Collapse of USSR
Internal factors:
Structural problems in the Soviet system
Among the most striking features of communism's collapse was its
suddenness. In fact, scholars were studying the factors behind
stability of USSR..
French political philosopher Alexis de
Tocqueville said “The most dangerous moment
for a bad government is generally that in which
it sets about reform.”
Some have argued that the collapse of
communism was an accident waiting to
happen, the inevitable outcome of structural flaws that
doomed Soviet-style regimes to inevitable collapse more
effectively than the contradictions identified by Marx as the
fatal flaw of the capitalist system.
The chief long-term problem was economic, though
arguably it had political roots, in that economic policies
and practices were dictated by political ideology. Structural
weaknesses were built into the system of the command economy which relied on inflexible
central planning, rewarded gross output of goods rather than productivity, and offered
disincentives to innovation in management and production techniques. Centrally planned
economies proved to be less effective than capitalist economies in delivering general
prosperity and producing modern consumer goods. Eruptions of political discontent in
1980–91 were thus, in significant measure, a manifestation of economic backwardness
and expressed a desire for western-style living standards and consumer goods.
The political weaknesses derived from the fact that communist regimes were structurally
unresponsive to popular pressure. In particular, in the absence of competitive elections,
independent interest groups and a free media, single-party communist states possessed no
mechanisms for articulating political discontent and initiating dialogue between rulers and
the people.
These problems were systemic and of long-standing.
Although structural weaknesses may explain communism’s susceptibility to collapse they do
not explain either its timing or its swiftness. The explanation lies in the impact of the
reforms that Mikhail Gorbachev introduced in the Soviet Union from 1985 onwards
The effects of Gorbachev's reforms: Glasnost and Political restructuring
It took specific initiatives by Gorbachev to turn these systemic problems
into a systemic crisis.
The first of these initiatives was the decision to permit dissemination of
knowledge about the realities of Soviet (glasnost or ‘openness’), the
second and third were political economic restructuring (perestroika).
It was his conviction that consent rather than coercion should, as far as
possible, guide implementation of these changes.
The other major element of political restructuring was the creation of an executive
presidency, a post for which Gorbachev insisted, he be allowed to stand unopposed. His aim
was to maintain a grip on the direction of change. But it was inevitable that his critics, and
even some of his supporters should note the irony of a leader who preached democracy but
claimed the right to stand above it himself. Arguably, however, Gorbachev's pursuit of
reform from the top down, self-serving though it was, was both very much in the
Russian/Soviet tradition and understandable in a country which was subject to growing
splits. The erosion of the integrative force of the Communist Party transformed the
dynamics of the political institutions at the Centre but also threatened the structure of the
Soviet Union itself.
Economic restructuring
Economic restructuring in a sense cannot be separated from politics since Soviet system
economics, like all areas of social life, was subject to a political and ideologically derived
rationale. Nevertheless, economic initiatives were important in their own right under
Gorbachev in that their goal was precisely to effect a separation of the economic from the
political, or at least to go some way in that direction .
In all these measures there was a partial move towards a free market or more precisely,
an attempt to straddle the gap between the stifling command economy and an incentive
led market system.
The effect of these economic changes was catastrophic. The reforms managed to cut the
ground from under the old system without putting in its place viable new economic
mechanisms. State planning was in abeyance but there was no fully operating market
mechanism in its place. Inflation, shortages, and declining production .To these could be
added rising crime rates, a sense of social disarray, and a general feeling of uncertainty
about the future.
Sinatra Doctrine - A new approach to relations with the USA and Western Europe, the basis
of which was the abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine. It meant allowing the states of
Eastern Europe to ‘do it their way’, meant that Gorbachev and the Soviet Union refused to
intervene as, one after another, communist regimes collapsed in 1989–90.
External factors contributing to the collapse
Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) - The policies of the Reagan
administration in the USA and the advance of economic and cultural
globalization. The Reagan administration’s contribution to this process
was in launching the ‘Second Cold War’ by instigating a renewed US
military build-up in the 1980s, particularly in the form of the Strategic
Defence Initiative (SDI) ( ‘star wars’ initiative) of 1983. This drew the Soviet Union into an
arms race that its already fragile economy could not sustain, helping provoke economic
collapse and increase the pressure for reform.
Economic globalization - It helped to widen differential living standards between the East
and the West. While the progressive internationalization of trade and investment helped to
fuel technological and economic development in the US-dominated West from the 1970s
onwards, its exclusion from global markets ensured that the Soviet-dominated East would
suffer from economic stagnation.
Cultural globalization - The spread of radio and television technology, helped ideas,
information and images from an apparently freer and more prosperous West to penetrate
the communist societies, particularly those in Eastern Europe. This, in turn, further fuelled
discontent and bred support for western-style economic and political reforms.
Internal causes of the collapse of Soviet communism
Long-term causes
1. Structural weaknesses in the economy, including
2. Inflexible central planning system
3. Inability to modernize
4. Inefficiency and absence of incentives in
5. Agricultural production
Short-term causes
1. Economic stagnation in the 1970s and 1980s
2. Poor harvests in the late 1970s and early 1980
3. Gorbachev's political and economic reforms
