In Re: Rodolfo Manzano Case Digest

The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Sec. 12,
Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19,
Facts: 

Judge Manzano was appointed by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of
Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Executive Order No. 856.
Before accepting the appointment, Judge Manzano wrote a letter to the SC requesting that
he be authorized to accept the appointment and to assume and discharge the powers and
duties attached to the said position.  He petitioned that his membership in the Committee
will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his position as Executive Judge and as a
member of judiciary.

Issues:
Should the petition be granted?

Held:

No. An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City
Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees,
particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and
improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are—

3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who
may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same
to proper authority for appropriate action;

3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the

proper administration of criminal justice.
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative
functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over
the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules
and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved
upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is
provided that the Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision of
the Secretary of justice and quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the
Office of the Secretary of Justice.

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution) 
Angara vs. Electoral Commission Digested
Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

FACTS:

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.

On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of

the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed
the last date to file election protests.

On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against

Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of
the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified.

On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day
for filing of protests is on Dec. 9.  Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections
to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the
case. 

    ISSUES:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
RULING:

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict
of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and
the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow
that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it
is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate
department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the
fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are
necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in
the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express
prohibition in the Constitution.

Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of
its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved
a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When,
therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the
election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet
met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the
election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was
still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as
depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to
be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.

The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of
the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest
against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor
prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might
prescribe.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with
cost against the petitioner. 
SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS. — The separation of powers is a fundamental

principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.

2. ID.; ID.; SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES. — But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of various departments of government.
For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is 80 far made a check on the legislative
power that his assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further
check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a
vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has
also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand,
the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence
of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to
determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction
and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly exercises to a certain extent control
over the judicial department. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments.
And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIARY THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONAL ARBITER TO ALLOCATE CONSTITUTIONAL
BOUNDARIES. — But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government.
The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MODERATING POWER OF THE JUDICIARY IS GRANTED, IF NOT EXPRESSLY, BY
CLEAR IMPLICATION. — As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and
perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to
so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under
a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the
said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended, it
would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels, for, then, the distribution of powers would be
mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in the
Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no
express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of
the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is
granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHAT IS MEANT BY "JUDICIAL SUPREMACY." — The Constitution is a definition of the
powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW LIMITED TO ACTUAL LITIGATION; WISDOM, JUSTICE OR
EXPEDIENCY OF LEGISLATION. — Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further
to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality
to legislative enactments not only because the Legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution
but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SYSTEM ITSELF NOT THE CHIEF PALLADIUM OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY;
SUCCESS MUST BE TESTED IN THE CRUCIBLE OF FILIPINO MINDS AND HEARTS. — But much as we
might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to
be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium
of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . .
their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of
their constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the
unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in the consultation
rooms and court chambers.

8. ID.; OUR CONSTITUTION HAS ADOPTED THE AMERICAN TYPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.
— Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers of
our Constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given
effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American
example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the
power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the
rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their
function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no
power to examine the validity of statutes (article 81, chapter IV). The former Austrian Constitution
contained a similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have
assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in
Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic,
February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts 121-123, Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial
constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws.

9. ID.; JURISDICTION OVER THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION. — The nature of the present controversy
shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two
agencies created by the Constitution. If the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, a void
would be created in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive of the
entire framework. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system.
Upon principle, reason and authority, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly." cralaw virtua1aw library

10. ID.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION; CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT OF POWER TO THE ELECTORAL
COMMISSION TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS
AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. — The original provision regarding
this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that the
assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken
from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House
shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word
"sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole
judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members, . . ." apparently in order
to emphasize the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred upon each House of the Legislature
over the particular cases therein specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of
power to the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and
complete." (Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)

11. ELECTORAL COMMISSION; HISTORICAL INSTANCES. — The transfer of the power of determining
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Legislature long lodged in the legislative
body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in
the science of government. As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of
insuring the non-partisan settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its
prerogative to two judges of the King’s Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in
accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has
become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125]
as amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act, 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2;
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51], s. 70; Expiring Laws
Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In
the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the Committee of the House
of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election
contests which were originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In
Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the election of members of the Upper
House of Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art.
37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free
City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or
National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the
Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak
Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927
(art. 43) all provide for an Electoral Commission.

12. ID.; ELECTORAL COMMISSION IN THE UNITED STATES. — The creation of an Electoral
Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means
unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the
number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made
no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United
States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission
composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House of
Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four
designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two
houses voting separately. Although there is not much moral lesson to be derived from the experience
of America in this regard, the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.

13. ID.; ID.; FAMILIARITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION WITH THE
HISTORY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD; ELECTORAL
COMMISSION IS THE EXPRESSION OF THE WISDOM AND ULTIMATE JUSTICE OF THE PEOPLE. — The
members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority
men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and
political development of other countries of the world. When, therefore, they deemed it wise to create
an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of
passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in
view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral
Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were
cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its
creation, the plan was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is
that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression
of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people." (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March
4, 1861.)

14. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE WAS TO TRANSFER IN ITS TOTALITY POWER EXERCISED PREVIOUSLY BY
THE LEGISLATURE OVER THE CONTESTED ELECTIONS OF THE MEMBERS TO AN INDEPENDENT AND
IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL. — From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the
purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the Legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not
so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the
long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted
the people acting through their delegates to the Convention to provide for this body known as the
Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority
parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and
further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme
Court.

15. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION IS AN INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION
ALTHOUGH FOR PURPOSES OF CLASSIFICATION IT IS CLOSER TO THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
THAN TO ANY OTHER. — The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the
necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to
it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all
intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be
sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision (sec. 4)
creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our
Constitution is very indicative. Its composition is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority
of members of the Legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the Legislature.

16. ID.; ID; ID.; GRANT OF POWER TO THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION INTENDED TO BE AS
COMPLETE AND UNIMPAIRED AS IF IT HAD REMAINED ORIGINALLY IN THE LEGISLATURE. — The
grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as
if it had remained originally in the Legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as
effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the constitution (Ex parte
Lewis, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State v. Whisman, 33 S. D., 260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1). If the power
claimed for the National Assembly to regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off
the power of the Electoral Commission to lay down a period within which protest should be filed were
conceded, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in
such a case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the
regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our
Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual
authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad
spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking
cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority
effective whenever and wherever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that
intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the
National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of
the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.

17. ID.; ID.; ID; ID.; THE POWER TO PROMULGATE INCIDENTAL RULES AND REGULATIONS LODGED
ALSO IN THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION. — The creation of the Electoral
Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within
which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where
a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the
one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed.,
vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure
to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive powers to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

18. ID; ID.; ID.; POSSIBILITY OF ABUSE NO ARGUMENT AGAINST GRANT OF POWER. — The
possibility of abuse is not an argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that
is not susceptible of abuse. If any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral
Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must
be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government
are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. The people in creating the Electoral Commission
reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned
to it, as it has given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the
agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each
constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed
to be animated with same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were
created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to
be desired in given instances, is inherent in the imperfections of human institutions. From the fact that
the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not
follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenged in appropriate cases
over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.

19. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTS OF THE CASE; EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS. — The Commonwealth
Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the
provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly
convened on November 25, of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner
was approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent against the
election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when
the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the
Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day
for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of
December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral
Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. As a
matter of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives division of the
National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three
justices of the Supreme Court and the six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral
Commission were respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1936. If Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly confirming non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the
effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the
National Assembly — on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such
cases — had already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had
time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to
its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been
contemplated, and should be avoided.

20. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CAN NOT DEPRIVE THE ELECTORAL
COMMISSION OF ITS AUTHORITY TO FIX THE TIME WITHIN WHICH PROTESTS AGAINST THE
ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE
FILED. — Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom
no protests has been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1936, can not be construed as a
limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good
reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of members of the Legislature at the time the power
to decide election contests was still lodged in the Legislature, confirmation alone by the Legislature
cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election
protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election
no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. Confirmation of the election of any
member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a
matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a
member-elect to a seat in the National Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body
(No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).

21. ID.; EFFECT OF CONFIRMATION UNDER THE JONES LAW. — Under the practice prevailing when
the Jones Law was still in force, each House of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests
against the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18
of the Jones Law making each House the sole judge of the election, returns and qualifications of its
members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each House respectively to
prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest the election of members of said bodies.
As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired,
each House passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns of such members against whose
election no protest had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the
filing of further protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad v.
Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, p. 89; Urgello v. Rama [Third
District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero v. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine
Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar v. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth
Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar v. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth
Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has
expressly repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have
been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the
authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor
constitutional provision which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on
December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members. And what
the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of
confirmation.

DECISION

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from
taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election
of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of
Tayabas.

The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents,
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of
the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;

(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as
member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of
votes;

(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;

(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following
resolution: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

" [No. 8]
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRAQUIENES NO SE HA
PRESENTADO PROTESTA.

"Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado
debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente,
son aprobadas y confirmadas.

"Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935." cralaw virtua1aw library

(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being
the only protest filed after the passage of Resolution No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-
things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district
of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified;

(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which
provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia."
library
cralaw virtua1aw

(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the
aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a)
that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its
members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted
formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the
prescribed period;

(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion
of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a
protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly, after confirmation;

(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid
"Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" ;

(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on
January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner’s "Motion to Dismiss the Protest." cralaw virtua1aw library

The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed
for: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as
regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;

(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said
election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or
the National Assembly;

(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose
exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to hem for
decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its
proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such
proceedings;

(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and
obeyed;

(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution and
paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United
States) as well as under sections 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised
because it involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.

On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent
Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" ; that in adopting its resolution
of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the
election of any member of the National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate
exercise of the implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations
essential to carry out the powers and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that
in adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the
election protest in question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it
acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department of the Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance
or control of the Supreme Court;

(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did
not deprive the Electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed
within the time that might be set by its own rules;

(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi- judicial functions, created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or
corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.

The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2,
1936, setting forth following as his special defense:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935,
there was no existing Law fixing the period within which protests against the election of members of
the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it
by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;

(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on
December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;

(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said
respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January
23, 1936, denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the
said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;

(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which
protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protests filed
subsequent thereto;

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with
quasi-judicial functions, whose decisions are final and unappeallable;

(f) That the Electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation,
board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that
neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of Article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution
and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;

(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the
United States) has no application to the case at bar.

The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner
prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral
Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of
this court of March 21, 1936.

There was no appearance for the other respondents. The issues to be decided in the case at bar may
be reduced to the following two principal propositions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
DANTE O. CASIBANG vs. HONORABLE
NARCISO A. AQUINO
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FACTS: Respondent Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected

Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501
votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably filed a protest
against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan; on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the
appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral
precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting;
and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971
Election Code.

In the meantime or on September 1972, the incumbent President issued

Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two
months thereafter, more or less, on November 1972, the 1971 Constitutional
Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935
Constitution; and the same was ratified by the sovereign people of the
Philippines on January 1973; and on March 31, 1973, this Court declared that
“there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered
in force and effect” (Javellana vs. Executive Secretary).

Thereafter or on October 1973, the petitioner had already completed

presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved
to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court
had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution by reason of which — principally) Section 9 of Article XVII
[Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has
intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that “… the provisions in the
1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by
the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, local governments should adhere to the
parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution
under its Article XI.” Furthermore, he stated that local elective officials have
no more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the
appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of
Article XVII.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: He contended that the New Constitution

did not divest the CFI of its jurisdiction to hear and decide election protests
pending before them at the time of its ratification and effectivity; that the
ratification of the New Constitution and its effectivity did not automatically
abolish the office and position of municipal mayor nor has it automatically cut
short the tenure of the office, so as to render the issue as to who is the lawfully
elected candidate to said office or position moot and academic; that election
protests involve public interest such that the same must be heard until
terminated and may not be dismissed on mere speculation that the office
involved may have been abolished, modified or reorganized; and that the
motion to dismiss was filed manifestly for delay.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: P.R. Yu contends that the election cases

of the 1935 Constitution being interwoven in the political complexion of our
new Constitution should be dismissed since the adoption of the New
Constitution by the people signified their intent to adhere to a Parliamentary
form of government and by reason of such adoption, the position of Municipal
Mayor has indeed been abolished. That pursuant to Sec 9 of Art XVII stating
“All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic shall
continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent
President of the Philippines, …” protects only those incumbent government
officials and employees and since the protestant is not such protected
government official, should he win his election protest, he would have no right
to hold such office since he does not fall within the ambit of incumbent
government officials at the time of the adoption of the New Constitution.

ISSUE: w/n the New Constitution placed the election review

outside the ambit of judicial review

HELD: No. The case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy.

No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any
act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly
reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election
protest. The term “political question” connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not

legality, of a particular measure.

That “the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the

new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or
employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot
be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the
time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under
protest or contest” and that “subject to the constraints specifically mentioned
in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor
could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to
disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective
position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code,
commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a
judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect’s right to the contested office.”‘
We rationalize that “the Constitutional Convention could not have intended,
as in fact it did not intend, to shield or protect those who had been unduly
elected. To hold that the right of the herein private respondents to the
respective offices which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to
question, would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could
have been an election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation,
vote buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to
preserve inviolate the sanctity of the ballot.” 

Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest
case with a political color. That section merely allocated unto the National
Assembly the power to enact a local government code and any change in the
existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.” It is apparent
at once that such power committed by the New Constitution to the National
Assembly will not be usurped or preempted by whatever ruling or judgment
the respondent Judge will render in the electoral protest case. Whoever will
prevail in that contest will enjoy the indefinite term of the disputed office of
mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the existing set-up of local government in
this country; subject always to whatever change or modification the National
Assembly will introduce when it will enact the local government code.
Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco, et al., G.R.
No. L-10520, February 28, 1957
10JAN
En Banc
[CONCEPCION, J.]
FACTS:  Petitioners pray that a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed to
respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio
and Placido Reyes, restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the
said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to
respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action. Petitioners likewise prayed
that judgment be rendered ousting respondents from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the preliminary injunction
permanent.
Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the
legality, and validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said respondents
Senators. Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is
without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the
members of the Electoral Tribunal

ISSUE: Was the dispute regarding the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal in the nature of a political question that will divest the Court of jurisdiction?
HELD: NO.
[T]he term “political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to “those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
the Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to
decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having
the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the
constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen “upon
nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes” in the Senate, and hence, is null
and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary authority” in the
choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate
prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.

“.. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover,
where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the
judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and,
particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or
statutory rights ..” (16 C.J.S., 439).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and
determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein.
SANIDAD vs COMELEC
AUGUST 28, 2018 GRACEZYL BLANCO LEAVE A COMMENT

PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO C. SANIDAD vs HONORABLE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS & HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER

G.R. No. L-44640

October 12, 1976

FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
991 to call for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-called Citizens
Assemblies (“barangays”). Its primary purpose is to resolve the issues of martial law (as to its
existence and length of effectivity).

On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the questions
that are to be asked during the referendum on October 16. The first question is whether or not the
citizen wants martial law to continue, and the second one asks for the approval on several
proposed amendments to the existing Constitution.
The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the national
referendum in October 16.

Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction to
enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16,
and to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution.

Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting
that the power to propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during the transition
period is expressly conferred to the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of
the Constitution.

Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of
October 16. They assert that the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution and a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation
renders the plebiscite a nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via
referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the
Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of
age and above.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that the issue raised
is political in nature – and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court. The Solicitor General also
asserts that at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to
exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

ISSUE: WON the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the constitutionality of PDs
991 and 1033).

HELD: YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question, while only 3
maintained it was of political nature and thus not justiciable.

The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a political one.
This is because the 1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power to propose amendments
to the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition.

After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active session, the
power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National
Assembly. The normal course has not been followed.

Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the
president undertook the proposal of amendments through Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect,
through a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment
procedure raises a contestable issue.
Daza vs. Singson
 MissIdea  Uncategorized  November 14, 2014 2 Minutes

G.R. 86344 21 December 1989

DAZA vs. SINGSON

FACTS:
1. After the May 1987 Congressional Elections, the House of
Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the
Commission on Appointments (COA) among the several political
parties represented in the chamber, as pursuant to Article 6, Section
18 of the Constitution. Herein Petitioner Daza was among those
chosen and listed as representative of the Liberal Party (LP).

2. However, on 16 September 1988, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino

(LDP) reorganized which resulted to political realignment in the
House; 24 members of LP resigned and joined LDP, thereby swelling
the former’s number from 159 to 17.

3. Due to such, the House revised its representatives in the COA by

withdrawing the seat of Petitioner and giving it to the newly LDP,
respondent Singson.

4. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint in the Supreme Court on the

ground of his removal from the COA. Consequently, the Court issued
a TRO to prevent both petitioner and respondent from serving in the
COA.

5. Petitioner contends that he cannot be removed because his

appointment is permanent, citing a ruling in Cunanan v. Tan, and
asserting that the rerganization of LDP is not based on permanent
political realignment since LDP is not a duly registered pol. party.

6. On the other hand, respondent avers that the question raised by

petitioner is political in nature and beyond the jurisdiction of the
court. Moreover, he invokes that nowhere in the Constitution requires
 that a political party be registered to be entitled to proportional
representation in the COA.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s removal from the COA by the HRep is legal?

RULING:
1. First, on the jurisdictional issue, the Court held that the contention of
respondent is not correct; the Court has jurisdiction over the matter
since what is involved is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of the
chamber in removing the ptitioner from the COA.
2. Second, on the issue of removal, the Court ruled that petitioner’s
contention that the LDP’s reoirganization is invalid since it is not yet
registere. However, on 23 November 1989, the COMELEC en banc
already affirmed the registration of the LDP.
3. On the contention that LDP has not yet passed the test of stability is
ikewise untenable. The Court stated that if such theory be followed,
petitioner’s party (LP) will also fall under such category and will not
be entitled representation in the COA since the Liberal Party was just
reorganized before for Pres. Roxas be able to run.
4. Further, the Court stressed that LDP had already been existing for
more than a year and having 157 members in the House and 6 in the
Senate is enough for it to be considered an eligible pol. party and if
petitioner’s contention be pursued, the members of LDP will be
denied of representation in the COA.