrecy
rule under R.A. No. 1405.29

In its reply, petitioner asserted the sufficiency of the allegations in the criminal Information for qualified theft, as the
same has sufficiently alleged the elements of the offense charged. It posits that through Marasigan’s testimony, the
Court would be able to establish that the checks involved, copies of which were attached to the complaint-affidavit
filed with the prosecutor, had indeed been received by respondent as cashier, but were, thereafter, deposited by the
latter to her personal account with Security Bank. Petitioner held that the checks represented the cash money stolen
by respondent and, hence, the subject matter in this case is not only the cash amount represented by the checks
supposedly stolen by respondent, but also the checks themselves.30

We derive from the conflicting advocacies of the parties that the issue for resolution is whether the testimony of
Marasigan and the accompanying documents are irrelevant to the case, and whether they are also violative of the
absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits and, hence, excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. The question of
admissibility of the evidence thus comes to the fore. And the Court, after deliberative estimation, finds the subject
evidence to be indeed inadmissible.

Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive acts of the offense must be
established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty because this is the critical and only requisite to a finding
of guilt. 31 Theft is present when a person, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons
or force upon things, takes the personal property of another without the latter’s consent. It is qualified when, among
others, and as alleged in the instant case, it is committed with abuse of confidence.32 The prosecution of this offense
necessarily focuses on the existence of the following elements: (a) there was taking of personal property belonging
to another; (b) the taking was done with intent to gain; (c) the taking was done without the consent of the owner; (d)
the taking was done without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things; and (e) it was done
with abuse of confidence.33 In turn, whether these elements concur in a way that overcomes the presumption of
guiltlessness, is a question that must pass the test of relevancy and competency in accordance with Section 334 Rule
128 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, whether these pieces of evidence sought to be suppressed in this case  the testimony of Marasigan, as well
as the checks purported to have been stolen and deposited in respondent’s Security Bank account  are relevant, is
to be addressed by considering whether they have such direct relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence; or whether they relate collaterally to a fact from which, by process of logic, an inference
may be made as to the existence or non-existence of the fact in issue.35

The fact in issue appears to be that respondent has taken away cash in the amount of ₱1,534,135.50 from the
coffers of petitioner. In support of this allegation, petitioner seeks to establish the existence of the elemental act of
taking by adducing evidence that respondent, at several times between 1988 and 1989, deposited some of its
checks to her personal account with Security Bank. Petitioner addresses the incongruence between the allegation of
theft of cash in the Information, on the one hand, and the evidence that respondent had first stolen the checks and
deposited the same in her banking account, on the other hand, by impressing upon the Court that there obtains no
difference between cash and check for purposes of prosecuting respondent for theft of cash. Petitioner is mistaken.

In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of personal property of one by another with intent to gain,
and it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen because the
deprivation relative to the offended party has already ensued from such act of execution.36 The allegation of theft of
money, hence, necessitates that evidence presented must have a tendency to prove that the offender has
unlawfully taken money belonging to another. Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains in attempting to draw a
connection between the evidence subject of the instant review, and the allegation of theft in the Information by
claiming that respondent had fraudulently deposited the checks in her own name. But this line of argument works
more prejudice than favor, because it in effect, seeks to establish the commission, not of theft, but rather of some
other crime  probably estafa.

Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and check is true in other instances. In estafa by conversion, for
instance, whether the thing converted is cash or check, is immaterial in relation to the formal allegation in an
information for that offense; a check, after all, while not regarded as legal tender, is normally accepted under
commercial usage as a substitute for cash, and the credit it represents in stated monetary value is properly capable
of appropriation. And it is in this respect that what the offender does with the check subsequent to the act of
unlawfully taking it becomes material inasmuch as this offense is a continuing one.37 In other words, in pursuing a
case for this offense, the prosecution may establish its cause by the presentation of the checks involved. These
checks would then constitute the best evidence to establish their contents and to prove the elemental act of
conversion in support of the proposition that the offender has indeed indorsed the same in his own name.38

Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus, for our purposes, as the Information in this case accuses respondent
of having stolen cash, proof tending to establish that respondent has actualized her criminal intent by indorsing the
checks and depositing the proceeds thereof in her personal account, becomes not only irrelevant but also
immaterial and, on that score, inadmissible in evidence.

We now address the issue of whether the admission of Marasigan’s testimony on the particulars of respondent’s
account with Security Bank, as well as of the corresponding evidence of the checks allegedly deposited in said
account, constitutes an unallowable inquiry under R.A. 1405.

It is conceded that while the fundamental law has not bothered with the triviality of specifically addressing privacy
rights relative to banking accounts, there, nevertheless, exists in our jurisdiction a legitimate expectation of privacy
governing such accounts. The source of this right of expectation is statutory, and it is found in R.A. No.
1405,39 otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955. 40

R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes to discourage private hoarding and at the same time encourage the
people to deposit their money in banking institutions, so that it may be utilized by way of authorized loans and
thereby assist in economic development.41 Owing to this piece of legislation, the confidentiality of bank deposits
remains to be a basic state policy in the Philippines.42 Section 2 of the law institutionalized this policy by
characterizing as absolutely confidential in general all deposits of whatever nature with banks and other financial
institutions in the country. It declares:

Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments
in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment,
or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. 1avvphi1

Subsequent statutory enactments43 have expanded the list of exceptions to this policy yet the secrecy of bank
deposits still lies as the general rule, falling as it does within the legally recognized zones of privacy.44 There is, in
fact, much disfavor to construing these primary and supplemental exceptions in a manner that would authorize
unbridled discretion, whether governmental or otherwise, in utilizing these exceptions as authority for unwarranted
inquiry into bank accounts. It is then perceivable that the present legal order is obliged to conserve the absolutely
confidential nature of bank deposits.45

The measure of protection afforded by the law has been explained in China Banking Corporation v. Ortega.46 That
case principally addressed the issue of whether the prohibition against an examination of bank deposits precludes
garnishment in satisfaction of a judgment. Ruling on that issue in the negative, the Court found guidance in the
relevant portions of the legislative deliberations on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became
the Bank Secrecy Act, and it held that the absolute confidentiality rule in R.A. No. 1405 actually aims at protection
from unwarranted inquiry or investigation if the purpose of such inquiry or investigation is merely to determine the
existence and nature, as well as the amount of the deposit in any given bank account. Thus,

x x x The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B&B Forest Development
Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the
defendant B&B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes
of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until
further order. It will be noted from the discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and
House Bill No. 3977which later became Republic Act No. 1405, that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to
place banks deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgmentThus:
x x x Mr. Marcos: Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means
to clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue [(BIR)] or, say, ₱1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this the deposit of this individual [has been]
attached by the [BIR].

Mr. Ramos: The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such
person. But where the primary aim is to determine whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper
assessment by the [BIR], such inquiry is not allowed by this proposed law.

Mr. Marcos: But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the attachment or garnishment of money
deposited is allowed. Let us assume for instance that there is a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or
for holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain individual, but such attachment or garnishment will
bring out into the open the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited by... the law?

Mr. Ramos: It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry... is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax liability
already declared for the protection of the right in favor of the government; but when the object is merely to inquire
whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by the law. x x x

Mr. Marcos: The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the amount of the deposit.

Mr. Ramos: Into the very nature of such deposit. x x x47

In taking exclusion from the coverage of the confidentiality rule, petitioner in the instant case posits that the account
maintained by respondent with Security Bank contains the proceeds of the checks that she has fraudulently
appropriated to herself and, thus, falls under one of the exceptions in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405  that the money
kept in said account is the subject matter in litigation. To highlight this thesis, petitioner avers, citing Mathay v.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Co.,48 that the subject matter of the action refers to the physical facts; the things real or
personal; the money, lands, chattels and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, which in the instant case
should refer to the money deposited in the Security Bank account.49 On the surface, however, it seems that
petitioner’s theory is valid to a point, yet a deeper treatment tends to show that it has argued quite off-tangentially.
This, because, while Mathay did explain what the subject matter of an action is, it nevertheless did so only to
determine whether the class suit in that case was properly brought to the court.

What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 has been pointedly
and amply addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,50 in which the Court noted that the
inquiry into bank deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on the fact that the money deposited in
the account is itself the subject of the action.51 Given this perspective, we deduce that the subject matter of the
action in the case at bar is to be determined from the indictment that charges respondent with the offense, and not
from the evidence sought by the prosecution to be admitted into the records. In the criminal Information filed with the
trial court, respondent, unqualifiedly and in plain language, is charged with qualified theft by abusing petitioner’s
trust and confidence and stealing cash in the amount of ₱1,534,135.50. The said Information makes no factual
allegation that in some material way involves the checks subject of the testimonial and documentary evidence
sought to be suppressed. Neither do the allegations in said Information make mention of the supposed bank
account in which the funds represented by the checks have allegedly been kept.

In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment itself that the Security Bank account is the ostensible
subject of the prosecution’s inquiry. Without needlessly expanding the scope of what is plainly alleged in the
Information, the subject matter of the action in this case is the money amounting to ₱1,534,135.50 alleged to have
been stolen by respondent, and not the money equivalent of the checks which are sought to be admitted in
evidence. Thus, it is that, which the prosecution is bound to prove with its evidence, and no other.

It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence relative to respondent’s Security Bank
account serves no other purpose than to establish the existence of such account, its nature and the amount kept in
it. It constitutes an attempt by the prosecution at an impermissible inquiry into a bank deposit account the privacy
and confidentiality of which is protected by law. On this score alone, the objection posed by respondent in her
motion to suppress should have indeed put an end to the controversy at the very first instance it was raised before
the trial court.
In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of respondent’s supposed bank account with
Security Bank and the documentary evidence represented by the checks adduced in support thereof, are not only
incompetent for being excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. They are likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as
they do not appear to have any logical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for qualified
theft. We find full merit in and affirm respondent’s objection to the evidence of the prosecution. The Court of Appeals
was, therefore, correct in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court.

A final note. In any given jurisdiction where the right of privacy extends its scope to include an individual’s financial
privacy rights and personal financial matters, there is an intermediate or heightened scrutiny given by courts and
legislators to laws infringing such rights.52 Should there be doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential nature of
bank deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into such accounts, then such doubts must be resolved in
favor of the former. This attitude persists unless congress lifts its finger to reverse the general state policy respecting
the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits.53

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87600 dated April
20, 2005, reversing the September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 36 in Criminal Case No. 02-202158, is AFFIRMED.
 45.) G.R. No. 233395, January 17, 2018

NORLINA G. SIBAYAN, Petitioner, v. ELIZABETH O. ALDA, THROUGH HER ATTORNEY-IN-

FACT, RUBY O. ALDA, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the October 25, 2016 Decision1 and the August 9, 2017 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 137921. The challenged rulings affirmed the June 9, 2014 and August 26, 2014
Orders3 of the Office of the General Counsel and Legal Services of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(OGCLS-BSP) denying herein petitioner Norlina G. Sibayan's (Norlina) resort to modes of discovery in
connection with an administrative case filed against her.

The Facts

The case stemmed from a letter-complaint filed by respondent Elizabeth O. Aida (Elizabeth), through
her daughter and attorney-in-fact, Ruby O. Aida (Ruby), with the Office of Special Investigation of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (OSI-BSP). Elizabeth charged Norlina, who was then the Assistant
Manager and Marketing Officer of Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc. (BDO) San Fernando, La Union Branch,
with unauthorized deduction of her BDO Savings Account with Account Number 0970097875, as well
as for failure to post certain check deposits to the said account.4

The complaint alleged that while Elizabeth did not make any withdrawals from her BDO savings
account from 2008-2009, its balance of One Million Seventy One Thousand Five Hundred Sixty One
and 73/100 Pesos (P1,071,561.73) as of July 22, 2008 was reduced to only Three Hundred Thirty
Four and 47/100 Pesos (P334.47) by October 31, 2008.5

Further, Elizabeth claimed that two crossed manager's checks, to wit: 1) United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB) Check No. 0000005197 in the amount of Two Million Seven Hundred Forty Three
Thousand Three Hundred Forty Six Pesos (P2,743,346) issued to her by Ferdinand Oriente
(Ferdinand), and 2) Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 0000002688 in the amount of Two
Million Two Hundred Thirty Seven Thousand Three Hundred Forty One and 891100 Pesos
(P2,237,341.89) issued to her by Jovelyn Oriente (Jovelyn) were not posted on her BDO savings
account despite the fact that the said checks were deposited on October 27, 2008.6

As for Norlina's defense, she argued that the charges were only meant to harass her and BDO as the
latter previously filed a criminal case against Elizabeth, Ruby, and their cohorts, for theft, estafa, and
violation of Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as the Access Devise Regulation Act of
1998.7 The said case proceeded from the acts of Elizabeth and her co-defendants therein of
withdrawing and laundering various amounts erroneously credited by BDO to Ruby's Visa Electron
Fast Card Account (Fastcard) with Account Number 4559-6872-3866-2036, which Elizabeth opened
for and in the name of Ruby on April 21, 2006.8

According to Norlina, when BDO merged with Equitable PCI Bank in May 2007, the former acquired
all of the latter's accounts, products and services, including the Fastcard, which functions the same
way as a regular Automated Teller Machine (ATM) card but with an added feature that allows its
holders to withdraw local currencies from ATMs overseas bearing the Visa Plus logo. Thus, using her
Fastcard at various ATMs in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, where she was based, Ruby was able to
withdraw the funds sent to her by Elizabeth, who was then working in Taiwan.9
Sometime in September 2008, BDO, however, discovered that from November 15, 2007 to
September 20, 2008, Ruby was able to withdraw the total amount of Sixty Four Million Two Hundred
Twenty Nine Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Seven and 50/100 Pesos (P64,229,297.50) despite
Elizabeth only having remitted the amount of One Million Six Hundred Forty Five Thousand Four
Hundred Eighty Six Pesos (P1,645,486). BDO conducted an investigation and discovered that Ruby
learned of the erroneous crediting of funds as early as November 2007 and utilized BDO's system
error to successfully launder money by transferring funds withdrawn from Ruby's Fastcard Account to
various bank accounts in the Philippines under the names of Elizabeth, Ruby and their friends and
relatives.10

The foregoing facts were allegedly admitted by Ruby, as evidenced by her execution before the
Philippine Consulate in Dubai of certain documents in BDO's favor, to wit:
1. Undertaking with Authorization11 dated October 21, 2008 promising to pay BDO the total amount
of money erroneously credited to her Fastcard account, including all charges, and authorizing BDO to
setoff and apply as payment whatever monies or properties to her credit or account on the books of
BDO or any other entity;

2. Special Power of Attorney12 dated October 22, 2008 authorizing BDO to setoff and apply any
money or other property on the books of BDO and/or other entities, banks, and financial institutions
under her mime or account for the payment of her obligation; and

3. Deed of Dation in Payment13 dated October 22, 2008 acknowledging her debt to BDO in the
amount of Php62,670,681.60 and conveying to BDO all of her interests, rights and title in the
properties described under the List of Properties14 attached in the said Deed.
Included in the afore-stated List of Properties purportedly ceded by Ruby to BDO are the following
bank accounts:
Bank/Account Number Account Name
BDO Account No. 0970097875 Elizabeth O. Alda
UCPB Account No. 2351047157 Ferdinand Oriente
BPI Account No. 85890237923 Jovelyn Oriente
Pursuant to the foregoing documents executed by Ruby, BDO debited Elizabeth's savings account and
the proceeds thereof were applied to Ruby's outstanding obligation to BDO. Thereafter, Ferdinand
and Jovelyn, who are relatives of Elizabeth and Ruby, went to BDO San Fernando, La Union branch
and presented to Norlina the above-mentioned UCPB and BPI manager's checks, the proceeds of
which were also purportedly applied as payment by Ruby to BDO.

After the parties' submission of their respective pleadings, the OSI-BSP issued a Resolution15 dated
June 13, 2012 finding a prima facie case against Norlina for Conducting Business in an Unsafe or
Unsound Manner under Section 56.216 of Republic Act No. 8791 ("The General Banking Law of
2000"), punishable under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653 ("The New Central Bank Act"). The
OGCLS-BSP then directed Norlina to submit her sworn answer to the formal charge filed by the OSI-
BSP.

Meanwhile, on October 19, 2012, Norlina filed a Request to Answer Written

Interrogatories17 addressed to Elizabeth, Jovelyn, and Ferdinand. Norlina also filed a Motion for
Production of Documents18 praying that UCPB and BPI be ordered to produce and allow the inspection
and copying or photographing of the Statements of Account pertaining to UCPB Account No.
2351047157 and BPI Account No. 85890237923, respectively, alleging that Ruby is the legal and
beneficial owner of both accounts.

Elizabeth, through Ruby, and Ferdinand filed their respective Objections19 to Norlina's request, while
Jovelyn's counsel filed a Manifestation20 stating that the former could not submit her answer since
she is working overseas.
 OGCLS-BSP Ruling

In its June 9, 2014 Order,21 the OGCLS-BSP denied Norlina's motions, ruling as follows:

Motion for Production of Bank Documents

xxxx

The respondent also alleged that the examination is exempted from the rule on secrecy of bank
deposit because the money deposited in the subject bank accounts is the subject matter of litigation.
This Office rules otherwise. The present action is an administrative proceeding aimed at determining
respondent's liability, if any, for violation of banking laws. A deposit account may be examined or
looked into if it is the subject matter of a pending litigation. The phrase "subject matter of the action"
pertains to physical facts, things, real or personal, money, lands, chattels, and the like by which the
suit is prosecuted. It does not refer to the delict or wrong committed by the defendant.

Hence, the Motion for Production of Bank Documents filed by the respondent is DENIED.

Request to Answer Written Interrogatories

With respect to respondent's Request to Answer Written Interrogatories addressed to Mr. Ferdinand
Oriente, Ms. Jovelyn Oriente, and Ms. Elizabeth Aida, the same is DENIED due to the fact that the
aforementioned persons are all witnesses for the prosecution. Respondent will be afforded the right
to confront these witnesses during the presentation of the prosecution's evidence. Moreover, this
Office cannot compel Elizabeth Aida and Jovelyn Oriente to answer the written interrogatories since
they are out of the country as manifested by the prosecution.

SO ORDERED.22
Norlina's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the OGCLS-BSP in its August 26, 2014
Order.23

Assailing that the OGCLS-BSP committed grave abuse of discretion in denying her motions, Norlina
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

CA Ruling

In its October 25, 2016 Decision, the CA upheld the OGCLS-BSP's rulings, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DENIED. The Orders of Public
Respondent dated June 9, 2014 and August 26, 2014 in Administrative Case No. 2012-047 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.24
The CA found that the OGCLS-BSP did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied Norlina's
motion for the production of bank documents and requests to answer written interrogatories. It
highlighted the fact that the proceedings before the OGCLS-BSP is summary in nature and to grant
Norlina's motions would merely delay the resolution of the case. The CA ruled that Norlina's
persistence to utilize modes of discovery will be futile since the information she supposedly seeks to
elicit are sufficiently contained in the pleadings and attachments submitted by the parties to aid the
OGCLS-BSP in resolving the case before it.25

Norlina then filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in its August 9,
2017 Resolution.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue
Norlina anchors her plea for the reversal of the assailed Decision on the following grounds:26
I.

THERE EXISTS NO SUBSTANTIAL GROUNDS FOR THE DENIAL OF PETITIONER SIBAYAN'S REQUESTS
TO ANSWER WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES.

A. REQUESTS. TO ANSWER WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES MAY BE SERVED ON ANY PERSON,

INCLUDING WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION, SUCH AS RESPONDENT ELIZABETH, FERDINAND
AND JOVELYN.

B. PETITIONER SIBAYAN'S REQUESTS FOR WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES ARE RELEVANT AND

MATERIAL TO THE CASE A QUO.

II.

PETITIONER SIBAYAN IS ENTITLED TO THE PRODUCTION OF BANK DOCUMENTS PURSUANT TO

SECTION 1, RULE 27 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
Succinctly put, the pivotal issue to be resolved is whether or not grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed to the OGCLS-BSP in denying Norlina's resort to modes of discovery.

The Court's Ruling

We find no error in the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly adhered to in administrative
investigations

Throughout the petition, Norlina persistently relies and quotes the provisions of the Rules of
Court27 on modes of discovery and argues her right to utilize the same. To her eyes, the denial of her
requests to answer written interrogatories and motion for production of bank documents deprived her
of availing of the rightful remedies which shall bring to the fore material and relevant facts for the
OGCLS-BSP's consideration.28 Thus, Norlina postulates that the OGCLS-BSP would now be forced to
resolve the case against her in an arbitrary manner.29

We disagree.

At the outset, it bears stressing that the proceeding involved in the present case is administrative in
nature. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules on evidence, the
same does not hold true for administrative bodies. The Court has consistently held that technical
rules applicable to judicial proceedings are not exact replicas of those in administrative
investigations.30 Recourse to discovery procedures as sanctioned by the Rules of Court is then not
mandatory for the OGCLS-BSP. Hence, We cannot subscribe to Norlina's tenacious insistence for the
OGCLS-BSP to strictly adhere to the Rules of Court so as not to purportedly defeat her rights.

Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the nature of the proceedings before the OGCLS-BSP
is summary in nature. Section 3, Rule 1 of the BSP Rules of Procedure on Administrative
Cases,31 states:
Section 3. Nature of Proceedings. - The proceedings under these Rules shall be summary in nature
and shall be conducted without necessarily adhering to the technical rules of procedure and evidence
applicable to judicial trials. Proceedings under these Rules shall be confidential and shall not be
subject to disclosure to third parties, except as may be provided under existing laws.
The rationale and purpose of the summary nature of administrative proceedings is to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules.32 As such, in
proceedings before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, like the OGCLS-BSP, decisions may be
reached on the basis of position papers or other documentary evidence only. They are not bound by
technical rules of procedure and evidence.33 To require otherwise would negate the summary nature
of the proceedings which could defeat its very purpose.

In this light, OGCLS-BSP did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying Norlina's request for written
interrogatories as the allowance of the same would not practically hasten, as it would in fact delay,
the early disposition of the instant case. We agree with the CA's discussion on this matter, to wit:
Further to grant the written interrogatories would merely delay the resolution of the issue brought
before [the OGCLS-BSP]. The fraud purportedly executed by [Elizabeth], along with her daughter,
her attorney-in-fact, assuming as true, is plain and clear from the records of the case, specifically the
Undertaking and Authorization allegedly executed by Ruby admitting the erroneous withdrawal of
various amounts from her peso FAST CARD account, to wit:

xxxx

In Our minds, the defense of fraud[,] is sufficiently contained in the pleadings and attachments of the
parties as to aid the Public Respondent in resolving the case before it.

We note that at the time of resolution of [Norlina's] motions, Jovelyn Oriente, one of the persons
requested to answer the written interrogatories, was already out of the country. While her deposition
may nevertheless be taken outside of the country, the same will definitely delay the resolution of an
otherwise summary case.34
Additionally, the denial of the motion for production of bank documents pertaining to 1) UCPB
Account No. 2351047157 and 2) BPI Account No. 8589023792335 is justified as the bank accounts
sought to be examined are privileged. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405, otherwise known as The
Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposit, provides:
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines
including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions
and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not
be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except
upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Norlina contends, however, that Ruby is the legal and beneficial owner of the foregoing accounts and
that the latter gave her permission to look into the said accounts as stated in the Undertaking with
Authorization,36 Special Power of Attorney,37 and Deed of Dation in Payment38 executed by her in
BDO's favor.

We are not convinced.

Records show that the account holder or depositor of UCPB Account No. 2351047157 is Ferdinand
Oriente while the account holder or depositor of BPI Account No. 85890237923 is Jovelyn
Oriente.39 Perforce, the documents executed by Ruby purportedly granting BDO access to the
foregoing accounts do not equate to Ferdinand and Jovelyn's permissions. Based on this alone, the
denial for Norlina to gain access to these bank accounts is warranted.

Clearly then, the Requests to Answer Written Interrogatories and Motion for Production of Documents
were both unnecessary and improper.

Norlina was not denied due process of law

Norlina bemoans that by suppressing her right to avail of discovery measures, the OGCLS-BSP
violated her right to due process. She maintains that the administrative character of the proceedings
involved is not sufficient to defeat such right.40

Norlina's claims are without merit.

Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. It is
enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.41 This
was further expounded in the recent case of Prudential Bank v. Rapanot,42viz:
"The essence of due process is to be heard." In administrative proceedings, due process entails "a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always
necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied."
As established by the facts, Norlina was afforded the opportunity to be heard and to explain her side
before the OGCLS-BSP. She was allowed to submit her answer and all documents in support of her
defense. In fact, her defense of fraud committed by Elizabeth and Ruby is sufficiently contained in
the pleadings and attachments submitted by the parties to aid the OGCLS-BSP in resolving the case
before it.

Evidently, the information sought to be elicited from the written interrogatories, as well as the bank
documents, are already available in the records of the case. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the
grant of Norlina's motions would merely delay the resolution of the case. In fine, the OGCLS-BSP's
issuance of the assailed orders did not violate Norlina's right to due process and was in accord with
the summary nature of administrative proceedings before the BSP. The opportunity accorded to
Norlina was enough to comply with the requirements of due process in an administrative case. The
formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be present in an administrative investigation,
as long as the parties are heard and given the opportunity to adduce their respective sets of
evidence.43

Further, even assuming that the pleadings and attachments on record are not sufficient for the just
resolution of the case against Norlina, the facts, arguments, and defenses put forward in the
pleadings of the parties, as well as the information Norlina seeks to obtain from Elizabeth, Ruby and
other witnesses, may be brought to light in a clarificatory hearing under Section 7 of the BSP Rules of
Procedure on Administrative Cases,44 to wit:
Section 7. Hearing. - After the submission by the parties of their position papers, the Hearing Panel
or Hearing Officer shall determine whether or not there is a need for a hearing for the purpose of
cross examination of the affiant(s).

If the Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer finds no necessity for conducting a hearing, he shall issue an
Order to that effect.

In cases where the Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer deems it necessary to allow the parties to
conduct cross-examination, the case shall be set for hearing. The affidavits of the parties and their
witnesses shall take the place of their direct testimony.
All told, the denial of Norlina's motions to resort to modes of discovery did not, and will definitely not,
equate to a denial of her right to due process. It must be stressed that Norlina's fear of being
deprived of such right and to put up a proper defense is more imagined than real. Norlina was
properly notified of the charges against her and she was given a reasonable opportunity to answer
the accusations against her. As correctly ruled by the lower tribunals, Norlina's attempt to resort to
modes of discovery is frivolous and would merely cause unnecessary delay in the speedy disposition
of the case.

Thus, no error or grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the OGCLS-BSP in not granting
Norlina's plea for written interrogatories and production of bank documents. Absent any showing that
the OGCLS-BSP had acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or with such grave abuse of
discretion as would amount to lack of jurisdiction, as in the present case, its orders dispensing with
the need to resort to modes of discovery may not be corrected by certiorari.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October
25, 2016 and the Resolution dated August 9, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 137921
are hereby AFFIRMED.
 46.) G.R. No. 201931, February 11, 2015

DOÑA ADELA1 EXPORT INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner, v. TRADE AND INVESTMENT

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (TIDCORP), AND THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
(BPI), Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the Decision2 dated November 15, 2011 and the Order3 dated May 14, 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211 in SEC Case No. MC06-103 for
Voluntary Insolvency.  The RTC approved the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement filed by
respondents Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) and the
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI).  Respondents stipulated in their agreement that petitioner shall
waive its rights to confidentiality under the provisions of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits and
the General Banking Law of 2000.

The facts follow:

On August 23, 2006, petitioner Doña Adela Export International, Inc., (petitioner, for brevity) filed a
Petition for Voluntary Insolvency.4  The case was docketed as SEC Case No. MC06-103 and raffled off
to the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211.

On August 28, 2006, the RTC, after finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, issued an
order declaring petitioner as insolvent and staying all civil proceedings against petitioner.  In the
same order, the RTC set the initial hearing on October 19, 2006.5 cralawlawlibrary

Thereafter, Atty. Arlene Gonzales was appointed as receiver.  After taking her oath, Atty. Gonzales
proceeded to make the necessary report, engaged appraisers and required the creditors to submit
proof of their respective claims.

On October 22, 2010, Atty. Gonzales filed a Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise
Agreement6 incorporating therein her proposed terms of compromise, the pertinent portion of which
reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. The remaining assets of the Petitioner Dona Adela Export Int’l., Inc., (Dona Adela) consists of
the following:

Asset Appraised Value Remarks

1.1 Land P5,616,000 w/ REM to TRC
1.2 Building 6,480,000 w/ REM to TRC
1.3 Sewing machines 942,000 w/o chattel mortgage to TRC (sic)
1.4 Sewing machines 755,000 w/chattel mortgage
1.5 Furnitures and Fixtures w/o appraised value

2.
The detailed list of the abovementioned assets and the corresponding appraised value is
attached hereto as Annex A;

3. The claims of the creditors of Petitioner previously submitted with their respective proofs of
claim are shown below:
 NAME OF CREDITOR AMOUNT
Technology Resource Center 29,546,342.45
BPI 11,069,575.82
*TIDCORP
City of Mandaluyong as of 3/25/09 1,061,370.12

4.

*TIDCORP has not yet submitted its peso amount of claim

xxxx

WHEREFORE, undersigned receiver respectfully proposed for the concerned parties of this (sic)
proceedings to enter into a compromise Agreement under the following terms and conditions:

a. That the remaining assets of the Petitioner mentioned under 1 above be assigned and applied
to their respective claims in the following manner:

a.1. The real estate property mentioned under 1.1 and 1.2 above with real estate mortgage
(REM) to Technology Resource Center (TRC) be assigned and applied to its credit.  All costs
and expenses for the transfer of the registration of the said property, including its unpaid real
estate taxes due to the City of Mandaluyong, and cost for cancellation of real estate mortgage
shall be borne by TRC.

a.2. For TRC to assign and waive its rights over the sewing machines and equipments under
chattel mortgage to it mentioned under 1.3 above as its share for the administrative costs of
this proceedings.

a.3. To assign to BPI and TIDCORP the sewing machines and equipments mentioned under 1.3
and 1.4 above in proportion with their credits.

a.4. All other remaining assets of Petitioner under 1.5 above be assigned to the Court-
appointed receiver, Atty. Arlene T. Gonzales for payment of receiver’s fees.

a.5. All other administrative expenses, if any, shall be for the account of TRC, BPI and
TIDCORP, in proportion to their respective credits.

b. That for the abovementioned purpose mentioned under 3.a. above, the appraisal value of the
property (as appraised by Royal Asia Appraisers which was previously submitted to the
Honorable Court) be made as the basis in determining the value of the properties; and the
amount of the claims that will be approved by this Honorable Court be made as the basis in
the determination of the amount of credits due to the respective creditors.

c. Furthermore, that the Compromise Agreement being proposed herein shall be without
prejudice to rights of the creditors to enforce actions against other debtors who are jointly and
solidarily liable with the petitioner.

d. Finally, that the petitioner, Dona Adela Int’l., Inc., be discharged from its debts to the party-
creditors by virtue of the Compromise Agreement as being proposed herein.7

On May 26, 2011, petitioner, through its President Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr., and Technology Resource
Center (TRC) entered into a Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement8 wherein petitioner agreed to
transfer a 351-square meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 10027 with existing improvements
situated in the Barrio of Jolo, Mandaluyong City, in favor of TRC in full payment of petitioner’s
obligation. The agreement bears the conformity of Atty. Gonzales as receiver.  TRC filed on May 26,
2011 a Compliance, Manifestation and Motion to Approve Dacion En Pago by Compromise
Agreement.9 cralawlawlibrary

On August 11, 2011, creditors TIDCORP and BPI also filed a Joint Motion to Approve
Agreement10 which contained the following terms: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. OBLIGATION OF PETITIONER. – The parties agree that the outstanding principal obligation
of petitioner to TIDCORP shall be in the amount of NINE MILLION FORTY-FOUR
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHT & 15/100 PESOS (P9,044,708.15), while to BPI in
the amount of ELEVEN MILLION SIXTY NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY
FIVE & 82/100 PESOS (P11,069,575.82).

2. SETTLEMENT. – TIDCORP and BPI both hereby agree to accept all the machineries in
petitioner’s inventory set aside pursuant to the Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise
Agreement dated 18 October 2010 filed by the Receiver, Atty. Arlene T. Gonzales. The said
machineries valued at THREE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P350,000.00) shall
be divided equally between TIDCORP and BPI.

3. SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS. – TIDCORP and BPI hereby agree that acceptance of the
abovementioned settlement shall constitute payment of petitioner’s aforesaid obligation
pursuant to Act No. 1956 (Insolvency Act).  However, the benefit of payment under the said
Insolvency Act shall only be in favor of petitioner and shall not in any manner affect the claims
of TIDCORP and BPI as against its sureties and/or guarantors.

4. EXPENSES AND TAXES. – All necessary expenses, including but not limited to, fees of the
Receiver, documentation and notarization, as well as all fees incurred or to be incurred in
connection to the full implementation of this Agreement shall be for the account of Mr.
Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr.

All taxes and fees incurred or to be incurred including but not limited to gross receipts tax
shall be for the account of the petitioner.

5. WAIVER OF CONFIDENTIALITY. – The petitioner and the members of its Board of

Directors shall waive all rights to confidentiality provided under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1405, as amended, otherwise known as the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, and
Republic Act No. 8791, otherwise known as The General Banking Law of 2000.  Accordingly,
the petitioner and the members of its Board of Directors by these presents grant TIDCORP and
BPI access to any deposit or other accounts maintained by them with any bank.For this
purpose, the petitioner and the members of its Board of Directors shall authorize TIDCORP and
BPI to make, sign, execute and deliver any document of whatever kind or nature which may
be necessary or proper to allow them access to such deposits or other accounts.

TIDCORP and BPI shall be further authorized to delegate to any person, who may exercise in
their stead, any or all of the powers and authority herein granted to them or substitute any
person in their place to do and perform said powers and authority.

18.HOLD FREE AND HARMLESS. – The petitioner shall indemnify and hold TIDCORP and BPI,
their respective Board of Directors, and officers free and harmless against any liability or claim
of whatever kind or nature which may arise from, or in connection with, or in relation to this
Agreement.11  (Underscoring supplied)

Epifanio Ramos, Jr. filed a Manifestation and Motion to the Proposed Compromise Agreement12 of
TIDCORP and BPI wherein he stated that petitioner has a personality separate and distinct from its
stockholders and officers.  He argued that he cannot be held liable for the expenses and taxes as a
consequence of the auction or distribution/payment of said machineries to the creditors; hence, his
name should be deleted as a party to the Compromise Agreement.

Likewise, Atty. Gonzales filed a Manifestation and Comment (On Dacion En Pago by Compromise
Agreement with TRC and Joint Motion to Approve Agreement of BPI and TIDCORP) with Motion for
Payment of Administrative Expenses and Receiver’s Fees.13 Atty. Gonzales manifested that she is
entitled to payment of administrative expenses and receiver’s fees in the total amount of
P740,200.00.  She further stated that it is just and fair for her to ask her due for services rendered
as officer of the Court from TRC who benefitted the most from the insolvency proceedings; and, that
she is waiving the administrative expenses and receiver’s fees due from TIDCORP and BPI.

In its Comment,14 TRC requested that the receiver’s fee be reduced to P106,000.00.  In her
Reply,15 Atty. Gonzales said that she will accept the amount of P106,000.00 being offered by TRC.

On November 15, 2011, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision approving the Dacion En Pago by
Compromise Agreement and the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered based on the foregoing exchange
of pleadings, as follows:

1. Finding the aforequoted Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement dated May 26, 2011
executed by and between Dona Adela Export International, Inc., represented by its president
Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr., and Technology Resource Center, represented by its Director General
Dennis L. Cunanan, to be in order and not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy, and the fact that the Court-Appointed Receiver in her Reply filed on October
24, 2011 intimated her conformity to the Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement, the
same is hereby APPROVED and is made the basis of this judgment;

2. As regards the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement dated July 29, 2011, filed by creditors
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines and the Bank of the
Philippine Islands, with the exception of paragraph 4 thereof pertaining to Expenses and
Taxes, the same is likewise APPROVED, for the same is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy, and the fact that the Court-Appointed Receiver in her
Reply filed on October 24, 2011 intimated her  conformity to said Joint Motion to Approve
Agreement;

3. Pursuant to its Comment filed on October 19, 2011, Technology Resource Center is hereby
ordered to pay the Court-Appointed Receiver, Atty. Arlene T. Gonzales the sum of
P106,000.00, representing its proportionate share of the administrative expenses incurred by
the receiver with legal interest from date of termination of this insolvency proceedings.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission who is directed
to cause the removal of petitioner Dona Adela Export International, Inc., from the list of registered
legal entities and to make a report to this Court of its Compliance within fifteen (15) days from said
elimination so that the Court could terminate the instant insolvency proceedings and release the
Court-Appointed receiver from her duties and responsibilities.

SO ORDERED.16
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration17 and claimed that TIDCORP and BPI’s agreement
imposes on it several obligations such as payment of expenses and taxes and waiver of
confidentiality of its bank deposits but it is not a party and signatory to the said agreement.

In its Order18 dated May 14, 2012, the RTC denied the motion and held that petitioner’s silence and
acquiescence to the joint motion to approve compromise agreement while it was set for hearing by
creditors BPI and TIDCORP is tantamount to admission and acquiescence thereto.  There was no
objection filed by petitioner to the joint motion to approve compromise agreement prior to its
approval, said the RTC. The RTC also noted that petitioner’s President attended every hearing of the
case but did not interpose any objection to the said motion when its conditions were being discussed
and formulated by the parties and Atty. Gonzales.19 cralawlawlibrary

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner asserts that express and written waiver from the depositor concerned is required by law
before any third person or entity is allowed to examine bank deposits or bank records. According to
petitioner, it is not a party to the compromise agreement between BPI and TIDCORP and its silence
or acquiescence is not tantamount to an admission that binds it to the compromise agreement of the
creditors especially the waiver of confidentiality of bank deposits.  Petitioner cites the rule on
relativity of contracts which states that contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it
cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has knowledge
thereof. Petitioner also maintains that waivers are not presumed, but must be clearly and
convincingly shown, either by express stipulation or acts admitting no other reasonable explanation.

Respondent BPI counters that petitioner is estopped from questioning the BPI-TIDCORP compromise
agreement because petitioner and its counsel participated in all the proceedings involving the subject
compromise agreement and did not object when the compromise agreement was considered by the
RTC.

Respondent TIDCORP contends that the waiver of confidentiality under Republic Act (R.A.) Nos. 1405
and 8791 does not require the express or written consent of the depositor.  It is TIDCORP’s position
that upon declaration of insolvency, the insolvency court obtains complete jurisdiction over the
insolvent’s property which includes the authority to issue orders to look into the insolvent’s bank
deposits.  Since bank deposits are considered debts owed by the banks to the petitioner, the receiver
is empowered to recover them even without petitioner’s express or written consent, said TIDCORP.

TIDCORP further avers that the BPI-TIDCORP compromise agreement approved by the RTC is binding
on petitioner and its Board of Directors by reason of estoppel.  The compromise agreement is not an
ordinary contract. Since it was approved by the insolvency court, the compromise agreement has the
force and effect of judgment; it is immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of
consent or forgery, TIDCORP concluded.

The main issue for our consideration is whether the petitioner is bound by the provision in the BPI-
TIDCORP Joint Motion to Approve Agreement that petitioner shall waive its rights to confidentiality of
its bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405, as amended, otherwise known as the Law on Secrecy of Bank
Deposits and R.A. No. 8791, otherwise known as The General Banking Law of 2000.

The petition is meritorious.

A judgment rendered on the basis of a compromise agreement between the parties in a civil case is
final, unappealable, and immediately executory.20 cralawlawlibrary

However, if one of the parties claims that his consent was obtained through fraud, mistake, or
duress, he must file a motion with the trial court that approved the compromise agreement to
reconsider the judgment and nullify or set aside said contract on any of the said grounds for
annulment of contract within 15 days from notice of judgment.  Under Rule 37, said party can either
file a motion for new trial or reconsideration.  A party can file a motion for new trial based on fraud,
accident or mistake, excusable negligence, or newly discovered evidence.  On the other hand, a party
may decide to seek the recall or modification of the judgment by means of a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that “the decision or final order is contrary to law” if the consent was
procured through fraud, mistake, or duress.  Thus, the motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration is the readily available remedy for a party to challenge a judgment if the 15-day
period from receipt of judgment for taking an appeal has not yet expired.21 cralawlawlibrary
In this case, petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the decision based on compromise
agreement assailing the waiver of confidentiality provision in the Agreement between its two
creditors, TIDCORP and BPI, in which petitioner was not a party.  After the trial court denied the
motion on the ground of estoppel, petitioner sought a direct recourse to this Court.

We stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions, final resolutions and orders of the
RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved.  There is a question of law
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not
call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.  On
the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts.  Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether
the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law.22 cralawlawlibrary

Petitioner submits the lone question of law on whether the waiver of confidentiality provision in the
Agreement between TIDCORP and BPI is valid despite petitioner not being a party and signatory to
the same.  According to petitioner, R.A. No. 1405 requires the express and written consent of the
depositor to make the waiver effective.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405, the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits enacted in 1955, was first amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1792 in 1981 and further amended by R.A. No. 7653 in 1993.  It now
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except when
the examination is made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank and is
specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to
believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is
necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity, or when the examination is
made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the
examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the
bank, or upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

R.A. No. 1405 provides for exceptions when records of deposits may be disclosed.  These are under
any of the following instances: (a) upon written permission of the depositor, (b) in cases of
impeachment, (c) upon order of a competent court in the case of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials or, (d) when the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation,
and (e) in cases of violation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Anti-Money Laundering Council
may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court.23 cralawlawlibrary

In this case, the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement was executed by BPI and TIDCORP only.  There
was no written consent given by petitioner or its representative, Epifanio Ramos, Jr., that petitioner
is waiving the confidentiality of its bank deposits. The provision on the waiver of the confidentiality of
petitioner’s bank deposits was merely inserted in the agreement.  It is clear therefore that petitioner
is not bound by the said provision since it was without the express consent of petitioner who was not
a party and signatory to the said agreement.

Neither can petitioner be deemed to have given its permission by failure to interpose its objection
during the proceedings.  It is an elementary rule that the existence of a waiver must be positively
demonstrated since a waiver by implication is not normally countenanced.  The norm is that a waiver
must not only be voluntary, but must have been made knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.  There must be persuasive
evidence to show an actual intention to relinquish the right.  Mere silence on the part of the holder of
the right should not be construed as a surrender thereof; the courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against the existence and validity of such waiver.24 cralawlawlibrary

In addition, considering that petitioner was already declared insolvent by the RTC, all its property,
assets and belongings were ordered delivered to the appointed receiver or assignee. Thus, in the
order of the RTC appointing Atty. Gonzales as receiver, petitioner was directed to assign and convey
to Atty. Gonzales all its real and personal property, monies, estate and effects with all the deeds,
books and papers relating thereto,25 pursuant to Section 3226 of the Insolvency Law.27 Such
assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt
by law from execution.28 Corollarily, the stipulation in the Joint Motion to Approve Compromise
Agreement that petitioner waives its right to confidentiality of its bank deposits requires the approval
and conformity of Atty. Gonzales as receiver since all the property, money, estate and effects of
petitioner have been assigned and conveyed to her29 and she has the right to recover all the estate,
assets, debts and claims belonging to or due to the insolvent debtor.30 cralawlawlibrary

While it was Atty. Gonzales who filed the Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise Agreement,
she did not sign or approve the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement submitted by TIDCORP and BPI. 
In her Manifestation and Comment (on Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement with TRC and
Joint Motion to Approve Agreement of BPI and TIDCORP) there is no showing that Atty. Gonzales
signified her conformity to the waiver of confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits. Atty. Gonzales
stated thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

13.  COMPROMISE AGREEMENT OF TIDCORP AND BPI

The undersigned receiver is in conformity with the compromise agreement of TIDCORP and BPI,
attached hereto as Annex C, which they submitted to this Honorable Court under the
abovementioned Joint Motion in so far as the sharing scheme of the sewing machine
inventories of Dona Adela is concerned. However, the undersigned receiver has the following
comments on the other provisions of the said compromise agreement:
cralawred

xxxx

13.2. The undersigned receiver reiterates that Dona Adela has no cash or other assets to source payment for
expenses and taxes provided under no. 4 of the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement. In fact, except for the
amount of P5,000.00 she initially asked for administrative expenses and the appraisal fees for the assets of
Dona Adela advanced by MR. EPIFANIO RAMOS, she has been shouldering all the administrative
expenses of this insolvency proceedings.

xxxx
21. As also mentioned under 13.2. above, Dona Adela has no cash to source payment for the
abovementioned administrative expenses and receiver’s fees, and its assets, which should have been
the source for payment for administrative expenses and receiver’s fees before the distribution to the
creditors, have already been assigned to the creditors by compromise agreement.

22. After considering its savings from foreclosure expenses, sheriff’s fees and other related expenses
had it pursued foreclosure proceedings, it is just fair for the undersigned receiver to ask her due for
services rendered as officer of this Honorable Court from TRC who benefitted the most from the
insolvency proceedings.31  (Emphasis ours)

Clearly, the waiver of confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits in the BPI-TIDCORP Joint Motion to
Approve Agreement lacks the required written consent of petitioner and conformity of the receiver. 
We, thus, hold that petitioner is not bound by the said provision.

It is basic in law that a compromise agreement, as a contract, is binding only upon the parties to the
compromise, and not upon non-parties.  This is the doctrine of relativity of contracts.32 The rule is
based on Article 1311 (1) of the Civil Code which provides that “contracts take effect only between
the parties, their assigns and heirs x x x.”33 The sound reason for the exclusion of non-parties to an
agreement is the absence of a vinculum or juridical tie which is the efficient cause for the
establishment of an obligation.34 Consistent with this principle, a judgment based entirely on a
compromise agreement is binding only on the parties to the compromise the court approved, and not
upon the parties who did not take part in the compromise agreement and in the proceedings leading
to its submission and approval by the court.  Otherwise stated, a court judgment made solely on the
basis of a compromise agreement binds only the parties to the compromise, and cannot bind a party
litigant who did not take part in the compromise agreement.35 cralawlawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The second paragraph of the
November 15, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211, in SEC
Case No. MC06-103 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

2. As regards the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement dated July 29, 2011, filed by creditors Trade
and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines and the Bank of the Philippine Islands,
with the exception of paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 thereof pertaining to Expenses and Taxes and
Waiver of Confidentiality, the same is likewise APPROVED, for the same is not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, and the fact that the Court-Appointed Receiver in
her Reply filed on October 24, 2011 intimated her conformity to said Joint Motion to Approve
Agreement.
47.) G.R. No. 128996               February 15, 2002

CARMEN LL. INTENGAN, ROSARIO LL. NERI, and RITA P. BRAWNER, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AZIZ RAJKOTWALA, WILLIAM FERGUSON,
JOVEN REYES, and VIC LIM, respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking the reversal of the Decision dated July 8, 1996 of the former
1 

Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37577 as well as its Resolution dated April 16, 1997
2  3 

denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The appellate court, in its Decision, sustained a resolution of the
Department of Justice ordering the withdrawal of informations for violation of Republic Act No. 1405 against private
respondents.

The facts are:

On September 21, 1993, Citibank filed a complaint for violation of section 31, in relation to section 144 of the
4  5 

Corporation Code against two (2) of its officers, Dante L. Santos and Marilou Genuino. Attached to the complaint
was an affidavit executed by private respondent Vic Lim, a vice-president of Citibank. Pertinent portions of his
6 

affidavit are quoted hereunder:

2.1 Sometime this year, the higher management of Citibank, N.A. assigned me to assist in the investigation
of certain anomalous/highly irregular activities of the Treasurer of the Global Consumer Group of the bank, namely,
Dante L. Santos and the Asst. Vice President in the office of Mr. Dante L. Santos, namely Ms. Marilou (also called
Malou) Genuino. Ms. Marilou Genuino apart from being an Assistant Vice President in the office of Mr. Dante L.
Santos also performed the duties of an Account Officer. An Account Officer in the office of Mr. Dante L. Santos
personally attends to clients of the bank in the effort to persuade clients to place and keep their monies in the
products of Citibank, NA., such as peso and dollar deposits, mortgage backed securities and money placements,
among others.

x x x           x x x          x x x

4.1 The investigation in which I was asked to participate was undertaken because the bank had found
records/evidence showing that Mr. Dante L. Santos and Ms. Malou Genuino, contrary to their disclosures and the
aforementioned bank policy, appeared to have been actively engaged in business endeavors that were in conflict
with the business of the bank. It was found that with the use of two (2) companies in which they have personal
financial interest, namely Torrance Development Corporation and Global Pacific Corporation, they managed or
caused existing bank clients/depositors to divert their money from Citibank, N.A., such as those placed in peso and
dollar deposits and money placements, to products offered by other companies that were commanding higher rate
of yields. This was done by first transferring bank clients’ monies to Torrance and Global which in turn placed the
monies of the bank clients in securities, shares of stock and other certificates of third parties. It also appeared that
out of these transactions, Mr. Dante L. Santos and Ms. Marilou Genuino derived substantial financial gains.

5.1 In the course of the investigation, I was able to determine that the bank clients which Mr. Santos and Ms.
Genuino helped/caused to divert their deposits/money placements with Citibank, NA. to Torrance and Global (their
family corporations) for subsequent investment in securities, shares of stocks and debt papers in other companies
were as follows:

xxx

b) Carmen Intengan

xxx
d) Rosario Neri

xxx

i) Rita Brawner

All the above persons/parties have long standing accounts with Citibank, N.A. in savings/dollar deposits and/or in
trust accounts and/or money placements.

As evidence, Lim annexed bank records purporting to establish the deception practiced by Santos and Genuino.
Some of the documents pertained to the dollar deposits of petitioners Carmen Ll. Intengan, Rosario Ll. Neri, and
Rita P. Brawner, as follows:

a) Annex "A-6" - an "Application for Money Transfer" in the amount of US $140,000.00, executed by
7 

Intengan in favor of Citibank $ S/A No. 24367796, to be debited from her Account No. 22543341;

b) Annex "A-7" - a "Money Transfer Slip" in the amount of US $45,996.30, executed by Brawner in favor of
8 

Citibank $ S/A No. 24367796, to be debited from her Account No. 22543236; and

c) Annex "A-9" - an "Application for Money Transfer" in the amount of US $100,000.00, executed by Neri in
9 

favor of Citibank $ S/A No. 24367796, to be debited from her Account No. 24501018.

In turn, private respondent Joven Reyes, vice-president/business manager of the Global Consumer Banking Group
of Citibank, admits to having authorized Lim to state the names of the clients involved and to attach the pertinent
bank records, including those of petitioners’. He states that private respondents Aziz Rajkotwala and William
10 

Ferguson, Citibank, N.A. Global Consumer Banking Country Business Manager and Country Corporate Officer,
respectively, had no hand in the disclosure, and that he did so upon the advice of counsel.

In his memorandum, the Solicitor General described the scheme as having been conducted in this manner:

First step: Santos and/or Genuino would tell the bank client that they knew of financial products of other companies
that were yielding higher rates of interests in which the bank client can place his money. Acting on this information,
the bank client would then authorize the transfer of his funds from his Citibank account to the Citibank account of
either Torrance or Global.

The transfer of the Citibank client’s deposits was done through the accomplishment of either an Application For
Manager’s Checks or a Term Investment Application in favor of Global or Torrance that was prepared/filed by
Genuino herself.

Upon approval of the Application for Manager’s Checks or Term Investment Application, the funds of the bank client
covered thereof were then deposited in the Citibank accounts of Torrance and/or Global.

Second step: Once the said fund transfers had been effected, Global and/or Torrance would then issue its/ their
checks drawn against its/their Citibank accounts in favor of the other companies whose financial products, such as
securities, shares of stocks and other certificates, were offering higher yields.

Third step: On maturity date(s) of the placements made by Torrance and/or Global in the other companies, using the
monies of the Citibank client, the other companies would then. return the placements to Global and/or Torrance with
the corresponding interests earned.

Fourth step: Upon receipt by Global and/or Torrance of the remittances from the other companies, Global and/or
Torrance would then issue its/their own checks drawn against their Citibank accounts in favor of Santos and
Genuino.
The amounts covered by the checks represent the shares of Santos and Genuino in the margins Global and/or
Torrance had realized out of the placements [using the diverted monies of the Citibank clients] made with the other
companies.

Fifth step: At the same time, Global and/or Torrance would also issue its/their check(s) drawn against its/their
Citibank accounts in favor of the bank client.

The check(s) cover the principal amount (or parts thereof) which the Citibank client had previously transferred, with
the help of Santos and/or Genuino, from his Citibank account to the Citibank account(s) of Global and/or Torrance
for placement in the other companies, plus the interests or earnings his placements in other companies had made
less the spreads made by Global, Torrance, Santos and Genuino.

The complaints which were docketed as I.S. Nos. 93-9969, 93-10058 and 94-1215 were subsequently amended to
include a charge of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
11 

As an incident to the foregoing, petitioners filed respective motions for the exclusion and physical withdrawal of their
bank records that were attached to Lim’s affidavit.

In due time, Lim and Reyes filed their respective counter-affidavits. In separate Memoranda dated March 8, 1994
12 

and March 15, 1994 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Hermino T. Ubana, Sr. recommended the dismissal of
petitioners’ complaints. The recommendation was overruled by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro M. Castro who, in a
Resolution dated August 18, 1994, directed the filing of informations against private respondents for alleged
13 

violation of Republic Act No. 1405, otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Law.

Private respondents’ counsel then filed an appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ). On November 17, 1994,
then DOJ Secretary Franklin M. Drilon issued a Resolution ordering, inter alia, the withdrawal of the aforesaid
14 

informations against private respondents. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by DOJ Acting
15 

Secretary Demetrio G. Demetria in a Resolution dated March 6, 1995. 16

Initially, petitioners sought the reversal of the DOJ resolutions via a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed with
this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 119999-120001. However, the former First Division of this Court, in a Resolution
dated June 5, 1995, referred the matter to the Court of the Appeals, on the basis of the latter tribunal’s concurrent
17 

jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs therein prayed for. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37577
in the Court of Appeals.

On July 8, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 37577 and
declared therein, as follows:

Clearly, the disclosure of petitioners’ deposits was necessary to establish the allegation that Santos and Genuino
had violated Section 31 of the Corporation Code in acquiring "any interest adverse to the corporation in respect of
any matter which has been reposed in him in confidence." To substantiate the alleged scheme of Santos and
Genuino, private respondents had to present the records of the monies which were manipulated by the two officers
which included the bank records of herein petitioners.

Although petitioners were not the parties involved in IS. No. 93-8469, their accounts were relevant to the complete
prosecution of the case against Santos and Genuino and the respondent DOJ properly ruled that the disclosure of
the same falls under the last exception of R.A. No. 1405. That ruling is consistent with the principle laid down in the
case of Mellon Bank, N.A. vs. Magsino (190 SCRA 633) where the Supreme Court allowed the testimonies on the
bank deposits of someone not a party to the case as it found that said bank deposits were material or relevant to the
allegations in the complaint. Significantly, therefore, as long as the bank deposits are material to the case, although
not necessarily the direct subject matter thereof, a disclosure of the same is proper and falls within the scope of the
exceptions provided for by R.A. No. 1405.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Moreover, the language of the law itself is clear and cannot be subject to different interpretations. A reading of the
provision itself would readily reveal that the exception "or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation" is not qualified by the phrase "upon order of competent Court" which refers only to
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was similarly denied in a Resolution dated April 16, 1997. Appeal was made
in due time to this Court.

The instant petition was actually denied by the former Third Division of this Court in a Resolution dated July 16,
18 

1997, on the ground that petitioners had failed to show that a reversible error had been committed. On motion,
however, the petition was reinstated and eventually given due course.
19  20

In assailing the appellate court’s findings, petitioners assert that the disclosure of their bank records was
unwarranted and illegal for the following reasons:

I.

IN BLATANT VIOLATION OF R.A. NO. 1405, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ILLEGALLY MADE DISCLOSURES OF
PETITIONERS’ CONFIDENTIAL BANK DEPOSITS FOR THEIR SELFISH ENDS IN PROSECUTING THEIR
COMPLAINT IN IS. NO. 93-8469 THAT DID NOT INVOLVE PETITIONERS.

II.

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ DISCLOSURES DO NOT FALL UNDER THE FOURTH EXCEPTION OF R.A. NO.
1405 (i.e., "in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation"), NOR UNDER
ANY OTHER EXCEPTION:

(1)

PETITIONERS’ DEPOSITS ARE NOT INVOLVED IN ANY LITIGATION BETWEEN PETITIONERS AND
RESPONDENTS. THERE IS NO LITIGATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES, MUCH LESS ONE INVOLVING
PETITIONERS’ DEPOSITS AS THE SUBJECT MATTER THEREOF.

(2)

EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE IS A LITIGATION INVOLVING PETITIONERS’ DEPOSITS

AS THE SUBJECT MATTER THEREOF, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ DISCLOSURES OF PETITIONERS’
DEPOSITS ARE NEVERTHELESS ILLEGAL FOR WANT OF THE REQUISITE COURT ORDER, IN
VIOLATION OF R.A. NO. 1405.

III.

THEREFORE, PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO PROSECUTE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR VIOLATIONS

OF R.A. NO. 1405 FOR HAVING ILLEGALLY DISCLOSED PETITIONERS’ CONFIDENTIAL BANK DEPOSITS
AND RECORDS IN IS. NO. 93-8469.

Apart from the reversal of the decision and resolution of the appellate court as well as the resolutions of the
Department of Justice, petitioners pray that the latter agency be directed to issue a resolution ordering the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal to file the corresponding informations for violation of Republic Act No. 1405 against private
respondents.

The petition is not meritorious.

Actually, this case should have been studied more carefully by all concerned. The finest legal minds in the country -
from the parties’ respective counsel, the Provincial Prosecutor, the Department of Justice, the Solicitor General, and
the Court of Appeals - all appear to have overlooked a single fact which dictates the outcome of the entire
controversy. A circumspect review of the record shows us the reason. The accounts in question are U.S. dollar
deposits; consequently, the applicable law is not Republic Act No. 1405 but Republic Act (RA) No. 6426, known as
the "Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines," section 8 of which provides:

Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits.- All foreign currency deposits authorized under this Act, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No.
1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except upon the written
permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into
by any person, government official bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any other
entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever. (italics supplied)
21 

Thus, under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign currency deposits, that is,
disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission of the depositor. Incidentally, the acts of private respondents
complained of happened before the enactment on September 29, 2001 of R.A. No. 9160 otherwise known as the
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001.

A case for violation of Republic Act No. 6426 should have been the proper case brought against private
respondents. Private respondents Lim and Reyes admitted that they had disclosed details of petitioners’ dollar
deposits without the latter’s written permission. It does not matter if that such disclosure was necessary to establish
Citibank’s case against Dante L. Santos and Marilou Genuino. Lim’s act of disclosing details of petitioners’ bank
records regarding their foreign currency deposits, with the authority of Reyes, would appear to belong to that
species of criminal acts punishable by special laws, called malum prohibitum. In this regard, it has been held that:

While it is true that, as a rule and on principles of abstract justice, men are not and should not be held criminally
responsible for acts committed by them without guilty knowledge and criminal or at least evil intent xxx, the courts
have always recognized the power of the legislature, on grounds of public policy and compelled by necessity, "the
great master of things," to forbid in a limited class of cases the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission
criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. xxx In such cases no judicial authority has the power to require, in
the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown. As was said in the case of State vs. McBrayer
xxx:

‘It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent, as distinguished from a mere intent, to violate the criminal law, is
an essential ingredient in every criminal offense, and that where there is the absence of such intent there is no
offense; this is especially so as to statutory offenses. When the statute plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is
done by some person, the law implies conclusively the guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as
to the meaning of the law he violates. When the language is plain and positive, and the offense is not made to
depend upon the positive, willful intent and purpose, nothing is left to interpretation.’22

Ordinarily, the dismissal of the instant petition would have been without prejudice to the filing of the proper charges
against private respondents. The matter would have ended here were it not for the intervention of time, specifically
the lapse thereof. So as not to unduly prolong the settlement of the case, we are constrained to rule on a material
issue even though it was not raised by the parties. We refer to the issue of prescription.

Republic Act No. 6426 being a special law, the provisions of Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, are
23 

applicable:

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for offences punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not
more than one month, or both: (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but
less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six
years; and (d) after twelve years for any other offence punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the
crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years: Provided, however, That all offences against any law or
part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall prescribe after five years. Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.

Violations of the regulations or conditions of certificates of public convenience issued by the Public Service
Commission shall prescribe after two months.
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to
run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. 1âwphi1

A violation of Republic Act No. 6426 shall subject the offender to imprisonment of not less than one year nor more
than five years, or by a fine of not less than five thousand pesos nor more than twenty-five thousand pesos, or
both. Applying Act No. 3326, the offense prescribes in eight years. Per available records, private respondents may
24  25 

no longer be haled before the courts for violation of Republic Act No. 6426. Private respondent Vic Lim made the
disclosure in September of 1993 in his affidavit submitted before the Provincial Fiscal. In her complaint-
26 

affidavit, Intengan stated that she learned of the revelation of the details of her foreign currency bank account on
27 

October 14, 1993. On the other hand, Neri asserts that she discovered the disclosure on October 24, 1993. As to 28 

Brawner, the material date is January 5, 1994. Based on any of these dates, prescription has set in.
29  30

The filing of the complaint or information in the case at bar for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 1405 did not
have the effect of tolling the prescriptive period. For it is the filing of the complaint or information corresponding to
the correct offense which produces that effect. 31

It may well be argued that the foregoing disquisition would leave petitioners with no remedy in law. We point out,
however, that the confidentiality of foreign currency deposits mandated by Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1246, came into effect as far back as 1977. Hence, ignorance thereof cannot be pretended.
On one hand, the existence of laws is a matter of mandatory judicial notice; on the other, ignorantia legis non
32 

excusat. Even during the pendency of this appeal, nothing prevented the petitioners from filing a complaint charging
33 

the correct offense against private respondents. This was not done, as everyone involved was content to submit the
case on the basis of an alleged violation of Republic Act No. 1405 (Bank Secrecy Law), however, incorrectly
invoked. 34

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

 48.) [G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997]

KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and
Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners, vs. CENTRAL BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y
NORTHCOTT, respondents.

DECISION

TORRES, JR., J.:

In our predisposition to discover the “original intent” of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars
of the status quo.  Little do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises
thrown our way by their framers.  Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune
and irrelevant to our day.

The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:

a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued restraining the respondents from
applying and enforcing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960;

b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:

1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and respondents;

2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the provision of the
Constitution, hence void; because its provision that “Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order to process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever”

i.) has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y
Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners’ favor in violation of substantive
due process guaranteed by the Constitution;

ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution;

iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since
criminals could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a
foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank.

The antecedents facts:

On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen
Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen
Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4,
and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and
people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal
Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No.
021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.);
3.) Dollar Account – China Banking Corp., US $/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine
Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the
complainant.

On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg Bartelli,
Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805
for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February
24, 1989, the day there was a scheduled hearing for Bartelli’s petition for bail the latter escaped from
jail.

On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscal’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest and Hold Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the accused Greg Bartelli y
Northcott, the criminal cases were archived in an Order dated February 28, 1989.

Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated February 22, 1989 granting the
application of herein petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. After
petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU Insurance Corporation in the amount P100,000.00, a
Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued by the trial court on February 28, 1989.

On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking
Corporation. In a letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking
Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on
it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking
Corporation saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the
disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order
which has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff
of Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever.

This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank in a letter dated
April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether said
section has been repealed or amended since said section has rendered nugatory the substantive right
of the plaintiff to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of
preliminary attachment as granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
Central Bank responded as follows:

“May 26, 1989

“Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino

12 Pres. Osmeña Avenue

South Admiral Village

Paranaque, Metro Manila

“Dear Ms. Carolino:

“This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on Section 113, CB Circular
No. 960 (1983).

“The cited provision is absolute in application. It does not admit of any exception, nor has the same
been repealed nor amended.

“The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts within the country’s banking system which
would help in the development of the economy. There is no intention to render futile the basic rights
of a person as was suggested in your subject letter. The law may be harsh as some perceive it, but it
is still the law. Compliance is, therefore, enjoined.

“Very truly yours,

(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO

Director”[1]

Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners’ motion for leave to serve summons
by publication in the Civil Case No. 89-3214 entitled “Karen Salvacion. et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y
Northcott.” Summons with the complaint was published in the Manila Times once a week for three
consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file his answer to the complaint and was declared in default
on August 7, 1989. After hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners on March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant, ordering the

latter:

“1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages;

“2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E. Salvacion the
amount of P150,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00 for both of them;

“3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and

“4. To pay attorney’s fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount of damages herein
awarded;

“5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus

“6. Costs of the suit.

“SO ORDERED.”

The heinous acts of respondents Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were related in graphic
detail by the trial court in its decision as follows:

“The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail of Makati but was able to
escape therefrom on February 24, 1989 as per report of the Jail Warden of Makati to the Presiding
Judge, Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136, where he was
charged with four counts of Rape and Serious Illegal Detention (Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805).
Accordingly, upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel, summons was served upon defendant by
publication in the Manila Times, a newspaper of general circulation as attested by the Advertising
Manager of the Metro Media Times, Inc., the publisher of the said newspaper. Defendant, however,
failed to file his answer to the complaint despite the lapse of the period of sixty (60) days from the
last publication; hence, upon motion of the plaintiffs through counsel, defendant was declared in
default and plaintiffs were authorized to present their evidence ex parte.

“In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witness the minor Karen E. Salvacion, her father,
Federico N. Salacion, Jr., a certain Joseph Aguilar and a certain Liberato Mandulio, who gave the
following testimony:

“Karen took her first year high school in St. Mary’s Academy in Pasay City but has recently transferred
to Arellano University for her second year.

“In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair Makati Cinema Square, with her
friend Edna Tangile whiling away her free time. At about 3:30 p.m. while she was finishing her snack
on a concrete bench in front of Plaza Fair, an American approached her. She was then alone because
Edna Tangile had already left, and she was about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 2 to 5)

“The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg Bartelli. He sat beside her when he
talked to her. He said he was a Math teacher and told her that he has a sister who is a nurse in New
York. His sister allegedly has a daughter who is about Karen’s age and who was with him in his house
along Kalayaan Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5).

“The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told him it’s Pilipino. He then
invited her to go with him to his house where she could teach Pilipino to his niece. He even gave her a
stuffed toy to persuade her to teach his niece. (Id., pp.5-6)

“They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to reach the defendant’s house along
Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p.6)

“When they reached the apartment house, Karen notices that defendant’s alleged niece was not
outside the house but defendant told her maybe his niece was inside. When Karen did not see the
alleged niece inside the house, defendant told her maybe his niece was upstairs, and invited Karen to
go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)
“Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door. Karen became nervous because his
niece was not there. Defendant got a piece of cotton cord and tied Karen’s hands with it, and then he
undressed her. Karen cried for help but defendant strangled her. He took a packing tape and he
covered her mouth with it and he circled it around her head. (Id., p. 7)

“Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which was just near the door. He tied her
feet and hands spread apart to the bed posts. He knelt in front of her and inserted his finger in her sex
organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to shout but no sound could come out because there were tapes
on her mouth. When defendant withdrew his finger it was full of blood and Karen felt more pain after
the withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p.8)

“He then got a Johnsons Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ as well as to her sex organ. After
that he forced his sex organ into her but he was not able to do so. While he was doing it, Karen found
it difficult to breathe and she perspired a lot while feeling severe pain. She merely presumed that he
was able to insert his sex organ a little, because she could not see. Karen could not recall how long
the defendant was in that position. (Id., pp. 8-9)

“After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told Karen to take a shower and
he untied her hands. Karen could only hear the sound of the water while the defendant, she presumed,
was in the bathroom washing his sex organ. When she took a shower more blood came out from her.
In the meantime, defendant changed the mattress because it was full of blood. After the shower,
Karen was allowed by defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she got tired crying. The incident
happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen had no way of determining the exact time because defendant
removed her watch. Defendant did not care to give her food before she went to sleep. Karen woke up
at about 8:00 o’clock the following morning. (Id., pp. 9-10)

“The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after breakfast of biscuit and coke at about 8:30 to
9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen while she was still bleeding. For lunch, they also took biscuit and
coke. She was raped for the second time at about 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In the evening, they had rice for
dinner which defendant had stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice that is why it looks like
“lugaw”. For the third time, Karen was raped again during the night. During those three times
defendant succeeded in inserting his sex organ but she could not say whether the organ was inserted
wholly.

“Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The defendant did not tie her hands and feet
nor put a tape on her mouth anymore but she did not cry for help for fear that she might be killed;
besides, all those windows and doors were closed. And even if she shouted for help, nobody would
hear her. She was so afraid that if somebody would hear her and would be able to call a police, it was
still possible that as she was still inside the house, defendant might kill her.  Besides, the defendant
did not leave that Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for help. At nighttime he slept with her again.
(TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-14)

“On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once in the morning for thirty minutes
after breakfast of biscuits; again in the afternoon; and again in the evening. At first, Karen did not
know that there was a window because everything was covered by a carpet, until defendant opened
the window for around fifteen minutes or less to let some air in, and she found that the window was
covered by styrofoam and plywood. After that, he again closed the window with a hammer and he put
the styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)

“That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although defendant left but kept the door
closed. She went to the bathroom and saw a small window covered by styrofoam and she also
spotted a small hole. She stepped on the bowl and she cried for help through the hole. She cried:
‘Maawa na po kayo sa akin. Tulungan n’yo akong makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako!’ Somebody heard her.
It was a woman, probably a neighbor, but she got angry and said she was ‘istorbo.’ Karen pleaded for
help and the woman told her to sleep and she will call the police. She finally fell asleep but no
policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16)

“She woke up at 6:00 o’clock the following morning, and she saw defendant in bed, this time sleeping.
She waited for him to wake up. When he woke up, he again got some food but he always kept the
door locked. As usual, she was merely fed with biscuit and coke. On that day, February 7, 1989, she
was again raped three times. The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about 8:30 – 9:00, and
the third was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped her for the second time he left but only for
a short while. Upon his return, he caught her shouting for help but he did not understand what she
was shouting about. After she was raped the third time, he left the house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-
17) She again went to the bathroom and shouted for help. After shouting for about five minutes, she
heard many voices. The voices were asking for her name and she gave her name as Karen Salvacion.
After a while, she heard a voice of a woman saying they will just call the police. They were also telling
her to change her clothes. She went from the bathroom to the room but she did not change her
clothes being afraid that should the neighbors call the police and the defendant see her in different
clothes, he might kill her. At that time she was wearing a T-shirt of the American bacause the latter
washed her dress. (Id., p. 16)

“Afterwards, defendant arrived and opened the door. He asked her if she had asked for help because
there were many policemen outside and she denied it. He told her to change her clothes, and she did
change to the one she was wearing on Saturday. He instructed her to tell the police that she left home
and willingly; then he went downstairs but he locked the door. She could hear people conversing but
she could not understand what they were saying. (Id., p. 19)

“When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing downstairs, she knocked
repeatedly at the door as hard as she could. She heard somebody going upstairs and when the door
was opened, she saw a policeman. The policeman asked her name and the reason why she was
there. She told him she was kidnapped. Downstairs, he saw about five policemen in uniform and the
defendant was talking to them. ‘Nakikipag-areglo po sa mga pulis,’ Karen added. “The policeman told
him to just explain at the precinct. (Id., p. 20)

“They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in front of the house. They rode the
car of a certain person she called Kuya Boy together with defendant, the policeman, and two of her
neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong Lacson and one Ate Nita. They were brought to Sub-Station I
and there she was investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her father arrived, followed by her
mother together with some of their neighbors. Then they were brought to the second floor of the
police headquarters. (Id., p. 21)
“At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the investigator. The written statement she
gave to the police was marked Exhibit A. Then they proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation
together with the investigator and her parents. At the NBI, a doctor, a medico-legal officer, examined
her private parts. It was already 3:00 in early morning, of the following day when they reached the NBI,
(TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22)  The findings of the medico-legal officer has been marked as Exhibit B.

“She was studying at the St. Mary’s Academy in Pasay City at the time of the Incident but she
subsequently transferred to Apolinario Mabini, Arellano University, situated along Taft Avenue,
because she was ashamed to be the subject of conversation in the school. She first applied for
transfer to Jose Abad Santos, Arellano University along Taft Avenue near the Light Rail Transit Station
but she was denied admission after she told the school the true reason for her transfer. The reason
for their denial was that they might be implicated in the case. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 46)

xxx       xxx       xxx

“After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with her brother and sister anymore,
and she is always in a state of shock; she has been absent-minded and is ashamed even to go out of
the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She appears to be restless or sad. (Id., p. 11) The father prays
for P500,000.00 moral damages for Karen for this shocking experience which probably, she would
always recall until she reaches old age, and he is not sure if she could ever recover from this
experience.” (TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11)

Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was published in the
Manila Bulletin once a week for three consecutive weeks. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the
date of the last publication of the notice of judgment and the decision of the trial court had become
final, petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli’s dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise,
the bank invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960.

Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.

The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two:

May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction in petitions for
declaratory relief rests with the lower court? She Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and
Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit
Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?

Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 providing that
“Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.”
should be adjudged as unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right of
petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the
judgment rendered in petitioners’ favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the
Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege n
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; 3.) it has provided a safe haven for
criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminal could escape civil liability
for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a
foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank; and 4.) The Monetary Board, in issuing
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 has exceeded its delegated quasi- legislative power
when it took away: a.) the plaintiff’s substantive right to have the claim sought to be enforced by the
civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the Revised
Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiff’s substantive right to have the judgment credit satisfied by way of the
writ of execution out of the bank deposit of the judgment debtor as granted to the judgment creditor
by Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is beyond its power to do so.

On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment alleges that the Monetary Board in
issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its power or authority because the subject
Section is copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was
not the Monetary Board that grants exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency
deposits, but the law (R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that it does not violate the substantive due
process guaranteed by the Constitution because  a.) it was based on a law; b.) the law seems to be
reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and d.) it applies to all
members of a class.

Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign currency deposits from
attachment, garnishment or any other order process of any court, is to assure the development and
speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the
Philippines; that another reason is to encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the
banking institutions thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel the same
to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development
of the country; that the subject section is being enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure; and that it applies to all currency deposits made by any person and therefore does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed to promote the public
interest and the general welfare; that the State cannot just stand idly by while a considerable segment
of the society suffers from economic distress; that the State had to take some measures to
encourage economic development; and that in so doing persons and property may be subjected to
some kinds of restraints or burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest. Respondent
Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that some
properties are exempted from execution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A. No. 6426 as
amended is such a law, in that it specifically provides, among others, that foreign currency deposits
shall be exempted from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.

For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons similar to that of
respondent Central Bank, also stated that respondent China Bank is not unmindful of the inhuman
sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from the beastly hands of Greg Bartelli; that it
is not only too willing to release the dollar deposit of Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the
sufferings petitioner has undergone; but it is restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No. 6426 and
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960; and that despite the harsh effect to these laws on
petitioners, CBC has no other alternative but to follow the same.

This court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.

Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petition for
declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for mandamus to require
respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214.

The Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declatory relief. [2] However,
exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications
and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus.[3]

Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good and in her gesture of
kindness by teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language as requested by the American, trustingly
went with said stranger to his apartment, and there she was raped by said American tourist Greg
Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was detained therein for four (4) days. This American tourist
was able to escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the child, having received a
favorable judgment in the Civil Case for damages in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which
amount could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched reputation she had suffered and may
continue to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing that this person who had wronged her has the
money, could not, however get the award of damages because of this unreasonable law. This
questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that she and
her parents fully deserve. As stated by the trial court in its decision,

“Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it was indoubtedly a shocking
and traumatic experience she had undergone which could haunt her mind for a long, long time, the
mere recall of which could make her feel so humiliated, as in fact she had been actually humiliated
once when she was refused admission at the Abad Santos High School, Arellano University, where
she sought to transfer from another school, simply because the school authorities of the said High
School learned about what happened to her and allegedly feared that they might be implicated in the
case.

xxx

The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the wanton and bestial manner
defendant had committed the acts of rape during a period of serious illegal detention of his hapless
victim, the minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault was in her being so naive and credulous to believe
easily that defendant, an American national, could not have such a bestial desire on her nor capable
of committing such heinous crime. Being only 12 years old when that unfortunate incident happened,
she has never heard of an old Filipino adage that in every forest there is a snake, xxx.” [4]

If Karen’s sad fate had happened to anybody’s own kin, it would be difficult for him to fathom how the
incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more important than his child’s right to said award of
damages; in this case, the victim’s claim for damages from this alien who had the gall to wrong a
child of tender years of a country where he is mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the
questioned provisions.

It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the country’s
economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the
reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the country has
recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process
of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when
enacted. The law failed to anticipate the inquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality
such as as the case before us.

It has thus been said that-

“But I also know,[5] that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human
mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths
are disclosed and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must
advance also, and keep pace with the times… We might as well require a man to wear still the coat
which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous
ancestors.”

In his comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:

“The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a national to obtain redress for a
wrong committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law and regulation promulgated for a purpose
which does not contemplate the application thereof envisaged by the allien. More specifically, the
petition raises the question whether the protection against attachment, garnishment or other court
process accorded to foreign currency deposits PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No. 960 applies when
the deposit does not come from a lender or investor but from a mere transient who is not expected to
maintain the deposit in the bank for long.

“The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals who are victimized in the
forum by foreigners who are merely passing through.

xxx

“xxx Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines refused to honor
the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 on the strength of the following provision of
Central Bank Circular No. 960:

‘Sec. 113 Exemption from attachment. – Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.’

“Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6426:
‘Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act which shall take effect
after the publication of such rules and regulations in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of
national circulation for at least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In case the Central Bank
promulgates new rules and regulations decreasing the rights of depositors, the rules and regulations
at the time the deposit was made shall govern.”

“The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426. As amended by
P.D. 1246, thus:

‘Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. — All foreign currency deposits authorized under this
Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized
under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely
confidential nature and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such
foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official,
bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any other entity whether public or
private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.’

“The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against attachment, garnishment and other court
process to foreign currency deposits is stated in its whereases, viz.:

‘WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, certain
Philippine banking institutions and branches of foreign banks are authorized to accept deposits in
foreign currency;

‘WHEREAS, under provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1034 authorizing the establishment of an
offshore banking system in the Philippines, offshore banking units are also authorized to receive
foreign currency deposits in certain cases;

‘WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit
System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines, certain incentives were provided for
under the two Systems such as confidentiality subject to certain exceptions and tax exemptions on
the interest income of depositors who are nonresidents and are not engaged in trade or business in
the Philippines;

‘WHEREAS, making absolute the protective cloak of confidentiality over such foreign currency
deposits, exempting such deposits from tax, and guaranteeing the vested right of depositors would
better encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions authorized to
accept such deposits in the Philippines thereby placing such institutions more in a position to
properly channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to
the economic development of the country;’
“Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to foreign currency deposits is to
assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit system and the Offshore
Banking in the Philippines’ (3rd Whereas).

“The Offshore Banking System was established by PD No. 1034. In turn, the purposes of PD No. 1034
are as follows:

‘WHEREAS, conditions conducive to the establishment of an offshore banking system, such as

political stability, a growing economy and adequate communication facilities, among others, exist in
the Philippines;

‘WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries to have as wide access as possible to the
sources of capital funds for economic development;

‘WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the Philippines will be advantageous and beneficial
to the country by increasing our links with foreign lenders, facilitating the flow of desired investments
into the Philippines, creating employment opportunities and expertise in international finance, and
contributing to the national development effort.

‘WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and human resources, and other positive factors
provide the Philippines with the clear potential to develop as another financial center in Asia;’

“On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was created by PD No. 1035. Its purpose are
as follows:

‘WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines has been authorized
under a separate decree;

‘WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as depository bank under the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act (RA No. 6426), have the resources and managerial competence to more actively engage
in foreign exchange transactions and participate in the grant of foreign currency loans to resident
corporations and firms;

‘WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency lending authority of the said depository banks
under RA 6426 and apply to their transactions the same taxes as would be applicable to transaction
of the proposed offshore banking units;’

“It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign
Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors (Vide
second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third Whereas of PD No. 1035). It is these depositors that are
induced by the two laws and given protection and incentives by them.

“Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit
encourage by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such
depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank
only for a short time.
“Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He deposited his dollars with
respondent China Banking Corporation only for safekeeping during his temporary stay in the
Philippines.

“For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that the dollar deposit of
respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.” [6]

In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the
questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court. Legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially
to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of
the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it
is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.  “Ninguno non deue
enriquecerse tortizerzmente con damo de otro.” Simply stated, when the statute is silent or
ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of
conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377)

It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a
device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense
of the innocent.

Call it what it may – but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso? Upholding the
final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the
foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient alien depositor against
injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This situation calls for fairness legal tyranny.

We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as
it amends Section 8 of R.A. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its
peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution
issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214, “Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch
CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y
Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
 49.) G.R. No. 214415, October 15, 2018

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA C. PACIOLES AND EMMANUEL C.

CHING, Petitioner, v. EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision2 dated February 27, 2014 and the Resolution3 dated September 4, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 130666, affirming the Orders dated May 31, 20124 and September 3,
20125 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 224, in SP. Proc. No. Q-92-13155,
which ordered the release of funds from a joint foreign currency deposit account.

Facts of the Case

Upon the death of Miguelita Ching Pacioles (Miguelita), she left several real properties, stock
investments, bank deposits and interests. She was survived by her husband, respondent Emilio B.
Pacioles, Jr. (Emilio), their two minor children, Miguelita's mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching
(Miguela), now deceased and Miguelita's brother, herein petitioner Emmanuel C. Ching (Emmanuel).6

On August 20, 1992, Emilio filed a petition for the settlement of Miguelita's estate with prayer for his
appointment as its regular administrator. Thereafter, Emilio and Emmanuel were appointed as co--
administrators.7

However, the appointment of Emmanuel was nullified in the CA Decision8 dated July 22, 2002 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 46763.

Among the properties left by Miguelita and included in the inventory of her estate were her two dollar
accounts with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)-San Francisco Del Monte (SFDM) Branch
(subject BPI account), the subject matter of the instant case.9

However, said dollar accounts were closed and consolidated into a single account (consolidated
account) which is Account No. 003248-2799-14 under the names of Emilio and Miguela Chuatoco or
Emmanuel upon their written request addressed to the bank.10

On September 30, 2011, Emilio filed a motion to allow him to withdraw money from the subject BPI
account to defray the cost of property taxes due on the real properties of Miguelita's estate.11

Ruling of the RTC

In an Order12 dated November 28, 2011, the intestate court granted the motion, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in the interest of substantial justice, the instant Motion to Allow Withdrawal of Bank
Deposit filed by the Administrator is partly GRANTED for the sole purpose of paying the subject realty
obligation and the costs thereof.

Accordingly, the Branch Manager of the [BPI], Del Monte Branch, or any authorized representative is
hereby [o]rdered to immediately RELEASE in favor of the Administrator, [Emilio], the total amount of
Four Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php 430,000.00) from Account No. 003248-2799-14 while the
difference shall remain in the custody of the said bank under the same type of account until further
orders from this court.
Thereafter, the said Branch Manager and the Administrator or any authorized representative are each
[o]rdered to SUBMIT to this Court a Compliance/Report with the pertinent document/s on the matter
within five (5) days from receipt thereof.

SO ORDERED.13

BPI-SFDM, through its bank manager, requested for a clarification on the abovementioned Order and
gave an opinion that the subject BPI account is covered by the Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the
Philippines. As such, it is exempt from orders of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies and that
withdrawals therefrom can only be made with the written consent of the account holders, who are
Emilio and Emmanuel.14

In an Order15 dated May 31, 2012, the intestate court held that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court affirms and reiterates the Order dated November 28,
2011 as substantial justice requires. To further clarify the same, the Administrator, [Emilio], shall
personally express his conformity and consent to the Branch Manager of the [BPI], Del Monte
Branch, or any authorized representative for the withdrawal of the subject amount of money which
shall be deemed sufficient for the purpose.

After such conformity and consent are expressed, the said Branch Manager or any authorized
representative is [o]rdered to immediately RELEASE in favor of the said Administrator, [Emilio], the
total amount of Four Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php 430,000.00) from Account No. 003248-
2799-14 while the difference shall remain in the custody of the said bank under the same type of
account until further orders from this Court.

Accordingly, the said Branch Manager and the Administrator or any authorized representative are
each [o]rdered to SUBMIT to this Court a Compliance/Report with the pertinent document/s on the
matter within five (5) days from receipt thereof.

SO ORDERED.16

Emmanuel filed a motion for reconsideration.17 In his motion, he asserted that the trial court erred in
directing the withdrawal of funds from the subject BPI account. Such motion was however denied in
an Order18 dated September 3, 2012.

Undaunted, Emmanuel filed a Petition for Certiorari,19 assailing the abovecited Orders of the trial
court, before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In a Decision20 dated February 27, 2014, the CA dismissed the petition. The CA found that the
intestate court did not err in allowing the withdrawal of funds from the subject BPI account as such
court has jurisdiction over the properties of Miguelita until the same have been distributed among the
heirs entitled thereto. The  fallo the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit and
the assailed orders of the [RTC] of Quezon City, Branch 224 dated 31 May 2012 and 03 September
2012 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.21

A motion for reconsideration22 filed by Emmanuel was denied by the CA in a Resolution23 dated

September 4, 2014, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.24

Hence, this Petition.

Issue

Essentially, the issue in the present case is whether or not the order of release of funds from a joint
foreign currency deposit account without securing the consent of a co-depositor is proper.

Ruling of the Court

We proceed with the nature of the subject BPI account.

It is established that the subject joint account, which involves foreign currency deposits, is under the
names of Emilio and Miguela (now deceased) or Emmanuel.

The rule on foreign currency deposits is embodied in Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426,25 also known
as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines, which provides that:

Sec. 8. Secrecy of foreign currency deposits. – All foreign currency deposits authorized under this
Act, as amended by PD No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under PD No. 1034,
are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except upon the
written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall foreign currency deposits be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office whether judicial or
administrative or legislative, or any other entity whether public or private; Provided, however, That
said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
(As amended by PD No. 1035, and further amended by PD No. 1246, prom. Nov. 21, 1977.)

This provision was reproduced in Section 8726 of the Central Bank of the Philippines Circular No. 1318
series of 1992.

In this case, the intestate court's assailed May 31, 2012 Order, ordered the bank and its officers to
release the money contained in the subject BPI account, thus:

[T]he said Branch Manager [of the BPI, Del Monte Branch], or any authorized representative is
hereby [o]rdered to immediately RELEASE in favor of the Administrator, [Emilio], the total amount of
Four Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php 430,000.00) from Account No. 003248-2799-14 x x x.27

It is apparent that in ordering the branch manager or any representative of BPI to release the money
contained in a foreign currency deposit account, the intestate court committed a violation of the law,
which expressly provides that all foreign currency deposits as defined by applicable laws are not
subject to any form of attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body.

Moreover, the subject BPI account is in the nature of a joint account. "[It] is one that is held jointly
by two or more natural persons, or by two or more juridical persons or entities. Under such setup,
the depositors are joint owners or co-owners of the said account, and their share in the deposits shall
be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved."28 In an "and" joint account, as in this case, the
depositors are joint creditors of the bank and the signatures of all depositors are necessary to allow
withdrawal.29
Thus, it is indispensable that all the persons named as account holders give their consent before any
withdrawal could be made.

In its disposition, the intestate court simply deemed sufficient the consent of Emilio to allow the
withdrawal from the subject BPI account without further reasons therefor, to wit:

It must also be noted that the subject Time Deposit Certificate with Account No. 003248-2799-14
appears to be under the names of herein Administrator and [Miguela] or [Emmanuel], hence the
consent or conformity of the depositor or herein Administrator [Emilio] is already deemed sufficient
for this purpose. x x x.30

Thus, the intestate court likewise erred in allowing the withdrawal of funds sans the consent of a co-
depositor.

Nevertheless, We recognize the functions and duties of an administrator of an estate. One of which is
to administer all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate which shall at any time come to his
possession or to the possession of any other person for him, and from the proceeds to pay and
discharge all debts, legacies, and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon.31

In this case, there were two administrators of Miguelita's estate, i.e., Emilio and Emmanuel.
However, it is important to highlight that Emmanuel's appointment was revoked by the CA in its
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 46763. Necessarily, as the revocation of Emmanuel's appointment as
administrator was established, his right over the funds contained in the joint account no longer
exists. It must be emphasized that his right over the same merely emanates from his being a co-
administrator.

Considering the nature of a joint account, we cannot but adhere to banking laws which requires the
consent of all the depositors before any withdrawal could be made. However, since Emmanuel no
longer has a right over the subject joint account in view of his removal as a co-administrator, it is
necessary that his name should be removed as an account holder and co-depositor of Emilio in a
proper forum for Emilio to be able to completely perform his functions and duties as an
administrator.

On this note, emphasis must be made on the jurisdiction of a trial court, sitting as an intestate court,
as regards the proper disposition of the estate of the deceased. Such jurisdiction continues until after
the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same.32 Thus, proper proceedings must be had before the intestate court so that the subject joint
account should be administered solely by Emilio, who is the lone administrator.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated February 27, 2014

and the Resolution dated September 4, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 130666
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
50.) G.R. No. 140687             December 18, 2006

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE "JOSEPH" GOTIANUY as substituted by ELIZABETH
GOTIANUY LO, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

A Complaint for recovery of sums of money and annulment of sales of real properties and shares of stock docketed
as CEB-21445 was filed by Jose "Joseph" Gotianuy against his son-in-law, George Dee, and his daughter, Mary
Margaret Dee, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 58.

Jose Gotianuy accused his daughter Mary Margaret Dee of stealing, among his other properties, US dollar deposits
with Citibank N.A. amounting to not less than P35,000,000.00 and US$864,000.00. Mary Margaret Dee received
these amounts from Citibank N.A. through checks which she allegedly deposited at China Banking Corporation
(China Bank). He likewise accused his son-in-law, George Dee, husband of his daughter, Mary Margaret, of
transferring his real properties and shares of stock in George Dee's name without any consideration. Jose Gotianuy,
died during the pendency of the case before the trial court.1 He was substituted by his daughter, Elizabeth Gotianuy
Lo. The latter presented the US Dollar checks withdrawn by Mary Margaret Dee from his US dollar placement with
Citibank. The details of the said checks are:

1) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405412 dated September 29 1997 in the amount of US$5,937.52
payable to GOTIANUY: JOSE AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET;

2) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405296 dated September 29 1997 in the amount of US$7,197.59

payable to GOTIANUY: JOSE AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET;

3) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405414 dated September 29 1997 in the amount of US$1,198.94

payable to GOTIANUY: JOSE AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET;

4) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405413 dated September 29 1997 in the amount of US$989.04
payable to GOTIANUY: JOSE AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET;

5) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405297 dated October 01 1997 in the amount of US$766,011.97
payable to GOTIANUY: JOSE AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET; and

6) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405339 dated October 09 1997 in the amount of US$83,053.10
payable to GOTIANUY: JOSE AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET.2

Upon motion of Elizabeth Gotianuy Lo, the trial court3 issued a subpoena to Cristota Labios and Isabel Yap,
employees of China Bank, to testify on the case. The Order of the trial court dated 23 February 1999, states:

Issue a subpoena ad testificandum requiring MS. ISABEL YAP and CRISTOTA LABIOS of China Banking
Corporation, Cebu Main Branch, corner Magallanes and D. Jakosalem Sts., Cebu City, to appear in person
and to testify in the hearing of the above entitled case on March 1, 1999 at 8:30 in the morning, with regards
 to Citibank Checks (Exhs. "AAA" to "AAA-5") and other matters material and relevant to the issues of this
case.4

China Bank moved for a reconsideration. Resolving the motion, the trial court issued an Order dated 16 April 1999
and held:

The Court is of the view that as the foreign currency fund (Exhs. "AAA" to "AAA-5") is deposited with the
movant China Banking Corporation, Cebu Main Branch, Cebu City, the disclosure only as to the name or in
whose name the said fund is deposited is not violative of the law. Justice will be better served if the name or
names of the depositor of said fund shall be disclosed because such a disclosure is material and important
to the issues between the parties in the case at bar.

Premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is denied partly and granted partly, in the sense that
Isabel Yap and/or Cristuta Labios are directed to appear before this Court and to testify at the trial of this
case on April 20, 1999, May 6 & 7, 1999 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning and only for the purpose of
disclosing in whose name or names is the foreign currency fund (Exhs. "AAA" to "AAA-5") deposited with the
movant Bank and not to other matters material and relevant to the issues in the case at bar.5

From this Order, China Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari6 with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision7 dated 29
October 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the petition of China Bank and affirmed the Order of the RTC.

In justifying its conclusion, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated:

From the foregoing, it is pristinely clear the law specifically encompasses only the money or funds in foreign
currency deposited in a bank. Thus, the coverage of the law extends only to the foreign currency deposit in
the CBC account where Mary Margaret Dee deposited the Citibank checks in question and nothing more.

It has to be pointed out that the April 16, 1999 Order of the court of origin modified its previous February 23,
1999 Order such that the CBC representatives are directed solely to divulge "in whose name or names is
the foreign currency fund (Exhs. "AAA" to "AAA-5") deposited with the movant bank." It precluded inquiry on
"other materials and relevant to the issues in the case at bar." We find that the directive of the court below
does not contravene the plain language of RA 6426 as amended by P.D. No. 1246.

The contention of petitioner that the [prescription] on absolute confidentiality under the law in question
covers even the name of the depositor and is beyond the compulsive process of the courts is palpably
untenable as the law protects only the deposits itself but not the name of the depositor. To uphold the theory
of petitioner CBC is reading into the statute "something that is not within the manifest intention of the
legislature as gathered from the statute itself, for to depart from the meaning expressed by the words, is to
alter the statute, to legislate and not to interpret, and judicial legislation should be avoided. Maledicta
expositio quae corrumpit textum – It is a dangerous construction which is against the words. Expressing the
same principle is the maxim: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos, which simply means that
where the law does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction." (Gonzaga, Statutes and their
Construction, p. 75.)8

From the Decision of the Court of Appeals, China Bank elevated the case to this Court based on the following
issues:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS INTERPRETED THE PROVISION OF SECTION 8 OF R.A.
6426, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSIT ACT, IN A
MANNER CONTRARY TO THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE, THAT IS, TO PROVIDE ABSOLUTE
CONFIDENTIALITY OF WHATEVER INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE FOREIGN CURRENCY
DEPOSIT.

II
 PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS NOT THE OWNER OF THE QUESTIONED FOREIGN CURRENCY
DEPOSIT. THUS, HE CANNOT INVOKE THE AID OF THE COURT IN COMPELLING THE DISCLOSURE
OF SOMEONE ELSE'S FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSIT ON THE FLIMSY PRETEXT THAT THE
CHECKS (IN FOREIGN CURRENCY) HE HAD ISSUED MAY HAVE ENDED UP THEREIN.

III

PETITIONER CAN RIGHTLY INVOKE THE PROVISION OF SEC. 8, R.A. 6426, IN BEHALF OF THE
FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITOR, OWING TO ITS SOLEMN OBLIGATION TO ITS CLIENT TO
EXERCISE EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE IN THE HANDLING OF THE ACCOUNT.9

As amended by Presidential Decree No. 1246, the law reads:

SEC. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. – All foreign currency deposits authorized under this Act, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under
Presidential Decree No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature
and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such foreign currency
deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office whether
judicial or administrative or legislative or any other entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that
said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process
of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. (As amended by
PD No. 1035, and further amended by PD No. 1246, prom. Nov. 21, 1977) (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the above provision, the law provides that all foreign currency deposits authorized under Republic Act No.
6426, as amended by Sec. 8, Presidential Decree No. 1246, Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign
currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034 are considered absolutely confidential in nature
and may not be inquired into. There is only one exception to the secrecy of foreign currency deposits, that is,
disclosure is allowed upon the written permission of the depositor.

This much was pronounced in the case of Intengan v. Court of Appeals,10 where it was held that the only exception
to the secrecy of foreign currency deposits is in the case of a written permission of the depositor.

It must be remembered that under the whereas clause of Presidential Decree No. 1246 which amended Sec. 8 of
Republic Act No. 6426, the Foreign Currency Deposit System including the Offshore Banking System under
Presidential Decree 1034 were intended to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors, and we quote:

Whereas, in order to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System
and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines, certain incentives were provided for under the two
Systems such as confidentiality of deposits subject to certain exceptions and tax exemptions on the interest
income of depositors who are nonresidents and are not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines;

Whereas, making absolute the protective cloak of confidentiality over such foreign currency deposits,
exempting such deposits from tax, and guaranteeing the vested rights of depositors would better encourage
the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions authorized to accept such deposits in the
Philippines thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to loans and
investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development of the country.

As to the deposit in foreign currencies entitled to be protected under the confidentiality rule, Presidential Decree No.
1034,11 defines deposits to mean funds in foreign currencies which are accepted and held by an offshore banking
unit in the regular course of business, with the obligation to return an equivalent amount to the owner thereof, with
or without interest.12

It is in this light that the court in the case of Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines,13 allowed the inquiry of the
foreign currency deposit in question mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case such that a strict
interpretation of the letter of the law would result to rank injustice. Therein, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American
tourist, was charged with criminal cases for serious illegal detention and rape committed against then 12 year-old
Karen Salvacion. A separate civil case for damages with preliminary attachment was filed against Greg Bartelli. The
trial court issued an Order granting the Salvacions' application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. A
notice of garnishment was then served on China Bank where Bartelli held a dollar account. China Bank refused,
invoking the secrecy of bank deposits. The Supreme Court ruled: "In fine, the application of the law depends on the
extent of its justice x x x It would be unthinkable, that the questioned law exempting foreign currency deposits from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever would be used as a device by an accused x x x for wrongdoing, and in so doing,
acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.14

With the foregoing, we are now tasked to determine the single material issue of whether or not petitioner China
Bank is correct in its submission that the Citibank dollar checks with both Jose Gotianuy and/or Mary Margaret Dee
as payees, deposited with China Bank, may not be looked into under the law on secrecy of foreign currency
deposits. As a corollary issue, sought to be resolved is whether Jose Gotianuy may be considered a depositor who
is entitled to seek an inquiry over the said deposits.

The Court of Appeals, in allowing the inquiry, considered Jose Gotianuy, a co-depositor of Mary Margaret Dee. It
reasoned that since Jose Gotianuy is the named co-payee of the latter in the subject checks, which checks were
deposited in China Bank, then, Jose Gotianuy is likewise a depositor thereof. On that basis, no written consent from
Mary Margaret Dee is necessitated.

We agree in the conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals.

The following facts are established: (1) Jose Gotianuy and Mary Margaret Dee are co-payees of various Citibank
checks;15 (2) Mary Margaret Dee withdrew these checks from Citibank;16 (3) Mary Margaret Dee admitted in her
Answer to the Request for Admissions by the Adverse Party sent to her by Jose Gotianuy17 that she withdrew the
funds from Citibank upon the instruction of her father Jose Gotianuy and that the funds belonged exclusively to the
latter; (4) these checks were endorsed by Mary Margaret Dee at the dorsal portion; and (5) Jose Gotianuy
discovered that these checks were deposited with China Bank as shown by the stamp of China Bank at the dorsal
side of the checks.

Thus, with this, there is no issue as to the source of the funds. Mary Margaret Dee declared the source to be Jose
Gotianuy. There is likewise no dispute that these funds in the form of Citibank US dollar Checks are now deposited
with China Bank.

As the owner of the funds unlawfully taken and which are undisputably now deposited with China Bank, Jose
Gotianuy has the right to inquire into the said deposits.

A depositor, in cases of bank deposits, is one who pays money into the bank in the usual course of business, to be
placed to his credit and subject to his check or the beneficiary of the funds held by the bank as trustee.18

On this score, the observations of the Court of Appeals are worth reiterating:

Furthermore, it is indubitable that the Citibank checks were drawn against the foreign currency account with
Citibank, NA. The monies subject of said checks originally came from the late Jose Gotianuy, the owner of
the account. Thus, he also has legal rights and interests in the CBC account where said monies were
deposited. More importantly, the Citibank checks (Exhibits "AAA" to "AAA-5") readily demonstrate (sic) that
the late Jose Gotianuy is one of the payees of said checks. Being a co-payee thereof, then he or his estate
can be considered as a co-depositor of said checks. Ergo, since the late Jose Gotianuy is a co-depositor of
the CBC account, then his request for the assailed subpoena is tantamount to an express permission of a
depositor for the disclosure of the name of the account holder. The April 16, 1999 Order perforce must be
sustained.19 (Emphasis supplied.)

One more point. It must be remembered that in the complaint of Jose Gotianuy, he alleged that his US dollar
deposits with Citibank were illegally taken from him. On the other hand, China Bank employee Cristuta Labios
testified that Mary Margaret Dee came to China Bank and deposited the money of Jose Gotianuy in Citibank US
dollar checks to the dollar account of her sister Adrienne Chu.20 This fortifies our conclusion that an inquiry into the
said deposit at China Bank is justified. At the very least, Jose Gotianuy as the owner of these funds is entitled to a
hearing on the whereabouts of these funds.
All things considered and in view of the distinctive circumstances attendant to the present case, we are constrained
to render a limited pro hac vice ruling.21 Clearly it was not the intent of the legislature when it enacted the law on
secrecy on foreign currency deposits to perpetuate injustice. This Court is of the view that the allowance of the
inquiry would be in accord with the rudiments of fair play,22 the upholding of fairness in our judicial system and would
be an avoidance of delay and time-wasteful and circuitous way of administering justice.23

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29
October 1999 affirming the Order of the RTC, Branch 58, Cebu City dated 16 April 1999 is AFFIRMED and this case
is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for continuation of hearing with utmost dispatch consistent with the above
disquisition. No costs.
 51.) G.R. No. 217682, July 17, 2018

JOSE "JINGGOY" P. EJERCITO ESTRADA AND MA. PRESENTACION VITUG

EJERCITO, Petitioners, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION); ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL, REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, JULIA C. BACAY-ABAD; AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

By petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, the petitioners seek to annul and set aside the
resolution promulgated on February 2, 2015,1 whereby the Sandiganbayan denied their Urgent
Motion to Suppress/Exclude (The Inquiry Report on the Bank Transactions Related to the Alleged
Involvement of Senator Jose P. "Jinggoy" Ejercito Estrada in the PDAF Scam, and the Testimony of
Witness Atty. Orlando C. Negradas, Jr. Thereon) (motion to suppress) filed in Criminal Case No. SB-
14-CRM-0239, a prosecution for plunder.2

Antecedents

On September 11, 2013, Benhur K. Luy, Merlina P. Sunas, Gertrudes K. Luy, Nova Kay Batal-
Macalintal, Elena S. Abundo and Avelina C. Lingo (whistleblowers) executed their Pinagsamang
Sinumpaang Salaysay in which they revealed the details of the Pork Barrel Scam that involved the
misuse or illegal diversion by certain legislators of their allocations from the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) in connivance with Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles), the whistleblowers' former
employer.3

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted its investigation, and on September 16, 2013
resolved to file in the Office of the Ombudsman verified criminal complaints for plunder,
malversation, direct bribery, and graft and corrupt practices against the persons involved in the Pork
Barrel Scam, including petitioner Senator Jose "Jinggoy" P. Ejercito Estrada (Estrada).

Acting on the criminal complaints, the Office of the Ombudsman requested the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC) on October 11, 2013 to conduct a financial investigation of the bank
accounts of the petitioners and others.4

On March 28, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a joint resolution finding probable cause to
indict Estrada and other persons for plunder and for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).5

Meanwhile, the AMLC, determining that Estrada's accounts were probably related to the charge of
plunder and the violation of R.A. No. 3019 charged against him and others, authorized its secretariat
to file in the Court of Appeals (CA) an ex parte application for bank inquiry pursuant to R.A. No.
9160, as amended (The Anti-Money Laundering Act).

In the resolution promulgated on May 28, 2014, the CA granted the ex parte application.6

In the information dated June 5, 2014 filed in the Sandiganbayan, the Office of the Ombudsman
charged Estrada and others with plunder, the accusatory portion of which was as follows:
In 2004 to 2012, or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Court's jurisdiction,
above-named accused JOSE P. EJERCITO ESTRADA, then a Philippine Senator, and PAULINE
THERESE MARY C. LABAYEN, then Deputy Chief of Staff of Sen. Estrada's Office, both public
officers, committing the offense in relation to their respective offices, conspiring with one another
and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (Php183,793,750.00) through a combination or series of overt criminal acts,
as follows:

a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representative DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after the project identification,
NAPOLES gave, and ESTRADA and/or LABAYEN received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be
funded from ESTRADA'S Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of
ESTRADA'S endorsement, directly or through LABAYEN, to the appropriate government agencies, of
NAPOLES' non-government organizations which became the recipients and/or target implementors of
ESTRADA'S PDAF projects, which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus
enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;
b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority, relationships,
connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7
In the process of inquiring into Estrada's accounts, the AMLC discovered that Estrada had transferred
substantial sums of money to the accounts of his wife, co-petitioner Ma. Presentacion Vitug Ejercito
(Ejercito), on the dates relevant to the Pork Barrel Scam. Considering that the transfers lacked
apparent legal or economic justifications, the AMLC concluded that the accounts were linked to a
predicate crime of plunder. Hence, the AMLC filed in the CA a supplemental ex parte application for
the bank inquiry to be conducted on Ejercito's accounts, among others.

On August 15, 2014, the CA granted the supplemental ex parte application.8

The results of the AMLC's bank inquiry into Estrada's accounts were contained in the so-called Inquiry
Report on the Bank Transactions Related to the Alleged Involvement of Senator Jose "Jinggoy" P.
Ejercito Estrada in the PDAF Scam (Inquiry Report). On December 19, 2014, the AMLC furnished the
Office of the Ombudsman a copy of the Inquiry Report. During Estrada's bail hearings in the
Sandiganbayan, the Prosecution presented Atty. Orlando C. Negradas, Jr., an AMLC financial
investigator, who testified on the Inquiry Report.9

On January 23, 2015, Estrada filed the motion to suppress.10

On February 2, 2015, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed resolution denying the motion to
suppress.

Estrada moved for reconsideration, but the Sandiganbayan denied his motion on March 2, 2015.11

Hence, the petitioners have come to the Court by petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
submitting that:
THE RESPONDENT TRIBUNAL COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICITON IN RULING THAT:

1. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND

SEIZURE AND ARREST AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND
CORRESPONDENCE SHOULD ONLY YIELD TO THE MANDATE OF THE AMLC, SINCE SUCH
ACTION OPENED THE GATE TO THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY A 'FISHING
EXPEDITION' PROHIBITED BY THE CONSTITUTION;

2. THAT THE AMENDMENT TO SECTION 11 OF R.A. 9160 SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY

IN THIS CASE, WITHOUT CONSIDERING THAT APPLICATION OF SECTION 11 IN THIS CASE
 VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY DERIVED FROM THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE; AND THAT
SECTION 11, INSOFAR AS IT DISPENSES WITH THE 'NOTICE' REQUIREMENT TO HOLDERS OF
RELATED ACCOUNTS, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL;

3. THAT THE CONTENTS OF THE AMLC INQUIRY REPORT IS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE IN THIS
CASE, CONSIDERING THAT IT WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO PRIVACY;

4. IN FAILING TO APPLY THE STANDARD OF 'STRICT SCRUTINY' IN DETERMINING WHETHER

PETITIONER MA. PRESENTACION EJERCITO WAS DEPRIVED OF HER RIGHT TO PRIVACY.12

The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), in representation of the State, counters that the petition
has not laid the foundation for a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan; that the Sandiganbayan correctly held that the right to privacy was not an illimitable
right but one necessarily circumscribed by the exceptions embedded in both the 1987 Constitution
and the laws; that the constitutionality of R.A. No. 10167 could not be attacked collaterally; that, in
any event, the Sandiganbayan properly ruled that the amendment under R.A. No. 10167 applied to
Estrada; that the "heightened/strict scrutiny" test was inapplicable because the extent and
delimitation of Estrada's privacy rights were specifically laid down in laws and jurisprudence, and
were matters of judicial application, not interpretation; and that the petition has not established
grounds that would entitle the petitioners to the provisional remedy of a temporary restraining order
or writ of preliminary injunction.13

In its comment, the AMLC posits that Ejercito is not a proper party; that R.A. No. 10167 does not
violate the constitutional rights to privacy and to due process; that R.A. No. 10167 is not an ex post
facto law; that the Congress has the power to enact R.A. No. 10167; and that the Inquiry Report did
not emanate from a fishing expedition, and, as such, the Inquiry Report and the testimony of Atty.
Negradas were admissible as evidence against Estrada.14

In other words, the issues are restated as follows:

a. Does Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160, as amended, violate the constitutionally mandated right to
due process and right to privacy?

b. Should the ex parte application for a bank inquiry order provided for in Section 11 of R.A. No.
9160, as amended, be applied retroactively?

Ruling of the Court

1.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160, as amended, is constitutional

We restate the relevant legal and jurisprudential milieu expounded on in Subido Pagente Certeza
Mendoza and Binay Law Offices v. Court of Appeals 15 (Subido), viz.:
As a brief backgrounder to the amendment to Section 11 of the AMLA, the text originally did not
specify for an ex parte application by the AMLC for authority to inquire into or examine certain bank
accounts or investments. The extent of this authority was the topic of Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon.
Judge Eugenio, Jr., et al. (Eugenio) where the petitioner therein, Republic of the Philippines,
asseverated that the application for that kind of order under the questioned section of the AMLA did
not require notice and hearing. Eugenio schooled us on the AMLA, specifically on the provisional
remedies provided therein to aid the AMLC in enforcing the law.

xxxx

Quite apparent from the foregoing is that absent a specific wording in the AMLA allowing for ex
parte proceedings in orders authorizing inquiry and examination by the AMLC into certain bank
deposits or investments, notice to the affected party is required.
Heeding the Court's observance in Eugenio that the remedy of the Republic then lay with the
legislative, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 10167 amending Section 11 of the AMLA and
specifically inserted the word ex parte appositive of the nature of this provisional remedy available to
the AMLC thereunder.
Like the petitioners in Subido, the petitioners herein contend that Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160, as
amended, is unconstitutional insofar as it allows the filing of an ex parte application for an order to
inquire into bank deposits and investments for violating the constitutionally-mandated right to due
process and right to privacy; that Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160 is being used for a "fishing
expedition;" that the disclosure of "related accounts" imposed by the amendment to Section 11 of
R.A. No. 9160 is clearly a "fruit of the poisonous tree;" and that the Inquiry Report should
consequently be declared inadmissible as evidence.16

The petitioners' contentions have no merit.

To start with, the procedural rules under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court governing the special civil
actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus limit the remedy to a person aggrieved by the
assailed decision, resolution, order or act.17 For purposes of the rule, a person aggrieved is one who
was a party in the original proceedings before the respondent officer, tribunal or agency.18 As such,
Ejercito cannot seek the annulment of the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan because she
was not a party in the original proceeding pending thereat involving Estrada, her husband.

And, secondly, the petitioners' assailing herein the constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160, as
amended, constitutes a collateral attack against such legal provision. A collateral attack against a
presumably valid law like R.A. No. 9160 is not permissible. Unless a law or rule is annulled by a
direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity stands.19

It is relevant to remind, however, that the constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160, as
amended, has been dealt with and upheld in Subido, where we ruled that the AMLC's ex
parte application for the bank inquiry order based on Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160, as amended by
R.A. No. 10167, did not violate substantive due process because the physical seizure of the targeted
corporeal property was not contemplated by the law.

We clarify that the AMLC, in investigating probable money laundering activities, does not exercise
quasi-judicial powers, but merely acts as an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation
similar to the functions of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Hence, the ex parte application
for the bank inquiry order cannot be said to violate any person's constitutional right to procedural
due process.20 Also, the source of the right to privacy respecting bank deposits is statutory, not
constitutional; hence, the Congress may validly carve out exceptions to the rule on the secrecy of
bank deposits, as illustrated in Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160.21

With the consistency of the assailed provision of R.A. No. 9160 with the Constitution, the petitioners'
argument that the Inquiry Report was the fruit of a poisonous tree and, therefore, inadmissible in
evidence remains unsubstantiated.

2.
The amendment to Section 11 of R.A. 9160 allowing an ex parte application for the bank
inquiry does not violate the proscription against ex post facto laws

The petitioners insist that R.A. No. 10167, which amended Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160, is an ex post
facto legislation because it applies retroactively to bank transactions made prior to the effectivity of
the amendment and imposes new legal burdens to already-completed transactions; that R.A. No.
10167 should only be prospective; that in Republic v. Eugenio, Jr. (545 SCRA 384), the application
for the bank inquiry order issued on July 4, 2005 as a means of inquiring into the records of
transactions entered into prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9160 would be constitutionally infirm and
offensive to the ex post facto clause; that the present case involves transactions and deposits made
by the petitioners in the period from 2005 up to 2012, or prior to the amendment of Section 11 of
R.A. No. 9160 that took effect on June 18, 2012; that by analogy the authority given through the
order issued upon ex parte application under R.A. No. 10167 cannot be made to apply to deposits
and transactions of the petitioners prior to June 18, 2012.22

The insistence of the petitioners is unfounded and bereft of substance.

An ex post facto law is a law that either: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the
law that was innocent when done, and punishes such act; or (2) aggravates a crime, or makes the
crime greater than it was when committed; or (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (4) alters the legal rules of
evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense; or (5) assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but
in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right for an act that was lawful when done; or (6)
deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.23

The petitioners rely on Republic v. Eugenio, Jr., wherein the Court declared that the proscription
against ex post facto laws should be applied to the interpretation of the original text of Section 11 of
R.A. No. 9160 because the passage of said law "stripped another layer off the rule on absolute
confidentiality that provided a measure of lawful protection to the account holder." Accordingly, we
held therein that the application for the bank inquiry order as the means of inquiring into records of
transactions entered into prior to thepassage of R.A. No. 9160 would be constitutionally infirm,
offensive as it was to the ex post facto clause of the Constitution.24

The petitioners' reliance on Republic v. Eugenio, Jr. is misplaced. Unlike the passage of R.A. No. 9160
in order to allow an exception to the general rule on bank secrecy, the amendment introduced by
R.A. No. 10167 does away with the notice to the account holder at the time when the bank inquiry
order is applied for. The elimination of the requirement of notice, by itself, is not a removal of any
lawful protection to the account holder because the AMLC is only exercising its investigative powers
at this stage. Indeed, R.A. No. 10167, in recognition of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution,
explicitly provides that "the penal provisions shall not apply to acts done prior to the effectivity of the
AMLA on October 17, 2001."

Furthermore, the AMLC's inquiry and examination into bank accounts are not undertaken whimsically
based on its investigative discretion. The AMLC and the CA are respectively required to ascertain the
existence of probable cause before any bank inquiry order is issued. Section 11 of R.A. 9160, even
with the allowance of an ex parte application therefor, cannot be categorized as authorizing the
issuance of a general warrant. This is because a search warrant or warrant of arrest contemplates a
direct object but the bank inquiry order does not involve the seizure of persons or property.25

Lastly, the holder of a bank account subject of a bank inquiry order issued ex parte is not without
recourse. He has the opportunity to question the issuance of the bank inquiry order after a freeze
order is issued against the account. He can then assail not only the finding of probable cause for the
issuance of the freeze order, but also the finding of probable cause for the issuance of the bank
inquiry order.26

3.
The petition has been rendered moot and academic by supervening events

The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, the Court takes cognizance of the fact that Estrada has
already been granted bail by the Sandiganbayan on September 15, 2017, the resolution for which
disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby RESOLVES to:

(1) DENY accused Estrada's Motion to Dismiss the case for lack of merit; and
(2) RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the Resolution dated January 7, 2016 as to accused Estrada, and
hereby GRANTS bail to accused Estrada, upon the submission and approval of bail in the amount of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), to be posted in cash.

SO ORDERED.27
On November 10, 2017, the Sandiganbayan denied the People's motion for reconsideration and
upheld the grant of bail to Estrada.28

Considering that the resolutions being assailed trace their roots to the bail hearing of Estrada, the
aforementioned conclusions of the Sandiganbayan relevant to his bail application, and the eventual
grant of bail to him have rendered his petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus moot and
academic. There is no question that whenever the issues have become moot and academic, there
ceases to be any justiciable controversy, such that the resolution of the issues no longer have any
practical value.29 In effect, the Court can no longer grant any substantial relief to which the petitioner
may be entitled. Hence, the Court should abstain from expressing its opinion in a case where no legal
relief is needed or called for.30

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for being

moot and academic, without pronouncement on costs of suit.
52.)
-55. Money Laundering.)
 56.) G.R. No. 224567, September 26, 2018

LYDIA CU, Petitioner, v. TRINIDAD VENTURA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated
July 1, 2016, of petitioner Lydia Cu that seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution1 dated
December 11, 2015 and Resolution2 dated May 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA)  in CA-G.R.
CR No. 37691 dismissing petitioner's appeal on the ground that as a private complainant, she is
not authorized to represent the State in an appeal from a criminal action.

The facts follow.

Petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 223(BP 22) against
respondent before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Eventually, the Office of the
City Prosecutor found probable cause and an Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Quezon City against respondent for violation of BP 22.

After trial on the merits, the MeTC, Branch 37 of Quezon City found the respondent guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of BP 22. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated
January 10, 2014 reads as follows:

The foregoing manifests clearly that the accused has violated beyond reasonable doubt, Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22. In view thereof, he is hereby ordered to:

1. Pay the total amount of the check which is for P2,000,000.00 and pay an interest of 12% per
annum from the date of the check, up to the time that is fully paid;

2. Pay a fine of P200,000.00;

3. Suffer an imprisonment of sixty (60) days;

4. Pay the costs of suit, including Attorney's Fees and per appearance fee, should there be any.

The accused is to suffer, subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.

Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal and on December 3, 2014, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC),  Branch 87, Quezon City reversed and set aside the decision of the MeTC. The
dispositive portion of the Decision acquitting the respondent reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, the Decision dated January 10, 2014 of the
Court a quo is hereby reversed and set aside and a new one rendered ACQUITTING the accused
TRINIDAD VENTURA, of the crime of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.

The civil aspect of the case is DISMISSED for failure of the private complainant to prove the
requisite quantum of evidence preponderance of evidence.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, through her counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC
in its Resolution dated May 5, 2015. Thereafter, she filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a
Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court with the CA. On July 20, 2015, she filed
her Petition for Review under Rule 42 with the CA.

The CA, in its Resolution dated December 11, 2015, dismissed the appeal. The CA disposed of
the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

According to the CA, in criminal actions brought before the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme
Court, the authority to represent the State is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA in its Resolution
dated May 13, 2016.

Hence, the present petition with the following issues presented:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT TRINIDAD VENTURA IS GUILTY OF B.P. 22.

II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IS LIABLE TO PETITIONER FOR THE CIVIL ASPECT.

Petitioner contends that respondent has been proven to have violated BP 22 beyond reasonable
doubt as all the elements of the offense were proven by the prosecution. She also insists that in
the petition for review that she filed with the CA, she questioned the civil aspect of the decision
of the RTC and, thus, there is no need for the representation of the OSG.

In her Comment dated August 30, 2016, respondent argues that petitioner was actually assailing
both the criminal and civil aspect of the appealed decision of the RTC when she filed an appeal
with the CA. Respondent further contends that petitioner has no legal standing to file the present
petition because the subject check was actually deposited not in her account but into the
account of MC Nova Apparel Export Corporation which is a family-owned corporation with
separate and distinct personality, and petitioner has not presented any authority or board
resolution to prove that she was authorized to represent the said corporation.

The petition is without merit.

The Rules of Court requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under
Rule 45.4 This Court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual
findings of the appellate courts are "final, binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and upon this
[c]ourt"5 when supported by substantial evidence.6 Factual findings of the appellate courts will
not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court.7

However, these rules do admit exceptions. Over time, the exceptions to these rules have
expanded. At present, there are ten (10) recognized exceptions that were first listed in Medina
v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.:8

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals
is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.9

These exceptions similarly apply in petitions for review filed before this court involving
civil,10 labor,11 tax,12 or criminal cases.13

A question of fact requires this court to review the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations of the
parties.14 This review includes assessment of the "probative value of the evidence
presented."15 There is also a question of fact when the issue presented before this court is the
correctness of the lower courts' appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties.16

In this case, the first issue raised by petitioner obviously asks this Court to review the evidence
presented during the trial. She has laid down in the present petition the reasons as to why this
Court should find respondent guilty of the crime charged against her and reverse the latter's
acquittal by the RTC. Clearly, this is not the role of this Court because the issue she presented is
factual in nature. Thus, the present petition must fail.

The CA dismissed petitioner's Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court because
she is not the proper party to appeal in a criminal case. It ruled that in criminal cases or
proceedings, only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines, or represent the People or State. This is in compliance with the provisions of
Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended,
thus:

Section 35. Power and Functions.  – The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When
authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government-
owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law
office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the service of a lawyer. It
shall have the following specific power and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of
appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.

The above, however, is not without any exception. The two exceptions are: (1) when there is
denial of due process of law to the prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on the
case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party, and (2) when the private
offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court.17

According to petitioner, she falls under the second because in the petition for review that she
filed before the CA, what she questioned was the civil aspect of the decision of the RTC.

In the second exception, it is assumed that a decision on the merits had already been rendered
by the lower court and it is the civil aspect of the case which the offended party is
appealing.18 The offended party, who is not satisfied with the outcome of the case, may question
the amount of the grant or denial of damages made by the court below even without the
participation of the Solicitor General.19

In Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa,20 the Court ruled that in criminal cases, the State is the
offended party and the private complainant's interest is limited to the civil liability arising
therefrom, thus:

Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a

reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally
feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made only by the public
prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private
complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on
the criminal aspect of the case. However, the offended party or private complainant may file a
motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as
the civil aspect thereof is concerned.

In De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,21   citing People v. Santiago,22 the Court held:

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein
it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by
the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended
party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may
file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the
People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in (the) name of said complainant.

The respondent, however, argues that what petitioner prayed for in her petition was for the CA
to rule that respondent be guilty of violation of BP 22 and be made liable for the amount of Two
Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,400,000.00), plus interests, thus:

WHEREFORE, the above premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the assailed Decision
dated December 3, 2014 and the Order dated May 5, 2015 be set aside and a new one be
rendered finding respondent guilty of violation of BP 22 and be made liable for the amount of
TWO MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,400,000.00) in favor of the petitioner,
plus interests.

Nothing in the above prayer does it mention nor is categorical in its statement that petitioner
only seeks the review of the civil aspect of the case. The fact that petitioner filed a petition for
review under Rule 42, or ordinary appeal with the CA, is already an indication that what she was
seeking was the reversal of the entire decision of the RTC, in both its criminal and civil aspects.
Petitioner could have filed a special civil action for certiorari had she intended to merely preserve
her interest in the civil aspect of the case.

Nevertheless, granting that what petitioner questioned was the civil aspect of the case, the
petition must still fail. A close reading of the records would show that the prosecution was not
able to prove and establish its case, not only in its criminal aspect but also in its civil aspect
where the required proof needed is only a preponderance of evidence. "Preponderance of
evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term 'greater weight of the evidence' or 'greater weight
of the credible evidence.' Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis,
means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier
of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto."23 As correctly ruled by the RTC:

The Court holds that the existence of accused-appellant's civil liability to plaintiff-appellee
representing the face value of the dishonored check has not been sufficiently established by
[preponderance of] evidence. Plaintiff-appellee mainly relied [on] her testimony before the court
[a quo] to establish the existence of this unpaid obligation. In gist, she testified that the
accused-appellant obtained a loan from her in the amount of $100,000.00 and as partial
payment of her obligation, accused-appellant issued the subject MetroBank Check No. 018049
dated June 15, 2007 in the amount of P2,400,000.00. When the accused-appellant allegedly
refused to pay her obligation, she deposited the check for payment but the same bounced for
the reason that it was drawn against insufficient funds. Unfortunately, plaintiff-appellee's
testimony alone does not constitute preponderant evidence to establish accused-appellant's
liability to her. Apart from the dishonored check, she failed to adduce any other documentary
evidence to prove that the accused has still an unpaid obligation to. her. Unsubstantiated
evidence are not equivalent to proof under the Rules.

In contrast, accused-appellant's defense consisted in, among others, her allegation that she had
already paid the face value of the check through the private complainant Lydia Cu. Accused-
appellant presented documents consisting of an Agreement between her and Lydia Cu, the
authorized representative of Jun Yupitun showing that she obtained a loan from Mr. Yupitun
through Lydia Cu in the amount of $31,000.00 (Exhibit "2") and the acknowledgment receipt
dated July 22, 2014 (Exhibit "2-a" ) signed by Lydia Cu showing that the principal loan obligation
of the accused-appellant was fully paid and gave her instruction to her secretary to just tear the
subject check or leave the same to her. The existence and due execution of those documents
were not rebutted by the prosecution. Thus, considering the presentation of these documents
which were not rebutted by the prosecution through the presentation of a rebuttal witness, it is
logical to conclude that absent any evidence to the contrary, it formed part of accused-
appellant's evidence of payment of her loan obligation, which includes the face value of the
dishonored check.24

Again, jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court, or if
there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal
aspect representing the People.25 The rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the party
affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the petitioners who are
mere complaining witnesses.26  For this reason, the People are deemed as the real parties-in-
interest in the criminal case and, therefore, only the OSG can represent them in criminal
proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.27 In view of the corollary principle that every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the
suit,28 an appeal of the criminal case not filed by the People as represented by the OSG is
perforce dismissible. The private complainant or the offended party may, however, file an appeal
without the intervention of the OSG, but only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is
concerned.29 He may also file a special civil action for certiorari even without the intervention of
the OSG, but only to the end of preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case.30

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated
July 1, 2016, of petitioner Lydia Cu is DENIED and the Resolution dated December 11, 2015
and the Resolution dated May 13,2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 37691
are AFFIRMED.
 57.) G.R. No. 224979, December 13, 2017

IVY LIM, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND BLUE PACIFIC HOLDINGS,

INC., Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the Decision1 dated October 27, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), which denied petitioner Ivy Lim's petition for review, and affirmed the
Decision2 dated September 30, 2013 and the Order dated December 3, 2013 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in Criminal Case No. 13-1586-86. The RTC affirmed the
Joint Decision3 dated May 22, 2013 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, which
found Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang  (B.P. Blg.) 22 in Criminal Cases No. 346643-52.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Private respondent Blue Pacific Holdings, Inc. (BPHI) granted Rochelle Benito a loan amounting
to P1,149,500.00 as evidenced by a Promissory Note acknowledged before a notary public on
July 29, 2003. Petitioner Lim signed as a co-maker of her sister Benito. To secure payment of
the loan, Benito and Lim issued eleven (11) Equitable PCI Bank checks with a face value of
P67,617.65 each, or a total amount of P743,794.15, to wit:

Check No. Date   Amount

0105461 May 29, 2004 P67,617.65
0105462 June 29, 2004 P67,617.65
0105463 July 29, 2004 P67,617.65
0105464 August 29, 2004 P67,617.65
0105465 September 29, 2004 P67,617.65
0105466 October 29, 2004 P67,617.65
0105467 November 29, 2004 P67,617.65
0105468 December 29, 2004 P67,617.65
0105452 January 29, 2005 P67,617.65
0105477 February 28, 2005 P67,617.65
0105478 March 29, 2005 P67,617.65

Later on, 10 of these 11 checks were dishonored when presented for payment for having been
drawn against a closed account. BPHI sent Lim various demand letters, but to no avail. On June
28, 2005, BPHI sent a final demand letter, which Lim supposedly received as shown by the
registry return card bearing her signature.
For failing to pay the amounts corresponding the dishonored checks, Lim was charged with 11
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For her part, Lim raised the defenses that (1) she could not
have signed and issued the checks on July 29, 2003 in the presence of BPHI Finance Officer
Juanito Enriquez because she was then abroad as shown by the Certification of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID); (2) BPHI has no permit to conduct financing business; (3)
the checks were issued to facilitate illegal trafficking of teachers to the United States
for which there has been a criminal action filed and resolved for human trafficking; and
(4) there was no valuable consideration given.

Upon arraignment on December 13, 2006, Lim, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to all
charges. During the preliminary conference, the parties admitted the following matters: (1) the
jurisdiction of the trial court; (2) the identity of Lim as the accused, (3) the existence of the
complaint affidavit, (4) the existence of the promissory note and Lim's signature thereon, and
(5) the existence and due execution of the 11 checks with BPHI as payee.

During trial, the prosecution presented its witness, BPHI Finance Officer Enriquez, and
documentary evidence consisting of the complaint-affidavit, the promissory note and the 11
checks, and the demand letters, among others. For the defense, Lim claimed that the subject
checks were unauthenticated because she was out of the country on July 29, 2003, as shown by
the certification of her travel record issued by the BID. She refuted the testimony of Enriquez
that he personally saw her signed the checks before him.

On May 22, 2013, the MeTC rendered a Joint Decision finding Lim guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of 10 counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused IVY LIM
a.k.a. IVY BENITO LIM guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 in Criminal [Case Nos.] 346643 or ten (10) counts and hereby orders her to pay a
FINE of SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX PESOS AND
50/100 (P676,176.50) which is the face value of the ten (10) checks with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code.

The accused IVY LIM a.k.a. IVY BENITO LIM is acquitted in Criminal Case No. 346642 for failure
of the prosecution to establish all the elements of the crime charged.

With regards to the civil aspect of these cases, she is hereby ordered to pay the private
complainant Blue Pacific Holdings, Inc. the total amount of SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-THREE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY-FOUR PESOS AND 15/100 (P743,794.15) which
corresponds to the face value of the eleven (11) checks subject matter of the present cases,
plus 12% interest per annum  from date of the filing of the Informations on May 22, 2006 until
the amount shall have been fully paid. She is likewise ordered to pay the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as and for attorney's fees and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.4

On appeal, the RTC found no reversible error and affirmed the MeTC Decision.

Dissatisfied, Lim filed a petition for review before the CA, which denied the same and affirmed
the RTC Decision. The CA also denied her motion for reconsideration. Hence, the petition.

Lim raises the following grounds in support of her petition for review on certiorari:
 A. AN UNAUTHENTICATED REGISTRY RETURN CARD CANNOT PROVE RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF
DISHONOR AND CANNOT BE A BASIS FOR CONVICTION FOR A CHARGE OF VIOLATION
OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 UNDER PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE SUCH THAT THE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT THERE WAS PROOF OF PERSONAL SERVICE OF
NOTICE OF DISHONOR ON THE PETITIONER BASED ON A COMPARISON OF SIGNATURES
ON THE SUBJECT CHECKS AND OF THE SIGNATURES ON THE REGISTRY RETURN CARD -
AND THAT HEREIN PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED FOR VIOLATION OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BLG. 22

B. UNAUTHENTICATED CHECKS CANNOT PROVE THAT HEREIN PETITIONER WAS THE SAME
PERSON WHO ISSUED SAID CHECKS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOCTRINE
ENUNCIATED IN UNCHUAN V. LOZADA. ET AL (SUPRA.), SUCH THAT THE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT HEREIN PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED FOR
VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22

C. A DOCUMENT THAT WAS NEVER PRESENTED, IDENTIFIED, AUTHENTICATED NOR

TESTIFIED ON DURING TRIAL CANNOT BE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE NOR USED TO PROVE
THE GUILT OF HEREIN PETITION[ER] FOR THE OFFENSE CHARGED AGAINST HER, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOCTRINE IN  UNCHUAN V. LOZADA, ET AL, (SUPRA.), SUCH
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RULINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT HEREIN PETITIONER WAS
PROPERLY CONVICTED FOR VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 CRIMINALLY AND
CIVILLY LIABLE.5

The petition lacks merit, but a modification of the imposed penalty and the interest on actual
damages awarded are in order.

First, Lim argues that the signature in the registry return card of the demand letter was never
authenticated because the prosecution's sole witness, Enriquez, admitted that he did not
personally or actually see her receive the notice of dishonor nor sign the registry receipt. She
faults Enriquez for failing to explain why he claimed that the signature on said registry return
card was hers. She also contends that the CA committed manifest error in ruling that her actual
receipt of the notice of dishonor was proven by comparing her signatures in the subject checks
with that of the registry return card, because nowhere in the Rules of Evidence or jurisprudence
is it provided that proof/authentication can be made by comparing two unauthenticated
documents.

Second, Lim points out that while Enriquez testified that he saw her personally signed the 10
postdated checks on July 29, 2003 in Makati City, his testimony was belied by a BID Certification
showing that she was out of the country that day and could not have signed the same checks.
Since she did not sign the checks in the presence of Enriquez on said date, then the subject
checks could not have been properly authenticated in accordance with the Rules on Evidence.

Lastly, Lim asserts that in holding her liable to BPHI, the trial court primarily relied on the
Promissory Note which was never produced, presented, identified, authenticated or testified on
by Enriquez. Thus, the trial court erred in admitting the said evidence and using it as basis for
holding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Due to the improper
admission of such evidence, Lim also contends that she could not be held civilly liable to BPHI for
the issuance of the postdated checks, inasmuch as lack of consideration is a defense under the
Negotiable Instruments Law.
Lim's arguments are untenable.

First, contrary to Lim's claim that only the unauthenticated registry return card was the only
proof presented by the prosecution to establish service of a notice of dishonor, the evidence on
record shows that the prosecution also presented the registry receipt and the testimony of
Enriquez who sent the demand letter by registered mail.

In Resterio v. People,6 the Court ruled that the notice of dishonor required under B.P. Blg. 22 to
be given to the drawer, maker or issuer of the check should be written. "If the service of the
written notice is by registered mail, the proof of service consists not only in the presentation as
evidence of the registry return receipt but also of the registry receipt together with the
authenticating affidavit of the person mailing the notice of dishonor. Without the authenticating
affidavit, the proof of giving the notice of dishonor is insufficient, unless the mailer personally
testifies in court on the sending by registered mail."

Here, the transcript of stenographic notes confirm that the prosecution complied with the
requisite proof of service of the notice of dishonor by presenting Enriquez, who testified on the
sending of such notice by registered mail, and identified the demand letter, the registry receipt
and the registry return card, viz.:

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

Q Mr. Witness, during the last hearing of this case, you went to identify the checks in question in
this case which have been previously marked in evidence as Exhibits to "O", and you testified
that these checks after they were issued to your company by the accused, Ivy Lim, the same
were deposited and dishonored by the bank for the reason of account closed, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.

Q Now, after the checks in question were dishonored by the bank for the reason as stated
account closed, what did you do?
A We called the accused by telephone to follow up payments of the returned checks, sir.

Q Were you able to talk to the accused through telephone?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was the reply of the accused, if any?

A The reply of Ms. Ivy Lim is that, can I answer that in Tagalog, your Honor?

COURT:
Yes. (Witness testifying in Tagalog)
A "Ayaw pabayaran ni Ate."

Q What did you do after that?

A Since our demand fell on death case, the office sent a demand letter dated 18 May 2005, sir.

Q To whom, was the demand letter sent?

A To Ms. Rocel Benito and Ms. Ivy Lim, sir.

Q Do you have a copy of the letter which you sent to the accused, Ivy Lim?
A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please produce the letter which you said was sent to the accused, Ivy Lim?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. DELA ROSA:
Witness is producing the Letter dated May 18, 2005 which has been marked in evidence as
Exhibit "Q" and "Q-1", respectively.

Q Mr. Witness, there appears to be a signature on top of the name Juanita M. Enriquez, whose
signature is this?
A The same is my signature, sir.

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

May we request your Honor that the signature properly identified by the witness be marked as
Exhibit "Q-4".

COURT:

Mark it.

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

Q How was this demand letter sent to the accused, Ivy Lim?
A The demand letter was sent through registered mail at Malolos, Bulacan, sir.

xxxx

Q Do you have any proof that the said letter, marked as Exhibit "Q" was sent be registered mail,
as you claimed in Malolos, Bulacan?
A I have the registry receipt and the registry return card of the registered mail, sir.

Q Please produce the said registry receipt and the registry return card?
A Yes, sir.

Q Where is the Registry Receipt in this document?

A This long bond is the Registry Receipt because the registered mail is composed of several
letters, sir.

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

May we respectfully request the Registry Receipt your Honor which this witness identified be
marked in evidence as Exhibit "Q-5."

ATTY. ALCUDIA:
Your Honor, that's already been marked in evidence as "Q-c." That is the list of mail matters,
your Honor.

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

Yes, I stand corrected, your Honor.

Q Now, who mailed this letter in Malolos, Bulacan?

A I am, sir.

xxxx

Q You said that you made a letter dated May 18, 2005 to the accused, Ivy Lim, what happened
to this letter?
A The letter was received by Ms. Lim, sir.
Q Do you have any proof to show that the letter was received by the accused, Ivy Lim?
A The return card of that registered mail attached to the letter, sir.

Q I am showing to you the return card which have been previously marked in evidence
as Exhibit "Q-2", where in this Exhibit "Q-2" will show that the accused received the
letter of demand.
A The signature of Ms. Lim on May 24, 2005 at the back of the Registry Return Receipt,
sir.

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

May we respectfully request that the dorsal portion of the Return Card your Honor be
marked in evidence as Exhibit "Q-5" the date May 24, 2005 and Exhibit "Q-6" which is
the signature of the accused.

COURT:
Mark them.7

In claiming that an unauthenticated registry return card cannot prove receipt of the notice of
dishonor, Lim only objected to Exhibits "Q", "Q-2" and "Q-3" because there is no showing at all
that the Demand Letter of Juanito Enriquez was actually and personally received by
her.8 However, actual receipt of such notice of dishonor was proved by the prosecution through
Enriquez who identified the signature on the dorsal portion of the registry return card as that of
Lim. Enriquez can credibly identify Lim's signature because he testified having witnessed her
signed the subject checks:

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

Q Now, Mr. Witness, in Exhibit "E" there appears to be a signature on the lower portion which
has been marked in evidence as Exhibit "E-2". Whose signature is that, the signature marked as
Exhibit "E-2"?
A The signature of Miss Ivy Lim.

Q And why do you know that is the signature of the accused Ivy Lim?
A I was, I saw her when she signed the check sir.

Q Now again Mr, Witness, in Exhibit "F" there appears to be a signature on the lower portion of
the check, more particularly this space for the drawer which has been marked Exhibit "F-2",
whose signature is that Mr. Witness?
A The signature is that of Miss Ivy Lim.

Q Why do you know that is the signature of Ivy Lim?

A Again, I saw her when she signed the check.9

It bears emphasis that despite Lim's opposition to the prosecution's Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence, the MeTC admitted all its exhibits, noting that the objections thereto
merely pertain to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, which shall be considered by the
court when it decides the case.10 Eventually, the MeTC has exercised its sound discretion,
pursuant to Section 22,11 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court in comparing the signatures of Lim in
the registry return card and the checks to ensure that the notice of dishonor was indeed
received by her, to wit:

As to the third element, Exhibit "Q", the demand letter dated May 18, 2005 addressed to Ivy
Benito Lim and signed by Juanita Enriquez was undisputedly received by the accused Ivy Lim as
shown in Exhibit "Q-6". The distinctive strokes in writing the name "Ivy" and the flourish of the
stroke in writing "im" in the latter part thereof, compared with the signatures appearing on all
the checks shown that these signatures were made by one and the same person.12

There is also no merit in Lim's claim that the subject checks were unauthenticated and not
proven to have been issued by her. For one, in the Preliminary Conference Order13 dated March
28, 2007, the parties admitted that whenever the court refers to the name of Ivy Lim, the name
pertains to the accused, and stipulated on the existence and due execution of the eleven (11)
checks with payee Blue Pacific Holdings, Inc. For another, BPHI Finance Officer Enriquez
presented and identified during trial the 11 checks issued by Lim, to wit:

ATTY. LEOPOLDO DELA ROSA:

Q Do you have in your possession or in your presence the checks that were issued in payment of
a loan by the accused in this case?
A What I have sir are the checks that bounced.

Q Yes, that is why can you produce them now?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please produce them now.

A Here sir.

Q Witness is producing the checks that bounced.

COURT:
Are those ten (10) checks?

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

Yes, I'll just count it your Honor. Ten (10) checks, original checks were produced by this witness
and we would like to manifest for the record that these checks have already been marked in
evidence as Exhibits "E" to "O". Now, I have here in my possession your Honor the original of
the checks, as well as, the photocopies of checks which had [already been] marked your Honor
and we would like to request again for the second time if counsel for the accused would like to
examine the photocopies as well as the original checks although these checks were already
produced during the pre-marking your Honor.

ATTY. ALCUDIA:
We manifest that all checks except the check which was marked Exhibit "G" has not been
presented your Honor.

COURT:
I think he is presenting the check.

ATTY. ALCUDIA:
I make of record that Exhibit "G" has not been presented for payment.

COURT:
Not presented for payment?

ATTY. ALCUDIA:
Not presented your Honor.

COURT:
Duly noted. So they are faithful reproduction of the original?
ATTY. ALCUDIA:
Yes, all Exhibits "E" to "O" including "G."

COURT:
So stipulated.

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

xxxx

Q Now again Mr. Witness, in Exhibit "F" there appears to be a signature on the lower portion of
the check, more particularly this space for the drawer which has been marked as Exhibit "F-2",
whose signature is that Mr. Witness?
A The signature is that of Miss Ivy Lim.

Q Why do you know that is the signature of Ivy Lim?

A Again I saw her when she signed the check.

Q May we manifest for the record that the signature in Exhibit "F" of the accused Ivy Lim has
been marked as Exhibit "F-2". Let us go to Exhibit "G", again there appears to be a signature on
the lower portion of this check, whose signature is that?
A Again the signature of Miss Ivy Lim.

Q May we respectfully manifest that the signature of Ivy Lim identified by this witness has been
marked as Exhibit "G-1". In Exhibit "H" there appears to be again a signature of the drawer.
Whose signature is that?
A Miss Ivy Lim sir.

Q May we again manifest that the signature appearing in Exhibit "H" is the signature of the
accused marked and bracketed as Exhibit "H-1" and properly identified by this witness. Again,
Mr. Witness, there appears to be a signature on the lower portion of Exhibit "I". Will you please
identify the signature, whose signature is that?
A Miss Ivy Lim sir.

Q May we manifest that the signature identified by this witness has been marked in evidence as
Exhibit "I-1". Again, in Exhibit "J" for the prosecution, there appears to be a signature on the
lower portion. Whose signature is that?
A Miss Ivy Lim sir.

Q May we manifest that the signature of the accused has been previously marked and bracketed
as Exhibit "J-1" and identified by this witness your Honor. In Exhibit "K" Mr. Witness, there
appears to be a signature on the lower portion. Whose signature is that?
A Miss Ivy Lim sir.

Q May we request now your Honor, because apparently the signature identified by the witness
has not been bracketed and marked, may we request that the same be bracketed and marked
as Exhibit "K- 1".

COURT
Bracket and mark.
ATTY. DELA ROSA:
Q Again in Exhibit "L" there is a signature on the lower portion. Whose signature is that?
A Miss Ivy Lim sir.

Q May we manifest that the signature in Exhibit "L" has been marked and bracketed as Exhibit
"L-1" and identified by this witness as that of the accused. In Exhibit "M" there appears to be a
signature on the drawer portion, whose signature is that?
A Miss Ivy Lim sir.

Q May we manifest that the signature identified by the witness has been marked and bracketed
as Exhibit "M-1" and identified by the witness. In Exhibit "N" there appears to be again a
signature, whose signature is that?
A Miss Ivy Lim.

Q May we manifest for the record that the signature identified by the witness has been marked
and bracketed as Exhibit "N-1" and properly identified by this witness. In Exhibit "O" there
appears to be again a signature. Whose signature is that?
A Signature of Miss Ivy Lim sir.

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

May we manifest that the signature of Miss Ivy Lim identified by the witness has been marked
and bracketed as Exhibit "O-1" and identified by this witness. Your Honor, I am ready to
continue, however, as I see the grim face of my fellow colleague waiting for their time and
considering that I have further documents to ask from this witness, I pray for continuance your
Honor.

COURT
Any objection?

ATTY. ALCUDIA:
No objection your Honor.14

Nowhere in the records did Lim deny that the signature on the 11 checks were hers nor claim
that her signatures thereon were forged. She cannot be heard now to complain that
unauthenticated checks cannot prove that she was the same person who issued them.

Raising the defenses of denial and alibi, Lim insists that she was abroad when she supposedly
signed the 10 checks in the presence of prosecution witness Enriquez on July 29, 2003, as
shown by a certification from the BID that she left the country on July 21, 2003 and returned on
October 29, 2003. While the prosecution failed to refute such evidence, the MeTC correctly noted
that (1) the unresolved issue is when these checks were issued and delivered to BPHI, and (2)
the fact that the checks were issued is not an issue, as the existence of the checks and
signatures of the accused on these checks are uncontroverted.15

There is nothing in the direct testimony of Enriquez which states that the checks were personally
signed by Lim before him on July 29, 2003, for he only said that the checks were issued in
BPHI's office at Morse corner Edison Streets in Barangay San Isidro, Makati.16 The wrong
information was elicited from Enriquez' cross examination, which may have been based on the
date when the promissory note was acknowledged before a notary pubic:17

ATTY. ALCUDIA:
We will proceed.
Q You have identified the Promissory Note, Exhibit "D", did you not Mr. Enriquez?
A Yes, sir.

Q And as stated here this was issued July 29, 2003, is it not?
A Yes, sir.

Q Is it not a fact that it is your claim that the checks subject of this complaint were issued and
tendered to you also on July 29, 2003?
A Yes, sir.

Q All checks?
A Yes, sir.18

At any rate, what is material in B.P. Blg. 22 cases is the date of issuance of the checks which
appear on their face, and not the exact date of the delivery or signing thereof. This can be
gleaned from the fact that the offenses punished in the said law are not committed if the check
is presented for payment after ninety (90) days from date of issue.

Concededly, the criminal action for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.19 With respect to the civil aspect of a B.P. Blg. 22 case, Lim would do well to remember
that when an action is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
corresponding pleading, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed
admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he
claims to be the facts.20

As can be gleaned from the Complaint-Affidavit dated October 5, 2005, the action of BPHI is not
only meant to prosecute Lim for issuing bouncing checks to secure payment of loan as evidenced
by a promissory note where Lim signed as a co-maker, but also for recovery of the amounts
covered by said checks intended as payment of the loan. Lim does not specifically deny the
genuineness and execution of the promissory note, let alone sets forth what he claims to be the
facts. Moreover, such instrument no longer needs to be authenticated because Lim stipulated on
the existence of the promissory note and her signature thereto, as shown in the Preliminary
Conference Order21 dated March 28, 2007.

Against Lim's claim that the promissory note was not presented, identified and testified on
during trial, the transcript of stenographic notes show otherwise, as it was made an integral part
of the Complaint-Affidavit, which in turn was presented, identified authenticated and testified on
during trial. Pertinent portion of the transcript of stenographic reads:

ATTY. DELA ROSA: [Private counsel of BPHI]

Q Mr. Witness, why do you say that these checks were drawn and issued by the accused in this
case?

ATTY. ALCUDIA: [Counsel of accused Lim]

Same objection, no basis.

COURT:
Objection overruled. We have now the basis. Objection overruled,

Q Why do you say that?

A: The cheeks were drawn and issued to us in payment of the Promissory Note, sir.
Q Were you present when these checks were issued and executed?
A Yes, your Honor.

ATTY. DELA ROSA

Q Where were the checks issued?
A In Makati, sir.

Q Where, what particular place?

A It is in our office at Morse corner Edison Streets in Barangay San Isidro, Makati.

Q In connection with this case Mr. Witness that you are testifying before this Honorable Court,
do you remember that you have executed a Complaint Affidavit insofar as this case is
concerned?
A Yes, sir.

Q I am showing to you Mr. Witness the original copy of the Complaint Affidavit which is attached
to the record of this case and which has been previously marked as Exhibit "A" which Complaint
Affidavit consist of five (5), no four (4) pages. Please examine this Affidavit or Complaint
Affidavit Mr. Witness and tell us what is the relation of that Complaint to the Complaint Affidavit
that you have mentioned.
A This is the Complaint Affidavit I subscribed and sworn to before Fiscal Henry Salazar.

Q Now, in this Complaint Affidavit there appears to be one of the affiant Juanito Enriquez. Who is
this Juanito Enriquez?
A I am sir.

Q Do you affirm and reaffirm the truthfulness and correctness of this Affidavit Complaint before
the oath that you have taken before this Honorable Court?
A Yes, sir.22

Significantly, Lim's counsel admitted during cross-examination that the prosecution has
presented, identified and testified on the subject promissory note, thus:

ATTY. ALCUDIA:
Before we proceed, may we request to be allowed access to the prosecution's Exhibits "D" and
"U" which witness testified on during direct examination? Your, Honor, we have been presented
a document which is original document designated Promissory Note but we note this is not
marked document by the prosecution. Nevertheless, we can proceed if private prosecutor will
stipulate and commit that this document is the original of the document that has been
provisionally marked as Exhibits "D" and "D-1".

COURT:
You can commit Mr. Private Prosecutor?

ATTY. DELA ROSA:

We admit your Honor. What happened here is that the exhibit was marked in the photocopy. I
think after making a comparison.23

Anent the civil aspect of the B.P. Blg 22 cases, her defense of lack of consideration for the
checks fails to persuade. Apart from having admitted the authenticity and due execution of the
promissory note, Lim also failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the
disputable presumptions24 that there were sufficient considerations for the said contract which
she signed as a co-maker, and for the negotiable instruments consisting of 11 checks issued
under her name as security for the payment of the loan. Besides, as a co-maker who agreed to
be jointly and severally liable on the promissory note, Lim cannot validly claim that she hardly
received any consideration therefor, as the fact that the loan was granted to the principal
debtor, her sister Benito, already constitutes sufficient consideration.

All told, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the RTC decision, which
upheld the conviction of Lim for 10 counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and her civil liability for the
face value of the 11 checks.

The elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;

2. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit; or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reasons, ordered the bank to stop payment; and

3. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient
funds in, or credit with, drawee bank for payment of the check in full upon its
presentment.

All the foregoing elements were established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, as
thoroughly discussed by the MeTC:

As to the first element, the Court finds that the checks were issued for value. Accused is the co-
maker of the promissory note (Exhibit "D") wherein she voluntarily bound herself to be jointly
and severally liable with Rochelle Benito, her sister, to Blue Pacific Inc. for the amount of
P605,000.00 plus interests. Accused is also a signatory to the eleven checks issued, along with
her sister, in favor of Blue Pacific. These checks constitute the means for payment of the
promissory note signed by the accused and her sister. It is undisputed that the co-accused,
Rochelle Benito was able to travel to the United States. The expenses incurred for the said travel
came, undoubtedly, from the proceeds of the said loan albeit the accused did not personally
received the proceeds thereof. Although there was no personal receipt of the proceeds by the
accused, it is undisputed that the principal objective of the accused, the processing and travel of
her sister to the United States was accomplished. The accused then stood to benefit from the
loan. The allegation of human trafficking, fraud and payment remains allegations as no evidence
was presented to the Court to prove [them]. The pieces of evidence presented, testimonial and
documentary, show that this is a business transaction between Blue Pacific and the accused.

As to the second element, except for Exhibit "G", the evidence shows that the ten (10) checks
were presented for payment and subsequently dishonored for the reason "Account Closed". The
check dated May 29, 2004 with check number 0105461 in the amount of P67,617.65 was not
presented for payment, and hence to criminal liability attached thereto.

As to the third element, Exhibit "Q", the demand letter dated May 18, 2005 addressed to Ivy
Benito Lim and signed by Juanita Enriquez was undisputedly received by the accused Ivy Lim as
shown in Exhibit "Q-6". The distinctive strokes in writing the name "Ivy" and the flourish of the
stroke in writing "im" in the latter part thereof, compared with the signatures appearing on all
the checks shown that these signatures were made by one and [the] same person. No evidence
was presented by the defense to refute the sending, receipt and existence of the signature of
accused Ivy Lim in Exhibits "Q" and Q-6".25
Be that as it may, a modification of the fine of P676,176.50 imposed by the MeTC is in order
because it appears to exceed the P200,000.00 limit under Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 which
provides for the penalty of "imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1)
year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court." Instead of imposing a lump sum fine, the proper
penalty should be a fine of P67,617.65 [face value of each check] for each of the Ten (10)
counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

Finally, the actual damages in the amount of P743,794.15 representing the face value of the
Eleven (11) checks, which the MeTC awarded to BPHI shall further incur interest at the rate of
six percent (6%)  per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid, in line with Nacar v.
Gallery Frames, Inc.26

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Court
of Appeals Decision dated October 27, 2014 in CA-G.R. CR No. 36204
is AFFIRMED with MODICATION:

(1) IVY LIM a.k.a. IVY BENITO LIM is ORDERED to PAY a FINE of SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED SEVENTEEN PESOS AND 65/100 (P67,617.65) for each of the Ten (10) counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 346643 to 346652, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, pursuant to Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code; and
(2) With regard to the civil aspect of these cases, she is hereby ORDERED to PAY the private
complainant Blue Pacific Holdings, Inc. the total amount of SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-THREE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY-FOUR PESOS AND 15/100 (P743,794.15) of the present
cases, plus twelve percent (12%) interest per annum from date of the filing of the Informations on May
22, 2006 until finality of this Decision, and six percent (6%) interest per annum from such finality until
fully paid. She is, likewise, ORDERED to PAY the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
as and for attorney's fees and to pay the costs of suit.
58.) G.R. No. 197849

RAFFY BRODETH and ROLAN B. ONAL, Petitioners

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ABRAHAM G. VILLEGAS, Respondents

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari  filed by petitioners Raffy Brodeth (Brodeth) and Rolan B.
1

Onal (Onal) assailing the 17 May 2011 Decision  and the 20 July 2011 Resolution  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
2 3

CA-G.R. CR No. 33104. The CA affirmed petitioners' criminal liability for violating Batas Pambansa Big. 22 (B.P.
Big. 22).

THE FACTS

On 16 August 2001, petitioners were charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 30A Manila (MeTC), with
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The informations read:

Criminal Case No. 371104-CR

That on or about September 5, 1999 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously make or draw and issue to VILL INTEGRATED TRANSPORT CORP., rep. by ABRAHAM
VILLEGAS to apply on account or for value METROBANK Check No. 2700111416 dated September 5, 1999 in the
amount of ₱123,600.00 payable to Vill Integrated Transport Corporation said accused well knowing that at the time
of issue he/she/they did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full
upon presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF)" and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused, failed to pay said VILL INTEGRATED TRANSPORT
CORPORATION the amount of the check or make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking
days after receiving said notice.
4

Criminal Case No. 371105-CR

That on or about August 31, 1999 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously make or draw and issue to VILL INTEGRATED TRANSPORT CORP., rep. by ABRAHAM
VILLEGAS to apply on account or for value METROBANK Check No. 2700111415 dated August 31, 1999 in the
amount of P 140,000.00 payable to Vill Integrated Transport Corporation said accused well knowing that at the time
of issue he/she/they did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full
upon presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF)" and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused, failed to pay said VILL INTEGRATED TRANSPORT
CORPORATION the amount of the check to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking
days after receiving said notice.
5

The charges against petitioners stemmed from an affidavit-complaint dated 23 November 2000 filed by Abraham G.
Villegas (Villegas), the Operations Manager of Vill Integrated Transportation Corporation (Vill Integrated). He alleged
that in the course of his company's operations, he transacted with Land & Sea Resources Phils. (L&S
Resources), Inc. by providing the latter equipment and tugboats for its own operations. After the execution of the
service contracts, L&S Resources started using the equipment and tugboats, and even made partial payments to
Vill Integrated. However, L&S Resources had not fully paid all of Vill Integrated's billings and its officers only made
promises to settle them but never did.6

According to Villegas, among the payments made by L&S Resources were three (3) checks drawn against
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank). Two (2) out of these three (3) checks, particularly: (a)
Metrobank Check No. 2700111415 dated 31 August 1999, and (b) Metrobank Check No. 2700111416 dated 5
September 1999,  are the subject checks in the instant case. When the subject checks were deposited to Vill
7

Integrated's account, they were dishonored as they were "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF)." 8

On 9 October 1999, and on 3 May 2000, due to L&S Resources' growing outstanding balance, its refusal to comply
with continued demand for payment, and on account of its checks that bounced, Vill Integrated sent demand letters
to settle the L&S Resources' account. 9

Despite the demands, L&S Resources did not settle its account; hence, the filing of the criminal complaint against
petitioners.

In his counter-affidavit executed on 8 May 2008, Brodeth alleged that L&S Resources' balance pertaining to the
subject checks were settled in cash duly received by Vill Integrated's officer. But, only one (1) of the three (3) checks
was returned. Upon inquiry, Brodeth was informed that the outstanding accounts were not the obligations of L&S
Resources but of one Noli Dela Cerna.  These allegations were backed up by Onal's letter dated 10 November
10

1999, explaining that Vill Integrated should bill Noli dela Cerna instead.
11

On 2 July 2008, the MeTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offense charged. The MeTC
held that the dishonor of the subject checks was sufficiently shown by the letters "DAIF" written at the back of the
checks, which is prima facie evidence that the drawee bank had dishonored the checks. Moreover, the MeTC ruled
that petitioners had known the checks were dishonored because they admitted they had the demand letters. 12

The MeTC Ruling

With regard to their defense, the MeTC was not convinced that the two (2) dishonored checks were paid at all, to
wit:

The defense contends that it was another officer of Land and Sea Resources by the name of Noli Dela Cerna who
had a remaining obligation to Vill Integrated which was not allegedly the obligation of their company Land and Sea
Resources but a personal obligation of Mr. Dela Cerna. The defense further argues that since Vill Integrated could
no longer locate the whereabouts of Mr. Dela Cerna, Vill Integrated chose to pressure them into paying the
obligation of the latter.

However, in the course of his testimony, Mr. Brodeth somehow made a three hundred sixty-degree tum on his first
contention when he testified that these checks were already paid on staggered basis as well [as] an alleged
arrangement with a certain Cristina Villegas that payment will be made in cash, fuel oil and food for the crew.
However, as Mr. Brodeth himself admitted there were no receipts to prove such payments.

Be that as it may, the defense was not able to show any convincing proof to back up both contentions. In fact, their
first contention that it was Mr. Dela Cerna who owes the complainant company was not even heavily relied upon by
them.

The accused anchors his defense mainly on the fact that the subject checks were already paid and made good.
Such being the case, the court deems it unnecessary to delve further on this line of argument and instead will
discuss the merits of its main defense that the checks were already paid.

To the mind of the court, it is quite absurd to think that the company or for that matter both accused would just pay
Vill Integrated without any proof to show that payments were indeed made. This attitude is not normal considering
that both accused were engaged in business themselves. As such they were presumed to know the ordinary and
routine duty that a receipt is necessary to evidence payment. In fact, it is not even a duty to ask for a receipt as
proof of a purchase or for any payment made but it is a common practice and a correlative duty on both seller and
buyer or creditor and debtor to issue one.

Furthermore, no person in his right mind would just part way[ s] with his hard[-]earned money without any assurance
that it will be received by its rightful possessor and in this case it was the company Vill Integrated.
Accused Brodeth contends that the company closed down sometime in 2000. This is the reason why he could no
longer locate the receipts. To the mind of the court this is a flimsy excuse and could be a last[-]ditch effort to
exonerate them from liability.

It is but natural to safely keep the said receipt[s] if indeed they exist. Sad to say, Land and Sea Resources, through
both accused, were remiss of its simple duty and as such, they should suffer the consequences.

Moreover, if indeed payments were already made, Vill Integrated would not exert efforts to go through the
painstaking rigors of court trial. Obviously, Vill Integrated was not paid because the subject checks given as
payment were dishonored by the bank, hence, it was forced to file these present cases.

The defense also offers Exhibit "2" to prove that the amounts of the check were paid. The court cannot consider this
evidence since what has been presented was a mere photocopy. The original document was never presented in
court. In fact, defense counsel undertook to submit the original of the said document but up to this date the same
was not presented in court.

Furthermore, Exhibit "2," which is purportedly a letter addressed to Vill Integrated regarding the obligations of Land
and Sea, does not refer nor does it mention the checks subject of these cases.

To reiterate, the defense was not able to convince the court that the two (2) checks that were dishonored were paid
at all. No documentary proof was shown that the checks were paid or made good after they were dishonored except
the bare allegation of the defense that they were paid. Without such proof to support its allegation, the defense of
payment must fail.

To make matters worse, accused Raffy Brodeth readily admitted in his cross[-]examination to have issued the two
(2) checks and that despite claiming to have already paid it, he could not produce any receipt to prove his claim. 13

Accordingly, the MeTC ordered petitioners to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 for each check that was issued, totaling
₱400,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. They were likewise ordered to pay Vill Integrated
₱283,600.00 as civil indemnity, and the costs of suit.14

On 29 July 2008, petitioners timely filed a notice of appeal, and the case was forwarded to the Regional Trial Court
for further proceedings.15

The RTC Ruling

After the parties had submitted their respective memoranda, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27 of Manila (RTC), in
Criminal Case Nos. 08- 264256-57, found no reversible error in the MeTC's decision and affirmed it in toto.  The
16

RTC's disposition is as follows:

On the first issue, the [c]ourt finds that the lower court has jurisidiction over the cases. The Affidavit-Complaint of
Abraham G. Villegas (Exh. "J"), Operations Manager of Vill Integrated states that the checks were issued in Manila.
Paragraph 9 of the said complaint affidavit, which was admitted as part of the testimony of Mr. Villegas states:

9. Despite the receipt of the said letters, the above-named principal officers, Rolan B. Onal, Noli de la Cerna and
Raffy Brodeth ignored our letters in refusing to pay not only their account of Pl,078,238.24 but also refused to
redeem the two (2) checks dated August 31, 1999 and September 5, 1999, to our detriment and prejudice, which
checks were issued on said dates in Manila, so we were forced to again refer the matter to our lawyer, Atty.
Romualdo M. Jubay, who sent new demand letters to the said persons dated Octber 15, 2000 and October 27,
2000, xerox copies of which letters are hereto attached and marked as Annexes "P" and "Q." (emphasis in the
original)

A case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 can be filed either at the place where the ckeck was issued or paid. In the instant
case, as already stated, the checks were issued in Manila.
Anent the second issue, accused-appellants insisted that the fact that the prosecution did not present a bank
personnel to attest to the fact of dishonor of the checks created doubt as to the authenticity and genuineness for the
reason therefor, as stamped at the back of the checks. This is misplaced.

In order to hold[ ... ] liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, aside from the fact of dishonor, it must also be established
beyond reasonable doubt that he knew the fact and reason for the dishonor of the check. In the instant case, the
original checks were presented in court. Accused were notified through a demand letter of the dishonor of the
checks. The defense conceded receipt of the notice of dishonor. Accused-appellants redeemed one of the checks
but failed to redeem the two other checks. This sufficed to make them fall within the ambit of the law.

On the third issue, accused-appellants posit that they cannot be held liable of the issuance of the subject checks
because they issued them in good faith, and as requested by private complainant to ensure payment of the
obligations of Land and Sea Resources. Accused-appellants were officers of the corporation. They were the ones
who issued the checks in favor of Land and Sea Resources. As drawers of the subject checks on behalf of the
corporation, they must be held criminally liable thereon. Besides, "Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 applies even
in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee."  (citation omitted)
17

After the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration,  petitioners filed a petition for review before the CA.
18 19

In the assailed decision, the CA denied petitioners' appeal. It emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charges
is the issuance of a bouncing check regardless of the purpose why it was issued. The fact that the checks were
drawn by a corporation cannot exculpate petitions from the charge against them. Further, the CA maintained that
the Me TC had jurisdiction to try the case because the complaint-affidavit categorically stated that the checks were
issued in Manila, to wit:

As regards the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the M[e]TC to try the case, a [v]iolation of B.P. [Blg.] 22 can be filed
either in the place where the check was issued or when it was presented for payment. The RTC ruled correctly that
the M[e]TC has jurisdiction to try the case for the reason that the affidavit-complaint of private complainant
categorically stated that the checks were issued in Manila. 20

Petitioners filed the instant petition after the CA promulgated the assailed resolution denying their motion for
reconsideration. They rely on the following grounds in their petition:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED RELIANCE ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE TO

ESTABLISH TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE METRO POLIT AN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA;

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED THE APPLICATION OF A PRESUMPTION ON

KNOWLEDGE OF INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS WHEN THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT EVEN AN
IOTA OF PROOF TO SHOW THAT PETITIONERS COULD BE CHARGED WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE
CORPORA TE FUNDS; AND

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED PETITIONERS' CONVICTION DESPITE THE APP
ARENT FAIL URE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 21

OUR RULING

Without having to consider the other two (2) assignments of errors, we find merit in the petition because the MeTC
had no territorial jurisdiction over the instant case.

Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of or to try
the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted
and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or where any one of the
essential ingredients took place. The fact as to where the offense charged was committed is determined by the facts
alleged in the complaint or informations. 22

In Isip v. People,  we explained:

23
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over
a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of
a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows
that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.  (emphasis supplied)
24

To reiterate, a court cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory, and if the evidence adduced during trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.25

Petitioners argue that the MeTC had no jurisdiction because Villegas' allegation that the subject checks were issued
in Manila was unsubstantiated. They explain that the lower courts should not have relied on this allegation for being
hearsay considering that Villegas had no firsthand knowledge about the transaction between Vill Integrated and L&S
Resources.

We agree with this position.

A careful review of the rulings of the lower courts would show that the only piece of evidence they considered
connecting the alleged violation of B.P. Big. 22 within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC is the affidavit-complaint
of Villegas. In this affidavit, the allegation that the subject checks were issued in Manila was mentioned only once
even though the circumstances behind the issuance of the checks were referred to a couple of times.  Moreover,
26

the phrase "in Manila" only appeared in the ninth paragraph of Villegas' affidavit where the elements of the offense
were already being summarized. Looking at the affidavit itself already casts some doubt as to where the subject
checks were really issued.

More importantly, we agree with petitioners that Villegas could not have testified or alleged in his affidavit that the
checks were issued in Manila because he was not privy to the contractual negotiations with L&S Resources nor was
he present when petitioners issued the checks. In fact, his position in the company did not give him any opportunity
to deal directly with his clients as brought out in his cross-examination:

Q: Mr. Villegas, you said that you are an Operations Manager of the Vill Integrated Transport Corporation?

A: Yes sir.

xxxx

Q: You said that you are the operations manager, specifically said that your main duties and responsibilities (sic) to
oversee maintenance of your tugboat, is that correct?

A: Yes sir.

Q: So directly or indirectly, you are not involved in dealing with customers of Vill Integrated Transport Corporation, is
that correct?

A: Yes sir.

Q: So, in the particular case the dealing with Rolan Onal and Raffy Brodeth, you are not involved in any way, is that
right?

A: No sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, Mr. Villegas, in the Contract dated 16 August 1999 that was previously marked by your
counsel, you were never a signatory to that contract?

A: No sir.

Q: That confirmed a fact that you are not in any way directly or indirectly involved in the transaction with both
accused.

A: No sir. 27

Furthermore, petitioners claimed in defense that the checks were issued as a guarantee for the payments. As
admitted by Vill Integrated's liason officer, their company collects payments from its clients in their respective
offices.  Considering that L&S Resources' principal place of business is in Makati City, it would be out of the
28

ordinary course of business operations for petitioners to go all the way to Manila just to issue the checks.

Our ruling in Morillo v. People  is instructive as to where violations of B.P. Blg. 22 should be filed and tried:
29

It is well-settled that violations of B.P. [Blg.] 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning
that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or
territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material
acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be
validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

The OSG, relying on our ruling in Rigor v. People, concluded that "the Supreme Court regarded the place of deposit
and the place of dishonor as distinct from one another and considered the place where the check was issued,
delivered and dishonored, and not where the check was deposited, as the proper venue for the filing of a B.P. Big.
22 case." The Court, however, cannot sustain such conclusion.

In said case, the accused therein obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila, and in payment
thereof, he issued a check drawn against Associated Bank of Tarlac. Thereafter, Rural Bank deposited the check at
PS Bank, San Juan, but the same was returned for the reason that it had been dishonored by Associated Bank of
Tarlac. When all other efforts to demand the repayment of the loan proved futile, Rural Bank filed an action against
the accused for violation of B.P. Big. 22 at the RTC of Pasig City, wherein crimes committed in San Juan are triable.
The accused, however, contends that the RTC of Pasig had no jurisdiction thereon since no proof had been offered
to show that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the
Municipality of San Juan. The Court, however, disagreed and held that while the check was dishonored by the
drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, evidence clearly showed that the accused had drawn, issued and
delivered it at Rural Bank, San Juan, viz.:

Lastly, petitioner contends that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig had no jurisdiction over this case since no proof
has been offered that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds
occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.

The contention is untenable.

x x x x.

The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro
Manila on November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was dated February 16, 1990 thereat. On May 25,
1990, the check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly
ruled:

Violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the check can be filed in any
of the places where any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn, issued, delivered
or dishonored. x x x
The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the place of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction of courts in
criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information. Although, the check was dishonored
by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San
Juan. The place of issue and delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of the offense, was also
overtly manifested in San Juan. There is no question that crimes committed in November, 1989 in San Juan are
triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig. In short both allegation and proof in this case sufficiently vest jurisdiction upon
the RTC in Pasig City.

The bone of contention in Rigor, therefore, was whether the prosecution had offered sufficient proof that the check
drawn in violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds
occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, thereby vesting jurisdiction upon the RTC of Pasig City. Nowhere in the
cited case, however, was it held, either expressly or impliedly, that the place where the check was deposited is not
the proper venue for actions involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22. It is true that the Court, in Rigor, acknowledged the
fact that the check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan while the same was deposited with the
PS Bank of San Juan. But such differentiation cannot be taken as basis sufficient enough to conclude that the court
of the place of deposit cannot exercise jurisdiction over violations of B.P. Blg. 22. In the absence, therefore, of any
ground, jurisprudential or otherwise, to sustain the OSG's arguments, the Court cannot take cognizance of a
doctrine that is simply inapplicable to the issue at hand.

In contrast, the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals cited by petitioner is more squarely on point with the instant
case.  In Nieva, the accused delivered to Ramon Joven a post-dated check drawn against the Commercial Bank of
1âwphi1

Manila as payment for Joven's dump truck. Said check was deposited in the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of
Philippine Islands. Joven was advised, however, that the Commercial Bank of Manila returned the check for the
reason that the account against which the check was drawn is a "closed account." Consequently, the accused was
charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the RTC of Pampanga. On the contention of the accused that said court
had no jurisdiction to try the case, the Court categorically ruled:

As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga has no jurisdiction to try the cases charged
herein as none of the essential elements thereof took place in Pampanga, suffice it to say that such contention has
no basis. The evidence discloses that the check was deposited and/or presented for encashment with the Angeles
City Branch of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. This fact clearly confers jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court
of Pampanga over the crimes of which petitioner is charged. It must be noted that violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are
categorized as transitory or continuing crimes and so is the crime of estafa. The rule is that a person charged with a
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

In fact, in the more recent Yalong v. People, wherein the modes of appeal and rules of procedure were the issues at
hand, the Court similarly inferred:

Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations, Yalong's appeal still remains dismissible on the
ground that, inter alia, the MTCC had properly acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 45414. It is well-settled
that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the acts
material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the
court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the
case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a
person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the
offense was in part committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 may be filed in
any of the places where any of its elements occurred - in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued,
delivered, or dishonored.

In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check was drawn, issued, and delivered in Manila, records reveal
that Ylagan presented the same for deposit and encashment at the LBC Bank in Batangas City where she learned
of its dishonor. As such, the MTCC [of Batangas City] correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 45414 as it
had the territorial jurisdiction to try and resolve the same. In this light, the denial of the present petition remains
warranted.

Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of the place where the check
was deposited or presented for encashment can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of B.P.
Blg. 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of the instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered in Pampanga
does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for it is undisputed that the subject check
was deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable PCIBank. The Me TC of Makati,
therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its
jurisdiction.  (emphases in the original and citations omitted)
30

From the foregoing, we can deduce that a criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 may be filed and tried
either at the place where the check was issued, drawn, delivered, or deposited. In the present case, however,
evidence on record is missing at any of these material places.

Again, the only factual link to the territorial jurisdiction of the Me TC is the allegation that the subject checks were
issued in Manila. In criminal cases, venue or where at least one of the elements of the crime or offense was
committed must be proven and not just alleged. Otherwise, a mere allegation is not proof and could not justify
sentencing a man to jail or holding him criminally liable. To stress, an allegation is not evidence and could not' be
made equivalent to proof.

All said, since the prosecution failed to prove that the subject checks were issued in Manila nor was any evidence
shown that these were either drawn, delivered, or deposited in Manila, the MeTC has no factual basis for its
territorial jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The 17 May 2011 Decision and the 20 July 2011 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33104 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 30, Manila. Criminal Case Nos. 371104-CR & 371105-
CR are DISMISSED without prejudice.
59.) G.R. No. 195248

JOHN DENNIS G. CHUA, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CRISTINA YAO, Respondents

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Orders,  dated 15 June 2010 and 28 December 2010 of the
1

Regional Trial Court, Branch 160, Pasig City (RTC), in SCA No. 3338, which affirmed the Decision,  dated 15 April.
2

2009, of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan City (MeTC), in Criminal Case No. 80165-68 finding
petitioner John Dennis G. Chua (petitioner) guilty of four (4) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P.
Big. 22).

THE FACTS

Respondent Cristina Yao (Yao) alleged that she became acquainted with petitioner through the latter's mother.
Sometime in the year 2000, petitioner's mother mentioned that her son would be reviving their sugar mill business in
Bacolod City and asked whether Yao could lend them money. Yao acceded and loaned petitioner ₱l million on 3
January 2001; ₱l million on 7 January 2001; and ₱l.5 million on 16 February 2001. She also lent petitioner an
additional ₱2.5 million in June 2001. As payment petitioner issued four (4) checks in these amounts but which were
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account. Upon dishonor of the checks, Yao personally delivered
her demand letter to the office of the petitioner which was received by his secretary.3

Petitioner was thus charged with four (4) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The cases were raffled to Branch 58,
then presided by Judge Elvira DC Castro (Judge Castro). On 16 September 2004, petitioner pleaded "not guilty."
After mediation and pre-trial conference, trial ensued before Pairing Judge Marianito C. Santos (Judge Santos) as
Judge Castro was promoted to the RTC of Quezon City.  On 25 July 2007, Judge Philip Labastida (Judge
4

Labastida) was appointed Presiding Judge of Branch 58 and took over trial proceedings.  Since petitioner failed to
5

present evidence, the cases were submitted for decision and promulgation of judgment was set on 30 September
2008.  Sometime in December 2008, Judge Labastida died.  On 20 February 2009, Judge Mary George T.
6 7

Cajandab-Caldona {Judge Caldona) was designated Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 58  and she assumed office
8

on 1 April 2009. 9

The MeTC Ruling

In a decision, dated 15 April 2009, signed by Judge Santos as the pairing judge, the MeTC found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, and sentenced him to pay a fine of
₱200,000.00 for each count.

The MeTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish that the checks issued by petitioner were payments for a
loan; and that upon dishonor of the checks, demand was made upon petitioner through his personal secretary.
The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. FINDING the accused JOHN DENNIS CHUA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of] having violated the crime of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which he is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱200,000.00) for each count, with subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed SIX (6) MONTHS for each count in case
of insolvency;

2. HOLDING the accused civilly liable to the extent of the value of the four (4) subject checks or in the total amount
of ₱6,082,000.00 with twelve (12%) interest per annum reckoned from date of extrajudicial demand which was
made on April 2002 until the whole obligation shall have been fully paid and satisfied;
3. ORDERING the accused to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 10

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC assailing Judge Santos' authority to render the
decision.

The RTC Ruling

In an Order, dated 15 June 2010, the RTC affirmed the conviction of petitioner. It held that the expanded authority of
pairing courts under Supreme Court Circular No. 19-98, dated 18 February 1998, clearly gave Judge Santos
authority to resolve the criminal cases which were submitted for decision when he was still the pairing judge. The
RTC added that Judge Santos was in a better position to resolve and decide the cases because these were heard
arid submitted for decision prior to the appointment of Judge Caldona as acting presiding judge on 20 February
2009 and her assumption to office on 1 April 2009. It observed that the promulgation of judgment was delayed
merely because a motion for reconsideration was filed which was later denied. The RTC disposed the case thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 11

Unconvinced, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC in an Order, dated 28
December 2010.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

I.

WHETHER OR NOT A DECISION PROMULGATED AND EXECUTED BY A PAIRING JUDGE, DESPITE THE
APPOINTMENT OF A PERMANENT JUDGE TO A COURT, IS VALID;

II.

WHETHER OR NOT A DECISION ADMITTING THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE ALL THE
ELEMENTS OF A CRIME, BUT STILL CONVICTING AN ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL CASE IS AN ACT
TANTAMOUNT TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO A LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION;

III.

WHETHER OR NOT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT IS
THE PROPER REMEDY FOR ACTS DONE BY A PRESIDING JUDGE SHOWING GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO A LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. 12

Petitioner argues that pursuant to Circular No. 19-98, decisions rendered by pairing judges are valid only when the
same are promulgated at the time when no presiding judge has been appointed, thus, the authority of pairing judges
automatically ceases upon the appointment and assumption to duty of the new presiding judge; that Judge Caldona
assumed office on 1 April 2009; that on 15 April 2009, when the assailed decision was promulgated, only Judge
Caldona had the authority to promulgate a decision on the case; and that the prosecution failed to prove that a
notice of dishonor was properly served upon petitioner.

In its comment,  respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), avers that
13

the cases were submitted for decision as early as 30 September 2008 and that Judge Caldona had not presided in
a single hearing; that in view of these circumstances, Judge Caldona was not familiar enough with the facts of the
case to enable her to competently render a decision; that Judge Caldona did not raise any opposition to the
promulgation of the 15 April 2009 decision; that Circular No. 5-98 provides that "cases submitted for decision and
those that passed the trial stage, i.e., where all the parties have finished presenting their evidence before such
Acting/ Assisting Judge at the time of the assumption of the Presiding Judge or the designated Acting Presiding
Judge shall be decided by the former", that from the time of the untimely demise of Judge Labastida, Judge Santos
was tasked to take over the cases as the designated pairing judge of Branch 58; and that Judge Santos was clothed
with authority to promulgate the assailed 15 April 2009 decision.

In his reply,  petitioner counters that Circular No. 5-98 is not applicable to the case as Circular No. 19-98 provides
14

that "the judge of the paired court shall take cognizance of all the cases thereat as acting judge therein until the
appointment and assumption to duty of the regular judge or the designation of an acting presiding judge", that the
authority of Judge Santos was derived as a pairing judge, not as acting or assisting judge, of Branch 58; and that his
authority automatically ceased on 20 February 2009, when Judge Caldona was designated as Acting Presiding
Judge of Branch 58.

THE COURT'S RULING

Appeal, not certiorari, is the

proper remedy to question the
MeTC decision.

At the outset, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when he sought to assail the MeTC decision. First, it has been
consistently held that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special civil action of certiorari will not be
entertained - remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not: alternative or successive. The proper
remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal. This holds true even if the
error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of
power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or
resolution. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements for the latter remedy is the unavailability of appeal. 15

Second, even if a petition for certiorari is the correct remedy, petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of a
prior motion for reconsideration. As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the availment of
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.  The filing of a motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is
16

intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way
of reexamination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. 17

Third, petitioner was not able to establish his allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
MeTC.  Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the
1âwphi1

petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.  In Yu v. Judge Reyes-
18

Carpio,  the Court explained:

19

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as
with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore,
the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or
quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the
petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross xxx. 20

As will be discussed, there was no hint of whimsicality, nor of gross and patent abuse of discretion as would amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation
of law on the part of Judge Santos.  He was clothed with authority to decide the criminal cases filed against
21

petitioner.

In addition, considering that petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari which is an original action, the
proper remedy after denial thereof is to appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of notice of appeal.  Hence,
22
when petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court, not only did he disregard the time-honored principle of
hierarchy of courts, he also availed of the wrong remedy for the second time.

Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural lapses committed by petitioner, in the interest of prompt dispensation of
justice and to prevent further prolonging the proceedings in this case, the Court resolves to give due course to his
petition and rule on the merits thereof.

Judge Santos had authority to

render the assailed decision
even after the assumption to
office of the designated
presiding judge of Branch 58.

Petitioner cites Circular No. 19-98 to support his contention that Judge Santos no longer had the authority to render
the assailed decision at the time of its promulgation on 15 April 2009. The circular reads:

In the interest of efficient administration of justice, the authority of the pairing judge under Circular No. 7 dated
September 23, 1974 (Pairing System for Multiple Sala Stations) to act on incidental or interlocutory matters and
those urgent matters requiring immediate action on cases pertaining; to the paired court shall henceforth be
expanded to include all other matters. Thus, whenever a vacancy occurs by reason of resignation, dismissal,
suspension, retirement, death, or prolonged absence of the presiding judge in a multi-sala station, the judge of the
paired court shall take cognizance of all the cases thereat as acting judge therein until the appointment and
assumption to duty of the regular judge or the designation of an acting presiding judge or the return of the regular
incumbent judge, or until further orders from this Court. (emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, the OSG avers that Judge Santos was in due exercise of his authority as provided by Circular
No. 5-98, viz:

1. Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an Acting/Assisting Judge shall cease to continue hearing cases in the
court where he is detailed and shall return to his official station upon the assumption of the appointed Presiding
Judge or the newly designated Acting Presiding Judge thereat. Cases left by the former shall be tried and decided
by the appointed Presiding Judge or the designated Acting Presiding Judge.

2. However, cases submitted for decision and those that passed the trial stage, i.e. where all the parties have
finished presenting their evidence before such Acting/Assisting Judge at the time of the assumption of the Presiding
Judge or the designated Acting Presiding Judge shall be decided by the former. This authority shall include
resolutions of motions for reconsideration and motions for new trial thereafter filed. But if a new trial is granted, the
Presiding Judge thereafter appointed or designated shall preside over the new trial until it is terminated and shall
decide the same.

3. If the Acting/Assisting Judge is appointed to another branch but in the same station, cases heard by him shall be
transferred to the branch where he is appointed and he shall continue to try them. He shall be credited for these
cases by exempting him from receiving an equal number during the raffle of newly filed cases. x x x (emphasis
supplied)

Both circulars are applicable in the case at bar in that Circular No. 5- 98 complements Circular No. 19-98.
Undoubtedly, the judge of the paired court serves as acting judge only until the appointment and assumption to duty
of the regular judge or the designation of an acting presiding judge. Clearly, the acting judge may no longer
promulgate decisions when the regular judge has already assumed the position. Circular No. 5-98, however,
provides an exception, i.e., the acting judge, despite the assumption to duty of the regular judge or the designation
of an acting presiding judge, shall decide cases which are already submitted for decision at the time of the latter's
assumption or designation.

In this case, Judge Santos, as judge of the paired court, presided over the trial of the cases which commenced with
the presentation of the prosecution's first witness on 7 June 2006.  On 25 July 2007, Judge Labastida was
23

appointed Presiding Judge of Branch 58 and he took over the trial of the cases.  The promulgation of judgment was
24

tentatively set on 30 September 2008.  Unfortunately, sometime in December 2008, Judge Labastida died.  Hence,
25 26
it was incumbent upon Judge Santos to serve as acting judge of Branch 58 as a result of Judge Labastida's
untimely death. When Judge Caldona assumed the position of Acting Presiding Judge on 1 April 2009,  the cases
27

already passed the trial stage as they were in fact submitted for decision. Further, it is worthy to note that Judge
Santos presided over a significant portion of the proceedings as compared to Judge Caldona who assumed office
long after the cases were submitted for decision. Finally, the use of the word "shall" in Circular No. 5-98 makes it
mandatory for Judge Santos to decide the criminal cases against petitioner. Clearly, Judge Santos had the authority
to render the assailed decision on 15 April 2009 notwithstanding Judge Caldona's assumption to office.

Failure to prove petitioner's

receipt of notice of dishonor
warrants his acquittal.

To be liable for violation of B.P. Big. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the making, drawing,
and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that
at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment. 28

Here, the existence of the second element is in dispute. In Yu Oh v. CA,  the Court explained that since the second
29

element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 created a prima
facie presumption of such knowledge, as follows:

SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of
which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within
ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of
funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee.

Based on this section, the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought into
existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that within five days from
receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for its payment. The presumption
or prima facie evidence as provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank
is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, since
there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.

xxxx

Indeed, this requirement [on proof of receipt of notice of dishonor] cannot be taken lightly because Section 2
provides for an opportunity for the drawer to effect full payment of the amount appearing on the check, within five
banking days from notice of dishonor. The absence of said notice therefore deprives an accused of an opportunity
to preclude criminal prosecution. In other words, procedural due process demands that a notice of dishonor be
actually served on petitioner.  (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
30

The Court finds that the second element was not sufficiently established. Yao testified that the personal secretary of
petitioner received the demand letter,  yet, said personal secretary was never presented to testify whether she in
31

fact handed the demand letter to petitioner who, from the onset, denies having received such letter. It must be borne
in mind that it is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the accused. The
prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for in the law is
reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused. 32

In this case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period under Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 22 would start and
end since there is no showing when petitioner actually received the demand letter. The MeTC, in its decision, merely
said that such requirement was fully complied with without any sufficient discussion. Indeed, it is not impossible that
petitioner's secretary had truly handed him the demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof beyond
reasonable doubt.  The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives the accused an opportunity to
33
preclude a criminal prosecution.  As there is insufficient proof that petitioner received the notice of dishonor, the
34

presumption that he had knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot arise. 35

Nonetheless, petitioner's acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove all elements of the offense beyond
reasonable doubt does not extinguish his civil liability for the dishonored checks. The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the
civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. 36

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 15 June 2010 and 28 December 2010 Orders of the Regional Trial
Court in SCA No. 3338 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner John Dennis G. Chua is ACQUITTED of the
crime of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 on four (4) counts on the ground that his guilt was not established
beyond reasonable doubt. He is, nonetheless, ordered to pay complainant Cristina Yao the face value of the subject
checks in the aggregate amount of ₱6,082,000.00, plus legal interest of 12% per annum from the time the said sum
became due and demandable until 30 June 2013, and 6% per annum from 1 July 2013 until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
60.) G.R. Nos. 59568-76               January 11, 1990

PETER NIERRAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY and HON. ANTONIO S. LOPEZ, in their capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Leyte, Palo, Leyte, and City Fiscal of Tacloban City, Leyte,
respectively, respondents.

Victor C. Veloso for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

Before Us is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction for the annulment of the resolution dated September
17, 1981 of the respondent Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy in nine (9) criminal cases, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Peter Nierras" docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 4379, 4380, 4381, 4382, 4383, 4384, 4385, 4386 and
4387, for estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code which denied petitioner's motion to quash. Said
motion to quash was filed by petitioner on the ground of double jeopardy as these offenses were already included in
Criminal Cases Nos. 3790, 3791, 3792, 3793, 4085, 4122, 4123, 4124, and 4125, entitled "People of the Philippines
v. Peter Nierras," for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, pending before the lower
court. In both sets of criminal cases, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment before the lower court.
However, immediately after his plea of not guilty in these estafa cases, petitioner moved in open court to be allowed
to withdraw his plea of not guilty upon his filing of a motion to quash, which was denied by respondent Judge ruling
as follows:

The motion to quash should be and is hereby denied. Accused Peter Nierras allegedly issued the checks in
favor of complainant Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation in payment of oil products which the latter
delivered to him simultaneously with the issuance of the checks.

x x x           x x x          x x x

. . . The crime of estafa committed by means of bouncing checks is not committed by mere issuance of a
check. Under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 4885, the
following are the elements of estafa: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3)
damage to the payee thereof (People v. Sabio, 86 SCRA 568). Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (1979) the
mere issuance of a check without sufficient funds issued in payment of a simultaneous obligation and the
check was dishonored upon presentation for that estafa is committed under the Revised Penal Code. At the
same time, the drawer will also be liable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for offense of issuing a check
without sufficient funds (pp. 1-2, Resolution On Motion To Quash dated September 17, 1981; Annex "MM",
Petition). (p. 100, Rollo)

The issue now submitted for Our consideration is whether the filing of the nine (9) other informations for estafa
against petitioner under the Revised Penal Code after he had earlier been charged with violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing the same bouncing checks will put him in jeopardy of being convicted twice for the
same offenses. In other words, can petitioner be held liable for the nine criminal cases for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, and separately also be held liable for the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised
Penal Code for the issuance of the same bouncing checks?

It appears that petitioner, a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, purchased oil products from it.
Simultaneous with the delivery of the products, he issued nine (9) checks in payment thereof. Upon presentation to
the Philippine National Bank at Naval, Leyte, said checks were dishonored for the reason that his account was
already closed. Thereafter, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation repeatedly demanded of petitioner either to
deposit funds for his checks or pay for the oil products he had purchased but he failed and refused to do either.
Petitioner argues that he would be placed in double jeopardy as all the elements of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of
the Revised Penal Code are also present in that crime punishable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 namely (1) "the
postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack
or insufficiency of funds to cover the check and (3) damage to the payee thereof."

Petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit.

Petitioner is charged with two (2) distinct and separate offenses, first under Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
approved on April 3, 1979 which provides that:

Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time
of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

and, second, under Article 315, (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code which states as follows:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein
below . . .

x x x           x x x          x x x

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud;

x x x           x x x          x x x

(d) By postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in
the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.

What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that deceit and damage are essential elements in Article
315 (2-d) Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the latter law, mere
issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he
issued the same without sufficient funds and hence punishable (People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523) which is not so
under the Penal Code. Other differences between the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored
check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same for a pre-
existing obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code such circumstance negates criminal
liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime
against property, while violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does
injury to the entire banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while
those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.

These differences are better understood by presenting the pertinent discussions on the passage of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 between the author of the bill, former Solicitor General and Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the Honorable Estelito P. Mendoza, presented in the memorandum for the government as follows:

MR. MENDOZA. If there is evidence demonstrating that the act committed does not only violate this
proposed Act but also the Revised Penal Code, there will be further prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code. That is why it is proposed in this Act that there be a single uniform penalty for all
violations in this Act. However the court is given the discretion whether to impose imprisonment or
fine or both or also in whatever severity the court may consider appropriate under the
circumstances.
 x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. VELOSO, F. The other way around, it is not so. So precisely, if I file a case for estafa against a
particular person for issuance of a bouncing check, then necessarily I can also be prosecuted under
this proposed bill. On the other hand, if a person is prosecuted under the proposed bill, it does not
necessarily follow that he can be prosecuted for estafa.

MR. MENDOZA. This is simply because that in a certain set of circumstances, the offense under this
Act is the only offense committed while under a different set of circumstances, not only the offense
described in this Act is committed but also estafa. So that, for example, if a check with sufficient
funds is issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation and the position of the Government should
turn out to be correct that there is no estafa, then the drawer of the check would only be liable under
this Act but not under the Revised Penal Code. But if he issues a check in payment, or
contemporaneously with incurring, of an obligation, then he will be liable not only for estafa but also
for violation for this Act. There is a difference between the two cases. In that situation where the
check was issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation, the issuance of the check does not cause
damage to the payee and so it is but appropriate that he should not be held for estafa but only for
violating this Act. But if he issued a check to induce another, to part with a valuable consideration
and the check bounces, then he does inflict an injury to the payee of the check apart from violating
this law. In that case, it should be but fair that he be subject to prosecution not only for estafa but
also for violating this law.

MR. VELOSO, F. Yes, I agree with the Solicitor General on that point but my worry is with respect to
situations where there is prosecution first to estafa.

MR. MENDOZA. Well, if there is estafa . . .

MR. VELOSO, F. Estafa committed by the issuance of a bouncing check, in which case it will be
mandatory on the part of the prosecuting official to also file a case for violation of this offense under
the proposed bill.

MR. MENDOZA. Yes, that is correct. In such a situation because if the offender did not only cause
injury on account of the issuance of the check but did issue a bouncing check penalized under this
Act, then he will be liable for prosecution under both laws. I would admit that perhaps in such
situation, the penalty may be somewhat severe. As a matter of fact, in other jurisdictions, the
issuance of bouncing checks is penalized with substantially lower penalty. However, because of the
situation in the Philippines, the situation being now relatively grave that practically everybody is
complaining about bouncing checks, may be it is necessary at least initially, at this point in time for
us to impose a rather severe penalty and even allow liability not only under this Act but also for
estafa. Then perhaps, after the necessary discipline has been inculcated in our people and that the
incidence of the offense has been reduced, we may then decide to amend the law and reduce the
penalty. But at this time, shall we say the evil is of such magnitude that only a dramatic and
expeditious effort to prosecute persons who issue bouncing checks may be necessary to curb
quickly this evil. (explanations given by Solicitor General ESTELITO P. MENDOZA at the Batasan
Pambansa during his sponsorship speech of BP 22 which he authored, pages 1037-1038, Record of
the Batasan, Plenary Session No. 70, Dec. 4, 1978). (Emphasis supplied). (pp. 115-117, Rollo or pp.
9-11, Memorandum for respondents).

Furthermore, Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provides that:

Prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the
Revised Penal Code.

While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner,
the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity
of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another
law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers
to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What
is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not
itself give rise to double jeopardy (People v. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 570).

In the instant petition, certiorari is not the proper remedy. We have held in Acharon v. Purisima, et al. (13 SCRA
309) that "when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied, remedy is not certiorari but to go to court without
prejudice to reiterating special defenses invoked in the motion, and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law," invoking the rule laid down in People
v. Magdaluyo (1 SCRA 990). If the petitioner cannot appeal at this state of the proceeding, it is because there is still
a necessity for the trial on the merits wherein the parties may present proofs in support of their contentions and not
because the remedy of appeal is unavailing.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

61.) G.R. No. 117857      February 2, 2001

LUIS S. WONG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the decision dated October 28, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CR
118561 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 17, convicting petitioner on
three (3) counts of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) violations, and sentencing him to
imprisonment of four (4) months for each count, and to pay private respondent the amounts of P5,500.00,
P6,410.00 and P3,375.00, respectively, corresponding to the value of the checks involved, with the legal rate of
interest from the time of filing of the criminal charges, as well as to pay the costs.
1âwphi1.nêt

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Wong was an agent of Limtong Press. Inc. (LPI), a manufacturer of calendars. LPI would print sample
calendars, then give them to agents to present to customers. The agents would get the purchase orders of
customers and forward them to LPI. After printing the calendars, LPI would ship the calendars directly to the
customers. Thereafter, the agents would come around to collect the payments. Petitioner, however, had a history of
unremitted collections, which he duly acknowledged in a confirmation receipt he co-signed with his wife.2 Hence,
petitioner’s customers were required to issue postdated checks before LPI would accept their purchase orders.

In early December 1985, Wong issued six (6) postdated checks totaling P18,025.00, all dated December 30, 1985
and drawn payable to the order of LPI, as follows:

(1) Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) Check No. 660143464-C for P6,410.00 (Exh. "B");

(2) ABC Check No. 660143460-C for P540.00 (Exh. "C");

(3) ABC Check No. PA660143451-C for P5,500.00 (Exh. "D");

(4) ABC Check No. PA660143465-C for P1,100.00 (Exh. "E");

(5) ABC Check No. PA660143463-C for P3,375.00 (Exh. "F");

(6) ABC Check No. PA660143452-C for P1,100.00 (Exh. "G").

These checks were initially intended to guarantee the calendar orders of customers who failed to issue post-dated
checks. However, following company policy, LPI refused to accept the checks as guarantees. Instead, the parties
agreed to apply the checks to the payment of petitioner’s unremitted collections for 1984 amounting to
P18,077.07.3 LPI waived the P52.07 difference.

Before the maturity of the checks, petitioner prevailed upon LPI not to deposit the checks and promised to replace
them within 30 days. However, petitioner reneged on his promise. Hence, on June 5, 1986, LPI deposited the
checks with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). The checks were returned for the reason "account
closed." The dishonor of the checks was evidenced by the RCBC return slip.

On June 20, 1986, complainant through counsel notified the petitioner of the dishonor. Petitioner failed to make
arrangements for payment within five (5) banking days.

On November 6, 1987, petitioner was charged with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 224 under three separate
Informations for the three checks amounting to P5,500.00, P3,375.00, and P6,410.00.5
The Information in Criminal Case No. CBU-12055 reads as follows:6

That on or about the 30th day of December, 1985 and for sometime subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, knowing at the time of
issue of the check she/he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and of causing damage, did
then and there issue, make or draw Allied Banking Corporation Check No. 660143451 dated 12-30-85 in the
amount of P5,500.00 payable to Manuel T. Limtong which check was issued in payment of an obligation of
said accused, but when the said check was presented with said bank, the same was dishonored for reason
‘ACCOUNT CLOSED’ and despite notice and demands made to redeem or make good said check, said
accused failed and refused, and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of said Manuel T. Limtong in the amount of P5,500.00 Philippine Currency.

Contrary to law.

Petitioner was similarly charged in Criminal Case No. 12057 for ABC Check No. 660143463 in the amount of
P3,375.00, and in Criminal Case No. 12058 for ABC Check No. 660143464 for P6,410.00. Both cases were raffled
to the same trial court.

Upon arraignment, Wong pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.

Manuel T. Limtong, general manager of LPI, testified on behalf of the company, Limtong averred that he refused to
accept the personal checks of petitioner since it was against company policy to accept personal checks from agents.
Hence, he and petitioner simply agreed to use the checks to pay petitioner’s unremitted collections to LPI. According
to Limtong, a few days before maturity of the checks, Wong requested him to defer the deposit of said checks for
lack of funds. Wong promised to replace them within thirty days, but failed to do so. Hence, upon advice of counsel,
he deposited the checks which were subsequently returned on the ground of "account closed."

The version of the defense is that petitioner issued the six (6) checks to guarantee the 1985 calendar bookings of
his customers. According to petitioner, he issued the checks not as payment for any obligation, but to guarantee the
orders of his customers. In fact, the face value of the six (6) postdated checks tallied with the total amount of the
calendar orders of the six (6) customers of the accused, namely, Golden Friendship Supermarket, Inc. (P6,410.00),
New Society Rice and Corn Mill (P5,500.00), Cuesta Enterprises (P540.00), Pelrico Marketing (P1,100.00), New
Asia Restaurant P3,375.00), and New China Restaurant (P1,100.00). Although these customers had already paid
their respective orders, petitioner claimed LPI did not return the said checks to him.

On August 30, 1990, the trial court issued its decision, disposing as follows:7

"Wherefore, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Luis S. Wong GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Violations of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in THREE (3) Counts and is
hereby sentenced to serve an imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS for each count; to pay Private
Complainant Manuel T. Limtong the sums of Five Thousand Five Hundred (P5,500.00) Pesos, Six
Thousand Four Hundred Ten (P6,410.00) Pesos and Three Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-Five
(P3,375.00) Pesos corresponding to the amounts indicated in Allied Banking Checks Nos. 660143451,
66[0]143464 and 660143463 all issued on December 30, 1985 together with the legal rate of interest from
the time of the filing of the criminal charges in Court and pay the costs."8

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. On October 28, 1994, it affirmed the trial court’s
decision in toto.9

Hence, the present petition.10 Petitioner raises the following questions of law -11

May a complainant successfully prosecute a case under BP 22 --- if there is no more consideration or price
or value – ever the binding tie that it is in contracts in general and in negotiable instruments in particular –
behind the checks? – if even before he deposits the checks, he has ceased to be a holder for value because
the purchase orders (PO’s) guaranteed by the checks were already paid?
 Given the fact that the checks lost their reason for being, as above stated, is it not then the duty of
complainant – knowing he is no longer a holder for value – to return the checks and not to deposit them
ever? Upon what legal basis then may such a holder deposit them and get paid twice?

Is petitioner, as the drawer of the guarantee checks which lost their reason for being, still bound under BP
22 to maintain his account long after 90 days from maturity of the checks?

May the prosecution apply the prima facie presumption of "knowledge of lack of funds" against the drawer
if the checks were belatedly deposited by the complainant 157 days after maturity, or will it be then
necessary for the prosecution to show actual proof of "lack of funds" during the 90-day term?

Petitioner insists that the checks were issued as guarantees for the 1985 purchase orders (PO’s) of his customers.
He contends that private respondent is not a "holder for value" considering that the checks were deposited by
private respondent after the customers already paid their orders. Instead of depositing the checks, private
respondent should have returned the checks to him. Petitioner further assails the credibility of complainant
considering that his answers to cross-examination questions included: "I cannot recall, anymore" and "We have no
more record."

In his Comment,12 the Solicitor General concedes that the checks might have been initially intended by petitioner to
guarantee payments due from customers, but upon the refusal of LPI to accept said personal checks per company
policy, the parties had agreed that the checks would be used to pay off petitioner’s unremitted collections.
Petitioner’s contention that he did not demand the return of the checks because he trusted LPI’s good faith is
contrary to human nature and sound business practice, according to the Solicitor General.

The issue as to whether the checks were issued merely as guarantee or for payment of petitioner’s unremitted
collections is a factual issue involving as it does the credibility of witnesses. Said factual issue has been settled by
the trial court and Court of Appeals. Although initially intended to be used as guarantee for the purchase orders of
customers, they found the checks were eventually used to settle the remaining obligations of petitioner with
LPI. Although Manuel Limtong was the sole witness for the prosecution, his testimony was found sufficient to prove
all the elements of the offense charged.13 We find no cogent reason to depart from findings of both the trial and
appellate courts. In cases elevated from the Court of Appeals, our review is confined to allege errors of law. Its
findings of fact are generally conclusive. Absent any showing that the findings by the respondent court are entirely
devoid of any substantiation on record, the same must stand.14 The lack of accounting between the parties is not the
issue in this case. As repeatedly held, this Court is not a trier of facts.15 Moreover, in Llamado v. Court of
Appeals,16 we held that "[t]o determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their
issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency
substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum." Nothing herein
persuades us to hold otherwise.

The only issue for our resolution now is whether or not the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable
doubt all the elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22.

There are two (2) ways of violating B.P. Blg. 22: (1) by making or drawing and issuing a check to apply on account
or for value knowing at the time of issue that the check is not sufficiently funded; and (2) by having sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issue but failing to keep sufficient funds therein or credit with said bank
to cover the full amount of the check when presented to the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days.17

The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 under the first situation, pertinent to the present case, are:18

"(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
 (3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment."

Petitioner contends that the first element does not exist because the checks were not issued to apply for account or
for value. He attempts to distinguish his situation from the usual "cut-and-dried" B.P. 22 case by claiming that the
checks were issued as guarantee and the obligations they were supposed to guarantee were already paid. This
flawed argument has no factual basis, the RTC and CA having both ruled that the checks were in payment for
unremitted collections, and not as guarantee. Likewise, the argument has no legal basis, for what B.P. Blg. 22
punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms
and conditions relating to its issuance.19

As to the second element, B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima
facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present.20 Thus, the maker’s knowledge is presumed
from the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds.21

Petitioner avers that since the complainant deposited the checks on June 5, 1986, or 157 days after the December
30, 1985 maturity date, the presumption of knowledge of lack of funds under Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 should not
apply to him. He further claims that he should not be expected to keep his bank account active and funded beyond
the ninety-day period.

Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:

Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of
which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented
within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon,
or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a
state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where
payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check." To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application,
the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the
amount of the check.22

Contrary to petitioner’s assertions, nowhere in said provision does the law require a maker to maintain funds in his
bank account for only 90 days. Rather, the clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds under the following conditions (1) presentment within 90 days from date of
the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make arrangements for payment in full
within 5 banking days after notice thereof. That the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of
the conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of the
offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a
reasonable time thereof. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be presented for
payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent
of the loss caused by the delay." By current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6)
months,23 or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after the date of the check. Hence
said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost, but
such knowledge could still be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court, private
respondent did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner that he would issue new checks.
Upon his failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit the said checks. After the checks were dishonored,
petitioner was duly notified of such fact but failed to make arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days
thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or
credit with the drawee bank at the time of issuance of the checks. And despite petitioner’s insistent plea of
innocence, we find no error in the respondent court’s affirmance of his conviction by the trial court for violations of
the Bouncing Checks Law.
However, pursuant to the policy guidelines in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, which took effect on November
21, 2000, the penalty imposed on petitioner should now be modified to a fine of not less than but not more than
double the amount of the checks that were dishonored.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Petitioner Luis S. Wong is found liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 but the penalty imposed on him is hereby MODIFIED so that the sentence of imprisonment is deleted. Petitioner
is ORDERED to pay a FINE of (1) P6,750.00, equivalent to double the amount of the check involved in Criminal
Case No. CBU-12057, (2) P12,820.00, equivalent to double the amount of the check involved in Criminal Case No.
CBU-12058, and (3) P11,000.00, equivalent to double the amount of the check involved in Criminal Case No. CBU-
12055, with subsidiary imprisonment24 in case of insolvency to pay the aforesaid fines. Finally, as civil indemnity,
petitioner is also ordered to pay to LPI the face value of said checks totaling P18,025.00 with legal interest thereon
from the time of filing the criminal charges in court, as well as to pay the costs.
1âwphi1.nêt
62.) G.R. No. 150618               July 24, 2003

EVANGELINE CABRERA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LUIS GO, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision dated January 25, 2001, and the October 9, 2001 Resolution of the Court
1 

of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17715 affirming the Decision dated January 17, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court
2 

(RTC) of Davao City, Branch 17, which found the petitioner Evangeline Cabrera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks
Law.

On August 2, 1993, three Informations were filed charging Evangeline Cabrera with violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the
accusatory portion of which respectively reads as follows:

That sometime in April 1992 in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, knowing fully well that she had no sufficient funds in the drawee bank, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously issued and/or made out a Prudential Bank Check No. 665332 in the amount of P50,907.70
postdated July 11, 1992 in favor of Luis Go, in payment of an obligation; but when said check was presented to the
drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason '‘Account Closed'’ and despite notice of
dishonor and demands made upon said accused to make good the check, the same refused and failed to make
payment, to the damage and prejudice of the herein complainant in the aforesaid amount of P50,907.70.

Contrary to law. 3

---

That sometime in April 1992 in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, knowing fully well that she had no sufficient funds in the drawee bank, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously issued and/or made out a Prudential Bank Check No. 658049 in the amount of P72,311.75
postdated June 12, 1992 in favor of Luis Go, in payment of an obligation; but when said check was presented to the
drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason '‘Account Closed'’ and despite notice of
dishonor and demands made upon said accused to make good the check, the same refused and failed to make
payment, to the damage and prejudice of the herein complainant in the aforesaid amount of P72, 311.75.

Contrary to law. 4

---

That sometime in April 1992 in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, knowing fully well that she had no sufficient funds in the drawee bank, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously issued and/or made out a Prudential Bank Check No. 658034 in the amount of P67,956.00
postdated May 2, 1992 in favor of Luis Go, in payment of an obligation; but when said check was presented to the
drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason '‘Account Closed'’ and despite notice of
dishonor and demands made upon said accused to make good the check, the same refused and failed to make
payment, to the damage and prejudice of the herein complainant in the aforesaid amount of P67,956.00.

Contrary to law. 5

The accused, now the petitioner in this case, was duly arraigned, assisted by counsel de oficio and entered a plea
of not guilty to all the charges. Joint trial thereafter ensued.
The Case for the Prosecution

Luis Go was the sole proprietor of the Davao Mindanao Pioneer Hardware & Company (DMPH Co.), located at No.
63 Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard, Davao City. One of his customers was Boni Co, a travelling salesman. The two
had agreed that Go would sell lumber materials and merchandise to Co on a thirty to forty-day credit basis. Go,
however, required Co to issue postdated checks in payment for his purchases. Since Co had no checking account
with any bank, he offered to pay for his purchases with postdated checks drawn and issued by the petitioner. Co
assured Go that he and the petitioner had a business arrangement. Go made inquiries at the bank and was told that
the petitioner handled her checks well. Since Go also believed that Co was a good businessman, he finally agreed
to accept the postdated checks issued by the petitioner. Go and Co also agreed that on the due date of the checks,
Co would either pay the amount thereof in cash by way of replacement for the same, or Go would negotiate, or
deposit the checks in his account and/or the account of DMPH Co.

Co purchased merchandise from Go and delivered postdated checks drawn against the petitioner’s checking
account with the Davao City Branch of Prudential Bank, bearing the following particulars:

Check Number Amount Date

658034 P67,956.00 May 02, 1992

658049 P72,311.75 June 12, 1992

665332 P50,907.70 July 12, 1992

When Co failed to pay for his purchases, Go deposited the three postdated checks in his account with the Far East
Bank & Trust Company (FEBTC) on August 3, 1992. As of July 31, 1999, the petitioner had ₱700.00 in her account.
When the checks were deposited, the petitioner’s account with the bank had a balance of only ₱100.04. The bank
had closed the petitioner’s account on August 4, 1992 after applying the said amount to the payment of bank
charges. The drawee bank thus dishonored the petitioner’s postdated checks, and duly stamped "Account Closed"
on the front and dorsal portions of each check. The drawee bank returned the checks to the FEBTC with the
corresponding check return slips. Nevertheless, Go continued selling merchandise to Co, who likewise continued to
draw and issue postdated checks; this time drawn against his personal account. Go accepted Co’s personal checks,
hoping that he would eventually be paid. Co’s personal checks were all dishonored by the drawee bank.

Go notified the petitioner that her three checks were dishonored by the drawee bank. She saw Go in his office and
confirmed that she and Co had a business arrangement. She asked Go to give Co more time to redeem the
postdated checks with cash. Go agreed. However, Co again failed to redeem the checks. The petitioner likewise
failed to pay the amounts of the checks despite Go’s repeated demands.

The Petitioner’s Evidence

Boni Co testified that he was engaged in the business of buying and selling merchandise from DMPH Co. Go had
agreed that Co would pay for his purchases on a thirty to forty-day credit basis to be guaranteed by postdated
checks. Since Co had no checking account, Go agreed to accept blank checks drawn against the petitioner’s
checking account with the Prudential Bank. Go also agreed to the arrangement that Co would pay for his purchases
after the merchandise was sold and the latter had collected from his customers. Co had paid Go the amount of
₱120,000.00 for his purchases, but Go did not issue any receipt therefor because of mutual trust and confidence.
Go, however, failed to return the three postdated checks issued by the petitioner.

The petitioner admitted that she was the drawer of the three postdated checks, but averred that she did not
receive any valuable consideration when she issued the same. She merely affixed her signature on the said
checks without filling up the names of the payees, the amounts and the corresponding dates therefor. She and Co
had agreed that the checks would not be encashed or deposited, but would merely serve as guarantee for the
payment of the stocks purchased by Co. Evidently, the petitioner acted in good faith when she issued the checks
and delivered them to Co, and as such should not be held guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22.
The petitioner also admitted that she spoke to Go but denied having received any notice of dishonor, or any demand
letter from the latter or from the DMPH Co., informing her of the dishonor of the checks and demanding payment of
the amounts thereof. She only learned that the checks were dishonored when she received a subpoena pertaining
to the same.6

On January 17, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution more than sufficient, to prove beyond reasonable doubt, the
guilt of accused, Evangeline Cabrera, for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, pursuant to Section 1 of BP Blg. 22,
accused EVANGELINE CABRERA, is sentenced to pay a FINE of ₱50,907.70, in favor of the government under
Crim. Case 30,806-93; under Crim. Case 30,807-93 a FINE of ₱72,311.75; and under Crim. Case 30,808-93, to pay
a FINE of ₱67,956.00 in favor of the government, with costs.

Moreover, pursuant to Art. 100 in relation to Art. 104 of the Revised Penal Code, governing civil indemnity, accused
is furthermore ordered, to pay the amount of:

In Criminal Case 30,806-93, the amount of ₱50,907.70;

In Criminal Case 30,807-93, the amount of ₱72,311.75; and

In Criminal Case 30,808-93, the amount of ₱67.956.00, in favor of Luis Go, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 39, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 5455, approved on April 21, 1969. 7

The trial court ruled that the evidence on record showed that the petitioner voluntarily issued the checks in question.
Notwithstanding her claim that the said checks were issued merely to accommodate Co and to guarantee the latter’s
obligations, she is guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 which prohibits and penalizes the mere issuance of a bouncing
check. The trial court did not rule on the petitioner’s claim that she did not receive any notice of dishonor from the
drawee bank or from the private complainant, or any letter of demand notifying her of such dishonor and demanding
payment of the amounts of the checks.

Aggrieved, the petitioner interposed an appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA). Therein, she asserted that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS A VALID ISSUANCE OF THE CHECKS IN
QUESTION;

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE THAT THE CHECKS IN QUESTION
WERE NOT ISSUED FOR A VALID CONSIDERATION IN SO FAR AS THE ACCUSED IS CONCERNED;

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD NOT
ESTABLISHED THE ELEMENT OF FRAUD OR DECEIT;

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED LIABLE TO PAY A FINE EQUIVALENT TO THE
AMOUNT OF THE CHECKS IN QUESTION; AND

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED LIABLE TO PAY THE COMPLAINANT THE
TOTAL SUM OF P191,175.45 NOTWITHSTANDING THE EVIDENCE THAT SHE DID NOT RECEIVE ANY
MERCHANDISE. 8

The petitioner argued in her brief that the prosecution failed to prove that she received any notice of dishonor of the
subject checks:

In fact under the law, a drawer of a check is entitled to a notice of dishonor and only if said drawer fails to make
good the same within five (5) banking days from receipt of said notice that bad faith or fraud is prima facie presumed
to exist.
In the case at bar, no such notice of dishonor was afforded the accused. Hence, for lack of bad faith or fraudulent
intent, the accused may not be convicted of the offense charged.

Moreover, the accused may not be said to have knowledge[d] that she has no funds in the bank at the time of
issuance because when subject checks were borrowed from her, the obligation of Boni Co and its maturity was not
yet fixed.
9

On January 25, 2001, the CA rendered a decision affirming the decision of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing consideration, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Without pronouncement as to costs. 10

The CA ruled that the petitioner voluntarily and validly issued the blank checks. Thus, the presumption is that the
checks were issued for valuable consideration, notwithstanding the claim that they were issued merely as a form of
deposit or guaranty.

The CA stressed that the failure of the prosecution to prove that the petitioner was motivated by fraud or deceit in
issuing the said checks was of no moment since fraud is not an element of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The CA
emphasized that the act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum; hence, fraud is not an essential element
of the crime. However, the CA failed to resolve the petitioner’s plea of acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove
that she received any notices of dishonor of the subject checks from the private respondent or from the drawee
bank.

Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, but the CA resolved on October 9, 2001
to deny the same. 11

In the petition at bar, the petitioner ascribes several errors to the CA. However, this Court believes that the threshold
issue to be resolved is whether or not the petitioner is liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, on her plea that:

In fact under the law, a drawer of a check is entitled to a notice of dishonor and only if said drawer fails to make
good the same within five (5) banking days from receipt of said notice that bad faith or fraud is prima facie presumed
to exist.

In the case at bar, no such notice of dishonor was afforded the accused. Hence, for lack of bad faith or fraudulent
intent, the accused may not be convicted of the offense charged.

Moreover, the accused may not be said to have knowledge that she has no funds in the bank at the time of
issuance because when subject checks were borrowed from her, the obligation of Boni Co and its maturity was not
fixed.

Under the foregoing facts and circumstances, it is unjust for the accused to be fined the total sum of P191,175.45 as
a penalty for alleged violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. 12

The petition is impressed with merit.

Section 1 of B.P. Blg. No. 22 provides that:

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds.—Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on
account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of
the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at
the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the
full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which
reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check
in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

The law enumerates the elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 as follows: (1) the drawing,
making and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or
issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment. The barefaced fact that the petitioner was the signatory to the checks that were
subsequently dishonored merely gave rise to a prima facie presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of funds;
it did not render her automatically liable for violating B.P. Blg. 22. The prosecution is burdened to prove all the
elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.  13

To prove the first and third elements of the crime, Section 3 of the law provides that the introduction in evidence of
the unpaid or dishonored check, having the drawee’s refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto,
with the reason therefor as aforesaid shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuing of the said checks and
the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly
dishonored for the reason written, stamped or attached thereto by the drawee on such dishonored checks. It is14 

difficult for the prosecution to prove the second element because knowledge involves a state of mind. Hence,
15 

Section 2 of the law provides that:

SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.—The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of
which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within
ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of
funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee. 16

In order to create the prima facie presumption, that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be shown
that he or she received a notice of dishonor and within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of
the check or shall arrange for its payment. The prosecution is burdened to prove the acts that gave rise to the prima
17 

facie presumption. On the other hand, the drawer has the right to adduce evidence to rebut the same. It is important
to stress that this presumption is not conclusive, or one that forecloses or precludes the presentation of evidence to
the contrary. Thus, the drawer of the check can still overturn the prima facie presumption by proving that the holder
18 

thereof was paid the amount due thereon, or that arrangements were made for payment in full by the drawee of the
check within five banking days after receipt of notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee bank.

In Lao vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the full payment of the amount of the check within five banking
19 

days from receipt of notice of dishonor is a complete defense. Hence, the absence of a notice of dishonor
necessarily deprives the drawer of the check the opportunity to preclude criminal prosecution:

It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator "a compromise by allowing him to
perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated."
This was also compared to "certain laws allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of time to surrender
the illegally possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring any criminal liability." In this light, the full
payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a "complete
defense." The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually
served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand—and the basic postulates of fairness require—that the notice
of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg.
22.20
In Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a mere oral notice or demand to pay is insufficient
21 

compliance with the requirements of the law:

Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor is fatal. The Court agrees.

While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction,
however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank,
`such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a mere oral notice or demand to pay
would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of
the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a
check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor.
The consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused.

Evidently, the appellate court did not give weight and credence to the assertion that a demand letter was sent by a
counsel of the complainant because of the failure of the prosecution to formally offer it in evidence. Courts are
bound to consider as part of the evidence only those which are formally offered for judges must base their findings
strictly on the evidence submitted by the parties at the trial. Without the written notice of dishonor, there can be no
basis, considering what has heretofore been said, for establishing the presence of "actual knowledge of insufficiency
of funds."
22

It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check.  It must
1âwphi1

also show that the drawer of the check received the said notice because the fact of service provided for in the law is
reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check.

As adverted to earlier, it is necessary in cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, that the prosecution prove
that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor. It is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue, the
person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service. (58 Am. Jur. 2d, Notice §45). The burden
of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. Now, ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Hence, for Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice. Moreover, it is a general
rule that, when service of a notice is sought to be made by mail, it should appear that the conditions on which the
validity of such service depends had existence, otherwise the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact of service
(C.J.S., Notice, § 18). In the instant case, the prosecution did not present proof that the demand letter was sent
through registered mail, relying as it did only on the registry return receipt. In civil cases, service made through
registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by the mailing office and an affidavit of the person mailing of
facts showing compliance with Section 7 of Rule 13 (See Section 13, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). If, in
addition to the registry receipt, it is required in civil cases that an affidavit of mailing as proof of service be
presented, then with more reason should we hold in criminal cases that a registry receipt alone is insufficient as
proof of mailing. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to present the testimony, or at least the affidavit, of the
person mailing that, indeed, the demand letter was sent. 23

In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce in evidence any notice of dishonor of the three postdated checks or
any letter of demand sent to and received by the petitioner. The bare testimony of Luis Go that he sent letters of
demand to the petitioner notifying her of the dishonor of her checks is utterly insufficient.

For failure of the prosecution to show that notices of dishonor of the three postdated checks were served on the
petitioner, or at the very least, that she was sent a demand letter notifying her of the said dishonor, the prima facie
presumption under Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 that she knew of the insufficiency of funds cannot arise. Thus, there
can be no basis for establishing the presence of "actual knowledge of insufficiency of funds."

In light of such failure, we find and so declare that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Hence, the need to reverse and set aside the decisions of both the Court of
Appeals and the trial court convicting the petitioner of the crime of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

However, we uphold the decision of the CA affirming the trial court’s decision ordering the petitioner to pay to the
private respondent the total face value of the checks in the amount of ₱209,175.45. We stress that a check is an
evidence of debt against the drawer, and although may not be intended to be presented, has the same effect as an
ordinary check, and if passed upon to a third person, will be valid in his hands like any other check. Hence, the
24 

petitioner is obliged to pay to the private respondent Luis Go the said amount of ₱209,175.45 with 12% legal
interest per annum, from the filing of the information until the finality of this decision, the sum of which, inclusive of
interest, shall be subject thereafter to 12% per annum interest until the amount due is fully paid, conformably to our
ruling that when an obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e. a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. In the absence of
such stipulation, the rate shall be 12% per annum computed from default, i.e. judicial or extrajudicial demand. In 25 

this case, the rate of interest was not stipulated in writing by the petitioner, the private respondent and Boni Co.
Thus, the applicable interest rate is 12% per annum.

WHEREFORE, the assailed January 25, 2001 Decision and October 9, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
C.A-G.R. CR No. 17715 affirming the January 17, 1993 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch
17, in Criminal Cases Nos. 30,806-93, 30,807-93 and 30,808-93 convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Cabrera is ACQUITTED of violations of B.P. Blg. 22
on the ground that her guilt for the said crimes has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner is
hereby directed to pay to the private respondent the total amount of ₱209,175.45 at 12% interest per annum from
the filing of the Informations until the finality of this Decision, the sum of which, inclusive of the interest, shall be
subject thereafter to 12% per annum interest until the amount due is fully paid. Costs de oficio.
63.) G.R. No. 138669           June 6, 2002

STEVE TAN and MARCIANO TAN, petitioners,

vs.
FABIAN MENDEZ, JR., respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision1 dated January 22, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals, Thirteenth Division, in CA-G.R. CR. No. 20030, which affirmed the decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Iriga City, Branch 37, convicting petitioners of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of six months imprisonment and to indemnify
private complainant the sum of P58,237.75 with legal interest from date of judicial demand. Also assailed in this
petition is the Court of Appeals’ resolution3 dated May 13, 1999 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts, as culled from records, are as follows:

Petitioners Steve Tan and Marciano Tan are the owners of Master Tours and Travel Corporation and operators of
Philippine Lawin Bus Co., Inc., while respondent Fabian Mendez, Jr. is the owner of three gasoline stations in Iriga
City, Ligao, Albay, and Sipocot, Camarines Sur. Petitioners opened a credit line for their buses’ lubricants and fuel
consumption with respondent. At the same time, the latter was also designated by petitioners as the booking and
ticketing agent of Philippine Lawin Bus Co. in Iriga City.

Under such arrangement, petitioners’ drivers purchased on credit fuel and various oil products for its buses through
withdrawal slips issued by petitioners, with periodic payments to respondent through the issuance of checks. On the
other hand, respondent remitted the proceeds of ticket sales to petitioners also through the issuance of checks. Sent
together with respondent’s remittance are the remittances of the ticket sales in the Baao Booking office, which is
managed separately and independently by another agent, Elias Bacsain.

Accordingly, petitioners issued several checks to respondent as payment for oil and fuel products. One of these is
FEBTC check no. 704227 dated June 4, 1991 in the amount of P58,237.75, as payment for gasoline and oil
products procured during the period May 2 to 15, 1991. Said check was dishonored by the bank upon presentment
for payment for being drawn against insufficient funds.

Respondent sent a demand letter dated June 21, 1991 to petitioners demanding that they make good the check or
pay the amount thereof, to no avail. Hence, an information for violation of B.P. 22 was filed against petitioners, upon
the complaint of respondent, before the RTC of Iriga City, Branch 37, as follows:

That on or about the 4th day of June 1991, in Iriga City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused having purchased from Shellhouse Iriga, Iriga City, owned and
managed by Atty. Fabian O. Mendez, Jr., fuel and other oil products in the amount of FIFTY EIGHT
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN and 75/100 (P58,237.75) PESOS, Philippine currency, and
that in payment thereof, the said accused knowing fully well that they had no sufficient funds or credit with
the drawee bank, conspiring and confederating with each other, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, issue and make out Far East Bank and Trust Company-Binondo Check No. 704227, payable to
the order of Shell house Iriga, dated June 4, 1991 in the amount of P58,237.75, and delivered to herein
private complainant Atty. Fabian O. Mendez, Jr., in Iriga City and upon its presentment for payment to the
drawee bank, the same was dishonored and refused payment for the reason "Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds" and despite repeated demands, accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to make the
necessary deposit with said bank sufficient money to cover the said check or to pay the said Atty. Fabian O.
Mendez, Jr., the value of the check in the amount of P58,237.75, to the latter’s damage and prejudice in the
aforesaid amount, plus other form of damages as may be proven in court. 1âwphi1.nêt

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Petitioners pleaded not guilty during arraignment and trial ensued.

At the trial, the prosecution presented FABIAN MENDEZ, JR., the private complainant, and MULRY MENDEZ. They
testified that FEBTC check no. 704227 and other checks in the amount of P235,387.33 were dishonored upon
presentment for payment to the bank and that they called petitioners’ attention regarding the matter. They sent a
demand letter to petitioners asking them to make good the check or pay the value thereof, but petitioners did not
heed the request. Instead, petitioners told respondent Fabian to wait a while. After respondent initiated this case,
petitioners attempted to settle the same along with other cases pending in other courts in Iriga City. They asked for
more time to settle their obligations because they were still waiting for a tax credit certificate in the amount
of P517,998 to be issued by the Ministry of Finance, that they would use to settle the cases.5

On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner MARCIANO TAN and ISIDRO TAN as witnesses. In his
testimony, Marciano averred that he cannot be held liable for violation of B.P. 22 because the amount subject of the
check had already been extinguished by offset or compensation against the collection from ticket sales from the
booking offices. He presented a memorandum6 dated June 10, 1991 showing the return to respondent of various
unencashed checks in the total amount of P66,839.25 representing remittance of ticket sales in the Iriga and Baao
offices that were earlier sent by respondent. After the alleged offset, there remains a balance of P226,785.83.7 The
memorandum8 states:

June 10, 1991

To Atty. Fabian Mendez:

We just would like to inform your good office that we are sending you back the following checks to be offset
to our gasoline account:

 
Returned check June 07 P 58,237.75
Of PLBC for gasoline 235,387.33 293,625.08

Your check:
Sales Iriga      May 29-31
                         June 1-5 P 17,373.00
         Baao      June 3-4 28,057.55
                         May 28-June 5,375.00
2    16,033.70  66,839.25

Balance to be paid for  

schedule  P 226,785.83

ESTEBAN TAN

On cross-examination, Marciano admitted to have drawn the subject check to pay private respondent’s gasoline
station and that it was not covered by sufficient funds at the time of its issuance due to uncollected
receivables.9 Upon query by the court, he claimed that he did not talk to private complainant and could not tell if the
latter agreed to offset the checks with the remittances.10

ISIDRO TAN, petitioners’ brother, corroborated Marciano’s claim of offset. He also admitted speaking with Mulry
Mendez regarding the proposed settlement of the case which, however, was not accepted by respondent.11

On rebuttal, respondent disputed petitioners’ claim of payment through offset or compensation. He claimed that the
amount of the four unencashed checks totaling P66,839.25 could not have offset the amount of the dishonored
checks since petitioners’ total obligations at that time had already reached P906,000.12 Moreover, even if
compensation took place, it should have been applied to an alleged earlier obligation of P235,387.33. Respondent
also claimed that compensation did not take place as there was no application of payment made by the petitioners
in their memorandum dated June 10,1991.13
After trial, the trial court convicted petitioners for violation of B.P. 22. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds both accused, as drawers of the check in question, guilty of the violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, as principals thereof, without attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
and hereby sentences both accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Six (6) Months, to indemnify the
private complainant jointly and severally, the sum of P58,237.75 with legal interest from date of judicial
demand, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.14

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioners, thus:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision being in conformity with law and the evidence, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.15

Hence, this petition. Petitioners raise the following errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT OF
PAYMENT BY OFFSETTING PRIOR TO THE DEMAND LETTER SENT BY RESPONDENT DESPITE THE
ABUNDANCE OF EVIDENCE PROVING THE SAME.

II

SINCE THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FOUND OFFSETTING CONTENTIOUS IT SHOULD

HAVE ACQUITTED PETITIONERS ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ASSUMING THAT THERE
WAS OFFSETTING THE PETITIONERS ARE NONETHELESS GUILTY BECAUSE PAYMENT DOES NOT
ABATE THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF B.P. 22.

Briefly, the following are the issues for our resolution:

1. Whether or not petitioners can be held liable for violation of B.P. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law; and

2. Whether or not payment through compensation or offset can preclude prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.

The law enumerates the elements of B.P. Blg. 22 to be (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply
for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3)
the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.16

We find all the foregoing elements present in this case. Petitioner Marciano admitted that he drew the subject check
as payment for the fuel and oil products of respondents. He knew at that time that there were no sufficient funds to
cover the check because he had uncollected receivables.17 The check was thus dishonored upon presentment to the
bank for payment.

The law has made the mere act of issuing a bum check a malum prohibitum,18 an act proscribed by legislature for
being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare.19 The gravamen of the offense under this law is the act of
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. Thus, even if there had
been payment, through compensation or some other means, there could still be prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.
We find that no reversible error was committed by the courts a quo in finding petitioners guilty of violation of B.P. 22.

In their defense, petitioners principally rely on the principle of compensation or offset under the civil law to avoid
criminal prosecution. Essentially, they argue that they could not be held liable for violation of B.P. 22 because the
amount covered by the subject check had already been paid by compensation or offset through other checks issued
by respondent as remittances of ticket sales for petitioners’ bus company.

It bears stressing that the issue of whether or not the obligations covered by the subject check had been paid by
compensation or offset is a factual issue that requires evaluation and assessment of certain facts. This is not proper
in a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court. We have repeatedly held that this Court is not a trier of
facts.20 The jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is confined to the review of
errors of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals, whose findings of fact are conclusive absent any showing that such
findings are entirely devoid of any substantiation on record.21

On this aspect, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court that the alleged compensation is not
supported by clear and positive evidence. The trial court noted that the total amount of the two checks issued by
petitioners is P293,625.08 while the total amount of the returned checks amounted to only P66,939.75. No
application of payment was made as to which check was to be paid. These factual findings should be accorded
respect and finality as the trial court is in the best position to assess and evaluate questions of fact. These findings
will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts or
circumstances that would substantially affect the disposition of the case.22

As found by the trial court, petitioners’ defense of compensation is unavailing because petitioners did not clearly
specify in the memorandum dated June 10, 1991 which dishonored check is being offset. Applying Article 128923 in
relation to Article 125424 of the Civil Code, the unencashed checks amounting to P66,839.25 should have been
applied to the earlier dishonored check amounting to P235,387.33 which is more onerous than the subject check
amounting to only P58,237.75.

We also note that no compensation can take place between petitioners and respondent as respondent is not a
debtor of petitioners insofar as the two checks representing collections from the Baao ticket sales are
concerned.25 Article 1278 of the Civil Code26 requires, as a prerequisite for compensation, that the parties be
mutually and principally bound as creditors and debtors.27 If they were not mutually creditors and debtors of each
other, the law on compensation would not apply.28 In this case, the memorandum shows that some unencashed
checks returned to respondent to allegedly offset the dishonored check were from the Baao ticket sales which are
separate from the ticket sales of respondent. Respondent only acted as an intermediary in remitting the Baao ticket
sales and, thus, is not a debtor of petitioners.
1âwphi1.nêt

Interestingly, petitioners never alleged compensation when they received the demand letter, during the preliminary
investigation, or before trial by filing a motion to dismiss. Moreover, if indeed there was payment by compensation,
petitioners should have redeemed or taken the checks back in the ordinary course of business.29 There is no
evidence on record that they did so.

Finally, while we sustain the conviction of petitioners, we deem it appropriate to modify the penalties imposed. We
delete the penalty of imprisonment and in lieu thereof, we impose upon petitioners a fine amounting to double the
value of the subject check, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency or non-payment.

Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, established
a rule of preference in imposing penalties in B.P. 22 cases. Section 1 of B.P. 22 imposes the following alternative
penalties for its violation, to wit: (a) imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than one year; or (b) a fine
of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000; or
(c) both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The rationale of Adm. Circular No. 12-2000 is found in our rulings in Eduardo Vaca vs. Court of Appeals30 and Rosa
Lim vs. People of the Philippines.31 We held in those cases that it would best serve the ends of criminal justice if, in
fixing the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is observed, i.e. that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order.
To be sure, it is not our intention to decriminalize violation of B.P. 22. Neither is it our intention to delete the
alternative penalty of imprisonment. The propriety and wisdom of decriminalizing violation of B.P. 22 is best left to
the legislature and not this Court. As clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001, the clear tenor and intention of
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule
of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. 22. Where the circumstances of the case, for
instance, clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine
alone may be considered as the more appropriate penalty. This rule of preference does not foreclose the possibility
of imprisonment for violators of B.P. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law. Needless to say,
the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the judge.
Should the judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
ought not to be deemed a hindrance.32

We are not unaware of the importance of checks in commercial transactions. In commercial parlance, they have
been widely and fittingly known as the substitute of money and have effectively facilitated the smooth flow of
commercial transactions. Thus, the pernicious effects and repercussions of circulating worthless checks are simply
unimaginable. It is for this reason that B.P. 22 was enacted by the legislature, to penalize individuals who would
place worthless checks in circulation and degrade the value and importance of checks in commercial transactions.

Nevertheless, while we recognize the noble objective of B.P.22, we deem it proper to apply the philosophy
underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in imposing penalties for its violation. The gist of Administrative Circular
No. 12-2000 is to consider the underlying circumstances of the case such that if the situation calls for the imposition
of the alternative penalty of fine rather than imprisonment, the courts should not hesitate to do so.

In this case, we note that petitioners had exerted efforts to settle their obligations. The fact of returning the
unencashed checks to respondent indicates good faith on the part of petitioners. Absent any showing that
petitioners acted in bad faith, the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment in this case is proper.33

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20030,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioners are ordered to indemnify respondent in the amount of P58,237.75
with legal interest from date of judicial demand. The sentence of imprisonment of six months is SET ASIDE and in
lieu thereof, a FINE in the amount of P116,475.5034 is imposed upon petitioners, with subsidiary imprisonment not to
exceed six months in case of insolvency or non-payment.35
63B.) G.R. No. 175381             February 26, 2008

JAMES SVENDSEN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Assailed via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Court of Appeals Decision1 of November 16, 2006 denying
petitioner’s appeal from the December 22, 2005 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 14
which affirmed the December 17, 2003 Judgment3 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 5,
finding James Svendsen (petitioner) guilty of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. Blg.) 22 or the Bouncing
Checks Law.

In October 1997, Cristina Reyes (Cristina) extended a loan to petitioner in the amount of P200,000, to bear interest
at 10% a month. After petitioner had partially paid his obligation, he failed to settle the balance thereof which had
reached P380,000 inclusive of interest.4

Cristina thus filed a collection suit against petitioner, which was eventually settled when petitioner paid
her P200,0005 and issued in her favor an International Exchange Bank check postdated February 2, 1999 (the
check) in the amount of P160,000 representing interest.6 The check was co-signed by one Wilhelm Bolton.

When the check was presented for payment on February 9, 1999, it was dishonored for having been Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds (DAIF).7

Cristina, through counsel, thus sent a letter to petitioner by registered mail informing him that the check was
dishonored by the drawee bank, and demanding that he make it good within five (5) days from receipt thereof.8

No settlement having been made by petitioner, Cristina filed a complaint dated March 1, 1999 against him and his
co-signatory to the check, Bolton, for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila. No
counter-affidavit was submitted by petitioner and his co-respondent. An Information dated April 13, 1999 for violation
of B.P. Blg. No. 22 was thus filed on April 29, 1999 before the MeTC of Manila against the two, the accusatory
portion of which reads:

That sometime in December 1998 the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
and jointly make or draw and issue to CRISTINA C. REYES to apply on account or for value
INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK check no. 0000009118 dated February 2, 1999 payable to CRISTINA
REYES in the amount of P160,000.00 said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did
not have sufficient funds and/or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check after having been deposited in the City of Manila, Philippines, and upon being
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused
failed to pay said CRISTINA C. REYES the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of
the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.9

Bolton having remained at large, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person.10

By Judgment of December 17, 2003, Branch 5 of the Manila MeTC found petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as
follows:
 WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused James Robert Svendson [sic] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) and imposes upon him to pay a fine of ONE
HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P160,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Accused is also made liable to pay private complainant Cristina C. Reyes civil indemnity in the total amount
of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P160,000.00) representing his civil obligation covered by
subject check.

Meantime, considering that other accused Wilhelm Bolton remains at large, let a warrant of arrest against
him ISSUE. Pending his apprehension, let the case against him be sent to the ARCHIVES. (Emphasis in the
original; underscoring supplied)

As priorly stated, the RTC affirmed the MeTC judgment and the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s appeal.

Hence, the present petition for review.

Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in finding that the first element of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 – the
making, drawing, and issuance of any check "to apply on account or for value" – was present, as the obligation to
pay interest is void, the same not being in writing and the 10% monthly interest is unconscionable; in holding him
civilly liable in the amount of P160,000 to private complainant, notwithstanding the invalidity of the interest
stipulation; and in violating his right to due process when it convicted him, notwithstanding the absence of proof of
receipt by him of a written notice of dishonor.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law reads:

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by
fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed
Two Hundred Thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a
credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date
appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. Where the check is drawn by a
corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such
drawer shall be liable under this Act.

For petitioner to be validly convicted of the crime under B.P. Blg. 22, the following requisites must thus concur: (1)
the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.11

Petitioner admits having issued the postdated check to Cristina. The check, however, was dishonored when
deposited for payment in Banco de Oro due to DAIF. Hence, the first and the third elements obtain in the case.

As for the second element, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides that

[t]he making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the
 check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker
or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid
by the drawee.

In Rico v. People of the Philippines,12 this Court held:

x x x [I]f x x x notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer of the bum
check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, then the presumption of
knowledge as provided in Section 2 of B.P. 22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of
reckoning the crucial five-day period.

x x x In recent cases, we had the occasion to emphasize that not only must there be a written notice of
dishonor or demand letters actually received by the drawer of a dishonored check, but there must also
be proof of receipt thereof that is properly authenticated, and not mere registered receipt and/or return
receipt.

Thus, as held in Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals, while Section 2 of B.P. 22 indeed does not state that the
notice of dishonor be in writing, this must be taken in conjunction with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where
there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in
the notice of dishonor or refusal". A mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for
conviction under the law. In our view, both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law require for the
act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but also that the
accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. This is consistent with the rule that penal
statues must be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. x x x

In fine, the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence and receipt by petitioner of the requisite written
notice of dishonor and that he was given at least five banking days within which to settle his account
constitutes sufficient ground for his acquittal.13 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The evidence for the prosecution failed to prove the second element. While the registry receipt,14 which is said to
cover the letter-notice of dishonor and of demand sent to petitioner, was presented, there is no proof that he or a
duly authorized agent received the same. Receipts for registered letters including return receipts do not themselves
prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters.15 Thus in Ting v. Court
of Appeals,16 this Court observed:

x x x All that we have on record is an illegible signature on the registry receipt as evidence that someone
received the letter. As to whether this signature is that of one of the petitioners or of their authorized agent
remains a mystery. From the registry receipt alone, it is possible that petitioners or their authorized agent did
receive the demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt.17

For failure then to prove all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, petitioner’s acquittal is in order.

Petitioner is civilly liable, however. For in a criminal case, the social injury is sought to be repaired through the
imposition of the corresponding penalty, whereas with respect to the personal injury of the victim, it is sought to be
compensated through indemnity, which is civil in nature.18

The decision of the MeTC, which was affirmed on appeal by the RTC and the appellate court, ordering petitioner "to
pay private complainant Cristina C. Reyes civil indemnity in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P160,000) representing his civil obligation covered by subject check," deserves circumspect
examination, however, given that the obligation of petitioner to pay 10% interest per month on the loan is
unconscionable and against public policy.

The P160,000 check petitioner issued to Cristina admittedly represented unpaid interest. By Cristina’s information,
the interest was computed at a fixed rate of 10% per month.19
While the Usury Law ceiling on interest rates was lifted by Central Bank Circular No. 905, nothing therein grants
lenders carte blanche to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a
hemorrhaging of their assets.20 Stipulations authorizing such interest are contra bonos mores, if not against the law.
They are, under Article 140921 of the New Civil Code, inexistent and void from the beginning.22

The interest rate of 10% per month agreed upon by the parties in this case being clearly excessive, iniquitous and
unconscionable cannot thus be sustained. In Macalalag v. People,23 Diño v. Jardines,24 and in Cuaton v. Salud,25 this
Court, finding the 10% per month interest rate to be unconscionable, reduced it to 12% per annum. And in other
cases26 where the interest rates stipulated were even less than that involved herein, the Court equitably reduced
them.

This Court deems it fair and reasonable then, consistent with existing jurisprudence, to adjust the civil indemnity
to P16,000, the equivalent of petitioner’s unpaid interest on the P200,000 loan at 12% percent per annum as of
February 2, 1999, the date of the check, plus 12% per annum interest to be computed from April 29, 1999, the date
of judicial demand (date of the filing of the Information) up to the finality of this judgment. After the judgment
becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the total amount due shall bear interest at 12% per
annum.27

Respecting petitioner’s claim that since the promissory note incorporating the stipulated 10% interest per month was
not presented, there is no written proof thereof, hence, his obligation to pay the same must be void, the same fails.
As reflected above, Cristina admitted such stipulation.

In any event, the presentation of the promissory note may be dispensed with in a prosecution for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 as the purpose for the issuance of such check is irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s criminal
liability. It is for the purpose of determining his civil liability that the document bears significance. Notably, however,
Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides that "Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to
have been issued for a valuable consideration, and every person whose signature appears thereon to have become
a party thereto for value." It was incumbent then on petitioner to prove that the check was not for a valuable
consideration. This he failed to discharge.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision of November 16, 2006 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Petitioner, James Svendsen, is acquitted of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

He is, however, ordered to pay private complainant, Cristina C. Reyes, the amount of SIXTEEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P16,000) representing civil indemnity, plus 12% interest per annum computed from April 29, 1999 up to the
finality of this judgment. After the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the total
amount due shall earn interest at 12% per annum.
63. BP 22.)
 64.) G.R. No. 234818, November 05, 2018

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FELIX AQUINO, ACCUSED-

APPELLANT, IRIS AQUINO (DECEASED), ELEANOR MACABBALUG (AT-LARGE), GENALYN
NASOL (AT-LARGE), ARTURO DELGADO, JR. (AT-LARGE), PEARL MILITAR (AT-LARGE) AND
CATHERINE ANNA DELA CRUZ (AT-LARGE), Accused.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Felix Aquino (Felix) assailing the
Decision2 dated July 28, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07078, which
affirmed the Joint Decision3 dated July 22, 2014, as partly revised by the Order4 dated August 8,
2014, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 04-1270, 04-
1271, 04-1273, 04-1274, 04-1275, 04-1276, 04-1277, 04-1278, 04-1279, 04-1280, 04-1281, 04-
1284, 04-1285, 04-1287, 04-1288, 04-1290, 04-1291, 04-1296, 04-1298, 04-1300, and 04-1301,
convicting him of twenty-one (21) counts of Syndicated Estafa defined and penalized under Article
315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1689.5

The Facts

The instant case stemmed from thirty-three (33) separate Informations6 filed before the RTC
each charging Felix and his co-accused, namely, Iris Z. Aquino (Iris), Eleanor Macabbalug, Genalyn
Nasol, Arturo Delgado, Jr., Pearl Militar, and Catherine Anna Dela Cruz of the aforesaid crime. The
accusatory portions of the said Informations, save for the case number, private complainants, dates,
and respective amounts, are similarly worded as follows:

That within the month of __________ in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another as a syndicate, did then and there, as Officers/Directors of Everflow Group of
Companies which operated on funds solicited from the public, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
induced _______ to give and/or deliver to said accused the amount of _________ as investment in
Everflow Group of Companies upon false pretenses and fraudulent acts executed by the accused prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud that said amount will earn 5% interest per
month, purposely for the accused to convert, misapply and misappropriate, as they did convert
misapply and misappropriate to their personal gain or benefit the amount received as investment, to
the damage and prejudice of ________ in the aforesaid amount of ________, which accused failed
and refused to return, as they continue to fail and refuse to return said amount despite demands for
them to do so.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

The prosecution alleged that spouses Felix and Iris are the owners of Everflow Group of Companies,
Inc. (Everflow), with the latter being its chairperson. Private complainants alleged that on various
dates between 2000 and 2002, they were convinced by Iris and Felix to invest their money in
Everflow, claiming that the money to be invested will earn seventy percent (70%) interest; that the
same will be doubled in more than a year; that the investment was in safe hands; and that it would
earn five percent (5%) interest per month. Convinced with the reassurances by Iris and Felix, they
invested a total of P5,161,211.28 and US$90,981.00. When complainants went back to Everflow to
get their investments, Felix promised the return of their money. After the closure of Everflow
because of the Cease and Desist Order issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission, they
demanded the return of their money, but to no avail. Thus, they were compelled to file multiple
charges of Syndicated Estafa against Felix, Iris, and their co-accused who are allegedly members of
the board of directors of Everflow.8

Of the seven (7) accused, only Felix and Iris were arrested and arraigned, while the others remained
at-large to this day.9 Further, on April 15, 2008, the RTC provisionally dismissed eleven (11)10 of the
thirty-three (33) counts of Syndicated Estafa with their consent, due to the failure to appear by the
respective private complainants before the court despite due notice.11

In their defense, Felix and Iris denied the accusations against them, claiming that they were mere
victims of a certain Rosario Baladjay who recommended that they put up Everflow as a conduit of
Multinational Telecom Investors Corporation (Multitel), which was controlled by a certain Rosario
Baladjay. They also alleged that the money invested in Everflow was also invested in
Multitel.12 Notably, the cases against Iris were dismissed due to her supervening death.13

The RTC Ruling

In a Joint Decision14 dated July 22, 2014, the RTC found Felix guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
sixteen (16) counts15 of the crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment for each count.16 It further ordered him to pay the total amount of P2,323,504.00
and US$4,983.00,17 with legal interest from the filing of the Informations until fully paid.18

The RTC found that Felix and his co-accused, who were in control of the operations of Everflow and
through their counselors, fraudulently induced private complainants to invest their money to
Everflow, despite knowing that they are prohibited from soliciting and accepting investments from
the general public. To even bolster their scheme, they even issued checks representing the
investment of private complainants plus interest, only for such checks to be dishonored upon
presentment for being drawn against closed accounts.19

However, in an Order20 dated August 8, 2014, the RTC modified the dispositive portion of its earlier
Joint Decision, convicting Felix of twenty-one (21) counts21 instead of sixteen (16) counts of
Syndicated Estafa, as indicated in the body of the said Joint Decision. Nonetheless, the RTC clarified
that while Felix was found criminally liable for twenty-one (21) counts of Syndicated Estafa, he can
only be held civilly liable to sixteen (16) private complainants in their respective cases, considering:
(a) that the witnesses who testified in the other five (5) counts were not necessarily the private
complainants therein who had personal knowledge of the commission of the offense; and (b) the
absence of private complainants in said five (5) counts and the absence of an authorization that they
are indeed claiming the civil aspect of their respective cases.22

Aggrieved, Felix appealed to the CA.23

The CA Ruling

In a Decision24 dated July 28, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto.25 It held that Felix and his
co-accused defrauded private complainants substantial amounts of money by misrepresenting and
falsely pretending to the latter that they will invest the money in legitimate businesses which will
earn them huge percentage of returns. However, such returns remained unrealized when the checks
purportedly representing the same were dishonored for being drawn against a closed account.
According to the CA, Felix and his co-accused's fraudulent intent was made even more apparent by
the fact that they solicited investments from the general public despite Everflow not being authorized
to do so.26

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Felix is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Syndicated Estafa.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is without merit.

Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC reads:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.

xxxx

The elements of Estafa as contemplated in this provision are the following: (a) that there must be a
false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation
was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the
offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to
part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.27

In relation thereto, Section 1 of PD 1689 states that Syndicated Estafa is committed as follows:

Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in
Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment
to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons
formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or
scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of money contributed by stockholders,
or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)" or farmers' association, or funds
solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.

xxxx

Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or Other Forms of Swindling, as

defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or Swindling is
committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)" or farmers' association, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.28

In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals that Felix and his co-accused repeatedly
induced the public to invest in Everflow on the undertaking that their investment would yield a huge
percentage of returns. Under such lucrative promise, the public – as represented by private
complainants – were enticed to invest their hard-earned money into Everflow. Initially, Everflow
would deliver on their promise, thus "hooking" the unwary investors into infusing more funds into
it. However, as the Everflow officers/directors, i.e., Felix and his co-accused, knew from the start
that Everflow had no clear trade by which it can pay the assured profits to its investors, they could
no longer comply with their guarantee and had to simply abscond with their investors' funds. It is
settled that "where one states that the future profits or income of an enterprise shall be a certain
sum, but he actually knows that there will be none, or that they will be substantially less than he
represents, the statements constitute an actionable fraud where the hearer believes him and relies
on the statement to his injury,"29 as in this case.

Lest it be misunderstood, not all proposals to invest in certain business ventures are tainted with
fraud. To be sure, an actionable fraud arises when the accused has knowledge that the venture
proposed would not reasonably yield the promised results, and yet, despite such knowledge,
deliberately continues with the misrepresentation. Business investments ordinarily carry risks; but for
as long as the incipient representations related thereto are legitimate and made in good faith, the
fact that the business eventually fails to succeed or skews from its intended targets does not mean
that there is fraud. As case law instructs, "the gravamen of the [crime of Estafa) is the employment
of fraud or deceit to the damage or prejudice of another.30 When fraud pertains to the means of
committing a crime or the classes of crimes under Chapter Three, Title Four, Book Two and Chapter
Three, Title Seven, Book Two of the RPC, criminal liability may arise; otherwise, if fraud merely
causes loss or injury to another, without being an element of a crime, then it may only be classified
as civil fraud from which an action for damages may arise.31

Far from being a legitimate business venture, the Court herein observes that Felix and his co-
accused's modus operandi is constitutive of criminal fraud as they used the same to commit a
crime. In fact, their modus operandi may be characterized as a kind of Ponzi scheme, which schemes
have gained notoriety in modern times. As generally defined, a Ponzi scheme is "a type of investment
fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by
new investors. Its organizers often solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities
claimed to generate high returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the perpetrators focus
on attracting new money to make promised payments to earlier-stage investors to create the false
appearance that investors are profiting from a legitimate business. It is not an investment strategy
but a gullibility scheme, which works only as long as there is an ever increasing number of new
investors joining the scheme. It is difficult to sustain the scheme over a long period of time because
the operator needs an ever larger pool of later investors to continue paying the promised profits to
early investors. The idea behind this type of swindle is that the 'con-man' collects his money from his
second or third round of investors and then absconds before anyone else shows up to collect.
Necessarily, Ponzi schemes only last weeks, or months at the most."32

In this light, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of Syndicated Estafa are present
in the instant case, as shown in the following circumstances: (a) the officers/directors of Everflow,
comprising of Felix and his co-accused who are more than five (5) people, made false pretenses and
representations to the investing public, i.e., private complainants, regarding a lucrative investment
opportunity with Everflow in order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and
representations were made prior to and simultaneous with the commission of fraud, which is made
more apparent by the fact that Everflow was not authorized by the Securities and Exchange
Commission to solicit investments from the public in the first place; (c) relying on the same, private
complainants invested various amounts of money into Everflow; and (d) Felix and his co-accused
failed to deliver their promised returns and ended up running away with private complainants'
investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice.

Thus, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by
the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding
facts and circumstances of the case. In fact, the trial court was in the best position to assess and
determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties, and hence, due deference
should be accorded to the same.33 As such, Felix's conviction for twenty-one (21) counts of
Syndicated Estafa must be upheld. Accordingly, he should suffer the penalty of life imprisonment for
each count of the aforesaid crime.
Finally, the Court deems it proper to adjust the actual damages awarded to private complainants in
order to reflect the amount defrauded from them, as indicated in the respective Informations. These
amounts shall earn legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the filing of
the Informations until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full
payment.34

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated July 28, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07078 finding accused-appellant Felix Aquino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of twenty-one (21) counts of Syndicated Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
for each count. He is further ordered to pay actual damages to the following private complainants in
the following amounts: (a) P150,000.00 to Elna E. Hidalgo; (b) P50,000.00 to Rosabella Espanol; (c)
US$562.00 to Reynold C. Español; (d) P15,000.00 to Virginia D. Casero; (e) P15,435.00 to Imelda
Dela Cruz; (f) P50,000.00 to Vennus C. Español; (g) P102,819.00 to Merlina C. Español; (h)
US$4,421.00 to Luz B. Unay; (i) P480,000.00 to Victor Flores; (j) P400,000.00 to Felix So Manota;
(k) P125,250.00 to Restituto C. Novero; (l) P320,000.00 to Melanie C. Navata; (m) P315,000.00 to
Michelle C. Navata; (n) P50,000.00 to Gil Nicanor; (o) P210,000.00 to Zosimo Malagday; and (p)
P40,000.00 to Elpidio Navata. All sums due shall each earn legal interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from the filing of the Informations until June 30, 2013, and six percent
(6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment.
65.) G.R. No. 205698

HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND (HDMF) PAG-IBIG FUND, Petitioner

vs.
CHRISTINA SAGUN, Respondent

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

We hereby consider and resolve the following consolidated appeals by petition for review on certiorari,  namely:
1

(1) G.R. Nos. 205698, 205780, 209446, 209489, 209852, 210143, 228452 and 228730, whereby petitioners
Department of Justice (DOJ), the People of the Philippines and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) assail
the decisions  of the Court of Appeals (CA): (i) setting aside the August 10, 2011 Review Resolution of the DOJ
2

insofar as Christina Sagun (Sagun) is concerned; and (ii) annulling the May 22, 2012 and August 22, 2012
resolutions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, in San Fernando City, Pampanga (Pampanga RTC), and
quashing the warrants of arrest issued against Delfin Lee, Dexter Lee (Dexter), and Atty. Alex Alvarez (Atty.
Alvarez) for lack of probable cause;

(2) G.R. No. 230680, whereby petitioner Cristina Salagan assails the decision of the CA dismissing her petition
for certiorari and upholding the resolutions dated May 22, 2012 and January 29, 2014 of the Pampanga RTC insofar
as finding probable cause for the crime of syndicated estafa and the issuance of a warrant of arrest against her were
concerned;

(3) G.R. Nos. 208744 and 210095, whereby the DOJ challenges the resolutions of the CA dismissing its petition
for certiorari for being filed out of time;  and
3

(4)G.R. No. 209424, whereby HDMF assails the decision promulgated on October 7, 2013,  whereby the CA found
4

no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Makati City (Makati RTC) in
issuing its January 31, 2012 final resolution granting the motion for summary judgment of Globe Asiatique Realty
Holdings, Corp. (Globe Asiatique) and Delfin Lee in Civil Case No. 10-1120 entitled Globe Asiatique Realty
Holdings Corporation and Delfin Lee, in his capacity as President of the Corportion v. Home Development Mutual
Fund (HDMF) or Pag-IBIG Fund, its Board of Trustees and Emma Linda Faria, Officer-in-Charge.

Salient Factual Antecedents

In 2008, Globe Asiatique, through its president Delfin Lee, entered into a Window I-Contract to Sell (CTS) Real
Estate Mortgage (REM) with Buy-back Guaranty take out mechanism with the HDMF, also known as the Pag-Ibig
Fund, for its Xevera Bacolor Project in Pampanga. Globe Asiatique and HDMF also executed various Funding
Commitment Agreements (FCAs) and Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs).  5

Under the FCAs, Delfin Lee warranted that the loan applicants that Globe Asiatique would allow to pre-process, and
whose housing loans it would approve, were existing buyers of its real estate and qualified to avail themselves of
loans from HDMF under the Pag-Ibig Fund; that all documents submitted to the HDMF in behalf of the applicants,
inclusive of the individual titles and the corresponding Deeds of Assignment, were valid, binding and enforceable;
that any person or agent employed by Globe Asiatique or allowed to transact or do business in its behalf had not
committed any act of misrepresentation; and that in the event of a default of the three-month payment on the
amortizations by said members or any breach of warranties, Globe Asiatique would buy back the CTS/REM
accounts during the first two years of the loan. 
6

The parties further agreed that Globe Asiatique would collect the monthly amortizations on the loans obtained by its
buyers in the first two years of the loan agreements and remit the amounts collected to HDMF through a Collection
Servicing Agreement (CSA). In this regard, Delfin Lee undertook to maintain at least 90% Performing Accounts
Ratio (PAR) under the CSA. 7
On June 10, 2008, Delfin Lee proposed the piloting of a Special Other Working Group (OWG) Membership Program
for its Xevera Bacolor Project while the FCA was in effect. The OWG Membership Program would comprise of
HDMF members who were not formally employed but derived income from non-formal sources (e.g., practicing
professionals, selfemployed members, Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), and entrepreneurs). Delfin Lee offered
to extend the buy-back guarantee from two to five years to bolster his position that the project was viable. HDMF
eventually entered into another agreement for this purpose.  8

Corollary to the foregoing, the parties entered into a second FCA worth ₱200,000,000.00. Globe Asiatique likewise
undertook that the PAR for all of its projects would be increased to at least 95%; that the buy-back guaranty for all
accounts taken out from the Xevera Bacolor Project would be increased to five years; that it would assign all its
housing loan proceeds from its other projects to HDMF to cover any unpaid obligations from the Xevera Project; and
that the OWG borrowers, to be eligible for Pag-Ibig Membership, would be required to present their Income Tax
Returns (ITRs) and affidavits of income. 9

On July 13, 2009, the parties executed a MOA granting Globe Asiatique an additional ₱5,000,000,000.00 funding
commitment line for its Xevera Projects in Pampanga on the condition that Globe Asiatique would maintain a 95%
PAR, and that the housing loan take-outs would be covered by a buy-back guaranty of five years.   Section 9 of the
10

MOA expressly stated, however, that the MOA "supersedes, amends and modifies provisions of all other previous
and existing Agreements that are Inconsistent hereto."  11

More FCAs were executed between the parties. According to HDMF, the aggregate amount of ₱7,007,806,000.00
was released to Globe Asiatique in a span of two years from 2008 to September 24, 2010, representing a total of
9 ,951 accounts. 12

In the course of its regular validation of buyers' membership eligibilities for taking out loans for the Xevera Project,
HDMF allegedly discovered some fraudulent transactions and false representations purportedly committed by Globe
Asiatique, its owners, officers, directors, employees, and agents/representatives, in conspiracy with HDMF
employees. HDMF invited the attention of Delfin Lee regarding some 351 buyers who surrendered or withdrew their
loans and were no longer interested in pursuing the same, and requested Globe Asiatique to validate the 351
buyers. Delfin Lee replied that Globe Asiatique was actually monitoring about 1,000 suspicious buyers' accounts.
Subsequently, HDMF ostensibly found out about an additional 350 buyers who either denied knowledge of having
availed of loans or manifested their intention to terminate their account. 
13

As a result, HDMF revoked the authority of Globe Asiatique under the FCA; suspended all take-outs for new
housing loans; required the buyback of the 701 fraudulent accounts; and cancelled the release of funds to Globe
Asiatique in August 2010.

About a month later, Globe Asiatique discontinued remitting the monthly amortization collections from all borrowers
of Xevera.

Finally, HDMF terminated the CSA with Globe Asiatique on August 31, 2010.  14

Meanwhile, HDMF continued its post take-out validation of the borrowers, and discovered that at least 644
supposed borrowers under the OWG Membership Program who were processed and approved by Globe Asiatique
for the take-out by HDMF were not aware of the loans they had supposedly signed in relation to the Xevera
Project; and assuming they were aware of the loan agreements, they had merely signed the same in consideration
of money given to them by Globe Asiatique; that some borrowers were neither members of HDMF nor qualified to
take out a housing loan from HDMF because they had insufficient or no income at all or they did not have the
minimum number of contributions in HDMF; and that some of the borrowers did not live in the units they
purchased.  15

HDMF alleged that at least 805 borrowers could not be located or were unknown in the addresses they had
provided in the loan agreements, or had indicated non-existent addresses therein; and that it incurred damages
totalling ₱1.04 billion covering the loans of 644 fraudulent and 805 fake borrowers attributed to the fraudulent and
criminal misrepresentations of Delfin Lee and Globe Asiatique's officials and employees.  16

The Criminal Charges

Upon the recommendation of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the DOJ conducted its preliminary
investigation against Globe Asiatique, particularly its officers, namely: Delfin S. Lee, Dexter L. Lee, Ramon Palma
Gil, Cristina Salagan, Lerma Vitug, Tintin Fonclara, Geraldine Fonclara, Revelyn Reyes, Atty. Rod Macaspac,
Marvin Arevalo, Joan Borbon, Christian Cruz, Rodolfo Malabanan, Nannet Haguiling, John Tungol and Atty. Alex
Alvarez on the strength of the complaint-affidavit dated October 29, 2010 filed by Emma Linda B. Faria, then the
officer-in-charge (OIC) of the HDMF. This first complaint alleged the commission of the crime of
syndicated estafa constituting economic sabotage, as defined and penalized under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689 (P.D. No. 1689). 17

The DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors to investigate the complaint.

On December 10, 2010, the NBI Anti-Graft Division recommended the filing of a second complaint for
syndicated estafa constituting economic sabotage under P.D. No. 1689, in relation to Article 315(2) of the Revised
Penal Code against Delfin Lee and the others. This second complaint was precipitated by the complaints of
supposed Globe Asiatique clients such as Evelyn Niebres, Catherine Bacani and Ronald San Nicolas, who were
victims of double sale perpetrated by Globe Asiatique.  18

Also, HDMF brought a complaint against Globe Asiatique and its officers for the fraudulent take-out of housing loans
for bogus buyers.

Subsequently, the DOJ formed yet another panel of prosecutors to conduct another preliminary investigation.  19

Upon learning of the filing of the second case in the DOJ, Delfin Lee filed a petition for the suspension of
proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action for specific performance that he and Globe Asiatique had
commenced in the Makati RTC, contending therein that the issue in the civil case constituted a prejudicial question
vis-a-vis the second DOJ case.

On February 21, 2011, the DOJ panel of prosecutors issued an Omnibus Order denying Delfin Lee's prayer for
suspension of proceedings.

After Delfin Lee's motion for reconsideration was denied on July 5, 2011, he filed his counter-affidavit ad cautelam in
the DOJ. 20

On August 10, 2011, Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano approved the Review Resolution of Senior Deputy State
Prosecutor Theodore M. Villanueva, the Chairman of the DOJ's Task Force on Securities and Business Scam
(SDSP Villanueva) pertaining to the first criminal complaint.  It is noted that the investigating prosecutors of the
21

DOJ's Task Force on Securities and Business Scam had initially recommended the filing of charges for the crime
of estafa defined and penalized under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
paragraph 2, Section 1 of PD No. 1689, against Delfin Lee, Sagun, and Cristina Salagan (Salagan). However,
SDSP Villanueva recommended in the Review Resolution the inclusion of Atty. Alvarez and Dexter Lee in
the estafa charge, thereby charging syndicated estafa, with no bail recommended. 22

Consequently, Delfin Lee filed an amended petition on August 25, 2011 to enjoin the DOJ from filing the information
for syndicated estafa in relation to the first DOJ case. 23

On September 15, 2011, Sagun filed in the CA her petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to assail the August 10, 2011 Review
Resolution of the DOJ (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 121346). 24

On his part, Atty. Alvarez resorted to his own petition for review on October 3, 2011 of the same August 10,
2011 Review Resolution in the DOJ. However, on November 14, 2011, he withdrew his petition following his filing of
a petition in the Manila RTC on October 10, 2011 assailing the same August 10, 2011 Review Resolution. He also
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on November 15, 2011 to enjoin the DOJ from filing the information in the
first syndicated estafa case, but he subsequently withdrew the petition and filed on the same day a petition for
injunction and prohibition in the Caloocan City RTC, Branch 125, to enjoin the DOJ from filing the information in the
first syndicated estafa case and from conducting the preliminary investigation in the second case. 25
Proceedings in the Pasig RTC

Prior to the DOJ's issuance of its August 10, 2011 Review Resolution, Delfin Lee initiated his action for injunction on
July 28, 2011 in the Pasig RTC to enjoin the DOJ from proceeding with the second DOJ case, and reiterated therein
that the civil case pending in the Makati R TC constituted a prejudicial question vis-a-vis the second DOJ case. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 73115 entitled Delfin S. Lee v. Department of Justice.

The Pasig RTC, then presided by Judge Rolando Mislang, granted Delfin Lee's prayer for the issuance of the TROs
on August 16, 2011, and admitted the amended petition on August 26, 2011.  26

The Pasig RTC thereafter issued the writ of preliminary injunction under both the original and the amended petitions
on September 5, 2011.  27

Aggrieved, the DOJ filed a petition for certiorari on October 6, 2011 (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 121594), alleging that Judge
Mislang had committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the filing of
the information for syndicated estafa with respect to the first case and from proceeding with the preliminary
investigation in the second case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. 28

On April 16, 2012, the CA granted the DOJ's petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 121594, and ruled that the
facts and issues in the civil case pending in the Makati RTC were not determinative of the guilt or innocence of
Delfin Lee in the cases filed in the DOJ; hence, it annulled and set aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
Judge Mislang. 29

The adverse ruling in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 121594 was appealed by petition for review on certiorari. On July 4, 2012,
the Court dismissed the appeal because of Delfin Lee's failure to show any reversible error on the part of the CA in
issuing the assailed decision. The dismissal became final and executory.  30

Much later on, Delfin Lee learned of the third and fourth criminal complaints filed in the DOJ. Again, he sought the
issuance of a TRO by the Pasig RTC.

On March 21, 2013, Judge Mislang issued the second TRO enjoining the preliminary investigation of the second,
third and fourth criminal complaints.31

On April 10, 2013, Judge Mislang issued the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 73115 enjoining the
conduct of the preliminary investigation in the second, third and fourth criminal complaints.  32

Consequently, the DOJ filed another petition for certiorari, docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 130409, to annul the writ
of preliminary injunction issued on April 10, 2013 by the Pasig RTC.

Proceedings in the Pampanga RTC

With the lifting of the first writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Pasig RTC, the DOJ filed a criminal case for
syndicated estafa against

Delfin Lee, Dexter Lee, Christina Sagun (Sagun), Cristina Salagan (Salagan), and Atty. Alex Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez)
on April 30, 2012 in the Pampanga RTC. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 18480 entitled People of the
Philippines v. Delfin Lee, Dexter L. Lee, Christina Sagun, Cristina Salagan, and Atty. Alex Alvarez. 33

The information in Criminal Case No. 18480 reads:

That sometime during the period from 10 June 2008 to 24 September 2010, or on dates prior and subsequent
thereto, in the City of San Fernando, Pampanga, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused DELFIN S. LEE, DEXTER L. LEE, CHRISTINA SAGUN[,] CRISTINA SALAGAN and ATTY. ALEX
ALVAREZ, acting as a syndicate formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction,
enterprise or scheme of soliciting funds from the general public, each performing a particular act in furtherance of
the common design, by way of take out on housing loans of supposed Pag-IBIG fund members through the use of
fictitious buyers and/or "special buyers" conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, by means of
false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the private complainant HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND,
otherwise known as the Pag-IBIG Fund, in the following manner, to wit: accused Delfin S. Lee, being the president
and chief executive officer of Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation (GA), a domestic corporation engaged in
real estate development, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly enter into funding commitment
agreements and other transactions with the private complainant, wherein said accused Delfin S. Lee made false
and fraudulent representations to the latter that GA has interested buyers in its Xevera projects in Bacolor and
Mabalacat, Pampanga when, in truth and in fact, said accused knew fully well that the corporation does not have
such buyers, as in fact the said corporation, through accused Delfin S. Lee, Dexter L. Lee, Christina Sagun, Cristina
Salagan and Atty. Alex Alvarez, in conspiracy with one another, submitted names of fictitious buyers and documents
to Pag-IBIG Fund as housing loan applicants/buyers of GA's Xevera projects in order to obtain, as in fact the said
corporation obtained, through accused Delfin S. Lee, fund releases from HDMF by way of housing loan take-out of
the said fictitious buyers. In addition, the said corporation, through accused Delfin S. Lee, Dexter L. Lee, Christina
Sagun, Cristina Salagan and Atty. Alex Alvarez, has also engaged in a "special buyers" scheme whereby it recruited
persons who does not have any intention to buy its housing units in Xevera but, in exchange for a fee, said "special
buyers" lent their names and Pag-IBIG membership to GA, so that the said corporation could use, as in fact it has
used, the names and Pag-IBIG membership of the said "special buyers" in obtaining fund releases from HDMF, as
the said corporation, through accused Delfin S. Lee, had in fact obtained fund releases from HDMF, by way of take-
out of the supposed housing loans of the "special buyers", and by reason of the aforesaid false and fraudulent
representations of accused Delfin S. Lee, Dexter L. Lee, Christina Sagun, Cristina Salagan and Atty. Alex Alvarez,
HDMF was induced to release, through several funding commitment agreements, to Globe Asiatique Realty
Holdings Corporation, through accused Delfin S. Lee, the total amount of ₱6,653,546,000.00, more or less, and
upon receipt of the aforesaid amount, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously convert, misappropriate and misapply the same, and despite repeated demands, the above-named
accused failed and refused to pay the same, to the damage and prejudice of the private complainant in the
aforesaid amount.

As to the element of deceit, it was found that the documents submitted by GA concerning the existence and
qualifications of its buyers are spurious and/or questionable. It was uncovered that at least 351 of the supposed
buyers have already surrendered or withdrew their loans and/or are no longer interested in pursuing their loans,
while the alleged buyers for additional 350 Xevera accounts have either denied availing of the loans or expressed
their intention to cancel their respective accounts. Afterwards, documents obtained by HDMF through special audit
conducted on the Xevera Projects disclose that out of the 8,230 loans taken out by Pag-IBIG, only 39% of the
borrowers belong to the Other Working Group (OWG) category. On the other hand, out of the 10% of the OWG
surveyed/audited, only 1.85% are actually living in the units they purchased, whereas, 83.38% of the acquired units
remain unoccupied; 7.69% of the units are closed, 6.15% are being occupied by third parties; and lastly, 0.92% of
the units are yet to be constructed. The same documents likewise show that: (a) from a random examination of the
units taken out by Pag-IBIG and which are being occupied by third parties, 16 units are being occupied by in-house
buyers - two of whom have fully paid their obligations with GA; 3 units were leased out by non-borrowers; 1 unit is
being occupied by a replacement buyer; and 82% of the borrowers of the units have failed to submit their respective
Income Tax Returns (ITR) which is a mandatory requirement for the approval of their loan applications, and (b) as a
result of the post take-out validation conducted by HDMF, it was found that 644 borrowers endorsed by GA are not
genuine buyers of Xevera homes while 802 are nowhere to be found; 3 buyers are already deceased; and 275 were
not around during the visit, hence, establishing that all of them are fictitious buyers.

In connection with the "special buyers scheme," it was established that the people engaged as such have no
intention of buying housing units from GA, but merely agreed to the same after GA's agents sought them out for a
fee of ₱5,000.00. After being paid such fee, the aforementioned "special buyers" agreed to apply for membership
with Pag-IBIG, on the condition that it is GA that pays for their 24 months installments, so that they can be qualified
to apply for a Pag-IBIG housing loan. Thereafter, these "special buyers" are made to execute loan and other
supporting documents, which are then submitted to HDMF for take-out of their housing loans for the Xevera
projects. After take-out, GA pays the monthly amortizations of these "special buyers" to Pag-IBIG, using the
payment made to it by Pag-IBIG on the housing loan of GA's Xevera project buyers. In this wise, GA's Performing
Accounts Ration (PAR) reached as high as 99.97%. However, when HDMF stopped fund releases to GA by way of
housing loan take-outs of its buyers, or sometime August 2010, GA started to fail in remitting to HDMF Pampanga
Branch office the monthly housing loan amortizations of its buyers of Xevera project. Thus, GA's almost 100%
monthly collection/remittance rate dropped to 0% or no remittance at all when HDMF stopped its fund releases to
GA, thereby establishing that the monthly amortizations of its borrowers were being paid by GA from the funds
released by HDMF on the housing loans of its Xevera housing project borrowers.
That in carrying out the aforesaid conspiracy, accused Christina Sagun, head of the documentation department of
Globe Asiatique Realty and Holdings Corp., did then and there unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly process and
approve the housing loan applications of the said fictitious and "special buyers" of GA, in clear violation of the terms
of conditions of the agreements entered into between HDMF and GA; accused Dexter L. Lee, did then and there,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly order employees of GA to find and recruit "special buyers," and in fact found
such special buyers, in accordance with the aforementioned illegal scheme, and in fact, is a co-signatory of the
checks issued by GA in favor of the said "special buyers;" accused Atty. Alex Alvarez, did then and there unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly notarize crucial pieces of documents, consisting, among others, of the buyer's affidavit of
income, promissory note, and developer's affidavit (by Ms. Cristina Sagun) alleging compliance with the conditions
set by HDMF, all of which are essential for the processing and approval of the purported transaction; and accused
CRISTINA SALAGAN, being the head of GA's accounting department, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously and
knowingly allow the release of the questionable amounts of ₱5,000.00 as payment to every fake/fictitious and/or
"special buyer" applicant of GA despite knowledge of its unlawful and illegal nature, to the damage and prejudice of
HDMF and/or its members.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 34

In due course, the respondents separately moved to quash the information and to seek judicial determination of
probable cause. 35

On May 22, 2012, the Pampanga RTC found probable cause for syndicated estafa and for the issuance of warrants
of arrest, to wit:

PREMISES GIVEN, the Court orders the following:

I. Probable cause for the crime of ESTAFA (ARTICLE 315 [2] [a] of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 1
of P.D. 1689, as amended, is found against the Accused DELFIN S. LEE, DEXTER L. LEE, CHRISTINA SAGUN,
CRISTINA SALAGAN and ATTY. ALEX ALVAREZ.

II. Issue Warrant of Arrest against DELFIN S. LEE, DEXTER L. LEE, CHRISTINA SAGUN, CRISTINA SALAGAN
and ATTY. ALEX ALVAREZ.

III. There is NO BAIL RECOMMENDED for each of DELFIN S. LEE, DEXTER L. LEE, CHRISTINA SAGUN,
CRISTINA SALAGAN and ATTY. ALEX ALVAREZ.

The setting (sic) on May 23 and 24, 2010 is (sic) CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED. 36

Upon notice of the resolution, Delfin Lee filed a Motion to Recall/Quash Warrant of Arrest and/or Hold in Abeyance
their Release to Law Enforcement Agencies Pending Resolution of this Motion.

On August 22, 2012, the Pampanga RTC denied Delfin Lee's Motion to Recall/Quash Warrant of Arrest and/or Hold
in Abeyance their Release to Law Enforcement Agencies Pending Resolution of this Motion.  37

Delfin Lee, Dexter and Salagan moved to reconsider the August 22, 2012 resolution of the Pampanga RTC.

Without waiting for the resolution of the motion, Delfin Lee filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of
a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the CA on November 26, 2012 to nullify the resolutions of the
Pampanga RTC dated May 22, 2012 and August 22, 2012 (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 127553). 38

Meanwhile, Atty. Alvarez also filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 22, 2012 resolution, but the Pampanga
RTC denied the motion on August 22, 2012. Thereafter, he filed a petition for certiorari with the CA to nullify and set
aside the May 22, 2012 and August 22, 2012 resolutions of the Pampanga RTC. The petition was docketed as C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 127690.
Dexter filed his own petition for certiorari in the CA to question the May 22, 2012 and August 22, 2012 resolutions of
the Pampanga RTC,

Salagan likewise filed her own petition for certiorari in the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
respondent Judge of the Pampanga RTC in issuing the May 22, 2012 resolution denying her second motion to
quash information with prayer to re-determine probable cause and the January 29, 2014 resolution denying her
motion for reconsideration.

The Civil Case

(Proceedings before the Makati RTC)

Globe Asiatique and Delfin Lee initiated the complaint for specific performance and damages against HDMF on
November 15, 2010. Docketed as Civil Case No. 10-1120,  the case was assigned to Branch 58 of the Makati RTC.
39

Globe Asiatique and Delfin Lee thereby sought to compel HDMF to accept the proposed replacements of the
buyers/borrowers who had become delinquent in their amortizations, asserting that HDMF's inaction to accept the
replacements had forced Globe Asiatique to default on its obligations under the MOA and FCAs. 40

Globe Asiatique and Delfin Lee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which the Makati RTC, after due
proceedings, resolved on January 30, 2012, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a Summary Judgment is hereby rendered declaring that:

1. Plaintiff (sic) have proven their case by preponderance of evidence. As such, they are entitled to specific
performance and right to damages as prayed for in the Complaint, except that the exact amount of damages
will have to be determined during trial proper.

2. Pursuant to the provisions of their MOA amending the continuing FCAs and CSAs, defendant HDMF is hereby
ordered to comply faithfully and religiously with its obligation under the said contracts, including but not limited to the
release of loan take-out proceeds of those accounts whose Deed [ s] of Assignment with Special Power of Attorney
have already been annotated in the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title covering the houses and lots
purchased by the Pag-IBIG member-borrowers from plaintiff GARHC as well as the evaluation of the loan
applications of those who underwent or will undergo plaintiff GARHC's loan counselling and are qualified or PAG-
IBIG FUND loans under the MOA and continuing FCAs and process the approval thereof only if qualified, under the
Window 1 Facility as provided for in the MOA and continuing FCAs;

3. The unilateral cancellation by defendant HDMF of the continuing FCAs specifically the latest FCAs of December
15, 2009, January 5 and March 17, 2010 and CSA dated 10 February 2009, is hereby SET ASIDE[;]

4. Defendants are ordered to automatically off-set the balance of those listed in Annex "E" of the Motion for
Summary Judgment against the retention money, escrow money, funding commitment fees, loan takeout proceeds
and other receivables of plaintiff GARHC which are still in the control and possession of defendant HDMF;

5. Defendants are ordered to accept the replacement-buyers listed in Annex "F" of the Motion for Summary
Judgment, which list is unopposed by defendants, without interest or penalty from the time of defendant HDMF's
cancellation of the Collection Servicing Agreement (CSA) resulting to the refusal to accept the same up to the time
that these replacement buyers are actually accepted by defendant HDMF;

6. Defendants are ordered to release the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title[s] (TCTs) of those accounts
which are fully paid or subjected to automatic off-setting starting from the list in Annex "E" of the Motion for
Summary Judgment and thereafter from those listed in Annex "F" thereof and cause the corresponding cancellation
of the annotations in the titles thereof.

Let this case be set for the presentation of evidence on the exact amount of damages that plaintiffs are entitled to on
March 12, 2012 at 8:30 in the morning.

SO ORDERED. 41
On December 11, 2012, the Makati R TC denied the motion for reconsideration of OIC Faria and Atty. Berberabe
filed through the Yorac Arroyo Chua Caedo and Coronal Law Firm (the Yorac Law Firm). The trial court held that the
Yorac Law Firm was not duly authorized to represent the HDMF; hence, it treated the motion for reconsideration as
a mere scrap of paper and opined that its filing did not toll the running of the period to appeal. As to the HDMF, the
Makati R TC, noting with approval the manifestation of Globe Asiatique and Delfin Lee to the effect that the HDMF
had not filed a motion for reconsideration or taken an appeal, deemed the summary judgment final and executory as
to the HDMF. 42

Aggrieved, the HDMF brought its petition for certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 128262).

Decisions of the CA

The CA promulgated the separate decisions now under review.

1.

C.A.-G.R. SP No. 130409

(DO.J petition assailing the April 10, 2013 writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Pasig RTC)

On June 18, 2013, the DOJ filed the intended petition for certiorari but inadvertently did not indicate therein the
proper docket number for the case thereby causing the assignment by the CA of a new docket number, specifically
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 130409. On June 26, 2013, the CA dismissed the DOJ's petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
130409 on the ground that it had not received a motion for extension of time to file the petition. 43

Meanwhile, on July 8, 2013, the CA issued its resolution in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 130404 denying the DOJ's motion for
extension for failure of the DOJ to file the intended petition for certiorari.

Realizing its error later on, the DOJ immediately filed a manifestation with motion to admit petition for certiorari to
clarify the mix-up and rectify its error. On August 14, 2013, the CA denied the DOJ's manifestation with motion to
admit petition for certiorari.

Hence, the DOJ filed a petition docketed as G.R. No. 208744 to assail the resolution promulgated on July 8, 2013 in
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 130404.  As to CA-G.R. SP No. 130409, the DOJ moved for reconsideration of the CA's
44

resolution dated June 26, 2013, but the motion was denied on November 11, 2013. 45

2.

C.A.-G.R. SP No. 128262

(HDMF Petition assailing the January 30, 2012 and December 11, 2012 resolutions of the Makati RTC in Civil
Case No. 10-1120)

On October 7, 2013, the CA promulgated its decision dismissing the HDMF petition in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 128262,  to 46

wit:

WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
public respondent in rendering the assailed Resolution dated January 30, 2012 containing the Summary Judgment
and the Resolution dated December 11, 2012 denying HDMF, Faria and Atty. Berberabe's Motion for
Reconsideration, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

The CA opined that the HDMF had availed itself of the wrong remedy to assail the January 3 0, 2012 summary
judgment and the December 11, 2012 resolution of the Makati RTC; and that the certiorari petition did not further
show that it had been filed under the authority of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, or by a private
law firm with the necessary pre-requisite conformity of the Government Corporate Counsel and Commission on
Audit.
47

3.

C.A.-G.R. SP No. 121346

(Sagun Petition assailing the August 10, 2011 Review Resolution of the DOJ)

In C.A.-G.R. SP No. 121346, the CA opined that respondent Sagun's duties as the Documentation Head of Globe
Asiatique were ministerial in nature and did not require the employment of much discretion. As the DOJ observed in
its assailed Review Resolution, Sagun's functions were limited to the collation of the documents submitted by the
borrowers/buyers through Globe Asiatique's Marketing Department, and to ensuring that such documents were
complete and duly accomplished, and to the determination and verification from the HDMF through the submission
of Membership Status Verification whether the borrowers/buyers were really HDMF members, or had updated
contributions, or had no existing housing loans, and were thus qualified to apply for housing loans. The CA
conceded that any errors or oversights, which could occur in the performance of Sagun's duties, should be
attributed to her negligence, as concluded in the Review Resolution.

While the DOJ asserted that the fraud could have been averted had Sagun not been negligent, the CA explained
that such negligence negated any intent to commit a crime; hence, Sagun could not have committed the crime
of estafa charged. Moreover, the documents Sagun had reviewed were forwarded to the HDMF for evaluation and
approval; hence, the HDMF had the opportunity and the ultimate prerogative and discretion on the documents.

Accordingly, the CA disposed in its assailed decision promulgated on October 5, 2012 in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
121346,  viz.:
48

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.

Consequently, the subject Review Resolution dated August 10, 2011 issued by respondent DOJ is SET ASIDE and
DISMISSED as against petitioner Christina Sagun.

SO ORDERED. 49

4.

C.A.-G.R. SP No. 127553, C.A.-G.R. SP No. 127554, and C.A.-G.R. SP No. 127690

(respectively, the Delfin Lee Petition, Dexter Lee Petition and Alvarez Petition assailing the May 22, 2012 and
August 22, 2012 resolutions of the Pampanga RTC)

On October 3, 2013, the CA promulgated its decision on the Alvarez petition (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 127690),  ruling
50

that there was not enough evidence to implicate Atty. Alvarez; that the RTC had merely listed the documents
submitted by the task force and had not conducted any evaluation of the evidence to determine whether or not
Alvarez had participated in the alleged grand scheme to defraud the HDMF; and that the RTC had relied solely on
the recommendation of the panel of prosecutors, which was insufficient under prevailing jurisprudence. The
disposition was as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition for Certiorari and the Supplemental Petition
are PARTIALLY GRANTED and the assailed Resolutions dated May 22, 2012 and August 22, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 42 of San Fernando City, Pampanga in so far as petitioner ALEX M. ALVAREZ is concerned
are hereby annulled and set aside. Accordingly, the warrant of arrest issued against him is hereby LIFTED,
QUASHED/RECALLED.

Meantime, since the evidence do not support the finding of probable cause against petitioner ALEX M. ALVAREZ,
public respondent court is hereby enjoined from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 18480 as against said petitioner
only.
SO ORDERED. 51

On November 7, 2013, the CA promulgated its decision on Delfin Lee's petition (C.A.-G.R. SP No.
127553),   decreeing:
52

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions dated May 22, 2012 and August 22, 2012 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for the issuance
thereof was attended with grave abuse of discretion on thepart of public respondent Hon. Ma. Amifaith S. Fider-
Reyes, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of the San Fernando, Pampanga RTC - Branch 42. Consequently,
the Warrant of Arrest issued against petitioner Delfin S. Lee is hereby QUASHED, RECALLED AND LIFTED.
Afore-named public respondent judge is directed to CEASE and DESIST from further proceeding with Criminal
Case No. 18480 insofar as petitioner Delfin S. Lee is concerned.

Furthermore, all government agencies tasked in the enforcement of the said warrant of arrest including but not
limited to the Philippine National Police (PNP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) are immediately ENJOINED from implementing the same.

SO ORDERED. 53

The CA observed that the RTC gravely abused its discretion because its conclusion on finding probable cause to
issue the arrest warrant was in the nature of speculation; that the RTC had merely relied on the information,
the Review Resolution and the six boxes of documentary evidence to find and conclude that a huge amount of
money had been transferred from the HDMF to Globe Asiatique through a complex scheme that could only have
been attained through the sustained action of people in concert to commit their criminal intention; that such findings
and conclusions were not based on hard facts and solid evidence as required by jurisprudence; that the report did
not mention how many perpetrators had conspired against the HDMF; that the parts of Delfin Lee and his supposed
cohorts in the supposed fraudulent acts committed againstthe HDMF had not been particularly identified; that the
conversion of the recommendation from the filing of simple estafa to syndicated estafa had not been clearly
explained in the Review Resolution; that the RTC had simply adopted such findings without justifying how the
charge could be for syndicated instead of simple estafa; and that the RTC had also issued the resolution a day
immediately after the six boxes of documentary evidence had come to its knowledge as the trial court.

The CA debunked the HDMF's argument that Delfin Lee had defrauded it into releasing a considerable sum of
money to Globe Asiatique through a complex scheme involving fraudulent buyers. The CA noted that the Deed of
Assignment with Contract to Sell and Special Power of Attorney executed between Globe Asiatique and the HDMF
showed that the HDMF had been ultimately duty-bound to check the applications of prospective borrowers and to
approve the same; that, consequently, whatever damage the HDMF had incurred could not be solely ascribed to
Delfin Lee; that in fact the DOJ had also endorsed the Review Resolution to the Ombudsman for the investigation of
the HDMF officers for violation of Republic Act No. 3019; and that it was confusing that Delfin Lee had been charged
separately ofanother crime instead of being joined with the officers of the HDMF who had been referred to the
Ombudsman for investigation.

On November 16, 2016, the CA promulgated its decision on Dexter's petition (C.A.-G.R. No. 127554), declaring that
the Pampanga RTC had erred in its determination of probable cause against him;  that the Pampanga RTC had
54

gravely abused its discretion when it based its assessment solely on the Review Resolution of the panel of
prosecutors, the information, and the six boxes of documents presented as evidence by the Prosecution without
making its independent assessment of the documents and other pieces of evidence to validate the issuance of the
arrest warrant issued against Dexter.

The CA disposed thusly:

ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing reasons, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated
May 22, 2012 and August 22, 2012 of Branch 42 of Regional Trial Court of Pampanga City (sic)
are ANULLED and SET ASIDE. Thus, the Warrant of Arrest issued against petitioner Dexter L. Lee is
hereby QUASHED, RECALLED and LIFTED. Furthermore, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42 of San Fernando,
Pampanga is directed to CEASE and DESIST from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 18480 insofar as
petitioner Dexter L. Lee is concerned.
Moreover, all government agencies tasked in the enforcement of the Warrant of Arrest including but not limited to
the Philippine National Police, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Immigration are
immediately ENJOINED from implementing the said Warrant.

SO ORDERED. 55

5.

C.A.-G.R. SP No. 134573

(Salagan Petition assailing the May 22, 2012 and January 29, 2014 resolutions of the Pampanga RTC)

Salagan claimed in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 134573 that there was no probable cause to charge her with the crime of
syndicated estafa in view of the decisions promulgated in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 121346, C.A.-G.R. SP No. 127553, and
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 127690 finding that no probable cause existed against Sagun, Delfin Lee and Atty. Alvarez,
respectively, for syndicated estafa.

The CA declared in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 134573, however, that the respondent Judge did not gravely abuse her
discretion in finding probable cause against Salagan, and upheld the validity of the information filed in the
Pampanga RTC against her; and that the warrant of arrest had been issued upon probable cause personally
determined by the judge.   It ruled that the respondent Judge had properly denied Salagan's second motion to
56

quash the information with prayer to re-determine probable cause based on a supervening event considering that
Salagan had erroneously assumed that the separate decisions promulgated by the CA were supervening events
that justified the re-determination of probable cause. 
57

The CA disposed on March 18, 2016 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 134573:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Resolution dated
May 22, 2012 and Resolution dated January 29, 2014 of the San Fernando, Pampanga RTC, Branch 42 are
hereby AFFIRMED insofar as Accused Cristina Salagan is concerned.

SO ORDERED. 58

Issues

We simplify the legal issues as follows:

(l)Whether or not the HDMF availed itself of the proper remedy to assail the summary judgment rendered by the
Makati RTC (G.R. No. 209424);

(2) Whether or not there was probable cause for the filing of the information for syndicated estafa, and for the
issuance of the warrants of arrest against the respondents for that crime (G.R. Nos. 205698, 205780, 209446,
209489, 209852, 210143, 228452, 228730 and 230680); and

(3) Whether or not the conduct of a preliminary investigation could be enjoined (G.R. Nos. 208744 and 210095).

On various dates, the Court issued TROs  to enjoin the implementation and enforcement of the assailed CA
59

decisions andresolutions issued in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 121346, C.A.-G.R. SP No. 127553, C.A.-G.R. SP No. 127554,
and C.A.-G.R. SP No. 127690. Inasmuch as the warrants of arrest remained valid nonetheless, Delfin Lee was
arrested by virtue thereof,  and was detained in the Pampanga Provincial Jail since his arrest until this time.  The
60 61

other respondents have remained at large.

Ruling of the Court

We PARTIALLY GRANT the petitions in G.R. No. 205698, G.R. No. 205780, G.R. No. 209446, G.R. No. 209489,
G.R. No. 209852, G.R. No. 210143, G.R. No. 228452, G.R. No. 228730 and G.R. No. 230680, and,
accordingly, MODIFY the assailed decisions of the CA.

On the other hand, we GRANT the petitions in G.R. No. 209424, G.R. No. 208744, and G.R. No. 210095, and,
accordingly, REVERSE the resolutions of the CA assailed therein.

1.

The January 30, 2012 summary judgment was an interlocutory judgment; hence, the HDMF correctly
instituted a petition for certiorari instead of an appeal

The HDMF argues that it correctly instituted the special civil action for certiorari to assail the resolutions of the
Makati RTC dated January 30, 2012 and December 11, 2012 issued in Civil Case No. 10-1120; that the Yorac Law
Firm had lawful authority to represent the HDMF; and that the Makati RTC rendered the questioned resolutions with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The HDMF's arguments are partly meritorious.

1.a.

The January 30, 2012 summary judgment was an interlocutory order

In Civil Case No. 10-1120, Globe Asiatique and Delfin Lee specifically averred separate causes of action against the
HDMF, including that for damages. Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due proceedings, a decision be rendered by the Honorable Court
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the following:

1. With respect to the First Cause of Action, for defendant P AGIB JG to accept the replacement of the
buyer/borrowers as offered by plaintiff GARHC contained in a list hereto attached as Annex "O" pursuant to the
latter's exercise of this option under Section 3. 7 of the latest Funding Commitment Agreement in relation to the
buyback provision under the Memorandum of Agreement dated 13 July 2009;

2. With respect to the Second Cause of Action, for defendant PAG-IBIG FUND to release the pending loan take-outs
and amount of retention due plaintiff GARHC pursuant to the MOA and latest FCA and for all defendants to jointly
and solidarily pay plaintiff GARHC the sum of Php 6,562,500.00, representing interest and penalty payments;

3. With respect to the Third Cause of Action, for defendant PAGIBIG FUND to honor the provisions of its MOA the
latest FCA and CSA, to set aside the cancellation of the FCA and CSA, and restore plaintiff GARHC to its rights
under the MOA, latest FCA and CSA;

4. With respect to the Fourth Cause of Action , for defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiff GARHC the sum
of Php 1 Million as and by way of attorney's fees, Php500,000.00 as and by way of litigation expenses, and cost of
suit; and

5. With respect to the Fifth Cause of Action, for defendants to pay exemplary damages in the amount of
PHp500,000.00.

Plaintiffs pray for such other reliefs and remedies that the Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the
premises.62

During the proceedings, Globe Asiatique and Delfin Lee filed the motion for summary judgment, stating the reliefs
prayed for, as follows:
PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due notice and hearing, an Order be issued granting the instant
Motion for Summary Judgment and simultaneously therewith, to render the Summary Judgment prayed for,
declaring and ordering the following:

1. That plaintiffs have proven their case by preponderance of evidence and, therefore, are entitled to specific
performance and right to damages as prayed for in the Complaint;

2. That defendants HDMF should faithfully and religiously comply with the pertinent provisions of the FCAs and
CSAs as amended by the MOA under the prevailing conditions prior to the precipitate unilateral termination thereof
by defendant HDMF, including but not limited to the release of loan take-out proceeds of those accounts whose DO
As with SP As have already been annotated in the corresponding TCTs as well as the evaluation and approval of
the loan applications of those who underwent or will undergo plaintiff GARCH's loan counselling and arc qualified for
PAG-IBIG loans under the MOA and FCAs;

3. That defendant HDMF's unilateral termination of the MOA, FCAs and CSA be declared illegal and be set aside;

4. That defendants be ordered to automatically off-set the balance of those listed in Annex "E" hereof composed of
fully-paid buyer-borrowers against the retention money, escrow money, funding commitment fees, loan take-out
proceeds and other receivables of plaintiff GARHC which are still in the control and possession of defendant HDMF;

5. That defendants be ordered to accept the replacement-buyers listed in Annex "F" hereof, without interest or
penalty from the time of defendant HDMF's refusal to accept the same up to the time that these replacement buyers
are actually accepted by defendant HDMF;

6. That defendants be ordered to release the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title(s) (TCTs) of those accounts
which are fully paid or subjected to automatic off-setting starting from the list in Annex "e" of the Motion for Summary
Judgment and thereafter from those listed in Annex "F" thereof and cause the corresponding cancellation of the
annotations in the titles thereof, including that of complaint-intervenor Tessie G. Wang's titles:

Plaintiffs pray for such other reliefs and remedies that the Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the
premises. 63

Globe Asiatique and Delfin Lee did not include the claim for damages among the reliefs prayed for by their motion
for summary judgment.

Granting the motion for summary judgment, the Makati RTC ultimately disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a Summary Judgment 1s hereby rendered declaring that:

1. Plaintiffs have proven their case by preponderance of evidence.  As such, they are entitled to specific
1avvphi1

performance and right to damages as prayed for in the Complaint, except that the exact amount of damages
will have to be determined during trial proper.

xxxx

Let this case be set for the presentation of evidence on the exact amount of damages that plaintiffs are
entitled on March 12, 2012 at 8:30 in the morning.

SO ORDERED.  (Bold underscoring supplied)

64

As the foregoing shows, the Makati R TC set the case for the presentation of evidence to establish the other claims
of Globe Asiatique and Delfin Lee stated in their complaint for specific performance, specifically those pertaining to
the fourth and fifth causes of action. The claims related to damages, which, being still essential parts of the case,
would still have to be established and adjudicated on their merits. Although the recovery of the damages was
dependent on the determination that the HDMF had breached its contract with Globe Asiatique, it could not yet be
said that the Makati RTC had fully disposed of the case through the summary judgment considering that there were
still other reliefs sought by Globe Asiatique and Delfin Lee yet to be tried and determined either way. Under the
circumstances, the summary judgment was, properly speaking, but an interlocutory judgment of the Makati RTC.

In this connection, the rule on separate judgments - Section 5, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court - is relevant.  The rule
1âwphi1

requires the action to proceed as to the remaining but unresolved claims, to wit:

SEC. 5. Separate judgments. - When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court, at any
stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a separate judgment disposing of
such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action
shall proceed as to the remaining claims. In case a separate judgment is rendered, the court by order may stay
its enforcement until the rendition of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as
may be necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is rendered. (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)

A partial summary judgment like that rendered on January 30, 2012 by the Makati RTC was in the category of a
separate judgment. Such judgment did not adjudicate damages, and still directed that further proceedings be had in
order to determine the damages to which Globe Asiatique and Delfin Lee could be entitled. Section 4, Rule 3 5 of
the Rules of Court thus came into operation. Section 4 states:

SEC. 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion. – If on motion under this Rule, judgment is not rendered upon the
whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel shall ascertain what material facts
exist without substantial controversy and what are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. The facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted on the
controverted facts accordingly. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

Worthy to emphasize is that the rendition of a summary judgment does not always result in the full adjudication of all
the issues raised in a case.  In such event, a partial summary judgment is rendered in the context of Section
65

4, supra. Clearly, such a partial summary judgment - because it does not put an end to the action at law by declaring
that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for - cannot be considered a
final judgment. It remains to be an interlocutory judgment or order, instead of a final judgment, and is not to be dealt
with and resolved separately from the other aspects of the case.

In Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,   the distinctions between final and interlocutory orders were delineated thusly:

66

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject
matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to
enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but
leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the
merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

What was the proper recourse against the partial summary judgment?

Considering that the January 30, 2012 partial summary judgment was interlocutory, the remedy could not be an
appeal, for only a final judgment or order could be appealed. Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court makes this
clear enough by expressly forbidding an appeal from being taken from such interlocutory judgment or order, to wit:

Section 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of
the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:

xxxx

(f) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and third party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court
allows an appeal therefrom; and

xxxx

In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action as
provided in Rule 65.

Consequently, the interlocutory January 30, 2012 summary judgment could be assailed only through certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the HDMF properly instituted the special civil action for certiorari to assail and
set aside the resolutions dated January 30, 2012 and December 11, 2012 of the Makati RTC.

1.b.

The Yorac Law Firm had no authority to file the HDMF's motion for reconsideration of the January 30, 2012
summary judgment rendered by the Makati RTC

The HDMF is a government-owned and -controlled corporation (GOCC) performing proprietary functions with
original charter or created by special law, specifically Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1752, amending P.D. No.
1530.  As a GOCC, the HDMF's legal matters are to be handled by the Office of the Government Corporate
67

Counsel (OGCC),  save for some extraordinary or exceptional circumstances when it is allowed to engage the
68

services of private counsels, provided such engagement is with the written conformity of the Solicitor General or the
Government Corporate Counsel and the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit (COA). 69

In Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation,   the Court underscored that the best evidence to prove
70

the COA's concurrence with the engagement of a private lawyer or law firm was the written concurrence from the
COA itself, viz.:

Petitioners primarily rely on a certified true copy of an Indorsement issued by COA Regional Office No. 10 as proof
of written concurrence on the part of the COA. All that it contains is a second-hand claim that the COA General
Counsel had allegedly concurred in the retainer contract between PHIVIDEC and Atty. Adaza. The written
concurrence itself which may be the best evidence of the alleged concurrence was not presented. It is also worth
noting that the said Indorsement was dated 4 June 2002, or approximately two years after the filing of the
expropriation case by Atty. Adaza.

The records reveal that although the OGCC authorized the HDMF to engage the services of the Yorac Law Firm,
the HDMF did not sufficiently prove that the written concurrence of the COA had been obtained.

To substantiate its claim of the COA's concurrence with the engagement of the Yorac Law Firm's legal services, the
HDMF presented the certification dated January 10, 2013,  viz.:
71

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the Commission on Audit (COA) has concurred in the Retainer Agreement entered into by and
between the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) and Yorac, Arroyo, Chua, Caedo & Coronel Law Firm, for
the latter to provide legal services to the HDMF in connection with the cases filed by or against Globe Asiatique
Realty Holdings Corporation, Mr. Delfin S. Lee, its officers, employees and agents, and such other cases that arose
out of or in relation to the Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation issues

This certification is issued to attest to the truth of the foregoing and for whatever legal purposes it may serve.
10 January 2013

(signed)

ATTY. FIDELA M. TAN

Corporate Auditor

It is immediately discernible, however, that the certification was merely the attestation by Atty. Tan that COA had
concurred in the retainer agreement entered into by and between the HDMF and the Yorac Law Firm. Such
attestation did not establish the written concurrence of the COA on the engagement of the Yorac Law Firm because
it did not state that the copy was a correct copy of the original considering that no copy of COA's written
concurrence was actually attached to the January 10, 2013 certification. Also, it did not thereby appear that Atty.
Tan was the custodian of the records of COA. As the Makati RTC further observed, the attestation had not been
made under the official seal of COA but printed only on the joint letterhead of the HDMF and COA, with the latter's
address being indicated to be in Mandaluyong City when the COA's office was actually located in Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City.  72

Atty. Tan's attestation of the COA's purported concurrence had no evidentiary value due to its non-conformity with
the requirements of Section 24 and Section 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court for presenting the record of a public
document, to wit:

Section 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. x x x

Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. - Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a)

The foregoing bolstered the fact that the attestation, being at best the second-hand opinion of Atty. Tan as a
corporate auditor who did not have the copy of the supposed COA concurrence, could not stand as the written
concurrence of the COA contemplated by law for the purpose.

Nonetheless, even if the January 10, 2013 certification was to be regarded as the written concurrence of the COA,
the fact that it was issued and presented after the Yorac Law Firm had entered its appearance on June 17, 2011 as
counsel of the HDMF should not go unnoticed.  Records reveal that as of December 7, 2011, the COA was still in
73

the process of evaluating the request for the concurrence on the hiring by the HDMF of the Y orac Law Firm.   This 74

forthwith contravened the specific requirement that the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General
or the Government Corporate Counsel, and the written concurrence of the COA should first be secured prior to the
hiring or employment of the private lawyer or law firm.  75

In view of the HDMF's failure to secure the written concurrence of the COA, the Yorac Law Firm could not have
been considered as authorized to represent the HDMF. With the filing of the HDMF's motion for reconsideration vis-
a-vis the January 30, 2012 summary judgment of the Makati RTC being unauthorized, the CA did not err in
upholding the Makati RTC's treatment of the HDMF's motion as a mere scrap of paper.

1.c

The broader interest of justice and the peculiar legal and equitable circumstances herein justified the
relaxation of technical rules

The import of failing to file the motion for reconsideration on the part of the HDMF meant that the 60-day period to
initiate the petition for certiorari should be reckoned from its receipt of the assailed January 30, 2012 summary
judgment. Since the HDMF actually filed the petition for certiorari on January 18, 2013, and thus went beyond the
reglementary period, the petition should be dismissed for being filed out of time.

There are instances, however, when the rigidity of the rule requiring the petition for certiorari to be filed within 60
days from the receipt of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be thereby assailed has been relaxed, such as:
(1) when the most persuasive and weighty reasons obtain; (2) when it is necessary to do so in order to relieve a
litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) in case of
the good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time of the default; (4) when special
or compelling circumstances exist; (5) when the merits of the case so demand; (6) when the cause of the delay was
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) when there
is no showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) when the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; (9) in case of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the appellant's fault; (10)
when the peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case so require; (11) when substantial
justice and fair play are thereby served; (12) when the importance of the issues involved call for the relaxation; (13)
in the exercise of sound discretion by the court guided by all the attendant circumstances; and (14) when the
exceptional nature of the case and strong public interest so demand. 76

Herein, the broader interest of justice and the attendant peculiar legal and equitable circumstances dictated that the
HDMF's petition for certiorari be resolved on its merits despite its filing beyond the reglementary period. The HDMF
believed in good faith that it had duly filed the motion for reconsideration vis-a-vis the January 30, 2012 summary
judgment. Although the Makati RTC noted the HDMF's failure to secure the COA's concurrence, and resolved to
treat the HDMF's motion for reconsideration as a mere scrap of paper, the reglementary period to file the petition
for certiorari had already lapsed, such failure to file on time was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the HDMF.

2.

There was no probable cause for the filing of the information for syndicated estafa and for the issuance of
the warrants of arrest for syndicated estafa against respondents

Delfin Lee, Dexter, Sagun and Alvarez were charged with syndicated estafa, along with Cristina Salagan, on the
basis of the findings of the DOJ that Globe Asiatique had violated its warranties under the FCAs and the July 13,
2009 MOA; that Globe Asiatique had submitted spurious and questionable documents concen1ing the qualifications
of its buyers; that Globe Asiatique had employed fictitious buyers to obtain funds from the HDMF; and that Globe
Asiatique had failed to remit to the HDMF the monthly housing loan amortizations of its buyers in the Xevera Project
in Pampanga.  77

The DOJ concluded thusly:

Given the foregoing the above-named respondents may be charged with the crime of "syndicated estafa" as they fall
within the legal definition of a syndicate. A syndicate is defined as "consisting of five or more persons formed with
the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme and the defraudation results
in the misappropriation of money contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, '"samahang
nayon(s)", or farmers association, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
(Paragraph 1, Section 1, P.D. No. 1689; People of the Philippines v. Vicente Menil, G.R. Nos 115054-66,
September 12, 2009).

xxxx

Having earlier established respondents' commission of estafa, it is pristine clear that the 1st and 2nd elements of the
offense of syndicated estafa has already been satisfied in the instant case. Relative to the 3rd element, we believe
that HDMF falls under the entities listed in P.D. 1689 that can be victimized under such law, as the provision
specifically includes entities which solicited funds from the general public. x x x

It is our considered view that HDMF is, in all respect, a corporation that solicited funds from the general public,
which respondents defrauded through the execution of their illegal scheme. We find as childish respondents' Delfin
and Dexter Lee's argument that the Pag-Ibig fund is a mandatory contribution and does not fall under the term
"solicited funds from the public." It bears to highlight that P.D. 1689 does not distinguish whether the solicited fund is
a voluntary or mandatory contribution. Rather, the essential point is that the funds used by HDMF came from the
general public. 78

On its part, the Pampanga R TC found probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the
respondents only because –

The records would show a huge amount of money that was transferred from the coffers of the PAG IBIG FUND and
released to the GLOBE ASIATIQUE through a complex scheme involving fraudulent buyers at a scale and over a
period of time that could only have been accomplished by and through the sustained supervision and action in
concert of a group of persons for the attainment of the same criminal objective. Hence, the Court finds probable
cause for the existence of a syndicated estafa.  79

The crucial questions before us relate to: (1) the DOJ's finding of probable cause for the filing of the information
against Sagun; and (2) the Pampanga RTC's judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of the
warrant of arrest against the respondents.

The concept of probable cause has been discussed in Napoles v. De Lima  as follows:
80

x x x During preliminary investigation, the prosecutor determines the existence of probable cause for filing an
information in court or dismissing the criminal complaint. As worded in the Rules of Court, the prosecutor determines
during preliminary investigation whether "there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." At this stage, the
determination of probable cause is an executive function. Absent grave abuse of discretion, this determination
cannot be interfered with by the courts. This is consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers.

On the other hand, if done to issue an arrest warrant, the determination of probable cause is a judicial function. No
less than the Constitution commands that "no . . . warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce[.]" This requirement of personal evaluation by the judge is reaffirmed in Rule 112,
Section 5 (a) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:

SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue.-

(a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this
Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the complaint or information. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the determination of probable cause for filing an information in court and that for issuance of an arrest
warrant are different. Once the information is filed in court, the trial court acquires jurisdiction and "any disposition of
the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court."

While the courts are generally not permitted to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch in the
discharge of its function of determining the existence of probable cause during the preliminary investigation,  the81

intervention of the courts may be permitted should there be grave abuse of discretion in determining the existence
of probable cause on the part of the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice.

Thus, in order to settle whether or not the CA correctly reversed the August 10, 2011 Review Resolution of the DOJ
insofar as it found probable cause to charge Sagun with syndicated estafa, and whether or not the warrants of arrest
issued against the respondents should be quashed, it is imperative to discuss the nature of syndicated estafa.

Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689 defines syndicated estafa in the following manner:

SECTION 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315
and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling
(estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the
unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of
money contributed by stockholders or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)", or farmer's
association, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.

When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos.

P.D. No. 1689 seeks to impose a harsher penalty on certain forms of swindling, more particularly,
syndicated estafa. The preamble of the decree recites:

WHEREAS, there is an upsurge in the commission of swindling and other forms of frauds in rural banks,
cooperatives, "samahang nayon (s)'', and farmers' associations or corporations/associations operating on funds
solicited from the general public;

WHEREAS, such defraudation or misappropriation of funds contributed by stockholders or members of such rural
banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)", or farmers' associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public, erodes the confidence of the public in the banking and
cooperative system, contravenes the public interest, and constitutes economic sabotage that threatens the stability
of the nation;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that the resurgence of said crimes be checked, or at least minimized, by imposing
capital punishment on certain forms of swindling and other frauds involving rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang
nayon(s)", farmers' associations or corporations/associations operating on funds solicited from the general public.

P.D. No. 1689 condemns the taking by fraud or deceit of funds contributed by members of rural banks,
cooperatives, samahang nayon or farmers' associations, or of funds solicited by corporations or associations from
the general public as such taking poses a serious threat to the general public. The elements of
syndicated estafa are: (a) estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised
Penal Code, is committed; (b) the estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and (c)
defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by the stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperative, samahang nayon(s), or farmers' associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from
the general public.82

In relation thereto, Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code specifies that:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned herein below shall be
punished by:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:

(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business, or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.

xxxx

The elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code are, namely: (a) that
there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on
the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d)
that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.  83
Based on the foregoing elements of syndicated estafa, the Court holds that the CA did not err in reversing the
August 10, 2011 Review Resolution of the DOJ insofar as Sagun was concerned and in quashing the warrants of
arrest issued against the respondents. In the same manner, we find and so hold that the CA erred in upholding the
propriety of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against Salagan.

2.a

In the case of the respondents, there was no syndicate as defined under P.D. No. 1689

A syndicate is defined by P.D. No. 1689 as consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of
carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme.  The Court has clarified in Remo v.
84

Devanadera that in order for any group to be considered a syndicate under P.D. No. 1689 –
85

On review of the cases applying the law, we note that the swindling syndicate used the association that they
manage to defraud the general public of funds contributed to the association. Indeed, Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1689 speaks of a syndicate formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful scheme
for the misappropriation of the money contributed by the members of the association. In other words, only those
who formed [or] manage associations that receive contributions from the general public who
misappropriated the contributions can commit syndicated estafa. x x x. (Emphasis supplied).

xxxx

Dissecting the pronouncement in Galvez for our present purposes, however, we are able to come up with
the following standards by which a group of purported swindlers may be considered as a syndicate under
PO No. 1689:

1. They must be at least five (5) in number;

2. They must have formed or managed a rural bank, cooperative, "samahang nayon," farmer's association
or any other corporation or association that solicits funds from the general public.

3. They formed or managed such association with the intention of carrying out an unlawful or illegal act,
transaction, enterprise or scheme i.e., they used the very association that they formed or managed as the
means to defraud its own stockholders, members and depositors.

None of the three abovementioned standards for determining the existence of a syndicate was present.

Delfin Lee, Dexter, Sagun, and Salagan were, respectively, the President/Chief Operating Officer, Executive Vice-
President, Head of the Documentation Department, and Head of the Accounting/Finance Department of Globe
Asiatique.  In view of their number being under five, the original charge brought against them was only for
86

simple estafa. It was only in the assailed Review Resolution of August 10, 2011 that SDSP Villanueva
recommended the filing of the charge for syndicated estafa due to the addition of Atty. Alvarez as a co-respondent,
thereby increasing the number of the respondents to at least five. But Atty. Alvarez was the Manager of the HDMF's
Foreclosure Department  whose only connection with Globe Asiatique was by reason of his having rendered
87

notarial services for the latter.  If Atty. Alvarez was not related to Globe Asiatique either by employment or by
88

ownership, he could not be considered as part of the syndicate supposedly formed or managed to defraud its
stockholders, members, depositors or the public. This alone immediately removed the
respondents' supposed association from being found and considered as a syndicate in the context of P.D. No. 1689.

Even assuming that Atty. Alvarez was juridically connected with Globe Asiatique in the context of P.D. No. 1689, the
association of the respondents did not solicit funds from the general public. Globe Asiatique was incorporated in
1994 as a legitimate real-estate developer "to acquire by purchase, lease, donation or otherwise, to own, use,
improve, develop, subdivide, sell, mortgage, exchange, lease, develop and hold for investment or otherwise, real
estate of all kinds, whether improve, manage, or otherwise dispose of buildings, houses, apartments, and other
structures of whatever kind, together with their appurtenances."  It is quite notable, too, that there was no allegation
89

about Globe Asiatique having been incorporated to defraud its stockholders or members. In fact, the HDMF, the only
complainant in the estafa charges, was not itself a stockholder or member of Globe Asiatique.
Moreover, the DOJ concluded that it was the HDMF itself, not Globe Asiatique, that had solicited funds from the
public, to wit:

x x x HDMF falls under the entities listed in PD 1689 that can be victimized under such law, as the provisions
specifically includes entities which solicited funds from the general public. x x x

xxxx

It is our considered view that HDMF is, in all respect, a corporation that solicited funds from the general
public, which respondents defrauded through the execution of their illegal scheme.

We find as childish respondents' Delfin and Dexter Lee's argument that the Pag-ibig fund is a mandatory
contribution and does not fall under the term "solicited funds from the public." It bears to highlight that P.D.
1689 does not distinguish whether the solicited fund is voluntary or mandatory contribution. Rather, the
essential point is that the funds used by HDMF came from the general public. 90

The funds solicited by HDMF from the public were in the nature of their contributions as members of HDMF, and
had nothing to do with their being a stockholder or member of Globe Asiatique.

It is further worth noting that the funds supposedly misappropriated did not belong to Globe Asiatique's stockholders
or members, or to the general public, but to the HDMF. The pecuniary damage pertained to the FCLs extended to
Globe Asiatique through ostensibly fictitious buyers and unremitted monthly housing loan amortizations for the
Xevera Project in Pampanga that were supposedly collected by Globe Asiatique in behalf of the HDMF pursuant to
the FCLs and MOA.

Based on the established circumstances, therefore, it becomes inevitable for the Court to affirm the CA's following
conclusion that:

x x x [T]he statement made by public respondent that there is probable cause because "xxx a huge amount of
money was transferred from the coffers of respondent HDMF and released to GA through a complex scheme xxx
that could only have been accomplished by and through the sustained supervision and action in concert of a group
of persons for the attainment of the same criminal objective," to be in the nature of a speculation only and carries no
weight in the determination of probable cause. Jurisprudence dictates that in the determination of probable cause,
the same should be based on hard facts and solid evidence and not dwell on possibilities, suspicion and
speculation. From the aforequoted paragraph alone, petitioner's (Delfin Lee) participation, if there was any, in the
offense for which he was indicted, was not established or ascertained. Worse, petitioner was not even named.
Neither were his cohorts in the alleged defrauding of respondent HDMF.

Petitioner Lee and his co-accused were charged with syndicated estafa. For estafa to have been committed by a
syndicate, the act must be committed by five or more persons. A considered scrutiny of the assailed Resolution by
public respondent which found probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest against petitioner Lee and his co-
accused, shows that there was no mention that the acts constituting estafa were done by five or more persons. The
resolution merely mentioned "could only have been accomplished by and through the sustained supervision and
action in concert of a group of persons for the attaim1ient of the same criminal objective." Moreover, the amount of
damage incurred by respondent HDMF was not ascertained. It goes without saying that public respondent did not
take it upon herself to determine, based on the evidence submitted, the exact amount of damage incurred by
respondent HDMF. Public respondent merely made a sweeping statement that a huge amount of money was
transferred from the coffers of the PAG-IBIG Fund to GA.

Under the canons of statutory construction, indeed, the determination of the purpose of the law is a step in the
process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment, because the reason for the enactment must
necessarily shed considerable light on "the law of the statute," i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should be
construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose, and the courts should seek to carry out this purpose
rather than to defeat it.  Given the rationale and purpose behind the enactment of P.D. No. 1689, it becomes
91

inevitable to conclude that the crime of syndicated estafa can only be committed by the enumerated groups created
for the sole purpose of defrauding its members through misappropriating the funds solicited from and contributed by
them. Evidently, the evil sought to be prevented by P.D.No. 1689 does not exist in this case.
2.b

Notwithstanding the absence of a syndicate, the respondents made false representations that gave rise to
probable cause for simple estafa against them

In Galvez v. Court of Appeals,   the Court has emphasized that swindling may fall within the ambit of P.D.No. 1689 if
92

it is committed through an association. On the other hand, Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code applies
regardless of the number of the accused when: (a) the entity soliciting funds from the general public is the victim and
not the means through which the estafa is committed, or (b) the offenders are not owners or employees who used
the association to perpetrate the crime.

Having shown that the alleged misappropriation was not committed through Globe Asiatique, we now address
whether or not the acts of the respondents gave rise to probable cause for simple estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of
the Revised Penal Code.

An examination of the records reveals that there is sufficient basis to support a reasonable belief that the
respondents were probably guilty of simple estafa. The first three elements of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of
the Revised Penal Code -- (a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or
fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c)
that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with
his money or property - obtained in this case.

The nature and character of deceit or fraud were explained in Lateo v. People,  to wit:
93

[F]raud in its general sense is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and
concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to
another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all
multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an
advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning,
dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated. And deceit is the false representation of a matter of
fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.

The first two elements of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code are satisfied if the false pretense
or fraudulent act is committed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, it being essential that
such false statement or representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive that induces the offended party
to part with his money.94

In this connection, the DOJ underscored in its assailed Review Resolution that the fraudulent scheme employed by
the respondents involved the "special buyers" arrangement. According to the sinumpaang salaysay of witnesses
Francisco de la Cruz and Veniza Santos Panem, former employees of Globe Asiatique, the "special buyers"
arrangement required:

x x x those who are not yet members of Pag-ibig Fund but who are paid by GA to apply for, and become members
of the Fund in exchange of ₱5,000.00 so that their names membership can be used to take out a housing loan from
Pag-ibig of units from housing projects of GA. They assert that these special buyer have really no intention to buy
housing units from GA projects but merely lend their Pag-ibig Fund membership to GA for a fee on condition that
they will not apply for a loan with Pag-Ibig for a period of two (2) years. The agents/employees of GA are the ones
who recruit these "special buyers" also for a commission. They explain that once recruited, these "special buyers"
are told to sign loan documents for Pag-Ibig but they will not occupy the housing units for which they applied for a
housing loan. These units taken out by Pag-ibig for GA's "special buyers" are then sold to real buyers who buy
direct from GA. Whenever real buyers complaint that the units they bought had not yet been taken-out, they are
made to execute an Affidavit of Undertaking that they are willing to assume the balance on the loan of the "special
buyer" and GA will make it appear to Pag-Ibig that the "special buyer" has changed his mind so that the property
could then be transferred to the real buyer. They further claim that there are more than "special buyers" than real
buyers of GA and that its owners, respondents Delfin and Dexter Lee, themselves ordered the employees to recruit
"special buyers".
Witness Panem also asserted in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that "special buyers" are also employed by GA in its
transactions with banks, like the RCBC and PNB. One of the enticement for these "special buyers", aside from the
₱5,000.00 fee, is that they are assured that they will not pay for the housing loan they applied for with Pag-Ibig as in
fact it is GA that pays for their housing loans. She also alleged that GA's employees sometimes use fictitious names
as "special buyers".95

Allegedly using the "special buyers" scheme, Globe Asiatique entered into the FCAs with the HDMF during the
period from August 12, 2008 to July 10, 2009 wherein Globe Asiatique represented that: (a) the buyers of its real
estate projects were members of Pag-Ibig, hence, qualified to apply for the takeout loans under the Pag-Ibig
Housing Loan Program; (b) the members-borrowers and their respective housing loan applications had been
properly evaluated and approved in accordance with the applicable guidelines of the Pag-Ibig Housing Loan
Program prior to their endorsement to the Pag-Ibig Fund; (c) that all documents submitted to the Pag-Ibig Fund,
inclusive of the individual titles and the corresponding Deeds of Assignment, were valid, binding, and enforceable in
all other respects that they purported to be; (d) that any person or agent employed or allowed to transact or do
business in its behalf had not committed any act of misrepresentation; and (e) that all pertinent laws, rules and
regulations had been complied with, among others.  As the result thereof, the HDMF extended the FCLs in favor of
96

Globe Asiatique amounting to ₱2.9 billion.

On July 13, 2009, the MOA was forged between the HDMF and Globe Asiatique for the latter to again avail of a loan
takeout from the HDMF. Accordingly, additional FCAs were extended to Globe Asiatique totaling ₱3.55 billion. While
the MOA did not contain the same representations made in the previous FCAs, it nevertheless required Globe
Asiatique to undertake the following corrective measures in case defects in the HDMF membership and housing
loan eligibilities of the buyers should arise, namely:

1) Require the borrower to complete the required number of contributions, in case the required 24 monthly
contributions is not met;

2) Require the borrower to update membership contributions, in case the membership status is inactive;

3) Require the borrower to update any existing Multi-Purpose Loan (MPL) if its in arrears or pay in full if the same
has lapsed;

4) Buyback the account in case the member has a HDMF housing loan that is outstanding, cancelled, bought back,
foreclosed or subject of dacion-en-pago.  97

Had Globe Asiatique, through the respondents, not made the foregoing representations and undertaking, the HDMF
would not have entered into the FCAs and granted the loan takeouts to Globe Asiatique to its damage and
prejudice.

We next determine the individual participation of the respondents in the "special buyers" scheme.

In Ching v. Secretary of Justice,  the Court declared that corporate officers or employees through whose act, default
98

or omission the corporation commits a crime were themselves individually guilty of the crime. The Court expounded
why:

The principle applies whether or not the crime requires the consciousness of wrongdoing. It applies to those
corporate agents who themselves commit the crime and to those, who, by virtue of their managerial positions or
other similar relation to the corporation, could be deemed responsible for its commission, if by virtue of their
relationship to the corporation, they had the power to prevent the act. Moreover, all parties active in promoting a
crime, whether agents or not, are principals.. Whether such officers or employees are benefited by their delictual
acts is not a touchstone of their criminal liability. Benefit is not an operative fact.

The DOJ aptly noted that the following acts of the respondents rendered them criminally accountable for
perpetrating the "special buyers" scheme and causing pecuniary damage to the HDMF: Delfin Lee, for signing the
FCAs and MOA in behalf of Globe Asiatique, and the checks issued by Globe Asiatique to the "'special buyers" and
the HDMF;  Dexter, for giving the orders to recruit "special buyers" and co-signing those checks issued to the
99

special buyers and HDMF;   Sagun, head of Globe Asiatiques's Documentation Department, for collating the
100
documents submitted by the borrowers/buyers, checking if the same are complete and duly accomplished, and for
verifying whether or not said borrowers/buyers are indeed Pag-Ibig members with updated contributions or existing
housing loans;   and Salagan, head of Globe Asiatique's Accounting/Finance Department, for reviewing all
101

requests for payment from on-site projects and preparing the corresponding checks, ensuring that all loan takeouts
are duly recorded, and that amortizations are timely remitted to HDMF.  102

We agree that the concerted acts of the respondents could manifest a common criminal design to make it appear
that Globe Asiatique had numerous qualified borrowers/buyers that would satisfy the HDMF's conditions for the loan
takeouts. Their acts, taken collectively, would probably support a charge of conspiracy, and suggest that they
participated in the transactions with a view to furthering the common design and purpose.  103

As for Atty. Alvarez, we do not subscribe to the CA's view that his act of notarizing various documents, consisting of
the individual buyer's affidavit of income, promissory note and developer's affidavit, which were material for the
processing and approval of the transactions,   was insufficient to establish his having been part of the conspiracy in
104

the execution of the "special buyers" scheme. In our view, the DOJ had reasonable basis to hold against him thusly:

x x x Atty. Alvarez knew, participated and consented to the illegal scheme perpetrated by respondents Delfin and
Dexter Lee, Christina Sagun and Cristina Salagan. It should be underscored that Atty. Alvarez notarized crucial
pieces of documents, consisting of the buyer's affidavit of income, promissory note, and developer's affidavit (by Ms.
Cristina Sagun) alleging compliance with the conditions set by HDMF, all of which are essential for the processing
and approval of the purported transaction. We also find the defense of Atty. Alvarez as self-serving, to say the least,
considering that part of his job as a notary public is to ascertain the identity of the affiant appearing before him. As it
turns out, a large number of the said affiants are either fictitious and/or non-existing, thereby enabling the execution
of the grand scheme of his co-respondents. It bears to note that his actions, apart from evidencing his conspiracy,
assent and/or cooperation in the accomplishment of the fraud, also constitutes a clear violation of Section 7,
Paragraph B (2) of Republic Act No. 6713. also known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees.  105

In view of the foregoing: the amendment of the information to charge simple estafa is warranted pursuant
to Hao v. People,   to wit:
106

With our conclusion that probable cause existed for the crime of simple estafa and that the petitioners have probably
committed it, it follows that the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the petitioners remains to be valid and
proper. To allow them to go scot-free would defeat rather than promote the purpose of a warrant of arrest, which is
to put the accused in the court's custody to avoid his flight from the clutches of justice.

Moreover, we note that simple estafa and syndicated estafa are not two entirely different crimes. Simple estafa is a
crime necessarily included in syndicated estafa. An offense is necessarily included in another offense when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

Under this legal situation, only a formal amendment of the filed information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court is necessary; the warrants of arrest issued against the petitioners should not be nullified since probable
cause exists for simple estafa.

3.

The conduct of the preliminary investigation by the DOJ was invalidly enjoined

In support of its move to reverse and set aside the adverse resolutions of the CA, the DOJ argues in C.A.-G.R. No.
208744 and C.A.-G.R. No. 210095 that the CA should not have dismissed its petition for certiorari for being
allegedly filed out of time because there existed special and compelling reasons to justify the relaxation of the
procedural rules. Worthy to note is that the CA had denied petitioner's motion for special extension of time to file the
petition for certiorari because there was no compelling reason to extend the period for doing so.

Under Section 4,   Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, any aggrieved party has a
107

non-extendible period of 60 days from receipt of the assailed decision, order or resolution within which to file the
petition for certiorari. The period is non-extendible to avoid causing any unreasonable delay that would violate the
constitutional rights of parties to the speedy disposition of the case.   Regrettably, when the DOJ finally filed the
108

petition for certiorari during the extended period sought, the petition lacked the proper docket number due to
inadvertence, which prompted the CA to assign a new docket number to the petition. This move on the part of the
CA resulted in the outright dismissal of the petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.

In view of the obtaining circumstances, we find merit in the DOJ's argument.

In Vallejo v. Court of Appeals,  the Court allowed the petition filed almost four months beyond the reglementary
109

period to proceed. We emphasized therein that meritorious cases should be allowed to proceed despite their
inherent procedural defects and lapses in keeping with the principle that the rules of procedure were but tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and that the strict and rigid application of rules that would allow
technicalities to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. The Court explained that
excusing a technical lapse and affording the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, instead of
disposing of the case on technicality and thereby causing grave injustice to the parties, would be a far better and
more prudent course of action.

Time and again, the Court, in resolving the OSG's requests for extension, has taken cognizance of the heavy
workload of that office. It should not be any different now. Worthy to note is that the OSG, representing the DOJ,
offered suitable explanations and apologies, like the associate solicitor in charge of filing the petition having been
rushed to the hospital and thus being denied the opportunity to supervise or see to the filing of the intended petition.
Also, the omission of the docket number from the petition that was ultimately filed did not look as if it was aimed
either to delay the proceedings or to confuse the CA. The explanation for the delay in the filing of the petition in the
CA tendered by the OSG thereon, coupled with its invocation of liberality or the relaxation of the rules, was fully
acceptable. As such, the petition should be allowed to proceed. We further find that the CA's dismissal of the
petition was disproportionate to the inadvertence committed considering the substantial merits of the DOJ's case.
Verily, the petition deserves to be given due course and resolved in view of the fact that the injunction issued by the
RTC against the DOJ on the conduct of the preliminary investigation was a patent nullity on its very face.

We now go to the merits of the petitions in C.A.-G.R. No. 208744 and C.A.-G.R. No. 210095.

The Pasig RTC issued the assailed April 10, 2013 order enjoining the DOJ from proceeding with the preliminary
investigation of the second, third, and fourth complaints for syndicated estafa against Globe Asiatique, et
al. because of its impression that the summary judgment rendered by the Makati RTC in favor of Globe Asiatique
had effectively removed the indispensable element of damage from the criminal complaints.   The Pasig RTC
110

undeniably gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.

It is an established judicial policy that injunction cannot be used as a tool to thwart criminal prosecutions because
investigating the criminal acts and prosecuting their perpetrators right away have always been in the interest of the
public. Such policy is intended to protect the public from criminal acts. The Pasig RTC could not feign ignorance of
such policy, especially considering that the CA's previous ruling against its issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction had been affirmed by this Court with finality. The CA also observed then:

[I]njunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because public interest requires that criminal acts be
immediately investigated and protected (sic) for the protection of society. It is only in extreme cases that injunction
will lie to stop criminal prosecution. Public respondent Judge anchored his issuance of the writ on the existence of a
prejudicial question. However, this Court finds that the facts and issues in the Makati civil case are not determinative
of Lee's guilt or innocence in the cases filed before the DOJ. Verily public respondent Judge committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when he issued the writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the DOJ from filing an information of estafa against Lee in the first DOJ case and from proceeding with the
preliminary investigation in the second DOJ case.  111

We emphasize yet again that the conduct of a preliminary investigation, being executive in nature, was vested in the
DOJ. As such, the injunction issued by the Pasig RTC inexcusably interfered with the DOJ's mandate under Section
3(2), Chapter 1; Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 to investigate the commission of crimes and to
prosecute the offenders.

Equally worthy of emphasis is that the ruling of the CA in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 121594 attained finality after the Court
reviewed such ruling in G.R. No. 201360. Considering that the petitions against the DOJ arose from the same
factual milieu and sought the same relief, which was to restrain the DOJ from conducting preliminary investigations
against Globe Asiatique and its officers and employees upon the complaints filed before the DOJ, and considering
further that the cases involved the same parties and reprised the arguments, the doctrine of the law of the case
certainly applied to bar a different outcome. At the very least, the Pasig RTC should have been very well instructed
thereby, and should have avoided the incongruous situation of ignoring what was already the clear law of the case.

The doctrine of the law of the case precludes departure in a subsequent proceeding essentially involving the same
case from a rule previously made by an appellate court. Applying this doctrine, the Court in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Suntay  held that:
112

We underscore that Land Bank v. Suntay (G.R. No. 157903) was the appropriate case for the determination of the
issue of the finality of the assailed RARAD Decision by virtue of its originating from Land Bank's filing on April 20,
2001 of its petition for judicial determination of just compensation against Suntay and RARAD Miñas in the RTC
sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Therein, Suntay filed a motion to dismiss mainly on the ground that the petition
had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period as required by Section 11, Rule XIII of the Rules of
Procedure of DARAB. After the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, Land Bank appealed to the CA, which sustained
the dismissal. As a result, Land Bank came to the Court (G.R. No. 157903), and the Court then defined the decisive
issue to be: "whether the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank's petition for the determination of just
compensation."

The Court ruled in favor of Land Bank. For both Land Bank and Suntay (including his assignee Lubrica), the holding
in Land Bank v. Suntay (G.R. No. 157903) became the law of the case that now controlled the course of subsequent
proceedings in the RTC as a Special Agrarian Court. In Cucueco v. Court of Appeals, the Court defined law of the
case as "the opinion delivered on a former appeal." Law of the case is a term applied to an established rule that
when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the
question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. With the pronouncement in G.R. No.
157903 having undeniably become the law of the case between the parties, we cannot pass upon and rule again on
the same legal issue between the same parties.  113

Indeed, the issue submitted for the Pasig RTC's dete1n1ination had been resolved by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
121594 to the effect that the Pasig RTC could not enjoin the DOJ from proceeding with the preliminary investigation
of the second complaint. As far as the parties were concerned, therefore, the propriety of the DOJ's conduct of the
preliminary investigation was no longer an unresolved issue. But by issuing the writ of preliminary injunction yet
again to prevent the preliminary investigation of the second and subsequent complaints by the DOJ, the Pasig RTC
acted with manifest whimsicality that amounted to gross and patent abuse of discretion. Such action was void and
ineffectual.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS:

(1) The petitions for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 209424 and, accordingly, ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the
decision promulgated on October 7, 2013 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. SP No. 128262;
REVERSES the resolution of December 11, 2012 issued in Civil Case No. 10-1120 by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 58, in Makati City declaring the partial summary judgment rendered on January 30, 2012 final and
executory; PRONOUNCES that the partial summary judgment rendered on January 30, 2012 may still be appealed
by the aggrieved party upon rendition of the final judgment in Civil Case No. 10-1120; and DIRECTS the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 58, in Makati City to conduct further proceedings in Civil Case No. 10-1120 with dispatch; and

(2) The petitions for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 208744 and G.R. No. 210095 and,

accordingly, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the resolution promulgated on July 8, 2013 in C.A.-G.R. No. 130404
denying the motion for extension of the Department of Justice, and the resolution promulgated on August 14, 2013
denying the motion to admit petition for certiorari filed by the Department of Justice; LIFTS and QUASHES the writ
of preliminary injunction issued on April 10, 2013 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 167, in Pasig City enjoining the
preliminary investigation for the second, third and fourth criminal complaints filed against the respondents on the
ground that such writ of preliminary injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; DECLARES that the Department of Justice may now resume the preliminary investigation of the
remaining criminal complaints against the respondents for simple estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code; and ORDERS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 167, in Pasig City to dismiss Civil Case No. 73115
entitled Delfin S. Lee v. Department of Justice.

The Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 205698, G.R. No. 205780, G.R.
No. 209446, G.R. No. 209489, G.R. No. 209852, G.R. No. 210143, G.R. No. 228452, G.R. No. 228730 and G.R.
No. 230680 and, accordingly:

(1) DIRECTS the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE to amend the information in Criminal Case No. 18480

entitled People of the Philippines v. Delfin Lee, Dexter L. Lee, Christina Sagun. Cristina Salagan, and Atty. Alex
Alvarez of the Regional Trial Court Branch 42, in San Fernando City,Pampanga to charge respondents DELFIN S.
LEE, DEXTER L. LEE, CHRISTINA SAGUN, CRlSTINA SALAGAN and ALEX M. ALVAREZ with
simple estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code; and

(2) ORDERS the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, in San Fernando City, Pampanga to
suspend proceedings in Criminal Case No. 18480 pending the filing by the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE of the
amended information as directed herein, and to try the respondents as the accused in Criminal Case No. 18480 in
accordance therewith, without prejudice to acting on any matter incidental to the conduct of the trial of a criminal
case, including applications for bail.
66.) G.R. No. 210612

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ERVIN Y. MATEO, EVELYN E. MATEO, CARMELITA B. GALVEZ, ROMEO L. ESTEBAN, GALILEO
J. SAPORSANTOS and NENITA S. SAPORSANTOS, Accused
ERVIN Y. MATEO, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant Ervin Y. Mateo (Mateo) assailing the Decision  of
1

the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 16, 2012, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04001, which affirmed with modification the
Judgment  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch .132, in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2936 and 03-
2

2987, finding Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of syndicated estafa, as defined and penalized
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689  (PD 1689), and
3

imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment for each count and to pay actual damages to the private
complainants.

The antecedents are as follows:

In March 2001, private complainant Herminia Alcid, Jr. (Herminia, Jr.) met a certain Geraldine

Alejandro (Geraldine) who introduced herself as the head of the Business Center of MMG International Holdings
Co., Ltd. (MMG). Geraldine was then soliciting investments and has shown a brochure showcasing the investments
and businesses of the said entity. Herminia, Jr. was also shown Articles of Partnership to prove that MMG is
registered with the 'Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Articles of Partnership showed accused-
appellant as a general partner who has contributed ₱49,750,000.00 to MMG. The other accused were shown to be
limited partners who have contributed ₱50,000.00 each. Convinced by the representations of Geraldine, Herminia,
Jr. invested ₱50,000.00 with MMG on April 20, 2002. Subsequently, all the interests and principal were promptly
paid, which induced him to make a bigger investment. On May 2, 2002, Herminio, Jr. and his father, Herminia, Sr.,
made a joint investment of ₱200,000.00. Later, Geraldine was also able to convince Herminia, Jr.'s sister, .Melanie,
who made an investment of ₱50,000.00 with MMG. The private complainants' investments were covered by a
notarized Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), signed by accused-appellant, which stipulated, among others, that
MMG was being represented by its President, herein accused-appellant, and that the investors will be earning
2.5o/o monthly interest income from the capital they have invested. Subsequently, the complainants received
several post-dated checks covering their investments. However, when they tried to deposit the checks, their banks
informed them that these were dishonored because MMG's accounts in the bank from which the checks were drawn
were already closed. The complainants then demanded from the accused the return of their money, but their
demands were unheeded. The private complainants and other investors then went to the SEC to file a complaint,
where they discovered that MMG was not a registered issuer of securities. The SEC forwarded their complaint to the
City Prosecutor of Makati.

Subsequently, on April 11, 2003, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Makat1 City filed two separate Informations  with
4

the RTC of Makati City charging accused-appellant, together with Evelyn E. Mateo, Carmelita B. Galvez, Romeo L.
Esteban, Galileo J. Saporsantos and Nenita S. Saporsantos with the crime of syndicated estafa. The Informations
were similarly worded, except as to the dates of the commission of the crime, the names of the complainants, and
the amounts obtained from them, as follows:

xxxx

That on or about the 2nd day of May (09th day of July) 2002 prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Philippines, said
accused, being officers, employees and/or agents of Mateo Management Group Holding Company, a corporation
operating on funds solicited from the public, conspiring, or confederating with, and mutually helping one another,
and operating as a syndicate, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud complainants
HERMINIO ALCID, SR. and HERMINIO ALCID, JR. (MELANIE ALCID) by means of false pretenses or fraudulent
acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud to the effect that they have the business,
property and power to solicit and accept investments and deposits from the general public and the capacity to pay
the complainants guaranteed monthly returns (interest) on investment from two point five percent (2.5%) and
lucrative commissions, and by means of other deceits of similar import, induced and succeeded in inducing
complainants to invest, deposit, give and deliver as in fact the latter gave and delivered to said accused the total
amount of ₱200,000.00 (₱50,000.00) as investment or deposit, accused knowing fully well that said pretenses and
representations are a fraudulent scheme to enable them to obtain said amount, and thereafter, having in their
possession said amount, with intent to gain and to defraud, misappropriated and converted the same to their own
personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said complainants in the said amount.

Contrary to law.

xxx 5

On motion of the prosecution, and without objection on the part of the defense, the Informations were subsequently
amended where the third and fourth lines of the Informations, as quoted above, were made to read as follows: " ...
being partners, officers, employees and/or agents of MMG; International Holdings Company, Ltd." 6

The above cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 03-2936 and 03-2987.

Similar cases for estafa and syndicated estafa, totalling 209, were also filed against the accused.

Among the accused, only accused-appellant was arrested and when arraigned on February 19, 2004, he pleaded
not guilty to all the charges.
7

Pre-trial  was then conducted. Thereafter, Criminal Case Nos. 03-2936 and 03-2987 were jointly tried.
8

After the prosecution rested its case, the defense, represented by private counsel, failed to present its evidence
despite several re-settings made by the RTC.  Thus, upon motion of the prosecution, the case was deemed
9

submitted for resolution.

10

On October 22, 2008, the RTC rendered its Judgment finding accused-appellant guilty as charged, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 03-2936, the Court finds the accused, Ervin Y. Mateo, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Syndicated Estafa penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.
Likewise, Ervin Y. Mateo is held solidarity liable with MMG International Holdings Company, Ltd. to pay private
complainant[s] Herminio Alcid, Jr. and Herminio Alcid, Sr. ₱206,000.00 as actual damages.

In Criminal Case No. 03-2987, the Court finds the accused, Ervin Y. Mateo, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Syndicated Estafa penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential
Decree No. 1689 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. Likewise, Ervin Y. Mateo is
held solidarily liable with MMG International Holdings Company, Ltd. to pay private complainant Melanie
Alcid ₱59,702.61 as actual damages.

SO ORDERED. 11

The RTC found that all the elements of the crime of syndicated estafa are present, to wit: (1) MMG was formed by
accused-appellant, together with five (5) other persons; (2) accused-appellant, together with his co-accused,
committed fraud in inducing private complainants to part with their money; and (3) the fraud resulted in the
misappropriation of the money contributed by the private complainants.

Accused-appellant appealed the RTC Decision with the CA. 12

On July 16, 2012, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision affirming the judgment of the RTC in toto.
The CA held, among others, that, contrary to accused-appellant's position, PD 1689 contemplates estafa as defined
and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC. The CA also held that all the elements of syndicated
estafa are present in the instant case.

On August 8, 2013, accused-appellant, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal  manifesting his intention to appeal
13

the CA Decision to this Court.

In its Resolution dated August 29, 2013, the CA gave due course to accused-appellant's Notice of Appeal and
ordered the elevation of the records of the case to this Court.
14

Hence, this appeal was instituted.

In a Resolution  dated March 5, 2014, this Court, among others, notified the parties that they may file their
15

respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire.

In its Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief)  dated May 6, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General
16

(OSG) informed this Court that it will no longer file a supplemental brief because it had already exhaustively
addressed in its brief filed before the CA all the issues and arguments raised by accused-appellant in his brief.

On the other hand, accused-appellant filed a Supplemental Brief  on June 30, 2014, raising the following issues:
17

A. WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED-APPELLANT MAY BE CONVICTED WITH ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315,
PARAGRAPH 2(A) IN RELATION TO P.D. 1689.

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE ELEMENT OF DEFRAUDATION WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
BY THE PROSECUTION.

C. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUFFICIENT QUANTUM OF PROOF TO WARRANT THE CONVICTION OF

APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT IN THE CHALLENGED
DECISION.

D. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-[APPELLANT] MAY BE CONVICTED IN THE ABOVEMENTIONED

CASES DESPITE THE STAY ORDER ISSUED BY THE COMMERCIAL COURT, RTC, BRANCH 256,
MUNTINLUPA CITY, FOR THE CORPORATE REHABILITATION OF MMG GROUP INCLUDING MMG
HOLDINGS.

E. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE
ERRORS IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND THE SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION. 18

The appeal lacks merit.

Anent the first issue raised, the Court does not agree with accused-appellant's contention that he may not be
found guilty of violating PD 1689 in relation to estafa under Article 315 (2)(a)  of the RPC on the ground that
19

the only kind of estafa contemplated under PD 1689 is that .defined under Article 315 (1)(b)  of the RPC and
20

not the kind of estafa falling under Article 315 (2)(a) of the same Code.

Section 1 of PD 1689 provides as follows:

Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315 and
316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling
(estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the
unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of
money contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)", or farmers
association, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusion temporal
to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos.

Suffice it to say that it has been settled in a number of cases  that estafa, as defined under Article 315 (2)(a) of the
21

RPC, is one of the kinds of swindling contemplated under PD 1689.

Under the second and third issues raised by accused-appellant, he argues that, insofar as he is concerned, the
element of defraudation was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the prosecution failed to prove that he
personally transacted or dealt with the private complainants. The Court is not persuaded.

The elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315 (2 )(a) of the RPC are the following: (a) that
there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent
representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that
the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part
with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 22

In addition, fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts,
omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed,
resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.  It is a 23

generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise, and which are resorted to by one
individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all
surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated.  On the other hand, deceit is
24

the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by
concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he
shall act upon it to his legal injury.
25

In relation to the above, the elements of syndicated estafa as defined under Section 1 of PD 1689 are:
(a) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed; (b) the estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five or ·more persons; and (c)
defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural
banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers' associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public. 26

With respect to the presence of the elements of fraud and deceit, the Court agrees with the arguments and
conclusions of the OSG, to wit:

In pursuit of their fraudulent investment scheme, appellant and his partners formed a partnership which, by its
Amended Article of Partnership, had the end in view "to acquire, manage, own, hold, buy, sell, and/or encumber
securities or equity participation of other persons, partnership, corporation, or any other entities, as permitted or may
be authorized by law as well as to [purchase] or otherwise acquire the whole or any [part] of the property, assests,
business and goodwill of any other persons, firm, corporation or association and to conduct in any lawful measures
the business so acquired and to express all the powers necessary or [convenient] in and about the conduct,
management and carrying on of such business. However, the [partnership] shall not engage in stock brokerage or
dealership of securities."

In violation thereof, the people behind the partnership were effectively engaging in the sale of securites by enticing
the public to "invest" funds with MMG International Holdings Co., Ltd. offering a promise of a two point five percent
(2.5%) monthly compensation out of the capital on their investment. These investment activities were clearly ultra
vires acts or acts beyond the partnership's authority.

In fact, Atty. Justine Callangan, Director of the Corporate Finance Division of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, issued on February 10, 2003 a Certification that based on the records of the Commission, MMG
International Holdings Co. Ltd. is not a registered issuer of securities. She explained in her testimony that the
partnership has not been issued a permit or a secondary license or franchise to go to the public and offer to sell any
form of securities which means that the partnership cannot offer or sell shares of stocks or equity, securities,
investment contracts, debt instruments like short-term or long-term commercial papers to more than nineteen (19)
people without any prior licensing from the Commission. In plain language, Atty. Callangan stated that soliciting
funds from the public is a form of issuing securities, which MMG International Holdings Co. Ltd. was not authorized
to do so.

Apparently, registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission was procured by MMG International Holdings
Co. Ltd. only for the purpose of giving a semblance of legitimacy to the partnership; that the partnership's business
was sanctioned by the government and that it was allowed by law to accept investments.

In carrying out the nefarious transactions, MMG International Holdings Co. Ltd. even published its own brochure
entitled "Alliance" which was shown to potential investors showcasing that it had the following businesses to finance
the promised earnings: a condotel (MMG Condotel), a realty company (Mateo Realty and Development
Corporation), schools (MMG Academy, Mateo College and Technical Foundation, Inc., MMG Computer Learning
Center, Mateo Institute of Computer Studies), consumer products manufacturing businesses (M-Power Enterprises,
Inc.), an insurance firm (Mateo Pre-Need Plans), retail establishments (MMG International Trading Corporation),
movie outfit (MMG Films International) and a shipping line (Mateo Maritime Management), among others.  Be that1âwphi1

as it may, there was no evidence presented by the partnership to bolster their representations of being engaged in
these so-called bustling business endeavors.

Evidently, the testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution more than amply proved that appellant, together
with his partners, employed fraud and deceit upon trusting individuals in order to convince them to invest in MMG
International Holdings Co. Ltd. It may even be observed that there was a uniform pattern employed in selling their
proposition as shown by how potential investors are ensnared by appellant and his partners, through MMG
International Holdings Co. Ltd. Business Center Head Geralding Alejandro. First, they would make a presentation of
the "Alliance" brochure featuring the businesses the company professes to own and combine with the
misrepresentation that they had the technical know-how and false promise of two point five percent (2.5%) monthly
compensation out of the capital on their investment. 27

Thus, in the present case, it is clear that all the elements of syndicated estafa, are present, considering that: (a) the
incorporators/directors of MMG comprising more than five (5) people, including herein accused-appellant, made
false. pretenses and representations to the investing public - in this case, the private complainants - regarding a
supposed lucrative investment opportunity with MMG in order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false
pretenses and representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the
same, private complainants invested their hard-earned money into MMG; and (d) the incorporators/directors of
MMG ended up running away with the private complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice.

Accused-appellant insists that the prosecution failed· to prove the element of defraudation because no sufficient
evidence was presented to prove that he "personally, physically and actually performed any 'false pretenses' and/or
'fraudulent representations' against the private complainants."  The Court does not agree. Accused-appellant should
28

be reminded that he is being accused of syndicated estafa in conspiracy with the other co-accused. In this regard,
the Court finds no error in the finding of the CA that herein appellant and his co-accused are guilty of conspiracy, to
wit:

xxxx

The evidence adduced by the prosecution established the existence of conspiracy among the accused in
committing the crime charged. They started by forming the partnership. All of them had access to MMG Holding's
bank accounts. They composed the Members of the Board of Directors that manage and control the business
transactions of MMG Holdings. Without the participation of each of the accused, MMG Holdings could not have
solicited funds from the general public and succeeded to perpetrate their fraudulent scheme. Hence, each of them is
a co-conspirator by virtue of indispensable cooperation in the fraudulent acts of the partnership.

xxx 29

In the instant case, it was not necessary for the prosecution to still prove .that accused-appellant himself
"personally, physically and actually performed any 'false pretenses' and/or 'fraudulent representations' against the
private complainants," given the findings of both the RTC and the CA of the existence of conspiracy among
appellant and his co-accused. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.  It is not essential that there
30

be actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every act.  It is sufficient that they acted in concert
31

pursuant to the same objective.  In any case, appellant's direct participation in the conspiracy is evidenced by the
32
findings of the CA· that: (1) the Articles of Partnership of MMG named appellant as the sole general partner with a
capital contribution of ₱49,750,000.00; (2) his signatures appear in the MOA entered into by the complainants and
facilitated by his co-accused Geraldine Alejandro; (3) his signatures also appear in the Secretary's Certificate and
Signature Cards which were submitted to Allied Bank when the partnership opened an account; (4) the MOA are
notarized and it was only on appeal that he denied his signatures appearing therein or questioned the authenticity
and due execution of the said documents. Indeed, it cannot be denied that accused-appellant, together with the rest
of his co-accused, participated in a network of deception. The active involvement of each in the scheme of soliciting
investments was directed at one single purpose - which is to divest complainants of their money on the pretext of
guaranteed high return of investment. Without a doubt, the nature and extent of the actions of accused-appellant, as
well as with the other persons in MMG show unity of action towards a common undertaking. Hence, conspiracy is
evidently present.

As to accused-appellant's contention that his signatures appearing in the questioned documents are mere facsimile
signatures, this Court has held that a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical
means, is recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.  Besides, as earlier mentioned, the
33

MOA where accused-appellant's signature appears, was notarized and that it was only on appeal that he denied
authenticity of such signatures and questioned the due execution of the concerned documents. Also, the same
facsimile signature, together with the other facsimile and stamped signatures of appellant's co-accused, were used
in opening a bank account in the name of MMG where accused-appellant was one of the authorized signatories. As
found by the CA, the bank used and recognized these facsimile and stamped signatures in transacting with
appellant and his co-accused without any complaints from them. Thus, accused-appellant cannot deny the binding
effect of the subject signatures.

With respect to the fourth issue raised, the matter to be resolved is whether the suspension of all claims as an
incident to MMG Group of Companies'. corporate rehabilitation also contemplate the suspension of criminal charges
filed against herein accused-appellant as an officer of the distressed corporation.

This Court rules in the negative.

Citing the case of Rosario v. Co,   the ruling of this Court in Panlilio, et al. v. RTC, Branch 51, City of Manila, et
34

al.,   to wit:

35

xxxx

x x x There is no reason why criminal proceedings should be suspended during corporate rehabilitation, more so,
since the prime purpose of the criminal action is .to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to
maintain social order. As correctly observed in Rosario, it would be absurd for one who has engaged in criminal
conduct could escape punishment by the mere filing of a petition for rehabilitation by the corporation of which he is
an officer.

The prosecution of the officers of the corporation has no bearing on the pending rehabilitation of the corporation,
especially since they are charged in their individual capacities. Such being the case, the purpose of the law for the
issuance of the stay order is not compromised, since the appointed rehabilitation receiver can still fully discharge his
functions as mandated by law. It bears to stress that the rehabilitation receiver is not charged to defend the officers
of the corporation. If there is anything that the rehabilitation receiver might be remotely interested in is whether the
court also rules that petitioners are civilly liable. Such a scenario, however, is not a reason to suspend the criminal
proceedings, because as aptly discussed in Rosario, should the court prosecuting the officers of the corporation find
that an award or indemnification is warranted, such award would fall under the category of claims, the execution of
which would be subject to the stay order issued by the rehabilitation court. x x x

x x x. 36

As to the last issue raised, accused-appellant insists that his acquittal of the same offense charged in several other
cases only proves that he never committed the said crime of syndicated estafa. Accused-appellant's logic is
skewed. The fact that he was acquitted in several other cases for the same offense charged does not necessarily
follow that he should also be found innocent in the present case. His acquittal in the cases he mentioned was due to
the prosecution's failure to present sufficient evidence to convict him of the offense charged. These cases involved
different parties, factual millieu and sets of evidence. In the present case, both the RTC and the CA found that the
evidence presented by the prosecution is enough to prove that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes of syndicated estafa. After a review of the evidence presented, this Court finds no cogent reason to
depart from the findings of the RTC and the CA.

Finally, the Court notes the recent passage into law of Republic Act No. 10951 (RA 10951), otherwise known as "AN
ACT ADJUSTING THE AMOUNT OR THE VALUE OF PROPERTY AND DAMAGE ON WHICH A PENALTY IS
BASED, AND THE FINES IMPOSED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
ACT NO. 3815, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE REVISED PENAL CODE", AS AMENDED. Consistent with the
settled principle that an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review, the Court finds it proper to
look into the applicability or non-applicability of the amendatory provisions of RA 10951 to the present case.

The amendments under RA 10951 were passed with the primary objective of adjusting the amounts or the values
of the property and damage on which a penalty is based for various crimes committed under the RPC, including
estafa. Section 85 of RA 10951 makes mention of PD 1689 as one of the laws which amends Article 315 of the
RPC.

On the other hand, it should be considered that PD 1689 is a special law which was enacted for the specific purpose
of defining syndicated estafa and imposing a specific penalty for the commission of the said offense.  Thus, the law
1âwphi1

emphatically states its intent in its ''WHEREAS" clauses, to wit:

xxxx

WHEREAS, there is an upsurge in the commission of swindling and other forms of frauds in rural banks,
cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s) ", and farmers' associations or corporations/associations operating on funds
solicited from the general public;

WHEREAS, such defraudation or misappropriation of funds contributed by stockholders or members of such rural
banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s) ", or farmers' associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public, erodes the confidence of the public in the banking and
cooperative system, contravenes the public interest, and constitutes economic sabotage that threatens the stability
of the nation;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that the resurgence of said crimes be checked, or at least minimized, by imposing
capital punishment on certain forms of swindling and other frauds involving rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang
nayon(s)", farmers' associations or corporations/associations operating on funds solicited from the general public;

x x x."

Notably, the first paragraph of PD 1689 penalizes offenders with life imprisonment to death regardless of the
amount or value of the property or damage involved, provided that a syndicate committed the crime. 37

Moreover, from the provisions of RA 10951, there appears no manifest intent to repeal or alter the penalty for
syndicated estafa. If there was such an intent, then the amending law should have clearly so indicated because
implied repeals are not favored.  Thus, unlike the specific amendments introduced by RA 10951 to the penalties on
38

estafa committed by means of bouncing checks, as defined under Article 315 (2)(d) and amended by Republic Act
No. 4885  and Presidential Decree No. 818,  nowhere in RA 10951 was it clearly shown that the legislature
39 40

intended to repeal or amend the provisions of PD 1689. As much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments
of the legislature.  A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere
41

implication.  Furthermore, for an implied repeal, a pre-condition must be found, that is, a substantial conflict should
42

exist between the new and prior laws.  Absent an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as
43

repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws.  The two laws, in brief, must be absolutely incompatible.  In the instant case, the Court finds neither
44 45

inconsistency nor absolute incompatibility in the existing provisions of PD 1689 and the amendatory provisions of
RA 10951. As such, the amendatory provisions under RA 10951 are not applicable to the present case.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated July 16, 2012 and Resolution dated July 1, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04001.
 67.) G.R. No. 220458, July 26, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROSARIO BALADJAY, Accused-

Appellant.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

"... the only people who get rich from "get rich quick" books are those who write them."

-Richard M. Nixon

Nature of the Case

Before this Court is an appeal from the November 13, 2014 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 06308 finding the accused-appellant, Rosario Baladjay (Baladjay),
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Syndicated Estafa  defined and penalized under
Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 1689.2

The Facts

In an Information dated August 6, 2003, accused-appellant Baladjay and her co-accused were

indicted with the crime of Syndicated Estafa. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

The undersigned Prosecutor accuses ROSARIO BALADJAY, SATURNINO BALADJAY, LITO

NATIVIDAD, RANDY RUBIO, TESS VILLEGAS, OLIVE MARASIGAN, LORNA PANGAN, CARMEN
CHAN, STELLA ILAGAN and JOHN MUNOZ of the crime of SYNDICATED ESTAFA under Article
315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to [PD] 1689, committed as follows:

That on or about and sometime during the months covering the period from May 2001 to
October 2002, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being officers, employees, and/or agents of Multinational
Telecom Investors Corporation (Multitel), an association operating on funds solicited from the
public, conspiring or confederating with and mutually helping one another, and confederating as
a syndicate, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud complainants JOSE
SAMALA, HENRY CHUA CO, ROLANDO T. CUSTODIO, KATHERINE T. HEBRON AND STELLA P.
LEE by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of fraud to the effect that they have the business, property and power to solicit and
accept investments and deposits from the general public and capacity to pay the complainants
guaranteed monthly interest on investment from 5% to 6% and lucrative commissions, and by
means of other deceits of similar import, induced and succeeded in inducing the complainants to
invest, deposit, give and deliver as in fact the latter gave the accused the total amount of
[Php]7,810,000.00 as investment or deposit, accused knowing fully well that said pretenses and
representations are fraudulent scheme to enable them to obtain said amount, and thereafter,
having in their possession said amount, with intent to gain and to defraud, misappropriated and
converted the same to their own personal benefits to the damage and prejudice of said
complainants in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Upon motion of the public prosecutor, the charge against Carmen Chan was dismissed for lack of
probable cause; while the other accused, aside from Baladjay, remained at large. On
arraignment, Baladjay pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.

The prosecution presented Rolando T. Custodio (Rolando), Estella Pozon Lee (Estella), Henry M.
Chua Co (Henry), and Yolanda Baladjay (Yolanda) to testify against accused-appellant Baladjay.

When Rolando took to the stand, he narrated that sometime in  February 2001, his neighbor told
him about Multitel, a company which allegedly pays its investors an interest income of at least
five percent (5%) per month. Enticed with the prospective returns, Rolando invested the amount
of Php100,000.00 in Multitel and received monthly interest payments, as promised.4

Thereafter, Rolando met Gladina Baligad (Gladina), a counselor of Multitel, who explained to him
that the company was engaged in the telecommunications business. Convinced of Gladina's
representations regarding Multitel's legitimacy and her assurances as to its profitability, Rolando
increased his investment in the company to Php2,000,000.00. Gladina then made a more
attractive offer, promising an increased monthly earning of eight to twelve percent (8%-12%) of
the investments, luring Rolando to invest a total of Php3,200,000.00 in Multitel. A receipt was
issued for every placement that Rolando made, together with checks personally signed by
Baladjay, representing his principal investment.5

However, sometime in October 2002, when he had yet to receive his interest income for the
month, Rolando learned that Baladjay was under investigation. Knowledge of this prompted him
to call Gladina, who assured him that Multitel would still be able to deliver on its promised
returns. Nevertheless, despite Gladina's assurance, Multitel defaulted. Rolando then conducted
his own investigation on the matter and found out that Multitel was not issued a secondary
license by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to deal in securities and solicit
investments from the general public. In fact, per an SEC Advisory, the company and its conduits
were not duly registered and had no juridical personality and authority to engage in any activity,
let alone investment-taking.6

Rolando exerted all effort to recover his investments after his discovery. He even attended the
meetings conducted by Multitel, the last one of which was held on November 5, 2002. During the
final meeting, Baladjay's co-accused Randy Rubio, Olive Marasigan, and Tess Villegas, all officers
of Multitel, met with the investors and repeatedly assured the latter that Multitel was a
legitimate company and that it was merely organizing its books so as to meet the monthly
withdrawals. Multitel, however, was unable to deliver on the promised returns, prompting
Rolando to file a criminal complaint.7

In her account of the events, Estella claimed that she was advised by Carmencita Chan
(Carmencita), a Multitel counselor, to invest in the company through the One Heart Multi-
Purpose Cooperative (One Heart).8 As Carmencita explained to her, One Heart was an agent of
Multitel, which could receive investments in the latter's behalf. Carmencita also informed Estella
in one of their meetings at One Heart's office at the Enterprise Building in Makati City that
Multitel is a local subsidiary of a New York-based telecommunications company.9

Carmencita later introduced Estella and her husband to accused Manolito Natividad (Manolito),
who confirmed the information about Multitel. With the promised yield of six percent (6%)
monthly interest, Estella's total investment with Multitel amounted to Php3,280,000.00 and
US$7,520.00. Estella initially received the promised interest yields. However, in October 2002,
no interest income was deposited to Estella's account. This impelled Estella to call Carmencita,
who told her that she had to wait before she could get her income for the month.10

Subsequently, Estella constantly called and followed up with Carmencita and even Multitel's
advertised hotline only to be repeatedly told that she would be informed of the status of her
investments. However, no information ever reached her, and her investments were never
returned by Multitel.11

In his testimony, Henry claimed that he knew the accused Baladjay, Satumino Baladjay, Randy
Rubio, Lito Natividad, and Tess Villegas. According to him, he was also persuaded by Gladina to
invest in Multitel because of the promise of a five percent (5%) monthly interest income. His
total investments amounted to Php1,050,000.00, for which he received interest payment only
once.12 When the guaranteed return never arrived, Henry called Gladina who relayed to him that
Baladjay was having difficulty with respect to the Multitel funds. Henry then became suspicious,
prompting him to consult with the SEC where he was informed that Multitel is a scam, and that a
Cease and Desist Order had already been issued against it for soliciting funds from the public
without a valid license.13

Henry then confronted Gladina, only to be redirected to Baladjay's then counsel. He then
attempted to settle with Baladjay, but the latter can no longer be contacted. And in his last-ditch
effort to recover his investment, he attended the investors meeting organized by Multitel
counselors, including Randy Rubio, Olive Marasigan, and Tess Villegas, among others.14

Lastly, Yolanda testified that her and Baladjay's husbands are brothers.15 Baladjay offered her a
job as a Multitel counselor, promising her commissions equivalent to seven percent (7%) of the
capital infused by the investors that she would convince. Accepting the offer, Yolanda ushered in
clients to Baladjay's office at the Enterprise Building in Ayala, Makati City until 2001. Thereafter,
Yolanda and the other Multitel counselors were assigned to different groups or cooperatives,
which Baladjay herself had established. According to her, the investments were placed in the
cooperatives, which, in turn, placed them in Multitel.16

By September 2002, Multitel started to have problems with the SEC. Consequently, the investors
demanded from Yolanda that she return their money placements. However, she could not
address their demands as she could no longer contact Baladjay, who, by then, was already
nowhere to be found.17

For its part, the defense presented accused-appellant Baladjay as its sole witness. Baladjay, in
her testimony, denied knowing, meeting, or transacting with the private complainants. She
insisted on her innocence and decried the allegations that she took the private complainants'
money in the aggregate amount of Php7,810,000.00.18

Baladjay added that while she is the President and Chairman of the Board of Multitel
International Holdings, Inc. (MIHI), it is a company totally distinct and separate from
Multinational Telecom Investors Corporation or Multitel. She claimed that her company, which
was registered with the SEC, was only engaged in the selling of cell phones and did not solicit
any investment from the public. However, Baladjay admitted that she was also known as the
president of Multitel.19

The Ruling of the RTC

On December 3, 2012, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 58, rendered
judgment in Criminal Case No. 03-3261 finding Baladjay guilty of Syndicated Estafa,  disposing
as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Convicting the accused Rosario Baladjay of the crime of syndicated estafa and is hereby
ordered to suffer life imprisonment.

By way of civil liability

2. To pay Dr. Rolando T. Custodio the sum of Php3,200,000.00 as actual damages and
Php500,000.00 as moral damages;

3. To pay Estella Ponce Lee the sum of Php3,280,000.00 and US$ 7,520.00 the rate to be
computed from the time of its investment and Php500,000.00 as moral damages;

4. To pay Henry M. Chua Co the sum of Php1,050,000.00 and Php500,000.00 as moral

damages;

Considering that the Court has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the other accused, let alias
warrants of arrest be issued against them.

SO ORDERED.

An Amended Decision20 was later issued on April 26, 2013 to correct the middle name of one of
the private complainants, Estella Pozon Lee.

Baladjay interposed an appeal from the above-quoted RTC ruling, arguing that the trial court
gravely erred in convicting her when her guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.21

The Ruling of the CA

In its November 13,2014 Decision, the CA affirmed the guilty verdict meted by the RTC, but with
modification with respect to the amount of moral damages awarded. The CA held that all the
elements of Estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC are present in the instant case, and that
the crime was committed by Baladjay together with her counselors numbering more than five
(5), thus, qualifying the felony to Syndicated Estafa in accordance with PD 1689. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision states:

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED and the Decision dated December 3, 2012, AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION, reducing the award of moral damages to Php100,000.00 for each of the
private complainant.

SO ORDERED.22

Aggrieved, accused-appellant Baladjay elevated the case before Us, raising the same arguments
she had at the CA.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the appellate court gravely erred in affirming the
accused-appellant's conviction for Syndicated Estafa.
 The Court's Ruling

We find no merit in the instant appeal.

All the elements of Syndicated Estafa

are present in the instant case

Accused-appellant and her eight (8) co-accused were charged with Syndicated Estafa, in relation
to Article 315 (2)(a) of the RPC, viz:

Art. 315.  Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned
herein below shall be punished by:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar
deceits.

xxxx

Jurisprudence elucidates that the elements of Estafa  by means of deceit under this provision are
as follows: (a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to the
offender's power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on
the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money
or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.23

In relation to the foregoing, Section 1 of PD 1689 qualifies the offense of Estafa if it is

committed by a syndicate, viz:

Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined
in Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life
imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or
more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction,
enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s),"  or
farmers' associations, or funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.

Synthesizing the two provisions of law, the elements of Syndicated Estafa,  therefore, are as
follows: (a) Estafa  or other forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is
committed; (b) the Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons;
and (c) the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders,
or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s),"  or farmers' associations, or of
funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.24

The special law is typically invoked by those who fall prey to the too-good-to-be-true promises
of a Ponzi scheme, wherein the purported investment program offers impossibly high returns
and pays these returns to early investors out of the capital contributed by later investors. The
history of such a stratagem has been discussed in the landmark ruling of People v. Balasa
(Balasa):

x x x x Named after Charles Ponzi who promoted the scheme in the 1920s, the original scheme
involved the issuance of bonds which offered 50% interest in 45 days or a 100% profit if held for
90 days. Basically, Ponzi used the money he received from later investors to pay extravagant
rates of return to early investors, thereby inducing more investors to place their money with him
in the false hope of realizing this same extravagant rate of return themselves. x x x x

However, the Ponzi scheme works only as long as there is an ever-increasing number of new
investors joining the scheme. To pay off the 50% bonds Ponzi had to come up with a one-and-a-
half times increase with each round. To pay 100% profit he had to double the number of
investors at each stage, and this is the reason why a Ponzi scheme is a scheme and not an
investment strategy. The progression it depends upon is unsustainable. The pattern of increase
in the number of participants in the system explains how it is able to succeed in the short run
and, at the same time, why it must fail in the long run. This game is difficult to sustain over a
long period of time because to continue paying the promised profits to early investors, the
operator needs an ever larger pool of later investors. The idea behind this type of swindle is that
the "con-man" collects his money from his second or third round of investors and then absconds
before anyone else shows up to collect. Necessarily, these schemes only last weeks, or months
at most.25

In Balasa, Panata Foundation of the Philippines, Inc. sent out brochures soliciting deposits from
the public, assuring would-be depositors that their money would either be doubled after 21 days
or tripled after 30 days. Under its alleged investment program, a depositor hands his investment
to a clerk who, in turn would give it to the teller. In exchange, the depositors would receive
filled-up printed forms called "slots," which bear resemblance to bank checks and were already
signed beforehand by the president of the foundation. The amounts received by the foundation
were deposited in various banks under the names of its president and/or secretary.26

The foundation started with a few depositors, most of whom only invested small amounts to see
whether the foundation would make good on its promise. As word got around that the
foundation was able to fulfill its obligations, more depositors were attracted by the promised
returns. Blinded by the prospect of gaining substantial profits for nothing more than a minuscule
investment, these investors were lured to reinvest their earnings, if not to invest more.27

The operations initially proceeded smoothly. However, on November 29, 1989, the foundation
closed down. Depositors then began to demand for the reimbursement of their deposits, but the
foundation was unable to deliver. Consequently, sixty-four informations, all charging the offense
of Syndicated Estafa  were filed against the officers and trustees of the foundation.28 The cashier
and the disbursing officer of the foundation were eventually found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment,
and were ordered to restitute to complainants the amounts defrauded.

Parallelisms can be drawn between Balasa and People v. Menil.29 In the said case, the spouses
Menil were the proprietors of a business operating under the name ABM Appliance and
Upholstery. Through ushers and sales executives, they began soliciting investments from the
general public in Surigao City and its neighboring towns, assuring would-be investors that their
money would be multiplied tenfold after fifteen (15) calendar days.30

Instead of the "slots" that were given to the investors in Balasa,  the spouses Menil issued
"coupons" as proofs of investment. And just as in Balasa, the initial amounts involved were
small, and so the spouses Menil were able to pay the returns on the investments as they fell
due. However, the amounts invested and the number of depositors gradually increased until it
reached a point wherein the daily investments amounting to millions of pesos were pouring in
and payments of the returns were delayed.31 On September 19, 1989, the spouses stopped
releasing payments altogether, prompting the investors to charge them with large-scale
swindling.32

More recently, in People v. Tibayan,33 the Court has convicted two incorporators of the Tibayan
Group Investment Company, Inc. (TGICI) of multiple counts of Syndicated Estafa  and
sentencing them to suffer life imprisonment for each count. As in the other fraudulent
investment schemes, the private complainants in that case were enticed to invest in TGICI due
to the offer of high interest rates, as well as the assurance that they will recover their
investments. After parting with their monies, the private complainants received a Certificate of
Share and post-dated checks, representing the amount of the principal investment and the
corresponding monthly interest earnings. The checks, however, were dishonoured upon
encashment, and the TGICI office closed down without private complainants having been paid.
The investors were then constrained to file criminal complaints against the incorporators and
directors of TGICI.

The gravamen of the offenses charged in all the afore-mentioned cases is the employment of
fraud or deceit to the damage or prejudice of another. As defined in Balasa:

Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all
acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or
confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and
unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious
means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure
an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all
surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated. On the
other hand, deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct,
by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed
which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.34

In the case at bar, it can be observed that Multitel engaged in a modus operandi that does not
deviate far from those practiced in the above-cited cases. The similarity of the pattern is
uncanny. Here, using Multitel as their conduit, Baladjay and her more than five (5) counselors
employed deceit and falsely pretended to have the authority to solicit investments from the
general public when, in truth, they did not have such authority. The deception continued when
Baladjay's counselors actively solicited investments from the public, promising very high interest
returns starting at five percent (5%) per month. Convinced of Baladjay's and her counselors'
promise of lucrative income, the private complainants were then enticed to invest in Multitel.
However, unknown to them, the promised high-yielding venture was unsustainable, as Multitel
was not really engaged in any legitimate business. Eventually, Baladjay and her cohorts ran
away with the private complainants' money causing them damage and prejudice.

Clearly, all the elements of Syndicated Estafa obtain in this case, considering that: (a) more than
five (5) persons are involved in Multitel's grand fraudulent scheme, including Baladjay and her
co-accused - who employed deceit, false pretenses and representations to the private
complainants regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity with Multitel in order to
solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and representations were made prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the false promises and
misrepresentations thus employed, private complainants invested their hard-earned money in
Multitel; and (d) Baladjay and her co-accused defrauded the private complainants, obviously to
the latter's prejudice.

Baladjay's connection with Multitel

has been clearly established

Baladjay contends, however, that the prosecution failed to prove her connection with Multitel,
which is supposedly an entity distinct from the company she actually owns.

We are not convinced.

Multitel was sufficiently proven to be owned by and linked to Baladjay. The positive and
straightforward testimony of her own sister-in-law, Yolanda, shows not only Baladjay's direct
connection with Multitel, but also her active participation in soliciting and convincing prospective
investors to place their investments in Multitel, viz:

ATTY. FERMO
Q: Why did you agree to become a counselor of Ms. Baladjay and recruit investors, Ms. Witness?
A: Because I will earn something from the persons that I will be recruiting, ma'am.
Q: You mentioned that you will earn, why, how much will you earn if you will be able to recruit investors
of Multitel?
A: She'll give me seven percent (7%) and then to the person they will be given four percent (4%).
xxxx
Q: Were you able to recruit or persuade others to invest at Multitel, Madam witness?
A: Yes, ma'am and the persons whom I recruited, I brought them to her residence and she personally talked
to them.
Q: When you brought these persons to her house, did they immediately invest?
A: Yes, ma'am they invested immediately because she is very articulate.
Q: After these investors made their investment, when will you receive the three percent (3%) commission?
A: Every month rna'am, I will receive the commission and the investors will also receive their monthly
interest.
Q: Do you know what are the proofs to show that people invested in Multitel, Madam witness?
A: She issued us post dated checks for the principal and the monthly interest was given in cash and we
have to sign in the paper.
xxxx
Q: For how long have you been a counselor of Multitel, Madam witness?
A: I started with her ma'am and it was already at Multitel Office in Ayala.
Q: When was that?
A: In the year 2000 rna'am.
Q: Year 2000 when she had an office at Ayala?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: What building is that Madam witness?
A: At Enterprise Building Ma'am.
Q: For how long were you able to bring investors at her office at Enterprise Building?
A: Until 2001, ma'am.
Q: So, why, what happened after 2001?
A: Because we already have our own group or cooperative.
Q: What do you mean, that you became part of the cooperative?
A: Because there were plenty of investors, rna'am and her office can no longer accommodate us.
Q: So, who established this cooperative, Madam witness?
A: She established the cooperative Ma'am and we have our own chairman.
Q: How many cooperatives were established, if you know, madam witness?
A: 16 Cooperatives, ma'am but I can only remember three names Telecon, Star Enterprise, One Heart.
Q: And what is the name of your cooperative?
A: Star Enterprise, ma'am.35

Further, Baladjay's claim that she has not transacted with the private complainants, or has never
known the supposed Multitel counselors to whom the victims of Multitel's fraudulent scheme
delivered their money, cannot prevail over the evidence on record. Baladjay cannot feign
innocence by hiding behind her so-called "counselors" because not only did they positively
identify her, she also signed the checks issued in favor of the investors.

The RTC and the CA both found that the witnesses presented in the instant case were credible,
having given their respective testimonies in a straightforward manner, corroborated by
documentary evidence. Accordingly, the totality of the testimonies of the witnesses,
documentary evidence on record, and findings of the SEC all point to Baladjay as the perpetrator
of a grand scheme to defraud investors of their investments in her company, Multitel.36

Based on the foregoing, the CA correctly affirmed Baladjay's guilt.

Notably, the crime of Estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the RPC was committed by accused-
appellant together with her counselors, numbering more than five (5), qualifying the crime to
Syndicated Estafa in accordance with PD 1689. Thus, the imposition of the penalty of life
imprisonment should be upheld, as well as the order to pay the actual damages suffered by each
of the private complainants. In addition thereto, the Court imposes interest on the monetary
penalty at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of the demand, which shall be
deemed as made on the same day the Information was filed against accused-appellant, until the
amounts are fully paid. 37

As regards the award of moral damages, the CA was correct in reducing the same to a fair, just
and reasonable amoune38 of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) for each of the
private complainants. The Court also imposes an interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum on the moral damages assessed from finality of this ruling until full payment.39
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court ADOPTS the findings and conclusions of law in the
Decision dated November 13, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 06308
and AFFIRMS said Decision WITH MODIFICATION that (1) accused-appellant is assessed and
shall pay an interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the amount of actual
damages suffered by each of the private complainants, reckoned from the filing of Information
on August 27, 2003 until fully paid, and (2) an interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum on the amount of moral damages awarded to each of the private complainants from the
finality of the Court's Decision until full payment.

As thus modified, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 58,
promulgated on December 3, 2012, as amended on April 26, 2013, shall read as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Convicting the accused Rosario Baladjay of the crime of Syndicated Estafa and ordering her to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.

By way of civil liability

2. To pay Dr. Rolando T. Custodio the sum of Php3,200,000.00 as actual damages;

3. To pay Estella Pozon Lee the sum of Php3,280,000.00 and US$7,520.00 the rate to be
computed from the time of its investment;

4. To pay Henry M. Chua Co the sum of Php1,050,000.00;

The afore-stated amounts shall be paid with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from August 27, 2003 until fully paid.

By way of moral damages

5. To pay Dr. Rolando T. Custodio, Estella Pozon Lee, and Henry M. Chua Co the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) each, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of the Court's Decision until fully paid.

Considering that the Court has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the other accused, let alias
warrants of arrest be issued against them.
68.) G.R. No. 187919               April 25, 2012

RAFAEL H. GALVEZ and KATHERINE L. GUY, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ASIA UNITED BANK, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 187979

ASIA UNITED BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
GILBERT G. GUY, PHILIP LEUNG, KATHERINE L. GUY, RAFAEL H. GALVEZ and EUGENIO H. GALVEZ,
JR., Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 188030

GILBERT G. GUY, PHILIP LEUNG and EUGENIO H. GALVEZ, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
ASIA UNITED BANK, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

THE FACTS

In 1999, Radio Marine Network (Smartnet) Inc. (RMSI) claiming to do business under the name Smartnet
Philippines and/or Smartnet Philippines, Inc. (SPI), applied for an Omnibus Credit Line for various credit facilities
1  2 

with Asia United Bank (AUB). To induce AUB to extend the Omnibus Credit Line, RMSI, through its directors and
officers, presented its Articles of Incorporation with its 400-peso million capitalization and its congressional telecom
franchise. RMSI was represented by the following officers and directors occupying the following positions:

Gilbert Guy - Exec. V-Pres./Director

Philip Leung - Managing Director

Katherine Guy - Treasurer

Rafael Galvez - Executive Officer

Eugenio Galvez, Jr. - Chief Financial Officer/Comptroller

Satisfied with the credit worthiness of RMSI, AUB granted it a ₱250 million Omnibus Credit Line, under the name of
Smartnet Philippines, RMSI’s Division. On 1 February 2000, the credit line was increased to ₱452 million pesos
after a third-party real estate mortgage by Goodland Company, Inc., an affiliate of Guy Group of Companies, in
3 

favor of Smartnet Philippines, was offered to the bank. Simultaneous to the increase of the Omibus Credit Line,
4 

RMSI submitted a proof of authority to open the Omnibus Credit Line and peso and dollar accounts in the name of
Smartnet Philippines, Inc., which Gilbert Guy, et al. represented as a division of RMSI, as evidenced by the
5 

letterhead used in its formal correspondences with the bank and the financial audit made by SGV & Co., an
independent accounting firm. Attached to this authority was the Amended Articles of Incorporation of RMSI, doing
business under the name of Smartnet Philippines, and the Secretary’s Certificate of SPI authorizing its directors,
Gilbert Guy and Philip Leung to transact with AUB. Prior to this major transaction, however, and, unknown to AUB,
6 
while RMSI was doing business under the name of Smartnet Philippines, and that there was a division under the
name Smartnet Philippines, Gilbert Guy, et al. formed a subsidiary corporation, the SPI with a paid-up capital of only
₱62,500.00.

Believing that SPI is the same as Smartnet Philippines - the division of RMSI - AUB granted to it, among others,
Irrevocable Letter of Credit No. 990361 in the total sum of $29,300.00 in favor of Rohde & Schwarz Support Centre
Asia Ptd. Ltd., which is the subject of these consolidated petitions. To cover the liability of this Irrevocable Letter of
Credit, Gilbert Guy executed Promissory Note No. 010445 in behalf of SPI in favor of AUB. This promissory note
was renewed twice, once, in the name of SPI (Promissory Note No. 011686), and last, in the name of Smartnet
Philippines under Promissory Note No. 136131, bolstering AUB’s belief that RMSI’s directors and officers
consistently treated this letter of credit, among others, as obligations of RMSI.

When RMSI’s obligations remained unpaid, AUB sent letters demanding payments. RMSI denied liability contending
that the transaction was incurred solely by SPI, a corporation which belongs to the Guy Group of Companies, but
which has a separate and distinct personality from RMSI. RMSI further claimed that while Smartnet Philippines is an
RMSI division, SPI, is a subsidiary of RMSI, and hence, is a separate entity.

Aggrieved, AUB filed a case of syndicated estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Section 1 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1689 against the interlocking directors of RMSI and SPI, namely, Gilbert
G. Guy, Rafael H. Galvez, Philip Leung, Katherine L. Guy, and Eugenio H. Galvez, Jr., before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City.

AUB alleged that the directors of RMSI deceived it into believing that SPI was a division of RMSI, only to insist on its
separate juridical personality later on to escape from its liabilities with AUB. AUB contended that had it not been for
the fraudulent scheme employed by Gilbert Guy, et al., AUB would not have parted with its money, which, including
the controversy subject of this petition, amounted to hundreds of millions of pesos.

In a Resolution dated 3 April 2006, the Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Gilbert G. Guy, et al. for estafa but
7 

dismissed the charge of violation of PD No. 1689 against the same for insufficiency of evidence, thus:

WHEREFORE, it is recommended that respondents be charged for ESTAFA under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, and the attached information be filed with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig City, with a
recommended bail of ₱40,000.00 for each respondent.

It is further recommended that the charge of violation of P.D. 1689 against the said respondents be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence. 8

Accordingly, an Information dated 3 April 2006 was filed against Gilbert Guy, et al. with the Regional Trial Court of
9 

Pasig City.

Both parties, i.e., the AUB and Gilbert Guy, et al., filed their respective Petitions for Review with the Department of
Justice (DOJ) assailing the 3 April 2006 Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City.

In a Resolution dated 15 August 2006, the DOJ reversed the City Prosecutor’s Resolution and ordered the
10 

dismissal of the estafa charges against Gilbert Guy, et al. for insufficiency of evidence.

The AUB’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied, constraining it to assail the DOJ Resolution before the Court of
Appeals (CA).

The CA partially granted AUB’s petition in a Decision dated 27 June 2008, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, finding probable cause against private respondents for the crime
of ESTAFA under Article 315, par 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. The assailed Resolution dated August 15, 2006
of the Department of Justice is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, subject to our ruling that the private respondents are
not liable under P.D. 1689. The April 3, 2006 Resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Paudac is
hereby REINSTATED. 11
Aggrieved, Gilbert Guy, Philip Leung and Eugenio H. Galvez Jr. (in G.R. No. 188030) and separately, Rafael Galvez
and Katherine Guy (in G.R. No. 187919) filed the present petitions before this Court assailing the CA Decision which
reinstated the City Prosecutor’s Resolution indicting them of the crime of estafa. The AUB also filed its own petition
before us, docketed as G.R. No. 187979, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision for dismissing the charge in
relation to Section 1 of PD No. 1689.

Hence, these consolidated petitions.

Gilbert Guy, et al. argue that this case is but a case for collection of sum of money, and, hence, civil in nature and
that no fraud or deceit was present at the onset of the transaction which gave rise to this controversy, an element
indispensable for estafa to prosper. 12

AUB, on the other, insists that this controversy is within the scope of PD No. 1689, otherwise known as
syndicated estafa. It contends that Guy, et al., induced AUB to grant SPI’s letter of credit to AUB’s damage and
prejudice by misleading AUB into believing that SPI is one and the same entity as Smartnet Philippines which AUB
granted an Omnibus Credit Transaction. After receiving and profiting from the proceeds of the aforesaid letter of
credit, Gilbert Guy, et al. denied and avoided liability therefrom by declaring that the obligation should have been
booked under SPI as RMSI never contracted, nor authorized the same. It is on this premise that AUB accuses
Gilbert Guy, et al. to have committed the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to PD No. 1689.

At issue, therefore, is whether or not there is probable cause to prosecute Gilbert Guy, et al. for the crime of
syndicated estafa on the basis of fraudulent acts or fraudulent means employed to deceive AUB into releasing the
proceeds of Irrevocable Letter of Credit No. 990361 in favor of SPI.

Our Ruling

This controversy could have been just a simple case for collection of sum of money had it not been for the
sophisticated fraudulent scheme which Gilbert Guy, et al. employed in inducing AUB to part with its money.

Records show that on 17 February 1995, Radio Marine Network, Inc. (Radio Marine) amended its corporate name
to what it stands today – Radio Marine Network (Smartnet), Inc. This was a month after organizing its subsidiary
corporation the Smartnet Philippines, Inc. with a capital of only ₱62,500.00. A year earlier, Gilbert Guy, et
13 

al., established Smartnet Philippines as a division of Radio Marine under which RMSI operated its business.

It was, however, only on 26 March 1998, when the Securities and Exchange Commission approved the amended
corporate name, and only in October 1999 did RMSI register Smartnet Philippines as its business name with the
Department of Trade and Industry. 14

It is in this milieu that RMSI transacted business with AUB under the name Smartnet Philippines and/or SPI.

Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa) – any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein below x
xx:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneous with
the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits. x x x.

The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following:

a. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;

b. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;

c. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he
was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means;

d. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 15

First, Gilbert Guy, Philip Leung, Katherine Guy, Rafael Galvez and Eugene Galvez, Jr., interlocking directors of
RMSI and SPI, represented to AUB in their transactions that Smartnet Philippines and SPI were one and the same
entity. While Eugene Galvez, Jr. was not a director of SPI, he actively dealt with AUB in his capacity as RMSI’s
Chief Financial Officer/Comptroller by falsely representing that SPI and RMSI were the same entity. Gilbert Guy,
Philip Leung, Katherine Guy, Rafael Galvez, and Eugene Galvez, Jr. used the business names Smartnet
Philippines, RMSI, and SPI interchangeably and without any distinction. They successfully did this by using the
confusing similarity of RMSI’s business name, i.e., Smartnet Philippines – its division, and, Smartnet Philippines,
Inc. – the subsidiary corporation. Further, they were able to hide the identity of SPI, by having almost the same
directors as that of RMSI. In order to let it appear that SPI is the same as that of Smartnet Philippines, they
submitted in their application documents of RMSI, including its Amended Articles of Incorporation, third-party real
16 

estate mortgage of Goodland Company in favor of Smartnet Philippines, and audited annual financial statement of
17 

SGV & Co. Gilbert Guy, et al. also used RMSI letterhead in their official communications with the bank and the
18 

contents of these official communications conclusively pointed to RMSI as the one which transacted with the bank.
19 

These circumstances are all indicia of deceit. Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words
or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which
deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
20

Second, the intent to deceive AUB was manifest from the start. Gilbert Guy et al. laid down first all the necessary
materials they need for this deception before defrauding the bank by first establishing Smartnet Philippines as a
division of Radio Marine under which Radio Marine Network Inc. operated its business. Then it organized a
21 

subsidiary corporation, the SPI, with a capital of only ₱62,000.00. Later, it changed the corporate name of Radio
22 

Marine Network Inc. into RMSI. 23

Undoubtedly, deceit here was conceived in relation to Gilbert Guy, et al.’s transaction with AUB. There was a plan,
documented in corporation’s papers, that led to the defraudation of the bank. The circumstances of the directors’
and officers’ acts in inserting in Radio Marine the name of Smartnet; the creation of its division – Smartnet
Philippines; and its registration as business name as Smartnet Philippines with the Department of Trade and
Industry, together with the incorporation of its subsidiary, the SPI, are indicia of a pre-conceived scheme to create
this elaborate fraud, victimizing a banking institution, which perhaps, is the first of a kind in Philippine business.

We emphasize that fraud in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all
acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal duty or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly
reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of
another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device and which are
24 

resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth
and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated. 25

As early as 1903, in U.S. v. Mendezona, we held that an accused may be convicted for estafa if the deceit of false
26 

pretense is committed prior to or simultaneous with fraud and is the efficient cause or primary consideration which
induced the offended party to part with his money or property.

Third, AUB would not have granted the Irrevocable Letter of Credit No. 990361, among others, had it known that
SPI which had only ₱62,500.00 paid-up capital and no assets, is a separate entity and not the division or business
name of RMSI. Gilbert Guy, et al. however, contends that the transaction subject in this controversy is a letter of
credit and not a loan, hence, SPI’s capital does not matter. This was also the contention of the DOJ in reversing the
27 

Resolution of the City Prosecutor’s Office of Pasig. The DOJ contended that:
It is also noted that the subject transaction, one of the several series of transactions between complainant AUB and
SPI, is not a loan transaction. It is a letter of credit transaction intended to facilitate the importation of goods by SPI.
The allegation as to the lack of capitalization of SPI is therefore immaterial and irrelevant since it is a letter of credit
transaction. The seller gets paid only if it delivers the documents of title over the goods to the bank which issued the
letter of credit, while the buyer/importer acquires title to the goods once it reimburses the issuing bank. The
transaction secures the obligation of the buyer/importer to the issuing bank.  28

It is true that ordinarily, in a letter of credit transaction, the bank merely substitutes its own promise to pay for the
promise to pay of one of its customers, who in turn promises to pay the bank the amount of funds mentioned in the
letters of credit plus credit or commitments fees mutually agreed upon. Once the issuing bank shall have paid the
beneficiary after the latter’s compliance with the terms of the letter of credit, the issuing bank is entitled to
reimbursement for the amount it paid under the letter of credit. 29

In the present case, however, no reimbursement was made outright, precisely because the letter of credit was
secured by a promissory note executed by SPI. The bank would have not agreed to this transaction had it not been
deceived by Gilbert Guy, et al. into believing the RMSI and SPI were one and the same entity. Guy and his cohorts’
acts in (1) securing the letter of credit guaranteed by a promissory note in behalf of SPI; and, (2) their act of
representing SPI as RMSI’s Division, were indicia of fraudulent acts because they fully well know, even before
transacting with the bank, that: (a) SPI was a separate entity from Smartnet Philippines, the RMSI’s Division, which
has the Omnibus Credit Line; and (b) despite this knowledge, they misrepresented to the bank that SPI is RMSI’s
division. Had it not for this false representation, AUB would have not granted SPI’s letter of credit to be secured with
a promissory note because SPI as a corporation has no credit line with AUB and SPI by its own, has no credit
standing.

Fourth, it is not in dispute that the bank suffered damage, which, including this controversy, amounted to hundreds
of millions of pesos.

It is worth emphasizing that under Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the function of a
preliminary investigation is to determine "whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded belief that
a crime x x x has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial." 30

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, the accused
committed the crime. Preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties'
31 

evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-founded belief that an offense has
32 

been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. The validity and merits of a party's accusation or
33 

defense, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during the trial proper. 34

We, therefore, sustain the findings of the CA and the City Prosecutor’s Resolution finding that probable cause exists
against Gilbert Guy, et al. for the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code and that Gilbert
Guy, et al. are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. AUB’s voluminous documents submitted to this
Court overcome this difficulty and established that there is sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded belief that
a crime has been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.

Lest it be misunderstood, we reiterate that this Court’s finding of probable cause is grounded on fraud committed
through deceit which surrounded Gilbert Guy, et al. transaction with AUB, thus, violating Article 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code; it is neither their act of borrowing money and not paying them, nor their denial thereof, but
their very act of deceiving AUB in order for the latter to part with its money. As early as the Penal Code of Spain,
which was enforced in the Philippines as early as 1887 until it was replaced by the Revised Penal Code in 1932, the
act of fraud through false pretenses or similar deceit was already being punished. Article 335 of the Penal Code of
Spain punished a person who defrauded another "by falsely pretending to possess any power, influence,
qualification, property, credit, agency or business, or by means of similar deceit." 35

Anent the issue as to whether or not Gilbert Guy, et al. should be charged for syndicated estafa in relation to
Section 1 of PD No. 1689, which states that:

SEC 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is
committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or
illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)", or farmers
associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/ associations from the general public.

We hold that the afore-quoted law applies to the case at bar, for the following reasons:

Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689, the elements of syndicated estafa are: (a) estafa or other forms of swindling as
defined in Artilce 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code is committed; (b) the estafa or swindling is committed by a
syndicate of five or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers associations or of funds
solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.36

First, as defined under Section 1 of PD No. 1689, a syndicate "consists of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme." Five (5) accused, namely,
Gilbert G. Guy, Rafael H. Galvez, Philip Leung, Katherine L. Guy, and Eugenio H. Galvez, Jr. were, (a) all involved
in the formation of the entities used to defraud AUB; and (b) they were the officers and directors, both of RMSI and
SPI, whose conformities paved the way for AUB to grant the letter of credit subject of this case, in AUB’s honest
belief that SPI, as Gilbert Guy, et al. represented, was a mere division of RMSI. As already discussed, although
Eugenio Galvez, Jr. was not a director of SPI, he, together with Gilbert Guy and Philip Leung, actively participated in
the scheme through their signed correspondences with the bank and their attendance in the meetings with
executives of AUB. Rafael Galvez and Katherine Guy, on the other hand, were the directors of RMSI and SPI who
37 

caused and authorized Gilbert Guy and Philip Leung to transact with AUB. 38

Second, while these corporations were established presumably in accordance with law, it cannot be denied that
Gilbert G. Guy, Rafael H. Galvez, Philip Leung, Katherine L. Guy, and Eugenio H. Galvez, Jr. used these
corporations to carry out the illegal and unlawful act of misrepresenting SPI as a mere division of RMSI, and, despite
knowing SPI’s separate juridical personality, applied for a letter of credit secured by SPI’s promissory note, knowing
fully that SPI has no credit line with AUB. The circumstances of the creation of these entities and their dealings with
the bank reveal this criminal intent to defraud and to deceive AUB.

Third, the fact that the defraudation of AUB resulted to misappropriation of the money which it solicited from the
general public in the form of deposits was substantially established. Section 3.1 of the General Banking Law
39 

defines banks as "entities engaged in the lending of funds obtained in the form of deposits." The Old General
Banking Act (R.A. No. 337) gave a fuller picture of the basic banking function of obtaining funds from the public by
way of deposits and the lending of these funds as follows:

Sec 2. Only entities duly authorized by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank may engage in the lending of funds
obtained from the public through the receipt of deposits of any kind, and all entities regularly conducting such
operations shall be considered as banking institutions, xxxx.

Gilbert Guy et al. want this Court to believe that AUB, being a commercial bank, is beyond the coverage of PD No.
1689. We hold, however, that a bank is a corporation whose fund comes from the general public. P.D. No. 1689
does not distinguish the nature of the corporation. It requires, rather, that the funds of such corporation should come
from the general public. This is bolstered by the third "whereas clause" of the quoted law which states that the same
also applies to other "corporations/associations operating on funds solicited from the general public." This is
precisely the very same scheme that PD No. 1689 contemplates that this species of estafa "be checked or at least
be minimized by imposing capital punishment involving funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general
public" because "this erodes the confidence of the public in the banking and cooperative system, contravenes public
interest and constitutes economic sabotage that threatens the stability of the nation." 40 
1âwphi1

Hence, for the stated reasons, we applied the law in People v. Balasa, a non-stock/non-profit corporation – the
41 

Panata Foundation of the Philippines, Inc. We held that PD No. 1689 also applies to other corporations/associations
operating on funds solicited from the general public.

In People v. Romero, we also applied the law to a stock corporation engaged in marketing, the Surigao San Andres
42 

Industrial Development Corporation. Likewise, in People v. Menil, we applied the law to another marketing firm
43 

known as ABM Appliance and Upholstery.

In these cited cases, the accused used the legitimacy of their entities to perpetrate their unlawful and illegal acts.
We see no reason not to apply this law to a banking institution, a corporation imbued with public interest, when a
clear reading of the PD 1689 reveals that it is within its coverage.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 June 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97160 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Gilbert G. Guy, Rafael H. Galvez, Philip Leung, Katherine L. Guy and
Eugenio H. Galvez, Jr. be charged for SYNDICATED ESTAFA under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code
in relation to Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1689
69.) G.R. NO. 153979             February 6, 2006

REGINO SY CATIIS, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (17th Division), REYNALDO A. PATACSIL, ENRICO D. LOPEZ,LUZVIMINDA A.
PORTUGUEZ and THE BUREAU OF JAIL MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION,
MAKATI CITY JAIL, THROUGH ITS OFFICER-IN-CHARGE WARDEN, CHIEF INSP. ISAGANI M.
GAMINO, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Regino Sy Catiis (petitioner) seeking to nullify the
Decision1 dated June 14, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which sustained the Order dated December 18, 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City,2 allowing private respondents to post bail and the Order dated
December 21, 2001 of the Executive Judge of the same court3 approving the surety bond posted by respondents
and their release.

Petitioner filed a letter-complaint dated May 28, 2001 against private respondents Reynaldo A. Patacsil, Enrico D.
Lopez, Luzviminda A. Portuguez and a certain Margielyn Tafalla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City, for violation of Art. 315, No. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689
(syndicated estafa) and other related offenses. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 01-10686. Private
respondents, except for Tafalla, filed their joint counter-affidavits denying the charges against them.

On October 10, 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Alessandro D. Jurado issued a Resolution4 finding the existence of
a probable cause for syndicated Estafa against private respondents and Tafalla with no bail recommended. The
Resolution was approved by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.

An Information was filed on the same day by Prosecutor Jurado against private respondents and Tafalla before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and raffled off to Branch 96, which reads:

The undersigned accuses REYNALDO A. PATACSIL, ENRICO D. LOPEZ, LUZVIMINDA A. PORTUGUEZ and
MARGIELYN TAFALLA, of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revise Penal Code in
relation to P.D. 1689, committed as follows:

That on or about the 3rd week of January 2000 or subsequent thereto in Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually
helping and aiding one another in a syndicated manner consisting of five (5) or more persons through corporations
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and/or unregistered foreign entities with intention of
carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, with intent to gain and by means of fraud
and deceit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud REGINO SY CATIIS and several other
persons in the following manner, to wit: by falsely or fraudulently pretending or representing, in a transaction or
series of transactions, which they made with the Complainant and the public in general to the effect that they were in
a legitimate business of foreign exchange trading successively or simultaneously operating under the following
name and style of Asia Profits Philippines, Incorporation, Winggold Management Philippines Incorporated, Belkin
Management Consultancy, Inc. and/or Belkin Profits Limited or other unregistered foreign entities induced and
succeeded in inducing complainant and several other persons to give and deliver and in fact, the latter and said
persons gave and delivered to said accused the amount of at least US$ 123,461.14 or its equivalent in Philippine
Pesos on the strength of said manifestations and representations, the accused knowing fully well that the above-
named corporations registered with the SEC and/or those unregistered foreign entities are not licensed nor
authorized to engage in foreign exchange trading corporations and that such manifestations and representations to
transact in foreign exchange were false and fraudulent that resulted to the damage and prejudice of the complainant
and other persons and that the defraudation pertains to funds solicited from the public in general by such
corporations/associations.5
On November 7, 2001, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin issued an Order finding probable cause against all the accused
and approved the recommendation of the City Prosecutor that the charge be non-bailable. The corresponding
warrants of arrest were issued.6

A return7 on the warrant of arrest was made by PO3 Joselito M. Coronel, PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group, Camp Crame, Quezon City, with the information that except for Margielyn Tafalla, who remained at large, all
other accused were already detained at the Makati City Jail.

On November 12, 2001, a notice of hearing was issued by Judge Bersamin setting the case for arraignment on
November 20, 2001. Private respondents on the same day filed an urgent motion to fix bail.

On November 20, 2001, private respondents, when arraigned, entered pleas of not guilty. The Prosecution was
required to file their comment/opposition on private respondents’ motion to fix bail which they did through the Private
Prosecutor with the conformity of Assistant City Prosecutor Arthur O. Malabaguio.8

On December 18, 2001, Judge Bersamin issued an Order reconsidering his earlier Order of November 7, 2001 by
declaring that the offense charged is bailable. In finding that the accused are entitled to bail, Judge Bersamin made
the following disquisitions:

xxx

In order to impose the penalty of life imprisonment to death under Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1689, the estafa or swindling
must be committed by a syndicate. The law plainly states that a syndicate consists of five or more persons formed
with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise, or scheme, and the defraudation
results in the misappropriation of money or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.

Herein, only four persons are actually charged. Consequently, the estafa charged has no relation to the crime
punished with life imprisonment to death under Sec. 1, Presidential Decree No. 1689.

The allegation of the information that the accused conspired with each other "in a syndicated manner consisting of
five (5) or more persons through corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and/or unregistered foreign entities with intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or
scheme" cannot change the juridical nature of the offense charged. If the Government has chosen to indict only
four persons, without more, the obvious reason is that only the persons actually charged were involved in
the commission of the offense. As such, there was no syndicate.

In all likelihood, the allegation of "in a syndicated manner consisting of five (5) or more persons" is made herein
solely for having bail denied. Whether that is true or not is beside the point, but the Court cannot now lend itself to
such a likelihood which, according to the foregoing disquisition, lacks legal basis. For that matter, the Court must
recant its approval of the recommendation to deny bail.

The Prosecution represents that the Supreme Court has affirmed in People vs. Romero a conviction under
Presidential Decree No.1689 "even if the accused charged is only less than five (5) accused."

Such representation is grossly misleading. Far to the contrary, in People v. Romero, where two accused were
actually charged but only one was ultimately penalized due to the death of the other accused during the pendency
of the case, the Supreme Court did not impose the higher penalty of life imprisonment to death because the
Prosecution "failed to clearly establish that the corporation was a syndicate, as defined under the law," holding,
instead, that, since the crime was not committed by a syndicate, the proper penalty is that provided in the second
paragraph of Sec.1, P.D. No. 1689, to wit:

When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000.00 pesos.

Yet, one should ask: Where, as here, the amount alleged in the information clearly "exceeds 100,000.00 pesos"
such that the second paragraph of Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1689, is applicable, is the offense still bailable considering that
the range of the imposable penalty is from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua?
The answer is in the affirmative.

Under Rule 110, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Information should aver, among others, the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances of the offense "in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstance and for the court to pronounce judgment."

A perusal of the information discloses that no aggravating circumstance has been alleged in the information.
The omission consequently precludes the State from proving any aggravating circumstance which will raise the
penalty to its maximum period of reclusion perpetua. The Court itself is also prohibited from imposing reclusion
perpetua, since the requirement of complete allegations of the particulars in the indictment is based on the right
of the accused to be fully informed of the nature of the charges against him so that he may adequately prepare for
his defense pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution.

As stated in People v. Romero, supra, the penalty under the second paragraph of Sec.1, P.D. No. 1689, when
there is neither mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant, is the medium period of reclusion
temporal, that is from sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.

Hence, the offense charged is unquestionably bailable.9

On December 26, 2001, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction10 assailing the Order of Judge Bersamin allowing private respondents to
post bail.

On the same day, then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo Sr.,11 Justice on Duty Per Office Memorandum of
Presiding Justice, issued a Resolution12 granting petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order,
thus, private respondents and all those acting for and in their behalf were temporarily restrained from enforcing and
implementing the Order of Judge Bersamin and from further proceeding in Criminal Case No. 01-105430.

However, unknown to petitioner, private respondents had already filed or posted their surety bonds on December
21, 2001 with the Office of Executive Judge Monina A. Zenarosa13 who approved the same on the same day and
ordered the immediate release of private respondents unless held for other lawful cause.14 Petitioner filed a
supplemental petition with the CA on January 14, 2002 assailing the jurisdiction of Judge Zenarosa in issuing the
Order dated December 21, 2001.

On June 14, 2002, the CA issued its assailed decision denying due course to the petition and dismissed the same
after it found no grave abuse of discretion committed by Judge Bersamin and Judge Zenarosa in issuing the
assailed orders.

Hence, the instant petition filed by petitioner raising the following issues, to wit:

Whether or not the issuance of the questioned Decision promulgated June 14, 2002 by the 17th Division of
the Court of Appeals sustaining the validity of the 1st assailed Order dated December 18, 2001 of Hon.
Presiding Judge Lucas P. Bersamin of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ruling that there
should be at least five (5) persons that must be charged under Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1689 is
not in accordance with law or with applicable decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court.

Whether or not the questioned Decision sanctioning the grant of bail in the 1st assailed Order dated
December 18, 2001 of Hon. Presiding Judge Lucas P. Bersamin of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City violated Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and actually departed
from the accepted and usual course in the determination of bailability of criminal offenses.

C
 Whether or not the questioned Decision sustaining the order of release in the 2nd assailed Order dated
December 21 of Hon. Executive Judge Monina A. Zenarosa of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
violated Section 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure15

Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689, the term "any person" must be
understood and read in its singular meaning so that even only one person can be indicted for committing "estafa or
other forms of swindling" in relation to P.D. No. 1689 citing the case of People v. Romero; that Judge Bersamin
erred when he already computed the possible penalty in case of private respondents’ conviction; that the capital
nature of an offense for the purpose of bailability is determined by the penalty prescribed by law, not by penalty
which may actually be imposed since the latter requires a consideration of the evidence on trial; that since no
evidence had yet been presented by both prosecution and defense, Judge Bersamin has again shown bias by
already computing the imposable penalty just to stretch the application of the law and questionably grant bail in
favor of private Respondents.

We are not persuaded.

The CA found that the assailed order of Judge Bersamin cannot be characterized as one issued with grave abuse of
discretion for he correctly determined that the Information did not charge a syndicated Estafa; that with only four
charged in the information, it could not be considered as committed by a syndicate which must consist of five or
more persons and he cannot be faulted for that.

Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689, increasing the penalty for certain forms of swindling or estafa, provides:

SECTION 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315
and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling
(estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the
unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of
moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers’
associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.

When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos.

Clearly, P.D. No. 1689 penalizes offenders with life imprisonment to death regardless of the amount involved,
provided that a syndicate committed the crime. A syndicate is defined in the same law as "consisting of five or more
persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or
scheme." Under the second paragraph, it is provided that if the offenders are not members of a syndicate, they shall
nevertheless be held liable for the acts prohibited by the law but they shall be penalized by reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud is more than ₱100,000.00.

Petitioner’s interpretation that the term "any person" in the first paragraph of section 1 could mean that even one
person can be indicted for syndicated estafa is contrary to the provision of the law. It bears stressing that the law
must be considered as a whole, just as it is necessary to consider a sentence in its entirety in order to grasp its true
meaning.16 It is a dangerous practice to base construction upon only a part of a section since one portion may be
qualified by the other portion.17 In fact, there is no need for any construction or interpretation of P. D. No. 1689 since
the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689 has defined what constitutes a
syndicate and such definition is controlling. Where a requirement is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no
discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed.18

In this case, the Information specifically charged only four persons without specifying any other person who had
participated in the commission of the crime charged, thus, based on the definition of syndicate under the law, the
crime charged was not committed by a syndicate. We find no reversible error committed by the CA when it upheld
the ruling of Judge Bersamin that with only four persons actually charged, the estafa charged has no relation to the
crime punished with life imprisonment to death under section 1 of P. D. No. 1689.

The wordings in the information that the accused conspired with each other "in a syndicated manner consisting of
five (5) or more persons through corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and/or unregistered foreign entities with intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or
scheme" is not sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law on what constitute a syndicate. It bears
stressing that the first paragraph of the accusatory portion of the Information charges only four persons. To repeat,
P.D. No. 1689 has provided for the definition of a syndicate and it is controlling. As correctly found by the trial court,
if the government has chosen to indict only four persons, without more, the obvious reason is that only the persons
actually charged were involved in the commission of the offense, thus, there was no syndicate. 1avvphil.net

Petitioner’s reliance in People v. Romero to support his argument is misleading. First, the issue of whether only one
person can be indicted for syndicated estafa was not an issue in the Romero case. Secondly, the Court did not
impose the penalty of life imprisonment to death on the accused since the prosecution failed to clearly establish that
the corporation was a syndicate as defined under the law. There is no other way of establishing a syndicate under
P.D. No. 1689 than by the adherence to the definition provided by law.

Since the crime charged was not committed by a syndicate as defined under the law, the penalty of life
imprisonment to death cannot be imposed on private Respondents. Judge Bersamin is correct when he ruled that
private respondents could only be punished with reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua in case of conviction since
the amount of the fraud exceeds ₱100,000.00. The next question is, whether Judge Bersamin is correct in finding
that the crime charged is bailable despite that the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua?

The Court answers in the affirmative.

Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000,
provide:

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in
the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.

Clearly, it is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying circumstances be expressly and
specifically alleged in the complaint or information. Otherwise, they cannot be considered by the trial court in their
judgment, even, if they are subsequently proved during trial.19 A reading of the Information shows that there was no
allegation of any aggravating circumstance, thus Judge Bersamin is correct when he found that the lesser penalty,
i.e., reclusion temporal, is imposable in case of conviction.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended,
now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. Since the
imposable penalty on private respondents, in case of conviction, is reclusion temporal, they are entitled to bail as a
matter of right. Notably, Judge Bersamin issued his Order finding the crime charge bailable and fixed the amount of
₱150,000.00 each for the provisional liberty of private respondents only after petitioner had submitted their
comment/opposition to petitioner’s motion to fix bail.

Petitioner claims that the Order of Judge Bersamin allowing private respondents to post bail already prejudged the
case; that he summarily decided the eventual and imminent dismissal of the criminal case without even the
reception of evidence; that such prejudgment came from a ruling on a mere issue of bail.
Such argument is baseless. The Order was issued on the basis that the allegations in the Information do not
establish that the crime charged was committed by a syndicate as defined under the law where the penalty of life
imprisonment to death could be imposed. Nowhere in the Order did Judge Bersamin state that the act complained
of is not punishable at all.

Petitioner next contends that private respondents’ filing of bail with Executive Judge Monina Zenarosa, other than
Branch 96 where the case is pending, is questionable and not in accordance with Section 17, Rule 11420 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure; that the records show that when private respondents filed their bail with
Judge Zenarosa, Branch 96 was open and available as private respondents through their representative were able
to pay for the issuance of the certifications on the Information and the Order dated December 18, 2001; that
petitioner’s counsel and the Assistant City Prosecutor Arthur Malabaguio had personally received their respective
copies of the Order dated December 18, 2001 inside the staff room of Branch 96 and they even attested that Judge
Bersamin was physically present on December 21, 2002, the day private respondents filed their bail bond with
Judge Zenarosa; that despite these circumstances, Judge Zenarosa still exercised jurisdiction over the bail filed by
private respondents and issued the Order dated December 21, 2001 approving the surety bonds and ordering the
release of private respondents; that the CA’s justification that Judge Zenarosa accepted the bail bond due to the fact
that Judge Bersamin was momentarily out of his office or premises at the time of posting of the bond was not borne
by the records.

We are not persuaded.

Section 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that bail in the amount fixed may be filed
with the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another
branch of the same court within the province or city. While Branch 96 is open and available on the day private
respondents posted their bail with Judge Zenarosa, it does not necessarily follow that Judge Bersamin was
available at that precise moment. Although it is alleged in the supplemental petition prepared by petitioner’s counsel,
Atty. Rodeo Nuñez, with the conformity of Prosecutor Malabaguio filed before the CA that both of them saw Judge
Bersamin discharging his function on that day, it is not under oath. Moreover, it is not specifically stated in the
supplemental petition that at the exact time Judge Zenarosa approved the bail, Judge Bersamin was available.
Thus, petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that official duty had been regularly performed21 by Judge Zenarosa
under the rules.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
June 14, 2002 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
70.)