Appiah Simon Jnr
OWUSU AND ANOTHER V AGYENTOA
A mother devised her house to her two children D and E for their use "absolutely." Some years
after they had taken possession of their separate and distinct portions of the house, D died
survived by his children, the defendant-appellants and his wife. After D's death his sister E who
had succeeded him under customary law took letters of administration to administer his estate.
In 1969 E registered D's portion of the house in her name. However, in 1975 the appellants who
had left the house when their father died in 1959 reentered his portion and subsequently lived
there rent-free. In April 1984 E sold D's portion of the house to the plaintiff-respondent. When
the appellants refused to vacate the house after the sale, the respondent successfully sued
them before the district court for ejectment. Their appeal from that decision to the High Court
was dismissed and they thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeal.
Issues: Whether D and E had held the house in dispute as joint tenants or tenants in common
Holding:
In order to determine whether a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common was created, the most
important features were the words in the will. On the authorities, since in the instant case the
testatrix by clause (2) of the will bequeathed the disputed house to D and E "absolutely", the
will conveyed a grant which was unconditional, unrestricted or unfettered. In terms of years, the
grant was limitless and did not end with the death of one devisee. The word "absolutely" was
therefore a word of severance creating separate and distinct share or interest for each devisee
even though by law each share was not physically divided. Accordingly, since a joint tenancy was
restricted to the life of the first person to die, leaving the entire devise to the surviving devisee,
but under a tenancy in common the scope of the grant to each devisee was unconditional,
unrestricted or unfettered to the extent of their separate and distinct interest or shares, clause
(2) created a tenancy in common. In the result, D died intestate as an absolute owner of the
portion he occupied, and his children, the appellants were entitled to stay in that portion for life
provided they exhibited good conduct.
This study source was downloaded by 100000829147683 from CourseHero.com on 04-29-2022 08:53:48 GMT -05:00
https://www.coursehero.com/file/60419520/agyentoa-v-owusudocx/
John Ayedze 10087775
OWUSU V AGYENTOA
A woman willed her house to her two children D and E for their use "absolutely." Some years
after they had taken possession of their separate and distinct portions of the house, D died
survived by his children, the defendant-appellants and his wife. After D's death his sister E who
had succeeded him under customary law took letters of administration to administer his estate.
In 1969 E registered D's portion of the house in her name. However, in 1975 the appellants who
had left the house when their father died in 1959 reentered his portion and subsequently lived
there rent-free. In April 1984 E sold D's portion of the house to the plaintiff-respondent. When
the appellants refused to vacate the house after the sale, the respondent successfully sued
them before the district court for ejectment. Their appeal from that decision to the High Court
was dismissed and they thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeal.
Issue: Whether D and E had held the house in dispute as joint tenants or tenants in common
Holding:
In order to determine whether a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common was created, the most
important features were the words in the will. On the authorities, since in the instant case the
testatrix by clause (2) of the will bequeathed the disputed house to D and E "absolutely", the
will conveyed a grant which was unconditional, unrestricted or unfettered. In terms of years, the
grant was limitless and did not end with the death of one devisee. The word "absolutely" was
therefore a word of severance creating separate and distinct share or interest for each devisee
even though by law each share was not physically divided. Accordingly, since a joint tenancy was
restricted to the life of the first person to die, leaving the entire devise to the surviving devisee,
but under a tenancy in common the scope of the grant to each devisee was unconditional,
unrestricted or unfettered to the extent of their separate and distinct interest or shares, clause
(2) created a tenancy in common. In the result, D died intestate as an absolute owner of the
portion he occupied, and his children, the appellants were entitled to stay in that portion for life
provided they exhibited good conduct.
This study source was downloaded by 100000829147683 from CourseHero.com on 04-29-2022 08:53:48 GMT -05:00
https://www.coursehero.com/file/60419520/agyentoa-v-owusudocx/
Daniel Gyan
AGYENTOA v OWUSU
A woman willed her house to her two children D and E for their use "absolutely." Some years
after they had taken possession of their separate and distinct portions of the house, D died
survived by his children, the defendant-appellants and his wife. After D's death his sister E who
had succeeded him under customary law took letters of administration to administer his estate.
In 1969 E registered D's portion of the house in her name. However, in 1975 the appellants who
had left the house when their father died in 1959 reentered his portion and subsequently lived
there rent-free. In April 1984 E sold D's portion of the house to the plaintiff-respondent. When
the appellants refused to vacate the house after the sale, the respondent successfully sued
them before the district court for ejectment. Their appeal from that decision to the High Court
was dismissed and they thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeal.
Issue:
Whether D and E had held the house in dispute as joint tenants or tenants in common
Holding: In order to determine whether a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common was created,
the most important features were the words in the will. On the authorities, since in the instant
case the testatrix by clause (2) of the will bequeathed the disputed house to D and E
"absolutely", the will conveyed a grant which was unconditional, unrestricted or unfettered. In
terms of years, the grant was limitless and did not end with the death of one devisee. The word
"absolutely" was therefore a word of severance creating separate and distinct share or interest
for each devisee even though by law each share was not physically divided. Accordingly, since a
joint tenancy was restricted to the life of the first person to die, leaving the entire devise to the
surviving devisee, but under a tenancy in common the scope of the grant to each devisee was
unconditional, unrestricted or unfettered to the extent of their separate and distinct interest or
shares, clause (2) created a tenancy in common. In the result, D died intestate as an absolute
owner of the portion he occupied, and his children, the appellants were entitled to stay in that
portion for life provided they exhibited good conduct.
This study source was downloaded by 100000829147683 from CourseHero.com on 04-29-2022 08:53:48 GMT -05:00
https://www.coursehero.com/file/60419520/agyentoa-v-owusudocx/
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