Prince Aian G.

Villanueva
Graduate Student, The Department of Political
Patronage Politics and Clientelism
Science, De La Salle University, 2401 Taft Avenue,
Manila, The Philippines in Housing Welfare: The Case of
E-mail: nuevazz@yahoo.com
Jessa Nicole P. Salazar Gawad Kalinga (GK) Villages in
Civil Aeronautics Board, CAB Bldg., Old MIA
Road, Pasay City, The Philippines
E-mail: icko.1209@gmail.com
Parañaque City, The Philippines
Recieved 20 February 2015; Accepted 22 July 2015
http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2015.0013

ABSTRACT Politics typically revolves around personalities rather than

Patronage politics has become a defining charac- programs or proposals, and serve usually as means of
teristic of the Philippine political landscape.
patronage (Quimpo, 2005). Patronage politics has always
Clientelism, a form of patronage, is often studied as
disadvantageous in governance and democratic been viewed as a negative practice and it has become a
consolidation. While the patron-client framework defining characteristic of the Philippine political landscape.
remains the most influential among schools of Patronage includes clientelism, wherein politicians
thought that explain Philippine politics, transforma-
prioritize their supporters in terms of governmental
tions in a clientelist exchange are evident given
changes in political, cultural and economic settings. assistances. The political elite solicits the support of the
Using this frame of new clientelism, we look at and relatively powerful who draw authority and strength from
revisit the structure of patronage in the provision of the powerless voters for assistance. In return, these voters
housing welfare in the Philippines, focusing now on
are rewarded with the fruits of the influence and whatever
the roles of three important actors— the nongov-
ernmental organization, the state through the local else that was agreed upon (Kawanaka, 2012). It is then a
government and the recipients or beneficiaries— in form of inequality and it can be a network to political
an urban setting, thus deviating from the traditional dynasty, which is another prohibited practice. It has always
conception of patronage and clientelist politics. This
been seen as a rapport to corruption, red tape, and other
relationship of clientelist exchange is presented in
our Accomplice-Principal-Accessory (APA) model of
illegal practices such as nepotism or fixing (Chen & Will-
clientelism, with the local government unit of iams 2007). Patronage politics or personality politics also
Parañaque City as accomplice, the Gawad Kalinga involves the act of selecting or appointing persons to
(GK) as the principal agent, and the recipients or
certain positions disregarding qualifications of applicants or
beneficiaries as accessories in the provision of hous-
ing welfare.
appointees as it largely is preferential on the official. That
Keywords: housing welfare, local government, new is, relationships, personal or familial, become the bases of
clientelism, nongovernmental organization, patron- decision-making. Wilkin (2011) succinctly captured this
client relations patronage politics
when he claimed that it is an indicator of bad governance.
Patronage thus hinders the efficient management of
INTRODUCTION
political and economical resources of the state (UNDP:
One of the weakest institutions of the
Human Development Report, 2005). Hence, clientage is
Philippines is its political system as it is
often studied as disadvantageous in governance and demo-
dominated by leading political families.
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cratic consolidation. As such, as scholars of Philip- THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

pine politics aver, there is an urgency to strengthen Kaufman (1974), synthesizing the works of Lande
the country’s political system to eliminate patron- (1971), Scott (1972) and Powell (1974) pointed out
age (Magno, 1992; Rocamora, 2002; Teehankee, that patron-client relations are a special type of
2009; Quimpo, 2011; Rivera, 2011). dyadic exchange between actors of unequal power
While it is true that scholarship on patron-client and status and is based on the principle of reciproc-
ties dates back more than several decades, the ity. He further characterized the relationship as
patron-client framework remains the most influen- particularistic and private and are anchored only
tial among schools of thought that explain Philip- loosely in public law or community norms
pine politics (Kerkvliet, 1995). However, transfor- (Kaufman, 1974). The presence of this clientelist
mations in a clientelist exchange are evident given exchange between actors (patrons, brokers and
changes in political, cultural and economic settings clients) organized into pyramidal networks is in
(Hopkin, 2001; Park, 2008; Reid, 2008; Tomsa and general agreement with more recent work on the
Ufen, 2012) and it is under this purview that we extant literature on patronage. Auyero, Lapegna
look at and revisit the structure of patronage in the and Poma (2009), for example, looked at clientelism
provision of housing welfare in the Philippines, as the distribution or promise of resources by
focusing now on the roles of three important political officeholders or political candidates in
actors— the nongovernmental organization, the exchange for political support. Specifically, and
state through the local government and the recipi- consistent with this, Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007)
ents or beneficiaries— in an urban setting, thus emphasized that political clientelism is a form of
deviating from the traditional conception of transaction that involves the direct exchange of a
patronage and clientelist politics. Aside from this, citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or
we intend to contribute to the existing debate on continuing access to employment, goods and ser-
urban politics fulfilling what Johnston (1979) posed vices. This relationship, Park (2008) argued, devel-
as a challenge to urbanizing nations: how well ops neither by force nor by contract. Thus, volun-
patron-client organizations govern their cities is tary engagement characterizes these exchanges of
critical, as it will outline the urban future of much benefits. Clearly, as Trantidis (2013) put, clientelism
of humanity. emerges from two interrelated political processes,
The article is organized as follows. The first which are competition for office and competition
section reviews briefly the extant literature and for access to resources distributed by political power.
theoretical considerations on patronage and The above definitions of clientelism fall under
clientelism. The methods used in the study then what is referred to as “old clientelism” or
follows. The presentation of how the clientelist “clientelism of the notables” which is characteristic
exchange transpires in the housing welfare is next. of traditional rural societies. In contrast, “new”
The final part concludes through a presentation of forms of clientelism involve that where an orga-
our accomplice-principal-accessory (APA) model of nized political party that uses state resources to win
clientage. the client’s vote takes up the role of the notable.

Patronage Politics and Clientelism in Housing Welfare: The Case of Gawad Kalinga (GK) Villages in Parañaque City, The Philippines /PRINCE AIAN G. VILLANUEVA, JESSA NICOLE P. SALAZAR
http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2015.0013
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Furthermore, this clientelism is a less unequal and ment, and the voting public? What type of relations
personalized and more openly materialistic than are produced and eventually recur in these arrange-
that of the old (Hopkin, 2001). This change in ments? How, if at all, does a non-governmental
clientele networks may well be reflective of what organization encourage patronage? How does the
Park (2008) believed is a function of the changes of state through the local government participate in
social configuration reflecting political and socio- this kind of exchange? These questions are left
economic development. Kitschelt (2000) argued in unresolved in the study of clientelism and these
his study of linkages between citizens and politi- guide us in understanding “new” clientelism in
cians that clientelist and programmatic linkage housing welfare in a highly urbanized Philippine
mechanisms must be considered as equivalents as city.
they have the capacity to organize and institutional-
ize relations of democratic accountability and CLIENTELIST POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE
responsiveness. He further pointed out that Clientelism is seen as a bond of reliance and
clientelist democracy has proved durable and has control based on power differences and inequality.
entrenched itself for long periods in a variety of The connection involves two services- instrumental
polities. Similarly, Tomsa and Ufen (2012) con- (e.g. economical and political) and sociational or
tended that in Southeast Asia, in the Philippines expressive (e.g. loyalty and solidarity). The former is
particularly, clientelism is resilient and highly provided by the top (patron) through a broker
adaptable to a range of political, economic and while the latter is directly given by the bottom
cultural settings and instead of disappearing, it has (client/s) (Auyero, Lapegna & Page Roma, 2009).
transformed into a more complex pattern of Caprara, et al (2006) provided this in their study
exchange. Apart from this, it is critical to empha- arguing that voters tend to decide based on per-
size that Reid’s (2008) statement, that the civil sonal preferences. According to them, modern
society, specifically nongovernmental organizations, politics had become more personalized, and politi-
is by itself a sphere where clientelism and cal choice was affected by two aspects of personality-
semiclientelism predominate given that well- traits and personal values. The reason behind these
intentioned NGO personnel who previously had a changes was the declining distinctiveness, diversity
critical stance towards clientelism would later on and extremity in the parties. Most of the platforms
ultimately become absorbed by these relationships, or goals presented by the parties were similar, so
is also an important evidence of the transforma- voters end up voting candidates or parties with
tion in clientelist politics. As he argued, as more favorable attitude towards them as voters. This was
overt forms of co-optation and authoritarianism somehow a form of subjectivity or bias because
are reduced, more subtle methods of instead of voting for the skilled one, you opt for
neoclientelism emerge. the closest one to you. It was a mild form of nepo-
Given these changes, how then do we character- tism or favoritism. The study concluded the su-
ize clientelism that exists among non-governmental premacy of values over traits. For people, particu-
organizations, the state through the local govern- larly voters, it was more important for leaders to

Patronage Politics and Clientelism in Housing Welfare: The Case of Gawad Kalinga (GK) Villages in Parañaque City, The Philippines /PRINCE AIAN G. VILLANUEVA, JESSA NICOLE P. SALAZAR
http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2015.0013
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have broad goals to which people attribute as continued that the allocation of public resources
general guiding principles. People put much impor- according to criteria of political affiliation does
tance on integrity. Adding to that, people wanted a not correspond well with traditional standards of
leader that they can trust, so this led to the practice democracy and good governance. As in Asia, this
of political patronage or patronage politics. People link is also evident in Eastern Europe and Africa.
chose according to friendship, family ties or favorit- In Russia, for example, patronage may have been
ism. re-orientated but they have not disappeared. As
The link between governance, clientelism and Hosking (2000) identified, during the
democracy has been prominent in the extant privatization process, personal connections were
literature. For instance, Chen and Williams (2007) more important than ever. Present-day Russian
examined the connection between political support state and political economy are marked by ele-
and red tape. According to them, red tape con- ments of patronage and clientelism. Moreover, in
noted wasteful and inefficient processes, excessive Uganda, reforms from the IMF and World Bank
bureaucracy, and inflexible organizational struc- were meant to curtail patronage opportunities
tures and professional practices. The study showed but the wide discretion given to the governing
that political support in terms of trust, confidence elites in the implementation has led to the
and provision of administrative autonomy pro- contrary: donor reforms initiated under struc-
vided conditions conducive to development and tural adjustment have not resulted to a smaller
maintenance of developmental culture that pro- state or in fewer public resources as initially set
motes learning, adaptation and innovation (Bo- (Mwenda and Tangri, 2005). Similarly, in Nige-
zeman and Kingsley, 1998). Hence, political sup- ria, the clientelistic chain serves as the channel
port diminished red tape. However, political through which development projects are imple-
support should not be too excessive to the point mented and thus rural underdevelopment
that it would become political patronage because persists in spite of a continual flow of develop-
that could lead to another conflict- corruption in ment work, services and goods (Omobowale and
form of nepotism and favoritism. Similarly, in the Olutayo, 2010). In Latin America, it is argued
study of Bangladesh’s transition to democracy, that inequality is built into the patron-client
Kochanek (2000) argued that a combination of relationship and it is key to understanding social
weak structures, patrimonial politics, personalized and political relationships as in clientship and
political parties, patron-client relationships and the citizenship and thus the crisis of democracy
absence of political consensus have resulted in a (Taylor, 2004). This is arguably the case as well of
partial democracy characterized by pervasive Argentina where symptoms of a heavily
corruption, absence of transparency and lack of clientelistic political culture is present given that
public accountability. In South India, Markussen low-income Argentines are in danger of being
(2010) posited that while political parties can be turned into political clients (Brusco, Nazareno
vehicles for economic and social development, they and Stokes, 2004) instead of active citizens.
can also serve as rent seeking instruments. He

Patronage Politics and Clientelism in Housing Welfare: The Case of Gawad Kalinga (GK) Villages in Parañaque City, The Philippines /PRINCE AIAN G. VILLANUEVA, JESSA NICOLE P. SALAZAR
http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2015.0013
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PATRONAGE AND PHILIPPINE POLITICS specifically violence, which is the reverse of recipro-
The Philippines is also a paradigmatic case of cal relations assumed by the patron-client frame-
clientelist politics. Scholars who emphasize on the work, thus offering bossism and warlordism as
clientelist nature of Philippine politics, specifically state-centered explanations of Philippine politics.
of elections and parties, aver that the culture of On a similar note, Quimpo (2005) emphasized
patronage has sustained the strong hold of patrons that the patron-client framework is a prominent
over clients over time; and this precluded parties interpretation of Philippine politics. However,
from differentiating themselves around political offering an alternative interpretation of Philippine
platforms. Teehankee (2009), for example, noted politics though his contested democracy that
that as personality-based organizations largely combines the frameworks of elite democracy and
organized around dominant local political clans democracy from below, he argued that the Philip-
and warlords, these parties are anchored on pine political landscape is characterized by a contes-
clientelistic relations leaving them devoid of tation between a patrimonial elite who has a
platform and ideology. Magno (1992) also claimed minimalist view of democracy and subordinate
that the political parties that developed in the classes and communities that cry for a more partici-
Philippines were mere institutional exemplifica- patory and egalitarian democracy.
tions of the patron’s vast networks of clients and Lande (2002) observed that while Philippine
their alliances at all levels of governance. This politics has changed since the early post-war years,
could perhaps be what Rivera (2011) pictured as in the rural areas, personalism and clientelism
the scenario where “[congressional representatives remain an important element of the country’s
and provincial governorships] positions serve as the electoral politics. Moreover, Kasuya (2005) also
nexus between national and local power by facilitat- posited that it is a widely accepted notion in the
ing patronage flows and rent-seeking activities”. scholarship in Philippine politics that the political
On a similar note, Rocamora (2002) pointed out landscape of the country is centered more on the
that these elites’ interests were institutionalized in exchange of patronage and favors among politi-
political parties and enabled the clan- and faction- cians, and between politicians and voters than on
based party system to remain impermeable of class partisan ties and/or the policy interests of voters.
based politics. The more recent body of literature on patron-
Scholars have described how these ties work in age stresses the possible functional aspects of a
the Philippines and other paradigmatic cases. patron-client exchange in the Philippines and the
Consistent with the definition of Kaufmann changes that go with it. Tadem (1998) for instance
(1974), Sidel (1997) noted that patron-client ties are contended that patronage politics has been one of
highly personalized, multifunctional, and affect- the reasons for the failure of government-initiated
laden. He further opined that social relations and cooperatives in the country. Moreover, Gonzalez
electoral politics in the Philippines are character- (2007) reiterated the influence of patronage in the
ized by the centrality of patron-client relations. Philippine political economy when he argued that
However, he pointed out the presence of force, clientelism is at the origin of path-dependence in

Patronage Politics and Clientelism in Housing Welfare: The Case of Gawad Kalinga (GK) Villages in Parañaque City, The Philippines /PRINCE AIAN G. VILLANUEVA, JESSA NICOLE P. SALAZAR
http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2015.0013
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budget restructuring in the country. Supporting Questions such as, “Honestly, do you have any
these functions of clientelism, the World Bank connection with the GK or probably, any politi-
suggested to limit the scope of patronage in public cian?” to determine the existence of patronage and
employment to reform the Philippine bureaucracy, “Do you think patronage politics is wrong?” to
giving way to a merit-based recruitment system in verify the points of view of the recipients on
the civil service. Eaton (2003) also maintained this clientage were asked to the respondents. Upon
when he claimed that over the course of the accumulating the data needed, after reading and
decades, in the Philippines, elite-dominated parties rereading of the interview transcripts, commonali-
mastered the politics of clientelism and as such, ties and variations of the respondents’ answers
non-governmental organizations are constrained to were initially identified. Through coding and open
influence the substance of the policy process. In coding, themes and categories were established,
electoral politics, Teehankee (2002) opined that from which discussion of answers to the research
clientelism and nepotism have reinforced the elitist questions on hand followed.
nature of Philippine elections and democracy.
Hedman (2010) succinctly captured this when she RESULT AND ANALYSIS
claimed that the possibilities and the promise of The existence of the patronage politics in our
further democratization in the Philippines have society is well established, yet illusive because often
continued to struggle against the familiar politics of it is seen as a detrimental factor in the political
clientelism, among many other obstacles. By and system. Based on the interviews and on the very
large, in the Philippines as in elsewhere, clientelism essence of patron-client framework, all three
entails patterns of service provision and resource entities commit patronage and serve as patrons
distribution that overprivilege some groups to the and clients, depending on the circumstances.
exclusion of others (Reid, 2008). However, even though all the bodies involved act
as patrons and clients at different situations, the
RESEARCH METHODS three themes that emerged the most are: the local
This research is a qualitative-descriptive one government of Parañaque is an accomplice, the
aimed to show the relationship between patronage Gawad Kalinga is a principal agent, and the recipi-
politics in housing programs and the urban poor in ents are accessories of patronage politics.
Parañaque City. Using in-depth interviews at cross-
sectional timeframes with 15 individuals consisting ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF PARAÑAQUE AS
of Gawad Kalinga (GK) block leaders, GK officials AN ACCOMPLICE OF PATRONAGE POLITICS
and LGU officials who were selected through An accomplice is the one that may assist or
purposive sampling technique, first-hand informa- encourage the principal agent with the intent to
tion regarding the perspectives of these individuals have the act committed, the same as the chief
on patronage politics in housing were gathered. actor. An accomplice may or may not be present
Because of the nature of the research, the names when the act is actually committed. The local
of the respondents were mindedly withheld. government of Parañaque is only an accomplice of

Patronage Politics and Clientelism in Housing Welfare: The Case of Gawad Kalinga (GK) Villages in Parañaque City, The Philippines /PRINCE AIAN G. VILLANUEVA, JESSA NICOLE P. SALAZAR
http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2015.0013
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clientelism because it has the same intentions with recipients. For the GK, the LGU behaves as its
the principal agent (GK) and full awareness of the patron when it approves the programs, issues the
plans or activities but has a minimal participation necessary permits, provides the list of possible
in the process. It is not a consistent actor because it recipients and supplies the land areas to be utilized.
only interferes when it wants. As one respondent It can acquire lands or lots for the projects in two
from the LGU has said, the mayor only makes ways, CMP and expropriation. The Community
appearances during ribbon cuttings and the GK Mortgage Program (CMP) is a mortgage financing
villages’ events; hence, the people think GK is one program of the National Home Mortgage Finance
of his platforms. The LGU will not engage in the Corporation (NHMFC) which assists legally orga-
association unless it is ascertained of benefits in nized associations of underprivileged and homeless
exchange for its services. This actuation by the citizens to purchase and develop a tract of land
local government upholds the “new clientelism” under the concept of community ownership. The
Leonard has included in his 2010 study of patron- primary objective of the program is to assist resi-
age. “New clientelism” is a form of clientage that dents of blighted areas to own the lots they occupy,
gives emphasis on reciprocity. Unlike the tradi- or where they choose to relocate to and eventually
tional clientelism wherein the patrons use their improve their neighborhood and homes to the
influence solely to manipulate the clients, this extent of their affordability. In this program, the
“new clientelism” suggests that patrons practice local government of Parañaque purchases the land
patronage to gain something else for themselves, areas and later on, the recipients will pay for it
not just political trust. This “new clientelism” also monthly. Meanwhile, the expropriation is appli-
states that patronage has a farther local and global cable when the government finds a private unused
reach. It is more widespread. This is observed in land that can be utilized to build villages but the
the multi-sectoral quality of the link among LGU, owner does not want to sell the lot. The LGU will
GK and the recipients. then issue an ordinance that will require the owner
A respondent stated: to sell it. Aside from that, the local government
-“Gawad Kalinga is a private sector, so our usual can also sponsor concrete materials if it wishes to as
involvement here in UMADO (now Urban Poor one LGU staff has mentioned. The LGU, through
Assistance Office/ UPAO) with them is only the its staffs, also helps in the planning of the founda-
land or area through CMP or expropriation and the tion of the villages.
list of the recipients. We also issue the required A respondent said:
permits like electrification permit.” - “We do the planning. We organize the area and
ensure the community involvement of each indi-
As seen in this response, there is an intertwin- vidual. We provide technical assistance. We do the
ing connection between the private sector and math of land allotment.”
public sector, further uplifting the “new
clientilism”. Moreover, we can observe here that This scenario is actually a contradiction to the
the LGU serves as patron to both GK and the argument of Antonio Gramsci that the civil soci-

Patronage Politics and Clientelism in Housing Welfare: The Case of Gawad Kalinga (GK) Villages in Parañaque City, The Philippines /PRINCE AIAN G. VILLANUEVA, JESSA NICOLE P. SALAZAR
http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2015.0013
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ety, being private and apart from the government, to settle in the village and when that term expires,
has the capacity to eliminate corruption in the they have to leave the village. This is an evidence
political arena. He gives importance on the role of of Leonard’s (2010) argument that people who
NGO’s in controlling corruption and says that if have less or no political connections are the ones
NGO’s can be strengthened and its efforts at who are less or not at all represented in the society;
monitoring the state encouraged, this would hence, they receive fewer benefits than those with
contribute to the eventual elimination of corrup- political links.
tion. But as shown in this event, the NGO’s One respondent said:
actually depend on the government. The whole “Yes, we do own this house. It is awarded to us.”
concept of being private is not applied in our
system nowadays. One respondent mentioned:
On the other hand, the LGU acts as the patron “We will soon have the land and housing title after
to the recipients when it prioritizes its supporters in we finish paying the government.”
the provision of services, particularly by including
them in the recipients’ list even when they do not One participant stated:
qualify and giving some of these followers allow- “We are not aware that we could pay the government
ances. One of the participants has even stated that monthly, so we can own our houses. The GK or the
he has been shocked by the presence of unknown city hall did not tell us.”
faces in their community.
One respondent said: These three responses are from three partici-
“I get paid Php1,500 as my allowance. But that also pants who are from different villages. The first 2
changes depending on whether I was able to do my respondents are from Marcelo and Salas, villages
task appropriately.” with political affiliation to the mayor. The last
respondent lives in Aya’s, a GK village presumed to
The respondent that has mentioned this is an be private. As shown here, patronage really does
outright supporter of the mayor, so he is provided play an important role in the provision govern-
with cash for his service. On the other hand, mental assistance and the LGU of Parañaque
another block leader has said that he has not adheres to that. It is highly responsive to its clients
received any allowance though he is a legitimate and passive to the rest.
block leader because he is not a supporter of the Since a patron-client relationship is a mutual
regime prior to the establishment of their village. one, the LGU- aside from providing- also gains in
We can visualize here the patron-client relationship its association with Gawad Kalinga and the recipi-
vividly. ents. Upon approving the Gawad Kalinga agendas,
The LGU has also prioritized its supporters by the local government’s duties are lessened. Accord-
handing them fully awarded housings, while the ing to R.A. 7279, the LGU has to uplift the condi-
recipients who have less political connection are tions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens
under the use of proc only. They are given 25 years in urban areas and in resettlement areas by making

Patronage Politics and Clientelism in Housing Welfare: The Case of Gawad Kalinga (GK) Villages in Parañaque City, The Philippines /PRINCE AIAN G. VILLANUEVA, JESSA NICOLE P. SALAZAR
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available to them decent housing at affordable A local government staff stated:

cost, basic services, and employment opportunities. “Bernabe used the Gawad Kalinga as a campaign
Gawad Kalinga does it for the local government. material to earn the patronage of the constituents. He
This is manifested in the following statements. made it appear that Gawad Kalinga was initiative or
An LGU official said: was his platform.”
The local government gains in the relationship
because it is able to fulfill its obligation in accor- ON “KALINGA POLITICS” AND THE GAWAD
dance with R.A. 7279.” KALINGA AS A PRINCIPAL AGENT OF PATRON-
AGE POLITICS
Another LGU officer-in-charge (OIC) stated: A principal is the chief actor or perpetrator of an
“Of course, the projects of GK are in favor of the act, the one who plans everything. The Gawad
local government because the MMDA has issued a Kalinga is the principal agent in this relationship.
memo requiring us to relocate settlers in mission It is the one who has pioneered the establishment
areas and through GK, that’s easier to accomplish.” of the links among multiple sectors, both private
and public. With GK’s template of land for the
Furthermore, the good image of Gawad Kalinga landless, homes for the homeless and food for the
as a free housing benefactor that promotes broth- hungry, GK works hand in hand with local chief
erly and sisterly love among the Filipinos is gradu- executives to provide for the basic needs of the
ally reflected on the LGU. The recipients then, constituents. Gawad Kalinga encourages the local
unaware of the complete process, believe that it is government units to be fathers and mothers to the
through the LGU that they are able to acquire the poor constituents and to bring services and devel-
housings; hence, they give their political trust to opment to those who need it most through
the current regime before, during and after elec- “Kalinga Politics.” Moreover, GK encourages the
tions. Some answers that sustain this claim are: participation of private sectors through CSR. GK
One recipient said: sees CSR as a stimulus for economic growth and
“They [LGU] pretend Gawad Kalinga is their project nation-building.
and people see them as good because of that.” As can be seen in the following replies and
specifically the local government officer’s response,
A respondent said: the Gawad Kalinga actually serves as a patron, even
“We campaign for him and support him during without the LGU’s intervention. In fact, according
elections.” to some recipients and to some city hall employees,
there is a private GK village without the approval
Another one said: of the LGU; hence, this shows that the GK is
“The ones living there are mayor’s supporters. They rightfully the principal agent of clientilism.
even campaign for him during elections. They offer A block leader stated:
other people money in exchange for votes.” “Gawad Kalinga convinces sponsors to support us
and they take care of matters regarding that.”

Patronage Politics and Clientelism in Housing Welfare: The Case of Gawad Kalinga (GK) Villages in Parañaque City, The Philippines /PRINCE AIAN G. VILLANUEVA, JESSA NICOLE P. SALAZAR
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Another respondent said: the citizens and the city because the Gawad Kalinga
“We have nothing to say against Gawad Kalinga. already does that housing and resettlement obliga-
They are the best to us! They help us a lot.” tion.
Instantaneously, Gawad Kalinga is a client of the
A recipient mentioned: naïve recipients and of the local government. The
“We feel secured here. We are not afraid anymore [of Gawad Kalinga needs the people to entice local
diseases or dying]. We have doctors from St. Luke’s.” and global sponsors to invest in their projects. As
one participant has stated:
A local government officer: “Without the people, GK is as good as dead. They
“We have nothing to do with that case [unqualified need the urban poor to attract sponsors. If they have
recipients]. Those recipients have inside connections no one to help, no one will fund them. Let’s face it.
with Gawad Kalinga.” Most of the GK heads are businessmen. They are
profit-oriented.”
The GK operates as a patron to the recipients by
sufficing them with their basic needs for survival Another respondent said:
and extending that help all throughout the exist- “I have heard of that issue. Gawad Kalinga has the
ence of the community. It provides sponsors, direct link to the sponsors, so when it distributes the
health services, conducive living environment, and good and services, especially financial aids, to the
job opportunities to the people. Some of its spon- community, it has already taken some portions.”
sors are Shell, Philips, HSBC, Nestle and Unilever
from Europe and other American companies such This statement shows that the GK also gains
as Procter & Gamble, Colgate, Microsoft, IBM and extra profit through the people, so it is a client of
Convergys. The GK is always there for the people the people. It achieves financial sustainability
and it even sets one GK official per village to because of the recipients. It has enough funds to
ensure the distribution of the goods and services continue its projects because of the urban poor.
given by the sponsors. In addition to that, GK can The Gawad Kalinga also requires the assistance
also include individuals in the recipients’ list when of the local government through “Kalinga Politics”
they wish to. This is a clearer evidence of patron- to operate. Without the approval of the local
age because GK actually has no right to select the government, particularly of the mayor, on the
recipients. Additionally, the GK serves as a patron “Kalinga Politics”, Gawad Kalinga should not
to the LGU by carrying out its task in accordance actually be able to perform its functions. There are
with the HLURB as what has been discussed just some cases that slip through it. The local
above. Apart from that, one respondent has government also provides the specific relocation
uttered that it helps the local government save sites that the Gawad Kalinga can develop and the
revenues. Instead of spending the revenues to initial file of recipients that the Gawad Kalinga can
relocate the urban poor, the LGU can spend the work with. As one respondent from LGU men-
money on other programs for the betterment of tioned:

Patronage Politics and Clientelism in Housing Welfare: The Case of Gawad Kalinga (GK) Villages in Parañaque City, The Philippines /PRINCE AIAN G. VILLANUEVA, JESSA NICOLE P. SALAZAR
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“Yes, Gawad Kalinga needs some permits from us uted to the villagers, the assigned GK official and
before they can operate anywhere here in the block leaders have readily acquired some for
Parañaque.” themselves privately. This is supported by the reply
of one LGU officer:
ON THE RECIPIENTS AS ACCESSORIES OF “Of course, no one will sponsor GK without the
PATRONAGE POLITICS people.”
An accessory is one contributing to or aiding in
the commission of an action. It is a participant, as Since most of the recipients are naïve and most
by command, advice, instigation, or concealment; of them do not know about the Gawad Kalinga’s
either before or after the fact or commission. The scheme, only few of them openly admitted that
recipients are the accessories of clientilism because they are knowledgeable of it and that there is really
they are the actors in the framework. But they do an exploitation. A block leader has timidly con-
not share the same intent as the principal and fessed that during meetings with the GK officials
accomplice. They are just left with no choice. for allocation of the sponsored services and good,
While the LGU and GK are the thinkers, the they take their share. But he claims that they take
recipients are the doers. They build the houses only a minimal portion, just enough for them.
through bayanihan, campaign for the LGU and, As clients, all the essentials of the recipients are
innocently, inveigle the sponsors. provided by the Gawad Kalinga and the local
Of course, it is evident that the recipients are government. They are sufficed economically,
the clients in this patron-client set-up. But under- socially and culturally by both entities. They do not
neath that, they are being exploited by the two need to ask for anything. The two bodies (LGU
bodies (LGU and GK); hence, unconsciously, they and GK) use their authority, social status and other
are participating as the patrons in clientilism. The personal resource to give these recipients assis-
local government utilizes them to win electoral tance. One respondent told me that their village
posts or to maintain the positions they are occupy- has international sponsors from Canada and
ing at the moment. Because of patronage, the Singapore through the efforts of GK. This is
previous regime has managed to stay for three further obvious in the other answers of the recipi-
consecutive terms. One of the respondents has ents.
even said that he has nothing terrible to say about One participant said:
the prior regime and he is depressed by the loss of “We don’t need to ask anymore. They readily provide
its descendant. for us.”
The Gawad Kalinga, on the other hand, uses
them to take profits from sponsors. One respon- One recipient stated:
dent has claimed that GK has been taking its share “We have doctors and dentists coming over here.
on the goods and services doled out by the spon- Sponsors bring us food. All that’s missing is a job for
sors. Moreover, another respondent has supported our kids’ allowances and schooling.”
this claim by saying that before the aids are distrib-

Patronage Politics and Clientelism in Housing Welfare: The Case of Gawad Kalinga (GK) Villages in Parañaque City, The Philippines /PRINCE AIAN G. VILLANUEVA, JESSA NICOLE P. SALAZAR
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Another one said: that the benefits are “private” or “club” goods, not
“I sometimes have my allowance as the block leader. I public. They are directed to individuals or small
am first in the receiving of the benefits from the communities, not to the general interests of a class
sponsors. I get assistance for my wife’s medical of people. For a concrete example, we have stud-
condition.” ied 3 Gawad Kalinga villages: Marcelo Green, Salas
and Aya’s. All three villages consist mostly of the
Philippine politics revolves around interpersonal urban poor population but the first 2 villages are
relationships- especially familial and patron-client fully awarded, while the last one, Aya’s, is provided
ones- and factions composed of personal alliances contractually to the settlers. The recipients have to
(Kerkvliet, 1995). Nonetheless, patterns of leave after 25 years without any question. What’s
clientage are different from what they were forty the reason for this difference? The first two GK
years ago. First, patronage relations today have a communities are composed of several supporters of
worldwide reach, through international trade, the LGU (mayor), while Aya’s is not. This is the
bilateral donor governments or international application of “new clientelism” (Leonard, 2010).
NGOs. Second, the means that power political The idea of “new clientage” suggests that NGO’s
clientage today are less monopolistic and less are used by the government to induce patronage or
adequate to the task of purchasing peasant political sometimes, the NGO’s serve as the patron without
loyalty. Thus the chains of patronage are less tight intervention from external forces. This research
than they were historically. Third, the greater shows that the NGO’s exploit the government to
diversity of patrons operating today are much more gain benefits for themselves like how the Gawad
likely to create spaces in which interests can eventu- Kalinga initiates partnerships with Local Chief
ally be aggregated into autonomous associations Executives to establish villages that would attract
with independent political significance at the local and foreign guarantors. NGO’s are actually
national level. NGOs play an important role in the principal agent of clientage, with the LGU as
opening up this political space although at the an intervening factor and the recipients as clients.
moment, they most often act like a new type of The concept of “new clientage” also states that
patron (Leonard, 2010). the patronage chains are less tight now, because
Parañaque City is not an exemption. As shown there are various sectors that can provide resources
in this study, clientelism is endemic in its system to the people. However, as shown in the study, the
and it involves both the public and private sector- clients are still clingy to their patrons, and they give
the LGU of Parañaque, Gawad Kalinga, and the out their absolute trust to them. They are overly
recipients. The reach of the networks is interna- dependent to their benefactors; hence, they will
tionalized as well. There are participations from not abandon the convenience and comfort of
Europe, Canada, Indonesia, Singapore and patronage.
America. The figure below illustrates a more concrete
We have also observed that the principle of process of clientelism in the housing programs of
reciprocity rules in the framework; that is to say the government of Parañaque and Gawad Kalinga.

Patronage Politics and Clientelism in Housing Welfare: The Case of Gawad Kalinga (GK) Villages in Parañaque City, The Philippines /PRINCE AIAN G. VILLANUEVA, JESSA NICOLE P. SALAZAR
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gains in the partnerships. It actually has established

the framework for the benefits it can obtain from
the partakers, so it participates as a client of the
LGU and the recipients. It needs the LGU’s
approval to operate and it requires the presence of
the recipients to entice municipal and interna-
tional benefactors. When it has benefactors, the
money keeps coming in and its continuity or
existence and sustenance are guaranteed. This is
FIGURE 1. SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF PATRONAGE IN HOUSING the Accomplice-Principal-Accessory (APA) model of
PROGRAM OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, PHILIPPINES patronage politics, wherein the LGU acts as the
accomplice, the GK as the principal agent and the
As observed, all units are intertwined with the recipients as the accessories. The principal is the
GK as the center and the pioneer of connections. chief actor and proponent, while the accomplice is
The LGU, by being a patron to GK when accepting a supporter of the idea of which it may be directly
its project proposals and assisting in the foundation or indirectly involved and the accessory is the
of the villages, also becomes a patron to the recipi- working hand of the principal and accomplice that
ents through the illegitimate inclusion of them in does not necessarily share the same intent but
the housing programs and the provision of allow- nonetheless benefits from this relationship.
ances for services to some of them. But the LGU
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http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2015.0013