Dalit Politics in India- Reservation and Electoral Politics

Introduction

In Indian culture, castes are social groups whose affiliation is determined by birth. Members of certain local
communities are endogamous, which means they have marital affairs amongst each other. They tend to
share political beliefs.
Since the distinctions between "civil society" and "political society" were dissolved, caste now played a
significant role in politics and dominated other state agencies such as the police and the judiciary system.
Though caste seems to really dictate access to certain entities, the position of that caste was also significant.
Historically, the caste system has had a strong impact on people's access to authority. Upper caste groups
profit further from having far more financial and political influence, while lower caste communities have
less access to such powers. The caste structure allots various economic strengths to different castes. The
upper castes will then exploit the economic and political systems to convert economic capital into political
power. If a lower caste was concentrated in one region, it might convert the concentration of caste members
into political influence and threaten the hegemony of the locally powerful upper caste. Gender too is
significant in the power structures of caste in politics1. Female representation in politics is lower in lower,
more traditional castes than in higher, more generally liberal castes. As a result, a relatively high number of
upper-caste women hold elected office in comparison to their lower-caste equivalents. The caste hierarchy,
as well as its position in politics and relation to power and wealth, has resulted in a culture marked by
patron-client associations along caste lines. This ultimately contributed to the tradition of vote banking, in
which electors support only candidates from their community hr
Changing the role of caste politics in India has historically been difficult. However, there has been a recent
change in caste politics, owing largely to India's economic liberalization. The power of caste has begun to
wane in modern India. This is attributed in part to the spread of schooling to all castes, which has
democratized the democratic structure. This "levelling" of the playing field, though, has not been without
debate. The British ingrained caste into the activities of India's main government agencies 2. The upper castes
or forward castes benefited the most from this indirect law, since they retained their superiority and
domination of power and authority over government institutions long after independence from the British.
The post-colonial state of India pledged growth, rule of law, and state - building, but in fact was a
complicated network of patronage networks that solidified upper-caste control over civil service institutions.
This network destroyed post-colonial India's promises of 'nation building,' ushering in an era of upper-caste
domination that persisted for the next four decades.

1
Yoginder Sikand. “A New Indian Muslim Agenda: The Dalit Muslims and the All-India Backward Muslim Morcha”, Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs, 2001
2
Kunhaman M. Dalit Development in India: A Political Economy Perspective. Glob J Arch & Anthropol. 2018
 Need for caste based reservation

While some of the biggest injustices of the caste system could have been curtailed, the system remains
unsettlingly pervasive to this day. According to data from the detailed 2011-12 India Human Development
Survey (IHDS-II), that included over 40,000 households, untouchability was practiced by 27% of all
households, with a number of Brahmin households admitting to it. Education seems to make no impact in
this case; 24% of families with a graduate as a participant continue to practice untouchability.
Intermarriage, Ambedkar's approach to caste, is uncommon. According to the same poll, only 5% of all
unions crossed caste lines. As a result, it should come as no surprise that India's culture also suffers from de
facto caste discrimination.
Dalits and other backward castes are also mostly absent from society's privileged classes. A 2019 Oxfam
and News laundry review of Indian newspapers, titled "Who Says Our Stories Counts," discovered such a
phenomenon. At the time of the survey, upper-caste citizens hold all leadership roles in Hindi television
news channels.
According to a 2018 response under the Right to Information Act, 96% of all faculty at the Indian Institute
of Technology Kharagpur pledged allegiance to the upper castes, per an article in The Caravan by Namit
Arora3.
Reservation, it is clear, does not bring in caste. Caste even now operates in the context of a segregated
system in which upper castes hold the highest roles. As a result, the protest against caste-based laws fosters a
silent caste culture. While caste is not discussed, it plays a significant role in determining who counts and
who does not.
Reservations are needed for social integration. The ostensible fallacy is, in practice, not a fallacy at all. To
crack the otherwise hushed segregation of Indian society, caste-sensitive interventions are necessary. Only
after this apartheid is disrupted can a casteless culture arise.
The Constitution guarantees every Indian fair legal rights and the right not to be discriminated against. Even
if reservation strategies fulfil the beneficial purposes of incorporation and de-segregation, as well as
equalizing conditions for everyone, they are nevertheless intolerable if they breach this fundamental right.
Reservation was long thought to be a natural balance for equality in India's constitutional past. This
sentiment was expressed during Constituent Assembly hearings and in many Supreme Court decisions.
However, this interpretation of reservation is perplexing. It agrees that those who are denied government
employment or university admissions because seats are reserved for representatives of disadvantaged castes
are treated unfairly. The state has discriminated against them and refused to recognize them as peers. Why
could we jeopardize the high importance of equality? Why should the state abandon the notion that
privileges are equal and that fairness is due to all people regardless of race, colour, or creed? The Supreme
Court no longer holds that reservation is a (necessary) deviation from equality. In the 1970s, the Supreme

3
Caste and the Delusion of “merit” in Indian Higher Education: Article by Namit Arora in The Caravan
Court ruled in N.M. Thomas (1975)4 that Article 16(4), which requires the state to pay for reservation, is not
an exemption to equality, but rather a function of Article 16. (1).
The clause, the Court argued, is simply an empathic restatement of the reality that Articles 14, 15, and 16 of
the Constitution empower the state to create fair classifications. The state must differentiate between
applicants when determining whether to hire for public positions or admit to universities. When such
classifications are rational, they are harmless. The Court ruled in N.M. Thomas that certain caste
classifications, such as those implicit in reservation, are also rational. Any doubts regarding this perception
of reservation should have been dispelled by the Supreme Court's endorsement of it in Indra Sawhney
(1992)5.
The Court said, "In previous judgments made by the Court before the 1960s, Article 16(4) was found to be
an exception to Article 16." (1). However, it has been interpreted slightly since 1976. Today, Articles 16(1)
and 16(4) are understood to be part of the same system aimed at achieving equality.”
As a result, the jurisprudence that reservation is an exception to equality has succumbed to the notion that it
is a part of equality. That being said, in Indra Sawhney, the Judiciary said something more. It was decided
that reservations could not reach 50%. The Court quoted Ambedkar as saying that reservation should be
limited to "a minority of seats." Excessive reservation will be a violation of the concept of fair opportunity.
The fact that reservation is conceived of as a political undertaking does not lessen its importance. The
reservation is still valid, thanks to the strong support of constitutional principles. Part IV of the Constitution
discusses the Directive Standards of Public Policy, which are basically standards that must rule.
The Directive Principles, although not legally binding, highlight the state's socialist nature. They must
solidify state strategy. They are useful methods for conceptualizing a welfare society. They are not
incompatible with human freedom. As explained by Kesavananda Bharati (1973) 6 and Abu Kavur Bai7,
these principles and rights must compliment and complement one another (1983).
It is the responsibility of the state to intervene to counteract the pernicious effects of caste. It is a
requirement of political justice that caste inequality and the caste system be reduced, and that we transition
toward a casteless community. The democratic project must extend and examine the different forms in
which caste and hierarchy are replicated and ingrained. Reservation is a subset of this larger initiative. S.
Nagappa detailed the comprehensiveness needed for schemes for the upliftment of the oppressed in the
Constituent Assembly in 1949.

Dalit Assertion in India

4
State of Kerala v N.M. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310; 1976 (1) SCR, 906
5
Indra Sawhney v Union of India AIR 1993 SC 477,1992 Supp 2 SCR 454
6
Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461: (1973) 4 SCC 225
7
Abu Kavur Bai and Ors. V. State of Tamil Nadu 1984 AIR 326, 1984 SCR (1) 725
Various political parties have effectively mobilized Dalits in the past around the Indian landscape. From the
start, the Congress has been able to secure a sizable share of Dalit votes. The rise of the Republican Party of
India (RPI) in certain places in the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, resulted in a change in Dalit votes
in those areas. Since 1977, the dalit vote has been split between the Congress and the Janata Group (later
Janata Dal). Despite the fact that Congress still enjoys the largest share of the dalit vote (27%) globally, the
Congress's hold on dalit votes has narrowed significantly. The emergence of regional parties in states during
the years of party system dissolution, as well as the parallel entry of the BSP 8 as a new claimant of political
allegiance from Dalits, are the key explanations for this change in Dalit votes. The 11th Lok Sabha election
in 1996 marked the beginning of a period of fierce competitive politics in Indian politics. It signalled the
culmination of the period of one-party domination and the beginning of multi-party players in various states.
These developments were manifestations of broader changes engulfing Indian culture, through which
various sections attempted to establish themselves in politics. Failure to find acceptance in existing national
political parties resulted in the emergence of backward castes. Despite inter- and intra-caste divisions and
controversies, they found good political presence in parties such as the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), the
Janata Dal (JD), the Samajwadi party, and the Samata party. Muslims joined forces with other political
groups to ensure the fall of the Congress and the BJP. Historically, Dalits' electoral activity was generally
limited to voting. Their level of participation, whether small or large, had no effect on their living
conditions. Their unqualified and disproportionate support for the Congress struggled to alleviate their
electoral injustice, leading to organized protest movements in states such as Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, and
sections of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Orissa. However, these movements have culminated in
incremental yet consistent improvements in the social and political position of the Scheduled Castes
(hereinafter SCs). To combat this injustice, SCs raised their degree of activism by forming mass
organizations, labor unions, political parties, and numerous resistance campaigns, and began asserting a
distinct dalit culture. This raised their self-esteem and ambitions, and enabled them to rise above their
socioeconomic and political disadvantages. Voting offers an important platform for the general public to
select the kind of leadership they wish to see installed in parliament and state legislatures. Many
observational studies performed within the first decades after independence indicate that dalits lagged
behind upper castes in terms of practicing their franchise. This voting trend is caused by a variety of factors,
the most prominent of which is the deprivation of voting rights by upper castes. The dalits feared backlash if
their candidacy preferences clashed with those of the upper castes. However, things have improved with
time, and the voting share of SCs has gradually risen. SC voter turnout in the 1996 general election was 89.2
percent, compared to 87.3 percent for the national average and 85.6 percent for upper castes. The same
pattern was seen in the 1998 polls, when the voter turnout for SCs was 93% and for upper castes was 91.9
percent. The change in party allegiance has been a significant aspect of the recent boom in dalit politics.

8
Dalit Movement and Emergence of BSP in Uttar Pradesh: Politics and Priorities, The Institute for Social and Economic Change,
2010
From its inception, the SCs have been regarded as the congress's "committed" vote reserve. However, during
elections conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were indications of a fall in its SC vote share. In
the 1996 Lok Sabha polls, the Congress was defeated by SCs in several districts, including UP and Bihar,
indicating a change in the electoral landscape. In the 1998 votes, the same trend of SC voting was observed.
With the exception of a few nations, Congress is no longer the first option of the Supreme Court. The
rejection of Congress by the SCs in several states represents their opposition of the vertical integration
mechanism, which has been infiltrated by the upper castes. Apparently, the SCs no longer vote according to
the preferences of the upper castes or local notables, which was a hallmark of elite politics during the first
four decades of democracy. In the world of party politics, this move represents a rupture of the patron-client
partnership. The BSP's enhanced results in the 1998 elections is a common example of SC statement in
electoral politics by a group that primarily has a foundation among them. SCs accounted for 67.4 percent of
BSP votes in 1996 and 60.6 percent of BSP votes in 1998. The party did remarkably well in the states of
Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, and Punjab, both in terms of vote share and amount of seats
gained. According to the 1996 All India election results, the BSP ran for 201 seats, secured 11, and received
3.8 percent of the overall valid votes cast in all India SC elections; the party's share was 12.1 percent. The
BSP's vote share increased steadily in all four states where the party had a solid base, namely Uttar Pradesh,
Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, and Haryana.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF DALIT MOVEMENT

The incremental emergence of a thin, but powerful, young, educated, and politically conscious Dalit middle
class during the 1990s was a significant change. As the Indian polity was globalized, this emerging class
entered an "essential mass." The Dalit phenomenon9 has grown in tandem with the shift toward a market-
oriented economy over the last two decades.
Though protests and parties such as the BSP have mobilized around questions of socio-political
empowerment such as citizenship, dignity, and self-respect, rising middle-class Dalit intellectuals have a
different emphasis. They stress the importance of economic empowerment through a variety of new ways,
indicating the growth of middle-class activism among Dalits.
Their ideas are better articulated in the Dalit Agenda, which was established at the Bhopal Conference in
January 2002.
According to the writers of the Dalit Agenda, under conventional policies of protective segregation and state
welfare, Dalits have remained mere welfare seekers, landless/asset-less, below the poverty line, without a
share in the economy's wealth, and unwilling to boost their socioeconomic status.
Only a small minority, or "creamy sheet," has been able to increase their educational attainment and
penetrate high-paying careers in government, the professions, the media, the arts, and, gradually, the private

9
Gail Omvelt, Dalit and the Democratic Revolution: Dr. Ambedkar and the Dalit Movement in Colonial India, New Delhi
sector. However, those campaigns have nothing in common or cater to rural communities in need of security
from atrocities and assistance in improving their material situation.
Simultaneously, weaker Dalit communities seeking upward mobility have shifted away from conventional
parties. There is widespread dissatisfaction with the BSP's inability to present a socioeconomic roadmap to
solve the real challenges of deprivation faced by Dalits.
With the rise of organizations/movements headed by new Dalit leaders – Azad's ASP, Jignesh Mevani's Una
Aytachar Ladat Samiti in Gujarat, and Prakash Ambedkar's Vanchit Bahujan Aghadi in Maharashtra – the
earlier philosophy and ways of mobilization used by older Dalit leaders no longer seem to appeal. Dalits are
looking for an evolved political party since achieving a modicum of political empowerment, identity, and
self-respect in the 1990s. The Dalit movement is reportedly caught between stagnation and rebirth. This
condition has resulted from two major developments:

1. Identity politics and a transition from a demand for social change to aspiration as a result of globalisation
and cultural modernisation, resulting in a schism between the better-off middle class and the marginalised
Dalit section.

2. The BSP's resurgence under new leadership, with its promises of sustainable growth and cultural
integration. It has drawn lower castes and developed an ideological rift between Ambedkarite or pro-BSP
Dalits and Hindutvawadi or pro-BJP Dalits.
These rapid and substantial changes in the 2000s triggered internal division within the Dalit group, which is
Aazad and his newly founded party's main challenge.

The founding of the Azad Samaj Party (ASP) by Chandra Shekhar Aazad on March 15, 2020 establishes a
major step in Dalit politics' transformation of the movement to a political party, espousing Kanshi Ram's
philosophy of ‘Bahujan hitaya, bahujan sukhaya.'
The Bhim Army was established in 2015 in Gharkoli village in western Uttar Pradesh to combat increasing
caste atrocities in the country. The organization quickly gained popularity, especially among the younger
generation of Dalits. Aazad believes that by transforming the campaign into a political group, he would be
able to reach out to all marginalized castes and create a political alliance. Rising abuses against Dalits after
the BJP came to power in 2014, as well as the government's failure to take corrective action, are behind the
founding of the ASP and related organizations across the region. Attempts by the BJP government to pay
homage to Dalit icon B.R. Ambedkar by erecting memorials, appointing a Dalit leader as president, and
commemorating Ambedkar's 150th birthday have not been effective.
Many Dalits claim that the BJP made assurances that attracted their help, but that its acts while in power
tend to be anti-Dalit. Aazad has effectively channeled growing disenchantment with both the BSP and the
BJP to create the Bhim Army and then the ASP.
Aazad established the Bhim Army, named after Dr. Ambedkar. Its stated goal is "confrontational direct
action to protect or regain Dalit integrity." Since its inception, the Bhim Army has obtained overwhelming
support from Dalits in Uttar Pradesh. This is because, although the BSP focused on political politics, the
Bhim Army attempted to overcome the community's feelings of terror and insecurity by supplying them
with a sense of comfort in the face of atrocities.
In April 2017, one of the most significant actions was a rally against brutal atrocities against Dalits by
Thakurs in Saharanpur. On May 21, at least 50,000 Dalits gathered in New Delhi to express their support at
Jantar Mantar. Other incidents involve conflicts over Azad's construction of a signboard reading "The Great
Chamar" in his village; action against Thakurs' expulsion of a Dalit groom from his horse; and a protest in
February 2020 against the dismantling of a temple dedicated to Sant Ravidas in Tughlaqabad, Delhi, all of
which earned widespread support.

Fearing Azad's rising popularity, the UP government attempted to restrain him by arresting him on June 17,
2017. Since being given bail in November 2017, he was arrested under the National Security Act until
September 2018, bolstering his popularity.

Other cases investigated by the Bhim Army included Rohith Vemula's suicide. Aazad, Jignesh Mevani,
Vinay Ratan Singh, Prakash Ambedkar, and other activists attended the Elgaar Parishad rally in Bhima
Koregaon. The most significant demonstration, though, occurred in March 2018 in response to the
government's obvious apprehension and hesitation in lodging a review petition in the Supreme Court against
its March 20 order calling for amendments to the SC/ST Act 1989.

Though Dalit agitations have occurred in the past in India, the size of this demonstration – spread through
many states, eleven people dead, several wounded, public property destroyed, usage of social media, and
evident outrage on the street – was maybe unparalleled and indicated disillusionment with, and increasing
anger towards, the BJP. These assaults fueled a new Dalit consciousness throughout India, as well as
protests in favor of leaders like Aazad.
He has maintained the Bhim Army and the ASP apart from both Dalit and non-Dalit groups.
Although he attempted to step closer to the BSP at first, opposition from Mayawati, who saw him as a
competitor, caused him to retreat. He also said that the BSP voted in parliament for the EWS quota, Article
370, and the CAA, thus “murdering” the constitution and crippling the Bahujan movement. He also stated
that his organization will not work with or assist the Congress party in the 2019 national elections, citing the
latter's opposition to Ambedkar and failure to do anything for Dalits during its 60-year reign.
Though the BAMCEF (All India Backward (SC, ST, and OBC) and Minority Communities Employees
Federation) went into decline since the formation of the BSP, Azad has agreed to keep the Bhim Army as an
organizational arm. The Bhim Army operates over 350 free schools for Bahujan children in order to build a
reliable vote bank for potential electoral campaigns. The Bhim Army claims that universalizing schooling
and healthcare will propel Dalits forward in Saharanpur, Meerut, Shamli, and Muzaffarnagar. He has
declared that the ASP will embark on a parivartan yatra to unite all Dalit Bahujan agitations throughout the
world.
The most critical aspect of Aazad's government, which is not visible in the narrower context of conventional
Dalit parties, is that it has tied Dalit needs and desires to wider problems of national importance while
focusing on Dalit needs and desires.
He has supported mass demonstrations by residents of both religions against the CAA and NRC, as well as
efforts to preserve the state's secular fabric. This is evident in Aazad's reading of the constitution's preamble
at the Jama Masjid in Delhi, as well as his support for demonstrations at Shaheen Bagh and elsewhere. He
has stated that his party would stick to "liberal morality," the ideals of democracy, freedom, and fraternity,
and will take part in the nation-building phase.

New Dalit movement

For several Dalits and activists, Azad's ASP holds out the prospect of a modern Dalit movement in north
India. He has been likened to Kanshi Ram, whose mission is still unfinished. The ASP holds out hope
because it has a powerful chief with an Ambedkarite worldview and a lot of popularity in western Uttar
Pradesh10. Furthermore, Azad is a victim of modern Dalit politics in the 2000s, and his ASP is distinct from
previous Dalit parties/organizations. The broader societal, political, and economic arena in which Dalit
politics formerly existed has changed dramatically. As a result, the Dalit group, with emerging gaps along
class and cultural lines, is pursuing a re-orientation of its future by creating a new vision of ideas and events
to fit its newly-found aspirations and desires.
Dalits, especially the younger generation, see Azad as a new force to spearhead the Dalit movement and fill
the vacuum created by Mayawati's dwindling prominence.

TRENDS IN VOTING

The most powerful opportunity for the general voter to exercise its discretion over the kind of government it
wishes to put in the parliament and the assemblies is by voting. In theory, polling is the occasion that
10
Dalit Movement in Mainstream Sociology, Economic and Political Weekly
political parties attempt to woo citizens with their policies and programs, and voters, in essence, try to
control the parties' policies and programs. In practice, as Weber puts it, after voting is removed from the
equation, the number of persons and social classes with additional sources of control on decision-making
decreases significantly [Verba and Wie 1972]. The SCs will have absolutely zero. Many empirical studies in
the past, especially in the first decades after independence, indicate that dalits lagged behind upper castes in
terms of exercising their franchise for a variety of reasons, the most significant of which was denial of
voting privilege by upper caste men and fear of retaliation if their candidate choice seemed to compete with
the SCs.
Now, things are starting to improve. The voting share of SCs has slowly increased. The voter percentage
estimates for the SCs and upper castes in the 1998 polls were 93% and 91.9 percent, respectively, and the
patterns have persisted (CSDS Data Unit, CSDS, Delhi). This reflects the dalits' high political aspirations
and their efforts to establish themselves in a democratic polity through the electoral process. The above
statistics dispel the common belief that the total SC vote is weak, owing to either their confusion regarding
their voting rights, fear of crime, or being refused the right to vote. Just 16 of the 1,791 SCs interviewed
cited the above factors for not voting. Figures also explicitly demonstrate that the upper castes have a lower
proclivity to vote in reserved constituencies due to "indifference," which can better be interpreted as a
consequence of not having the ability to vote in favor of their caste candidates.
One possible reason for the consistent increase in SC voter participation is that polling is no longer a passive
practice for the SCs. The increase in schooling, appreciation of their privileges, recognition of the power of
the adult franchise to build room for rising their voice, growing stake in the electoral result, and the lowering
of the voting age from 21 to 18 allowing the more outspoken and aspirant younger age group to vote all
account for the amount of SCs practicing their franchise. Most notably, voting has been a social standing
problem for dalits. The fact that the SCs have outperformed the upper castes in terms of voter participation
demonstrates their enhanced political consciousness and ability to express themselves.