The Robredo Style:

Philippine Local Politics in Transition

TAKESHI KAWANAKA
Politics in the Philippines has been a matter of patronage. The political elite
solicits the support of the relatively powerful who draw strength from the individually
powerless voters for assistance. In return, the former will reward the latter with the
fruits of influence and whatever else that was agreed upon. This relationship of
patronage is renewed during elections and is understood as the way the political
system worked until the late President Ferdinand Marcos declared Martial Law and
did away with patronage politics. In its place came a more unilateral relationship
which voided contracts with traditional power brokers. The Aquino administration
facilitated the return of patronage politics but at the same time introduced a new
breed of leaders. One such politician is Naga City Mayor Jesse Robredo. Robredo
consolidated popular support without the aid of mutually rewarding ties, a strong
political machine or a monopoly of power. The manner in which he secured the
maximum term of office and improved the lives of his constituents sets a new
standard in governance. The author calls it the Robredo Style.

Introduction

Local politics has been considered as one of the main areas of

concern in Philippine politics. Several frameworks have been proposed,
based on empirical researches since the 1960s. Each framework is
attractive and persuasive because of the abundant field data. However,
studies on local politics have their own limitations because of their very
empirical nature. The peculiarity of an area which a researcher chooses
is always involved, though he/she tries to construct a sort of general
framework which could explain the patterns of local politics in the
Philippines. Time factor should also be given attention. Changes in the
socio-economic situation create a climate for changes of political
leadership.

This paper intends neither to refute the previous frameworks nor

construct an alternative general framework, but tries to explore some
points which may have been missed out in their discussions. In order to
do so, Naga City focusing on Mayor Jesse Robredo’s administration is
chosen as the case. There are several reasons for choosing Naga City,
the main one being its urban setting. One important point which has been
left out in the previous discussions is the impact of urbanization on local

5
 6 PHILIPPINE LOCAL POLITICS IN TRANSITION

politics. Although Naga City is still a small city, its urbanized situation is
apparent. It is not so difficult to assume that urbanization transforms the
political pattern as it does the socio-economic situation of both constituency
and the political elite. Another reason for choosing Naga City is its so-
called innovative political leader. The city has been continuously earning
awards under the administration of Mayor Jesse Robredo. The previous
frameworks did not consider the political leader’s capability for governance
as an important factor.1 This aspect should be scrutinized as well.

Frameworks of Philippine Local Politics

There are three dominant frameworks in the study of Philippine local

politics: patron-client relationships, political machine, and patrimonialism/
bossism.

Patron/Client Relationships
The most dominant and traditional framework is the patron-client
relationship. This framework emphasizes the reciprocal — dyadic —
personal relations, instead of ideology, class and religion, as the main
factor in the mobilization of political support. According to James Scott,
the patron-client relationships is:

An exchange relationship between roles — may be defined as a special

case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship
in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patrons) uses
his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or
both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates
by offering general support and assistance, including personal services,
to the patron.2

In the context of Philippine local politics, the patron-client framework

is combined with factionalism. Carl Lande discusses that:

The two rival parties in each province are structured by vertical chains
of dyadic patron-client relationships extending from great and wealthy
political leaders in each province down to lesser gentry politicians in the
towns, down further to petty leaders in each village, and down finally to
the clients of the latter: the ordinary peasantry.3

Furthermore, he points out that a local faction:

TAKESHI KAWANAKA 7

Is a loose combination of a number of such family constellations with

a rather large and prosperous family constellation at its core and
smaller or less prosperous ones at its periphery. Within each family
constellation, a strong web of kinship ties binds related families
together into a cohesive group. Between the allied constellations of the
faction, a smaller number of dyadic ties — more commonly ties of
marriage, compadre ties, or ties of patronship and clientship rather
than ties of blood — create a lesser bond. Family constellations work
in alliance with one another for varying periods of time due to the need
to create combinations formidable enough to compete with some
prospect of success in local elections or in other community prestige
contests.4

Needless to say, this framework is constructed on the basis of a rural

setting. The assumed patron here is landlord and the client is a tenant.
The image of the set of political relations is vertical pyramid style.

Political Machine
As commercialization and social mobilization increased, scholars
started to point out the transformation of the patron-client relationship.
Some discuss it in the context of the breakdown of the patron-client
relationship and the rise of social unrest.”5 Others emphasize the
emergence of the political machine, which is a more sophisticated
mechanism of distribution of patronage. Kit Machado’s work is suggestive
in this context. According to him:

The most evident change is that factions are losing their extra-political
character and are being transformed into quite specialized political
organizations. This reflects a change in the central element of the
faction from an extended family or alliance of families into an electoral
machine, composed of an individual leader and his followers, that has
been built for specifically political purposes.6

Willem Wolters also points out that:

It is of course true that a large amount of government money was

distributed along particularistic lines in the form of “patronage” during
elections. But this patronage should not be confused with “patron-
client” patronage. That is, the term “patronage” when applied to
 8 PHILIPPINE LOCAL POLITICS IN TRANSITION

political activities by politicians and political scientists refers to the

distribution of favors by higher-level politicians, the so-called “pork-
barrel funds.” This type of patronage is capable of being dispensed
without recourse to patron-client relationships. Although the
characteristics of patron-client relationships might well be discerned in
many of the ties which bind higher-level politicians to lower-level ones,
or local politicians to a handful of immediate supporters, in general the
relationships between politicians and the electorate were short term,
impersonal, instrumental and based on a specific transaction (if any).
These relationships, if they may be called relationships at all, endured
for a few weeks or months at most, and consequently were of a
completely different nature than the multi-faced, dyadic relationships
that linked landlords and tenants in “the good old days.”7

Political machine does not need a dyadic personal relationship. It is

based on short-term, materialistic benefits. At the same time, political
leaders’ socio-economic status has changed. In the patron-client
relationship framework, they are landlords. But in the political machine
framework, they are professional politicians.

Patrimonialism/Bossism
Although there are some differences, the patron-client relationship
framework and the political machine framework share a common
characteristic — the reciprocal relationship between politicians and
between a politician and supporters. The patron-client relationship
framework describes it as very personal and comprehensive. On the other
hand, the political machine framework argues that the reciprocal relation
is more limited to political purpose. Hence the short term arrangement.

But the patrimonialism/bossism framework does not consider the

reciprocal relationship as an important factor. The relationship is rather
unilateral. John Sidel defines that:

“Bosses,”...refers to predatory power brokers who achieve monopolistic

control over both coercive and economic resources within given territorial
jurisdictions or bailiwicks (balwarte). Bosses thus include para-statal
mafias, small-town mayors, provincial governors, congressmen, and
even presidents. “Bossism,” ... alludes to that “sophisticated system of
brigandage,” that interlocking, multi-tiered directorate of bosses whose
TAKESHI KAWANAKA 9

control over the state apparatus facilitates their exploitation of the

archipelago’s human and natural resources.”8

The existence of coercion and the role of state apparatus distinguish

the patrimonialism/bossism framework from others. Coercion is the
opposite of reciprocal relationships. Instead of patronage and loyalty,
there exist intimidation and submission. Access to state apparatus, on
the other hand, allows the elite to gain wealth and rule through coercion
and violence. Such is not present in the patron-client relationship
framework (and in a sense, the political machine framework) which sees
the elite’s socio-economic status as vital to their having opportunities to
become political leaders.

The patrimonialism/bossism framework stresses the crucial role of

violence, fraud, and vote buying, reducing it to a sophisticated academic
translation of the more common term, “3Gs (Guns, Goons and Gold).”

Urbanization and Good Governance

These frameworks have their own limitations. As the patrimonialsm/

bossism framework points out, the patron-client relationship and political
machine frameworks neglect ties between elite and state apparatus.
Furthermore, they cannot explain the existence of coercion.

Regarding the socio-economic background of politicians, the patron-

client relationship framework has difficulty explaining the emergence of
non-landlord politicians.

On the other hand, patrimonialism/bossism does not admit the

significance of the existence and effectiveness of reciprocal relationships.
This kind of relationship can be easily found among politicians and
sometimes, even the most violence-inclined politicians give paternalistic
benefits and protection to loyal supporters as a “patron.”

It should be noted also that the patron-client relationship and

patrimonialism/bossism frameworks do not consider the time factor and
changes in the socio-economic situation. It is as if local politics never
changed since the time of Spanish colonization.
 10 PHILIPPINE LOCAL POLITICS IN TRANSITION

n Although there are some differences, The reality is that several

frameworks can be found in one
the patron-client relationship framework
place. In some places, different
and the political machine framework share types of political leadership appear
one after another through the course
a common characteristic — the reciprocal
of time. And besides, local politics
relationship between politicians and in the Philippines is so diverse.
between a politician and supporters. The
In the discussion of the above-
patron-client relationship framework
mentioned frameworks, two factors
describes it very personal and were not cited. One is urbanization,9
comprehensive. On the other hand, the which dissolves traditional political
and social relations which has been
political machine framework discusses existing in rural areas. Economic
that the reciprocal relation is more limited activities shift from agriculture to
commerce or manufacturing. A new
to political purpose. Hence the short term
urban poor emerges, totally different
arrangement. from tenants in rural areas. In
addition, professionals (the so-
called middle class) are becoming
defined as a social group, too. It must be remembered that almost half
of the population in the Philippines reside in urban areas. Thus, the
significance of dealing with the urban area factor should be recognized.

Another factor is the emergence of local politicians who are known

primarily for good governance and integrity. Although, there are not so
many of them, it is a remarkable trend. Aside from Mayor Robredo, the
roster includes, Mayor Edward Hagedorn of Puerto Princesa City,
Gov.Roberto Pangdanganan of Bulacan province, Mayor Eddie Dorotan
of Irosin, Sorsogon province, Mayor Rosalita Nunes of Gen. Santos City,
and Mayor Mauricio Domogan of Baguio City to name a few. Their
emergence may be compatible with the previously cited frameworks, but,
cannot be explained by them sufficiently, especially since they defeated
politicians who were either patrons or bosses in their respective localities.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that most of them are from urban areas.

Political History of Naga City

Naga City is one of the oldest Spanish settlements in the Philippines.

It used to be called Nueva Caceres. Since then, Naga has been the center
TAKESHI KAWANAKA 11

of religion and education in the Bicol region. Naga City was the capital
of Camarines Sur until it acquired its charter (R.A. 305) and became an
independent city in 1948.

Today, Naga City is composed of 27 barangays and has 126,972

residents.10 Among the 27 barangays, only five are called “upland
barangays,” or rural areas. The others, whose population comprises 88%
of the total population of Naga City, are considered as urban areas. The
main industry in Naga is commerce.

Table 1: Influential Political Groups in Naga City

Election Year
1959 Ojeda - M. Villafuerte (NP)

1963 Felipe-Sibulo (LP)

1978 L. Villafuerte (KBL)

1980 (UNIDO)

1986
1987 Roco (LDP)
1988 (LDP) Robredo (LDP)
conflict
1992 coalition (Lakas)

1998 (LAMMP) coalition (AD)

(AD)

Legend: in power
retaining some power
powerless
 12 PHILIPPINE LOCAL POLITICS IN TRANSITION

The Days of Landed Wealthy Families

Naga City had appointed mayors from the enactment of its charter
in 1948 up to 1959. The first elected mayor in 1959 is Nacionalista
member Victorino Ojeda, a lawyer from a landed wealthy family. 11 (See
Table 1 for the influential political groups in Naga.) His opponent was
Ramon Felipe, Jr., who is also from one of the wealthiest landed families
in Naga since Spanish time. Father Ramon Felipe, Sr. was a congressman
for two terms (1922-28) and a governor for two terms (1928-34). Felipe
Jr.’s wife is from the Abella family, considered the wealthiest of the
wealthy in Naga.12

A topnotcher in the 1944 bar exams, Felipe, Jr. was able to win the
next elections held in 1963 as the Liberal candidate, defeating incumbent
Vice-mayor Mariano Villafuerte, Jr. (Nacionalista), who is also a son of a
former congressman (1928-34) and governor (1942), Mariano Villafuerte,
Sr.

When Felipe, Jr. ran for the congressional elections in 1965 and won,
then Vice-Mayor Vicente Sibulo became mayor. Although Sibulo was also
born in Naga, he is a bit different from his predecessors. His father, Pablo
Sibulo, migrated from Muntinlupa and gained a high status in Naga not
with inherited wealth, but through the legal profession. Vicente Sibulo’s
mother is from the prominent Prado family in the neighboring municipality,
Camaligan. Like his father, Vicente Sibulo is a lawyer. He was city fiscal
before becoming the vice-mayor.13

Sibulo was the mayor for 14 years until he was removed by former
President Ferdinand Marcos in December 1979. He was elected as
mayor in 1967 and 1971. His vice-mayor was Felipe, Jr.’s sister, Virginia
Felipe-Perez, a pharmacist. Sibulo is remembered as a development-
oriented administrator. He employed his cousin, Pit Prado, a technocrat,
as his consultant. The public market in Naga was built during Sibulo’s
term.

A Boss Backed by the State

Naga was under the governance of the Sibulo-Felipe tandem from
1963 until 1972, when Martial Law was declared, after which, Luis
Villafuerte emerged as a political kingpin not only of Naga, but also of the
entire Bicol region. Villafuerte's father Mariano Sr. was ambushed and
TAKESHI KAWANAKA 13

killed in 1942 by anti-Japanese guerrillas for his alleged collaboration

during the Occupation. Since then, the Villafuerte family’s political power
in Naga waned, though Luis’s elder brother Mariano Villafuerte, Jr.
became at one time vice-mayor. Luis Villafuerte’s rise was facilitated by
President Marcos who took notice of the then corporate lawyer. With the
support of the late strongman, Villafuerte won a seat in the Interim
Batasan Pambansa in 1978. In 1979 he was appointed Minister of
Trade.

The nationally prominent Villafuerte tried to build his political clout in

local politics, especially in Naga City and Camarines Sur province. In Naga
City, his opponent was Mayor Sibulo who survived martial rule by joining
the administration party, Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL). Not one to
yield to Marcos, Sibulo was not a member of the “favored few” and was
removed from his position just one month before the local elections in
1980. Villafuerte recommended his henchman, Carlos del Castillo to the
position. Del Castillo was not from the elite families, though his father was
a municipal board member once. He started as a member of the police
force and after passing bar exams became city fiscal. Before he became
Villafuerte’s choice, he served as city councilor for one term. Del Castillo
became mayor along with his KBL candidates for vice-mayor and
councilors. Their opponents were Ramon Felipe and Sibulo’s wife who ran
for mayor and vice-mayor respectively but lost through massive
disenfranchisement and other forms of electoral fraud that were allegedly
committed in the elections.

Just before the 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections, Villafuerte

defected to United Democratic Organization (UNIDO). Already displaced
from the post of Trade Minister in 1981 it was rumored that he lost his
place in the inner circle of Marcos. But his defection later strengthened
his political position. Winning the congressional post, Villafuerte gained
further prominence when the Marcos regime was toppled and Corazon
Aquino took over the presidency in 1986. Villafuerte was already a key
person in UNIDO at that time. President Aquino appointed him as
Chairman of Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization
and then Officer-in-Charge Governor of Camarines Sur.14

Villafuerte saw his nephew Jesse Robredo as a future mayor of Naga

City. 15 The young Robredo found himself appointed as Program Director
 14 PHILIPPINE LOCAL POLITICS IN TRANSITION

of the Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP), a governmental

planning agency for the development of the Bicol region.

Robredo is from a family of Chinese businessmen engaged in lumber

and trading in Naga City. After completing Mechanical Engineering and
Industrial Management Engineering courses at the De La Salle University,
he joined the San Miguel Corporation as head of the logistics division.
Before assuming directorship of the BRBDP he earned his masters
degree in Business Administration from the University of the Philippines.
He was only 28 years old.

In 1988, the Villafuerte-backed Robredo ran for mayor under the

ticket of Lakas ng Bansa, which would later merge with other parties to
form the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). Robredo’s opponent
then was lawyer Ramon Roco, Senator Raul Roco’s younger brother.
Roco was a member of an anti-Villafuerte coalition in Camarines Sur and
Naga City.16

The Roco family was not a major political force in Naga City. It gained
recognition only after Raul threw his hat into the political arena, especially
when he was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
In 1987, Raul ran in the 2nd district of Camarines Sur (Naga City and nine
other neighboring municipalities) against former Vice-Mayor Virginia
Felipe-Perez. By this time, Naga City had two political factions, Villafuerte
and Roco (or the anti-Villafuerte group). Villafuerte supported Felipe-
Perez while the Sibulo group supported Roco. Felipe, Jr. kept his distance
from the Naga City elections, being Chairman of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec). The race was tight but Roco eventually won a seat
in the House of Representatives.17

Another Villafuerte-Roco confrontation took place the following year

when Robredo and Ramon Roco fought for Naga City’s highest office.
Robredo secured victory with a small margin of 947 votes. Robredo’s
vice-mayor candidate Dr. Lourdes Asence was elected but eight among
10 seats in the city council were occupied by the Roco group. The 1988
elections proved to be a turning point in the city’s political history as the
old families were slowly disappearing from the political arena. Vicente
Sibulo’s nephew, Mariano Sibulo and again, Virginia Felipe-Perez took
part in the mayoralty race but found very little support from the voters.
TAKESHI KAWANAKA 15

Rise of a New Politician

When Robredo became mayor, Villafuerte was elected as governor
of Camarines. Though the congressional seat was held by Roco,
Villafuerte, not Robredo, possessed greater influence in Naga City. The
predicted collision between Robredo started when Villafuerte tried to
override Robredo’s own style of management and administration of the
city.18 Jueteng, an illegal numbers game, was also a major source of
conflict. The involvement of one of Villafuerte’s son in jueteng operations
was an open secret19 and the mayor was anti-gambling.20 The resulting
rift created a three-way power struggle between Robredo, Villafuerte and
Roco.

The 1992 elections saw the birth of a Villafuerte-Roco coalition.

Villafuerte sought re-election for governorship, while Roco aimed for a trip
to the Senate. In Naga City, Villafuerte fielded his elder sister, Pura Luisa
V. Magtuto, in the mayoralty race under the LDP ticket along with Roco’s
city councilors. Meanwhile, Robredo found himself ousted from the LDP
due to his differences with Villafuerte but later decided to join future
president Fidel Ramos’ Lakas-NUCD as a founding member. The decision
proved crucial as the Villafuerte group claimed Robredo was not a Filipino
citizen and therefore unqualified for the post. Robredo needed an ally for
this post election controversy.21

The 1992 elections in Naga City turned into a cash war with the
Villafuerte camp setting up an incorporeal organization, "Bunyog Banuaan"
(unity of a town), which provided loans on the condition that if Magtuto
won, the recipients need not honor their debts. Aside from this, massive
vote buying was carried out.22 Robredo’s pockets were not as deep but
he was able to rely on local organizations and government institutions.
The result was a landslide victory for Robredo. Not only did he win re-
election by a big margin (33,487 votes to Magtuto’s 9,056 votes), but
also his vice-mayor and councilors swept the polls. Meanwhile, Villafuerte
lost his bid for another term as governor.In 1995, Robredo ran uncontested
and his ticket soundly defeated Villafuerte’s bets.

In 1998, Robredo was barred from seeking a third consecutive term

due to the constitutional limitation for local positions. As his uncle
anointed him, Robredo adopted Sulpicio “Cho” Roco, Jr, consultant for
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), as his
successor and formed a new coalition. For the Camarines Sur 2nd district
 16 PHILIPPINE LOCAL POLITICS IN TRANSITION

congressional race, Robredo endorsed the candidacy of progressive city

councilor, James Jacob. Villafuerte positioned his son Luis Raymund "L-
Ray" Villafuerte Jr. against Roco, and another son Mariano Jose “Bong”
Villafuerte III against Jacob. As in the previous elections, Villafuerte rode
on vote buying while Robredo leaned on organizations for support.29 The
result was also the same; Robredo vanquished Villafuerte.

Political Leaders

Who are the political leaders in Naga City? The profiles of political
leaders give a clue to analysis of local politics.

Mayors
While their family backgrounds differ, all of the mayors were born in
Naga City. Victorino Ojeda (1959-1963) and Ramon Felipe (1963-
1965) are from old landed wealthy families. Sibulo (1965-1979) is from
a professional family which was not originally from the region. Carlos Del
Castillo (1979-1988), is also from a middle class family. Robredo’s
parents were not landowners. Hence, after Sibulo, it seems landed elite
found the door closed to politics. This tendency is more obvious among
city councilors. Regarding their occupations, there is a shift from lawyers
(Ojeda, Felipe, Sibulo, Del Castillo) to management experts (Robredo,
Roco) (Table 2).

Table 2: Background of Mayors

Mayors Term Family Birthplace Education Occupation

Victorino Ojeda 1959-63 Landed Naga LlB Lawyer

Ramon Felipe 1963-65 Landed Naga LlB Lawyer
Vicente Sibulo 1965-79 Professional Naga LlB Lawyer
Carlos del Castillo 1979-88 n.a. Naga LlB Police/Lawyer
Jesse Robredo 1988-98 Business Naga MBA Business Exec.
Sulpicio Roco 1998- Agriculture Naga MA Consultant
Anthropology
TAKESHI KAWANAKA 17

Although it is not stated in the table, all Naga City mayors have a
politician kin. Ojeda, Felipe, del Castillo have fathers who were political
leaders (although del Castillo’s father was only municipal board member).
Sibulo’s father was also active in politics and his elder brother, Ramon,
was once appointed mayor of Naga City. And then, of course, Villafuerte
is Robredo’s distant uncle. Also, except for del Castillo, most of the
mayors did not previously occupy the position of city councilor. Mobility
between mayor and city councilor is low.

City Councilors
Regarding socio-economic status, most of the city councilors belong
to the middle class (more specifically the upper middle through the
author's observation). Among three councilors classified as A and B, only
one is involved in business; the other two are professionals. An examination
of occupations reveals that almost all of them are professionals such as
lawyers, medical doctors, and government employees. There are two ex-
barangay captains, but one of them is a lawyer. Another one was
Association of Barangay Captains chairperson before she was elected,
meaning she was an ex officio member of the city council even before she
got an elective position. Considering this, the mobility between city
councilors and barangay officials is not noticeable.

With respect to birth places, surprisingly, only three of them are from
Naga. Actually, among the three Naga-born councilors, only one has
parents who are natives of Naga. The other two migrated from other
municipalities. It is also noteworthy that they are not related to any
politician in Naga City, though almost half of them have politicians as their
kin in other places. Generally, city councilors in Naga City are professionals
belonging to middle class, and owe their status as city councilor to their
own capacity, not to kinship. One cannot find anybody from traditional
landed wealthy families among city councilors. Furthermore, except for
one councilor, representatives of the business elite cannot be found
either.

Barangay Captains
The background of 27 barangay captains are summarized in Table 3.
As compared with mayors and city councilors, barangay captains belong
to lower socio-economic groups. Nevertheless, those who belong to
classes D and E are not necessarily from barangays of urban poor areas.
 18 PHILIPPINE LOCAL POLITICS IN TRANSITION

Some barangays even have subdivisions where a middle class population

reside. Therefore, it is clear that people from middle and rich classes are
not interested in barangay matters.

Table 3: Background of Barangay Captains

Age No. Socio-economic No. Birthplace No.

status*

20-30 1 A&B 3 Naga 17

30-40 4 C 7 Outside Naga 10
40-50 11 D 7
50-60 9 E 10
60-70 2

Education No. Occupation No.** Politicians in Kin*** No.

Elementary 5 Engineer 3 Yes, in Naga 3

High School 2 Gov't. employee 2 Yes, outside 0
Undergraduate 8 Teacher 2 None 24
College graduate 11 Nurse 1
Units in Masters 1 Business (own) 11
Company employee 4
Agriculture 4
Barangay official only 1
Driver 1
Housewife 1
Barangay tanod 1
Barangay health worker 1

* Criteria are same as Table 2

** Usually, one has several occupations. Occupations before being elected captain are also counted.
Some captains are not involved in the occupations above as of interview.
*** Including barangay captain level
TAKESHI KAWANAKA 19

Among the barangay captains few are professionals and many are
involved in small business. In addition to this, 13 out of 27 Naga City
barangay captains have no occupations other than their elective posts.
They either resigned or retired from jobs they previously held. This shows
that the benefits derived from the post can sustain their households. It
is facilitated by the increase of local autonomy under the 1991 Local
Government Code.

Regarding birth places, not a few barangay captains are from outside
Naga. This indicates that barangay captains are elected based on their
personal capacity (like city councilors) and not by kinship. This argument
is also augmented by the data that show only a few barangay captains
having politicians as their kin.

Meanwhile, 15 out of the 27 barangay captains experienced the

position of barangay kagawad before being elected as captain. The
mobility among barangay officials is high.

The Robredo Style 1: City Governance and Organizations

There are several aspects which cannot be explained by previous

frameworks. In order to avoid simplification of the actual dynamism, this
paper does not adopt a key word to describe Robredo’s political style. This
paper simply refers to his manner of political mobilization as the Robredo
Style.

Robredo was able to institutionalize organizations of residents by

sectors, and incorporate them into the public services and city governance.
This is his most remarkable accomplishment. The highly institutionalized
organizations work as (1) a system to provide benefits to residents as part
of public service, (2) an instrument to maintain ward leader24 loyal to and
active in the Robredo administration, and lastly (3) a mechanism to
gather information. Then, in order to take care of the organizations,
Robredo set up some offices in the city government. These offices
facilitate the activities of organizations and provide several kinds of
assistance to the members thereof.
 20 PHILIPPINE LOCAL POLITICS IN TRANSITION

Lingkod Barangay Office and Organizations

After assuming the mayorship in 1988, Robredo started building
his own organizations. The existing ones were organized either by
Villafuerte or his henchman del Castillo. But as confrontation with
Villafuerte became inevitable, it became imperative for him to have his
own network. Robredo regularly roamed the city after office hours and
tried to establish contact and build personal relationships with ward
leaders. Aside from former Villafuerte’s leaders, he also tried to absorb
Roco’s leaders.

The previous mayors’ style of maintaining ward leaders in Naga was

neither well institutionalized nor organized. A political leader has to meet
with each ward leader personally, and ask for mobilization assistance
during an election period. Robredo realized the difficulties that come with
dealing with each leader, especially with their respective “requests,” but
kept close personal contact with them. Having organized them, Robredo
allowed the leaders to coordinate among themselves and at the same
time, set up their counterparts in the city government.25

The first organizations were Lakas ng Kababaihan and the Barangay

People’s Organization. Lakas ng Kababaihan is a women’s organization,
which was organized by Robredo’s wife, Maria Leonor in 1989, and
formalized just before the 1992 elections. The original membership of
5,000 has swelled to more than 15,000. The Barangay People’s
Organization started as the Barangay Precinct Organization in 1988, a
group of election precinct watchers. Robredo had 10 watchers in each
precinct and Naga had 321 precincts in 1992. It began with about 3,200
members active only during election time. In 1995, it was reorganized
into the Barangay People’s Foundation and with livelihood projects
among its activities, increased its membership to 6,000. Many of the
members of Lakas ng Kababaihan also belong to Barangay People’s
Organization, and they sometimes belong to other sector-based
organizations.

In 1992, the Lingkod Barangay Office was created to take care of

these organizations, and taking over the function of the Office of the
Mayor regarding organizations. Table 4 lists the organizations handled by
the Lingkod Barangay Office. Its functions can be summarized as follows.
During non-election time, it (1) organizes and maintains organizations by
facilitating the programs of each like induction, festival occasions, etc.;
TAKESHI KAWANAKA 21

Table 4: Organizations Handled by Lingkod Barangay Office

(as of 1997)

Name Membership Founded

Lakas ng Kababaihan ng Naga Federation 15,000 1989

Lakas ng Kababaihan Cooperative 5,000 n.a.
Senior Citizens League 10,000 1990
Naga City Youth Federation 3,000 1993
Rabuz Naga (zonal beautification group) n.a. 1994
Barangay People's Foundation* 6,000 1995
Padyak Operators & Drivers Association 2,000 1993
Trimobile Operators & Drivers Association 4,500 1994
Karatela Association 150 1993
Market Stallholders Federation 6,000 1960
Metro Naga Vendors Federation 1,000 1995
Vegetable Planters Federation 4,000 1993

*Formerly known as Barangay People's Organization founded 1988

Source: Lingkod Barangay Office

and (2) accepts and provides members’ request for assistance to them.
If the Lingkod Barangay Office itself cannot do this, it refers the requests
to the concerned department of the city government. Most of these
requests are so-called “indigent services” like medicine, medical check-
up, and funeral support. During election time it mobilizes organizations
for the support of administration, detects and solves the problems of
leaders in the organizations, sets the administration candidates’ schedule
of campaigning; gets feedback from members regarding the response of
residents towards city government and broadens the mass base by
recruiting new active ward leaders who transferred from other places or
reached legal age.

Most of the members of the organizations are from the lower income
groups. They are the ones who need the city government's public service
the most. Women are more committed to the activities of organizations
than men and play a more crucial role in mobilization at the ward level.26
 22 PHILIPPINE LOCAL POLITICS IN TRANSITION

The Urban Poor Affairs

Like in other urban centers, Naga has a huge urban poor population.
According to the city government, as of 1989, there are 5,500 families
regarded as squatters and slum dwellers in Naga City. They comprise
about 25 percent of the city population.27 As early as 1986, a non-
government organization known as the COPE Foundation arrived in Naga
City and started organizing the urban poor. Although it was able to
achieve some success in organizing some residents, it had to face
uncooperative, or sometimes antagonistic reaction from the del Castillo
administration. It was only when Robredo assumed the mayorship that
the city government became more supportive. Working together with
Robredo, urban poor organizations were established and provided
assistance to the residents, especially regarding land acquisition. In
1989, the city government set up the Urban Poor Affairs Office (UPAO)
to respond to the needs of urban poor residents. The membership of
Naga City Urban Poor Federation, which was founded in 1986, grew from
nine urban poor communities to more than 70 member organizations
during the Robredo administration.28

UPAO is different from Lingkod Barangay Office because it does not

initiate organizing. There is a so-called tripartite approach based on the
cooperation of the city government, NGOs and People’s Organizations.
Hence, the office has less political color. But UPAO’s projects have
tremendous impact on the perspective of the urban poor towards the city
government. By cooperating in organizing urban poor residents, their
demands became clear and it became easier for the city government to
respond as shown by the visible benefits it has provided to urban poor
residents. During the period from 1989 to 1997, the city government
disposed a total of 49.6 hectares of private- and government-owned
lands to a total of 4,668 urban poor families.29 Robredo’s policy towards
urban poor was well appreciated.30 This situation prepares the foundation
for mobilization by organizations handled by Lingkod Barangay Office.

DOLECOM
The Development Office for Livelihood, Employment, Cooperatives
and Manpower (DOLECOM) was formally established in 1992, but its
functions were handled by the City Planning and Development Office
TAKESHI KAWANAKA 23

Table 5: Livelihood Loans Released by DOLECOM

Year Amount Released Collection Efficiency(%) Beneficieries

1990 P 108,000 n.a. n.a. 127

1991 638,000 P44,253 6 1,009
1992 531,900 79,725 14 1,063
1993 2,036,625 676,522 33 1,063
1994 3,753,202 1,394,613 37 2,261
1995 4,376,500 2,257,465 51 2,824
1996 3,526,125 2,499,660 70 2,843

Source: DOLECOM 1997 Updated Office Briefer

since 1988. Among its functions, providing livelihood programs is the

most significant as it plays a crucial role in Robredo’s organizations.31

A loan of up to P15,00032 can be availed of by individual at an interest

rate of 1 percent per month, without collateral. Majority of the clients own
small businesses. Most of them are walk-in clients, and some are
referred by other offices like Lingkod Barangay Office and the Mayor’s
Office. DOLECOM also provides loans to livelihood projects of Lakas ng
Kababaihan.

However, it must be emphasized that DOLECOM was not created for

any political purpose.33 This kind of public service is badly needed by the
residents of Naga considering their present situation. A livelihood
program is the most important concern and its lending policy is a great
relief to those who cannot avail of loans from private financial institutions.
DOLECOM also performs well as a financial institution since it was able
to collect payments from 70 percent of its clients in 1996 (Table 5).

City Social Welfare Office

The field office of Department of Social Welfare and Development
transferred to the city government under the scheme of devolution as
 24 PHILIPPINE LOCAL POLITICS IN TRANSITION

provided for by the 1991 Local Government Code. Like DOLECOM it

provides assistance to Robredo’s organizations.

As mentioned above, the so-called indigent assistance is indispensable

to maintain organizations. The City Social Welfare Office handles 70
cases, and releases P10,000 per month on the average. Indigent
assistance is mainly composed of providing free medicine and funeral
support. These two are most in demand, and therefore appreciated by the
low income class. Most of the cases are referred by Lingkod Barangay
Office and some city officials like the mayor and city councilors.34 The
budget for the indigent assistance comprises 58 percent of the budget
of the office excluding personal services.35

Robredo Style 2: Performance and Approachability

The Robredo style has both hard and soft aspects. The hard aspect
involves the incorporation of organizations in the city government while
the soft aspect pertains to the resident’s perception of Robredo’s
performance and personal character. Through interviews with 27 barangay
captains and 28 ward leaders (leaders of Lakas ng Kababaihan and
Barangay People’s Foundation), two expressions emerged as reasons for
supporting Robredo in their discourses. One is “Maganda ang
pamamalakad niya,” and another is “Madali siyang lapitan.”36 These are
interpreted as “good performance” and “approachability,” respectively.37

Performance of Mayor/City Government

There is no question about the good performance of the Robredo
administration.38 Numerous innovations and projects were implemented
during Robredo’s terms. Actually, Robredo had already prepared a
development scheme for Naga City even before running for mayor. His
last project as BRBDP director was the development planning of Naga
City.39 He also brought with him some technocrats from BRBDP specifically
to plan and implement the development scheme.

Robredo summarized his three terms as follows:

First term was basically building the foundations for the city hall. We did
not have enough money, but we told ourselves that we should build the
right attitude as far as people are concerned. And during my first term
TAKESHI KAWANAKA 25

it was a learning period. We focused on what is the most important for

the people of the city. During my second term, we had access to more
resources. We focused more on infrastructure building. All the roads in
the city were paved except those going to the mountains. We built new
schools... hand in hand with this is our constituency from the urban
poor. We have one of the strongest urban poor...in the country. My third
term focuses on sustaining development in the city. We are more open
on quality rather than getting everything. We have defined our role in
relation to other towns and the city. We’ve defined our role in relation
to the development of the region. So, we are focusing more on banking
service. We are focusing on quality education, we are focusing on
preventive health care. We are taking a look at cleaning the rivers,
improving the sewage management. These things are more on creating
a healthy environment, a high quality of life rather than just the purpose
of having.40

However, there are some questions about the content of “good

performance” and, moreover, “development.” There are varying
perceptions toward these depending on the individual’s socio-economic
class. Generally, the middle class tends to look at performance in terms
of integrity of governance (no graft and corruption), public safety (peace
and order situation), and increase of investments in the city. But, lower
income class takes performance as cementing roads, or several kinds of
assistance being provided by the city government.41 Nonetheless,
Robredo’s administration was able to show performance in both contexts.
It may be pointed out that some of the business elite in the city are not
contented with Robredo’s administration. The main issue is tax.42

Although the tax rate was not increased, the amount of tax,
especially real property tax, increased because the market value of land
went up along with Naga’s booming economy. Regarding the differences
of perception according to class, Robredo himself explains:

Most of the middle class are professionals. I guess, they are to a certain
point are happy with what we are doing. That is my gauge basically.
Normally, during election time, we do not campaign in the subdivisions.
The reason why we do that is because these people have made up their
minds. They hardly care. What is important to them is I collect garbage,
pave the streets, provide lights and other facilities. What is important
to them is they see their taxes are well spent. So, we hardly campaign
 26 PHILIPPINE LOCAL POLITICS IN TRANSITION

Table 6: Revenue and Expenditures

Year Cash Inflow Increase Cash Outflow Administration

1977 P 6,844,720.72 P 6,084,364.94 Sibulo

1980 16,194,605.58 11,631,643.97 1st year of del Castillo
1987 19,254,111.62 18.9% 20,203,764.49 last year of del Castillo
1988 25,213,484.46 23,203,746.49 1st year of Robredo
1991 60,964,191.89 141.8% 59,897,837.52 Naga returned to 1st class city
1993 126,344,646.26 107.2% 107,982,744.62 Increase of IRA by LGC
1996 188,845,116.48 177,950,634.17

Source: City Planning and Development Office, Naga City Statistical Profile, n.d.

in the subdivision but we get normally 80 to 90 percent of their vote.

But there are big businessmen in the city who are not happy with me
personally. Because you know, we have always insisted, since 1988,
that people should pay taxes. And whether you like it or not, we will do
it. Some people are very happy with us. And again, it’s a matter of
choice. Whether we allow them to cheat the government, or we make
them unhappy. But we get the results we want. Basically the principle
in taxing them is a means of transferring wealth. They have taken
advantage of the growth of the city. If there is one group who benefitted
from the economic developments in the city, it's basically the
businessmen. So, we are saying that you have an obligation to return
to the constituents the benefits of taxes.43

Discussing performance, the increase of revenue is regarded as

Robredo’s first achievement. When Robredo assumed his post, Naga City
was a third class city in terms of revenue. He improved the tax collection
system including a stricter assessment of the tax base. Before the
implementation of the 1991 Local Government Code, Naga was able to
improve to the status of a first class city. As Table 6 shows, the city
government's revenue drastically increased from 1988 to 1991.
TAKESHI KAWANAKA 27

The increase of investment is also noteworthy. Although such

increase cannot be solely attributed to the governance of Robredo since
the activities of the private sector also contributed to this, the cooperative
attitude of the city government provided a conducive atmosphere for the
increase. Proof of this is the increase in the number of business
establishments in Naga City from 2,397 in 1988 to 4,710 in 1997.44

Improvements in road construction were very visible. Table 7 shows

the road inventory, and it can be seen that the number of concrete roads
significantly increased during Robredo's administration. The cement-
paved paths in urban poor areas are especially appreciated by slum
residents to whom a cemented road is almost synonymous to development.

Aside from these, there are countless award winning projects like the
“Productivity Improvement Program,” a scheme designed to improve
effectiveness of management of the city government; “Government
Computerization Program,” “Metro Naga Development Council,”

Table 7: Road Inventory (in kms)

Type 1977 % 1987 % 1996 %

Concrete 20.121 14 36.174 23 114.850 71

Asphalt 42.968 31 61.935 40 20.225 12
Gravel 49.482 36 53.882 35 20.442 12
Unsurfaced 25.766 19 3.348 2 8.553 5
Total 138.337 100 155.879 100 164.070 100

Source: Naga City Government, Restoring Pride in the Nagueño, The State of the
City Report, n.d.
 28 PHILIPPINE LOCAL POLITICS IN TRANSITION

“Emergency Rescue Naga,” and “Naga Kaantabay sa Kauswagan,” a

housing and urban development project. These projects might not be
easily recognized by ordinary residents, but the awards they received are
indicative of the capability of the Robredo administration. Among the
ward leaders the honors that easily come to mind include “The Outstanding
Young Persons (TOYP) of the World” given by the Junior Jaycees
International in 1994 and “Ten Outstanding Young Men (TOYM) of the
Philippines” given by the Junior Jaycees Philippines in 1991.45

Robredo does not ignore the significance of awards. He formed a

“propaganda group” from members of the BRBDP and local media. They
prepared articles about these awards, and sent them to the national
media. This “propaganda group” played a very crucial role during
elections as well. They drew strategies to counter opponents’ black
propaganda and misinformation campaign.46

Approachability
Robredo is often seen in a T-shirt and shorts at the city hall. One does
not need to make an appointment to see him. The process of meeting
the mayor involves entering his room and waiting for one’s turn. Robredo
walks the street like a normal resident and plays basketball with the
children. These help make people see Robredo as a very approachable
mayor. Past mayors were not as open to contact. One ward leader recalls
the time when she wanted to talk to Mayor Sibulo, she was only allowed
to talk to his driver. Another ward leader said Mayor del Castillo always
wore barong tagalog and never met with people who did not have an
appointment. There is a talk going around that Ms. Magtuto during her
failed bid in the 1992 elections washed her hands with alcohol after
shaking hands with residents.

Approachability is closely related with organizing people, especially

people from the lower income class. On this Robredo said:

We are one of the best organized. I guess, our secret really is not just
our performance, I think it's the organization. Although we do perform
well, without a good organization I can not win a straight ticket.47

Adding:
TAKESHI KAWANAKA 29

You know I put a lot of time on it (organization). I never refuse any

invitations. If I’m alone, I pay visits. I suppose the advantage of being
like this is that people can approach you and just tell you anything. I can
joke with young people. I enjoy talking to anybody. In fact, sometimes
my meetings extend beyond what is necessary. And most of these are
small talk only. Let’s say for instance, the official agenda should cover
only 30 minutes. But sometimes for more than an hour you are talking
nonsense already. It’s just an exchange of banter. And people like it, I
guess. I have been to the farthest place in the city. I’ve been to a place
where no other mayor has been. In fact, my only constraint right now
is that I got a lot of assignments. I hold a lot of positions. So, this, to
a certain extent, controls my schedule. But, if not for that, almost every
night, I am out.48

Conclusion

The study of local politics in Naga indicates the following points.

Firstly, there has been a change in the city’s leaders, particularly

their background. From the 1960s to the 1970s, leaders came from the
old landed wealthy families (Ojeda, Felipe). In the 1980s, there emerged
a leader (Villafuerte) backed by state power and utilized the relations with
Malacañang to achieve political success and employed fraudulent
means to stay in power. This same leader hung on to power despite the
fall of his original benefactor by allying himself with the new regime. But
with Robredo, came the dawn of a new leadership. Not dependent on
wealth or state influence, Robredo introduced a new political framework.
The administrations of Ojeda, Felipe and Sibulo may be explained by the
patron-client framework. On the other hand, Villafuerte may fit the
framework of patrimonialism/bossism. Robredo came in with a political
machine factor, but has several attributes which have been missed by
previous frameworks like good performance and aproachability. At any
rate, what should be emphasized here is that there is no framework
covering all the past leaders in Naga. The political styles shifted as leaders
changed. However, there are some similarities among them. One, most
of the leaders have influential politicians in their kin. Two, some of them
have development-oriented tendencies regardless of their socio-economic
origin. Felipe was a lawyer who later became Minority Floor Leader of the
House of Representatives and Comelec Chairman. Sibulo devised a
development scheme and built the public market. Villafuerte was a
 30 PHILIPPINE LOCAL POLITICS IN TRANSITION

successful lawyer in the field of investment banking. Naga was accustomed

to capable administrators, and this worked when Robredo came in the
political arena.49

Secondly, there is separation of economic and political elite in the

city. Robredo comes from a Chinese business family that was not part of
the dominant business elite. Almost all of the city councilors are
professionals from the middle class, except for one who comes from a
rich business family. This situation was not implied in previous frameworks.
In Naga, there are roughly two types of economic elite. One depends on
the leasing of land in the commercial area, while the other is basically
involved in commerce, like trading and retail. The former includes the
Abella, Felipe, Diaz, Jimenez, and Sison families, mostly of Spanish
descent. The latter includes the Tan, Enrile, Lee, Sia, Biedo, Prieto,
Bichara, Ohvan families, mostly Chinese. In terms of the number, the
latter is more than the former. The De Guzman family is also prosperous,
but it is neither Spanish nor Chinese.50 This rich class is not directly
involved in politics nowadays or even if they ran for elective positions, they
do not win on the basis of their socio-economic status alone.51

Thirdly, with regard to the birth place of political leaders, while all
mayors were born in Naga, most of the city councilors and many of the
barangay captains are from other places. Even among the ward leaders
who were interviewed, 17 out of 28 are from outside of Naga. This shows
that kinship is not a crucial factor in mobilization. Needless to say, this
situation is created because of Naga’s urban setting, especially, the
migration of population. But the fact that all mayors have politicians as
kin indicates that it is necessary or, at least an advantage to do so in order
to win the mayorship. On the contrary, city councilors and barangay
captains do not need this factor as shown in the data. This discrepancy
regarding politicians as kin between mayors and city councilors/barangay
captains can be explained by the low mobility of mayor and city
councilors/barangay captains. No mayor, except for del Castillo,
experienced being city councilor. It implies that there are different
standards or criteria in electing a mayor and city councilor. This is also
observed in the case of city councilors and barangay captains.

Fourthly, Robredo's style is composed of mainly two aspects, namely

performance and approachability. There is no doubt that the organizations
and the city government’s support are the main pillars of Robredo’s
TAKESHI KAWANAKA 31

political mobilization. The question is whether these organizations are

political machines. Basically, they are. Organizations work as routes to
distribute patronage to ward leaders and residents in a sense, and
members are required to be loyal to the Robredo administration. In
addition to this, the fact that the members are mostly urban poor is a
typical feature of the machine like the one which appeared in urban cities
of the U.S. They are not civic groups, definitely. But there should be a
reservation in the discussion. It should be noted that there is no
corruption. Members of the organizations are provided formal public
services, not private favors. As regards the services, even non-members
can avail of them. On the other hand, if the qualification required for
receiving the benefits are not satisfied, even members cannot enjoy the
services.52 The difference between members and non-members is that
the members have easier access to the city government, since they
already have connections. Moreover, the provided services must meet
the needs of the constituency as public policy. If this is seen from the view
point of public administration, utilizing residents’ organization is the
effective way to provide public services to people, rather than dealing with
them individually. Demands become clearer and more organized within
the organizations. Most importantly, Robredo basically does not allow
benefits to be doled out. Although there are indigent services, others like
livelihood loans and land acquisition are not provided for free. In short,
Robredo’s organizations have two aspects, one as a political machine,
and another as an instrument of effective public administration.

Fifthly, the perplexing aspect of the Robredo style is the perception

of residents toward performance and personality, and its impact on
political mobilization. In the first place, the problem with this aspect is
consciousness. Hence, it is not easy to prove the causal relationship
between their perceptions and political mobilization. The expressions of
“Maganda ang pamamalakad niya" and “Madali siyang lapitan" are
almost fixed expressions. Through the interviews, it appears that ward
leaders do not have abundant vocabulary to describe their perceptions.
So, there is a certain limitation to the discussion on residents’ behavior
which is merely based on some expressions found in their discourses.
However, in the case of Robredo, it is easily proved that he has good
performance and approachability as shown above. So, the probability
that these two factors motivate residents to support Robredo is quite
high. In addition, the previous mayors are not as good as Robredo in these
 32 PHILIPPINE LOCAL POLITICS IN TRANSITION

aspects, therefore, performance and approachability distinguish him

from others.

The second question is that even good performance and

approachability eventually provide material benefits. Good performance
elevates the standard of the residents’ life, and approachability makes
residents’ access to resources easier. On that account, it is possible to
discuss that political mobilization is attained by means of materialistic
benefits, not by idealistic admiration, in the end. This issue has to be
scrutinized further. Nevertheless it is clear that the residents prefer the
long term benefits provided as public services to short term benefits like
money and goods provided as vote buying activities during the election
period. In other words, residents know that the former benefits are more
substantial than the latter. Here, it should be emphasized that this
situation was not created by residents’ spontaneous awareness, but by
Robredo’s initiative and determination. In short, Robredo performed and
people learned.

Robredo's style is successful in the circumstances shown above, and

in more general terms, within the urban setting. At the same time,
Robredo's style has complex feature in itself which cannot be explained
by previous frameworks. There is a complicated web of causal relations.
Deliberate study is still needed in the field of local politics. ❁
TAKESHI KAWANAKA 33

Endnotes
1 But some have already pointed out the significance of moral appeals. See Mark M.
Turner, “Politics During the Transition in Zamboanga City, 1984-1988,” in Benedict J.
Kerkvliet and Resil B. Mojares eds., From Marcos to Aquino: Local Perspectives on
Political Transition in the Philippines (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press,
1991), pp. 13-35; Mark R. Thompson, The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule
and Democratic Transition in the Philippines (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1995), pp.29-32.
2 James Scott, “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” American
Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No.1, March 1972, p.32.
3 Carl Lande, Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics (New
Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), p. 2.
4 Ibid., p. 17.
5 Thomas C. Norwak and Kay A. Snyder, “Clientist Politics in the Philippines: Integration
or Stability?” American Political Science Review, Vol. 68, No. 3, September 1974; and
Thomas C. Norwak and Kay Snyder, “Economic Concentration and Political Change in
the Philippines,” in Benedict J. Kerkvliet ed., Political Change in the Philippines:
Studies of Local Politics Preceeding Martial Law (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii,
1974).
6 K. G. Machado, “Changing Aspects of Factionalism in Philippine Local Politics,” Asian
Survey, No. 11, December 1971, p.1183.
7 Willem Wolters, Politics, Patronage and Class Conflict in Central Luzon (Quezon City:
New Day Publishers, 1984), pp. 198-199.
8 John Thayer Sidel, Coercion, Capital, and The Post-Colonial State: Bossism in The
Postwar Philippines, Ph. D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1995, pp.42-43.
9 Though Sidel deals with Cebu City as one of the cases in his dissertation (Sidel,
Coercion, Capital and the Post- Colonial State, pp. 137-221). On the other hand, the
political machine framework recognizes the importance of commercialization, but it still
discusses this phenomena in rural setting.
10 Data of 1995, Naga City Planning and Development Office, Naga City Statistical
Profile, n. d.
11 Interview with Mayor Ojeda’s youngest son, Paco, Naga City, March 17, 1998.
12 Republic of the Philippines, Sixth Congress Official Directory of the House of Represen-
tatives, 1965-1969, Editorial and Publication Service, House of Representatives,
1997, pp.79-80.
13 Interview with former Naga City mayor and incumbent Human Rights Commissioner
Vicente Sibulo, Pasig City, October 28, 1997.
14 Interview with Atty. Alfredo Tria, Camarines Sur Provincial Administrator, Naga City,
August 3, 1997.
15 Robredo’s grandfather (father side) and Villafuerte’s mother have a common father, but
different mothers. When Robredo was studying at De La Salle University, he stayed at
Villafuerte’s residence in Makati. Interview with Mayor Jesse Robredo, Naga City,
August 19, 1997.
16 This anti-Villafuerte coalition was formed by gubernatorial candidate Felix "Nancing"
Alfelor, Jr. and was composed of some members of the UNIDO, Liberal Party, PDP-
Laban in Camarines Sur and Naga City.
17 Interview with Commissioner Vicente Sibulo, Pasig City, October 28, 1997.
18 A barangay reported that Villafuerte on several occassion was seen scolding Robredo
at the Naga City Hall and Provincial Capital regarding city administration.
 34 PHILIPPINE LOCAL POLITICS IN TRANSITION

19 Michael Dueidas, "Maceda exposes ‘unholy alliance' in Bicol: PC Top Brass Coddling
Gambling Lords?” Philippine Free Press, September 19, 1989, pp.6-7.
20 Robredo pointed out that this issue is one that he cannot tolerate. Interview with Mayor
Jesse Robredo, Naga City, August 19, 1997.
21 Interview with Mayor Jesse Robredo, Naga City, August 19, 1997.
22 This was confirmed by several interviewees, though their names cannot be disclosed.
Allegedly, P500 (maximum amount) was distributed to each family at the last phase of
elections. According to a reliable source, the Villafuerte camp spent a total of P10-12
million for city elections. On the other hand, it is not clear how much the Robredo camp
spent for elections because resources of the city government cannot be counted as his
own expenditures. According to a source person in Robredo’s group, approximately P1
million was spent. But another source mentioned P5 million as a realistic estimate of
Robredo’s campaign expenses. It is assumed that the real amount may be between the
two figures.
23 However, this time, more sophisticated tactics were used in addition to the convention-
al method of distributing money and grocery items (rice, coffee, milk, noodles etc.) by
visiting each house. The Villafuerte camp reportedly distributed a paper marked
"Application for Precinct Aide” during the election campaign period. When a resident
signs the paper, he receives P100. And on the eve of voting, Villafuerte set up a
distributing center inside the campus of University of Nueva Caceres. If a resident brings
this application, another P100 or a bag of groceries is given.
24 In Naga, a ward leader is merely called "leader." The word "lider" is not commonly used
at least in the city. See, Mary Hollsteiner, The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine
Municipality, Community Development Research Council, University of the Philippines,
1963, p.41.
25 Before this system was set up, many people go directly to the mayor to get assistance.
When the office's capacity failed to keep up with the requests, this system was put in
place. Interview with Mr. Vic Cabrera, Chief of Lingkod Barangay Office, Naga City,
August 11, 1997.
26 Interview with Mr. Aton Nabua, Officer, Lingkod Barangay Office, Naga City, August 18,
1997.
27 Naga City Government, Restoring Pride in the Nagueño: The State of the City Report,
n. d.
28 Interviews with Mr. Nathan Sergio, Chief of Urban Poor Affairs Office, Naga City, April
8, 1997, August 19, 1997; Mr. Honesto Perez, Sr., President of Naga City Urban Poor
Federation, Naga City, August 24, 1997; Mrs. Salve Almania-Cadag, Community
Organizer, COPE Foundation, Naga City, September 1, 1997. Jocelyn Vicente Angeles,
“The Role of the Naga City Urban Poor Federation in the Passage of Pro-Poor
Ordinances and Polices," in Marlon A. Wui, Ma.Glenda S. Lopez, eds., State, Civil
Society Relations in Policy-Making (Quezon City, Third World Studies Center, 1997).
29 Naga City Government, Restoring Pride in the Nagueño, The State of the City Report.
City Government provides assistance under the scheme of either (1) direct purchase,
(2) land swapping, (3) land sharing, (4) land sharing, or (5) community mortgage.
30 However, there was a disputed case in 1997. The area called Marasigan in Barangay
Sabang was once declared a blighted area, which means people in the place cannot be
relocated. But the city government allowed the dwellers relocation to a nearby location.
As a consequence, Robredo’s annointed mayoral candidate, Roco, lost in Bgy. Sabang
in the 1998 elections.
31 Interviews with Mr. Florencio Tan Mongoso, Jr., Chief, DOLECOM, Naga City, August
14, 1997; Mr. Wilfredo C. Moraño III, Livelihood Program Officer, DOLECOM, Naga City,
August 25, 1997.
TAKESHI KAWANAKA 35

32 The available loan is between P1,000 to P3,000, upon application, and between
P3,000 to P5,000 upon renewal. Fifteen thousand is the maximum limit for individual
clients.
33 Regardless of the non-political intentions of DOLECOM, it can be utilized for political
purposes. For example, loans (under City Planning and Development Office at that
time) were provided to some crucial ward leaders in order to counter the virtual vote
buying of Magtuto’s Bunyog Banuaan in 1992 elections, according to reliable sources.
34 Interview with Ms. Minnie Palacio, Chief, City Social Welfare Office, Naga City, August
20 and 29, 1997.
35 Naga City, Annual Budget CY 1997, p.34.
36 Interviews with Barangay Captains and ward leaders were conducted in Tagalog.
37 These two factors were also pointed out by the City Information Officer. He used the
words “performance" and “human relations." Interview with Mr. Joselito del Rosario,
City Information Officer, Naga City, November 27, 1997.
38 Some critics of Robredo claim that Naga could have developed even without Robredo
because of the potential of the city, the devolution and development plans formulated
by previous administrations. It is hard to verify this statement since it is a historical “if.”
But by saying this, the critics also admit that there has been development under
Robredo’s administration. Interview with Blandino Maceda, Provincial Local Govern-
ment Operations Officer of Camarines Sur, Naga City, November 22, 1996. Interview
with Gil Basmayor, DZGE Radio broadcaster, Canaman, Camarines Sur, November 23,
1996.
39 Interview with Councilor Gabriel Bordado, Jr., Naga City, September 4, 1997. Councilor
Bordado transferred from BRBDP to the City Government with Robredo and played a
crucial role as City Administrator.
40 Discussion with Mr. Frank Mendoza, Program Coordinator, Metro Naga Development
Council, was very insightful regarding this point. Naga City, May 11, 1998.
41 Interview with Mr. Antonio Concepcion, Chairman of Metro Naga Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry, Naga City, November 28, 1997. But on the other hand, one of the
officials of the chamber said, “You will not find a businessman that will say their taxes
are low. All businessmen will say they are overtaxed. But, if you compare with other
cities, we might be lower or competitive.” Interview with Mr. Fidel Yu, Board Secretary,
Metro Naga Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Naga City, August 21, 1997.
42 Interview with Mayor Jesse Robredo, Naga City, August 19, 1997.
43 Naga City Government, Restoring Pride in the Nagueño: The State of the City Report.
44 As of 1997, Naga City has won one international award, 25 national awards, 12
regional awards for its programs and projects. Robredo himself has earned seven
awards as of December 1996. “A City of Innovations and Excellence,” Philippine Daily
Inquirer, December 18, 1996.
45 Interview with Councilor Gabriel Bordado, Jr., Naga City, September 4, 1997; and Mr.
Frank Mendoza, Naga City, November 27, 1997. Bordado and Mendoza have been key
persons in the propaganda group.
46 Interview with Mayor Jesse Robredo, Naga City, August 19, 1997.
47 Interview with Mayor Jesse Robredo, Naga City, August 19, 1997.
48 Interview with Mayor Jesse Robredo, Naga City, August 19, 1997.
49 Robredo said that the deciding factor in his victory against Ramon Roco in 1988 was
his well-prepared development scheme which he earlier presented during the Public
Forum for mayoral candidates before the elections. Interview with Robredo, August 19,
1997. This was also mentioned by Councilor Bordado. Interview with Councilor Gabriel
Bordado, Jr., Naga City, September 4, 1997.
 36 PHILIPPINE LOCAL POLITICS IN TRANSITION

50 It is very difficult to determine who are the rich in the city based on figures. The author
tried to find them out at the City Assessor’s Office and Treasurer's Office. However,
since most of them set up companies to operate businesses like trading and retail, and
even the title of the lands are placed under different names, it was impossible. It is also
surprising that some of the land titles are registered under the names of dead persons.
The names of the rich families are indicated by a high ranking official of the city
government.
51 A member of De Guzman family was city councilor with Robredo group. But he bolted
the group and ran for vice-mayor in 1998 elections and lost. Likewise, members of the
Sison and Bichara families ran in the same elections and also lost.
52 The qualifications depend on what service is sought. For instance, to get indigent
services, income level has to be below a certain level.