FIRST DIVISION reached their majority, while in fact they have not, is

valid, and they cannot be permitted after wards to excuse

[G.R. No. L-11872. December 1, 1917.] themselves from compliance with the obligation assumed
by them or to seek their annulment. (Law 6, title 19, 6th
DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, partida.) The judgment that holds such a sale to be valid
plaintiffs-appellants, vs. JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator and absolves the purchaser from the complaint 􏰀led
of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu, defendant- against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale
appellee. of minors property nor the rules laid down in consonance
therewith. (Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, of
Perfecto Salas Rodriguez for appellants. Vicente Foz for April 27, 1860, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.) This
appellee. doctrine is entirely in accord with the provisions of section
333 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which determines
SYLLABUS
cases of estoppel.
1. VENDOR AND PURCHASER; MINORS. — The
DECISION
annulment of a deed of sale of a piece of land was
sought on the ground that two of the four parties thereto TORRES, J p:
were minors, 18 and 19 years old, respectively, on the
date when the instrument was executed, but no direct This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, 􏰀led by counsel
proof of this alleged circumstance was adduced by for the plaintiffs from the judgment of September 22,
means of certi􏰀ed copies of the baptismal certi􏰀cates of 1914, in which the judge of the Seventh Judicial District
the two minors, nor any supplemental proof such as dismissed the complaint 􏰀led by the plaintiffs and
might establish that in fact they were minors on that date. ordered them to keep perpetual silence in regard to the
Held: That the statement made by one of the adult litigated land, and to pay the costs of the suit.
parties of said deed, in reference to certain notes made
in a book or copybook of a private nature, which she said By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo
their father kept during his lifetime and until his death, is and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the Court of First
not su􏰁cient to prove the plaintiffs' minority on the date of Instance of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, as the
the execution of the deed. latter died soon thereafter, the complaint was amended
by being directed against Jose
2. ID.; ID. — The courts have laid down the rule that the
sale of real estate, effected by minors who have already CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
passed the ages of puberty and adolescence and are
near the adult age when they pretend to have already Espiritu in his capacity of administrator of the estate of
the deceased Luis Espiritu. The plaintiffs alleged that partition of the estate of their deceased mother Margarita
they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Espiritu, together with the products thereof, uncollected
Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of Margarita since 1901, or their equivalent, to wit, P450 per annum,
Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that and to pay the costs of the suit.
Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her
paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares in In due season the defendant administrator answered the
area situated in the barrio of Panducot, municipality of aforementioned complaint, denying each and all of the
Calumpit, Bulacan, and bounded as described in allegations therein contained, and in special defense
paragraph 4 of the amended complaint, which hereditary alleged that the land, the subject-matter of the complaint,
portion had since then been held by the plaintiffs and had an area of only 2 1 cavanes of seed rice; that, on
their sisters, through their father Wenceslao Mercado, May 25, 1894, its owner, the deceased Margarita Espiritu
husband of Margarita Espiritu; that, about the year 1910, y Yutoc, the plaintiffs' mother, with the due authorization
said Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced, and of her husband Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz sold
fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo to Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,000 a portion of said
and Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left land, to wit, an area such as is usually required for 􏰀fteen
by their mother, for the sum of P400, which amount was cavanes of seed; that subsequently, on May 14, 1901,
divided among the two plaintiffs and their sisters Wenceslao Mercado y Aredo Cruz, the plaintiffs' father, in
Concepcion and Paz, notwithstanding the fact that said his capacity as administrator of the property of his
land, according to its assessment, was valued at P3,795; children sold under pacto de retro to the same Luis
that one-half of the land in question belonged to Espiritu at the price of P375 the remainder of said land,
Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of this share, that is, one- to wit, an area covered by sixcavanes of seed to meet
fourth of said land, to the plaintiffs, and the other one- the expenses of the maintenance of his (Wenceslao's)
fourth, to their two sisters Concepcion and Paz; that the children, and this amount being still insu􏰁cient he
part of the land belonging to the two plaintiffs could successively borrowed from said Luis Espiritu other sums
produce 180 cavanes of rice per annum, which, at P2.50 of money aggregating a total of P600; but that later, on
per cavanes was equivalent to P450 per annum; and that May 17, 1910, the plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be of
Luis Espiritu had received said products from 1901 until legal age, executed, with their sisters Maria del Consejo
the time of his death. Said counsel therefore asked that and Maria de la Paz, the notarial instrument inserted
judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be integrally in the 5th paragraph of the answer, by which
null and void the sale they made of their respective instrument, ratifying said sale under pacto de retro of the
shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that the land that had belonged to their mother Margarita Espiritu,
defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to the effected by their father Wenceslao Mercado in favor of
plaintiffs the shares of the land that fell to the latter in the Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,600, they sold absolutely
and perpetually to said Luis Espiritu, in consideration of
P400, the property that had belonged to their deceased court.
mother and which they acknowledged having received
from the aforementioned purchaser. In his cross As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale,
complaint the defendant alleged that the complaint 􏰀led Exhibit 3, executed by them on May 17, 1910, on the
by the plaintiffs was unfounded and malicious, and that ground that they were minors when they executed it, the
thereby losses and damages in the sum of P1,000 had questions submitted to the decision of this court consist
been caused to the intestate estate of the said Luis in determining whether it is true that the plaintiffs were
Espiritu. He therefore asked that judgment be rendered then minors and therefore incapable of selling their
by ordering the plaintiffs to keep perpetual silence with property on the date borne by the instrument Exhibit 3;
respect to the land in litigation and, besides, to pay said and in case they then were such, whether a person who
intestate estate P1,000 for is really and truly a minor and, notwithstanding, attests
that he is of legal age, can, after the execution of the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com deed and within the legal period, ask for the annulment of
the instrument executed by him, because of some defect
losses and damages, and that the costs of the trial be that invalidates the contract, in accordance with the law
charged against them. (Civ. Code, arts. 1263 and 1300), so that he may obtain
the restitution of the land sold.
In reply to the cross-complaint, the plaintiffs denied each
and all of the facts therein set forth, and in special The record shows it to have been fully proven that in
defense alleged that at the time of the execution of the 1891 Lucas Espiritu obtained title by composition with the
deed of sale inserted in the cross-complaint the plaintiffs State, to three parcels of land, adjoining each other, in
were still minors, and that since they reached their the sitio of Panducot of the pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan,
majority the four years 􏰀xed by law for the annulment of containing altogether an area of 75 hectares, 25 ares and
said contract had not yet elapsed. They therefore asked 69 centares, which facts appear in the title Exhibit D; that,
that they be absolved from the defendant's cross- upon Luis Espiritu's death, his said lands passed by
complaint. inheritance to his four children named Victoria, Ines,
Margarita, and Luis; and that, in the partition of said
After trial and the introduction of evidence by both decedent's estate, the parcel of land described in the
parties, the court rendered the judgment aforementioned, complaint as containing forty- seven and odd hectares
to which the plaintiffs excepted and in writing moved for a was allotted to the brother and sister Luis and Margarita
reopening of the case and a new trial. This motion was in equal shares. Margarita Espiritu, married to Wenceslao
overruled, exception was taken by the petitioners, and, Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, had by this husband 􏰀ve
the proper bill of exceptions having been presented, the children, Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo,
same was approved and transmitted to the clerk of this Josefa, and Amalia, all surnamed Mercado y Espiritu,
who, at the death of their mother in 1896 inherited, by aforementioned wife, then deceased, to Luis Espiritu in
operation of law, one-half of the land described in the 1894.
complaint.
However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of
The plaintiffs' petition for the annulment of the sale and the same year, 1901, the widower Wenceslao Mercado,
the consequent restitution to them of two-fourths of the according to the private document Exhibit 2, pledged or
land left by their mother, that is, of one-fourth of all the mortgaged to the same man, Luis Espiritu, for P375, a
land described in the complaint, and which, they stated part, or an area covered by six cavanes of seed, of the
amounts to 11 hectares, 86 ares and 37 centares. To this land that had belonged to this vendor's deceased wife,
claim the defendant excepted, alleging that the land in Margarita Espiritu, adjoining the parcel previously sold to
question comprised only an area such as is customarily the said Luis Espiritu and which now forms a part of the
covered by 21 cavanes of seed. land in question — a transaction which Mercado was
obliged to ,make in order to obtain funds with which "to
It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of cover his children's needs." Wenceslao Mercado, the
May 25, 1894, the plaintiffs' mother conveyed by actual plaintiffs' father, having died, about the year 1904, the
and absolute sale for the sum of P2,000, to her brother plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado, together with
Luis Espiritu a portion of the land now in litigation, or an their sisters Consejo and Paz, declaring themselves to be
area such as is usually covered by about 15 cavanes of of legal age and in possession of the required legal
seed; and that, on account of the loss of the original of status to contract, executed and subscribed before a
said instrument, which was in the possession of the notary- the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, in
purchaser Luis Espiritu, and furthermore because, during which referring to the previous sale of the land, effected
the revolution, the protocols or registers of public by their deceased mother for the sum of P2,600 and with
documents of the Province of Bulacan were burned, her husband's permission and authorization, they sold
Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the widower of the absolutely and in perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum
vendor and father of the plaintiffs, executed, at the of P400 "as an increase" of the previous purchase price,
instance of the interested party Luis Espiritu, the notarial the land described in said instrument and situated in
instrument Exhibit 1, of the date of May 20, Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, of an area equal
to that usually sown with 21 cavanes of seed, bounded
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com on the north by the lands of Flaviano Abreu and the heirs
of Pedro Espiritu, on the east by those of Victoria Espiritu
1901, in his own name and in those of his minor children and Ines Espiritu, on the south by those of Luis Espiritu,
Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and and on the west by those of Hermogenes Tan-Toco and
Amalia, and therein set forth that it was true that the sale by the Sapang-Maitu stream.
of said portion of land had been made by his
In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment got for her brother Domingo the other cedula, Exhibit B,
of the deed Exhibit 3, on the ground that on the date of its pertaining to the year 1910, wherein it appears that the
execution they were minors without legal capacity to latter was then already 23 years of age; that she did not
contract, and for the further reason that the deceased know why her uncle did so; that she and her brother and
purchaser Luis Espiritu availed himself of deceit and sisters merely signed the deed of May 17, 1910; and that
fraud in obtaining their consent for the execution of said her father Wenceslao Mercado, prior to his death had
deed. pledged the land

As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
parochial church of Apalit (the plaintiffs were born in
Apalit) that the baptismal register books of that parish to her uncle Luis Espiritu.
pertaining to the years 1890-1891, were lost or burned,
the witness Maria Consejo Mercado recognized and The witness Ines Espiritu testi􏰀ed that after the death of
identi􏰀ed the book Exhibit A, which she testi􏰀ed had the plaintiffs' father, it was Luis Espiritu who directed the
been kept and taken care of by her deceased father cultivation of the land in litigation. This testimony was
Wenceslao Mercado, pages 396 and 397 of which bear corroborated by her sister Victoria Espiritu, who added
the attestation that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado was that her nephew, the plaintiff Domingo, had lived for
born on August 4, 1890, and Josefa Mercado, on July 14, some time, she did not know just how long, under the
1891. Furthermore, this witness corroborated the control of Luis Espiritu.
averment of the plaintiffs' minority, by the personal
registration certi􏰀cate of said Domingo Mercado, of the Roque Galang, married to a sister of Luis Espiritu, stated
year 1914, Exhibit C, by which it appears that in 1910 he that the land that fell to his wife and to his sister-in-law
was only 23 years old, whereby it would also appear that Victoria, and which had an area of about 8 hectares less
Josefa Mercado was 22 years of age in 1910, and than that of the land allotted to the aforementioned Luis
therefore, on May 17, 1910, when the instrument of and Margarita produced for his wife and his sister-in-law
purchase and sale, Exhibit 3, was executed the plaintiffs Victoria a net and minimum yield of 507 cavanes in 1907,
must have been, respectively, 19 and 18 years of age. in spite of its being high land and of inferior quality, as
compared with the land in dispute, and that its yield was
The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testi􏰀ed that still larger in 1914, when the said two sisters' share was
after her father's death her brother and sisters removed 764 cavanes.
to Manila to live there, although her brother Domingo
used to reside with his uncle Luis Espiritu, who took Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed
charge of the administration of the property left by his Exhibit 3 was rati􏰀ed, was a witness for the defendant.
predecessors in interest; that it was her uncle Luis who He testi􏰀ed that the was drawn up by him at the request
of the plaintiff Josefa Mercado; that the grantors of the those of his other relatives. He denied that his father had
instrument assured him that they were all of legal age; at any time administered the property belonging to the
that said document was signed by the plaintiffs and the Mercado brother and sisters.
other contracting parties, after it had been read to them
and had been translated into the Pampangan dialect for In rebuttal, Antonino Mercado, a cousin of Wenceslao,
those of them who did not understand Spanish. On father of the plaintiffs, testi􏰀ed that he mediated in
cross- examination, witness added that ever since he several transactions in connection with a piece of land
was 18 years of age and began to court, he had known belonging to Margarita Espiritu. When shown the deed of
the plaintiff Josefa Mercado, who was then a young purchase and sale Exhibit 1, he stated that he was not
maiden, although she had not yet commenced to attend acquainted with its contents. This same witness also
social gatherings, and that all this took place about the testi􏰀ed that he mediated in a transaction had between
year 1898, for witness said that he was then [at the time Wenceslao Mercado and Luis Espiritu (he did not
of his testimony, 1914,] 34 years of age. remember the year), in which the former sold to the latter
a parcel of land situated in Panducot. He stated that as
Antonio Espiritu, 60 years of age, who knew Lucas he was a witness of the deed of sale he could identify this
Espiritu and the properties owned by the latter, testi􏰀ed instrument were it exhibited to him; but he did not do so,
that Espiritu's land contained an area of only 84 cavanes, for no instrument whatever was presented to him for
and, after its owner's death, was under witness' identi􏰀cation. The transaction mentioned must have
administration during two harvest seasons; that the concerned either the rati􏰀cation of the sale of the land of
products yielded by a portion of this land, to wit, an area 15 cavanes, in 1901, attested in Exhibit 1, or the
such as is sown by about 15 cavanes of seed, had been, mortgage or pledge of the other parcel of
since 1894, utilized by Luis- Espiritu, by reason of his
having acquired the land; and that, after Margarita CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
Espiritu's death, her husband Wenceslao Mercado took
possession of another portion of the land, containing an 6 cavanes, given on May 14, 1901, by Wenceslao
area of six cavanes of seed and which had been left by Mercado to Luis Espiritu, as may be seen by the private
this deceased, and that he held the same until 1901, document Exhibit 2. In rebuttal, the plaintiff Josefa
when he conveyed it to Luis Espiritu. Mercado denied having gone to the house of the notary
Tanjutco for the purpose of requesting him to draw up
The defendant-administrator, Jose Espiritu, a son of the any document whatever. She stated that she saw the
deceased Luis Espiritu, testi􏰀ed that the plaintiff document Exhibit 3 for the 􏰀rst time in the house of her
Domingo Mercado used to live off and on in the house of uncle Luis Espiritu on the day she signed it, on which
his deceased father, about the year 1909 or 1910, and occasion and while said document was being signed said
used to go back and forth between his father's house and notary was not present, nor were the witnesses thereto
whose names appear therein; and that she went to her the remainder of said land, an area of six cavanes, made
said uncle's house, because he had sent for her, as well with the same purchaser, at an increase of P400 over the
as her brother and sisters, sending a carromata to fetch price of P2,600, making an aggregate sum of P3,000,
them. Victoria Espiritu denied ever having been in the decomposed as follows: P2,000, collected during her
house of her brother Luis Espiritu in company with the lifetime, by the vendors' deceased mother; P600
plaintiffs, for the purpose of giving her consent to the collected by the vendors' father; and the said increase of
execution of any deed in behalf of her brother. P400, collected by the plaintiffs.

The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even In the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May
circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu 25, 1894, Margarita Espiritu conveyed to her brother Luis
employed fraud, deceit, violence or intimidation, in order the parcel of 15 cavanes of seed, Exhibit 1, and after her
to effect the sale mentioned in the document Exhibit 3, death the plaintiffs' widowed father mortgaged or pledged
executed on May 17, 1910. In this document the vendors, the remaining portion or parcel of 6 cavanes of seed to
the brother and sisters Domingo, Maria del Consejo, Paz, her brother-in-law, Luis Espiritu, in May, 1901 (Exhibit 2).
and Josefa, surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, attested the So it is that the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, which was
certainty of the previous sale which their mother, during assailed by the plaintiffs, recognized the validity of the
her lifetime, had made in behalf of said purchaser Luis previous contracts, and the totality of the land, consisting
Espiritu, her brother, with the consent of her husband of an area containing 21 cavanes of seed rice, was sold
Wenceslao Mercado, father of the vendors of the portion absolutely and in perpetuity, the vendors receiving in
of land situated in the barrio of Panducot, pueblo of exchange P400 more; and there is no conclusive proof in
Calumpit, Bulacan; and in consideration of the fact that the record that this last document was false and
the said vendor Luis Espiritu paid them, as an increase, simulated on account of the employment of any violence,
the sum of P400, by virtue of the contract made with him, intimidation, fraud, or deceit, in the procuring of the
they declare having sold to him absolutely and in consent of the vendors who executed it.
perpetuity said parcel of land, and waive thenceforth any
and all rights they may have, inasmuch as said sum Considering the relation that exists between the
constitutes the just price of the property. document Exhibit 3 and those of previous dates, Exhibits
1 and 2, and taking into account the relationship between
So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an the contracting parties, and also the general custom that
acknowledgment of the contract of sale of the parcel or prevails in many provinces of these Islands for the
portion of land that would contain 15 cavanes of seed vendor or debtor to obtain an increase in the price of the
rice made by the vendors' mother in favor of the sale or of the pledge, or an increase in the amount
purchaser Luis Espiritu, their uncle, and likewise an loaned, without proof to the contrary, it would be
acknowledgment of the contract of pledge or mortgage of improper and illegal to hold, in view of the facts
hereinabove set forth, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu, therefore a rash venture to attempt to recover this latter
now deceased, had any need to forge or simulate the parcel by means of the contract of final and absolute
document sale, set forth in the deed Exhibit 3.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com Moreover, the notarial document Exhibit 1, as regards the
statements made therein, is of the nature of a public
Exhibit 3 inasmuch as, since May 1894, he has held in document and is evidence of the fact which gave rise to
the capacity of owner by virtue of a prior acquisition, the its execution and of the date of the latter, even against a
parcel of land of 15 cavanes of seed, and likewise, since third person and his predecessors in interest such as are
May, 1901, according to the contract of mortgage or the plaintiffs. (Civ. Code, art. 1218.)
pledge, the parcel of 6 cavanes, or the remainder of the
total area of 21 cavanes. The plaintiffs' father, Wenceslao Mercado, recognizing it
to be perfectly true that his wife Margarita Espiritu sold
So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now said parcel of land which she inherited from her father, of
after his death, his testate or intestate estate is in lawful an area of about "15 cavanes of seed," to her brother
possession of the parcel of land situated in Panducot that Luis Espiritu, by means of an instrument executed by her
contains 21 cavanes of seed, by virtue of the title of on May 25, 1894 — an instrument that disappeared or
conveyance of ownership of the land measuring 15 was burned — and likewise recognizing that the
cavanes and, in consequence of the contract of pledge or protocols and register books belonging to the Province of
mortgage in security for the sum of P600, is likewise in Bulacan were destroyed as a result of the past revolution,
lawful possession of the remainder of the land, or an area at the request of his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu he had
containing 6 cavanes of seed. no objection to give the testimony recorded in said
notarial instrument, as it was the truth regarding what had
The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to occurred, and in so doing he acted as the plaintiffs'
recover said 􏰀rst parcel of land, as its ownership was legitimate father in the exercise of his parental authority,
conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular title of inasmuch as he had personal knowledge of said sale, he
purchase and sale; and as to the other portion of 6 himself being the husband who authorized said
cavanes of seed, they could have redeemed it before conveyance, notwithstanding that his testimony affected
May 17, 1910, upon the payment or the return of the sum his children's interests and prejudiced his own, as the
which their deceased father Wenceslao Mercado had, owner of any fruits that might be produced by said real
during his lifetime, received as a loan under security of property.
the pledged property; but, after the execution of the
document Exhibit 3, the creditor Luis Espiritu de􏰀nitely The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2
acquired the ownership of said parcel of 6 cavanes. It is were identi􏰀ed as authentic by one of the plaintiffs,
Consejo Mercado, and as the record shows no evidence limited solely to the parcel of land of 6 cavanes of seed,
whatever that this document is false, and it does not pledged by the deceased father of the plaintiffs in
appear to have been assailed as such, and as it was security for P600 received by him as a loan from his
signed by the plaintiffs father, there is no legal ground or brother-in- law Luis Espiritu, for the reason that the parcel
well-founded reason why it should be rejected. It was of 15 cavanes had been lawfully sold by its original
therefore properly admitted as evidence of the certainty owner, the plaintiffs' mother.
of the facts therein set forth.
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid
The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the down the rule that the sale of real estate, made by minors
document Exhibit 3 consista in that, on the date of May who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not,
17, 1910, when it was executed and they signed it, they is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse
were minors, that is, they had not yet attained the age of themselves from the ful􏰀llment of the obligations
21 years 􏰀xed by Act No. 1891, though no evidence contracted by them, or to have them annulled in
appears in the record that the plaintiffs Josefa and pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th
Domingo Mercado were in fact minors, for no certi􏰀ed Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to be
copies were presented of their respective baptismal valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint 􏰀led
certi􏰀cates, nor did the plaintiffs adduce any against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale
supplemental evidence whatever to prove that Domingo of minors' property, nor the juridical rules established in
was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of age when they consonance therewith. (Decisions of the supreme court
of Spain, of April 27, 1860, July 11, 1868, and March 1,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com 1875.)

signed the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, With respect to the true age of the plaintiffs, no proof was
inasmuch as the copybook, Exhibit A, notwithstanding adduced of the fact that it was Luis Espiritu who took out
the testimony of the plaintiff Consejo Mercado, does not Domingo Mercado's personal registration certi􏰀cate on
constitute sufficient proof of the dates of the births of the April 13, 1910, causing the age of 23 years to be entered
said Domingo and Josefa. therein in order to corroborate the date of the notarial
instrument of May 17th of the same year; and the
However, even in the doubt whether they certainly were supposition that he did, would also allow it to be
of legal age on the date referred to, it cannot be gainsaid supposed, in order to show the propriety of the claim, that
that in the document Exhibit 3 they stated that they were the cedula Exhibit C was taken out on February 14, 1914,
of legal age at the time they executed and signed it, and wherein it is recorded that Domingo Mercado was on that
on that account the sale mentioned in said notarial deed date 23 years of age, for both these facts are not proved;
Exhibit 3 is perfectly valid — a sale that is considered as neither was any proof adduced against the statement
made by the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa in the notarial CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
instrument Exhibit 3, that, on the date when they
executed it, they were already of legal age, and, besides them from the sums of money received as loans; and,
the annotation contained in the copybook Exhibit A, no 􏰀nally, on the execution of the impugned document
supplemental proof of their true ages was introduced. Exhibit 3, the plaintiffs received and divided between
themselves the sum of P400, which sum, added to that of
Aside from the foregoing, from a careful examination of the P2,000 received by Margarita Espiritu, and to that of
the record in this case, it cannot be concluded that the the P600 collected by Wenceslao Mercado, widower of
plaintiffs, who claim to have been minors when they the latter and father of the plaintiffs, makes all together
executed the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, have suffered the sum of P3,000, the amount paid by the purchaser as
positive and actual losses and damages in their rights the price of all the land containing 21 cavanes of seed,
and interests as a result of the execution of said and is the just price of the property, was not impugned,
document, inasmuch as the sale effected by the plaintiffs' and, consequently, should be considered as equivalent
mother, Margarita Espiritu, in May, 1894, of the greater to, and compensatory for, the true value of said land.
part of the land of 21 cavanes of seed, did not occasion
the plaintiffs any damage or prejudice whatever, for the For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned
reason that the portion of the land sold to Luis Espiritu to the judgment appealed from have been refuted, and
was disposed of by its lawful owner, and, with respect to deeming said judgment to be in accordance with law and
the area of 6 cavanes that was a part of the same the evidence of record, we should, and do hereby, a􏰁rm
property and was pledged or mortgaged by the plaintiffs' the same, with the costs against the appellants. So
father, neither did this transaction occasion any damage ordered.
or prejudice to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as their father
stated in the document Exhibit 2 that he was obliged to Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street and Malcolm, JJ.,
mortgage or pledge said remaining portion of the land in concur. Separate Opinions
order to secure the loan of the P375 furnished by Luis
Espiritu and which was subsequently increased to P600 CARSON, J., concurring:
so as to provide for certain engagements or perhaps to
I concur.
meet the needs of his children, the plaintiff; and
therefore, to judge from the statements made by their But in order to avoid misunderstanding, I think it well to
father himself, they received through him, in exchange for indicate that the general statement in the prevailing
the land of 6 cavanes of seed, which passed into the opinion to the effect that the making of false
possession of the creditor Luis Espiritu, the bene􏰀t which representations as to his age by an infant executing a
must have accrued to contract will preclude him from disa􏰁rming the contract
or setting up the defense of infancy, must be understood plea that he was not of said age when he assumed the
as limited to cases wherein, on account of the minor's obligation. The reason for this is that the law helps the
representations as to his majority. and because of his deceived and not the deceivers."
near approach thereto, the other party had good reason
to believe, and did in fact believe the minor capable of In the glossary to these provisions of the Partidas by
contracting. Gregorio Lopez, I 􏰀nd the following:

The doctrine set forth in the Partidas, relied upon by the CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
supreme court of Spain in the cases cited in the
prevailing opinion, is substantially similar to the doctrine "(1) De tal tiempo. Nota bene hoc verbum, nam si
of estoppel as applied in like instances by many of the appareret ex aspectu eum esse minorem, tunc
courts in the United States. adversarius non potest dicere se deceptum; imo tam
ipse, quam minor videntur esse in dolo, quo casu
For purposes of convenient comparison, I here insert competit minori restitutio, quia facta doli compensatione,
some citations of authority, Spanish and American, perinde est ac si nullus fuisset in dolo, et ideo datur
recognizing the limitations upon the general doctrine to restitutio; et quia scienti dolus non infertur, l. 1. D. de act.
which I am inviting attention at this time; and in this empt. secundum Cyn. Alberic et Salic. in l. 3. C. si minor
connection it is worthy of note that the courts of the se major. dixer. adde Albericum tenentem, quando per
United States look with rather less favor than the aspectum aliter constaret, in authent. sacramenta
supreme court of Spain upon the application of the puberuqm, col. 3. C. si advers vendit.
doctrine, doubtless because the cases wherein it may
properly be applied, are much less likely to occur in a "(2) Enganosamente. Adde 1. 2. et 3. C. si minor se
jurisdiction where majority is reached at the age of 21 major. dixer. Et adverte nam per istam legem Partitarum
than a jurisdiction wherein majority is not ordinarily quae non distinguit, an adultus, vel pupillus talerrl
attained until the infant reaches the age of 25. assertionem faciat, videtur comprobari dictum Guillielm.
de Cun de quo per Paul. de Castr. in 1. qui jurasse. in
princ. D de jurejur. quod si pupillus proximus pubertati
Ley 6, tit. 19, Partida 6.a is, in part, as follows:
juret, cum contrahit, se esse puberem, et postea etiam
"If he who is a minor (1) deceitfully says or sets forth in juret, quod non veniet contra contractum quod habebit
an instrument that he is over twenty-􏰀ve years of age, locum dispositio authenticae sacramenta puberum, sicut
and this assertion is believed by another person who si esset pubes: et cum isto dicto transit ibi Paul. de Cast.
takes him to be of about that age, (2) in an action at law multum commedans, dicens, se alibi non legisse; si
he should be deemed to be of the age he asserted, and tamen teneamus illam opinionem, quod etiam pupillus
should not (3) afterwards be released from liability on the doli capax obligatur ex Juramento, non esset ita miranda
dicta, decissio; vide per Alexand. in dict. 1. qui jurasse, in latter pretend to be twenty-􏰀ve years of age and, due to
princ. Item lex ista Partitarum expresse sentit de adulto, the circumstances that they are nearly of that age, are
non de pupillo, cum superius dixit, que paresciere de tal married, or have the administration of their property, or
tiempo: Doctores etiam intelligunt de adulto 11. dict. tit. on account of other special circumstances affecting them,
C. si minor. se major dixer. et patet ex 11. illius tituli. Quid the other parties to the contract believe them to be of
autem dicemus in dubio, cum non constat de dolo legal age."
minoris? Azon. in summa illius tit. in 􏰀n. dicit, quod
praesumitur dolug in minore, qui se majorem dixit; et With these citations compare the general doctrine in the
idem tenet Glossa in dict. 1. 3. et ibi Odofred. in 􏰀n. United States as set forth in 22 Cyc. (p. 610), supported
Cynus tamen, et alli, tenent oppositum, quia dolus non by numerous citations of authority.
praesumitur, nisi probetur, 1. quotiens, s., qui dolo, D. de
probat. Et hoc etiam vult ista lex Partitarum, cum dicit, si "Estoppel to dissa􏰁rm — (I) In General. — The doctrine
lo faze enganosamente: et ita tenent Alberic et Salicet. in of estoppel not being as a general rule applicable to
dict. 1. 3. ubi etiam Bart. in 􏰀n. Si autem minor sui infants, the court will not readily hold that his acts during
facilitate asserat se majorem, et ita juret, tunc distingue, infancy have created an estoppel against him to disa􏰁rm
ut habetur dict. 1. 3 quia aut juravit verbo tenus, et tunc his contracts. Certainly the infant cannot be estopped by
non restituitur, nisi per instrumentum seu scripturam the acts or admissions of other persons.
probet se minorem; et si juravit corporaliter, nullo modo
restituitur, ut ibi; et per quze instrumenta probentur, cum CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
verbo tenus juravit, vide per Specul. tit. de restit, in integr.
"(II) False representations as to age. — According to
s. quis autem, col. 4. vers. sed cujusmodi erit scriptura,
some authorities the fact that an infant at the time of
ubi etiam vide per Speculatorem aliquas notabiles
entering into a contract falsely represented to the person
quaestiones in ista materia, in col. 5. videlicet, an
with whom he dealt that he had attained the age of
praejudicet sibi minor ex tali juramento in aliis
majority does not give any validity to the contract or estop
contractibus, et tenet, quod non; et tenet glossa 􏰀nalis in
the infant from disa􏰁rming the same or setting up the
1. de aetate, D. de minor. in 􏰀n. gloss. vide ibi per
defense of infancy against the enforcement of any rights
Speculat. ubi etiam de aliis in ista materia."
thereunder; but there is also authority for the view that
In the decision of the supreme court of Spain dated the such false representations will create an estoppel against
27th of April, 1860, I 􏰀nd an excellent illustration of the the infant, and under the statutes of some states no
conditions under which that court applied the doctrine, as contract can be disa􏰁rmed where, on account of the
appears from the following resolution therein set forth. minor's representations as to his majority, the other party
had good reason to believe the minor capable of
"Sales of real estate made by minors are valid when the contracting. Where the infant has made no
representations whatever as to his age the mere fact that
the person with whom he dealt believed him to be of age,
even though his belief was warranted by the infant's
appearance and the surrounding, circumstances, and the
infant knew of such belief, will not render the contract
valid or estop the infant to disaffirm."

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

SECOND DIVISION BULBULMO" (p. 19, Annex "A")

[G.R. No. L-44748. August 29, 1986.] Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela alleges that the
defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not only
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. wounded his feelings but also caused him undue
(RCPI), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and embarrassment and affected adversely his business as
LORETO DIONELA, respondents. well because other people have come to know of said
defamatory words. Defendant-corporation as a defense,
O. Pythogoras Oliver for respondents. alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was a private
joke between the sending and receiving operators and
DECISION that they were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff
and therefore did not form part of the telegram and that
PARAS, J p:
the Tagalog words are not defamatory. The telegram
Before Us, is a Petition for Review by certiorari of the sent through its facilities was received in its station at
decision of the Court of Appeals, modifying the decision Legaspi City. Nobody other than the operator manned
of the trial court in a civil case for recovery of damages the teletype machine which automatically receives
against petitioner corporation by reducing the award to telegrams being transmitted.
private respondent Loreto Dionela of moral damages
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
from P40,000 to P15,000, and attorney's fees from
P3,000 to P2,000. The said telegram was detached from the machine and
placed inside a sealed envelope and delivered to plaintiff,
The basis of the complaint against the defendant
obviously as is. The additional words in Tagalog were
corporation is a telegram sent through its Manila Office to
never noticed and were included in the telegram when
the offended party, Loreto Dionela, reading as follows:
delivered.
"176 AS JR 1215 PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-
The trial court in finding for the plaintiff ruled as follows:
66 LORETO DIONELA CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY.
WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER. "There is no question that the additional words in Tagalog
are libelous. They clearly impute a vice or defect of the
LORETO DIONELA — CABANGAN — WIRE ARRIVAL
plaintiff. Whether or not they were intended for the
OF CHECK-PER. 115 PM.
plaintiff, the effect on the plaintiff is the same. Any person
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING — KA reading the additional words in Tagalog will naturally
DIYAN — WALA KANG PADALA DITO — KAHIT think that they refer to the addressee, the plaintiff. There
is no indication from the face of the telegram that the amount of P40,000.00 as the reasonable amount of
additional words in Tagalog were sent as a private joke moral damages and the amount of P3,000.00 as
between the operators of the defendant. attorney's fees which the defendant should pay the
plaintiff." (pp. 15-16, Record on Appeal).
"The defendant is sued directly — not as an employer.
The business of the defendant is to transmit telegrams. It The respondent appellate court in its assailed decision
will open the door to frauds and allow the defendant to confirming the aforegoing findings of the lower court
act with impunity if it can escape liability by the simple stated:
expedient of showing that its employees acted beyond
the scope of their assigned tasks. "The proximate cause, therefore, resulting in injury to
appellee, was the failure of the appellant to take the
"The liability of the defendant is predicated not only on necessary or precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence
Article 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but on the of the humiliating incident now complained of. The
following articles of said Code: company had not imposed any safeguard against such
eventualities and this void in its operating procedure does
"ART. 19. — Every person must, in the exercise of his not speak well of its concern for their clientele's interests.
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with Negligence here is patent. This negligence is imputable
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and to appellant and not to its employees.
good faith.
"The claim that there was no publication of the libelous
"ART. 20. — Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully words in Tagalog is also without merit. The fact that a
or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify carbon copy of the telegram was filed among other
the latter for the same." telegrams and left to hang for the public to see, open for
inspection by a third party is sufficient publication. It
"There is sufficient publication of the libelous Tagalog would have been otherwise perhaps had the telegram
words. The office file of the defendant containing copies been placed and kept in a secured place where no one
of telegrams received are open and held together only by may have had a
a metal fastener. Moreover, they are open to view and
inspection by third parties. CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

"It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to damages and chance to read it without appellee's permission.
attorney's fees. The plaintiff is a businessman. The
libelous Tagalog words must have affected his business "The additional Tagalog words at the bottom of the
and social standing in the community. The Court fixes the telegram are, as correctly found by the lower court,
libelous per se, and from which malice may be presumed Petitioner's contentions do not merit our consideration.
in the absence of any showing of good intention and The action for damages was filed in the lower court
justifiable motive on the part of the appellant. The law directly against respondent corporation not as an
implies damages in this instance (Quemel vs. Court of employer subsidiarily liable under the provisions of Article
Appeals, L-22794, January 16, 1968; 22 SCRA 44). The 1161 of the New Civil Code in relation to Art. 103 of the
award of P40,000.00 as moral damages is hereby Revised Penal Code. The cause of action of the private
reduced to P15,000.00 and for attorney's fees the respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil
amount of P2,000.00 is awarded." (pp. 22-23, record) Code (supra). As well as on respondent's breach of
contract thru the negligence of its own employees. 1
After a motion for reconsideration was denied by the
appellate court, petitioner came to Us with the following: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of receiving and transmitting messages.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS. I Everytime a person transmits a message through the
facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that
receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes
Petitioner-employer should answer directly and primarily
to transmit the message accurately. There is no question
for the civil liability arising from the criminal act of its
that in the case at bar, libelous matters were included in
employee.
the message transmitted, without the consent or
II knowledge of the sender. There is a clear case of breach
of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that libelous matters in the message sent to the private
there was sufficient publication of the alleged libelous respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only
telegram in question, as contemplated by law on libel. through its employees. Hence the acts of its employees
in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of
III the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable
directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the petitioner's business is to deprive the general public
liability of petitioner- company-employer is predicated on availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective
Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Articles on Human and adequate remedy. In most cases, negligence must
Relations. be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However,
since negligence may be hard to substantiate
IVThe Honorable Court of Appeals erred in awarding
Atty's fees. (p. 4, Record). CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA
LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering
the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the
injury.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the

appellate court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.Feria (Chairman), Fernan Alampay, and

Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. In contracts the negligence of the employee (servant)

is the negligence of the employer (master). This is the
master and servant rule.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

EN BANC. trial for having been filed out of time.

[G.R. No. L-30538. January 31, 1981.] On automatic review, the Supreme Court held that
appellants' defense of alibi cannot prevail over their
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. having been positively identified by the prosecution
BONIFACIO TIROL and CIRIACO BALDESCO, witnesses whose credibility was never successfully
defendants-appellants. assailed; that the motion for new trial filed more than
fifteen days after rendition of judgment was filed out of
Arcadio G. de la Cruz for defendants-appellants. time; and that conspiracy was sufficiently established by
positive evidence showing the assailants' unison in action
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Conrado T. Limcaoco and singleness of purpose.
and Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya for plaintiff-appellee.
Judgment modified as to civil liability and as to appellant
SYNOPSIS Baldesco whose criminal liability was extinguished by his
death pending appeal but whose civil liability the Court
Awakened by the barking of dogs one evening, Kosain
ruled remained recoverable from his estate.
Manibpol saw two men come up his house on the pretext
of borrowing a piece of his land. Suddenly, another man SYLLABUS
came up who, after flashing his flashlight and boxing
Kosain's face, was followed by a group of more than ten 1. CRIMINAL LAW; LIABILITY OF ACCUSED; EFFECT
men who simultaneously hacked and boloed Kosain and OF DEATH PENDING APPEAL; RESOLUTION OF
the members of his family, resulting in the death of CRIMINAL LIABILITY AS BASIS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY
Kosain's wife and of his six children. The wounded WHICH SURVIVES. — Where during the pendency of an
Kosain and a six-year old daughter, who survived the appeal in a criminal case one of the accused dies, the
massacre were able to recognize the appellants as appeal will be resolved insofar as he is concerned only
among their assailants with the help of a lighted for the purpose of determining his criminal liability which
petroleum lamp and the moonlight. is the basis of civil liability for which his estate may be
liable following the doctrine in People vs. Sendaydiego
Charged with multiple murder and double frustrated (81 SCRA 124, 134).
murder, appellants interposed the defense of alibi. The
trial court convicted and sentenced them to death upon 2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DEATH CERTIFICATE
finding of conspiracy to commit the crime charged based NOT HEARSAY EVEN IF ISSUING
principally on the testimonies of Kosain and his six-year
old daughter. The court denied appellant's motion for new CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com
DOCTOR DID NOT FACT OF DEATH IS NOT IN ISSUE; that of the victim. The trial court correctly rejected his
CASE AT BAR. — Where the fact of death of the victims theory that he was not in his house when the incident
is not in issue; where the testimonies of the prosecution occurred but in another town looking for a job because of
witnesses that the victims died because of stab wounds the inconsistencies noted in his evidence.
inflicted by the armed men who entered their residence
on the night of December 4, 1965 remain uncontroverted; 4. ID.; ID.; ALIBI CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE
and where the fact that death came to the deceased by IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED BY CREDIBLE
foul means is a moral and legal certainty, the death WITNESSES. — The alibi of both appellants cannot
certificates of the victims are only corroborative of the prevail over the positive identification of the prosecution
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the witnesses identifying and pointing to the accused as
accused may not claim that the court erred in admitting among the group of men which massacred the victims.
them as part of the testimony of the witnesses on the The two survivors, Kosain and his 6-year old daughter,
ground that they are hearsay evidence, the doctor who positively identified both accused as two of the more than
issued them having done so on the strength of the sketch ten men who entered their house on December 4, 1965
furnished by the police, without personally examining the and participated in the hacking and boloing of their family
bodies of the victims. Accused Tirol was even more distinctly and positively
recognized as the "bungi" (harelipped) who hacked some
3. ID.; ID.; ALIBI, A WEAK DEFENSE; NECESSARY OF of the victims. The credibility of theses two prosecution
SHOWING PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF PRESENCE witnesses was never successfully assailed.
AT SCENE OF THE CRIME DUE TO DISTANCE. — It is
well- settled that the defense of alibi, which is easy to 5. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NOT
concoct, must be received with utmost caution, for it is AFFECTED BY MINOR INCONSISTENCIES IN
one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by TESTIMONY. — The inconsistencies attributed to Kosain
an accused. To be acceptable, it must be shown that the Manibpol refer to minor details (i.e., about the length of
place where the accused was alleged to be when the time he had known one of the two persons who first
offense was committed must be located at such a came up to his residence on the pretext of borrowing his
distance that it is well nigh impossible for him to be at the lot), which do not affect his credibility. The apparent
scene of the crime. In the case at bar, although appellant inconsistency in his testimony as well as that of 6-year
Baldesco testified that the victim's house is more than old Undang Kosain whose credibility was never
three kilometers from his, it still does not belie the fact questioned, as to who among the armed men hacked or
that he could easily go there if he wanted to, considering attacked which victim, is likewise insufficient to destroy
that both residence s are within the same barrio. So is their credibility, considering that the presence of a
the house of appellant Tirol located in the same barrio. number of armed men simultaneously participating in the
According to him, his house is about 11⁄2 kilometers from lawful aggression could really be confusing. As noted by
the trial court, it would be natural if the witnesses, who motion for new trial.
were themselves victims of the horrible deed, were not
confused during that terrifying massacre committed 7. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AS A
together by more than ten persons. GROUND THEREFOR ; REQUISITES; NOT PRESENT
IN CASE AT BAR. — Before a new trial may be granted
6. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MOTION FOR NEW on the ground of a newly discovered evidence, it must be
TRIAL; MUST BE FILED WITHIN FIFTEEN DAYS FROM shown that: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial;
RENDITION OF JUDGMENT WHERE DEATH PENALTY (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and
IMPOSED. — Section 9. Rule 122 of the Rules of Court produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
requires that in all cases in which the death penalty is diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely
imposed; the records should be forwarded to the cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) it must
Supreme Court within twenty (20) days but not less than be to the merits as ought to produce a different result, if
fifteen (15) days from rendition of judgment. This 20-day admitted. In the case at bar, therefore, even granting that
the motion for a new trial was filed on time, the same
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com does not merit favorable action. The ground relied on is
an alleged newly discovered evidence, referring to a
period is not rigid nor absolute nor jurisdictional, and may sworn statement executed by a barrio captain after
be shortened or extended. However, the extension of judgment had already been rendered, which states that
period is for the purpose of enabling the lower court to Kosain Manibpol, the prosecution witness, had admitted
comply with the mandatory requirement of elevating the to him that the implicated one of the accused only for the
records for review, and not to lengthen the minimum purpose of making money out of the case and that said
period within which the trial courts may modify or alter Manibpol had in fact demanded from a son-in-law of one
their decision. As enunciated in People vs. Bocar (97 of the accused one carabao in exchange for his not
Phil. 398), the reason for the 15-day minimum testifying against the said accused. The very affidavit of
requirement is such that within that period, the trial court the barrio captain indicates that the so-called extra-
may on its own motion with the consent of the defendant, judicial admission of Kosain was already available during
grant a new trial. Within that period., the trial court may the trial, otherwise, he would not have demanded from
modify its judgment by reducing the penalty or fine, or the accused's son-in-law one carabao so that he will not
even set it aside altogether and acquit the accused. In testify against the accused. The son-in-law should have
the case at bar, the motion for a new trial was filed been presented as a defense witness if such was the
twenty-eight days after rendition of the judgment. fact, together with some other barrio residents who had
Although a 15-day extension was granted to the lower knowledge. as was allegedly "public knowledge in our
court within which to forward the record of this case, that barrio," that the said accused was not involved in the
extension did not affect the 15-day period for filing of a crime.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; POSITIVE Baldesco from police custody on December 15, 1965 and
EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO SHOW CONCERT OF his subsequent re-arrest while en route to Davao. On the
DESIGN. — While it has been held that conspiracy must other hand, accused Tirol himself testified that after
be established by positive evidence, direct proof is not coming from Salat, he left his house and never returned,
essential to show it, since by its very nature it is planned for the reason that the members of his family were afraid
in utmost secrecy. Conspiracy implies concert of design of some vendetta because of the massacre of Kosain
and not participation in every detail of the execution. If it Manibpol's family. The trial court noted that this fear was
is proved that two or more persons aimed, by their acts, entertained even before a warrant of arrest could be
at the accomplishment of some unlawful object, each issued. These actuations could only indicate a sense of
doing a part so that their acts, through apparently guilt. As the trial pointed out, fear, of reprisal or retaliation
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, could only haunt one who is aware of his wrongdoing.
indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiments, conspiracy may be inferred 10. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE;
although no actual meeting between them to conspire is TREACHERY IN CASE AT BAR ABSORBS NIGHTTIME,
proved, for the prosecution need not establish that all the TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH,
parties thereto agreed to every detail in the execution of EMPLOYING MEANS TO WEAKEN THE DEFENSE,
the crime or that they were actually together at al stages AND BY A BAND. — There were treachery in the case at
of the conspiracy. In this case under review, it has been bar because the accused and their companions were
clearly established that the appellants and their cohorts made a deliberate surprise attack on the victims. They
acted in unison when they went up the house of Kosain perpetrated the killings in such a manner that there was
Manibpol and attacked their victims in a manner showing no risk to themselves. Treachery has absorbed the
singleness of purpose — the massacre of the entire circumstance of nighttime, taking advantage of superior
family of Kosain. The fact that two survived is of no strength, employing means to weaken the defense, and
moment. The intention to kill all of them was most patent. that the crime was committed by a band.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com 11. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; DWELLING.
— The aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the crime
9. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; INCRIMINATING having been committed in the dwelling place of the
EVIDENCE IN CASE AT BAR TAKEN JUDICIAL victims who had not given any provocation, likewise can
NOTICE OF. — In addition to the prosecution evidence be appreciated.
which has clearly established the guilt of the accused
appellants, there are more incriminating proofs that 12. ID.; MULTIPLE MURDER AND DOUBLE
emanate from the appellants themselves. The trial court FRUSTRATED MURDER; PENALTY. — The crimes of
had taken judicial notice of the escape of accused murder of seven persons qualified by treachery, and of
two frustrated murders, aggravated by the circumstance came and hacked or boloed him, his wife and his seven
of dwelling, with no mitigating circumstance, are children, resulting in the death of his wife, Kadidia
penalized by the maximum penalty provided for in Article Kalantongan and his six children, namely, Daduman,
248 which is death. Malaguianon, Locayda, Pinangcong, Baingkong and
Abdul Rakman, all surnamed Kosain. He and one of his
DECISION daughters, Undang Kosain, who was about six years old,
survived although wounded. They were able to run to the
PER CURIAM p: houses of their neighbors, and were later brought to the
municipal building where they reported to the police and
Review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of were given medical attention.
Cotabato, Branch III, in Criminal Case No. 360, dated
March 31, 1969, imposing on Bonifacio Tirol and Ciriaco For the death of Kosain's wife and his six children, as
Baldesco the death penalty for each of the seven (7) well as for the wounding of himself and his daughter
murders and an indeterminate sentence for each of the Undang, fourteen (14) persons were charged (p. 3, Vol.
two (2) frustrated murders.cdrep II, rec.) with multiple murder and double frustrated
murder by the Matalam Chief of Police, and these were:
The following facts appear uncontroverted. Nicolas Bate, Beatingco Junior, Ruperto Diosma, Pablo
Diosma, Lorenzo Canio, Durico Sugang, Teofilo
In the evening of December 4, 1965, while Kosain
Baldesco, Ciriaco Baldesco, Julian Casiag, Nick Bunque,
Manibpol was sleeping with his family in their house at
a certain Miestizo, Sofring Romualdo, and Bonifacio
Kabalangasan, Matalam, Cotabato, he was awakened by
Bautista [later amended to Bonifacio Tirol; p. 29, Vol. II,
the barking of their dogs. When he got up to investigate,
rec.]. Of the fourteen, only Ciriaco Baldesco and
he saw two persons outside their house who had already
Bonifacio Tirol were apprehended, while the rest remain
come up. They were Beatingco, Jr. and Julian Casian.
at large.
He asked them what they came for, and they answered
that they wanted to borrow part of his land, to which he On February 17, 1966, after the second stage of
consented. After he gave his consent, Kulas Bati preliminary investigation was waived by accused Ciriaco
suddenly arrived, flashed his flashlight on his face and Baldesco and Bonifacio Tirol, the acting Provincial Fiscal
boxed him. When he fell to the floor, the rest of his of Cotabato filed the following information (p. 37, Vol. II,
assailant's companions, numbering more than ten, who rec.) against the two:
were all armed with bladed weapons and firearms, also
"INFORMATION
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"The undersigned Acting Provincial Fiscal accuses
Bonifacio Tirol and Ciriaco Baldesco of the crime of The prosecution relied mainly on the testimonies of the
multiple murder with double frustrated murder, committed two survivors, Kosain Manibpol and his daughter Undang
as follows: Kosain, to prove the guilt of the accused. The only other
witness presented by the prosecution was the municipal
"That on or about December 4, 1965, in Kabalangasan, health officer who issued the death certificates of the
Barrio Lampayan, Matalam, Province of Cotabato, deceased and the medical certificate of Kosain.
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, in company with Nicolas Bate, Kosain Manibpol, 33 years old, widower and resident of
Beatingco Junior, Ruperto Diosma, Pablo Diosma, Kabalangasan, Matalam, Cotabato, declared on direct
Lorenzo Canio, Durico Sugang, Teofilo Baldisco, Julian examination that at about 8:00 P.M. on December 4,
Casiag, Nick Bunque, Miestizo, Sopring Romualdo and 1965, more than
Bonifacio Bautista who are still at large, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com
armed with bladed weapons and firearms did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery ten (10) persons, all armed, entered his house in
and evident premeditation and with intent to kill, taking Kabalangasan, Matalam, Cotabato. Two persons,
advantage of the cover of the night, attack, stab and Beatingco Junior and Julian Casian, came ahead,
shoot Kadidia Kalangtogan, Duaduman Kosain, immediately after he got up from his sleep to check what
Malaguianon Kosain, Locayda Kosain, Penangcong was causing the barking of their dogs which awakened
Kosain, Biacong Kosain and Abdul Rakman Kosain, who him. When he asked why they were there, the two
as a result thereof, sustained mortal wounds which answered that they wanted to borrow his land, to which
directly caused their death and Kosain Manibpol and he consented. Suddenly, Kulas Bate arrived flashed his
Undang Kosain sustained serious wounds which flashlight on his face and boxed him. When he fell to the
ordinarily would have caused their death, thus performing floor, the rest of the armed men came and hacked or
all acts of execution which should have produced the boloed not only him but also his wife and seven children.
crime of double murder as a consequence thereof, but Among the assailants he recognized aside from the three
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes above-named were Bonifacio Tirol, Ciriaco Baldesco,
independent of the will of the accused, that is by the Ruperto Diosma, Florencio Caño, Dorico whose family
timely and able medical assistance rendered to said name he forgot, Teofilo Baldesco, a certain mestizo and
Kosain Manipbol and Undang Kosain which prevented Sopring Romualdo. He actually saw Ciriaco Baldesco
their death. hacking his wife with a bolo, and the "bungi" (harelipped)
Bonifacio Tirol hacking his eldest daughter. He had
"Contrary to law, especially Article 248 and 6 of the known Bonifacio Tirol for two years before the incident
Revised Penal Code." and Ciriaco Baldesco for a longer period. His wife and six
of his children died as a result of the sudden attack. He assailants of his wife and children by saying that
himself was wounded at the outer part of his right arm, at Bonifacio Tirol hacked his wife and Ciriaco Baldesco
the back of his right wrist and on his forehead, and his hacked his eldest child (p. 29, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
chest was badly beaten; but he survived because he was
able to run to the house of a neighbor named Angcogan Undang Kosain, about 6 years old, resident of
(t.s.n., pp. 1-10, Vol. III, rec.) Kabalangasan, Matalam, Cotabato, corroborated the
testimony of her father Kosain Manibpol, that she and her
On cross-examination, Kosain testified that when he was father are the only two in the family now, after her
investigated by the police, he was not sure of the mother, sisters and brother had been killed by more than
surname of the accused Bonifacio, so he stated that it ten armed men who entered their house and attacked
may be Bautista. He learned later that the surname was their family. Among their more than ten assailants, she
Tirol. He admitted that he was confused when he stated knows only three, namely Kulas Bati, Ciriaco Baldesco
earlier that he had known Bonifacio Bautista for one year and another person whom she remembers only as
and Bonifacio Tirol for two years. Bonifacio Bautista and "bungi" (harelipped). Of the three she knows, only two
Bonifacio Tirol are one and the same person. He further were in court, namely Ciriaco Baldesco and the "bungi"
declared that after he had fallen down as a result of the Bonifacio Tirol. She identified them by touching the
blow by Kulas Bate, Sopring immediately hacked him. It shoulders of Baldesco and Tirol (p. 65 t.s.n., Vol. III,
was after he fell that he was able to observe the stabbing rec.). She remembers Tirol distinctly because of his
and slashing of his family, because his assailants must appearance as "bungi". She did not see who hacked her
have thought him dead. He later fled to the house of mother, but she saw "bungi" hack his younger brother
Angcogan who ran away because of fear, but returned and sister. Her elder sisters were hacked by Baldesco.
afterwards with companions and went to their house to She herself was hacked at her back by Kulas Bati. She
verify what happened (pp. 10-24, t.s.n., Vol, III, rec.). showed in court her scar at the back of the left shoulder
going diagonally to the spinal column and measuring
On questioning by the court, Kosain testified that on the about 6 inches long and 3/4 of an inch wide, which
night of December 4, 1965 he slept with a petroleum light appeared to have scars of stitches. Afterwards, she went
burning in their house as in fact they always slept with to the house of a neighbor named Antalig.
their house lighted because their youngest child would
cry if there was no light. When he was attacked he was CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com
not able to shout for help because he was caught
unaware. His eldest daughter, Danonan (Daduman) was In answer to the court's questions, Undang declared that
the one who pleaded with their assailants not to hack she had three older sisters, two younger sisters and one
them as they had no fault, but she was also hacked and younger brother. Her elder sisters were Danonang
hit at the abdomen. At this stage he interchanged the (Daduman), Maguianon (Malaguianan) and Lakaida
(Locayda). Her younger sisters were Inangkong Accused Bonifacio Tirol, 31 years old, married and
(Penangkong) and Bayangkong (Benangkong), and her residing at Kabalangasan, Matalam, Cotabato, likewise
younger brother was Abdul Rakman. They all died when testified on his own behalf. He declared that he was in
more than ten men went inside their house while they Salat, a part of Kabacan, Cotabato, from December 2 to
were lying down on the mat. She did not see who hacked 7, 1965, seeking employment as a laborer in the logging
their father, but she saw Bonifacio Tirol hacking her three firm of Felipe Tan. He left Kabalangasan at 10:00 A.M.,
elder sisters, and Ciriaco Baldesco hacking his younger took a motorboat and arrived in Salat at 5:00 P.M. He did
brother. They used "kalsido" or bolo. The other men were not see the manager, Felipe Tan, of the logging firm until
also armed with boloes, and one of them, Kulas Bati was December 6, 1965, and so he was able to return to
with a firearm. There was light inside their house at that Kabalangasan only on December 7, 1965. While in Salat,
time. Besides, it was moonlight night. Before the night of he stayed in the camp where his friend Rufino Duan, was
the hacking incident, she used to see Bonifacio Tirol staying. When he returned to Kabalangasan, his family
passing by their house in going to the house of Kulas Bati had already evacuated out of fear for revenge, because
which is near their house. She has not seen Ciriaco of the massacre of the family of Kosain. He went to
Baldesco before (t.s.n., pp. 69-75, Vol. III, rec.). Malamaing, another barrio of Matalam, where he found
his family. In Malamaing they stayed in the house of a
On cross-examination, Undang testified that she used to Cebuano named Kulas. They never went back to
see Ciriaco Baldesco at their store where her family buys Kabalangasan because they were afraid that Kosain's
things. The house of Baldesco is near the schools of her family might take revenge on them (t.s.n., pp. 131-142,
elder sisters. She sometimes went with them to school. Vol. III, rec.).
Her oldest sister was hacked by Baldesco at the
abdomen. Her two other elder sisters were likewise His wife Nicolasa Tirol, 30 years old and residing at
hacked by Baldesco at the abdomen. Her younger Paco, Kidapawan, Cotabato, confirmed Tirol's absence
brother was hacked by Bonifacio Tirol. Their house was from Matalam from December 2 to 7, 1965 while he was
lighted at that time, aside from the fact that it was bright looking for a job in Salat. She also stated that she
because of the round moon. The accused Baldesco and evacuated her family because she was warned that the
Tirol were dressed in white and dark clothes. The color of family of Kosain might take revenge on them (t.s.n., pp.
the dark clothes was black. She does not know of any 145-151, Vol. III, rec.).
trouble between Ciriaco Baldesco or Bonifacio Tirol and
her father (t.s.n., pp. 79-85, Vol. III, rec.). A friend from the logging company, Rufino Duan, 23
years old, single and residing at Paco, Kidapawan,
The defense of both accused is alibi, and neither of them Cotabato, likewise corroborated Tirol's testimony that he
disputed the facts established by the prosecution except was in Salat from December 2 to 7, 1965. The said
to deny involvement in the crimes alluded to them. accused stayed with him in the camp he is occupying
while he was at Salat for seven (7) days, looking for "It appearing that the accused have been detained, they
work. In order to go to Salat from Kabalangasan, one has each should be credited one-half (1/2) of their preventive
to take a ride on a truck (t.s.n., pp. 118-122, Vol. III, rec.). imprisonment in the cases of two frustrated murders.

After trial, the trial court rendered its decision (pp. 6-28, "The penalty herein imposed for each of the seven
Vol. I, rec.) dated March 31, 1969, murders being the maximum — death — the records of
this case are hereby automatically elevated to the
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the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: "Let copy of this Judgment be furnished the Philippine
Constabulary and the NBI at Cotabato City, and the
"WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the herein Police Department of Matalam, Cotabato, so that they
accused, Bonifacio Tirol and Ciriaco Baldesco, guilty may exert efforts to apprehend the other culprits who
beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder of committed the crimes herein dealt with.
seven (7) persons, namely: Daduman Klantongan Kosain
[also written in the transcript of steno-type notes as "SO ORDERED."On appeal, accused Baldesco and Tirol,
Danonan and Dananong]; Baingkong Kosain [also written contend in their joint brief:.
in the transcript as Bai Ingkong]; Abdul Kalatogan Kosain
[also written in the transcript as Abdul Rakman]: Kadidia "FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR:
Kalantongan, Malaguianon Kosain, Locayda Kosain [also
written Lokaida], Pinangkong Kosain [also written "The lower court erred in admitting the death certificates
Maningdong] and Binangkong, and of the crime of issued by the doctor who did not personally view and
Frustrated Murder of Kosain Manipbol [also written as examine the victims, but whose findings therein were
Kusain Manedpol] and Undang Kosain; and hereby based upon the sketch prepared by the police.
sentences each of them to suffer the supreme penalty of
death for each of the seven murders of the seven "SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR:
deceased, and to an imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS
to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS "The lower court erred in disregarding the testimony of
for each of the two frustrated murders of the two both accused despite the convincingly strong evidence
wounded persons, and to indemnify jointly and severally showing that they were not at the scene of the crime on 4
the heirs of each of the seven deceased with the sum of December 1965, and therefore their non-participation in
SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) for each of the the crime charged.
seven deceased, or FORTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS
"THIRD ASSIGNED ERROR:
(P42,000.00) in all, and pay the costs, fifty-fifty.
"The lower court erred in not granting new trial even as Vol. III, rec.). The fact of death of the victims is not in
the complaining witness himself made a voluntary extra- issue. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that
judicial admission by means of a sworn statement the victims died because of stab wounds inflicted by the
(affidavit) that he merely involved accused Baldesco for a armed men who entered their residence on the night of
consideration. December 4, 1965 remain uncontroverted. That death
came to the deceased by foul means is a moral and legal
"FOURTH ASSIGNED ERROR:"The evidence failed to certainty. Their death certificates therefore are only
establish conspiracy among the accused. corroborative of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses.
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Appellants would likewise have the Court give credence
"FIFTH ASSIGNED ERROR: to their defense of alibi, alleging that they have presented
convincingly strong evidence showing that they were not
"The decision is contrary to law" (p. 98, Vol. I, rec.). at the scene of the crime on December 4, 1965. This
contention is devoid of merit. The rule is well-settled, to
During the pendency of this appeal, or on October 23,
the point of being trite, that the defense of alibi, which is
1977, appellant Baldesco died in the New Bilibid Prison
easy to concoct, must be received with utmost caution,
Hospital (p. 192, Vol. I, rec.), so that on January 28,
for it is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted
1978, We resolved to dismiss this case insofar as the
to by an accused. (People vs. Castañeda, 93 SCRA 58,
criminal liability of the said appellant is concerned.
69; People vs. Cortez, 57 SCRA 208.).
Following the doctrine in People vs. Sendaydiego (81
SCRA 124, 134), this appeal will be resolved insofar as Moreover, the alibi of both appellants cannot prevail over
Baldesco is concerned only for the purpose of the positive identification of the prosecution witnesses
determining his criminal liability which is the basis of the identifying and pointing to the accused as among the
civil liability for which his estate may be liable. group of armed men which massacred the victims
(People vs. Tabion, 93 SCRA 566, 570; People vs.
Appellants would like the court to reject the death
Angeles, 92 SCRA 433). The two survivors, Kosain and
certificates of the victims on the ground that they are
his 6-year old daughter positively identified both accused
hearsay evidence, since the doctor who issued them did
as two of the more than ten persons who entered their
so on the strength of the sketch furnished by the police,
house on December 4, 1965 and participated in the
without personally examining the bodies of the victims.
hacking and boloing of their family. Accused Tirol was
WE find no error in the admission of said exhibits "as part even more distinctly and positively recognized as the
of the testimony of the witnesses" (p. 9, Vol. I and p. 95, "bungi" (harelipped) who hacked some of the victims.
The credibility of these two prosecution witnesses was
never successfully assailed. The inconsistencies the scene of the crime, according to his own daughter
attributed to Kosain Manibpol refer to minor details (i.e., and witness, Teofista Baldesco (p. 116, Vol. III, rec.). And
about the length of time he had known one of the two although Baldesco himself testified that the victims'
persons who first came up to his residence on the pretext house is more than three (3) kilometers from his, it still
of borrowing his lot - pp. 15-16, Vol. III, rec., in relation to does not belie the fact that he could easily go there if he
Exhibits "1" and "2", pp. 5 and 17, Vol. II, rec.), which do wanted to, considering that both residences are within
not affect his credibility. The apparent inconsistency in the same barrio of Kabalangasan.
his testimony as well as that of 6-year old Undang Kosain
whose credibility was never questioned, as to who So also is the house of Tirol located in the same barrio.
among the armed men hacked or attacked which victim is According to him, his house is about 1 1/2 kilometers
likewise insufficient to destroy their credibility, from that of the victim. He wants to impress upon this
considering that the presence of a number of armed men court, however, that he was not in his house when the
simultaneously participating in the unlawful aggression incident occured but in another town looking for a job in a
could really be confusing. As noted by the trial court, it logging company. The trial court correctly rejected this
would be unnatural if the witnesses who were themselves theory because of the inconsistencies noted in Tirol's
victims of the horrible deed were not confused during that evidence. Said the trial court:
terrifying massacre committed together by more than ten
persons (p. 27, Vol. I rec.). What is important is the "The alibi of Bonifacio Tirol is unbelievable. His witness
positive identification of the two accused appellants as Rufino Duan testified that from Kabalangasan where
having been in that group and who participated in the Bonifacio Tirol lived to Salat where Bonifacio was
concerted attack on the helpless victims. "Alibi is supposed to be on December 4, 1965, people would take
unavailing once the accused is positively identified by a truck ride of the PTC; but Bonifacio Tirol declared that
one without motive to he went to Salat by speedboat, and went home to
Kabalangasan by banca. Duan testified that Salat is very
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com far from Kabalangasan because it takes one day to reach
it from there; but Bonifacio Tirol declared that he started
charge falsely said accused, specially with a grave at Kabalangasan by motorboat at 10:00 A.M., and arrived
offense that could bring death by execution on the culprit" at Salat at 5:00 P.M. or seven hours only. He modified
(People vs. Estante, 92 SCRA 122). this afterwards, in the cross-examination, by testifying
that from his house in Kabalangasan to the log pond
The weakness of appellant Baldesco's defense lies in the where he took the speedboat, he had to walk from 6:00
fact that his house where he purportedly stayed from A.M. to 10:00 A.M. or for 3 hours; fixing the time from his
6:00 P.M. of December 4, 1965 to the following day - is home to Salat at 10 hours. But this testimony about the
only about one kilometer from the house of the victims, log pond cannot be believed. He testified he did not know
where the log pond was located; that was the first time he CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com
went there. How he located a log pond at a place he did
not know is certainly beyond belief. Of course, he said vs. de la Cruz, G.R. No. L-30912, April 30, 1980; People
Rufino told him where to pass, but that was a long time vs. Mercado, et al., L-39511-13, April 28, 1980; People
ago. Bonifacio Tirol further testified that when he went vs. Malibay, 63 SCRA 421).
home to Kabalangasan, he took a banca at Salat at 3:00
dawn and arrived in his house at Kabalangasan at 9:00 in As to appellant Baldesco, the testimonies of his
the morning, or 6 hours. He changed the time of arrival to witnesses do not at all bolster his alibi. Demeterio Riparip
10:00 A.M. when questioned by the Court about it. When stated that he took supper with Baldesco at 6:00 P.M. on
asked by the Court why the difference in the period of December 4, 1965, after which he slept at 7:00 P.M. and
time of travel, he reasoned out that the motorboat in did not wake up until the next morning (p. 109, t.s.n., Vol.
going to Salat was going upstream, and the paddled III, rec.). Baldesco's daughter, Teofista, on the other
banca in going to Kabalangasan was going downstream. hand, testified that she took supper at 6:00 P.M. with her
Even, if that were so, the difference cannot be three or father, mother, brother and sister (p. 116, t.s.n., Vol. III,
four hours. rec.), without mentioning the presence of Riparip in their
house; then she listened to the radio with her father,
xxx xxx xxx mother, brother and sister up to 9:00 P.M. and went to
sleep afterwards. These testimonies do not rule out the
"But even granting that Bonifacio really went to Salat on possibility that he could have left the house that same
the 2nd to look for work, there was no physical evening while the rest of his family were sound asleep
impossibility for him to be in Kabalangasan on the and returned late that night or early the following
evening of the 4th which was a Saturday. The testimony morning.
of Duan that he saw Bonifacio on the 4th in the evening
cannot be believed because of his interest and its The third assigned error is likewise bereft of merit.
improbability. Why should Bonifacio wait for the manager Counsel for appellants contends that the trial court erred
on a Saturday evening when the next day was a Sunday, in not granting a new trial even as the complaining
therefore not a work day?" (pp. 24-25, Vol. I, rec.). witness himself made a voluntary extrajudicial admission
by means of a sworn statement (affidavit) that he merely
It is a well-settled doctrine that for alibi to be acceptable, involved accused Baldesco for a consideration. The trial
it must be shown that the place where the accused was court rejected the motion for new trial on the ground that
alleged to be when the offense was committed must be it was filed out of time (p. 97, Vol. II, rec.).
located at such a distance that it is nigh impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime (People Section 9, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court requires that in
all cases in which the death penalty is imposed, the
records should be forwarded to this Court within twenty death; that Kosain Manibpol, the principal witness, had
(20) days but not less than fifteen (15) days from confided to him that he was only interested in
rendition of judgment. This 20-day period is not rigid or commercializing or making money out of his case, which
absolute nor jurisdictional, and may be shortened or is why he implicated the accused Baldesco; that Kosain
extended (People vs. Bocar, 97 Phil. 398). However, the Manibpol had persuaded him to convince Feliciano
extension of period is for the purpose of enabling the Codoy, a son-in-law of Baldesco, to give him (Kosain)
lower court to comply with the mandatory requirement of one carabao so that he will drop the case; that Kosain
elevating the records for review, and not to lengthen the Manibpol also personally demanded from Codoy one
minimum period within which trial courts may modify or carabao so that he will not testify against Baldesco; that
alter their decision. As enunciated in People vs. Bocar, he (affiant) even went with Kosain to see Codoy in
supra, the reason for the 15-day minimum requirement is November, 1967 to persuade him to give a carabao to
such that within that period, the trial court may on its own Kosain, but Codoy refused; and that Kosain, realizing the
motion with the consent of the defendant, grant a new wrong he had done, was willing to tell the truth regarding
trial. Within that period the trial court may modify its the non-
judgment by reducing the penalty or fine, or even set it
aside altogether and acquit the accused. CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com

In the case at bar, the motion for new trial was filed on involvement and non-participation of Baldesco in the
April 28, 1969 (pp. 92-94, Vol. II, rec.) or twenty-eight crime charged, but it was too late to tell the court
days after rendition of the judgment on March 31, 1969 because the case was already submitted for decision;
(p. 90, Vol. II, rec.). Although a 15-day extension from and that it was a common knowledge in their barrio that
April 21, 1969 was granted to the lower court within Baldesco was not among the band that killed Kosain's
which to forward the record of this case (p. 30, Vol. I, family.
rec.), that extension did not affect the 15-day period for
filing a motion for new trial. This so-called "extra-judicial admission," referring to
Diosma's sworn statement is not the kind of newly-
But even granting that the said motion was filed on time, discovered evidence contemplated in Section 2, Rule 121
the same does not merit a favorable action. The ground of the Rules of Court. Well-settled is the rule that before a
relied on is an alleged newly-discovered evidence, new trial may be granted on the ground of newly-
referring to a sworn statement (p. 94, Vol. II, rec.) discovered evidence, it must be shown that: (a) the
executed on April 17, 1969 by a certain Romualdo evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence
Diosma, barrio captain of barrio Lampayan, Matalam, could not have been discovered and produced at the trial
Cotabato. In the said affidavit, the affiant declared that he even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the
was shocked to learn that the accused were sentenced to evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching, and (d) it must be to the association and a concurrence of sentiments, conspiracy
merits as ought to produce a different result, if admitted may be inferred although no actual meetings between
[Jose vs. CA, 70 SCRA 258]. them to conspire is proved, for the prosecution need not
establish that all the parties thereto agreed to every detail
The very affidavit of Diosma indicates that the so-called in the execution of the crime or that they were actually
extra-judicial admission of Kosain was already available together at all stages of the conspiracy" (see also People
during the trial, otherwise, he would not have demanded vs. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285).
from Feliciano Codoy personally one carabao so that he
will not testify against accused Baldesco. In this case under review, it has been clearly established
that the appellants and their cohorts acted in unison
For how could he have offered not to testify against when they went up the house of Kosain Manibpol and
Baldesco if the trial was already concluded? Codoy attacked their victims in a manner showing singleness of
should have been presented as a defense witness if such purpose - the massacre of the entire family of Kosain.
was the fact, together with some other barrio residents The fact that two survived is of no moment. The intention
who had knowledge, as was allegedly "public knowledge to kill all of them was most patent.
in our barrio," that Baldesco was not involved in the
crime. The purported extra- judicial admission is a last- Thus, the fifth assigned error, i.e., that the decision is
minute concoction. contrary to law, need not be considered separately. The
prosecution evidence has clearly established the guilt of
Appellants also point out as error that the evidence failed the accused appellants. In addition, there are more
to establish conspiracy. While it has been held that incriminating evidence that emanate from the appellants
conspiracy must be established by positive evidence, themselves. The trial court had taken judicial notice of the
direct proof is not essential to show it, since by its very escape of
nature it is planned in utmost secrecy (People vs.
Peralta, 25 SCRA 760). CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com

In the case of People vs. Mada-i Santalani (93 SCRA accused Baldesco from police custody on December 15,
316, 330), We held: "Conspiracy implies concert of 1965 (p. 27, Vol. II, rec.), and his subsequent re-arrest
design and not participation in every detail of the while en route to Davao (p. 28, Vol. II. rec.). On the other
execution. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed, hand, accused Tirol himself had testified that after
by their acts, at the accomplishment of some unlawful coming from Salat, he left his house and never returned,
object, each doing a part so that their acts, though for the reason that the members of his family were afraid
apparently independent, were in fact connected and of some vendetta because of the massacre of Kosain
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal Manibpol's family (pp. 141-142, Vol. II, rec.). The trial
court noted that this fear was entertained even before the The civil liability of both appellants for each of the seven
chief of police could file a complaint and a warrant of victims of the seven murders is hereby raised to
arrest could be issued. These actuations could only P12,000.00 and their civil liability for each of the two
indicate a sense of guilt. As the trial court pointed out, victims of the two frustrated murders is hereby increased
fear of reprisal of retaliation could only haunt one who is to P8,000.00. The civil liability arising from the crime of
aware of his wrongdoing (p. 26, Vol. I, rec.). two or more accused is solidary.

The trial Court did not err in finding the accused guilty of WHEREFORE, APPELLANTS BONIFACIO TIROL AND
murder of seven (7) persons, qualified by treachery, and CIRIACO BALDESCO ARE HEREBY SENTENCED TO
of two frustrated murders. There was treachery because (1) INDEMNIFY JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY KOSAIN
the accused and their companions made a deliberate MANIBPOL AND UNDANG KOSAIN AS THE ONLY
surprise attack on the victims. They perpetrated the SURVIVING HEIRS OF THE SEVEN MURDER VICTIMS
killings in such a manner that there was no risk to IN THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00)
themselves. Treachery has absorbed the circumstance of PESOS FOR EACH OF THE SEVEN MURDER
nighttime, taking advantage of superior strength, VICTIMS; AND (2) INDEMNIFY JOINTLY AND
employing means to weaken the defense, and that the SEVERALLY KOSAIN MANIBPOL IN THE SUM OF
crime was committed by a band. EIGHT THOUSAND (P8,000.00) PESOS AND UNDANG
KOSAIN ALSO IN THE SUM OF EIGHT THOUSAND
The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation (P8,000.00) PESOS AS THE TWO VICTIMS OF THE
was not proven, hence it may not be appreciated. TWO FRUSTRATED MURDERS.prLL

The aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the crime THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT IS HEREBY
having been committed in the dwelling place of the AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS. SO ORDERED.
victims who had not given any provocation, likewise can
be appreciated. Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Considering that there is no mitigating circumstance, the Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
trial court did not err in imposing the maximum penalty
provided for in Article 248. Fernando, C.J., concurs insofar as the accused Bonifacio
Tirol is concerned. The death of accused Ciriaco
Since the penal liability of appellant Ciriaco Baldesco had Baldesco had terminated the criminal case as to him.
been extinguished by his death on October 23, 1977,
only his civil liability remains to be determined which can CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com
be recovered from his estate.
Barredo, J., concurs in the judgment against appellant
Tirol; dissents as regards Baldesco because of the belief
that his liability, both criminal and civil were extinguished
by his death.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-17396. May 30, 1962.]

CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ALFONSO

PE, defendant- appellee.
Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff- Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First
appellant. Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee. Instance of Manila to recover moral, compensatory,
exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of
SYLLABUS P94,000.00, exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation.
1. DAMAGES; ACTS CONTRARY TO MORALS. —
Defendant won Lolita's affection thru an ingenious Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in
scheme or trickery and seduced her to the extent of the complaint, set up as a defense that the facts alleged
making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of
that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the action.
pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the
rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the After trial, the lower court, after 􏰂nding that defendant
latter's family who was allowed free access because he had carried on a love affair with one Lolita Pe, an
was a collateral relative and was considered as a unmarried woman, being a married man himself,
member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with declared that defendant cannot be held liable for moral
each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that
only in Gasan but in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a defendant, being aware of his marital status, deliberately
barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affair and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. So it
reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was rendered decision dismissing the complaint.
forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing
Lolita. Plaintiff even 􏰂led deportation proceedings Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on
against defendant who is a Chinese national. the ground that the
Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with
Lolita until she disappeared from the parental h o m e , CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
Held; The wrong defendant has caused Lolita and her
family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that issues involved are purely of law.
he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury
The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the
to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good
parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time
customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21
of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24
of the New Civil Code.
years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man
DECISION and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette
Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan,
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J p: Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation.
Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town. 13th of this month and we will have a date on the 14th,
Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.
Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of
such fact and the similarity in their family name, Reply
defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded
him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, Love"
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext
that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police
The two eventually fell in love with each other and authorities and the NBI but up to the present there is no
conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of news or trace of her whereabouts.
Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a
The present action is based on Article 21 of the new Civil
barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each
Code which provides:
other the contents of which reveal not only their
infatuation for each other but also the extent to which "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
they had carried their relationship. The rumors about their in a manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or
love affair reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from
going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages
plaintiffs even 􏰂led deportation proceedings against is based on the fact that defendant, being a married man,
defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing
defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless. plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her plaintiffs have clearly established that an illicit affair was
brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B España carried on between defendant and Lolita which caused
Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita great damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs
disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers who are her parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court
and sisters checked up her things and found that Lolita's considered their complaint not actionable for the reason
clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a that they failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in
crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. Thus, the trial court
note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may
3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of not presume that it was the defendant who deliberately
defendant. In English it reads: induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of
"Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the
affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit
the uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her
of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that
defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other, he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury
not only without any desire on their part, but also against to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good
their better judgment and in full consciousness of the customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21
disastrous consequences that such an affair would of the new Civil Code.
naturally bring on both of them. This is specially so with
respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed.
love with defendant who is a married man." Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the
sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,500.00 as
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. Costs against
which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead appellee.
to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an
ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown Paredes and Dizon, JJ. concur.
by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita
on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to
the latter's family who was allowed free access because
he was a collateral relative and was considered as a
member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with
each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not
only in Gasan but in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a
barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affair
reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing EN BANC
Lolita. Plaintiffs even 􏰂led deportation proceedings
against defendant who is a Chinese national. [G.R. No. L-12471. April 13, 1959.]
Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with
Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. ROSARIO L. DE BRAGANZA, ET AL., petitioners, vs.
Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain FERNANDO F. DE VILLA ABRILLE, respondent.
of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but
Oscar M. Herrera for petitioners.R. P. Sarandi and F. interest from October 30, 1944.
Valdez Anama for respondents.
The above petitioners, it appears, received from Villa
SYLLABUS Abrille, as a loan, on October 30, 1944 P70,000 in
Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof,
1. CONTRACTS; INCAPACITY OF PARTIES; promised in writing (Exhibit A) to pay him P10,000 "in
MINORITY; WHEN CAN BE MADE THE BASIS OF AN legal currency of the P. I. two years after the cessation of
ACTION OF DECEIT. — The failure of the minor to the present hostilities or as soon as International
disclose his minority when making a contract does not Exchange has been established in the Philippines", plus
per se, constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of 2% per annum.
an action of deceit. In order to hold the minor liable, the
fraud must be actual and not constructive. Because payment had not been made, Villa Abrille sued
them in March 1949.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF MINOR UNDER THE
CONTRACT. — Although the written contract is In their answer before the Manila court of 􏰄rst Instance,
unenforceable because of non-age, however, the minor defendants claimed to have received P40,000 only--
shall make restitution to the extent that he may have instead of P70,000 as plaintiff asserted. They also
profited by the king he received. averred that Guillermo and Rodolfo were minors when
they signed the promissory note Exhibit A. After hearing
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ANNULMENT ; FOUR YEAR PERIOD the parties and their evidence, said court rendered
WHEN NOT APPLICABLE. — Where minority is set up judgment, which the appellate court affirmed, in the terms
only as a defense to an act on, without the minor asking above described.
for any positive relief from the contract, the four-year
period 􏰄xed by Article 1301 of the Civil Code may not be There can be no question about the responsibility of Mrs.
applied. Rosario L. Braganza

DECISION CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

BENGZON, J p: because the minority of her consigners does not release

her from liability; since it is a personal defense of the
Rosario L. de Braganza and her sons Rodolfo and minors. However, such defense will benefit her the extent
Guillermo petition for review of the Court of Appeals' of the shares for which such minors may be responsible.
decision whereby they were required solidarily to pay (Art. 1148, Civil Code). It is not denied that at the time of
Fernando F. de Villa Abrelle the sum of P10,000 plus 2% signing Exhibit A, Guillermo and Rodolfo Braganza were
minors--16 and 18 respectively. However, the Court of the theory that such misrepresentation is not a part of,
Appeals found them liable pursuant to the following and does not grow out of, the contract, or that the
reasoning: enforcement of liability for such misrepresentation as a
tort does not constitute an indirect method of enforcing
". . . These two appellants did not make it appear in the liability on the contract. In order to hold the infant liable,
promissory note that they were not yet of legal age. If however, the fraud must be actual and not constructive. It
they were really fair to their creditor, they should have has been held that his mere silence when making a
apprised him on their incapacity, and if the former, in contract as to his age does not constitute a fraud which
spite of the information relative to their age, parted with can be made the basis of an action of deceit." (Emphasis
his money, then he should be contended with the Supplied.)
consequence of his act. But, that was not the case.
Perhaps defendants in their desire to acquire much "The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one
needed money, they readily and willingly signed the who contracts with him in the belief that he is of full age
promissory note, without disclosing the legal impediment must be actual not constructive, and mere failure of the
with respect to Guillermo and Rodolfo. When minors, like infant to disclose his age is not su􏰉cient." (27 American
in the instant case, pretended to be of legal age, when in Jurisprudence, p. 819.)
fact they were not, they will not later on be permitted to
excuse themselves from the ful􏰄llment of the obligation The Mercado case 1 cited in the decision under review is
contracted by them or to have it annulled." (Mercado, et different because the document signed therein by the
al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215.) [Emphasis Suppled.] minor speci􏰄cally stated he was of age; here Exhibit A
contained no such statement. In other words, in the
We cannot agree to the above conclusions. From the Mercado case, the minor was guilty of active
minor's failure to disclose their minority in the same misrepresentation; whereas in this case, if the minors
promissory note they signed, it does not follow as a legal were guilty at all, which we doubt it is of passive (or
proposition, that they will not be permitted thereafter to constructive) misrepresentation. Indeed, there is a
assert it. They had no juridical duty to disclose their growing sentiment in favor of limiting the scope of the
inability. In fact, according to Corpus Juris Secundum, 43 application of the Mercado ruling, what with the
p. 206; consideration that the very minority which incapacitated
minors from contracting should likewise exempt them
" . . . . Some authorities consider that a false from the results of misrepresentation.
representation as to age inducing a contract is a part of
the contract and accordingly hold that it cannot be the We hold, on this point, that being minors, Rodolfo and
basis of an action in tort. Other authorities hold that such Guillermo Braganza could not be legally bound by their
misrepresentation may be the basis of such an action, on signatures in Exhibit A.
It is argued, nevertheless, by respondent that inasmuch testimony that the funds delivered to them by Villa Abrille
as this defense was interposed only in 1951, and were used for their support during the Japanese
inasmuch as Rodolfo reached the age of majority in occupation. Such being the case, it is but fair to hold that
1947, it was too late to invoke it because more than 4 they had pro􏰄ted to the extent of the value of such
years had elapsed after he had becomes emancipated money, which value has been authoritatively established
upon reaching the age or majority. The provisions of in the so-called Ballantine Schedule: in October 1944,
Article 1301 of the Civil Code are quoted to the effect that P40.00 Japanese notes were equivalent to P1 of current
"an action to annul a contract by Philippine money. Wherefore, as the share of these
minors was 2/3 of P70,000 or P46,666.66, that should
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com now return P1,166.67. 3 Their promise to pay P10,000 in
Philippine currency, (Exhibit A) can not enforced, as
reason has reached majority age. The parties do not
already stated, since they were minors incapable of
specify the exact date of Rodolfo's birth. It is undenied,
binding themselves. Their liability, to repeat, is presently
however, that in October 1944, he was 18 years old. On
declared without regard of said Exhibit A, but solely in
the basis of such datum, it should be held that in October
pursuance of Article 1304 of the Civil Code.
1947, he was 21 years old, and in October 1951 he was
25 years old. So that when this defense was interposed Accordingly, the appealed decision should be modi􏰄ed in
in June 1951, four years had not yet completely elapsed the sense that Rosario Braganza shall pay 1/3 of
from October 1947.
P10,000 i.e., P3,333.33 4 plus 2% interest from October
Furthermore, there is reason to doubt the pertinency of 1944; and Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza shall pay
the 4-year period 􏰄xed by Article 1301 of the Civil Code jointly 5 to the same creditor the total amount of
where minority is set up only as a defense to an action, P1,166.67 plus 6% interest beginning March 7, 1949,
without the minors asking for any positive relief from the when the complaint was filed. No costs in this instance.
contract. For one thing, they have not 􏰄led in this case
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista
an action for annulment. 2 They merely interposed an
Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Endencia, JJ.,
excuse from liability.
concur.
Upon the other hand, these minors may not be entirely
Footnotes
absolved from monetary responsibility. In accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code, even if their written 1.Mercado vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215.
contract is unenforceable because of non-age, they shall
make restitution to the extent that they may have pro􏰄ted
by the money they received. (Art. 1340) There is 2.It would be observed in this connection, that the New
 Civil Code does not govern the contract executed
in 1944.

3.P46,666.00 divided by 40.

4.She says peso for peso, in view of the terms of Exhibit

A. She is, indeed, willingly to pay as much.

5.Arts. 1137, 1138, Civil Code, Debtors presumed to be

bound jointly — not severally. Un Pak Leung vs.
Negora, 1 Phil., 391 Flaviano vs. Delgado , 11
Phil., Compania General vs. Obed, 13 Phil., 391.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 119976. September 18, 1995.]

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, v s .

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY
MONTEJO, respondents. remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as
soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.The Solicitor General thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have
for public respondent.Paquito N . Ochoa, Jr. and different residences in various places. However, a person
Gracelda N . Andres for private respondent. can only have a single domicile, unless, for various
reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor
SYLLABUS of another domicile of choice.
1. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; CONSTRUED. — Article 50 of 4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; RESIDENCE USED
the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil SYNONYMOUSLY WITH DOMICILE. — For political
rights and the ful􏰂llment of civil obligations, the domicile purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are
of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these
Ong vs. Republic this court took the concept of domicile concepts have evolved in our election law, what has
to mean an individual's "permanent home," "a place to clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one residence for election purposes is used synonymously
intends to return, and depends on facts and with domicile.
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."
Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE FROM PERMANENT
elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a RESIDENCE WITHOUT INTENTION TO ABANDON IT
􏰂xed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of DOES NOT RESULT IN LOSS OR CHANGE OF
returning there permanently. DOMICILE. — So settled is the concept (of domicile) in
our election law that in these and other election law
2. ID.; ID.; RESIDENCE, CONSTRUED. — Residence, in cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an
its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of individual from his permanent residence without the
an individual to a certain place. It is the physical intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change
presence of a person in a given area, community or of domicile. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on
country. the residence quali􏰂cation for certain elective positions
have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the
3. ID.; ID.; DIFFERENTIATED FROM RESIDENCE. —
The essential distinction between residence and domicile CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when
the purpose for which the resident has taken up his Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it
abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as actually means only "domicile."
pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACT OF RESIDENCE, NOT she subsequently noted down in her Certi􏰂cate of
STATEMENT IN CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, Candidacy. A close look at said certi􏰂cate would reveal
DECISIVE FACTOR IN DETERMINING RESIDENCY the possible source of the confusion: the entry for
QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENT. — It is the fact of residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the
residence, not a statement in a certi􏰂cate of candidacy entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate
which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not seeks election. Having been forced by private respondent
an individual has satis􏰂ed the constitution's residency to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte
quali􏰂cation requirement. The said statement becomes instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that
material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be 7 and Item 8 — the 􏰂rst requiring actual residence and
plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a
which would lead to his or her disqualification. cdlex voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an
unintended entry for which she could be disquali􏰂ed.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — It stands to reason This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to
therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest negate the fact of residence in the First District if such
mistake in jotting down the word "seven" in the space fact were established by means more convincing than a
provided for the residency quali􏰂cation requirement. The mere entry on a piece of paper. cdll
circumstances leading to her 􏰂ling the questioned entry
obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which 8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE FROM LEGAL RESIDENCE
prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual OR DOMICILE OF A TEMPORARY OR SEMI-
stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in PERMANENT NATURE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
the First district, which was "since childhood" in the LOSS OF RESIDENCE. — We have stated, many times
space provided. These circumstances and events are in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile
amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's even if he has lived and maintained residences in
questioned resolution, albeit with a different different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a
interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner factual relationship to a given place for various purposes.
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a
to make her eligible to run in the First District, private profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary
respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of
petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that
Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City
in the First District, which was Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which since childhood up to the time she 􏰂led her certi􏰂cate of
candidacy because she became a resident of many have two legal residences at the same time. In the case
places" 􏰉ies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent
this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to
residence and domicile for election law purposes. convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of
origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To
9. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; A MINOR FOLLOWS THE effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of
DOMICILE OF HIS PARENTS; CASE AT BENCH. — A relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to
minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, supplant the former domicile with one of her own
once choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com 12. ID.; ID.; ID.; MARRIAGE, NOT A CAUSE FOR LOSS
OF DOMICILE. — In this connection, it cannot be
acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin
that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1954. For there is a
operation of law. This domicile was not established only clearly established distinction between the Civil Code
when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary concepts of "domicile" and "residence." The presumption
to private respondent's averments. that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile
by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred
10. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES TO EFFECT CHANGE OF from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the
DOMICILE. — Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must two concepts are well delineated. A survey of
demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of
domicile; 2. A bona 􏰂de intention of abandoning the domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse
former place of residence and establishing a new one; upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that
and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose. the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of
origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BENCH. — In the absence of
marriage. Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58
clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889: La mujer esta
residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only
obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que 􏰂je su
with evidence showing concurrence of all three
residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con
requirements can the presumption of continuity or
justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido
residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires
transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su 􏰂je de
residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their
wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. (various) residences.
This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual
residence because it refers to a positive act of 􏰂xing a 13. ID.; ID.; TERM RESIDENCE REFERS TO "ACTUAL
family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is RESIDENCE." — The term residence may mean one
further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite
translade su residencia" in the same provision which another thing in political law. What stands clear is that
means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," insofar as the Civil Code is concerned — affecting the
referring to another positive act of relocating the family to rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term
another home or place of actual residence. The article residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual
obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this
is a 􏰂xed, fairly-permanent concept when it plainly unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when
connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept
another not only once, but as often as the husband may her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not
deem 􏰂t to move his family, a circumstance more a domicilium necessarium.
consistent with the concept of actual residence. Very
signi􏰂cantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under 14. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTE
Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS REQUIRING RENDITION OF JUDGMENT WITHIN
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately SPECIFIED TIME, MERELY DIRECTORY. — It is a
preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of
husband and wife to live together. The duty to live judgment within a speci􏰂ed time is generally construed
together can only be ful􏰂lled if the husband and wife are to be merely directory, "so that non-compliance with them
physically together. This does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the
statute had intended such result it would have clearly
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com indicated it." The difference between a mandatory and a
directory provision is often made on grounds of
takes into account the situations where the couple has necessity.
many residences (as in the case of petitioner). If the
husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their 15. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMELEC;
residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in JURISDICTION TO DECIDE PENDING
order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to DISQUALIFICATION CASE NOT LOST BY HOLDING
conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to OF ELECTIONS. — With the enactment of Sections 6
"residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it
where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose
jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of
case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the choice, as she continued living there even after reaching
elections. the age of majority.

16. ID.; LEGISLATURE; HOUSE OF CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET);
SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO 2. ID.; ID.; DOMICILE BY OPERATION OF LAW;
ELECTIONS, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF ACQUIRED BY MARRIAGE AND DELIBERATE
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS; CANDIDATE MUST HAVE CHOICE OF A DIFFERENT DOMICILE BY THE
BEEN PROCLAIMED. — As to the House of HUSBAND. — There is also no question that in May,
Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E.
assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became
quali􏰂cations after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to subject to change by law, and the right to change it was
say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all given by Article 110 of the Civil Code. The di􏰊cult issues
contests relating to the elections, returns and start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to
quali􏰂cations of members of Congress begins only after former President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of
a candidate has become a member of the House of her Tacloban domicile. Justice Puno respectfully submits
Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the that her marriage by itself alone did not cause her to lose
House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code
this point has no jurisdiction over the question. merely gave the husband the right to 􏰂x the domicile of
the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may
PUNO, J ., concurring opinion: explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which
case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged. The
1. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; DOMICILE OF ORIGIN AND husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior
DOMICILE OF CHOICE; ESTABLISHED BY domicile even if it is different. It is not, therefore, the mere
CANDIDATE'S CONTINUED STAY IN HER PARENT'S fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different
RESIDENCE. — There is no question that petitioner's domicile by the husband that will change the domicile of
original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The
domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise
Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code
Petitioner went to school, and thereafter worked there. binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her
Justice Puno considers Tacloban as her initial domicile, coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the
both her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally
Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her 􏰂xed by the husband. These acts are void not only
because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her the death on September 28, 1989 of former President
domicile but also because they are contrary to law and Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of
public policy. prLL 􏰂rst impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of
thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BENCH. — In the case at distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily
bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos relying on American authorities. He echoes the theory
exercised his right to fix the family domicile and that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last
established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then domicile of her husband until she makes an actual
the congressman. At that particular point of time and change. The American case law that the wife still retains
throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in her dead husband's domicile is based on ancient
Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has common law which we can no longer apply in the
been 􏰂xed by operation of law, it was not affected in Philippine setting today. The presumption that the wife
1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when retains the domicile of her deceased husband is an
they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as extension of this common law concept. The concept and
a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her its extension have provided some of the most iniquitous
husband was elected President, when they lived in jurisprudence against women. The rulings relied upon by
Malacañang Palace, and when she registered as a voter Mr. Justice Davide in CJS and AM JUR 2d are American
in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she state court decisions handed down
served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa,
Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
Manila during the incumbency of her husband as
President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil between the years 1917 and 1938, or before the time
Code, it was only her husband who could change the when women were accorded equality of rights with men.
family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did Undeniably, the women's liberation movement resulted in
not effect any such change. To a large degree, this far-ranging state legislations in the United States to
follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage eliminate gender inequality. However, it has been
loses her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires declared that under modern statutes changing the status
that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually of married women and departing from the common law
lives or what she believes or intends." theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not
acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE THAT AFTER THE the law. In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the
HUSBAND'S DEATH, WIFE RETAINS LAST DOMICILE Law, Second (Con􏰉ict of Laws 2d), the reputable
OF HER HUSBAND, SHOULD NOW BE ABANDONED. American Law Institute also categorically stated that the
— The more di􏰊cult task is how to interpret the effect of view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held.As the result of
statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law
practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried disabling her to choose her own domicile has been
sister." In light of the Family Code which abrogated the repealed. Considering all these, common law should not
inequality between husband and wife as started and put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned
perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor
espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains reason for this gender-based burden. Llibris
the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil
Code which provides the statutory support for this stance 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DELIBERATE CHOICE BY WIFE
has been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By MANIFEST IN CASE AT BAR. — But even assuming
its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that
free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or petitioner chose to reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still,
manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her
by the domiciliary determination of her dead husband. a􏰊davit submitted to the respondent COMELEC,
petitioner averred among others that: "I was not
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WIFE REACQUIRED DOMICILE OF permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Niño
ORIGIN UPON DEATH OF HUSBAND. — Prescinding Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I wanted to stay
from these premises, Justice Puno respectfully submits and reside, after repairs and renovations were
that the better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose,
her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live there."
petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue after It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her
her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not disputed
domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no that in 1992, she 􏰂rst lived at the house of her brother in
person can be without a domicile at any point of time. San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she
This stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot
the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner
Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, Justice reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District
Puno cannot see the fairness of the common law of Leyte, she more than complied with the constitutional
requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban requirement of residence ". . . for a period of not less than
domicile before she could be released from her Batac one year immediately
domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her
act but through the act of her deceased husband when CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
he 􏰂xed their domicile in Batac. Her husband is dead
preceding the day of the election," i.e., the May 8, 1995 following completion of her six-month actual residence
elections. therein, petitioner (Montejo) 􏰂led a petition with the
COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First
7. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; CERTIFICATE OF District to the Second District and pursued such move up
CANDIDACY; AMENDMENT TO CORRECT A BONA to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose
FIDE MISTAKE, ALLOWED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT. being to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as
— The amendment of a certi􏰂cate of candidacy to petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the congressional
correct a bona 􏰂de mistake has been allowed by this election in the First District. He also 􏰂led a bill, along with
Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create another
(Alialy v. COMELEC , 2 SCRA 957, 960 [1961]; legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the
Canceran v. COMELEC , 107 Phil. 607 [1960]; Gabaldon First District and to make it a part of the new district, to
v. COMELEC , 99 Phil. 898 [1956]) achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the
Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now
8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM FROM 􏰂led the instant petition, for the same objective, as it is
HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION OF BONA FIDE obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with
CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICE; RIGHT respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and
VIOLATED BY LEGAL AND EXTRA-LEGAL verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an
OBSTACLES AGAINST CANDIDATE TO PREVENT honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on
HER FROM RUNNING. — Section 10, Article IX-C of the May 8, 1995. All these attempts to misuse our laws and
Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any legal processes are forms of rank harassments and
public o􏰊ce shall be free from any form of harassment invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her
and discrimination." A detached reading of the records of equal access to a public o􏰊ce. We cannot commit any
the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the
extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against petitioner meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the
to prevent her from running as the people's harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived
representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner's a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow.
Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she averred that There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner
when respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the
was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its
run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner interpretation, bile and bitterness.
(Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration
by writing a letter stating that she is not a resident of said 9. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; ONE YEAR
city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT; RATIONALE;
(petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa CANDIDATE'S LIFETIME CONTACTS WITH FIRST
DISTRICT OF LEYTE SATISFIES INTENT. — In Gallego is 􏰂xed, without any present intention of removing
v. Vera, we explained that the reason for this residence therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a
requirement is "to exclude a stranger or newcomer, person in which he has voluntarily 􏰂xed his abode, or
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose,
community and not identi􏰂ed with the latter, from an but with a present intention of making it his permanent
elective o􏰊ce to serve that community. . . ." Petitioner's home (28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a 􏰂xed permanent
lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be residence to which when absent for business, or
contested. Nobody can claim that she is not acquainted pleasure, or for like reasons one intends to return, and
with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that
None can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the they disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19
Constitution. SCRA 966, 969)

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com 2. ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATIONS. — Domicile is classi􏰂ed
into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law
10. ID.; ID.; ELECTION CASES; DOMINANT attributes to every individual a domicile of origin, which is
CONSIDERATION IN RESOLUTION THEREOF IS THE the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or
NEED TO EFFECTUATE WILL OF THE ELECTORATE. of the person on whom he is legally dependent at the
— In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is generally
is the need to effectuate the will of the electorate. The the place where one is born or reared, it maybe
election results show that petitioner received Seventy elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of choice, on the other
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-One (70,471) votes, hand, is the place which the person has elected and
while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it
Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is has for its true basis or foundation the intention of the
clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the person (28 C.J.S. 6). A third classi􏰂cation is domicile by
First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile
We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable independent of his own intention or actual residence,
technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that
lean towards a rule that will give life to the people's of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a
political judgment. parent and a child (28 C.J.S. 7).

FRANCISCO, J ., concurring opinion: 3. ID.; ID.; CHANGE OF DOMICILE; REQUISITES. — In

order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile
1. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; DEFINED. — Domicile has and acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the
been de􏰂ned as that place in which a person's habitation following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence
or bodily presence in the new locality, (b) intention to law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform their
remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to marital duties and obligations to one another. The
abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact
(Romualdez v. RTC , Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA that it was the legal or moral duty of the individual to
408, 415). reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while the
wife retains her marital domicile so long as the marriage
4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; RESIDENCE subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's
SYNONYMOUS WITH DOMICILE. — In election law, termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases.
when our Constitution speaks of residence for election Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by
purposes it means domicile (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite
the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from all
Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no
longer serves any meaningful purpose. It is my view
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT ABANDONED OR LOST BY therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile
REGISTRATION OF VOTER IN A PLACE OTHER THAN of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's death without
HIS PLACE OF ORIGIN. — In several decisions, though, even signifying her intention to that effect.
the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a
voter in a place other than his place of origin is not 7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY CLAIMING THAT A PERSON
su􏰊cient to constitute abandonment or loss of such HAS ABANDONED OR LOST HIS RESIDENCE OF
residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). ORIGIN MUST SHOW AND PROVE SUCH LOSS OR
Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to ABANDONMENT. — It is for the private respondent to
depart from this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has
of abandoning her domicile of origin. effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos
Norte or for some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com the party (herein private respondent) claiming that a
person has abandoned or lost his residence of origin who
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; MARITAL DOMICILE; LOST UPON must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment
DEATH OF HUSBAND; WIFE REVERTED TO HER or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. 16),
ORIGINAL DOMICILE; CASE AT BAR. — Tacloban, because the presumption is strongly in favor of an
Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was original or former domicile, as against an acquired one
involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos (28 C.J.S. 16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to
Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then discharge this burden as the record is devoid of
Congressman Marcos. By legal 􏰂ction she followed the convincing proof that petitioner has acquired, whether
domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her
domicile of origin. within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it
indubitably stands that she had more than a year of
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ONE-YEAR RESIDENCE residence in the constituency she
REQUIREMENT; REQUIREMENT MET IN CASE AT
BENCH. — The records, on the contrary, clearly show CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-
year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has
returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification
Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good required by the 1987 Constitution.
Government which sequestered her residential house
and other properties forbade her necessitating her PADILLA, J ., dissenting opinion:
transient stay in various places in Manila. In 1992, she
ran for the position of president writing in her certi􏰂cate 1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS;
of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. CERTIORARI; COMELEC DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE
After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISQUALIFYING
acquired her residence certi􏰂cate and resided with her CANDIDATE FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban ONE YEAR RESIDENCE QUALIFICATION. — The one
City until August of 1994 when she was allowed by the year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or
PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered residential not the term "residence" is to be synonymous with
house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. It was in the same month of "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and
August when she applied for the cancellation of her actual presence in one district must inall situations satisfy
previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law.
to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which And this, because of a de􏰂nite Constitutional purpose.
she did on January 28, 1995. From this sequence of He must be familiar with the environment and problems
events, I 􏰂nd it quite improper to use as the reckoning of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the
period of the one-year residence requirement the date one-year residence in said district would be the minimum
when she applied for the cancellation of her previous period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility.
registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which Petitioner's certi􏰂cate of candidacy 􏰂led on 8 March
private respondent never bothered to disprove is that 1995 contains the decisive component or seed of her
petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 disquali􏰂cation. It is contained in her answer under oath
presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the
Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately
1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. It preceding the election." It follows from all the above that
appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in
holding that petitioner is disquali􏰂ed from the position of NUMBER OF VOTES WHERE THE WINNING
representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte CANDIDATE IS DECLARED DISQUALIFIED DEEMED
in the elections of 8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not THE WINNER. — Under Sec. 6 of RA 6646, (An Act
less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System
district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election and for other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988)
(8 May 1995)." it is provided that: . . . — Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
2. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; DISQUALIFICATION; voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE SECOND HIGHEST The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a
NUMBER OF VOTES CAN NOT BE DECLARED disquali􏰂ed candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The
WINNER OF ELECTIVE OFFICE WHERE CANDIDATE law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court or
WHO OBTAINED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES Commission on Elections to continue hearing the petition
IS DECLARED DISQUALIFIED OR NOT ELIGIBLE FOR for disquali􏰂cation in case a candidate is voted for and
OFFICE. — The fact that the candidate who obtained the receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason,
highest number of votes is later declared to be he is not declared by 􏰂nal judgment before an election to
disquali􏰂ed or not eligible for the o􏰊ce to which he was be disquali􏰂ed. What happens then when after the
elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes to be CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
declared the winner of the elective o􏰊ce. The votes cast
for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be elections are over, one is declared disquali􏰂ed? Then,
valid to vote the winner into o􏰊ce or maintain him there. votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal
However, in the absence of a statute which clearly contemplation, he no longer received the highest number
asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the of votes. It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646
matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the does not make the second placer the winner simply
candidate was alive, quali􏰂ed, or eligible, they should not because a "winning candidate is disquali􏰂ed," but that
be treated as stray,void or meaningless. (Labo vs. the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained
Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1) the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast
for the disquali􏰂ed candidate not being counted or
3. ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646 (AN ACT considered. As this law clearly re􏰉ects the legislative
INTRODUCING REFORMS IN THE ELECTORAL policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this
SYSTEM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES); VOTES Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon
CAST FOR A CANDIDATE DECLARED DISQUALIFIED the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that
BY FINAL JUDGMENT SHALL NOT BE COUNTED; "the quali􏰂cations prescribed for elective o􏰊ce cannot be
CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE SECOND HIGHEST erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of 4. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR CHANGE OF DOMICILE.
ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no — To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
less than the Constitution. ACCORDINGLY, I vote to demonstrate (a) an actual removal or an actual change of
DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of domicile, (b) a bona 􏰂de intention of abandoning the
Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving former place of residence and establishing a new one,
the highest number of votes, from among the quali􏰂ed and (c) acts which correspond with the purpose.
candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st
district of Leyte. 5. ID.; ID.; ONCE LOST CAN BE RECOVERED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW; NO AUTOMATIC
REGALADO, J ., dissenting opinion: REVERSION OR REACQUISITION OF DOMICILE. —
Domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be
1. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; DOMICILE OF ORIGIN; recovered likewise in accordance with law. However, we
CONSTRUED. — The domicile of the parents at the time are here being titillated with the possibility of an
of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of origin," automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of
constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by
until the acquisition of a new domicile in a different place. operation of law. The majority agrees that since petitioner
lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the
2. ID.; ID.; KINDS. — Domicile is said to be of three termination of the marriage also terminates that effect
kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and thereof. I am impressed by the ingeniousness of this
domicile by operation of law. The 􏰂rst is the common theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother
case of the place of birth or domicilium originis; the of inventions. Regretfully, I 􏰂nd some di􏰊culty in
second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument.
domicilium proprio motu; the last which is consequential,
as that of a wife arising from marriage, is sometimes 6. ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY ABANDONMENT OF
called domicilium necesarium. DOMICILE DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY RESTORE
DOMICILE OF ORIGIN. — If a party loses his domicile of
3. ID.; ID.; DOMICILE BY OPERATION OF LAW; origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby
ACQUIRED BY MARRIAGE. — When petitioner voluntarily abandons the
contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by
operation of law, not only international or American but of CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
our own enactment, she acquired her husband's domicile
of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons
her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City. that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his
original domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally
indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to 8. ID.; ID.; DOMICILE BY OPERATION OF LAW; AFTER
establish the same as his new domicile, which is THE HUSBAND'S DEATH, THE WIFE HAS THE RIGHT
precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for TO ELECT HER OWN DOMICILE. — The American rule
purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do. is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice death the wife has the right to elect her own domicile, she
cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin, not nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased
only because there is no legal authority therefor but husband until she makes an actual change. In the
because it would be absurd. Pursued to its logical absence of a􏰊rmative evidence, to the contrary, the
consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal residence
rule out the fact that said party could already very well follows that of her husband and will continue after his
have obtained another domicile, either of choice or by death.
operation of law, other than his domicile of origin.
Signi􏰂cantly and obviously for this reason, the Family 9. ID.; FAMILY CODE; RIGHT AND POWER TO FIX
Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly FAMILY HOME CAN NOT AFFECT DOMICILE FIXED
does not regulate this contingency since it would impinge BY LAW. — I cannot appreciate the premises advanced
on one's freedom of choice. in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68
and 69 of the Family Code. All that is of any relevance
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, therein is that under this new code, the right and power to
petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of 􏰂x the family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I
choice (unless we assume that she entered into the cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the 􏰂rst
marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such place was never exercised by the spouses, could affect
abandonment was further a􏰊rmed through her the domicile 􏰂xed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and,
acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In fact, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is true that a wife
this is even a case of both voluntary and legal now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal
abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more or family domicile, but that has no bearing on this case.
reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that With the death of her husband, and each of her children
with the termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner having gotten married and established their own
had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was
domicile of origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this and is no longer called for or material in the present
would be tantamount to saying that during the period of factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of
marital coverture, she was simultaneously in possession concern in petitioner's case was the matter of her having
and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a acquired or not her own domicile of choice.
state of suspended animation. LexLibris
10. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; ONE YEAR
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT; NOT MET BY GRANTED ONLY IN ABSENCE OR EXCESS OF
CANDIDATE'S RESIDENCY FOR SEVEN (7) MONTHS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION; PREVIOUS DISCRETION. — A writ of certiorari may be granted only
RESIDENCY AT DOMICILE OF ORIGIN NOT if the COMELEC has acted without or in excess of
COUNTED WHERE THE SAME WAS LOST DUE TO jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1,
MARRIAGE AND NOT REACQUIRED AFTER Rule 65, Rules of Court).
HUSBAND'S DEATH. — In sum, petitioner having lost
Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BENCH, NOT A
not having automatically reacquired any domicile CASE FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT. — Since the
COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com respondent's petition, the only issue left is whether it
acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the
therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the petitioner. My careful and meticulous perusal of the
political constituency of which it is a part continued since challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC
her birth up to the present. Respondent commission was, Second Division and theEn Banc resolution of 7 May
therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion,
in her amended/corrected certi􏰂cate of candidacy, and in much less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the
holding her to her admission in the original certi􏰂cate Second Division dispassionately and objectively
that she had actually resided in that constituency for only discussed in minute details the facts which established
seven months prior to the election. beyond cavil that herein petitioner was disquali􏰂ed as a
candidate on the ground of lack of residence in the First
DAVIDE, JR., J ., dissenting opinion: Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied,
miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her
CERTIORARI; PROPER REMEDY FROM A DECISION, residence.
ORDER OR RULING OF THE COMELEC. — Under
Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, 4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; DOMICILE; LOSS OR
decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC may be ABANDONMENT THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. — I
brought to this Court only by the special civil action for respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. provided the COMELEC, either by admission or by
COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or
SCRA 84 [1989]). abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban
City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WRIT OF CERTIORARI; MAY BE live again in her domicile of origin, that became her
second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, FIXING THEREOF, A JOINT DECISION OF SPOUSES.
was for only seven months before the day of the election. — It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69
She was then disquali􏰂ed to be a candidate for the of the Family Code, the 􏰂xing of the family domicile is no
position of Representative of the First Congressional longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a
District of Leyte. A holding to the contrary would be joint decision of the spouses, and in case of
arbitrary. disagreement the court shall decide. The said article
uses the term "family domicile," and not family residence,
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOMICILE OF CHOICE LOST BY as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and the
OPERATION OF LAW BY MARRIAGE. — It may indeed wife may elect to remain in one of such residences,
be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live
either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she together and its corresponding bene􏰂ts" (ALICIA V.
lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of the
her marriage to the then Congressman (later, President) Philippines, [1988], 102).
Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of law is
that domicile which the law attributes to a person, 7. ID.; DOMICILE, DOMICILE BY OPERATION OF LAW;
independently of his own intention or actual residence, as DEATH OF HUSBAND REVIVES POWER OF WIFE TO
results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife ACQUIRE HER OWN DOMICILE; NO AUTOMATIC
arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile 7, 11). Under RESTORATION OF WOMAN'S DOMICILE OF ORIGIN.
the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her — The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's
new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which
of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Under the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect
common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is
domicile unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled
doctrine is that after the husband's death the wife has a
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last
domicile of her husband until she makes an actual
and, by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, change (28 C.J.S. Domicile 12, 27). Or, on the death of
no matter where the wife actually lives or what she the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own
believes or intends. Her domicile is 􏰂xed in the sense domicile is revived, but until she exercises the power her
that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his
certain limitations, he can change her domicile by death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 62, 45). Note that what is
changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 48, 37). revived is not her domicile of origin but her power to
acquire her own domicile.
6. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; FAMILY DOMICILE;
8. ID.; ID.; LOSS OF DOMICILE; MARRIAGE, NOT A vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in
GROUND. — I 􏰂nd to be misplaced the reliance by the 1954 conclusively establish that she had indeed
majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a new
[1954]), and the subsequent cases which established the oneanimo et facto
principle that absence from original residence or domicile
of origin to pursue studies, practice one's profession, or CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
engage in business in other states does not constitute
loss of such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence
Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326). aisadc
provides that transfer of residence to any other place by
reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in 10. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND
private and public service; educational activities; work in SUFFICIENCY; SELF-SERVING STATEMENT,
military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy WITHOUT PROBATIVE VALUE. — Neither should this
or air force, the constabulary or national police force; or Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that
con􏰂nement or detention in government institutions in she "merely committed an honest mistake" in writing
accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of original down the word "seven" in the space provided for the
residence. Those cases and legal provision do not residency quali􏰂cation requirement in the certi􏰂cate of
include marriage of a woman. The reason for the candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light of
exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it the foregoing disquisitions, would be all sound and fury
were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any
consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the
which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile truth.
(of origin or of choice), then such cases and legal
11. ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF; ONE WHO ASSERTS
provision should have expressly mentioned the same.
A FACT HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING IT. — The
9. ID.; ID.; ABANDONMENT THEREOF IN CASE AT majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence
BENCH. — This Court should not accept as gospel truth that he who asserts a fact or the a􏰊rmative of an issue
the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her a􏰊davit that has the burden of proving it Imperial Victory Shipping
her "domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City," and Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T . Cerna
that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having
residence of origin to which [she] always intended to admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the
return whenever absent." Such a claim of intention petitioner could not deny the legal consequence thereof
cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The
Code. Besides, the facts and circumstances or the majority opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y
operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal by the ponente and in the other separate opinions. A
domicile at the time of her marriage automatically widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated,
became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion is can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed
consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she
presumed to retain her deceased husband's domicile automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but
until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her
domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and
exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which
miserably failed to discharge that burden. cdlex are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply
demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of
ROMERO, J ., separate opinion: choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin.
Added together, the time when she set up her domicile in
POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; RESIDENCE; the two places su􏰊ced to meet the one-year requirement
DOMICILE BY OPERATION OF LAW; WIDOW NO to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte.
LONGER BOUND BY THE DOMICILE OF THE
DEPARTED HUSBAND; WIDOW MAY CHOOSE VITUG, J., separate opinion:1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;
DOMICILE; ONE YEAR RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, GENERALLY
MET IN CASE AT BAR. — Bearing in mind that the term
"resident" has been held to be synonymous with CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
"domicile" for election purposes, it is important to
determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First MANDATORY IN CHARACTER. — Constitutional
District of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided there provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character
for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her unless, either by express statement or by necessary
domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at implication, a different intention is manifest (see
the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).
adopts, the same may have been changed when she
married Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by 2. ID.; COMELEC; WITH JURISDICTION OVER PRE-
operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES. — The
released her from the obligation to live with him at the Commission on Elections (the "COMELEC") is
residence 􏰂xed by him during his lifetime. What may constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws
confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the term and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ."
"domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing
choice," or "domicile by operation of law," which subject said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass
we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed upon the quali􏰂cation and disquali􏰂cation prescribed by
law ofcandidates to an elective o􏰊ce. Indeed, pre- also personal presence in that place, coupled with
proclamation controversies are expressly placed under conduct indicative of such intention.' 'Domicile' denotes
the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, a 􏰂xed permanent residence to which when absent for
C, Sec. 3, Constitution). business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return. . . . (Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT 7, Tacloban City [226 SCRA 408, 409])
ON THE OBSERVANCE OF ONE-YEAR RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENT OF THE COMELEC, GENERALLY 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS FOR CHANGE OF
UPHELD ON APPEAL. — The matter before us DOMICILE. — Residence thus acquired, however, may
speci􏰂cally calls for the observance of the constitutional be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order,
one-year residency requirement. This issue (whether or in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must
not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
basically a question of fact or at least inextricably linked locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
to such determination. The 􏰂ndings and judgment of the intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words,
COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule there must basically be animus manendi coupled with
and subject only to a number of exceptions under the animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at
basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not the domicile of choice must be for an inde􏰂nite period of
reviewable by this Court. Using the above tests, I am not time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must
committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed be actual.
resolution.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMELEC; ITS
4. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; PLACE OF HABITUAL JURISDICTION ENDS WHEN JURISDICTION OF
RESIDENCE. — For civil law purposes,i.e., as regards ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL BEGINS. — The COMELEC's
the exercise of civil rights and the ful􏰂llment of civil jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends
obligations, the domicile of a natural person is the place when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned
of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). begins. It signi􏰂es that the protestee must have
theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become
5. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; DOMICILE a "member" of the Senate or the House of
SYNONYMOUS WITH RESIDENCE. — In election Representatives. LexLibris
cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as
synonymous terms, thus: '(t)he term 'residence' as used 8. ID.; ID.; PROCLAMATION OF CANDIDATE, NOT A
in the election law is synonymous with 'domicile,' which MINISTERIAL FUNCTION. —
imports not only an intention to reside in a 􏰂xed place but
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs.
COMELEC(137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along
The question can be asked on whether or not the with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA
proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella
of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992])
number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994])
is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous decision
of which, being adequately de􏰂ned, does not allow the penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief
use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug
ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on
required by law before a proclamation is properly done. official leave).

9. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; CANDIDATE WHO MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:

OBTAINED THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF
VOTES NOT NECESSARILY ENTITLED TO BE 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMELEC; WITHOUT
DECLARED WINNER OF ELECTIVE OFFICE WHERE POWER TO DISQUALIFY CANDIDATE FOR LACK OF
CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE HIGHEST NUMBER ELIGIBILITY. — In my view the issue in this case is
OF VOTES IS LATER DECLARED DISQUALIFIED OR whether the Commission on Elections has the power to
NOT ELIGIBLE. — I should like to next touch base on the disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack
applicability to this case of Section 6 of Republic Act No. eligibility for the o􏰊ce to which they seek to be elected. I
6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. think that it has none and that the quali􏰂cations of
881. I realize that in considering the signi􏰂cance of the candidates may be questioned only in the event they are
law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election
speci􏰂c instances they ostensibly would cover as the protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the
principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of
argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in
favor of the disquali􏰂ed candidate, whenever ultimately this case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC
declared as such, should not be counted in his or her is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized
favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray and were not rendered valid by their agreement to submit
votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by their dispute to that body. To be sure, there are
the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine 􏰂rst provisions denominated for "disquali􏰂cation," but they
enunciated in the case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. are not concerned with a declaration of the ineligibility of
238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the
incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of term of the o􏰊ce. Third is the policy underlying the
an offense) of a person either to be a candidate or to prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections
continue as a candidate for public o􏰊ce. There is also a for President, Vice President, Senators and members of
provision for the denial or cancellation of certi􏰂cates of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The
candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of
representations as to certain matters required by law to Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other
be stated in the certificates. cdll Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the
election, returns and qualifications of members of
2. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; ABSENCE OF Congress or of the President and Vice President, as the
PROVISION FOR PRE- PROCLAMATION CONTEST case may be. By providing in § 253 for the remedy of quo
BASED ON INELIGIBILITY. — The various election laws warranto for determining an elected o􏰊cial's
will quali􏰂cations after the results of elections are
proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the
Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence
be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into
determining a candidate's quali􏰂cations for an o􏰊ce the qualifications of candidates unless they have been
before his election. There are none in the Omnibus elected.
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing for 4. ID.; ID.; PETITION TO DISQUALIFY CANDIDATE
synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are, in FOR INELIGIBILITY FALLS WITHIN THE
other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation contests JURISDICTION OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL. —
but only election protests or quo warranto proceedings Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was not a
against winning candidates. petition for cancellation of certi􏰂cate of candidacy under
§ 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONS. — Three reasons may be petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is
cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding important to note this, because, as will presently be
for determining before election the quali􏰂cations of a explained, proceedings under § 78 have for their purpose
candidate. First is the fact that unless a candidate wins to disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas
and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to
determining his eligibility for the o􏰊ce. Second is the fact disqualify a person from holding public office. Jurisdiction
that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the
citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a House of Representatives is vested in the Electoral
long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the Tribunal of that body.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; QUO 7. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS
WARRANTO; QUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATE DIFFERENTIATED FROM DECLARATION OF
PASSED UPON ONLY AFTER PROCLAMATION OF INELIGIBILITY. — The assimilation in Rule 25 of the
CANDIDATE. — In the only cases in which this Court COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds
dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certi􏰂cates of for disquali􏰂cation is contrary to the evident intention of
candidacy, the allegations were that the respondent the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their
candidates had made false representations in their consequences are proceedings for "disquali􏰂cation"
certi􏰂cates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship, different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility."
age, or residence. But in the generality of cases in which "Disquali􏰂cation" proceedings, as already stated, are
this Court passed upon the quali􏰂cations of respondents based on grounds speci􏰂ed in Sections 12 and 68 of the
for o􏰊ce, this Court did so in the context of election Omnibus Election Code and in § 40 of the Local
protests or quo warranto proceedings 􏰂led after the Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an
proclamation of the respondents or protestees as individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing
winners. as a candidate for public o􏰊ce. In a word, their purpose
is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the
6. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; ABSENCE OF start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other
PROVISION FOR PRE- PROCLAMATION CONTESTS hand, refers to the lack of the quali􏰂cations prescribed in
BASED ON INELIGIBILITY; CANNOT BE SUPPLIED BY the Constitution or the statutes forholding public o􏰊ce
A MERE RULE OF THE COMELEC. — The lack of and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of
provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act
is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is 8. ID.; ID.; POSSESSION OF QUALIFICATIONS FOR
a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the PUBLIC OFFICE DOES NOT IMPLY THAT CANDIDATE
exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, § 6 of IS NOT DISQUALIFIED. — That an individual possesses
the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the the quali􏰂cations for a public o􏰊ce does not imply that
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the he is not disquali􏰂ed from becoming a candidate or
power to continuing as a candidate for a public o􏰊ce and vice
versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the
quali􏰂cations prescribed in § 2 of the law does not imply
decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially that he does not suffer from any of disqualifications
involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, provided in § 4.
residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX-C, § 2[3])
9. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS BASED
ON INELIGIBILITY; ELECTION PROTEST OR ACTION only be inquired into by the HRET. Accordingly, I vote to
FOR QUO WARRANTO, PROPER REMEDY. — To grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the
summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-009, including
may only be sought in an election protest or action for its questioned orders dated April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995,
quo warranto 􏰂led pursuant to § 253 of the Omnibus May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner
Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation. With Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her
respect to elective local o􏰊cials (e.g., Governor, Vice proclamation as Representative of the First District of
Governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of
etc.) such petition must be 􏰂led either with the
COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
Courts, as provided in Art. IX-C, § 2(2) of the
Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes
President, the petition must be 􏰂led with the Presidential proceedings for the disquali􏰂cation of candidates on the
Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, § 4, last paragraph), and in ground of ineligibility for the office, it should be
the case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral considered void. LLjur
Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, § DECISION
17) There is greater reason for not allowing before the
KAPUNAN, J p:
election the 􏰂ling of disquali􏰂cation proceedings based
on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for A constitutional provision should be construed as to give
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which
House of Representatives, because of the same policy it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an
prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases against aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be
such candidates. "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
10. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS;
CERTIORARI; COMELEC WITHOUT JURISDICTION than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The
TO ASSUME DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATE mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim
BASED ON INELIGIBILITY. — For these reasons, I am from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the
of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with
SPA No. 95-009; that its proceedings in that case, the conditions and needs of a community and not
including its questioned orders, are void; and that the identi􏰂ed with the latter, from an elective o􏰊ce to serve
eligibility of petitioner Imelda Romualdez- Marcos for the that community." 3
o􏰊ce of Representative of the First District of Leyte may
Petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos 􏰂led her of time, the deadline for the 􏰂ling of the same having
Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy for the position of already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Corrected/Amended Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy should
Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995
providing the following information in item no. 8: 4 deadline. 9

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK Consequently, petitioner 􏰂led the Amended/Corrected
TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head
ELECTION: ______ Years and seven Months. O􏰊ce in Intramuros, Manila on March 31, 1995. Her
Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy 009 was likewise 􏰂led with the head o􏰊ce on the same
Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of
District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, the word "seven" in her original Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy
􏰂led a "Petition for Cancellation and Disquali􏰂cation" 5 was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which
with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner she sought to rectify by adding the words "since
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certi􏰂cate of
In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Candidacy and that "she has always maintained
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency
Tacloban City as her domicile or residence." 11
requirement for candidates to the House of
Impugning respondent's
representatives on the evidence of declarations made by
her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and
in her Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling
the certificate of candidacy."7 motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification,
she noted that:
On March 29, 1995, petitioner 􏰂led an
Amended/Corrected Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy, changing When respondent (petitioner herein,) announced that she
the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and
8 of the amended certi􏰂cate. 8 On the same day, the run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner
Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed immediately opposed her intended registration by writing
petitioner that: a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but
of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had
[T]his o􏰊ce cannot receive or accept the aforementioned registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of
Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy on the ground that it is 􏰂led out her six month actual residence therein, petitioner 􏰂led a
petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought
from the First District to the Second District and pursued that what was asked was her "actual and physical"
such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or
to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she
congressional election in the First District. He also 􏰂led a could have responded "since childhood." In an
bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the accompanying a􏰊davit, she stated that her domicile is
creation of another legislative district to remove the town Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which
of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. she always intended to return whenever absent and
However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her
on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of
the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident
submit along with respondent for the judgment and of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood,
verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an although she only became a resident of the Municipality
honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has
May 8, 1995. 12 always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of
the First District, before coming to the Municipality of
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Tolosa.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to
1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) 􏰂nding private Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her
respondent's Petition for Disquali􏰂cation in SPA 95-009 registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she
meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be
Corrected/Amended Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy of March a candidate for the District. However, this intention was
31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election O􏰊cer of
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident
the validity of amending the original Certi􏰂cate of of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this
Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for 􏰂ling claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in
certi􏰂cates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance Tolosa.
with the one year residency requirement, the Second
Division held: This incident belies respondent's claim of 'honest
misinterpretation or honest mistake.' Besides, the
"Respondent raised the a􏰊rmative defense in her Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE.
Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of
result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" 'residence of origin' which she interprets to be Tacloban
on her part and, therefore, an amendment should City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com integrity of the election.

her Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7)
thought what was asked was her actual and physical month period of her residency in order to prolong it by
presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there claiming it was 'since childhood' is to allow an
is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission.
fact, item no. 8 in the Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy speaks The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the
clearly of 'Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I respondent indicated in her certi􏰂cate of candidacy can
seek to be elected immediately preceding the election.' be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration
Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which
persuasive. prLL re􏰉ects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A,
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter
mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit. to the election o􏰊cer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated
August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her
To further buttress respondent's contention that an registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so
amendment may be made, she cited the case of Alialy v. that she can be re- registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot,
COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different
the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to documents show the respondent's consistent conviction
the 'inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa,
result of the election, or deviations from provisions Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of
intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on
elections.' The Supreme Court in that case considered March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The
the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe
instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. The
change in the number of years of residence in the place xxx xxx xxx
where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial
matter which determines her quali􏰂cation as a Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected
candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this
accurate material representation in the original certi􏰂cate Commission.
which adversely affects the 􏰂ler. To admit the amended
certi􏰂cate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting xxx xxx xxx
minds of manipulating candidate, to the detriment of the
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the
discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied representative of the City of Manila and later on served
with the one year residency requirement of the as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have
Constitution. served these positions if she had not been a resident of
the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she 􏰂led her
In election cases, the term 'residence' has always been certi􏰂cate of candidacy for the o􏰊ce of the President in
considered as synonymous with 'domicile' which imports 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro
not only the intention to reside in a 􏰂xed place but also Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994,
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct respondent wrote a letter with the election o􏰊cer of San
Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com registration in the permanent list of voters that she may
be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a 􏰂xed Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been
permanent residence to which when absent for business a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time
or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. she 􏰂led her certi􏰂cate of candidacy because she
(Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; became a resident of many places, including Metro
Romualdez vs. RTC- Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence
respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First
in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is
pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban. In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of
intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a as a voter in different places and on a several occasions
resident of the First District since childhood is nothing declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she
more than to give her a color of quali􏰂cation where she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to
is otherwise constitutionally disquali􏰂ed. It cannot hold have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and
ground in the face of the facts admitted by the reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez
respondent in her a􏰊davit. Except for the time that she vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one
studied and worked for some years after graduation in acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur:
Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2)
after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon
resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a the old domicile. In other words there must basically be
registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When
where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila,
coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves
a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a
resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned resident of the district for six months only." 15
Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school
days, as her place of domicile. In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8,
1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied
Pure intention to reside in that place is not su􏰊cient, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24,
there must likewise be conduct indicative of such 1995 Resolution declaring her not quali􏰂ed to run for the
intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she position of Member of the House of Representatives for
has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution
accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not tersely stated:
conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has
not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the
one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial
Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her matters having been raised therein to warrant re-
residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila. examination of the resolution granting the petition for
disqualification. 18
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a
resident of the First On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution
allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com the canvass show that she obtained the highest number
of votes in the congressional elections in the First District
District of Leyte "since childhood." of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC
reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing
To further support the assertion that she could have not
that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the
been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than
event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January
28, 1995; respondent registered as a voter at precinct In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner
No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the
in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of
municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed
may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995.
since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she
her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833
votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said of petitioner's quali􏰂cations after the May 8, 1995
Certi􏰂cate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental elections.
Petition. LLcd
I. Petitioner's qualification
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner
from running for the congressional seat of the First A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second
District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of
suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in
court for relief. election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in
agreement with the general proposition that for the
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with
Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute
classified into two general areas: or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a
conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
I. The Issue of Petitioner's qualifications candidate's quali􏰂cations for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one qualification for an elective position, has a settled
year at the time of the May 8, 1995 elections. meaning in our jurisdiction.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the
exercise of civil rights and the ful􏰂llment of civil
a) Prior to the elections obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's
mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code. for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile
includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or
b) After the Elections physical presence in a 􏰂xed place" and animus manendi,
or the intention of returning there permanently.
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual
relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political
physical presence of a person in a given area, laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law,
community or country. The essential distinction between what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact
residence and domicile in law is that residence involves that residence for election purposes is used
the intent to leave when the purpose for which the synonymously with domicile.
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a
place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile;
if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term
established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly residence . . . is synonymous with domicile which imports
normal for an individual to have different residences in not only intention to reside in a 􏰂xed place, but also
various places. However, a person can only have a personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the
domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid quali􏰂cations of the respondent therein to post of
this distinction quite clearly: Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental.
Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
'Residence' is used to indicate a place of abode, whether registration as a voter other than in the place where one
permanent or temporary; 'domicile' denotes a 􏰂xed is elected does not constitute loss of residence.28 So
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in in these and other election law cases, this Court has
one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not stated that the mere absence of an individual from his
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the permanent residence without the intention to abandon it
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but
he may have numerous places of residence. His place of The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the
residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not residence quali􏰂cation for certain elective positions have
by any means necessarily so since no length of placed beyond doubt the principle that when the
residence without intention of remaining will constitute Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it
domicile." actually means only "domicile" to wit:

For political purposes the concepts of residence and Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt
to require residence in the place not less than one year In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the
question is: What is the Committee's concept of framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual de􏰂nition given to the term residence in election law,
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
residence?
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular Imelda Romualdez Marcos satis􏰂ed the residency
members of the National Assembly are concerned, the requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
proposed section merely provides, among others, 'and a Constitution? Of what signi􏰂cance is the questioned
resident thereof,' that is, in the district for a period of not entry in petitioner's Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy stating her
less than one year preceding the day of the election. This residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as
was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the seven (7) months?
interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certi􏰂cate
xxx xxx xxx of candidacy which

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the
same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an
as a matter of intention rather than actual residence. individual has satis􏰂ed the constitution's residency
quali􏰂cation requirement. The said statement becomes
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be
consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
rather than mere intention to reside? knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which would lead to his or her disqualification.
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some di􏰊culty
especially considering that a provision in the Constitution It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely
in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad committed an honest mistake in jotting down the word
may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the "seven" in the space provided for the residency
original concept that it should be by domicile and not quali􏰂cation requirement. The circumstances leading to
physical residence. 30 her 􏰂ling the questioned entry obviously resulted in the
subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item
down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte 7 and Item 8 — the 􏰂rst requiring actual residence and
instead of her period of residence in the First District, the second requiring domicile — coupled with the
which was "since childhood" in the space provided. circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a
These circumstances and events are amply detailed in voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an
the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned unintended entry for which she could be disquali􏰂ed.
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to
instance, when herein petitioner announced that she negate the fact of residence in the First District if such
would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible fact were established by means more convincing than a
to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo mere entry on a piece of paper. dctai
opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a
resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
registered in her place of actual residence in the First
District, which was Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile
subsequently noted down in her Certi􏰂cate of could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the
Candidacy. A close look at said certi􏰂cate would reveal Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed
the possible source of the confusion: the entry for Resolution of April 24, 1995 maintains that "except for the
residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years
entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived
seeks election thus: in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts
as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, be any place where she lived in the last few decades
LeytePOST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the
PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan,
Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then,
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I in 1965, following the election of her husband to the
SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila
THE ELECTION: ______ Years and Seven Months. where she registered as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter,
she served as a member of the
Having been forced by private respondent to register in
her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner
had jotted down her period of stay in her actual residence Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila.
in a space which required her period of stay in her legal "She could not, have served these positions if she had
not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for
stressed. Here is where the confusion lies. "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his
lot, and that, of course includes study in other places,
We have stated, many times in the past, that an practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When
individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace
and maintained residences in different places. to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town
Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons,
relationship to a given place for various purposes. The or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from
absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a his professional or business activities; so there he
profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary registers himself as voter as he has the quali􏰂cations to
or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity
residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that to choose the o􏰊cials who are to run the government
"she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City especially in national elections. Despite such registration,
since childhood up to the time she 􏰂led her certi􏰂cate of the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or
candidacy because she became a resident of many residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the
places" 􏰉ies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which explanation why the registration of a voter in a place
this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) other than his residence of origin has not been deemed
residence and domicile for election law purposes. In su􏰊cient to constitute abandonment or loss of such
Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed: residence. It 􏰂nds justi􏰂cation in the natural desire and
longing of every person to return to his place of birth.
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's
who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in birth must be overcome by positive proof of
a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandonment for another.
abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or
with his family in another municipality, has his residence From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-
in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner
registered as an elector in the other municipality in was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of
question and having been a candidate for various insular the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously
and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a referring to petitioner's various places of (actual)
resident of the latter municipality. residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only
ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 we and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but
explained that: also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile,
which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by
Division's assailed Resolution: 36 COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held
various residences for different purposes during the past
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally
point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in
years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of
Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her
Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she adulthood there and eventually established residence in
graduated from high school. She pursued her college different parts of the country for various reasons. Even
studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University during her husband's presidency, at the height of the
in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to
Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still her domicile of origin by establishing residences in
in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important
her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his personal milestones in her home province, instituting
o􏰊ce in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she well-publicized projects for the bene􏰂t of her province
married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was and hometown, and establishing a political power base
still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there where her siblings and close relatives held positions of
as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always
the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together with either her in􏰉uence or consent. These well-
in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the
1965, when her husband was elected President of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in
Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the
Malacañang Palace and registered as a voter in San COMELEC's Resolutions, or the majority of the
Miguel, Manila. COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country
always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban,
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family Leyte.
were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In
November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, Private respondent in his Comment, contends that
respondent ran for election as President of the Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because
Philippines and 􏰂led her Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy she did not live there until she was eight years old. He
wherein she indicated that she is a resident and avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she
"abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years case at bench, the evidence adduced by private
and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness
by merely expressing her intention to live there again." required to convince this court that an abandonment of
We do not agree. domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed
occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. As voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile
domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of
gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile
of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that
established only when she reached the age of eight petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as
years old, when her father brought his family back to a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand
Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments. E. Marcos in 1954. For there is a clearly established
distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile"
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation
demonstrate: 37 of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of
the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; because the Civil Code is one area where the two
concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com on this specific area explains:
2. A bona 􏰂de intention of abandoning the former place In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between
of residence and establishing a new one; and domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations
between a person and a place; but in residence, the
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these juridical, independent of the necessity of physical
criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to presence. 40
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
three requirements can the presumption of continuity or
residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires ARTICLE 110. The husband shall 􏰂x the residence of the
an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with
have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service
of the Republic. concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of
transferring from one place to another not only once, but
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the as often as the husband may deem 􏰂t to move his family,
concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the a circumstance more consistent with the concept of
female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would actual residence.
suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her
domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of The right of the husband to 􏰂x the actual residence is in
residence upon marriage. harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and
unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of
Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states: LexLib origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity,
be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde place of actual residence.
quiera que 􏰂je su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin
embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta Very signi􏰂cantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found
obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND
ultramar o' a pais extranjero. OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su 􏰂je de obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means
wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. ARTICLE 109. The husband and wife are obligated to
This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and
residence because it refers to a positive act of 􏰂xing a render mutual help and support.
family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is
further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido The duty to live together can only be ful􏰂lled if the
translade su residencia" in the same provision which husband and wife are physically together. This takes into
means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," account the situations where the couple has many
referring to another positive act of relocating the family to residences (as in the case of petitioner). If the husband
another home or place of actual has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences,
the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that
Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence."
residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the
refer to domicile which is a 􏰂xed, fairly-permanent wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for
professional or other reasons, stays in one of their Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married
(various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains: woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate
from that of her husband during the existence of the
Residence and Domicile. — Whether the word marriage where the husband has given cause for
"residence" as used with reference to particular matters
divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to
is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some
obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in
di􏰊culty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a
such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts,
consideration of the purpose and intent with which the
under the Civil
word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously,
at other times they are distinguished from one another. CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
xxx xxx xxx Code, to live separately from her husband either by
taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to
origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be
the physical presence of a person in a place. A person
compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt.
can have two or more residences, such as a country
residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can exist
without actually living in the place. The important thing for Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced
domicile is that, once residence has been established in that it is not within the province of the courts at this
one place, there be an intention to stay there country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
permanently, even if residence is also established in cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of
some other place. 41 course where the property rights of one of the pair are
invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the
the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of
iron-clad principle. In cases applying the Civil Code on contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the
the question of a common matrimonial residence, our purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order
can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the
jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where
spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience
the spouses could not be compelled to live with each
of those countries where the courts of justice have
other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a
assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people
residence different from that of her husband or, for
shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile
questionable. Thus in England, formerly the
(apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la
Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the
conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State
and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the
make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is
contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148)
delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal
rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of
the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Spain appears to have a􏰊rmed an order of the Audiencia
Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the
James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to
Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money
his regret that the English law on the subject was not the and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her
same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all
decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her
restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be from the property which she had brought to the marriage.
obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this
by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was
growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences
Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and
imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of control of her property; and it does not appear that her
conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience
disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the
basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
in the character of alimony.
to that order would necessarily have been followed by
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, imprisonment for contempt.
only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever
attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then
the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged —
where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her
husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of husband's actual place of residence 􏰂xed by him. The
New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn vs. Darby, problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several
36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal
Code of Louisiana similar to Article 56 of the Spanish and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of
these places Mr. Marcos did 􏰂x as his family's residence. acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband
But assuming that Mr. Marcos had 􏰂xed any of these died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country
places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly
upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by
her domicile of origin. aisadc operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was
unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of
On the other hand, the common law concept of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's
"matrimonial domicile" appears to have been permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them
experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her
between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family residence certi􏰂cate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while
Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted living in her brother's house, an act which supports the
by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to
distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight
Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair,
changes in the concept of women's rights in the having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes"
intervening years by making the choice of domicile a and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of
product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46 Metro Manila merely quali􏰂ed as temporary or "actual
residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence from our discussion pointing out speci􏰂c situations where
may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin
and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the
is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned — affecting marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that
the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of
term residence should only be interpreted to mean her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one
"actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived where situations exist within the subsistence of the
from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different
that when petitioner married the former President in from her husband.
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a
new home, not a domicilium necesarium. In the light of all the principles relating to residence and
domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner persuaded that the facts established by the parties
gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com InTrapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the
interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty
weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting (30) days within which a decree may be entered without
petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the the consent of counsel, it was held that 'the statutory
First District of Leyte. provisions which may be thus departed from with
impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory
II. The jurisdictional issue proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode
or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the
had already lapsed considering that the assailed essential act.' Thus, in said case, the statute under
resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen examination was construed merely to be directory.
(14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner The mischief in petitioner's contending that the
contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a
Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election
over the election of members of the House of Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that
Representatives in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 17 of our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then
the Constitution. This is untenable. refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of
having failed to reach a decision within a given or
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of prescribed period. cdll
judgment within a specified time is generally construed to
be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of
them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that
R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is
if the statute had intended such result it would have
evident that the respondent Commission does not lose
clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a
jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disquali􏰂cation
mandatory and a directory provision is often made on
case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the
grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by
elections. cdlex
several American authorities, this court in Marcelino v.
Cruz held that: 51 As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's
supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
The difference between a mandatory and directory
petitioner's quali􏰂cations after the May 8, 1995 elections,
provision is often determined on grounds of expediency,
su􏰊ce it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge
the reason being that less injury results to the general
of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
quali􏰂cations of members of Congress begins only after
a candidate has become a member of the House of Padilla, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., see dissenting
Representatives.53 Petitioner not being a member of the opinion. Romero, Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see separate
House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at opinion. Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., join the separate opinion
this point has no jurisdiction over the question. of J. Puno. Puno and Francisco, JJ., see separate
concurring opinion. Hermosisima, Jr., J., joins the
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined dissenting opinion of J. Padilla.
in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or
deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis Separate Opinions
of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a
distinction was made PUNO, J ., concurring:

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are
alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike
on such a ground here. Surely, many established should be treated unalike in proportion to their
principles of law, even of election laws were 􏰉outed for unalikeness.1 Like other candidates, petitioner has
the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA clearly met the residence requirement provided by
regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution. 2 We cannot
meaning and spirit of EDSA by ourselves bending disqualify her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution
established principles of law to deny an individual what guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from
he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, the following factual and legal propositions:
we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistake of the past.
First. There is no question that petitioner's original
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were
possesses the necessary residence quali􏰂cations to run domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place.
District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions Petitioner went to school and thereafter worked there. I
dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. Her
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents
proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as
the First District of Leyte. she continued living there even after reaching the age of
majority.
SO ORDERED.LLjurNarvasa, C.J., joins J. Mendoza in
his separate opinion. Feliciano, J., is on official leave. Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954,
petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E. unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to
Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became his wife's prior domicile even if it is different. So we held
subject to change by law, and the right to change it was in de la Viña,6
given by Article 110 of the Civil Code to her husband.
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides: ". . . When married women as well as children subject to
parental authority live, with the acquiescence of their
"ARTICLE 110. The husband shall 􏰂x the residence of husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the
the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living latter live, they have their own independent domicile. . . ."
with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the
service of the Republic." 3 (Emphasis supplied) It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the
deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was
prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by
In De la Viña v. Villareal and Geopano, 4 this Court the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by
explained why the domicile of the wife ought to follow that Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all
of the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the
the theoretic identity of person and interest between the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any
husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the way the domicile legally 􏰂xed by the husband. These
nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity
other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure to choose her domicile but also because they are
their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where contrary to law and public policy.
union and harmony prevail." 5 In accord with this
objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former
husband and wife "to live together." LLpr President Marcos exercised his right to 􏰂x the family
domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where
Third. The di􏰊cult issues start as we determine whether he was then the congressman.At that particular point of
petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos ipso time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her
facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac
respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did domicile has been 􏰂xed by operation of law, it was not
not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as
of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to 􏰂x Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where
the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965
husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his when her husband was elected President, when they
wife, in which case, the wife's domicile remains lived in Malacañang Palace, and when she registered as
a voter in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when her own separate and apart from him.9 Legal scholars
she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, agree that two (2) reasons support this common law
Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro doctrine. The 􏰂rst reason as pinpointed by the legendary
Manila during the incumbency of her husband as Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being
President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
Code, it was only her husband who could change the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into
family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did that of the husband." 10 The second reason lies in "the
not effect any such change. To a large degree, this desirability of having the interests of each member of the
follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage family unit governed by the same law." 11 The
loses her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her
that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually deceased husband is an extension of this common law
lives or what she believes or intends."7 concept. The concept and its extension have provided
some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence against
Fourth. The more di􏰊cult task is how to interpret the women. It was under common law that the 1873
effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided
President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The where women were denied the right to practice law. It
issue is of 􏰂rst impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) was unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper
schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice evidently un􏰂ts it for many of the occupations of civil
Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities. 8 He life. . . . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings
echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the wife relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS 13 and AM JUR
retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes 2d 14 are American state court decisions handed down
an actual between the years 1917 15 and 1938, 16 or before the
time when women were accorded equality of rights with
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com men. Undeniably, the womens' liberation movement
resulted in far- ranging state legislations in the United
change. States to eliminate gender inequality. 17 Starting in the
decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case
their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected with
law that the wife still retains her dead husband's domicile
gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court
is based on ancient common law which we can no longer
in Reed v. Reed, 18 stuck a big blow for women equality
apply in the Philippine setting today. The common law
when it declared as unconstitutional an Idaho law that
identi􏰂ed the domicile of a wife as that of the husband
required probate courts to choose male family members
and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of
over females as estate administrators. It held that mere "Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil
administrative inconvenience cannot justify a sex-based Code, wives suffer under
distinction. These signi􏰂cant changes both in law and in
case law on the status of women virtually obliterated the CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of married
women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of certain restrictions or disabilities. For instance, the wife
the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of
Secundum editors did not miss the relevance of this the giver or the value of the gift, other than from her very
revolution on women's right as they observed: "However, close relatives, without her husband's consent. She may
it has been declared that under modern statutes accept only from, say, her parents, parents-in-law,
changing the status of married women and departing brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so-called
from the common law theory of marriage, there is no fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession
reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile or occupation or engage in business if her husband
for every purpose known to the law. " 19 In publishing in objects on serious grounds or if his income is su􏰊cient to
1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second (Con􏰉ict of support their family in accordance with their social
Laws 2d), the reputable American Law Institute also standing. As to what constitutes 'serious grounds' for
categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . .is no objecting, this is within the discretion of the husband.
longer held. As the result of statutes and court decisions,
a wife now possesses practically the same rights and "xxx xxx xxx
powers as her unmarried sister." 20
"Because of the present inequitable situation, the
In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we amendments to the Civil Law being proposed by the
should continue clinging to theanachronistic common University of the Philippines Law Center would allow
lawthat demeans women, especially married women. I absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties,
submit that the Court has no choice except to break away such that the divorced spouses are free to get married a
from this common law rule, the root of the many year after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However,
degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws in order to place the husband and wife on an equal
particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender footing insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned,
discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, the following are specified as the grounds for absolute
Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, cited a few of them divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by
as follows: 21 the respondent in any of the ways speci􏰂ed in the
Revised Penal Code; or (2) an attempt by the respondent
"xxx xxx xxx "Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives against the life of the petitioner which amounts to
attempted parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3)
abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without parental authority over their minor children, both over
just cause for a period of three consecutive years; or (4) their persons as well as their properties; 24 joint
habitual maltreatment. responsibility for the support of the family; 25 the right to
jointly manage the household; 26 and, the right to object
"With respect to property relations, the husband is to their husband's exercise of profession, occupation,
automatically the administrator of the conjugal property business or activity. 27 Of particular relevance to the
owned in common by the married couple even if the wife case at bench is Article 69 of the Family Code which took
may be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law away the exclusive right of the husband to 􏰂x the family
does not leave it to the spouses to decide who shall act domicile and gave it jointly to the husband and the wife,
as such administrator. Consequently, the husband is thus:
authorized to engage in acts and enter into transactions
bene􏰂cial to the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, "ARTICLE 69. The husband and wife shall 􏰂x the family
cannot similarly bind the partnership without the domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
husband's consent.
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"And while both exercise joint parental authority over their
children, it is the father whom the law designates as the The court may exempt one spouse from living with the
legal administrator of the property pertaining to the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other
unemancipated child." valid and compelling reasons for the exemption.
However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, not compatible with the solidarity of the family."
principally through legislations, to eliminate inequality (Emphasis supplied)
between men and women in our land. The watershed
came on August 3, 1988 when our Family Code took Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code.
effect which, among others, terminated the unequal Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife to live
treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the
responsibilities. 22 Court of Appeals speci􏰂ed the instances when a wife
may now refuse to live with her husband, thus: 28
The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving
new rights to married women and by abolishing sex- "(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but
based privileges of husbands. Among others, married she may refuse to do so in certain cases like:
women are now given the joint right to administer the
family property, whether in the absolute community (a) If the place chosen by the husband as family
system or in the system of conjugal partnership; 23 joint residence is dangerous to her life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or "The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the
abusive conduct or insults, making common life family law so as to emancipate the wife from the
impossible; exclusive control of the husband and to place her at
parity with him insofar as the family is concerned. The
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, wife and the husband are now placed on equal standing
but she cannot get along with her mother-in-law and they by the Code. They are now joint administrators of the
have constant quarrels. (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, family properties and exercise joint authority over the
46 OG 6122); persons and properties of their children. This means a
dual authority in the family. The husband will no longer
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters
relations for 10 years with different women and treated concerning the family." (Emphasis supplied)
his wife roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v.
Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92); In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality
between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving the common law, there is no reason in espousing the
no money to his family for food and necessities, and at
the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
(Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG 129);
anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of
(f) If the husband has no 􏰂xed residence and lives a her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which
vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329); provides the statutory support for this stance has been
repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to
home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70)." resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner
such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has domiciliary determination of her dead husband.
completely emancipated the wife from the control of the
husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to
of interest. No less than the late revered Mr. Justice consider our Constitution and its 􏰂rm guarantees of due
J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision process and equal protection of law. 30 It can hardly be
Committee of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view doubted that the common law imposition on a married
in one of his rare lectures after retirement: 29 woman of her dead husband's domicile even beyond his
grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-
"xxx xxx xxx based discrimination and is not rationally related to the
objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead
a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason
previous fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more for this gender-based burden.
concerned with equality between sexes as it explicitly
commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental But even assuming arguendo that there is need for
equality before the law of women and men." To be exact, convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire her
Section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample
role of women in nation building, and shall ensure evidence to this effect. In her a􏰊davit submitted to the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men." respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred:
We shall be transgressing the sense and essence of this
constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women "xxx xxx xxx
the caveman's treatment. LLjur
"36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit country, after several requests for my return were denied
that the better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for
her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in our Government to issue me my passport.
1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that
petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue after 37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my
her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no beloved husband, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which
domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no the Government unreasonably considered a threat to the
person can be without a domicile at any point of time. national security and welfare.
This stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to
her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of
immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot,
the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family
Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not
Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I
cannot see the fairness of the common law requiring CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before
she could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized.
her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the The PCGG, however, did not permit and allow me.
act of her deceased husband when he 􏰂xed their
domicile in Batac. Her husband is dead and he cannot 39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in
rule her beyond the grave. The law disabling her to the Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a friend's
choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes
all these, common law should not put the burden on
Park which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She
Makati. may also cause repairs and renovation of the
sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and understood that her undertaking said repairs is not
resided in the residence of my brother in San Jose, authorization for her to take over said properties, and that
Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG all expenses shall be for her account and not
to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to
and Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. her.'

40.1. In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day "xxx xxx xxx
and All Souls' Day that year, I renovated my parents'
burial grounds and entombed their bones which had 43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the
been excavated, unearthed and scattered. Sto. Niño Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I
wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San
Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for permissions to — Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live
'. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban there."
and farmhouse in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for
us the Marcos family to have a home in our own It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her
motherland.' domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not disputed
that in 1992, she 􏰂rst lived at the house of her brother in
"xxx xxx xxx San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she
transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot
Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col. Simeon are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner
Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District
to repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part of Leyte, she more than complied with the constitutional
of his letter: requirement of residence ". . . for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the election,"
'Dear Col. Kempis,
i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections. LLcd
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this
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Commission, that she intends to visit our sequestered
The evidence presented by the private respondent to "xxx xxx xxx
negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil. He
presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record 􏰂led "The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the
with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of local chapter N.P. in the original certi􏰂cate of candidacy
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did
period of residence in said barangay was six (6) months not render the certi􏰂cate invalid. The amendment of the
as of the date of her 􏰂ling of said Voter's Registration certi􏰂cate, although at a date after the deadline, but
Record on January 28, 1995. 31 This statement in before the election, was substantial compliance with the
petitioner's Voter's Registration Record is a non- law, and the defect was cured."
prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least
one (1) year residence in the district in which the It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous
candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy 􏰂led on March 8, 1995 cannot
reference is the First District of Leyte. Petitioner's be used as evidence against her. Private respondent's
statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months petition for the disquali􏰂cation of petitioner rested alone
before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary evidence
has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As — petitioner's Voter's Registration Record and her
aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the original Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy. Ranged against the
First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless
residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in contacts with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2)
her favor. Private respondent also presented petitioner's pieces of evidence are too insu􏰊cient to disqualify
Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy 􏰂led on March 8, 1995 32 petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent the
where she placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8 people of the First District of Leyte who have
which called for information regarding "residence in the overwhelmingly voted for her.
constituency where I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election." Again, this original certi􏰂cate of Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution
candidacy has no evidentiary value because on March 1, mandates that "bona 􏰂de candidates for any public o􏰊ce
1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her shall be free from any form of harassment and
Amended/Corrected Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy, 33 discrimination." 35 A detached reading of the records of
petitioner wrote "since childhood" after Item No. 8. The the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and
amendment of a certi􏰂cate of candidacy to correct a extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against petitioner
bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a to prevent her from running as the people's
matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held in representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner's
Alialy v. COMELEC , 34 viz.: Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she averred: 36
xxx xxx xxx May 8, 1995."

"10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) These allegations which private respondent did not
motive in 􏰂ling the instant petition is devious. When challenge were not lost to the perceptive eye of
respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion,
intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run 37 held:
for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner
(Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration "xxx xxx xxx
by writing a letter stating that 'she is not a resident of said
city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.' (Annex "2" of "Prior to the registration date — January 28, 1995 — the
respondent's a􏰊davit, Annex "2"). After respondent petitioner (herein private respondent Montejo) wrote the
(petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa Election O􏰊cer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent
following (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a
resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban City. The purpose of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the
Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the
completion of her six-month actual residence therein, Legislative Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and
petitioner (Montejo) 􏰂led a petition with the COMELEC to South Cotabato, Out of Which the New Provinces of
transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively
Second District and pursued such move up to the Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo,
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the
remove respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's Municipality of Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte,
(Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election in the transferred to the Second District of Leyte. The Hon.
First District. He also 􏰂led a bill, along with other Leyte Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the Second
Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative District of Leyte, opposed the move of the petitioner
district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First (Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736
District and to make it a part of the new district, to (December 29, 1994), the Commission on Elections
achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the refused to make the proposed transfer. Petitioner
Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now (Montejo) 􏰂led ' Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
􏰂led the instant petition, for the same objective, as it is No. 2736' which the Commission denied in a Resolution
obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with promulgated on February 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo)
respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and 􏰂led a petition forcertiorari before the Honorable
verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy G.Montejo vs. Commission on
honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on Elections, G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of
the Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable access to a public o􏰊ce. We cannot commit any
ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the
to make sure that the respondent (petitioner herein) will meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the
register as a voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived
run as Representative not in the First but in the Second a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow.
District. There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner
cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the
"It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its
Supreme Court unanimously promulgated a 'Decision,' interpretation, bile and bitterness.
penned by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the
dispositive portion of which reads: Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera, 38 we explained that the
reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a
'IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions
insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of and needs of a community and not identi􏰂ed with the
the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of latter, from an elective o􏰊ce to serve that
the Fourth District to the Third District of the province of community. . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the
Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can
Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of claim that she is not acquainted with its problems
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the because she is a stranger to the place. None can argue
province of Leyte. No costs.' she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
"Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant
respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained to register consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the
in the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is electorate. The election results show that petitioner
received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-One
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(70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-
instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes.
Tacloban City and Tolosa are in the same First Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the
Legislative District." electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not a
sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case
processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will give life
discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal to the people's political judgment.
A 􏰂nal point. The case at bench provides the Court with they disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin v.
the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality of status
between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
common law precedents on the domicile of married
women and by rede􏰂ning domicile in accord with our Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married
woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by Domicile is classi􏰂ed into domicile of origin and domicile
her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and of choice. The law attributes to every individual a
anomalous balance of advantage of a husband over his domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or
wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is
even if the glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the
live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born
discrimination against married women and we should not or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of
excavate what has been entombed. More importantly, the choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person
Constitution forbids it. has elected and chosen for himself to displace his
previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation
I vote to grant the petition. FRANCISCO, J ., concurring: the intention of the person (28 C.J.S. 6). In order to hold
that a person has abandoned his domicile and acquired a
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia 􏰂nding new one called domicile of choice, the following
petitioner quali􏰂ed for the position of Representative of requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily
the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, presence in the new locality, (b) intention to remain there
to express a few comments on the issue of petitioner's or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the
domicile. old domicile or animus non revertendi (Romualdez v.
RTC , Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415). A third
Domicile has been de􏰂ned as that place in which a classi􏰂cation is domicile by operation of law which
person's habitation is 􏰂xed, without any present intention attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own
of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from
domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily 􏰂xed his legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from
abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child (28
purpose, but with a present intention of making it his C.J.S. 7).
permanent home (28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a 􏰂xed
permanent residence to which when absent for business, In election law, when our Constitution speaks of
or pleasure, or for like reasons one intends to return, and residence for election purposes it means domicile (Co v.
depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199
SCRA 692, 713;Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To that it was the legal or moral duty of the individual to
my mind, public respondent Commission on Elections reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while the
misapplied this concept of domicile which led to wife retains her marital domicile so long as the marriage
petitioner's disquali􏰂cation by ruling that petitioner failed subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's
to comply with the constitutionally mandated one-year termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases.
residence requirement. Apparently, public respondent Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by
Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite
registration as voter in many places as conduct absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from all
disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no
of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions, though, longer serves any meaningful purpose. CDta
the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a
voter in a place other than his place of origin is not It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her
su􏰊cient to constitute abandonment or loss of such original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's
residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). death without even signifying her intention to that effect.
Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner
depart from this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent to disprove, that
of abandoning her domicile of origin.
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It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin
was supplanted by a new domicile due to her marriage, a petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for
domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s. The clear
the death of her husband in 1989 she retains her rule is that it is the party (herein private respondent)
husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his
makes an actual change thereof. I 􏰂nd this proposition residence of origin who must show and prove
quite untenable. preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v.
Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. 16), because the
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former
was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. 16).
Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this
Congressman Marcos. By legal 􏰂ction she followed the burden as the record is devoid of convincing proof that
domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the petitioner has acquired, whether voluntarily or
law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform their involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of
marital duties and obligations to one another. 1 The origin.
question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner,
has complied with the constitutional one-year residence therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-year
requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the quali􏰂cation required by the 1987 Constitution.
Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but
the Presidential Commission on Good Government which I vote to grant the petition. dctai PADILLA, J ., dissenting:
sequestered her residential house and other properties
forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as
places in Manila (A􏰊davit p. 6, attached as Annex I of the expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice
Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position of president Kapunan.
writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as
San Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional
back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certi􏰂cate provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the
2 and resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided provision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by
in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular
she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states
sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte that — "no person shall be a member of the House of
(Annex I, p. 6). 3 It was in the same month of August Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
when she applied for the cancellation of her previous Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least
registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register twenty-􏰂ve (25) years of age, able to read and write, and
anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on except the party list representatives, a registered voter in
January 28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I 􏰂nd it the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one- thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
year residence requirement the date when she applied preceding the day of the election." (Article VI, Section 6)
for the cancellation of her previous registration in San
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws,
Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent
the term residence has been understood as synonymous
never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred
with domicile. This argument has been validated by
her residence after the 1992 presidential election from
San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
resided therein until August of 1994. She later transferred
to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that no less than the Court in numerous cases 1 where
both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First signi􏰂cantly the factual circumstances clearly and
Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that convincingly proved that a person does not effectively
she had more than a year of residence in the lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein
is manifest with his personal presence in the place, All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. the unambiguous limitation that "for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of the
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be di􏰊cult to election," he must be a resident in the district where he
conceive of different modalities within which the phrase desires to be elected.
"a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a
period of not less than one year" would fit. To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial
regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be
The 􏰂rst instance is where a person's residence and synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the
domicile coincide in which case a person only has to candidate's intent and actual presence in one district
prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed
for not less than a year before the election. by the fundamental law. And this, because of a de􏰂nite
Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the
A second situation is where a person maintains a environment and problems of a district he intends to
residence apart from his domicile in which case he would represent in Congress and the one-year residence in said
have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course, district would be the minimum period to acquire such
he satis􏰂es the one-year residence period in the district familiarity, if not versatility. cdll
as the minimum period for eligibility to the position of
congressional representative for the district. In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative
facts are distinctly set out in the now assailed decision of
In either case, one would not be constitutionally the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as
disquali􏰂ed for abandoning his residence in order to affirmed by the Comelec en banc) —
return to his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of
choice; neither would one be disquali􏰂ed for abandoning "In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8
altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban,
district where he desires to be a candidate. Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant
Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation graduated from high school. She pursued her college
wherein a person maintains several residences in studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University
different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues of Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education.
as an option as long as there is no effective Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School,
abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work
choose the district most advantageous for him. with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in
his o􏰊ce in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she
married ex-President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still "On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at
a congressman of Ilocos Norte. She lived with him in Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She 􏰂led with
Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. the Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter
When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she
in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, alleged that she has resided in the municipality of Tolosa
Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when her for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
husband was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines, she lived with him in Malacañang "On March 8, 1995, respondent 􏰂led with the O􏰊ce of
the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, a Certi􏰂cate of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. been a resident in the constituency where she seeks to
be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries
"During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a therein are as follows:
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human
Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed 7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION:
that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted Housewife/Teacher/Social Worker 8. RESIDENCE
and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for
election as President of the Philippines and 􏰂led her Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot,
Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she Tolosa, Leyte
is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro
Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent 􏰂led a letter 9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I
with the election o􏰊cer of San Juan, Metro Manila, SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING
requesting for cancellation of her registration in the ELECTION: _______ Years Seven Months
Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San
Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re- 10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR
registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
(Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31, 1994, respondent
􏰂led her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said o􏰊ce; That I will support
Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
she is a duly registered voter in 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
San Juan, Metro Manila that she intends to register at thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and
Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. decrees promulgated by the duly-constituted authorities;
That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564,
evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as
best of my knowledge. laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio vs.
Paredes,23 Phil. 238 that:
(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
". . . Sound policy dictates that public elective o􏰊ces
(Signature of Candidate)" 2 are 􏰂lled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that o􏰊ce, and it
Petitioner's aforestated certi􏰂cate of candidacy 􏰂led on 8 is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
March 1995 contains the decisive component or seed of government that no one can be declared elected and no
her disquali􏰂cation. It is contained in her answer under measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives
oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
preceding the election."
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed number of votes is later declared to be disquali􏰂ed or not
no grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is eligible for the o􏰊ce to which he was elected does not
disquali􏰂ed from the position of representative necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes to be declared the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com winner of the elective o􏰊ce. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to
for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections
vote the winner into o􏰊ce or maintain him there.
of 8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-
However, in the absence of a statute which clearly
year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte)
asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the
immediately preceding the day of election (8 May 1995)."
matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
Having arrived at petitioner's disquali􏰂cation to be a candidate was alive, quali􏰂ed, or eligible, they should not
representative of the 􏰂rst district of Leyte, the next be treated as stray, void or meaningless."
important issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional
can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and
Reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes)
proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified
(84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:
candidates for representative in said district.
". . . Any candidate who has been declared by 􏰂nal
judgment to be disquali􏰂ed shall not be voted for, and CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by 􏰂nal judgment received the highest number of votes.
before an election to be disquali􏰂ed and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the make the second placer the winner simply because a
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, "winning candidate is disquali􏰂ed," but that the law
upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may, considers him as the candidate who had obtained the
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence the disqualified candidate not being counted or
of his guilt is strong." considered,

There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to As this law clearly re􏰉ects the legislative policy on the
sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not
provision quoted above. As the law now stands, the re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in
legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the
of a 􏰂nal judgment of disqualification only before the quali􏰂cations prescribed for elective o􏰊ce cannot be
election, but even during or after the election. The law is erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disquali􏰂ed expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no
validated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on less than the Constitution.
Elections to continue hearing the petition for
disquali􏰂cation in case a candidate is voted for and ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to
receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to
he is not declared by final judgment before an election to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of
be disqualified. cdasia votes, from among the quali􏰂ed candidates, as the duly
elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the
power to suspend proclamation (when evidence of his REGALADO, J ., dissenting:
guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law. What
While I agree with some of the factual bases of the
happens then when after the elections are over, one is
majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same
declared disquali􏰂ed? Then, votes cast for him "shall not
conclusion drawn therefrom. Hence, this dissent which
be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer
assuredly is not formulated "on the basis of the
personality of a petitioner in a case." 6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in
1986 and the sojourn of the Marcos family in Honolulu,
I go along with the majority in their narration of Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines
antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent to this in 1991 and resided in different places which she claimed
case, and which I have simplified as follows: to have been merely temporary residences.

1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her 7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the
childhood in the present Tacloban City, she being a Philippines and in her
legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken
up permanent residence therein. She also went to school CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
there and, for a time, taught in one of the schools in that
city. certi􏰂cate of candidacy she indicated that she was then
a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos Manila.
who was then domiciled in Batac, Ilocos Norte, by
operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that 8. On August 24, 1994, she 􏰂led a letter for the
place in 1954. cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of
Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in
3. In the successive years and during the events that order that she may "be re-registered or transferred to
happened thereafter, her husband having been elected Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994, she
as a Senator and then as President, she lived with him followed this up with her Sworn Application for
and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration wherein she
Malacañang Palace in San Miguel, Manila. stated that she was a registered voter in Precinct No.
157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and that
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in San Juan,
Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in 9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter
the exercise of the right of suffrage. at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which
purpose she 􏰂led with the therein Board of Election
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging that
assumed those lofty positions successively, ever she had resided in that municipality for six months.
abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte
where he maintained his residence and invariably voted 10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner 􏰂led her certi􏰂cate of
in all elections. candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a American law from which for this case we have taken our
resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where jurisprudential bearings.
she sought to be elected.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at
11. On March 29, 1995, she 􏰂led an the time of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of
"Amended/Corrected Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy" wherein origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until
her answer in the original certi􏰂cate of candidacy to item abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a
"8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I different place. 1 In the instant case, we may grant that
SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING petitioner's domicile of origin, 2 at least as of 1938, was
THE ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a new what is now Tacloban City.
entry reading "SINCE CHILDHOOD."
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice,
her candidacy, petitioner had complied with the residency and domicile by operation of law. The 􏰂rst is the common
requirement of one year as mandated by no less than case of the place of birth or domicilium originis; the
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party
ordomicilium proprio motu; the last which is
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues
with a dissertation on the difference between residence consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage, 3 is
and domicile. We have had enough of that and I sometimes called domicilium
understand that for purposes of political law and, for that
matter of international law, residence is understood to be CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
synonymous with domicile. That is so understood in our
necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile of origin
jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction
can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a
to the concept of residence for purposes of civil,
domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired by
commercial and procedural laws whenever an issue
the party.
thereon is relevant or controlling.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then
Consequently, since in the present case the question of
Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only international
petitioner's residence is integrated in and inseparable
from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the or American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired
standpoint of the concept of the latter term, speci􏰂cally her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte
its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in
choice and domicile by operation of law, as understood in Tacloban City.
Her subsequent changes of residence — to San Juan, therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte
Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to Honolulu, which, if at all, can be the object of legal change under
Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila — do the contingencies of the case at bar.
not appear to have resulted in her thereby acquiring new
domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes
resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado E.
misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on
assumption of new o􏰊cial positions or the loss of them. Elections, 7 and advances this novel proposition:
Her residence in Honolulu and, of course, those after her
return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against "It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin
her will or only for transient purposes which could not by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
have invested them with the status of domiciles of President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By
choice.5 operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal
domicile at the time of her marriage became Batac,
After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up Ilocos Nortealthough there were no indications of an
to the present imbroglio over her requisite residency in intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin.
Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing Because of her husband's subsequent death and through
that she ever attempted to acquire any other domicile of the operation of the provisions of the New Family Code
choice which could have resulted in the abandonment of already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile
her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, automatically reverted to her domicile of origin. . . ."
we note the majority's own submission 6 that, to (Emphasis supplied).
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate (a) an actual removal or an actual change of Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that
domicile, (b) a bona 􏰂de intention of abandoning the petitioner had acquired a domicilium necesariumin Batac,
former place of residence and establishing a new one, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a
and (c) acts which correspond with the purpose. quali􏰂cation that she did not intend to abandon her
domicile of origin. I 􏰂nd this bewildering since, in this
We consequently have to also note that these situation, it is the law that declares where petitioner's
requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or
apply whether what is sought to be changed or putative intent to hold on to her former domicile.
substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium originis) or Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that one
a domicile by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). cannot have more than one domicile at a time, 8 the
Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which majority would be suggesting that petitioner retained
had been replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it is
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com rule out the fact that said party could already very well
have obtained another domicile, either of choice or by
Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does operation of law, other than his domicile of origin.
not exist therein) the equivalent of what is fancied as a Signi􏰂cantly and obviously for this reason, the Family
reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile. prLL Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly
does not regulate this contingency since it would impinge
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can on one's freedom of choice.
only be recovered likewise in accordance with law.
However, we are here being titillated with the possibility Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily
of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we assume
of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by that she entered into the marital state against her will)
operation of law. The majority agrees that since petitioner but, on top of that, such abandonment was further
lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by
termination of the marriage also terminates that effect operation of law. In fact, this is even a case of both
thereof. I am impressed by the ingeniousness of this voluntary and legal abandonment of a domicile of origin.
theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother With much more reason, therefore, should we reject the
of inventions. Regretfully, I 􏰂nd some difficulty in proposition that with the termination of her marriage in
accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument. 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto
reacquired her domicile of origin which she lost in 1954.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during
domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily abandons the the period of marital coverture, she was simultaneously in
former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which
that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his was only in a state of suspended animation.
original domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally
indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while
establish the same as his new domicile, which is after the husband's death the wife has the right to elect
precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for her own domicile, 9 she nevertheless retains the last
purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do. domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice actual change.10 In the absence of a􏰊rmative evidence,
cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin, not to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile
only because there is no legal authority therefor but or legal residence follows that of her husband and will
because it would be absurd. Pursued to its logical continue after his death. 11
consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would
I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of should be resolved by legislative articulation but not by
the majority's theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of the the eloquence of the well- turned phrase.
Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that
under this new code, the right and power to fix the family In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her
domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive domicile of origin since 1954 and not having
how that joint right, which in the 􏰂rst place was never automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot
exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile 􏰂xed legally claim that her residency in the political
by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth
long prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has the up to the present. Respondent commission was,
coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect
domicile, but that has no bearing on this case. With the in her amended/corrected certi􏰂cate of candidacy, and in
death of her husband, and each of her children having holding her to her admission in the original certi􏰂cate
gotten that she had actually resided in that constituency for only
seven months prior to the election. These considerations
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural
issues raised by petitioner.
married and established their own respective domiciles,
the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS
called for or material in the present factual setting of this the petition for lack of merit.
controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's
case was the matter of her having acquired or not her cdlex
own domicile of choice. cdll
DAVIDE, JR., J ., dissenting:
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the
growing and expanded participation of women in the I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority
affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, more
Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I have particularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualification.
searched in vain for a speci􏰂c law or judicial
pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the
implication supports the majority's desired theory of Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the
automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium COMELEC may be brought to this Court only by the
originis of petitioner. De􏰂nitely, as between the settled special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251
there is a world of difference; and, unquestionably, this [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of
COMELEC has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte.
or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of
Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, origin, that became her second domicile of choice, where
jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the only her stay, unfortunately, was for only seven months before
issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of the day of the election. She was then disquali􏰂ed to be a
discretion in disqualifying the petitioner. candidate for the position of Representative of the First
Congressional District of Leyte. A holding to the contrary
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged would be arbitrary.
resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC Second
Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile
discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte.
grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in
Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman
minute details the facts which established beyond cavil (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by
that herein petitioner was disquali􏰂ed as a candidate on operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes
the ground of lack of residence in the First Congressional to a person, independently of his own intention or actual
District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that
miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or of the wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 7,
circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil
residence.LexLib Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the
domicile of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the Said Article reads as follows:
COMELEC's 􏰂ndings of fact for lack of proof that the
petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of ARTICLE 110. The husband shall 􏰂x the residence of the
origin, which is allegedly within the First Congressional family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with
District of Leyte. the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service
of the Republic.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has
provided the COMELEC, either Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com Although the duty of the spouses to live together is
mutual, the husband has a predominant right because he
by admission or by documentary evidence, overwhelming is empowered by law to 􏰂x the family residence. This
right even predominates over some rights recognized by together and its corresponding bene􏰂ts" (ALICIA V.
law in the wife. For instance, under Article 117 the wife SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of the
may engage in business or practice a profession or Philippines, [1988], 102).
occupation. But because of the power of the husband
to 􏰂x the family domicile, he may 􏰂x it at such a place as The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's
would make it impossible for the wife to continue in domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which
business or in her profession. For justi􏰂able reasons, the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect
however, the wife may be exempted from living in the of
residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot
validly allege desertion by the wife who refuses to follow CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
him to a new place of residence, when it appears that
they have lived for years in a suitable home belonging to the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported
the wife, and that his choice of a different home is not by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that
made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence after the husband's death the wife has a right to elect her
on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1985 ed., own domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her
339). husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S.
Domicile § 12, 27). Or, on the death of the husband, the
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived,
her own domicile and, by operation of law, acquires that but until she exercises the power her domicile remains
of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or that of the husband at the time of his death (25 Am Jur
what she believes or intends. Her domicile is 􏰂xed in the 2d Domicile § 62, 45). Note that what is revived is not her
sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own
subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile domicile.
by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 48, 37).
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the time
the Family Code, the 􏰂xing of the family domicile is no of his death — which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their
longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San Miguel,
joint decision of the spouses, and in case of Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable
disagreement the court shall decide. The said article her husband to effectively perform his o􏰊cial duties.
uses the term "family domicile," and not family residence, Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it
as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and the was there to which she returned in 1991 when she was
wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, already a widow. In her sworn certi􏰂cate of candidacy for
which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live the O􏰊ce of the President in the synchronized elections
of May 1992, she indicated therein that she was a While this uncertainty is not important insofar as
resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the residence in the congressional district is concerned, it
said elections in that place. nevertheless proves that forty-one years had already
lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August origin by virtue of marriage and that such length of time
1994 when she exercised her right as a widow to acquire diminished her power of recollection or blurred her
her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn memory.
statement requesting the Election O􏰊cer of San Juan,
Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent I 􏰂nd to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion
list of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the
be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, subsequent cases which established the principle that
Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence" absence from original residence or domicile of origin to
(photocopy of Exhibit "B", attached as Annex "2" of pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in
private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she business in other states does not constitute loss of such
contradicted this sworn statement regarding her place of residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117
birth when, in her Voter's A􏰊davit sworn to on 15 March of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that
1992 (photocopy of Exhibit "C", attached as Annex "3", transfer of residence to any other place by reason of
Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on 28 one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and
January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E", attached as public service; educational activities; work in military or
Annex "5", Id.), and her Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy sworn naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force,
to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A", attached the constabulary or national police force; or con􏰂nement
as Annex "1", Id.), she solemnly declared that she was or detention in government
born in Manila.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of
origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the a􏰊davit institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss
attached to her Answer to the petition for disquali􏰂cation of original residence. Those cases and legal provision do
(Annex "I" of Petition), she declared under oath that her not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the
"domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it
to return to such domicile or residence of origin why did were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to
she inform the Election O􏰊cer of San Juan that she consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance
would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile
Voter's Registration Record and in her certi􏰂cate of (of origin or of choice), then such cases and legal
candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? provision should have expressly mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self- concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium
serving claim of the petitioner in her a􏰊davit (Annex "A" necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her
of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte."
of Petition) that her "domicile or residence of origin is That conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil
Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased
this domicile or residence of origin to which [she] always husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power
intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim of to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to
intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own
the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and circumstances or domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden.
the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in
1954 conclusively establish that she had indeed I vote to deny the petition. LexLibris ROMERO, J .,
abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a new separate opinion:
one animo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A
Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326). Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the
COMELEC ruled that she was disquali􏰂ed from running
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the for Representative of her District and that, in the event
petitioner's claim that she "merely committed an honest that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her
mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space proclamation should be suspended. Not by a
provided for the residency quali􏰂cation requirement in straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its
the certi􏰂cate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving decision as has been its unvarying practice in the past,
and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be but by a startling succession of "reverse somersaults."
all sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not Indicative of its shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's
commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she certi􏰂cate of candidacy were 􏰂rst, the action of its
stated was the truth. Second Division disqualifying her and cancelling her
original Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in 24, 1995; then the denial by the COMELEC en banc of
evidence that he who asserts a fact or the a􏰊rmative of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day
an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory before the election; then because she persisted in
Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T . running, its decision on May 11, 1995 or three days after
Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that
Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman the results of the canvass should show that she obtained
Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal the highest number of votes (obviously
consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to
that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at least CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot
opponent), but almost simultaneously reversing itself by possibly go far enough to sever the domiciliary tie
directing that even if she wins, her proclamation should imposed by her husband.
nonetheless be suspended.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the
Crucial to the resolution of the disquali􏰂cation issue husband unilaterally to 􏰂x the residence or domicile of
presented by the case at bench is the interpretation to be the family, as laid down in the Civil Code, 2 but to
given to the one-year residency requirement imposed by continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the
the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional seat.1 rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to
live together has ceased, is to close one's eyes to the
Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to stark realities of the present.
be synonymous with "domicile" for election purposes, it is
important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was At the other extreme is the position that the widow
in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she had automatically reverts to her domicile of origin upon the
resided there for at least a period of one year. demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum
Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a
parents lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what domicile? To answer this question which is far from
theory one adopts, the same may have been changed rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic
when she married Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled principles of domicile. Everyone must have a domicile.
in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death Then one must have only a single domicile for the same
certainly released her from the obligation to live with him purpose at any given time. Once established, a domicile
at the residence 􏰂xed by him during his lifetime. What remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives
may confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the who has no domiciles, as de􏰂ned by the law he is
term "domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile subject to.
of choice," or "domicile by operation of law," which
subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored
discussed by the ponente and in the other separate legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky by
opinions. the con􏰉icting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This
being the state of things, it is as imperative as it is
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light
of legal opinion as to the effect of the husband's death on of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity of
the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in
widow's domicile remains unchanged; that the deceased keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize
husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left and protect the human rights of women, no less than
men. her personal freedoms, practically relegating her to the
position of minors and disabled persons. To illustrate a
Admittedly, the notion of placing women on par with men, few: The wife cannot, without the husband's consent,
insofar as civil, political and social rights are concerned, acquire any property by gratuitous title, except from her
is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral
the middle of this century. It is a historical fact that for relatives within the fourth degree. 9 With respect to her
over three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized employment, the husband wields a veto power in the
by Spain, a conservative, Catholic country which case the wife exercises her profession or occupation or
transplanted to our shores the Old World culture, mores, engages in business, provided his income is su􏰊cient for
attitudes and values. Through the family, according to its social standing and his
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. 10
Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is
the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil the effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till
Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no after three hundred days following the death of her
choice but to accept such concepts as the husband's husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to
being the head of the family and the wife's subordination a child.11 The mother who contracts a subsequent
to his authority. In such role, his was the right to make marriage loses the parental authority over her children,
vital decisions for the family. Many instances easily come unless the deceased husband, father of the latter, has
to mind, foremost being what is related to the issue expressly provided in his will that his widow might marry
before us, namely, that "the husband shall 􏰂x the again, and has ordered that in such case she should
residence of the family." 3 Because he is made keep and exercise parental authority over their children.
responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the 12 Again, an instance of a husband's overarching
family, 4 he is also empowered to be the administrator of in􏰉uence from beyond the grave.
the conjugal property, with a few exceptions 5 and may,
therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino
purposes speci􏰂ed under the law; 6 whereas, as a wives for hundreds of years evoked no protest from them
general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal until the concept of human rights and equality between
and among nations and individuals found hospitable
partnership without the husband's consent. 7 As regards
lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the
the property pertaining to the children under parental
Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then,
authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in
the Spanish "conquistadores" had been overthrown by
his absence may the mother assume his powers. 8 the American forces at the turn of the century. The
Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on bedrock of the U.N. Charter was 􏰂rmly anchored on this
credo: "to rea􏰊rm faith in fundamental human rights, in human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal between the sexes are the following provisions: "The
rights of men and women." (Emphasis supplied) State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights" 16 and "The
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines State recognizes the role of women in nation-building,
bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning of the feminist and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law
movement. What may be regarded as the international of women and men." 17
bill of rights for women was implanted in the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against A major accomplishment of women in their quest for
Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory
Assembly which entered into force as an international provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of
treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the
the Philippines bound itself to implement its liberating grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their
spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that husbands. Speci􏰂cally, the husband and wife are now
"The Philippines . . . adopts the generally accepted given the right jointly to 􏰂x the family domicile; 18
principles of international law as part of the law of the concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for
land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, the support of the family is the right and duty of both
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." 13 One spouses to manage the household; 19 the administration
such principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to and the enjoyment of the community property shall
men and women "the same rights with regard to the law
relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to belong to both spouses jointly; 20 the father and mother
shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the
choose their residence and domicile. " 14 (Emphasis
supplied) property of their unemancipated common child 21 and
several others.
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on
Filipino women was Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law,
insofar as women's rights are concerned, Congress
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com passed a law popularly known as "Women in
Development and Nation Building Act." 22 Among the
re􏰉ected in the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines and rights given to married women evidencing their capacity
later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were speedily to act in contracts equal to that of men are:
approved by the 􏰂rst lady President of the country,
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain
Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on the
loans and execute security and credit arrangements
under the same conditions as men; whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their civil,
political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death
and private sector programs granting agricultural credit, of their husbands but must retain the same, regardless?
loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal
treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
programs;
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile
and enter into insurance contracts; and of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither
does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin,
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her
married men in applying for passports, secure visas and domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and
other travel documents, without need to secure the subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which
consent of their spouses. 23 are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply
demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin.
Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court now be Added together, the time when she set up her domicile in
the 􏰂rst to respond to its clarion call that "Women's the two places su􏰊ced to meet the one-year requirement
Rights are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte.
women's full participation in decision- making at all levels,
including the family" should be removed. Having been In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the
herself a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the petition. LLjur VITUG, J ., separate opinion:
International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in
1975, this writer is only too keenly aware of the The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional
unremitting struggle being waged by women the world mandates.
over, Filipino women not excluded, to be accepted as
equals of men and to tear down the walls of The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a
discrimination that hold them back from their proper bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and
places under the sun. LexLib directions and render steady our strides hence. It only
looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past are
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution
global, legislative, executive and judicial, according more belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A
rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating constitution may well become outdated by the realities of
time. When it does, it must be changed but while it representation from the political parties and the parties or
remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy, organizations registered under the party-list system
open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
answer to perceived transitory needs, let alone societal Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.
The Commission on Elections (the "COMELEC") is
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws
in character unless, either by express statement or by and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ."
necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (Art. IX-C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing
(see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51). said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass
upon the quali􏰂cation and disquali􏰂cation prescribed by
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 law of candidates to an elective o􏰊ce. Indeed, pre-
and Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental law. proclamation controversies are expressly placed under
These provisions read: the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX-
C, Sec.
"SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House
of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-􏰂ve years of age, able to read and write, and, 3, Constitution).
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident The matter before us speci􏰂cally calls for the observance
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately of the constitutional one-year residency requirement. This
preceding the day of the election." issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to
my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least
"SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of inextricably linked to such determination. The 􏰂ndings
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal and judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to long established rule and subject only to a number of
the election, returns, and quali􏰂cations of their respective exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of discretion," are not reviewable by this Court.
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, I do not 􏰂nd much need to do a complex exercise on
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or what seems to me to be a plain matter. Generally, the
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who term "residence" has a broader connotation that may
shall be chosen on the basis of proportional mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's
o􏰊cial duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of
place where he sojourns during a considerable length of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the
time). For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signi􏰂es that the
of civil rights and the ful􏰂llment of civil obligations, the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed
domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the
residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, House of Representatives. The question can be asked on
the controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a
Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, ministerial function of the Commission on Elections
Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus: dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election
exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an
"In election cases, the Court treats domicile and obligation the performance of which, being adequately
residence as synonymous terms, thus: '(t)he term de􏰂ned, does not allow the use of further judgment or
'residence' as used in the election law is synonymous discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is
with 'domicile,' which imports not only an intention to tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the
reside in a 􏰂xed place but also personal presence in that facts and conditions such as may be required by law
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.' before a proclamation is properly done. LLpr
'Domicile' denotes a 􏰂xed permanent residence to which
when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain
one intends to return. . . . Residence thus acquired, from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise
however, may be lost by adopting another choice of of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which,
domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by by no less than a constitutional 􏰂at, are explicitly within
choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory
there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to
other words, there must basically be animus manendi later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating
coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to to the election, returns and quali􏰂cation" of
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
inde􏰂nite period of time; the change of residence must CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for
the new domicile must be actual." its members.

Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next
charge the COMELEC with having committed grave touch base on the applicability to this case of Section 6 of
abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution. Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly: sections shall not prevent his proclamation and
assumption to office."
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646 "xxx xxx xxx
I realize that in considering the signi􏰂cance of the law, it
"SECTION 6. Effect of Disquali􏰂cation Case. — Any may be preferable to look for not so much the speci􏰂c
candidate who has been declared by 􏰂nal judgment to instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle
be disquali􏰂ed shall not be voted for, and the votes cast they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument
for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of
candidate is not declared by 􏰂nal judgment before an the disquali􏰂ed candidate, whenever ultimately declared
election to be disquali􏰂ed and he is voted for and as such, should not be counted in his or her favor and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion rationale of the now prevailing doctrine 􏰂rst enunciated in
of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the the case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912])
pendency thereof order the suspension of the which, although later abandoned in Ticzon vs.
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence COMELEC (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs.
of his guilt is strong." COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along
with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881 "xxx xxx xxx 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 [1989]), Abella
(201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992])
"SECTION 72. Effects of disquali􏰂cation cases and and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994])
priority. — The Commission and the courts shall give rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous decision
priority to cases of disquali􏰂cation by reason of violation penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief
of this Act to the end that a 􏰂nal decision shall be Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
rendered not later than seven days before the election in Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug
which the disqualification is sought. and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on
o􏰊cial leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the
"Any candidate who has been declared by 􏰂nal judgment
first Labo decision:
to be disquali􏰂ed shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any "Finally, there is the question of whether or not the
reason, a candidate is not declared by 􏰂nal judgment private respondent, who 􏰂led the quo warranto petition,
before an election to be disquali􏰂ed, and he is voted for can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The
and receives the winning number of votes in such simple reason is that as he obtained only the second
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding highest number of votes in
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com "'. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic
concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority
people of Baguio City. or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed
as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
"The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. which have positively declared through their ballots that
Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in they do not choose him.
1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was
proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, 'Sound policy dictates that public elective o􏰊ces are
who was disquali􏰂ed as a turncoat and considered a 􏰂lled by those who have received the highest number of
non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, votes cast in the election for that o􏰊ce, and it is a
the second placer won by default. That decision was fundamental idea in all republican forms of government
supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
J. , ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus
concurring.) with three dissenting (Teehankee, Acting Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and
another two reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, 'The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest
Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.) number of votes is later declared to be disquali􏰂ed or not
eligible for the o􏰊ce to which he was elected does not
"Re-examining that decision, the Court 􏰂nds, and so necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the
holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier second highest number of votes to be declared the
case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which winner of the elective o􏰊ce. The votes cast for a dead,
represents the more logical and democratic rule. That disquali􏰂ed, or non-eligible person may not be valid to
case, which reiterated the doctrine 􏰂rst announced in vote the winner into o􏰊ce or maintain him there.
1912 in Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported However, in the absence of a statute which clearly
by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the
with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., candidate was alive, quali􏰂ed, or eligible, they should not
concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved be treated as stray, void or meaningless.' (at pp. 20- 21)"
his vote, (Makasiar, J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.)
and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for
Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held: the dismissal of the petition. cdll
MENDOZA, J ., separate opinion: person either to be a candidate or to continue as a
candidate for public o􏰊ce. There is also a provision for
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com the denial or cancellation of certi􏰂cates of candidacy, but
it applies only to cases involving false representations as
In my view the issue in this case is whether the to certain matters required by law to be stated in the
Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify certificates.
candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the
o􏰊ce to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has These provisions are found in the following parts of the
none and that the quali􏰂cations of candidates may be Omnibus Election Code:
questioned only in the event they are elected, by 􏰂ling a
petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the § 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been
appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, declared by competent authority insane or incompetent,
as in this case, in the House of Representatives Electoral or has been sentenced by 􏰂nal judgment for subversion,
Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has
proceedings in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
valid by their agreement to submit their dispute to that disquali􏰂ed to be a candidate and to hold any o􏰊ce,
body. unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for
authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's The disquali􏰂cations to be a candidate herein provided
quali􏰂cations for an o􏰊ce before his election. There are shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 􏰂ve years from his service of sentence, unless within the
7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre- same period he again becomes disquali􏰂ed. (Emphasis
proclamation contests but only election protests or quo added)
warranto proceedings against winning candidates. cdll
§ 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for action or protest in which he is a party is declared by
"disquali􏰂cation," but they are not concerned with a 􏰂nal decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by
declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These the Commission of having (a) given money or other
provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to material consideration to in􏰉uence, induce or corrupt the
insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a voters or public o􏰊cials performing electoral functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; disquali􏰂ed shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
(c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of him shall not be counted. I f for any reason a candidate is
that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made not declared by 􏰂nal judgment before an election to be
any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 number of votes in such election, the Court or
and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
shall be disquali􏰂ed from continuing as a candidate, or if the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion for the
he has been elected, from holding the o􏰊ce. Any person complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
foreign country shall not be quali􏰂ed to run for any candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
elective o􏰊ce under this Code, unless said person has (Emphasis added)
waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of
a foreign country in accordance with the residence § 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a
requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove
added) provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or
cancel a certi􏰂cate of candidacy as provided in Section
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

§ 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
certi􏰂cate of candidacy. — A veri􏰂ed petition seeking to 7160):
deny due course or to cancel a certi􏰂cate of candidacy
may be 􏰂led by any person exclusively on the ground § 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are
that any material representation contained therein as disquali􏰂ed from running for any elective local position:
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition
may be 􏰂led at any time not later than twenty-􏰂ve days (a) Those sentenced by 􏰂nal judgment for an offense
from the time of the 􏰂ling of the certi􏰂cate of candidacy involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis years after serving sentence;
added)
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646): administrative case;

§ 6. Effect of Disquali􏰂cation Case. — Any candidate (c) Those convicted by 􏰂nal judgment for violating the
who has been declared by 􏰂nal judgment to be oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship; to material matters in her certificate of candidacy.

(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore
here or abroad; not a petition for cancellation of certi􏰂cate of candidacy
under §78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is
have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to important to note this, because, as will presently be
avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; explained, proceedings under §78 have for their purpose
and to disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas
quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to
(g) The insane or feeble-minded. disqualify a person from holding public o􏰊ce. Jurisdiction
over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the
The petition 􏰂led by private respondent Cirilo Roy House of Representatives is vested in the Electoral
Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For Tribunal of that body.
Cancellation and Disquali􏰂cation," contained no
allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez- Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with
Marcos made material representations in her certi􏰂cate petitions for the cancellation of certi􏰂cates of candidacy,
of candidacy which were false. It sought her the allegations were that the respondent candidates had
disquali􏰂cation on the ground that "on the basis of her made false representations in their certi􏰂cates of
Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy,
candidacy with regard to their citizenship, 1 age, 2 or
[she] is disqualified from running for the position of
Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, residence. 3 But in the generality of cases in which this
1995, [she] would have resided less than ten (10) months Court passed upon the quali􏰂cations of respondents for
in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its o􏰊ce, this Court did so in the context of election protests
part, the COMELEC's Second Division, in its resolution of 4 or quo warranto proceedings 5 􏰂led after the
proclamation of the respondents or protestees as
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com winners.

April 24, 1995, cancelled her certi􏰂cate of candidacy and Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an
corrected certi􏰂cate of candidacy on the basis of its authorized proceeding for determining before election the
􏰂nding that petitioner is "not quali􏰂ed to run for the qualifications of a candidate. cda
position of Member of the House of Representatives for
the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is
any 􏰂nding that she had made false representations as proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining
his eligibility for the o􏰊ce. In contrast, whether an Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-
individual should be disquali􏰂ed as a candidate for acts proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over President, Senators and members of the House of
spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, §15) The purpose is to
question which should be determined lest he wins preserve the prerogatives of
because of the very acts for which his disquali􏰂cation is
being sought. That is why it is provided that if the CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
grounds for disquali􏰂cation are established, a candidate
will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the
his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of
has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be the election, returns a n d qualifications of members of
proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.6 Congress or of the President and Vice President, as the
case may be.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's
eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his By providing in §253 for the remedy of quo warranto for
domicile, may take a long time to make, extending determining an elected o􏰊cial's quali􏰂cations after the
beyond the beginning of the term of the o􏰊ce. This is results of elections are proclaimed, while being
amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy
120265,Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code,
determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not
the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of
This is contrary to the summary character of proceedings candidates unless they have been elected.
relating to certi􏰂cates of candidacy. That is why the law
makes the receipt of certi􏰂cates of candidacy a Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding
for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC
ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its o􏰊cers. 7 The amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide
law is satis􏰂ed if candidates state in their certi􏰂cates of in Rule 25, §1 the following:
candidacy that they are eligible for the position which
they seek to 􏰂ll, leaving the determination of their Grounds for disquali􏰂cation. — Any candidate who does
quali􏰂cations to be made after the election and only in not possess all the quali􏰂cations of a candidate as
the event they are elected. Only in cases involving provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who
charges of false representations made in certi􏰂cates of commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction. disquali􏰂cation may be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of as a candidate for a public o􏰊ce and vice versa. We
candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law.
Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the quali􏰂cations
action which is a substantive matter which the prescribed in §2 of the law does not imply that he does
COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule making power not suffer from any of disquali􏰂cations provided in§4.
under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is
noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the Indeed, provisions for disquali􏰂cations on the ground
COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election practices
right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are
qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing the
voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)] proclamation and prolonging the election protest," 8
through the use of "manufactured" election returns or
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the
grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disquali􏰂cation is results of the election. This rationale does not apply to
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in cases for determining a candidate's quali􏰂cations for
their grounds but also in their consequences are o􏰊ce before the election. To the contrary, it is the
proceedings for "disquali􏰂cation" different from those for candidate against whom a proceeding for disquali􏰂cation
a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disquali􏰂cation" is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds prevented
speci􏰂ed in §12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code
and in §40 of the Local Government Code and are for the CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
purpose of barring an individual from becoming a
candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public from assuming office even though in end he
o􏰊ce. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate prevails.aisadc
from the race either from the start or during its progress.
"Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a
quali􏰂cations prescribed in the Constitution or the candidate may only be sought in an election protest or
statutes for holding public o􏰊ce and the purpose of the action for quo warranto 􏰂led pursuant to §253 of the
proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his
incumbent from office. cdlex proclamation. With respect to elective local o􏰊cials (e.g.,
Governor, Vice Governor, members of the Sangguniang
Consequently, that an individual possesses the Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be 􏰂led either with
quali􏰂cations for a public o􏰊ce does not imply that he is the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal
not disquali􏰂ed from becoming a candidate or continuing Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX, C, §2(2) of the
Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed
President, the petition must be 􏰂led with the Presidential with the proclamation of petitioner.
Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, §4, last paragraph), and in the
case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Footnotes
and in the case of Congressmen, with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, §17) There is 1. Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580 (1881). 2. CONST,
greater reason for not allowing before the election the Art. VI, states:
􏰂ling of disquali􏰂cation proceedings based on alleged
ineligibility in the case of candidates for President, Vice Sec. 6. No person shall be a member of the House of
President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Representatives, because of the same policy prohibiting Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
the filing of pre-proclamation cases against such twenty-􏰂ve years of age, able to read and write, and
candidates. except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that preceding the day of the election.
its proceedings in that case, including its questioned
orders, are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner See, Jarrolt v. Mabberly, supra, note 1. 3. Gallego vs.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the o􏰊ce of Vera, 73 Phil. 453 (1941).4. Rollo, p. 114, Annex "D".5.
Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be Rollo, p. 110, Annex "D".6. Rollo, p. 113.7. Rollo, p. 111.
inquired into by the HRET. 8. Rollo, p. 115, Annex "E".

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to grant the petition and to annul CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
the proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA
9. Signed by Virgilio S. Oledan, Provincial Election
No. 95-009, including its questioned orders dated April
Supervisor IV, Leyte; Rollo, p. 116, Annex "F". 10. Rollo,
24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995,
p. 117, Annex "G". Petitioner explained the
declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible
circumstances surrounding the 􏰂lling up of
and ordering her proclamation as Representative of the
First District of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule the original certificate thus:
25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes
proceedings for the disquali􏰂cation of candidates on the "1. On March 8, 1995, I 􏰂led my certi􏰂cate of candidacy
ground of ineligibility for the office, it should considered for Member of the House of Representatives
void. (Congresswoman) of the First Legislative District of the
province of Leyte, which was drafted by Mr. Filomeno A. November 5, 1992, I bought my Residence Certi􏰂cate
Zeta. No. 15226186L there, which is made an integral part
hereof as Annex "I" (Annex "2" hereof).
"2. I learned lately that Congressman Cirilo Montejo
wants to disqualify me as I allegedly lack residence in the 11. Id., at p. 120. See also, Rollo, p. 130-133, Annex "I",
constituency because of the entry of the word 'SEVEN' in petitioner's A􏰊davit explaining her residence:
Item No. 8 of my certificate of candidacy.
"13. I established my domicile, however in Tacloban,
"3. I read my certi􏰂cate of candidacy before signing it Leyte (Tacloban City in 1938, when I was little over eight
and I thought of the word 'RESIDENCE' to mean actual (8) years old. Shortly after my mother died on April 7,
or physical residence, and the word 'SEVEN' merely 1938, my widowed father, Vicente Orestes Romualdez,
re􏰉ected my actual and physical residence in Barangay brought me and my brothers . . . and my sisters to
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Tacloban, Leyte (now Tacloban City) his hometown.

"3.1. The word 'SEVEN' was placed on my certi􏰂cate of xxx xxx xxx
candidacy to indicate that at lease one (1) month had
passed from my registration as voter of Tolosa, Leyte, on "18. I have always considered Tacloban City as my
January 28, 1995, when I wrote '06' months under permanent residence or residence of origin. I have not
'PERIOD OF RESIDENCE' as my actual or physical abandoned and have never intended to abandon my
residence in the town. permanent residence or residence of origin there. To it I
always intend to return whenever absent."
"4. I thought then that the sense in Item No. 10 of my
certi􏰂cate of candidacy stating 'THAT I AM eligible for "19. In 1952, I went to Manila to work with my cousin, the
said O􏰊ce' was su􏰊cient to a􏰊rm that I possess all the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the
quali􏰂cations, including my residence, for Member of the House of Representatives."
House of Representatives for which I am aspiring in the
May 8, 1995 elections. "20. In May, 1954, I married President Ferdinand E.
Marcos when he was still the congressman of Ilocos,
"5. The fact, however, is that my domicile or residence of Norte.
origin is Tacloban City, a component city of the First
Legislative District of Leyte. I never intended to abandon "21. As a dutiful wife who loved him deeply, I lived with
this domicile or residence of origin to which I always him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered as a voter
intended to return whenever absent; indeed in 1992, I there."
returned to Tacloban City to live and stay there. On
"22. In 1965, my husband was elected President of the "38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to
Republic of the Philippines. immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot,
Tolosa Leyte even if my residences there were not livable
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The
PCGG, however, did not permit and allow me.
Together, we lived in Malacañang Palace and I
registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila." xxx xxx xxx

"23. My registration as voter in Batac, Ilocos Norte; San "40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and
Juan, Rizal (now San Juan, Metro Manila); and San resided in the residence of my brother in San Jose,
Miguel, Manila, was for convenience because I had to Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG
live with my husband to serve him when he was to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City
congressman, Senator and President of the Republic of and Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte."
the Philippines. During those years however, I never
intended nor desired to abandon my domicile or 12. Rollo, p. 122.13. Commissioners Manolo B. Gorospe
residence of origin in Tacloban City, which I established and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores formed the majority
since I was a child."
opinion. Commissioner Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando
xxx xxx xxx dissented. 14. Rollo, p. 64.

"33. Throughout the Marcos Presidency, I spent most of 15. Rollo, p. 57-64.
my birthday, anniversaries and attended the Sto. Niño
Fiesta in Tacloban City. I regularly visited my domicile or 16. Petitioner filed a "Motion to Recall Resolution
residence of origin in Leyte and even held important Promulgated on April 24, 1995 and to Dismiss the
functions and entertained guests and foreign dignitaries Petition Because of Lapse of Jurisdiction; Alternatively,
there." Motion for Reconsideration." The Commission's May 7,
1995 Resolution treated the same simply as a Motion for
"34. After President Ferdinand E. Marcos and I, together Reconsideration.
with our children and innocent grandchildren were
abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii, in 17. Commissioners Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios
February, 1986, my Leyte properties were sequestered A. Salazar-Fernando and Julio F. Desamito dissented. All
by the PCGG, and were destroyed and cannibalized." filed separate dissenting opinions. In disqualifying
petitioner, the majority held:
xxx xxx xxx
"As it stands now, only the Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy residence.
respondent 􏰂led on March 8, 1995, stands, and on the
basis of the entries therein, she is disquali􏰂ed to run for 36. Rollo, p. 38.37. 18 Am Jur 219-220.38. 20 Am Jur 71.
the House of Representatives for failure to meet the 39. TOLENTINO, 1 COMMENTARIES &
constitutional requirement of one (1) year of residence in JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE, 220 (1987).
the place where she wanted to be elected." 40. Id.41. TOLENTINO, 1 COMMENTARIES AND
JURISPRUDENCE ON CIVIL CODE, 220 (1987).
18. Rollo, p. 78, Annex "B".19. Rollo, p. , Annex "D".20.
19 SCRA 966 (1967). See also, Corre v. Corre, 100 Phil 42. "Under modern laws, it is clear that many exceptions
221 (1956). to the rule that the domicile of the wife is determined by
that of her husband must obtain. Accordingly, the wife
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com may acquire another and separate domicile from that of
her husband where the theoretical unity of the husband
21. Id., at 969.22. Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890 and wife is dissolved, as it is by the institution of divorce
(1954).23. Id.24. 52 Phil. 645 (1928).25. Citing People v. proceedings; or where the husband has given cause for
Bender, 144 N.Y.S., 145.26. 61 Phil. 36 (1934).27. 96 divorce; or where there is a separation of the parties by
Phil. 294 (1954).28. Id., see also Ujano v. Republic, 17 agreement, or a permanent separation due to desertion
SCRA 147 (1966); Nuval v. Guray, supra note 22. 29. II of the wife by the husband or attributable to cruel
RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL treatment on the part of the husband; or where there has
CONVENTION, 110 (July 22, 1986). 30. Id.31. 199 been a forfeiture by the wife of the bene􏰂t of the
SCRA 692 (1991).32. Id., at 714.33. 61 Phil. 36 (1934). husband's domicile." 9 R.C.L., 545, cited in De la Viña,
34. 96 Phil. 294, 299-300 (1954).35. B.P. 881, Sec. 117 supra. If the law allows the wife to automatically revert to
states: her original domicile or acquire a new domicile under
these situations, all the more should it sanction a
xxx xxx xxx reversion — or the acquisition of a new domicile by the
wife — upon the death of her
"Any person who transfers residence to another city,
municipality or country solely by reason of his CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
occupation; profession; employment in private or public
service; educational activities; work in military or naval husband.43. 41 Phil. 13 (1920).
reservations; service in the army, navy or air force; the
constabulary or national police force; or con􏰂nement or 44. The rule that the wife automatically acquires or
detention in government institutions in accordance with follows her husband's domicile is not an absolute one. A
law shall not be deemed to have lost his original speci􏰂c situation recognized in Spanish jurisprudence
involves the one in which husband acquiesces (1 50. American Tupe Founders Co. v. Justice's Court, 133
Manresa 223) or gives his tacit consent (Scaevola, Civil Cal. 819, 65 Pac. 742;Heillen v. Phillipps, 88 Cal. 557, 26
Code, 354). Pac. 366; Drake v. Bagley, 69 Mo. App. 39; State v.
Davis, 194 Mo. 585.
45. 42 Phil. 54 (1921).46. Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy
recognizes the same Civil Code distinction. However, 51. Supra, note 39, citing Huffines v. Gold, 154 Tenn.
taking 583; 588; 288 S.W. 353, 354.

another approach, she writes: 52. SEC. 6. Effect of Disquali􏰂cation Case. — Any
candidate who has been declared by 􏰂nal judgment to
(6) The above Article (Article 69, FC) uses the term be disquali􏰂ed shall not be voted for, and the votes cast
"family domicile" instead of family residence because the for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife may candidate is not declared by 􏰂nal judgment before an
elect to remain in one of such residences, which may election to be disquali􏰂ed and he is voted for and
destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its receives the winning number of votes in such election,
corresponding bene􏰂ts. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK ON the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 102 (1988). hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion
of the complainant or any intervenor, may during thereof
47. Rollo, pp. 132-133. order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
48. The provision reads: Section 78. Petition to deny due
course or to cancel a certi􏰂cate of candidacy. — A SEC. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a
veri􏰂ed petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel Certi􏰂cate of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove
a certi􏰂cate of candidacy may be 􏰂led by any person provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or
exclusively on the ground that any material cancel a certi􏰂cate of candidacy as provided in Section
representation contained therein as required under 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be 􏰂led at
any time not later than twenty-􏰂ve days from the time 53. CONST., Art. VI, Sec. 11 states:
of 􏰂ling of the certi􏰂cate of candidacy and shall be
decided after due notice and hearing, not later than The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have
fifteen days before the election. an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
questions relating to the election, returns, and
49. Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51 (1983). quali􏰂cations of their respective Members. . . .
PUNO, J., concurring: 9. 28 CJS, S. 12, p. 24.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com 10. Restatement of the Law, 2d, Conflict of Laws 2d., S.
21, p. 84.
1. Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, bk., v. 3, 1131(a) (W.
Ross translation, 1925 ed). 11. Ibid.

2. It provides: "No person shall be a member of the 12. 83 U.S. 442; 21 Law Ed. 442; S.C. 16 Wall 130.
House of Representatives unless he is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines and on the day of the election, is 13. Supra.
at least twenty- 􏰂ve years of age, able to read and write,
and except the party list representatives, a registered 14. Supra.
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year 15. In re Green's Estate, 191 N.Y.S. 757, 117 Misc. 800,
immediately preceding the day of the election." 165 N.Y.S. 1063, 99 Misc. 582.
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Clark, et al. v. Baker, et al., 196 SE 750, 186 Ga 65.
3. There are two (2) other instances when a married
17. Lefcourt, Women and The Law, 1990 ed.
woman may have a domicile different from the husband:
(1) if they are legally separated pursuant to par. 1, Art. 18. 404 US 71.
106 of the Civil Code, and (2) if the husband forcibly
ejects the wife from the conjugal home to have illicit 19. 28 CJS S. 12, p. 25 citing Shute v. Sargent, 36 A
relations with another. (De la Viña v. Villareal and 282, 67 N.H. 305.
Geopano, 41 Phil. 13 [1920]).
20. Op cit., p. 84.
4. Op cit.
21. Women's Status in Philippine Society, UP Law
5. Id., at pp. 16-17. Center, 1979, pp. 4-6.
6. Id., at p. 20, citing 1 Manresa 223. 22. In submitting the draft of the Family Code to
President Corazon Aquino, the Civil Code Revision
7. 25 AM JUR 2nd S. 48, p. 37. Committee stated:
8. 28 CJS on Domicile, S. 12, 27; 25 AM JUR 2nd on "Close to forty years of experience under the Civil Code
Domicile S. 62, 46.
adopted in 1949 and changes and developments in all our children in the matter of adoption by foreigners; and
aspects of Filipino life since then have revealed the (7) to bring our law on paternity and 􏰂liation in step with
unsuitability of certain provisions of that Code, implanted or abreast of the latest scientific discoveries." (Emphasis
from foreign sources, to Philippine culture; the supplied)
unfairness, unjustness, and gaps or inadequacies of
others; and the need to attune them to contemporary 23. Article 96, Family Code.24. Article 225, Family Code.
developments and trends: 25. Article 70, Family Code.26. Article 71, Family Code.
27. Article 73, Family Code.28. Op cit., Handbook on the
In particular — to cite only a few instances — (1) the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 98-99.29. As cited in
property regime of conjugal partnership of gains is not in Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of Philippines, pp.
accord with Filipino custom, especially in the rural areas, 184-185.
which is
30. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides: "No
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be
more congenial to absolute community of property; (2) denied the equal protection of the laws."
there have considerably been more grounds for
annulment of marriage by the Church than those 31. Exhibit "E"; see also Exhibit "B" in SPA No. 95-001.
provided by the Code, thus giving rise to the absurd
situation of several marriages already annulled under 32. Exhibit "A" in SPA No. 95-009.
Canon Law but still considered subsisting under the Civil
Law and making it necessary to make the grounds for 33. Exhibit "2" in SPA No. 95-009.
annulment under both laws to coincide; (3) unequal
treatment of husband and wife as to rights and 34. 2 SCRA 957, 960 (1961); See Canceran v.
responsibilities, which necessitates a response to the COMELEC, 107 Phil. 607 (1960); Gabaldon v.
long-standing clamor for equality between men and COMELEC, 99 Phil. 898 (1956).
women now mandated as a policy to be implemented
35. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution also provides:
under the New Constitution; (4) the inadequacy of the
"The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities
safeguards for strengthening marriage and the family as
for public service. . . ."
basic social institutions recognized as such by the New
Constitution; (5) recent developments have shown the 36. Annex "G", Petition.
absurdity of limiting the grounds for legal separation to
the antiquated two grounds provided under the Civil 37. Petition, Annex "B-1", pp. 6-7.
Code; (6) the need for additional safeguards to protect
38. 73 Phil. 453, 459 (1951). Harvey, 261 Ky. 522, 88 S.W. 2d 42, 46, 47, as cited in
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring:
4. Article 110, Civil Code.
1. See Articles 68-73 of E.O. 209, as amended,
otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines. 5. Towson vs. Towson, 126 Va. 640, 102 S.E. 48, 52;
Fisher vs. Jordan, C.C.A. Tex., 116 F. 2d. 183, 186;
2. Residence Certificate No. 15226186L, dated Nov. 5, Minick vs. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149 So. 483, 488;
1992.3. PCGG Chairman Gunigundo's letter addressed Hartzler vs. Radeka, 265 Mich. 451, 251 N.W. 554.
to Col. Kempis. PADILLA, J., dissenting:
6. Citing 18 Am. Jur. 219-220.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
7. Montejo vs. Marcos, En Banc, May 10, 1995.
1. Nuval vs. Guray, G.R. No. 30241, December 29, 1928;
Larena vs. Teves, G.R. No. 42439, December 10, 1934; 8. Citing 20 Am. Jur. 71.
Gallego vs. Verra, G.R. No. 48641, November 24, 1941;
De los Reyes vs. Solidum, G.R. No. 42798, August 31, 9. Cheely vs. Clayton, D.C., 110 U.S. 701, L. Ed. 298.
1935; but seeRomualdez vs. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,
where a sudden departure from the country was not 10. In re Gates' Estate, 191 N.Y.S. 757, 117 Misc. 800 —
deemed "voluntary" so as to constitute abandonment of In re Green's Estate, 164 N.Y.S. 1063, 99 Misc. 582,
domicile both in fact and in law. affirmed 165 N.Y.S. 1088, 179 App. Div. 890, as reported
in 28 C.J.S. 27.
2. Annex "A" Petition, pp. 2-4.
11. Clark vs. Baker, 196 S.E. 750, 186 Ga. 65, op. cit. 37.
REGALADO, J., dissenting:
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
1. Struble vs. Struble, Tex. Civ. App., 177 S.W. 2d, 279,
283. 1. Art. VI, Sec. 6, Const.: "No person shall be a Member
of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
2. This is also referred to as natural domicile or domicile born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the
by birth (Johnson vs. Twenty-One Bales, 13 Fed. Cas. election, is at least twenty-􏰂ve years of age, able to read
863). and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be
3. Story, Con􏰉ict of Laws, Sec. 46; Railroad Co. vs. elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
Kimbrough, 115 Ky. 512, 74 S.W. 229; and Johnson vs. than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election." MENDOZA, J., concurring:

2. Art. 110: "The husband shall 􏰂x the residence of the 1. Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 297 (1992) (for
family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with mayor).
the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service
of the Republic. 2. Loong v. COMELEC, 216 SCRA 760 (1992) (for
regional vice governor).
3. Art. 110, Civil Code. 4. Art. 111, Civil Code. 5. Art. 112,
Civil Code. 6. Art. 171, Civil Code. 7. Art. 172, Civil Code. 3. Abella v. Larrazabal, 180 SCRA 509 (1989); Abella v.
COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 (1991) (for provincial
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com governor).

8. Art. 320, Civil Code. 4. Co v. HRET, 199 SCRA 692 (1991) (election protest
against a Congressman).
9. Art. 114, Civil Code.
5. Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954) (quo warranto
10. Art. 117, Civil Code. against a governor); Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453 (1941)
(quo warranto against a mayor); Larena v. Teves, 61
11. Art. 84, Civil Code. Phil. 36 (1934) (quo warranto against a provincial board
member); Tanseco v. Arteche, 57 Phil. 227 (1932) (quo
12. Art. 328, Civil Code. warranto against a governor); Yra v. Abaño, 52 Phil. 380
(1928) (quo warranto against a municipal president);
13. Art. II, Sec. 2, Const.
Vivero v. Murillo, 52 Phil. 694 (1929) (quo warranto
14. Part IV, Art. 15, Paragraph 4, CEDAW. against a municipal president). Cf . Aznar v. COMELEC,
185 SCRA 703 (1990) (quo warranto, although
15. Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended prematurely filed, against a governor-elect).
by Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987, which took
effect on August 3, 1988. 6. R.A. No. 6646, § 6; Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra note
1. 7. OEC, 76.8. Lagumbay v. COMELEC, 16 SCRA 175
16. Art. II, Sec. 11, Const.17. Art. II, Sec. 14, Const.18. (1966).
Art. 69, Family Code.19. Art. 71, Family Code.20. Art. 96,
Family Code.21. Art. 225, Family Code.22. Republic Act CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2017 cdasiaonline.com
No. 7192 approved February 12, 1992. 23. Ibid., Sec. 5.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 5921. July 25, 1911.]

THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK,

plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN CODINA ARENAS AND
OTHERS, defendants; VICENTE SIXTO VILLANUEVA,
appellant.
Chicote & Miranda, for appellant.W. A. Kincaid and Thos. Francisco Lara del Pino, as principals, and Alipio Locso,
L. Hartigan, for appellee. Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as
sureties, assumed the obligation to pay, jointly and
SYLLABUS severally, to the corporation, The Standard Oil Company
of New York, the sum of P3,305.76, at three months from
1. MONOMANIA; INSANITY; SUFFICIENCY OF date, with interest at P1 per month.
PROOF. — In our present knowledge of the state of
mental alienation such certainty has not yet been On April 5, 1909, The Standard Oil Company of New
reached as to warrant the conclusion that a person York sued the said 􏰃ve debtors for payment of the
affected by a monomania of wealth, believing himself to P3,305.76, together with the interest thereon at the rate
be wealthy when in reality he is not, is really insane. of 1 per cent per month from the 15th of December,
1908, and the costs.
2. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF MENTAL CAPACITY. —
Capacity to act must be presumed to attach to every The defendants were summoned, the record showing
person who has not been previously declared to be that summons was served on Vicen2te Sixto Villanueva
incapable, and to continue until the contrary is proven, on April 17, 1909.
that is until it is shown that, at the moment of acting, the
person in question was actually incapacitated, insane or On May 12, 1909, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and Siy Ho
out of his mind. were declared to be in default and were so noti􏰃ed, the
latter on the 14th and the former on the 15th of May,
3. ID.; ID.; CONTRACTS; BONDS; CONSIDERATION.
— In general, a consideration is required to support a CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
contract, and if it is not shown it is always presumed un til
the contrary is proven. In the case of a bond, however, 1909.
while it may be given for other and more substantial
consideration, the execution of such an instrument is On August 28, 1909, the Court of First Instance of the
often supported by no other consideration than the city of Manila sentenced all the defendants to pay jointly
liberality of the person executing it. and severally to the plaintiff company the sum of
P3,305.76, together with the interest thereon at 1 per
DECISION cent per month from December 15, 1908, until complete
payment should have been made of the principal, and to
ARELLANO, C.J p: pay the costs.

On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas and While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa
Torres de Villanueva, the wife of Vicente Sixto by him and that the consent that was given by him for the
Villanueva, appeared and alleged: (1) That on July purpose was entirely voluntary and, consequently, valid
24,1909, the latter was declared to be insane by the and e􏰋cacious. As a result of such 􏰃ndings the court
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila; (2) that she ruled that the petition for an inde􏰃nite stay of execution
was appointed his guardian by the same court; (3) that, of the judgment rendered in the case be denied and that
on October 11, following, she was authorized by the the said execution be carried out.
court, as guardian, to institute the proper legal
proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by After the 􏰃ling of an exception to the above ruling, a new
her husband while in a state of insanity, among them that hearing was requested "with reference to the defendant
concerned in the present cause, issued in behalf of The Vicente S. Villanueva" and, upon its denial, a bill of
Standard Oil Company of New York; (4) that she, the exceptions was presented in support of the appeal
guardian, was not aware of the proceedings had against submitted to this court and which is based on a single
her husband and was only by chance informed thereof; assignment of error as follows:
(5) that when Vicente S. Villanueva gave the bond, the
subject of this suit, he was already permanently insane, "Because the lower court found that the monomania of
was in that state when summoned and still continued so, great wealth, suffered by the defendant Villanueva, does
for which reason he neither appeared nor defended not imply incapacity to execute a bond such as the one
himself in the said litigation; and, in conclusion, she herein concerned."
petitioned the court to relieve the said defendant
Villanueva from compliance with the aforestated Certainly the trial court founded its judgment on the basis
judgment rendered against him in the suit before of the medico-legal doctrine which supports the
mentioned, and to reopen the trial for the introduction of conclusion that such monomania of wealth does not
evidence in behalf of the said defendant with respect to necessarily imply the result that the defendant Villanueva
his incapacity at the time of the execution of the bond in was not a person capable of executing a contract of bond
question, which evidence could not be presented in due like the one here in question.
season on account of the then existing incapacity of the
This court has not found the proof of the error attributed
defendant.
to the judgment of the lower court. It would have been
The court granted the petition and the trial was reopened necessary to show that such monomania was habitual
for the introduction of evidence, after due consideration and constituted a veritable mental perturbation in the
of which, when taken, the court decided that when patient; that the bond executed by the defendant
Vicente Villanueva, on the 15th of December, 1908, Villanueva was the result of such monomania. and not
executed the bond in question, he understood perfectly the effect of any other cause, that is, that there was not,
well the nature and consequences of the act performed nor could there have been any other cause for the
contract than an ostentation of wealth and this purely an executes an onerous contract. The bond, as aforesaid,
effect of such was executed by Vicente S. Villanueva on December 15,
1908, and his incapacity, for the purpose of providing a
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com guardian for him, was not declared until July 24, 1909.

monomania of wealth; and that the monomania existed The trial court, although it conceded as a fact that the
on the date when the bond in question was executed. defendant had for several years suffered from such
monomania, decided, however, guided by the medico-
With regard to the 􏰃rst point: "All alienists and those legal doctrine above cited, that a person's believing
writers who have treated of this branch of medical himself to be what he is not or his taking a mere illusion
science distinguish numerous degrees of insanity and for a reality is not necessarily a positive proof of insanity
imbecility, some of them, as Casper, going so far into a or incapacity to bind himself in a contract. Speci􏰃cally, in
wealth of classi􏰃cation and details as to admit the reference to this case , the following facts were brought
existence of 60 to 80 distinct states, an enumeration of out in the testimony given by the physicians, Don
which is unnecessary. Hence, the confusion and the Rudesino Guervo and Don Gervasio de Ocampo,
doubt in the minds of the majority of the authors of witnesses for the defendant, the 􏰃rst of whom had visited
treatises on the subject in determining the limits of sane him some eight times during the years 1902 and 1903,
judgment and the point of beginning of this incapacity, and the latter, only once, in 1908.
there being some who consider as a su􏰋cient cause for
such incapacity, not only insanity and imbecility, but even Dr. Cuervo:
those other chronic diseases or complaints that
momentarily perturb or cloud the intelligence, as mere "Q. "A.
monomania, somnambulism, epilepsy, drunkenness,
suggestion, anger, and the divers passional states which "Q. "A.
more or less violently deprive the human will of
necessary liberty." (Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil "Q. "A.
Code, Vol. V, p. 342.) In our present knowledge of the
state of mental alienation such certainty has not yet been "Q.
reached as to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial
But if you should present to him a document which in no
decision, that he who suffers the monomania of wealth,
wise concerns his houses and if you should direct him to
believing himself to be very wealthy when he is not, is
read it, do you believe that he would understand the
really insane and it is to be presumed, in the absence of
contents of the document?
a judicial declaration, that he acts under the in􏰊uence of
a perturbed mind, or that his mind is deranged when he
As to understanding it, it is possible that he might, in this I be normal and regular and that he observed nothing to
see nothing particularly remarkable; but afterwards, to indicate the contrary; and that the defendant was quiet
decide upon the question involved, it might be that he and composed and spoke in an ordinary way without
could not do that; it depends upon what the question giving cause for any suspicion that there was anything
was." Dr. Ocampo: abnormal.

Do you say that he is intelligent with respect to things Honorable Judge Araullo testi􏰃ed as a witness for the
other than those concerning greatness? plaintiff that while trying in the Court of First Instance over
which he presided, the case concerning the estate of the
Yes, he reasons in matters which do not refer to the Chinaman Go-Cho-Co, and Mr. Villanueva having been
question of greatness and wealth. proposed as a surety therein, the witness asked him
some questions about his property, in order to ascertain
He can take a written paper and read it and understand whether he was solvent and would be adequate surety,
it, can he not? and that Villanueva testi􏰃ed the same as many others
had done, and witness did not notice any particular
Read it, yes, he can read it and understand it, it is disorder or perturbation of his mental faculties; that he
probable that he can, I have made no trial. answered the questions concerning the, property that he
held, stated its value, speci􏰃ed the place where it was
Is he not a man of considerable intelligence, only with the
situated, his answers being precisely relevant to the
exception of this monomania of greatness and wealth?
matter treated; that he therefore approved the bond; and
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com that all this took place between July and September,
1908. This witness having been asked, on cross-
"A. Of not much intelligence, an ordinary intelligence. "Q. examination, whether Mr. Villanueva, subsequent to the
He knows how to read and write, does he not?"A. Yes, date mentioned, had again been surety in any other
sir, I believe that he does." case, and whether it appeared strange to witness that Mr.
Villanueva should engage in giving bonds and whether
Mr. F. B. Ingersoll, a witness for the plaintiff, testi􏰃ed that for that reason he rejected this new bond, replied that it
as a notary he had prepared the instrument of bond and was in that same case relative to the estate of the
received the statements of the signers; that he explained Chinaman. Go-Cho-Co that he endeavored to
to Mr. Villanueva its contents and when the witness investigate, as he customarily did, with regard to whether
asked the latter whether he wished to sign it he replied Mr. Villanueva had given any other previous bond, and
that he was willing and did in fact do so; that the that he discovered that he had in fact previously given
defendant's mental condition appeared to the witness to bond in a criminal case, but that, as it had already been
cancelled, he had no objection to accepting the one
offered by Mr. Villanueva in the said Go-Cho-Co case. bene􏰃t of an assumed obligation to pay him some three
thousand pesos, with monthly interest. But he added that
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person Arenas & Co. obtained an agent to look for sureties for
who has not previously been declared incapable, and them, to whom Arenas paid a certain sum of money. The
such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the witness did not know, however, whether Arenas gave the
contrary be not proved, that is, that at the moment of his money for the signature of the bond or simply in order
acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his that the agent might 􏰃nd sureties. The fact is that the
mind: which, in the opinion of this court, has not been sureties came with the agent and signed the bond.
proved in this case.
The appellant presented, as proof that Villanueva
With regard to the second point, it is very obvious that in concealed from his family his dealings with Arenas, a
every contract there must be a consideration to note by the latter addressed to his friend, Mr. Villanueva,
substantiate the obligation, so much so that, even though on the 13th of May, 1909, that is, two days before
it should not be expressed in the contract, it is presumed Villanueva was declared to be in default, inviting him to a
that it exists and that it is lawful, unless the debtor proves conference "for the purpose of treating of a matter of
the contrary. (Civil Code, art. 1277.) In the contract of great importance of much interest to Villanueva, between
bond the consideration, generally, is no other, as in all 5 and 6 of that same day, in the garden and on the
contracts of pure bene􏰃cence, than the liberality of the benches which are in front of the Delmonico Hotel, on
benefactor. (Id, 1274.) Out of the ordinary, a bond may Calle Palacio, corner of Calle Victoria, and, if it rained, in
be given for some other consideration, according to the the bar on the corner." It can not be a􏰋rmed with
agreement and the free stipulation of the parties and may certainty (the trial court considers it probable) that
be, as in onerous and remuneratory contracts, something Villanueva engaged in the business of giving bonds for a
remunerative stipulated as an equivalent, on the part of certain consideration or remuneration; but neither can it
the beneficiary of the bond. be sustained that there was no other cause for the giving
of the bond in question than the mental disorder that
It is not clear as to the reason why Villanueva gave the dominated the intellect of the person obligated to the
bond in favor of the two members of the 􏰃rm of Arenas & extent of his believing himself so oversupplied with
Co., Francisco Lara, and Juan Arenas. Lara testi􏰃ed that money as to be able to risk it in behalf of any person
he had never had dealings with Villanueva; from which it whatever. There is no proof that the said bond was
is inferred that the latter merely the product of an insensate ostentation of wealth,
nor that, if Villanueva boasted of wealth in giving several
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com bonds, among them that herein concerned, he was
in􏰊uenced only by the monomania of boasting of being
could hardly have been moved to favor the former by the
wealthy, when he was not.
Neither is there any proof whatever with respect to the and was not deprived of its management; that he went
third point, that is, that, granting that he was a out every morning without her knowing where he went;
monomaniac, he was dominated by that malady when he that she did not know whether he had engaged in the
executed the bond now under discussion. In the business of signing bonds, and that, with reference to the
interpretative jurisprudence on this kind of incapacity, to one now concerned, she had learned of it only by 􏰃nding
wit, lunacy or insanity, it is a rule of constant application the note, before mentioned, wherein Arenas invited him
that it is not enough that there be more or less probability to a rendez-vous on the benches in front of the
that a person was in a state of dementia at a given time, Delmonico Hotel; that she had not endeavored legally to
if there is not direct proof that, at the date of the deprive him of the management of his own real estate
performance of the act which it is endeavored to which had been inherited by him, although he did not
invalidate for want of capacity on the part of the executor, attend to the collection of the rents and the
the latter was insane or demented, in other words, that
he could not, in the performance of that act, give his CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
conscious, free, voluntary, deliberate and intentional
consent. The witnesses who as physicians testi􏰃ed as to payment of the land tax, all this being done by her, and
extravagancies observed in Villanueva's conduct; she also it was who attended to the subsistence of the
referred, two of them, to a time prior to 1903, and another family and to all their needs. Finally, and with direct
of them to the year 1908, but none to December 15, reference to the point under discussion, she was asked:
1908, the date of the execution of the bond sought to be
invalidated. The testimony of one of these witnesses "Q. "A.
shows that when Villanueva's wife endeavored, in 1908,
"Q. "A.
to have her husband con􏰃ned in the Hospicio de San
Jose and cared for therein, objection was made by the Is it not true that, up to the date of his signing this bond,
director of the institution who advised her that if he he used to go out of the house and was on the streets
entered in that way and lodged in the ward for old men, nearly every day? to which she replied:
as soon as he shouted and disturbed them in their sleep
he would have to be locked up in the insane ward; to He went where he pleased, he does this even now. He
which Villanueva's wife replied "that her husband was not goes to the markets, and buys provisions and other
exactly insane enough to be placed among the insane." things. In fact I don't know where he does go.
This same lady, testifying as a witness in this case,
stated: that no restrictions had ever been placed upon From his actions toward others, did he show any
her husband's liberty to go wherever he wished and do indication of not being sane when he was on the street,
what he liked; that her husband had property of his own according to your opinion?
Half of Manila knows him and are informed of this fact
and it is very strange that this should have occurred. If
you need witnesses to prove it, there are many people
who can testify in regard to this particular."

The only incorrectness mentioned by this lady is that her

husband, when he went to the market, would return to
the house with his pockets full of tomatoes and onions,
and when she was asked by the judge whether he was a
man of frugal habits, she replied that, as far as she knew,
he had never squandered any large sum of money; that
he had never been engaged in business; that he
supported himself on what she gave him; and that if he
had something to count on for his living, it was the
product of his lands.

Such is a summary of the facts relating to the debated

incapacity of the appellant, and it is very evident that it
can not be concluded therefrom that, on December 16,
1908, when Villanueva subscribed the obligation now
contested, he did not possess the necessary capacity to
give e􏰋cient consent with respect to the bond which he
freely executed.

Therefore, the judgment appealed from is a􏰋rmed, with

the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
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[G.R. No. L-46061. November 14, 1984.]

ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL,
respondents. from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him.
Either way, his private life was mistakenly and
Romeo Z. Comia for petitioner.Roman R. Bersamin for unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income
private respondent. and mental anguish.

SYLLABUS DECISION

CIVIL LAW; CIVIL CODE; DAMAGES; ACTS AND AQUINO, J p:

OMISSIONS FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 26;
WRONGFUL ADVERTISEMENT AND FAILURE TO This case is about the recovery of damages for a
MAKE IMMEDIATE RECTIFICATION; CASE AT BAR. — wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where Saint
Judge Jose M. Leuterio found that as a result of St. Louis Louis Realty Corporation misrepresented that the house
Realty's mistake in misrepresenting the house of Doctor of Doctor Conrado J. Aramil belonged to Arcadio S.
J. Aramil as belonging to Arcadio S. Arcadio, magnified Arcadio.
by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered
mental anguish and his income was reduced by about St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the
P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover there was a permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without permission
violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code). of Doctor Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday Times of
The Appellate Court adopted the facts found by the trial December 15, 1968 an advertisement with the heading
court. Those factual findings are binding on the Supreme "WHERE THE HEART IS". Below that heading was the
Court. The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual photograph of the residence of Doctor Aramil and the
damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000) as Arcadio family and then below the photograph was the
attorney's fees. They are sanctioned by Articles 2200, following write-up:
2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows
moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article "Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR. AND
26. The acts and omissions of the firm fall under Article MRS. ARCADIO S.
26. St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in
mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its
ARCADIO and their family have been captured by
purpose, it never made any written apology and
BROOKSIDE HILLS. They used to rent a small 2-
explanation of the mixup. It just contented itself with a
bedroom house in a cramped neighborhood, sadly
cavalier "rectification". Persons who know the residence
inadequate and unwholesome for the needs of a large
of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted,
family. They dream(ed) of a more pleasant place free
lingering impression that he was renting his residence
from the din and dust of city life yet near all facilities. sly remarks although in light vein as `it looks like your
Plans took shape when they heard of BROOKSIDE house,' `how much are you renting from the Arcadios?',
HILLS. With thrift and determination, they bought a lot `like your wife portrayed in the papers as belonging to
and built their dream house . . . for P31,000. The another husband', etc., have resulted in no little mental
Arcadios are now part of the friendly, thriving community anguish on my part.
of BROOKSIDE HILLS . . . a beautiful first-class
subdivision planned for wholesome family living." "I have referred this matter to the Legal Panel of the
Philippine Medical Association and their final advice is
The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times pending upon my submission of supporting ownership
dated January 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil, a papers.
neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of the U.
E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, noticed the "I will therefore be constrained to pursue court action
mistake. On that same date, he wrote St. Louis Realty against your corporation unless you could satisfactorily
the following letter of protest:LLjur explain this matter within a week upon receipt of this
letter."
"Dear Sirs:
The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of
This is anent to your advertisements appearing in the St. Louis Realty in charge of advertising. He stopped
December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 issues of the publication of the advertisement. He contacted Doctor
Sunday Times which boldly depicted my house at the Aramil and offered his apologies. However, no
above-mentioned address and implying that it belonged rectification or apology was published.
to another person. I am not aware of any permission or
authority on my part for the use of my house for such On February 20, 1969, Aramil's counsel demanded from
publicity. St. Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages of
P110,000 (Exh. D). In its answer dated March 10, St.
"This unauthorized use of my house for your promotional Louis Realty claimed that there was an honest mistake
gain and much more the apparent distortions therein are I and that if Aramil so desired, rectification would be
believe not only transgression to my private property but published in the Manila Times (Exh. 3).LexLib
also damaging to my prestige in the medical profession. I
have had invited in several occasions numerous medical It published in the issue of the Manila Times of March 18,
colleagues, medical students and friends to my house 1969 a new advertisement with the Arcadio family and
and after reading your December 15 advertisement, their real house. But it did not publish any apology to
some of them have uttered some remarks purporting Doctor Aramil and an explanation of the error.
doubts as to my professional and personal integrity. Such
On March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages. St. Appeals.
Louis Realty published in the issue of the Manila Times
of April 15, 1969 the following "NOTICE OF The Appellate Court affirmed that judgment, with Acting
RECTIFICATION" in a Presiding Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan asponente, and
Justices Sixto A. Domondon and Samuel F. Reyes
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com concurring.cdrep

space 4 by 3 inches: The Appellate Court reasoned out that St. Louis Realty
committed an actionable quasi- delict under articles 21
"This will serve as a notice that our print ad `Where the and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned
Heart is' which appeared in the Manila Times issue of advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not
March 18, 1969 is a rectification of the same ad that belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally,
appeared in the Manila Times issues of December 15, was annoyed by that contretemps.
1968 and January 5, 1969 wherein a photo of the house
of another Brookside Homeowner (Dr. Aramil-private In this appeal, St. Louis Realty contends that the
respondent) was mistakenly used as a background for Appellate Court ignored certain facts and resorted to
the featured homeowner's the Arcadio family. surmises and conjectures. This contention is
unwarranted. The Appellate Court adopted the facts
"The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the Arcadio family with found by the trial court. Those factual findings are binding
their real house in the background, as was intended all on this Court.
along."
St. Louis Realty also contends that the decision is
Judge Jose M. Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty contrary to law and that the case was decided in a way
should have immediately published a rectification and not in conformity with the rulings of this Court. It argues
apology. He found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's that the case is not covered by article 26 which provides
mistake, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover, persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence"
there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26, and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
Civil Code). relations of another" and "similar acts", "though they may
not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of
The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual action for damages, prevention and other relief".
damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as
attorney's fees. St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by
articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article
2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions
mentioned in article 26. As lengthily explained by Justice
Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the firm fall under
article 26.

St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in

mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely
circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its
purpose, it never made any written apology and
explanation of the mixup. It just contented itself with a
cavalier "rectification".

Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were

confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he
was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio
had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was
mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered
diminution of income and mental anguish.LexLib

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WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is

affirmed. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and
Cuevas, JJ ., concur.

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 445 . March 31, 1902.]

PEDRO MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRANCISCO

MARTINEZ, defendant-appellee.
Carlos Ledesma, for appellant. Felipe Calderon, for the property held in common with the plaintiff to give it to
appellee. his wife and her relatives.

SYLLABUS In a supplementary prayer plaintiff asked the court to

direct that the complaint be entered in the property
1.GUARDIANSHIP; PRODIGALITY. — In order to render register of the province, which was done by order of the
a person legally unfit to administer his own affairs his court.
acts of prodigality must show a morbid mind and a
disposition to spend or waste the estate so as to expose The defendant in his answer denies the allegations in the
his family to want or to deprive his forced heirs of their complaint and sets forth a state of facts quite inconsistent
inheritances. with those alleged in the complaint.

2.ID.; ID. — Courts will not go further to restrain Among other things, it is stated that he has executed in
donations than to enforce the express limitations favor of the plaintiff a general power of attorney under
imposed by law as required by public policy. which the plaintiff has administered the community estate
for several years; that the plaintiff has caused the ships
DECISION Germana, Don Francisco,

COOPER, J p: CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

This is an action brought by Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the and Balayan, belonging to the estate, to be registered in
son and the compulsory legal heir, against Francisco his own name without the consent of the father and is
Martinez Garcia for a declaration of prodigality against otherwise mismanaging and misappropriating the
the father. property of the estate, which caused the defendant to
revoke the power of attorney given to plaintiff, and that
The allegations in the complaint are substantially: That the suit brought by the defendant against the plaintiff was
Don Francisco Martinez, owing to his advanced age, is due to the attitude of the son, who, notwithstanding the
dissipating and squandering his estate by making fact that the power of attorney had been revoked, refused
donations to his second wife, Doña Anastacia Ilustre, and to render an account of his administration.
to her parents of properties amounting to over $200,000;
that he has given over the administration of this estate to The Court of First Instance rendered judgment against
the management of his wife; that the defendant has a the plaintiff and adjudged the costs against him. The
propensity for litigation and has instituted groundless plaintiff has appealed to this court.
actions against the plaintiff in order to take possession of
The acts which constitute prodigality are not de􏰌ned in Public policy requires that limitations of the character
the Civil Code owing to the dif􏰌culty of applying general mentioned should be imposed upon the owner, but a law
rules to the varying circumstances of the case and the which would impose restrictions further than such as are
different situations of persons. required by public policy may well be regarded unjust and
tending in a contrary direction, as destroying the
The declaration of prodigality must be made in an incentive to acquire property, and as subduing the
ordinary action (en juicio contradictorio). (Art. 221 of the generous impulse of the heart.
Civil Code.)
Beyond these limitations the law does not attempt to
The proceedings must be instituted by the consort or the adjust claims to generosity.
forced heirs. (Art. 222 of the Civil Code.)
There were a number of witnesses introduced both by
Under our law it may be inferred that the acts of the plaintiff and by the defendant whose testimony it is
prodigality must show a morbid state of mind and a unnecessary to recount.
disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to
such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want of The testimony on the part of the plaintiff was wholly
support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their insuf􏰌cient to support the allegations of his complaint. It
undisposable part of the estate. was vague, indefinite, and of an inconclusive nature.

Donations are considered as acts of liberality dictated by The father's estate consisted of city property in Manila; of
generosity and affection. All persons who can contract farms and of certain vessels, two of which are
and dispose of property may make donations. (Art. 624 of steamships. There is no evidence offered to show any
the Civil Code.) transfers by sale or mortgage of these properties. This
could have been easily done if such existed. Donations of
Donations may comprise all the actual property of the real property must be made in a public deed (Art. 633 of
donor, except such as is required for the support of the the Civil Code), and the acquisition of vessels must also
donor in a condition corresponding to his circumstances. be included in a written instrument, and produces no
(Art. 634 of the Civil Code.) effect with regard to third persons if not recorded in the
Commercial
And with further limitation that no person can give by a
donation more than what he can give by testament. CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
A donation is considered inof􏰌cious in all that exceeds Registry. (Art. 573 of the Code of Commerce.)
such limits. (Art. 636 of the Civil Code.)
There is no proof that there was any money belonging to Arellano, C .J ., Torres, Willard, Mapa and Ladd, JJ .,
the estate, or other personal property, the transfer of concur.
which could not be easily traced.
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The son has been in possession of a greater part of the
estate since November, 1897, collecting the revenue
from the ships and rents from the city property.

The farms have been nonproductive on account of the

disturbed conditions of the country, and the revenue from
even these has been in part collected by the son.

While some of the witnesses state that the possessions

of the wife have greatly increased since her marriage,
there is no evidence whatever to show that there has
been any perceptible diminution of the defendant's
property. This can be accounted for only on the grounds
that the father, so far from being a prodigal, is still in the
full exercise of his faculties and still possesses the
industry, thrift, and ability that resulted in the
accumulation of a splendid estate after the date of his
marriage with the mother of the plaintiff, to one-half of
which estate the plaintiff has succeeded as heir of the
mother.

A careful consideration of the evidence is suf􏰌cient to

induce the belief that the plaintiff himself possesses that
propensity for instituting lawsuits which he unjustly
attributes to his father. EN BANC
The judgment of the Court of First Instance is af􏰌rmed [G.R. No. L-18630. December 17, 1966.]
and costs of suits in both courts is adjudged against the
plaintiff. APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.
P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner. First Instance in dismissing the complaint. Of course, the
Antonio V. Bonoan for respondent. dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to
whatever actions may correspond to the child of the
SYLLABUS plaintiff against defendant- appellant, if any.

1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; REQUISITES FOR DECISION

RECOVERY OF MORAL DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE
21, CIVIL CODE. — The essential feature under Article REYES, J.B.L., J p:
21 of the Civil Code is seduction, that in law is more than
mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of promise of Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its
marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the Court of
enticement, superior power or abuse of con􏰄dence on First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797)
the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded dismissing appellant's action for support and damages.
(U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9
Phil. 595). The essential allegations of the complaint are to the
effect that, from December, 1957, the defendant
2. ID.; ID.; NO RECOVERY OF MORAL DAMAGES (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the
UNDER ARTICLE 21, IF SEDUCTION IS ABSENT; plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that
CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar the facts show that "defendant expressed and professed his undying love
for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, plaintiff-appellee, and affection for plaintiff who also in due time,
a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of
relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. defendant's promises of marriage plaintiff consented and
Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly, there is here voluntariness and mutual passion, CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not regularly until December 1959, through his protestations
have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one of love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded
year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which
promises of marriage, and would have cut short all the latter conceived a child; that due to her pregnant
sexual relation upon 􏰄nding that defendant did not intend condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation,
to ful􏰄ll his promises. Hence, no case is made under plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM
Article 21 of the Civil Code and, no other cause of action Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a
being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to support
herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, 109 Phil. 640;
marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29,
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a
decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn We find this appeal meritorious.
child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than
P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for
plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus damages, under Article 21 above mentioned, the Court of
P10,000.00 attorney's fees. Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum
submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the Court of First 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code.
Instance dismissed the complaint for failure to state a Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the
cause of action. Code), the Commission stated:

Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, "But the Code Commission has gone farther than the
and the latter ultimately decided the case, holding with sphere of wrongs de􏰄ned or determined by positive law.
the lower court that no cause of action was shown to Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
support, but decreed that the complaint did state a cause helpless, even though they have actually suffered
of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows: necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule:
"ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good 'ART. 23. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
the damage." customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damage.'
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment
setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of "An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing
origin to proceed with the case. norm: 'A' seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of 'X'. A
promise of marriage either has not been made, or can
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the
actions for breach of a promise to marry are not present laws,
permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her
seducer" (27 Phil. 123).
there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of
age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of And in American Jurisprudence we find:
marriage be 􏰄led. Therefore, though the grievous moral
wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her "On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the
family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of
her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient
under the proposed article, she and her parents would to warrant a recovery.
have such a right of action."
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and
example set forth in the Code Commission's the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized
seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to
more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a
promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses
deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of would be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
con􏰄dence on the part or the seducer to which the
woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the
U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595). complaint. The material allegations there are as follows:

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that "I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at
— 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon City, while defendant is
also of legal age, single, and residing at 525 Padre
"To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some Faura, Manila, where he may be served with summons;
su􏰉cient promise or inducement and the woman must
yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became
consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is acquainted with each other sometime in December, 1957
from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent Dig. and soon thereafter, the defendant started visiting and
tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart courting the plaintiff;
from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent
do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately and in due time the defendant expressed and professed
his undying love and affection for the plaintiff who also in Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand
due time reciprocated the tender feelings; out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the
plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated
and the defendant as are wont of young people in love acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the
had frequent outings and dates, idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and
mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not
became very close and intimate to each other and have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one
sometime in July, 1958, in consideration of the year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
defendant's promises of marriage, the plaintiff consented promises of marriage, and would have cut short all
and acceded to the former's earnest and repeated pleas sexual relations upon 􏰄nding that defendant did not
to have carnal knowledge with him; intend to ful􏰄ll his promises. Hence, we conclude that no
case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July,
other cause of action being alleged, no error was
1959 except for a short period in December, 1958 when
committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the
the defendant was out of the country, the defendant
complaint.
though his protestations, of love and promises of
marriage succeeded in having carnal knowledge with Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without
plaintiff; prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the
child of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the
any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement,
plaintiff started conceiving which was confirmed by a
since the child's own rights are not here involved.
doctor sometime in July, 1959;
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition,
Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of
the plaintiff informed the defendant and pleaded with him
First Instance is affirmed. No costs.
to make good his promises of marriage, but instead of
honoring his promises and righting his wrong, the Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
defendant stopped and refrained from seeing the plaintiff, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
since about July, 1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to concur.
all intents and purposes has broken their engagement
and his promises." CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-20089. December 26, 1964.]

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant. Samson S.

Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee. MAY BE VALIDLY DESIGNATED. — The procedure of
designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive
SYLLABUS evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the
Rules of Court.
1. DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY;
WHEN ACTIONABLE WRONG. — Ordinarily, a mere 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. DESIGNATION OF COMMISSIONER NOT
But to formally set a wedding and go through all the NECESSARY WHERE HE IS IN DEFAULT. — The
necessary preparations and publicity, only to walk out of defendant's consent to the designation of the clerk of
it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite court as commissioner to receive evidence is not
different. This is palpably and unjusti􏰅ably contrary to necessary where he was declared in default and thus
good customs, for which the erring promisor must be held had no standing in court.
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of
the New Civil Code. 6. AFFIDAVITS OF MERIT; MUST CONTAIN FACTS
AND NOT CONCLUSIONS OF FACT. — A􏰆davits of
2. ID.; ID.; MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES MAY merit to be valid must contain facts and not mere
BE AWARDED IN AN ACTIONABLE BREACH OF conclusions of facts.
PROMISE SUIT. — When a breach of promise to marry
is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral 7. ID.; ID.; WHEN CONCLUSION OF FACT, NOT A
damages may be awarded under Article 2219 (10) of the FACT, DEEMED CONTAINED IN AFFIDAVIT. — An
said Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded a􏰆davit of merit stating no facts, but merely an inference
under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that that defendant's failure was due to fortuitous events
the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and and/or circumstances beyond his control, is held to
oppressive manner. contain a conclusion of fact, not a fact.

3. PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE; AFFIDAVIT OF DECISION

MERITS IN PETITION FOR BELIEF MUST STATE
FACTS CONSTITUTING DEFENSE. — An a􏰆davit of CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
merits supporting a petition for relief from judgment must
state facts constituting a valid defense. Where such an BENGZON, J.P., J p:
affidavit merely states conclusions or opinions, it is not
valid. The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams
and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious
4. ID.; TRIAL BY COMMISSIONER; CLERK OF COURT endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is
worse, complete public humiliation. from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for
new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following out. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties
their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23,
set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the
1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be: possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added
that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for
Dear Bet — relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed
submitted for resolution."
"Will have to postpone wedding. My mother oppose it.
Am leaving on the Convair today. On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before
the court. Instead, on the following day his counsel 􏰅led
"Please do not ask too many people about the reason a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on
why — That would only create a scandal. defendant's petition for relief. The counsel stated that he
would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City —
Paquing"But the next day, September 3, he sent her the
the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable
following telegram:
settlement. The court granted two weeks counted from
"NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING August 25, 1955.
VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks
PAKING" given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955 but
that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from
again. Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the
court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez 􏰅led no answer and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time,
was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence however, defendant's counsel informed the court that
before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to
pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.09 On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying
as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as defendant's aforesaid
attorney's fees; and the costs.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
On June 21, 1955 defendant 􏰅led a "petition for relief
petition. Defendant has appealed to this Court. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October
30, 1959).
In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo
defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set In support of his "motion for new trial and
aside the judgment by default. Speci􏰅cally, it was stated reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is
that defendant 􏰅led no answer in the belief that an contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no
amicable settlement was being negotiated. provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for
breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly 1960) as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept.
supported by an a􏰆davit of merit stating facts constituting 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is
a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress
Defendant's a􏰆davit of merits attached to his petition of deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil
June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid Code the provisions that would have it so.
defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to
marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to
fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
control". An a􏰆davit of merits like this, stating mere impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code
conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. provides that "Any person who wilfully causes loss or
(Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L- 15800, December 29, 1960.) good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage."
Defendant, however, would contend that the a􏰆davit of
merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and
because the judgment sought to be set aside was null defendant applied for a license to contract marriage,
and void, it having been based on evidence adduced which was subsequently issued. (Exhs. A, A-1). Their
before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were
Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to- be's
commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the
34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses
defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not for the maid of honor and the 􏰍ower girl were prepared.
have to be obtained for he was declared in default and A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal
thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil., showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E).
And then, with but two days before the wedding, be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of
defendant, who was then 28 years old, simply left a note the new Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
mother opposes it . . ." He enplaned to his home city in oppressive, or malevolent manner". The argument is
Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, devoid of merit as under the above-narrated
he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a
returning soon". But he never returned and was never "wanton . . . reckless [and] oppressive manner." This
heard from again. Court's opinion, however, is that considering the
particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a
marry. As stated, mere reasonable award.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated
modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. affirmed, with costs.
But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ.,
quite different. This is palpably and unjusti􏰅ably contrary concur.
to good customs, for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
aforesaid.

Defendant urges in his aforestated petition that the

damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised
as to the award of actual damages. What defendant
would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral
and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00,
should be totally eliminated. EN BANC

Per express provision of Article 2219(10) of the new Civil [G.R. No. L-16439. July 20, 1961.]
Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary
APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
damages, defendant contends that the same could not
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner. A. P. Salvador for 2230, New Civil Code).
respondents.
DECISION
SYLLABUS
REYES, J.B.L., J p:
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ABORTION; CONSENT OF WOMAN
OR HUSBAND DOES NOT EXCUSE CRIMINAL ACT. — This petition for certiorari brings up for review the
Abortion, without medical necessity to warrant it, is a question whether the husband of a woman, who
criminal act, and neither the consent of the woman nor voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages
that of the husband would excuse it. from the physician who caused the same.

2. DAMAGES; UNBORN FOETUS: WITHOUT The litigation was commenced in the Court of First
PERSONALITY; AWARD FOR DEATH OF A PERSON Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the
DOES NOT COVER UNBORN FOETUS. — The husband of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio
minimum award for the death of a person does not cover Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the
the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court
personality and incapable of having rights and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Lazo and against
obligations. defendant Geluz ordering the latter to pay P3,000 as
damages, P700 as attorney's fees and the costs of the
3. ID.; ID.; PARENTS OF UNBORN FOETUS CANNOT suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a special
SUE FOR DAMAGES ON ITS BEHALF. — Since an division of 􏰇ve, sustained the award by a majority vote of
action for pecuniary damages on account of personal three justices as against two, who rendered a
injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such
right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
heirs of an unborn child.
separate dissenting opinion.The facts are set forth in the
4. ID.; ID.; NATURE OF DAMAGES RECOVERABLE BY majority opinion as follows:
PARENTS OF UNBORN CHILD. — The damages which
the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to "Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio
the moral damages for the illegal arrest of normal Geluz) for the 􏰇rst time in 1948 — through her aunt
development of the foetus, i.e., on account of distress Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her
and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment present husband before they were legally married.
of their parental expectations, as well as to exemplary Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and
damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted
by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of
again became pregnant. As she was then employed in personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one
the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such
to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child
defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, on account of the injuries it received, no such right of
she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In
accompanied by her sister Puri􏰇cacion and the latter's fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the
daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal
clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where death, since no transmission to anyone can take place
the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again from one that lacked juridical personality (or juridical
aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no
the sum of 􏰇fty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff answer to invoke the provisional personality of a
was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under
for his election to the provincial board; he did not know Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article
of, nor gave his consent to, the abortion." expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing
the condition that the child should be subsequently born
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiffs alive: "provided it be born later with the conditions
basis in 􏰇ling this action and award of damages. Upon speci􏰇ed in the following article". In the present case,
application of the defendant Geluz, we granted certiorari. there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the
award of damages in the sum of P3,000.00 upon the The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same
provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the effect; and is generally held that recovery can not be had
Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway
for the said article, in 􏰇xing a minimum award of P3,000 Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northhampton,
for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the
unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. editorial note, 10 ALR (2d) 639).
Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva
no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to
consecuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" collect any damages at all. But such damages must be
(Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado" Vol. those in􏰉icted directly upon them, as distinguished from
1, p. 49). being incapable of having rights and the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his
obligations. right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents
can not expect either help, support or services from an
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com "It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband
who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his
unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician
damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development would be high-minded rather than mercenary; and that
of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e. on account of his primary concern would be to see to it that the medical
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the profession was purged of an unworthy member rather
disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code, than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal pro􏰇t, and
Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or
circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the criminal cases he had 􏰇led, or both, instead of
the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of
Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral which not only he, but also his wife, would be the
damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference beneficiaries."
to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the
appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity
and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible
majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the
it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; consent of the woman or that of her husband does not
and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does
the 􏰇rst. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the not justify an award of damages that, under the
event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the
punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after The decision appealed from is reversed, and the
learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal
cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Department
have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners for their
money payment, since he sued for P50,000 damages information and such investigation and action against the
and P3,000 attorneys fees, an "indemnity" claim that, appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.
under the circumstances of record, was clearly
exaggerated. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have
aptly remarked that: Concepcion, J., took no part. De Leon, J., did not take
part.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. L-5426-28. May 29, 1953.]RAMON JOAQUIN,

petitioner, vs. ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.

Agrava, Peralta & Agrava for petitioner. Leonardo Abola

for respondent.
SYLLABUS old; JN, Jr. about 30; P was two or three years older than
her brother; while the other sisters C and N were
1. SURVIVORSHIP; EVIDENCE; WHERE FACTS ARE between 23 and 25. With this, three proceedings were
CLEAR PRESUMPTIONS CANNOT LIE. — On February instituted, which were jointly heard, for the summary
6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was settlement of the estates of the deceased, by the
raging, the spouses of JN, Sr. and AJ, together with their petitioner, an acknowledged natural child of AJ and
three daughters, P, C, and N, and their son JN, Jr. and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and by the
the latter's wife, AC, sought refuge in the ground 􏰁oor of respondent son of JN, Sr. by 􏰅rst marriage. The
the building known as the German Club, at the corner of controversy relative to succession is focused on the
San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City. During question whether the mother, AJ, died before her son JN,
their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells Jr. or vice versa. The trial court found the mother to have
were exploding around, and the Club was set on 􏰅re. survived her son but the appellate court found otherwise.
Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the Held: The facts are quite adequate to solve the problem
people inside the building, especially those who were of survivorship between AJ and JN, Jr., and keep the
trying to escape. The three daughters were hit and fell on statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that
the ground near the entrance; and JN. Sr. and his son in the light of the conditions painted by FL, a fair and
decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer haven. reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that JN,
They could not convince AJ, who refused to join them Jr., died before his mother. The presumption that AJ died
and so JN, Sr., his son JN, Jr., and the latter's wife, AC before her son is based purely on surmises,
and a friend and former neighbor FL, dashed out of the speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation
burning edi􏰅ce. As they came out JN, Jr. was shot in the in the evidence. The opposite theory — that the mother
head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. outlived her son is deduced from established facts which,
The others lay 􏰁at on the ground in front of the Club weighed by common experience, engender the inference
premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of
Club, already on 􏰅re, collapsed, trapping many people preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are
inside, presumably including AJ: JN, Sr., Mrs., JN, Jr. decided, this inference ought to
and FL managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby, and
stayed there about three days, until February 10, 1945, CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
when they were forced to leave the shelter because the
shelling tore it open. They 􏰁ed toward the St. Theresa prevail. It can not be defeated as in an instance, cited by
Academy in San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately met Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, "bordering on the ridiculous,
Japanese patrols, who 􏰅red at the refugees, killing JN, where in an action on the game laws it was suggested
Sr. and his daughter-in-law. At the time of the massacre, that the gun with which the defendant 􏰅red was charged
JN, Sr. was at the age of 70; his wife was about 67 years with shot, but that the bird might have died in
consequence of fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing question is one of law which may be reviewed by the
Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.) Supreme Court. (1 Moran Comm. on the Rules of Court,
3rd Ed. 855, 857.)
2. ID.; EVIDENCE OF SURVIVORSHIP. — The evidence
of survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect, 5. ID.; INTERMEDDLING WITH COURT DECISIONS;
circumstantial or inferential. Where there are facts, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. — The prohibition against
known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence
be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rules refers to decisions supported by substantial evidence.
of preponderance of evidence controls. But substantial evidence is meant real evidence or at
least evidence about which reasonable men may
3. ID.; ID.; PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCE REQUIRED. disagree. Findings grounded entirely on speculations,
— Section 68 (ii) of Rule 123 does not require that the surmises, or conjectures come within the exception to the
inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein general rules.
provided be certain. It is the "particular circumstances
from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are DECISION
required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence.
In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond TUASON, J p:
doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but it may be plain
enough to justify a 􏰅nding of fact." (In re Bhenko's These three proceedings were instituted in the Court of
Estate, 4 N. Y. S. 2d. 427, citing Tortera vs. State of New First Instance of Manila for the summary settlement of
York, 269 N. Y. 199 N. E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River the estates of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela
Bridge Co., 80 N. W. 622.) Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar
Navarro, deceased. All of them having been heard jointly,
4. EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY; UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE Judge Rafael Amparo handed down a single decision
AND CONTRADICTED EVIDENCE, DISTINGUISHED. which was appealed to the Court of Appeals, whose
— Undisputed evidence is one thing, and contradicted decision, modifying that of the Court of First Instance, in
evidence another. An incredible witness does not cease turn was elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
to be such because he is not impeached or contradicted.
But when the evidence is purely documentary, the The main question presented in the 􏰅rst two courts
authenticity of which is not questioned and the only issue related to the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin
is the construction to be placed thereon, or where a case Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children, all of whom
is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the were killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese
facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the troops in Manila in February 1945.
correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com was packed with refugees, shells were exploding around,
and the Club was set on 􏰅re. Simultaneously, the
The trial court found the deaths of these persons to have Japanese started shooting at the people inside the
occurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls, named building, especially those who were trying to escape. The
Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, three daughters were hit and fell on the ground near the
Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin entrance; and Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and his son decided
Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial to abandon the premises to seek a safer haven. They
court except that, with regard to Angela Joaquin de could not convince Angela Joaquin, who refused to join
Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared them; and so Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin
to have survived his mother. Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, and a
friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out
It is this modi􏰅cation of the lower court's 􏰅nding which is of the burning edi􏰅ce. As they came out, Joaquin
now being contested by the petitioner. The importance of Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier
the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died and immediately dropped. The others lay 􏰁at on the
before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets.
that it radically affects the right of succession of Ramon Minutes later, the German Club, already on 􏰅re,
Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably
acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and including Angela Joaquin.
adopted child of the deceased spouses, and of Antonio
C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by "Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and
first marriage. Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter
nearby, and stayed there about three days, until February
The facts, which are not disputed, are outlined in the 10, 1945, when they were forced to leave the shelter
statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals as because the shelling tore it open. They 􏰁ed toward the
follows: St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street, but
unfortunately met Japanese patrols, who 􏰅red at the
"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and his daughter-
Manila was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and in-law.
Angela Joaquin, together with their three daughters,
Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin "At the time of the massacre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was
Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin was about 67 years
refuge in the ground 􏰁oor of the building known as the old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr. about 30; Pilar Navarro was two
German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and San or three years older than her brother; while the other
Luis Streets of this City. During their stay, the building sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin,
were between 23 and 25." the exploding shells. We cannot say for certain. No
evidence is available on the point. All we can decide is
The Court of Appeals' 􏰅ndings were all taken from the that no one saw her alive after her son left her side, and
testimony of Francisco Lopez, who miraculously survived that there is no proof when she died. Clearly, this
the holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals circumstance alone cannot support a 􏰅nding that she
opined that, "as between the mother Angela Joaquin and died later than her son, and we are thus compelled to fall
the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of back upon the statutory presumption. Indeed, it could be
survivorship is uncertain and insu􏰎cient" and the said that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship
statutory presumption must be applied. The Appellate would be precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties
Court's reasoning for its conclusion is thus stated: like these. Hence, the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30,
must be deemed to have survived his mother, Angela
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of age
(Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).
"It does not require argument to show that survivorship
cannot be established by proof of the death of only one of "The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died
the parties; but that there must be adequate proof that likewise disposes of the question whether she and her
one was alive when the other had already died. Now in deceased children perished in the same calamity. There
this case before us, the testimony of the sole witness being no evidence to the contrary, the only guide is the
Lopez is to the effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot occasion of the deaths, which is identical for all of them:
and died shortly after leaving the German Club in the the battle for the liberation of Manila. A second reason is
company of his father and the witness, and that the that the law, in declaring that those fallen in the same
burning edi􏰅ce entirely collapsed minutes after the battle are to be regarded as perishing in the same
shooting of the son; but there is not a scintilla of calamity, could not have overlooked that a variety of
evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which we may causes of death can (and usually do) operate in the
infer the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during course of combats. During the same battle, some may
the appreciable interval from the instant her son turned die from wounds, others from gases, 􏰅re, or drowning. It
his back to her, to dash out of the Club, until he died. All is clear that the law disregards episodic details, and
we can glean from the evidence is that Angela Joaquin treats of the battle as an overall cause of death in
was unhurt when her son left her to escape from the applying the presumption of survivorship.
German Club; but she could have died almost
immediately after, from a variety of causes. She might "We are thus led to the conclusion that the order in which
have been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters, the members of the Navarro-Joaquin family met their end
killed by falling beams from the burning edi􏰅ce, is as follows: 􏰅rst, the three daughters Pilar, Concepcion,
overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters from and Natividad; then the mother Angela Joaquin; then the
son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days later (of which there "Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the 􏰅rst to die
is no doubt), the father Joaquin Navarro, Sr." of the two or more persons who would inherit one from
the other, the person who alleges the prior death of either
Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the
whether section 334 (37) of Act No. 190, now section presumption shall be that they died at the same time, and
69(ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take
article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889, now article 43 of the place."
New Civil Code. It is the contention of the petitioner that it
did not, and that on the assumption that there is total lack Both provisions, as their language plainly implies, are
of evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela intended as a substitute for facts, and so are not to be
Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under article available when there are facts. With particular reference
33, be held to have died at the same time. to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which it
represents is one in which the facts are not only unknown
The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left but unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no speci􏰅c
open for consideration when absolute necessity therefor evidence as to the time of death . . . " . . . it is assumed
arises. We say irrelevant because our opinion is that that no evidence can be produced. . . . Since the facts
neither of the two provisions is applicable for the reasons are unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law
to be of fairness appropriate to the different legal situations that
arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)
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In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court
presently set forth.Rule 123, section 69(ii) of the Revised of Appeals cited and applied with respect to the deaths of
Rules of Court, reads: the Navarro girls, pointing out that "our rule is taken from
the Fourth Division of sec. 1936 of the California Code of
"When two persons perish in the same calamity, such as Civil Procedure," the Supreme Court of California said:
wreck, battle, or con􏰁agration, and it is not (1) shown
who died 􏰅rst, and there are no (2) particular "When the statute speaks of 'particular circumstances
circumstances from which it can be inferred, the from which it can be inferred' that one died before the
survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting other, it means that there are circumstances from which
from the strength and age of the sexes, according to the the fact of death by one before the other may be inferred
following rules: as a rational conclusion from the facts proven. The
Statute does not mean circumstances which would show,
xxx xxx xxxArticle 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 is of the or which would tend to show, probably that one died
following tenor: before the other. Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs. Miller, 8
Cal. App. 28, 96 Pac. 22. When, by circumstantial "Q. "Q.
evidence alone, a party seeks to prove a survivorship
contrary to the statutory presumption, the circumstances "Q.
by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be
such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the "Q.
general rules of evidence in civil cases. The inference of
survivorship cannot rest upon mere surmise, speculation, "Q. "Q.
or conjecture. As was said in Grand Lodge vs. Miller,
"Q. "Q.
supra, 'if the matter is left to probability, then the statute
settles the presumption.'" "Q.
It is manifest from the language of section 69(ii) of Rule "Q.
123 and of that of the foregoing decision that the
evidence of survivorship need not be direct; it may be "Q.
indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are
facts, known or knowable, from which a rational "Q. "Q.
conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step
in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls. You said you were also hit at that time as you leave the
German Club with Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Joaquin
Are there particular circumstances on record from which Navarro, Jr. and the latter's wife? — A. Yes, sir.
reasonable inference of survivorship between Angela
Joaquin and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' Did you fall? — A. I fell down.
testimony competent and su􏰎cient for this purpose? For
a better appreciation of this issue, it is convenient and And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.?
necessary to detail the testimony, which was described — A. Yes, sir.
by the trial court as "disinterested and
When the German Club collapsed where were you? — A.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com We were about 15 meters away from the building but I
could see what was going on."
trustworthy" and by the Court of Appeals as "entitled to
credence." Lopez testified: xxx xxx xxx

"Q. Could there have been an interval of 􏰅fteen minutes

between the two events, that is the shooting of Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. and the collapse of the German Club? — A. and the latter's wife? — A. Because the Japanese had
Yes sir, I could not say exactly, Occasions like that, you set 􏰅re to the Club and they were shooting people
know, you are confused. outside, so we thought of running away rather than be
roasted."
Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead
of 􏰅fteen minutes? — A. Possible, but not probable. xxx xxx xxx

Could it have been 40 minutes? — A. Yes, sir, about 40 You mean to say that before you jumped out of the
minutes." xxx xxx xxx German Club all the Navarro girls, Pilar, Concepcion, and
Natividad, were already wounded? — A. To my
You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? — knowledge, yes.
A. Yes, sir.
They were wounded? — A. Yes, sir.
Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela
Joaquin die? — A. Well, a few minutes after we have Were they lying on the ground or not? — A. On the
dashed out, the German Club, which was burning, ground near the entrance, because most of the people
collapsed over them, including Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr." who were shot by the Japanese were those who were
trying to escape, and as far as I can remember
xxx xxx xxx
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From your testimony it would appear that while you can
give positive evidence to the fact that Pilar, Concepcion "Q.
and Natividad Navarro, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died,
you can not give the same positive evidence to the fact "Q.
that Angela Joaquin also died? — A. Yes, sir, in the
sense that I did not see her actually die, but when the "Q.
building collapsed over her I saw and I am positive and I
did not see her come out of that building so I presumed they were among those killed."xxx xxx xxx
she died there."
So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the
xxx xxx xxx Japanese a few minutes before you left the place? — A.
That is what I think, because those Japanese soldiers
Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, were shooting the people inside especially those trying to
Mr. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Mr. Joaquin Navarro Jr. escape."
xxx xxx xxx as stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very
remote. True, people in the building were also killed but
And none of them was shot except the three girls, is that these, according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who
what you mean? — A. There were many people shot had tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese
because they were trying to escape." troops. It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro,
Sr. made an attempt to escape. She even made frantic
xxx xxx xxx efforts to dissuade her husband and son from leaving the
place and exposing themselves to gun fire.
How come that these girls were shot when they were
inside the building, can you explain that? — A. They were This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where
trying to escape probably." she was may well give an idea, at the same time, of a
condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the
It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains moment her husband, son, and daughter- in-law left her.
facts quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship It strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to
between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and her, the perils of death from staying were not so
keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement
believed that in the light of the conditions painted by that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40
Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the
namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother. head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse that
killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The Court of Appeals said
While the possibility that the mother died before the son
the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and the
can not be ruled out, it must be noted that this possibility
breaking down of the edi􏰅ce was "minutes". Even so, it
is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational
was much longer than 􏰅ve seconds, long enough to
deduction from proven facts that it was the other way
warrant the inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin was still
around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was
alive when her son expired.
killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the
German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides
negotiated that distance in 􏰅ve seconds or less, and so the collapse of the
died within that interval from the time he dashed out of
the building. Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
father and wife started to 􏰁ee from the clubhouse, the old
lady was alive and unhurt, so much so that the Navarro building, by which Mrs. Navarro could have been killed.
father and son tried hard to have her come along. She All these causes are speculative, and the probabilities, in
could have perished within those 􏰅ve or fewer seconds, the light of the known facts, are against them. Dreading
Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital question
refusal to follow the only remaining living members of her in such cases is the cogency of the proof afforded by the
family, she could not have kept away from protective secondary facts. How likely, according to experience, is
walls. Besides, the building had been set on 􏰅re to trap the existence of the primary fact if certain secondary
the refugees inside, and there was no necessity for the facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts, Sec. 596.) The same
Japanese to waste their ammunition except upon those author tells us of a case where "a jury was justified in
who tried to leave the premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin drawing the inference that the person who was caught
likely to have been killed by falling beams because the 􏰅ring a shot at an animal trespassing on his land was the
building was made of concrete and its collapse, more person who 􏰅red a shot about an hour before at the
likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not same animal also trespassing." That conclusion was not
cause instantaneous death; certainly not within the brief airtight, but rational. In fact, the circumstances in the
space of 􏰅ve seconds between her son's departure and illustration leave greater room for another possibility than
his death. do the facts of the case at hand.

It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that In conclusion, the presumption that Angela Joaquin de
are not conclusive. Section 69(ii) of Rule 123 does not Navarro died before her son is based purely on surmises,
require that the inference necessary to exclude the speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation
presumption therein provided be certain. It is the in the evidence. The opposite theory - that the mother
"particular circumstances from which it (survivorship) can outlived her son - is deduced from established facts
be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by which, weighed by common experience, engender the
the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the
can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil
certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a finding of cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail. It can
fact." (In re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing not be defeated as in an instance, cited by Lord Chief
Tortora vs. State of New York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Justice Kenyon, "bordering on the ridiculous, where in an
Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y. 622.) As the action on the game laws it was suggested that the gun
California courts have said, it is enough that "the with which the defendant 􏰅red was not charged with
circumstances by which it is sought to prove the shot, but that the bird might have died in consequence of
survivorship must be such as are competent and the fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs.
su􏰎cient when tested by the general rules of evidence in Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)
civil cases." (In re Wallace's Estate, supra.) "Juries must
often reason," says one author, "according to It is said that that part of the decision of the Court of
probabilities, drawing an inference that the main fact in Appeals which the appellant impugns, and which has
issue existed from collateral facts not directly proving, but been discussed, involves 􏰅ndings of fact which can not
be disturbed. The point is not, in our judgment, well We are constrained to reverse the decision under review,
considered. The particular circumstances from which the and hold that the distribution of the decedents' estates
parties and the Court of Appeals drew conclusions are, should be made in accordance with the decision of the
as above seen, undisputed, and this being the case, the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of passing
correctness or incorrectness of those conclusions raises upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put
a question of law, not of forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin
Navarro's death preceded that of her son. Without costs.
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Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo,
fact, which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
into. As was said in 1 Moran Commentaries on the Rules
of Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857, "Undisputed evidence is one CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
thing, and contradicted evidence is another. An incredible
witness does not cease to be such because he is not
impeached or contradicted. But when the evidence is
purely documentary, the authenticity of which is not
questioned and the only issue is the construction to be
placed thereon, or where a case is submitted upon an
agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in
the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the
conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law
which may be reviewed by the Supreme Court."

The question of whether upon given facts the operation

of the statutory presumption is to be invoked is a SECOND DIVISION
question of law.
[G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005.]
The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on
questions of evidence refers to decisions supported by NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM,
substantial evidence. By substantial evidence is meant petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY
real evidence or at least evidence about which BISAYA," respondent.
reasonable men may disagree. Findings grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures come DECISION
within the exception to the general rule.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p: speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. 11
In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet
Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko) 1 and Ruby Lim assail table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka
the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang"). 12
November 2001 reversing the Decision 3 of the Regional Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr.
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as Filart. 13 Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance,
the Resolution 4 of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July however, completely ignored him thus adding to his
2002 which denied petitioners' motion for shame and humiliation. 14 Not long after, while he was
reconsideration. still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati
policeman approached and asked him to step out of the
The cause of action before the trial court was one for
hotel. 15 Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of
damages brought under the human relations provisions
of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent the party by the policeman. 16 Claiming damages, Mr.
herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One
screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two
o'clock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney's fees. 17
having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, 5 he was
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes
spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart,
to leave the party but not under the ignominious
who then approached him. 6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that
her in a party at the hotel's penthouse in celebration of she was the Hotel's Executive Secretary for the past
the natal day of the hotel's manager, Mr. Masakazu
twenty (20) years. 18 One of her functions included
Tsuruoka. 7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him organizing the birthday party of the hotel's former
for which she replied: "of course." 8 Mr. Reyes then went General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. 19 The year 1994 was
up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits no different. For Mr. Tsuruoka's party, Ms. Lim generated
which was the latter's present for the celebrant. 9 At the an exclusive guest list and extended invitations
penthouse, they 􏰃rst had their picture taken with the accordingly. 20 The guest list was limited to
celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka's closest friends
Filart. 10 After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not
was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to one of those invited. 21 At the party, Ms. Lim 􏰃rst noticed
his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was Mr.
stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to
leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and
Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink. 22 Mindful of making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food
Mr. Tsuruoka's wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim on her. 33
approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to inquire
as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited. 23 Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint
Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of before the lower court, also gave her version of the story
Dr. Filart. 24 As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.
with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to 34 According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to
interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he
Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the
invite Mr. Reyes. 25 Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to penthouse but to Altitude 49. 35 When they reached the
tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. 26 penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he
Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to was not properly dressed and was not invited. 36 All the
inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place,
want to leave. 27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col. Batung. 37
Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung whom she Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes
later approached. 28 Believing that Captain Batung and shouting. 38 She ignored Mr. Reyes. 39 She was
Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that
the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to she invited him. 40
tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. 29
Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the
Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him complaint, 41 giving more credence to the testimony of
herself as there were no other guests in the immediate Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to
vicinity. 30 However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that
Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the
himself to the food, she decided to wait. 31 When Mr.
party as he was uninvited:
Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim
approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindi ho kayo Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he
dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant.
pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for
lang po umalis na kayo." 32 She then turned around attending a party to which he was not invited by the host.
Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law Ms. Lim in approaching several people to inquire into the
imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and
some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against was uncalled for as she should have approached Dr.
defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he Filart 􏰃rst and both of them should have talked to Mr.
himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 Reyes in private:
SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of
defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should
her and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. have been done by appellee Lim was to approach
His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told
must therefore fail. 42 appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave the
party as the celebrant only wanted close friends around.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to approach
the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that
testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filart's invitation, appellant
in a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests: could not have suffered such humiliation. For that,
appellee Filart is equally liable. cTDaEH
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation,
telling him that he should not 􏰃nish his food and to leave xxx xxx xxx
the place within the hearing distance of
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration
of one person, which calls not only protection of human
other guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the
customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes
appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as a liable for damages, especially if said acts were attended
consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote
liability arises from the acts which are in themselves legal bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a
or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one] doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some
cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of
another in a manner contrary to morals or good customs. fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603). 44
43
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary
obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in . . . DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF
the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE
(P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorney's HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000). 45
On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals IV.
a􏰉rmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the
. . . IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS
motion had "been amply discussed and passed upon in
TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY,
the decision sought to be reconsidered." 46 CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE
AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and
REGARD
Ruby Lim contend that the Court of Appeals seriously
erred in — V.
I. . . . IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE
DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANT'S BRIEF, THEREBY
. . . NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI
DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL
NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to
II.
the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made
. . . HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and
DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."
BISAYA "COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HcDSaT
HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR.
The doctrine of volenti non 􏰃t injuria ("to which a person
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com assents is not esteemed in law as injury" 47 ) refers to
self-in􏰏icted injury 48 or to the consent to injury 49 which
FILART'S INVITATION" precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger,
III.
even if he is not negligent in doing so. 50 As formulated
by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not 􏰃nd
application to the case at bar because even if respondent The consequential question then is: Which version is
Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the credible?
party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New
Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and
shame. iatdcjur From an in depth review of the evidence, we 􏰃nd more
credible the lower court's findings of fact.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim
acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by
the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, 􏰃ve-star
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and hotel, 53 for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotel's former
if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who
her employer, is solidarily liable with her. was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant) 54 and who could
not just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by
As the trial court and the appellate court reached many, being an actor. While he was already spotted by
divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who
same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the
without choice but to use its latent power to review celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of
such 􏰃ndings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we the celebrant's instruction to keep the party intimate,
are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to would naturally want to get rid of the "gate-crasher" in the
reviewing and revising errors of law. 51 One of the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a
exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process,
as the 􏰃ndings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. To
those of the trial court. 52 The lower court ruled that Ms. unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes
Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the would certainly re􏰏ect badly on Ms. Lim's ability to follow
party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close
appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is friends and some of the hotel's personnel. Mr. Reyes,
liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms.
Reyes by telling him not to 􏰃nish his food and to leave Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not
the place within hearing distance of the other guests. offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do
Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. that and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the
Filart's invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party. contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had
unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim
talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him could have been no intention on her part to cause
to kiss: embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff's reaction to the
request that must have made the other guests aware of
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim what transpired between them. . . .
approached you while you were at the buffet table? How
close was she when she approached you? Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was
no need for the police to take him out. 56
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was
that close and she shouted? Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes's version of
the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil
A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however,
dito, bumaba ka na lang." had not presented any witness to back his story up. All
his witnesses — Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
Alexander Silva — proved only that it was Dr. Filart who
HTcADC xxx xxx xxx
invited him to the party. 57
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many. 55
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be
Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21
and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer,
him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that
the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite of its employee. 58
and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of
Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to
belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was as the principle of abuse of rights, 59 is not a panacea for
correct in observing that — all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:

Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
when the request for the latter to leave the party was and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
made such that they nearly kissed each other, the everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
request was meant to be heard by him only and there
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised
in a manner which does not conform with the norms and that is, the act complained of must be intentional. 68
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another,
a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr.
wrongdoer must be responsible." 60 The object of this Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by
article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must animosity against him. These two people did not know
be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but each other personally before the evening of 13 October
also in the performance of one's duties. 61 These 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an
standards are the following: act with justice, give explanation for Ms. Lim's alleged abusive conduct except
the statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. 62
old," had a "very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr.
Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or
Reyes) possibly in􏰏uenced by her associates in her work
intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is
a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; at the hotel with foreign businessmen." 69 The lameness
of this argument need not be belabored. Su􏰉ce it to say
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 63
that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is
Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend
proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article
it but innuendos and conjectures.
20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law 64
which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr.
within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on Reyes to leave was likewise
the other hand, states:
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate
the damage. court's declaration that Ms. Lim's act of personally
approaching Mr. Reyes (without 􏰃rst verifying from Mrs.
Article 21 65 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a
the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; cause of action "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack
(2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public of consideration of one person, which calls not only
order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity."
injure. 66 70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim's
act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, 67 conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs.
Filart's companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the
invite Mr. Reyes. 71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad records are bereft of any information as to the social and
judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently,
amount to bad faith. the conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot
withstand scrutiny as it is without basis. CAcDTI
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages,
neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are
answerable for exemplary damages 72 especially for the concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have
reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court of suffered through Ms. Lim's exercise of a legitimate right
Appeals held — done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must
be his to bear alone.
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt
because of the latter's lowly station in life. This has to be WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition 􏰃led by
limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED.
established. Social equality is not sought by the legal The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November
provisions under consideration, but due regard for 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby
decency and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
And by way of example or correction for public good and Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated
to avert further commission of such acts, exemplary 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
damages should be imposed upon appellees. 73 SO ORDERED.Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and
Tinga, JJ., concur.
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted 􏰃ndings is
that it runs counter with the very facts of the case and the
evidence on hand. It is not disputed that at the time of the
incident in question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of long
standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a
Board Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) EN BANC
chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz
Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 o􏰉cial [G.R. No. 27710. January 30, 1928.]
candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an
awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
GERMAN MARAMBA and GENOVEVA MUERONG,
the Philippines."74 During his direct examination on
defendants-appellants.
rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income 75 and
Pedro C. Quinto, for plaintiff-appellant.Turner, Rheberg & Isidro Bambalan y Calcotura was the owner, with Torrens
Sanchez, for defendants-appellants. title, of the land here in question and that the plaintiff in
the sole and universal heir of the said deceased Isidro
SYLLABUS Bambalan y Calcotura, especially as regards the said
land. This being so, the fundamental question to be
1. CONTRACTS; PURCHASE AND SALE; MINORITY. resolved in this case is whether or not the plaintiff sold
— The contract of purchase and sale of real property the land in question to the defendants.
executed by a minor is vitiated to the extent of being void
as regards said minor. The defendants a􏰈rm they did and as proof of such
transfer present document Exhibit 1, dated July 17, 1922.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REGISTRATION. — A contract of The plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed
purchase and sale of real property registered in said document, yet, he did so by intimidation made upon
accordance with the Torrens system, does not bind the his mother Paula Prado by the defendant Genoveva
property if it is not registered and is only valid between Muerong, who threatened the former with imprisonment.
the parties and as authority for the register of deeds to While the evidence on this particular point does not
make the proper registration. Therefore, the purchaser, decisively support the plaintiff's allegation, this document,
by virtue of the deed of sale alone, does not acquire any however, is vitiated to the extent of being void as regards
right to the property sold and much less if the vendor is a the said plaintiff, for the reason that the latter, at the time
minor. he signed it, was a minor, which is clearly shown by the
record and it does not appear that it was his real intention
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MERCADO vs. ESPIRITU. — The to sell
doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado
vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
be estopped from contesting the contract executed by
him pretending to be of age, is not applicable when the the land in question.
vendor, a minor, did not pretend to be of age and his
minority was known to the purchaser. What is deduced from the record is, that his mother
Paula Prado and the latter's second husband Vicente
DECISION Lagera, having received a certain sum of money by way
of a loan from Genoveva Muerong in 1915 which,
ROMUALDEZ, J p: according to Exhibit 3, was P200 and according to the
testimony of Paula Prado, was P150, and Genoveva
The defendants admit in their amended answer those Muerong having learned later that the land within which
paragraphs of the complaint wherein it is alleged that was included that described in said Exhibit 3, had a
Torrens title issued in favor of the plaintiff's father, of arrived at, approximately, by taking the P150 received by
which the latter is the only heir and caused the plaintiff to Paula Prado and her husband in 1915 and adding thereto
sign a conveyance of the land. interest at the rate of 50 per cent per annum, then agreed
upon, or P75 a year for seven years up to July 31, 1922,
At any rate, even supposing that the document in the date of Exhibit 1.
question, Exhibit 1, embodies all of the requisites
prescribed by law for its e􏰈cacy, yet, it does not, The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been
according to the provisions of section 50 of Act No. 496, su􏰈ciently proven, because the witness Paula Prado was
bind the land and would only be a valid contract between the only one who testi􏰐ed thereto, whose testimony was
the parties and as evidence of authority to the register of contradicted by that of the defendant Genoveva Muerong
deeds to make the proper registration, inasmuch as it is who, moreover, asserts that she possesses about half of
the registration that gives validity to the transfer. the land in question. There are, therefore, not su􏰈cient
Therefore, the defendants, by virtue of the document data in the record to award the damages claimed by the
Exhibit 1 alone, did not acquire any right to the property plaintiff. In view of the foregoing, the dispositive part of
sold and much less, if it is taken into consideration that, the decision appealed from is hereby a􏰈rmed, without
according to the evidence in the record, the vendor Isidro any express finding as to the costs in this instance. So
Bambalan y Prado, the herein plaintiff, was a minor. ordered.

As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real,
case of Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), JJ., concur.
wherein the minor was held to be estopped from
contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
of age, is not applicable herein. In the case now before
us the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age; his minority
was well known to the purchaser, the defendant, who
was the one who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula to
be used in the acknowledgment of the document.

In regard to the amount of money that the defendants

allege to have given the plaintiff and her son in 1922 as
the price of the land, the preponderance of evidence
shows that no amount was given by the defendants to
the alleged vendors in said year, but that the sum of
P663.40, which appears in the document Exhibit 1, is