SUERTE, BRYAN ALBERT N.

[G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003]

ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, respondent
FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-governmental organization internationally accredited to issue halal
certifications in the Philippines. To carry out its functions, it formulated internal rules and
procedures based on the Qur’an and Sunnah for food analysis and inspection, and began to issue
certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers for a fee.
Later, respondent Office issued Executive Order 46 which created the Philippine Halal
Certification Scheme. Such order vested exclusive authority on the Office on Muslim Affairs
(OMA) to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. OMA then
warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official halal certification since those
without said certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain
pork. It also began to send letters to food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal
certification only from OMA lest they violate the order. As a result, the IDCP lost revenues after
food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it.
Hence, petitioner filed a petition to nullify EO 46, contending that it is unconstitutional
for the government to formulate policies & guidelines on the halal certification scheme because
it is a function that only religious organizations can lawfully & validly perform for the Muslims.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 46 is unconstitutional for violating the non-establishment and free
exercise clauses guaranteed under Art. III, Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are
drawn from the Qur’an & Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food
products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations to
interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption; by arrogating
to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its
own interpretation of the Qur’an & Sunnah on halal food.
Only the prevention of an immediate & grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness & immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no compelling justification for the government to deprive
Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal,
even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning
to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the
Muslim Filipinos right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by
government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for
human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the
religious freedom of Muslims.
 SUERTE, BRYAN ALBERT N.
[G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004]
MIKE VELARDE, petitioner vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent
FACTS:
SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional
provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or
urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate. The subsequent
proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in these words:
“x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to file an Answer], a
Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde,
filed their Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, filed a Comment and
Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an Answer within the extended period and similarly prayed for the
dismissal of the Petition.  All sought the dismissal of the Petition on the common grounds that it
does not state a cause of action and that there is no justiciable controversy.  They were ordered to
submit a pleading by way of advisement, which was closely followed by another Order denying
all the Motions to Dismiss.  Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister
Eraño Manalo moved to reconsider the denial.  His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked for
extension to file memorandum.  Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first Order by
submitting his Memorandum.
The Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by
Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo, which raised no new arguments other than those already
considered in the motions to dismiss. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at some point
that the “endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation
of the separation clause. After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to
include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision.  Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate
Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court.
ISSUE:
What is the standard form of a Decision? Did the challenged Decision comply with the
aforesaid form? 
RULING:
No. The challenged Decision did not comply with the proper form of a Decision. In
general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following: (1) statement of the case;
(2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which each issue is,
as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive portion. 
The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue,
especially in cases in which controversial or novel issues are involved.
Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because
it made no findings of facts and final disposition.  Hence, it is void and deemed legally
inexistent.  Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just
modify.
Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.  Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of
the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void. Indeed, the
RTC’s Decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on
which it was based. Thus, the trial court clearly transgressed the constitutional directive.
 SUERTE, BRYAN ALBERT N.
[G.R. No. 144801.  March 10, 2005]
DOMINADOR L. TARUC, et al., petitioners vs. BISHOP PORTFIRIO DELA CRUZ, et al.,
respondent
FACTS:
Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28,
1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine
Independent Church. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a
complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the
Regional Trial Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done
without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case?
RULING:
No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is
a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the
performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of
religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. “Civil Courts will not
interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or
property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have
jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.”
Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.
 SUERTE, BRYAN ALBERT N.
[G.R. No. 130716.  December 9, 1998]
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, respondent
FACTS:  
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the
state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that
respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of
recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.  He claims that any compromise on the alleged
billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of “paramount public interest,” since it has a
“debilitating effect on the country’s economy” that would be greatly prejudicial to the national
interest of the Filipino people.  Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions
or deals being contrived and effected by the government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the
Marcos heirs.  They claim, though, that petitioner’s action is premature, because there is no
showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements.  And even
if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and
conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.
ISSUE:
 Whether the constitutional right to information may prosper against respondents’
argument that the “should be disclosed” proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements are
not yet effective and binding
RULING:
Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is
incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to
disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up
with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth, subject to some of the following
recognized restrictions:  (1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade
secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.   The General and Supplemental Agreements
dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby
declared NULL  AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution.  Respondent PCGG,
its officers and all government functionaries and officials who are or may be
directly  or  indirectly  involved  in  the  recovery  of  the  alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed
compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth,
in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision.
 SUERTE, BRYAN ALBERT N.
[G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002]
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, respondent
FACTS: 
The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority to disclose all facts on PEA’s
then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation to reclaim
portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement
with AMARI involving such reclamation. PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to
institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his constitutional right to information without a
showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution.
PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of
the signing or implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy
requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not petitioner has legal standing to compel PEA to comply with its
constitutional duties?
RULING:
Petition granted. The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer’s suit because the
petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. The right of citizens to
information on matters of public concern and the application of a constitutional provision
intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among
Filipino citizens are two constitutional rights involved. The thrust of the first issue is to compel
PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos.
The second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the
public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional
duty to the nation.