RULE 38
MADARANG V SPS MORALES
A petition for relief from judgment must
be filed within 60 days after petitioner
learns of the judgment, final order, or
proceeding and within six (6) months
from entry of judgment or final order

This court agrees that the petition for relief from judgment was filed out of time. However, the trial
court erred in counting the 60-day period to file a petition for relief from the date of finality of
the trial court’s decision. Rule 38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that
the 60-day period must be counted after petitioner learns of the judgment or final order. The
period counted from the finality of judgment or final order is the six-month period. Section 3, Rule 38
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.– A petition provided for in either of the
preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of
the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after
such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied
with affidavits, showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon and the
facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may
be. (Emphasis supplied)
The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly
complied with.26 A petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is
dismissed outright. This is because a petition for relief from judgment is an exception to the
public policy of immutability of final judgments.27
In Gesulgon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 28 the Labor Arbiter ordered Mariscor
Corporation to reinstate Edwin Gesulgon as chief cook on board one of its vessels. Mariscor
Corporation had notice of the decision on March 27, 1987, but it did not appeal the Labor Arbiter’s
decision. Since decisions of Labor Arbiters become final 10 calendar days from receipt of the
decision, the decision became final on April 6, 1987.
On February 28, 1989, Mariscor Corporation filed a motion to set aside judgment with the National
Labor Relations Commission. The Commission treated the motion as a petition for relief from
judgment and granted the petition for relief from judgment. It remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter
for further proceedings.
This court set aside the order granting the petition for relief from judgment for having been filed
beyond the double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
This court explained:
A party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two (2)
reglementary periods: (a) the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of
the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and (b) within a fixed period of six
(6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with
these periods is required because provision for a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of
liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the
fundamental principle that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality
in order at last to put an end to litigation. In Turqueza v. Hernando, this Court stressed once more
that:
 
SO PAG HINDI KAYA WITHIN 60 DAYS
LAST CHANCE TO FILE PFR within ABSOLUTELY
NON-EXTENDIBLE PERIOD OF 6 MONTHS
(BOTH THESE PERIODS ARE NOT EXTENDIBLE)
. . . the doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy
and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of courts must become final at
some definite date fixed by law. The law gives an exception or ‘last chance’ of a timely petition
for relief from judgment within the reglementary period (within 60 days from knowledge and 6
months from entry of judgment) under Rule 38, supra, but such grave period must be taken
as ‘absolutely fixed, in extendible, never interruptedand cannot be subjected to any condition
or contingency. Because the period fixed is itself devised to meet a condition or contingency
(fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect), the equitable remedy is an act of grace, as it
were, designed to give the aggrieved party another and last chance’ and failure to avail of
such last chance within the grace period fixed by the statute or Rules of Court is fatal . . . .29
(Emphasis in the original)
In Spouses Reyes v. Court of Appeals and Voluntad, 30 the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan rendered
a decision against the Spouses Reyes’ predecessors-in-interest. The decision became final on
December 8, 1995. The Spouses Reyes had notice of the decision on May 30, 1997 when they
received a Court of Appeals order directing them to comment on the petition for certiorari filed by
respondents heirs of Voluntad. Attached to the Court of Appeals’ order was a copy of the trial court’s
decision.
On June 21, 2000, the Spouses Reyes filed a petition for relief from judgment against the Regional
Trial Court of Bulacan’s decision. This court affirmed the dismissal of the petition for relief from
judgment for having been filed out of time and said:
It should be noted that the 60-day period from knowledge of the decision, and the 6-month
period from entry of judgment, are both inextendible and uninterruptible. We have also time
and again held that because relief from a final and executory judgment is really more of an exception
than a rule due to its equitable character and nature, strict compliance with these periods, which are
definitely jurisdictional, must always be observed.31 (Emphasis in the original)
In this case, petitioners, through counsel, received a copy of the trial court’s decision on
January 29, 2010. They filed a motion for reconsideration and an amended motion for
reconsideration, which similarly alleged the following:
The defendants, by the undersigned counsel, to this Honorable Court, respectfully allege:
1. That on January 29, 2010, they received the decision in the above entitled case rendered by this
Honorable Court, dated December 22, 2009;
2. That with due respect to the Honorable Court, the decision is contrary to law & to the defendants[’]
evidence presented in court. Hence, this urgent motion.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court, that the decision sought to be
reversed be reconsidered and another one be rendered in favor of the defendants. 32
Although petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and amended motion for
reconsideration, these motions were pro forma for not specifying the findings or conclusions
in the decision that were not supported by the evidence or contrary to law. 33 Their motion for
reconsideration did not toll the 15-day period to appeal.34
Petitioners cannot argue that the period to appeal should be counted from August 11, 2011, the day
petitioners personally received a copy of the trial court’s decision. Notice of judgment on the
counsel of record is notice to the client. 35 Since petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the
decision on January 29, 2010, the period to appeal shall be counted from that date.
Thus, the decision became final 15 days after January 29, 2010, or on February 13, 2010.
Petitioners had six (6) months from February 13, 2010, or until August 12, 2010, to file a petition for
relief from judgment.
NIRECEIVE NI COUNSEL BEFORE PETITIONER,
PERIOD IS COUNTED FROM THE COUNSEL RECEIVED
THE SHIT NOT THE TIME NARECEIVE NI PETITIONER.
(notice to counsel is notice to client)
Since petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment on September 24, 2010, the petition for
relief from judgment was filed beyond six (6) months from finality of judgment. The trial court
should have denied the petition for relief from judgment on this ground.

PURCON V MRM PHILIPPINES

The threshold issue before Us is – Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from Our resolution denying his petition for review?
We answer in the negative. A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Supreme
Court.
First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is entered through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for relief
from judgment, this rule must be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the
original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court, thus:
Section 1. Original cases cognizable. – Only petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary and
attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls may be filed
originally in the Supreme Court.

A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule 56 cases originally cognizable
by this Court.

In Dela Cruz v. Andres, We reiterated Our pronouncement in Mesina v. Meer, that a petition for relief
10 11

from judgment is not an available remedy in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The
Court explained that under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed
within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set
aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the same court which
rendered the decision, viz.:
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. – When a judgment or final order
is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case
praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. (Underscoring supplied)
12

Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and
Regional Trial Courts.
As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or Municipal
Trial Court which decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition for relief. Under the old rule, a
petition for relief from the judgment or final order of Municipal Trial Courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, viz.:
Section 1. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment of inferior court. – When a judgment
is rendered by an inferior court on a case, and a party thereto by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, has been unjustly deprived of a hearing therein, or has been prevented from taking an
appeal, he may file a petition in the Court of First Instance of the province in which the original judgment
was rendered, praying that such judgment be set aside and the case tried upon its merits.
Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from the judgment or other proceeding thereof. –
When a judgment order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in a Court of First
Instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court
and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for Municipal and
Regional Trial Courts and designation of Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts as courts of record.
13 14

Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules
of Court. It may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme
15

Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal
Rules of the CA allows the remedy of petition for relief in the CA.
16

There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief applicable in the CA or
this Court. The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45 which
pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the remedies available before said Court such as
annulment of judgments or final orders or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule
52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned.

If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the CA, with more
reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court. This Court entertains only
questions of law. A petition for relief raises questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, which are beyond the concerns of this Court.
ALF-itc
Nevertheless, even if We delve into the merits of the petition, the same must still be dismissed. The
late filing of the petition for review does not amount to excusable negligence. Petitioner’s lack of
devotion in discharging his duty, without demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,
cannot be a basis for judicial relief. For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to prosper, nothing
short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must be shown.
The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of
the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or mistaken mode of
procedure for that matter; otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal
which has already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of procedure
by counsel.
In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, this
Court affords a party a second opportunity to vindicate his right. But this opportunity is unavailing in the
instant case, especially since petitioner has squandered the various opportunities available to him at the
different stages of this case. Public interest demands an end to every litigation and a belated effort to
reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the
administration of justice.
Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects
of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode
of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has
already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to mistaken mode of procedure by
counsel. 17

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED.

VALENCIA V CA
First, petitioner avers that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the motion on the
ground that the portion of the decision sought to be executed had been vacated by private
respondents' timely appeal. Petitioner avers that he received the trial court's decision on July 23,
1993, and he filed the motion on August 5, 1993, well within the 15-day period for appeal. Private
respondents do not dispute these averments.
Section 23 of "E. Appellate Jurisdiction" in the Interim Rules and Guidelines Implementing Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that perfection of an appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last day
to appeal by any party.14 Moreover, the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not automatically
divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case. 15 The trial court can take cognizance of
the motion for execution pending appeal if filed within 15 days from the party's notice of the
decision.16 In this case, however, the trial court's jurisdiction was interrupted and lost when
an appeal was filed by private respondents. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not find
any abuse of discretion by the trial court's holding to the effect that the judgment would be
deemed in abeyance or vacated because of private respondents' timely appeal.
Second, should the trial court have allowed the petition for relief? Petitioner alleges that the Court of
Appeals erred in refusing to compel the trial court to act on the petition for relief. According to him,
the trial court's duty under Rule 38 of the Rules of court, 17 except sections 4 & 6 thereof, is ministerial
such that upon finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the judge must order the other
party to answer, conduct a hearing and decide whether to grant or deny the petition. The judge was
therefore remiss in his duty when he deferred action on the petition, since his only role was either to
dismiss or grant it, according to petitioner.
Private respondents argue that the trial court was correct in deferring action on the petition for relief,
in the interest of justice and equity. To grant the petition pending private respondents' appeal, they
aver, would pre-empt the Court of Appeals. This, they say, is not abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
We find no merit in petitioner's argument. A petition for relief under Rule 38 is only available
against a final and executory judgment. 18 In this case, the trial court's judgment subject of the
petition for relief has not yet attained finality because of the timely appeal by private
respondents. Therefore, petitioner cannot require the judge to follow the procedure laid down
in Rule 38. The judge did not err nor abuse his discretion when he deferred action on the
petition.
Corollarily, the Court of Appeals did not err in failing to annul the portion of the trial court's judgment
dismissing petitioner's counterclaim for lack of due process. This can well be settled in the
petition for relief before the trial court. Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court 19 provides that
parties can avail of the action for annulment of judgment when a petition for relief is no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner. In the present case, the latter remedy was
still available.

GOMEZ V MONTALBAN

(DITO NAG FILE SIYA MRFJ within 15 day period to appeal, MR dapat remedy niya, so since
hindi pa final and executory yung judgement, premature pa MFRJ niya kasi nagaapply lang
MFRJ sa Final and excutory judgement. 

Sa case bago dito, yung kay Valencia v CA, not yet final naman kase within 15 days, nakapag
appeal si petitioner so hindi din proper dun yung MRFJ.
On the propriety of the granting by the RTC of respondent’s Petition for Relief from Judgment, the
Court finds and so declares that the RTC did indeed commit an error in doing so.
First of all, a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is only available against a final
and executory judgment.28 Since respondent allegedly29 received a copy of the Decision dated 4
May 2004 on 14 May 2004, and she filed the Petition for Relief from Judgment on 28 May 2004,
judgment had not attained finality. The 15-day period to file a motion for reconsideration or
appeal had not yet lapsed. Hence, resort by respondent to a petition for relief from judgment
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was premature and inappropriate.
Second, based on respondent’s allegations in her Petition for Relief before the RTC, she had no
cause of action for relief from judgment.
Section 1 of Rule 38 provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. – When a judgment or
final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the
same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the court may grant relief from judgment only
"[w]hen a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in any
court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence x x x."
In her Petition for Relief from Judgment before the RTC, respondent contended that judgment was
entered against her through "mistake or fraud," because she was not duly served with summons
as it was received by a Mrs. Alicia dela Torre who was not authorized to receive summons or
other legal processes on her behalf.
As used in Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, "mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law,
which relates to the case.30 The word "mistake," which grants relief from judgment, does not
apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have
committed in the trial. Such errors may be corrected by means of an appeal. 31This does not
exist in the case at bar, because respondent has in no wise been prevented from interposing
an appeal.
"Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which prevented
the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court, 32or was used to
procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy.33This is not present in the
case at hand as respondent was not prevented from securing a fair trial and was given the
opportunity to present her case.
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against.34 Under Section 1, the "negligence" must be excusable and generally imputable to
the party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client. 35 To follow a contrary
rule and allow a party to disown his counsel’s conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative,
and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant
should do is seek administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of
the court’s ruling.

SANTOS V SANTOS

The Court agrees with the conclusion of the CA and the defensor vinculi regarding the finality of the
RTC decision; however, we do not agree with their assertions as to the effect of the decision on the
subsequent proceedings a quo.
There is indeed no showing in the record that Dana moved for reconsideration or new trial from the
RTC decision. She, nevertheless, filed an appeal. However, probably cognizant of the proscription in
Section 2030 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which makes the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a
motion for new trial a precondition for filing an appeal, she withdrew her appeal and filed a petition
for relief from judgment.
There is no provision in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC prohibiting resort to a petition for relief from
judgment in a marriage nullity case. Furthermore, the said Rule sanctions the suppletory
application of the Rules of Court 31 to cases within its ambit. It cannot, therefore, be said that Dana
availed of an inappropriate remedy to question the decision of the trial court. Indeed, the trial court
admitted Dana's petition for relief, heard the parties on the issues thereon, and rendered an order
denying the petition. Dana then properly and seasonably assailed the order of denial via certiorari to
the CA. It is, therefore, clear that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-6954 continued even
after the trial court had rendered judgment and even after the lapse of the 15-day period for
appealing the decision.
Nevertheless, considering the nature and office of a petition for relief, which is to set aside a final
judgment,32 the Court cannot agree with Dana's assertion that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case
No. 03-6954 had not attained finality. In fact, the decision has already been annotated in their
marriage contract.33 This finding, however, does not detract from the fact that the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 03-6954 continued even after the trial court had rendered judgment, precisely
because Dana filed a petition for relief from that judgment. From the denial of her petition, she
sought recourse to the appellate court. The appellate court, in dismissing the case upon the parties'
compromise on their conjugal properties, invoked the finality of the RTC decision as a bar to the
litigation of the other issues raised by Dana's petition. This conclusion is untenable.
 In Samia v. Medina,34 which involved the application of the statutory ascendant of Rule
38 in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the Court held:

There is a great deal of similarity between an order granting a motion for a new trial
based upon "accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against" under section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and an order granting a
motion for a new trial based upon "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect," under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as both set aside the
judgment, order, or proceeding complained of; both call for a new trial, and in both the
injured party may question the order granting the motion for the new trial upon appeal
from the new judgment rendered upon the merits of the case. The only fundamental
difference lies in this, that while the judgment, order, or proceeding coming under
section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not final, that coming under section 113 is
final. But this does not alter the nature or effect of the order granting the new trial, for
this order does not put an end to the litigation in the sense that the party injured
thereby has no other remedy short of appeal; he may question the propriety of
the new trial on appeal from an adverse judgment rendered after such trial.35
(Emphasis and underscoring Ours)

In Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Sheriff of Manila,36 decided prior to the enactment of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court held:

There is no question that a judgment or order denying relief under Rule 38 is final and
appealable, unlike an order granting such relief which is interlocutory. However, the
second part of the above-quoted provision (that in the course of an appeal from the
denial or dismissal of a petition for relief, a party may also assail the judgment on the
merits) may give the erroneous impression that in such appeal the appellate court may
reverse or modify the judgment on the merits. This cannot be done because the
judgment from which relief is sought is already final and executor. x x x

The purpose of the rule is to enable the appellate court to determine not only the
existence of any of the grounds relied upon whether it be fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, but also and primarily the merit of the petitioner's cause of action
or defense, as the case may be. If the appellate court finds that one of the grounds
exists and, what is of decisive importance, that the petitioner has a good cause of
action or defense, it will reverse the denial or dismissal, set aside the judgment in the
main case and remand the case to the lower court for a new trial in accordance with
Section 7 of Rule 38.37 (Citations omitted)

The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure changed the nature of an order of denial of a petition for
relief from judgment, making it unappealable 38 and, hence, assailable only via a petition for
certiorari.39 Nevertheless, the appellate court, in deciding such petitions against denials of petitions
for relief, remains tasked with making a factual determination, i.e., whether or not the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition. To do so, it is still obliged, as Service
Specialists instructs, to "determine not only the existence of any of the grounds relied upon whether
it be fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also and primarily the merit of the
petitioner's cause of action or defense, as the case may be."40 Stated otherwise, the finality of the
RTC decision cannot bar the appellate court from determining the issues raised in the petition for
relief, if only to determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
denying such petition. While a Rule 38 Petition does not stay the execution of the judgment, 41
the grant thereof reopens the case for a new trial; 42 and thus, if merit be found in Dana's
certiorari petition assailing the trial court's denial of her petition for relief, the case will be
reopened for new trial.
The CA, therefore, erred in refusing to reopen Dana's petition on the basis of the finality of the trial
court decision.
The Court now resolves the question regarding the propriety of setting aside the judgment on
compromise.
On one hand, the immutability and immediate effect of judgments upon compromise is well-settled.
In Magbanua v. Uy,43 it was held that:

When a compromise agreement is given judicial approval, it becomes more than a

contract binding upon the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as
a determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment. It is
immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery. The
nonfulfillment of its terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of execution; in
such an instance, execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. 44

However, like any other judgment, a judgment upon compromise which is contrary to law is a void
judgment; and "[a] void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect. It does not divest rights,
and no rights can be obtained under it; all proceedings founded upon a void judgment are equally
worthless."45
On the other hand, Article 2035(2) and Article 5 of the New Civil Code provide:

ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

xxxx

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;

xxxx

ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be
void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

Again, the Court reiterates, at the risk of being repetitive, that the petition which gave rise to these
proceedings is for the declaration of nullity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage. Dana's petition for
certiorari with the CA, which is nothing but a consequence of the proceedings before the RTC,
alleges the fraudulent deprivation of her chance to refute and controvert Leodegario's allegations
and to present her side of the issue, which she also lays down in her petition. The core issue of
Dana's petition is, therefore, the validity of her marriage to Leodegario. The termination of the case
by virtue of the compromise agreement, therefore, necessarily implies the settlement by compromise
of the issue of the validity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage.
In Uy v. Chua,46 which also involves an issue not subject to compromise under Article 2035, the
Court held:

The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18

February 2000 and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000
in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to settle the question of
petitioner's status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In
exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the
children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each.
Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise
Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and
future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise
 Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered
by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.47 (Emphasis and
underscoring Ours)

In a long line of cases,48 the Court has censured and punished lawyers, and even judges, who have
drafted agreements to dissolve marriages or to sanction adulterous relations. The rule applies a
fortiori to the CA. It was, therefore, erroneous for the appellate court to terminate Dana's suit - which
puts in issue the validity of her marriage - by virtue of the execution of the Decision 11 Q.R. No.
214593 compromise agreement which only covers the property relations of the spouses. While these
issues are intertwined, a compromise of the latter issue should not and cannot operate as a
compromise of the former, per Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
The Court cannot give its imprimatur to the dismissal of the case at bar even if, as the appellate
court held, it was Dana's intention 49 to have the case terminated upon the execution of the
compromise agreement. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the appellate court when it ruled that
the scope of the compromise agreement is limited to Dana and Leodegario's property relations vis-
à-vis their children, as Article 2036 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] compromise comprises only
those objects which are definitely stated therein, or which by necessary implication from its terms
should be deemed to have been included in the same." As held by the appellate court:

The agreement makes no mention of the marital ties between [Leodegario] and [Dana]
but is limited only to their property relations vis-à-vis their children. 50

However, despite the error committed by the appellate court, absent vices of consent or other
defects, the compromise agreement remains valid and binding upon Dana and Leodegario, as they
have freely and willingly agreed to, and have already complied with, the covenants therein. The
agreement operates as a partial compromise on the issue of the disposition of the properties of the
marriage.
Nevertheless, the Court is constrained to uphold the appellate court's decision, because the trial
court's denial of Dana's petition for relief from judgment does not amount to grave abuse of
discretion.
While the remaining issues in the petition partake of a factual nature, the Court deems it necessary
to write finis to this case at this level in order to avoid remanding the case to the appellate court. It
has been held that "remand is not necessary if the Court is in a position to resolve a dispute on the
basis of the records before it; and if such remand would not serve the ends of justice." 51 A careful
perusal of the petitions filed by Dana before the trial court, the appellate court, and this Court betrays
the lack of allegations sufficient to support a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38.
Jurisprudence provides that fraud, as a ground for a petition for relief, refers to extrinsic or collateral
fraud52 which, in turn, has been defined as fraud that prevented the unsuccessful party from fully and
fairly presenting his case or defense and from having an adversarial trial of the issue, as when the
lawyer connives to defeat or corruptly sells out his client's interest. Extrinsic fraud can be committed
by a counsel against his client when the latter is prevented from presenting his case to the court. 53 In
Lasala v. National Food Authority,54 the Court defined extrinsic fraud in relation to parties
represented by counsel, viz.:

Extrinsic fraud x x x refers to "any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation
committed outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party is prevented from
fully exhibiting his side by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as
by keeping him away from court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise, or
where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat."
 Because extrinsic fraud must emanate from the opposing party, extrinsic fraud
concerning a party's lawyer often involves the latter's collusion with the prevailing party,
such that his lawyer connives at his defeat or corruptly sells out his client's interest.

In this light, we have ruled in several cases that a lawyer's mistake or gross negligence
does not amount to the extrinsic fraud that would grant a petition for annulment of
judgment.

We so ruled not only because extrinsic fraud has to involve the opposing party, but also
because the negligence of counsel, as a rule, binds his client. 55 (Citations omitted)

Given this definition, the Court found the following circumstances sufficient to make out a case for
extrinsic fraud:

The party in the present case, the NFA, is a government agency that could rightly rely
solely on its legal officers to vigilantly protect its interests. The NFA's lawyers were not
only its counsel, they were its employees tasked to advance the agency's legal
interests.

Further, the NFA's lawyers acted negligently several times in handling the case that it
appears deliberate on their part.

First, Atty. Mendoza caused the dismissal of the NFA's complaint against Lasala by
negligently and repeatedly failing to attend the hearing for the presentation of the NFA's
evidence-in-chief. Consequently, the NFA lost its chance to recover from Lasala the
employee benefits that it allegedly shouldered as indirect employer.

Atty. Mendoza never bothered to provide any valid excuse for this crucial omission on
his part. Parenthetically, this was not the first time Atty. Mendoza prejudiced the NFA;
1aшphi1

he did the same when he failed to file a motion for reconsideration and an appeal in a
prior 1993 case where Lasala secured a judgment of P34,500,229.67 against the NFA.

For these failures, Atty. Mendoza merely explained that the NFA's copy of the adverse
decision was lost and was only found after the lapse of the period for appeal. Under
these circumstances, the NFA was forced to file an administrative complaint against
Atty. Mendoza for his string of negligent acts.

Atty. Cahucom, Atty. Mendoza's successor in handling the case, notably did not cross-
examine Lasala's witnesses, and did not present controverting evidence to disprove
and counter Lasala's counterclaim. Atty. Cahucom further prejudiced the NFA when he
likewise failed to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal from the trial court's
September 2, 2002 decision, where Lasala was awarded the huge amount of
P52,788,970.50, without any convincing evidence to support it.

When asked to justify his failure, Atty. Cahucom, like Atty. Mendoza, merely mentioned
that the NFA's copy of the decision was lost and that he only discovered it when the
period for appeal had already lapsed.

The trial court's adverse decision, of course, could have been avoided or the award
minimized, if Atty. Cahucom did not waive the NFA's right to present its controverting
evidence against Lasala's counterclaim evidence. Strangely, when asked during
hearing, Atty. Cahucom refused to refute Lasala's testimony and instead simply moved
for the filing of a memorandum.
 The actions of these lawyers, that at the very least could be equated with unreasonable
disregard for the case they were handling and with obvious indifference towards the
NFA's plight, lead us to the conclusion that Attys. Mendoza's and Cahucom's actions
amounted to a concerted action with Lasala when the latter secured the trial court's
huge and baseless counterclaim award. By this fraudulent scheme, the NFA was
prevented from making a fair submission in the controversy.56

Lasala has been subsequently reiterated in Cagayan Economic Zone Authority v. Meridien Vista
Gaming Corporation,57 where the Court held that:

[I]n cases of gross and palpable negligence of counsel and of extrinsic fraud, the Court
must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby. x x x [F]or the extrinsic
fraud to justify a petition for relief from judgment, it must be that fraud which the
prevailing party caused to prevent the losing party from being heard on his action or
defense. Such fraud concerns not the judgment itself but the manner in which it was
obtained. Guided by these pronouncements, the Court in the case of Apex Mining, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals wrote:

If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and

the error committed as a result thereof is so serious that the client, who
otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the
litigation may be reopened to give the client another chance to present
his case. Similarly, when an unsuccessful party has been prevented from
fully and fairly presenting his case as a result of his lawyer's professional
delinquency or infidelity, the litigation may be reopened to allow the party
to present his side. Where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance,
negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the clients being
held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day
in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground.58
(Citations omitted and emphases in the original)

As in Lasala, the Court found sufficient factual justification for the grant of CEZA's petition for relief,
viz.:

At the inception, CEZA was already deprived of its right to present evidence during the
trial of the case when Atty. Baniaga filed a joint manifestation submitting the case for
decision based on the pleadings without informing CEZA. In violation of his sworn duty
to protect his client's interest, Atty. Baniaga agreed to submit the case for decision
without fully substantiating their defense. Worse, after he received a copy of the
decision, he did not even bother to inform his client and the OGCC of the adverse
judgment. He did not even take steps to protect the interests of his client by filing an
appeal. Instead, he allowed the judgment to lapse into finality. Such reckless and gross
negligence deprived CEZA not only of the chance to seek reconsideration thereof but
also the opportunity to elevate its case to the CA.59

Turning now to the case at bar, it is clear that Dana's allegations in her petition for relief fall way
short of the jurisprudential threshold for extrinsic fraud. The Court quotes the allegations Dana made
in her petition for relief with the trial court:

In all candor, [Dana] wanted to present her side of the controversy and all she intended
was to take the witness stand. Without her knowing it, however, her time to present her
evidence passed without her being able to do so. Her previous counsel did not remind,
much less advice [sic], her of the hearing dates to present her case. Particularly, she
 was not simply aware of the hearings held by this [h]onorable [c]ourt on February 26
and March 26, 2009. She can only surmise that somebody must have maneuvered to
impress, if not mislead, the [h]onorable [c]ourt that she was not interested to present
her side.

This must be so since after [Dana] confronted her counsel about the promulgation of
the Decision without her being able to present evidence, her counsel nonchalantly told
her that it was their mutual decision not to present any evidence. This was not what
[Dana] thought and knew. In the first place, she filed her Answer to the petition and
assailed all the material allegations therein. She found no reason to abandon her case.

[Dana], by these assertions does not accuse her previous counsel any
wrongdoing or neglect, or any other parties probably in cahoots with her said
counsel. But it certainly had caused some harm to and, in fact, defrauded this
[h]onorable [c]ourt which was led into believing that [Dana] was not interested in
presenting her evidence. Hence, this [h]onorable [c]ourt found that [Dana] failed to
appear despite notice as already mentioned above. Had it known that she was
interested on [sic] presenting her side, this [h]onorable [c]ourt certainly would not have
denied her that right. Otherwise put, by the deception, this Honorable Court was not
aware that [Dana] was deprived of her day in court.60 (Emphasis and underlining Ours)

Dana's petition is anchored on two main allegations: first, that her counsel failed to notify her
of the hearings dated February 26 and March 26, 2009; and second, that her counsel
nonchalantly told her that it was their mutual decision to not present any evidence. However,
she categorically admits that she "does not accuse her previous counsel [of] any wrongdoing
or neglect, or any other parties probably in cahoots with her said counsel." 61 Furthermore,
the petition makes no specific citation of other acts or circumstances attributable to her
counsel that fraudulently deprived Dana of her opportunity to fully ventilate her claims and
defenses with the trial court. The acts complained of in the petition constitute neither "gross
and palpable negligence" nor corruption or collusion amounting to extrinsic fraud. The
general rule, which binds the client to the negligence of her counsel, remains applicable to
this case. All told, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed her petition for relief.

RULE 47

REPUBLIC V DE CASTRO
Respondents maintain that they did not receive a copy of the trial court’s decision of October 9,
2002,12 and that they came to know of it only on September 29, 2005 when the trial court’s sheriff
personally served upon them a copy of the writ of execution of the decision.13
Section 1, Rule 47 of the 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the remedy of annulment of
judgments or final orders/resolutions of a Regional Trial Court in civil actions can only be availed of
where "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are
no longer available through no fault of the petitioner."
A petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a remedy granted only under
exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the
ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided by law. Such action is never resorted to as a
substitute for a party’s own neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary or other
appropriate remedies.14 1avvphi1

Upon notice of the writ of execution on, by respondents’ own information, September 29,
2005, respondents – if indeed they were completely unaware of the trial court’s decision –
had available remedies to question it. They could have promptly filed a motion to quash the
writ of execution or, in the alternative, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 15 of
the 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure. That they had ample opportunity to do so is gathered from
the fact that the writ of execution of the decision was not immediately implemented by the
sheriff as it was satisfied only on July 20, 2006. Having failed to avail of any of the aforesaid
remedies without any justification, respondents are barred from resorting to the action for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47; otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction
or negligence. So Lazaro v. Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas (Bulacan), Inc.16 teaches:
Let it be stressed at the outset that before a party can avail of the reliefs provided for by Rule 47, i.e.,
annulment of judgments, final orders, and resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one
must have failed to move for new trial in, or appeal from, or file a petition for relief against
said issuances or take other appropriate remedies thereon, through no fault attributable to
him. If he failed to avail of those cited remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot
resort to the action for annulment provided in Rule 47, for otherwise he would benefit from
his own inaction or negligence (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 140615, Feb. 19, 2001, 352
SCRA 235, 250).
In the instant case, not only did petitioner fail to avail of the ordinary and appropriate remedies in
assailing the questioned judgments of the trial court, but he also failed to show to the satisfaction of
this Court that he could not have availed of the ordinary and appropriate remedies under the Rules.
According to petitioner, he allegedly learned of the cases filed against him by respondent bank
only when the writs of execution were issued against him. At the very least then, he could
have moved to quash the writs of execution. In the alternative, he could have filed a petition
for relief from judgment under Rule 38. Instead, petitioner merely alleged that he approached
Atty. Gregorio Salazar, the bank’s counsel, for clarification and assistance, which is not one
of the ordinary and appropriate remedies contemplated by the Rules. Petitioner’s failure to
explain why he failed to avail of said remedies, which were still available to him at that time,
in both Civil Case No. 7355-M and Civil Case No. 2856-V-88, is fatal to his cause. To be sure, a
petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is not a substitute for one’s own neglect in not
availing of the ordinary and appropriate remedies, but a peculiar remedy granted under certain
conditions to those who failed to avail of the ordinary remedies without their fault. Thus, in our
considered view, based on the cited reasons and circumstances, the Court of Appeals did not err
when it denied the petition for annulment of judgment. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED and the assailed Court of Appeals
Decision dated June 26, 2009 and Resolution dated September 30, 2009 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, but only insofar as the Court of Appeals nullified 1) the Order dated April 29, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, Br, 40 of Calapan City granting petitioner’s motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution, 2) the Writ of Execution dated August 2, 2005, and all execution proceedings/actions
pursuant thereto, and 3) the trial court’s order to immediately serve a copy of its Decision dated
October 9, 2002 upon respondents.

SPOUSES FLORES SPOUSES ESTRELLADO

SPOUSES ALVAREZ V CA
It must be clarified at the outset that the instant petition is one for certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, and thus, this Court is limited only to inquire on whether
or not respondent CA acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment.
Annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. It is a recourse that 7

presupposes the filing of a separate and original action for the purpose of
annulling or avoiding a decision in another case. It is not a continuation or
8

progression of the same case, as in fact the case it seeks to annul is already
final and executory, but rather, it is an extraordinary remedy that is equitable
in character and is permitted only in exceptional cases. 9
Annulment of judgment, as provided for in Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Thus: cralawred

Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have
been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.

Jurisprudence, however, recognizes lack of due process as an additional

ground to annul a judgment. 10

Under Section 5, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, it is incumbent that when a court finds
11

no substantial merit in a petition for annulment of judgment, it may dismiss the petition
outright but the "specific reasons for such dismissal" shall be clearly set out.
12

Here, the allegations in the petition clearly set forth the ground of the RTC's lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners. It was alleged that petitioner Nora
Alvarez was never personally served with summons and petitioner Edgar
Alvarez, who is one of the heirs of the spouses Alvarez was not impleaded as
party-defendant in the case.
Should the allegation of lack of jurisdiction be proven, then this would constitute a
serious ground that could affect the validity of the Court's judgment. The Court
explained the effect if the judgment rendered IS one without jurisdiction, thus: cralawred

x x x Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to

either lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the defending party or over the
subject matter of the claim. In case of absence or lack of jurisdiction, a
court should not take cognizance of the case. Thus, the prevailing rule is
that where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject matter, the
judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect no
judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no right can be
obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts
performed and all claims flowing out are void. It is not a decision in
contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become executory. It
also follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to
another case by reason of res judicata. (Citation omitted)
13

The CA, instead, outrightly dismissed the petition based on technical grounds.
First, the CA did not give due course to the petition as it is not compliant with Section
4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, for failure of the petitioners to attach with their
petition, documents supporting their cause of action. True, owing to the exceptional
character of the remedy of annulment of judgment, the limitations and guidelines set
forth by Rule 47 should be strictly complied with. A petition for annulment which
14

ignores or disregards any of these limitations and guidelines cannot prosper.

A perusal of the petition would reveal that petitioners annexed therein the following
documents: (a) the assailed RTC Decision dated December 18, 2007; (b) Transfer
15

Certificate of Title No. 128750 proving that their predecessors were the former
16

registered owners thereof; (c) petitioner Edgar Alvarez's Certificate of Live Birth 17

proving filiation to the former owners of the subject land; (d) proof of receipt by 18

petitioner Nora Alvarez of the RTC Decision; (e) RTC Order dated December 10, 2008,
19

submitting for resolution petitioners' "Motion to Set Aside Judgment by Way of Special
Appearance"; (f) Entry of Final Judgment of the RTC Decision; (g) Summons; and (h)
20 21

Sheriff's Return. 22

Not satisfied with the foregoing documents, the CA dismissed the petition and
mentioned the specific documents which were lacking. In their motion for
reconsideration, petitioners submitted the said lacking documents, specifically: (a) the
Petition for Consolidation of Ownership, (b) two copies of the Deed of Sale with Right
23

to Repurchase; (c) a Copy of the Motion for Leave to Intervene; and the (d) Motion to
24 25

Set Aside Judgment By Way of Special Appearance. Without determining whether said
26

additional documents are relevant or not, it is more prudent for the CA to have
reconsidered their ruling of dismissal when petitioners submitted the documents which
were said to be lacking thereby substantially complying with what was required of
them.
Second, the CA dismissed the petition for failure to avail first the remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment or other appropriate
remedies. If these remedies were not availed of, petitioners must allege in
their petition that said ordinary remedies are no longer available through no
fault on their part; otherwise, the petition will be dismissed. It bears to stress
that these mandatory requirements apply only when the ground for the
petition for annulment of judgment is extrinsic fraud. If the petition for
annulment of judgment is based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioners need not
allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, reconsideration or appeal were
no longer available through no fault on their part. As held by this Court: cralawred

In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of

the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature
or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that
the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or
judgment or appeal therefrom ate no longer available through no fault of
her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the
RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either
collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order
in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches. 27

(Citations omitted)

Third, in attempting to resolve the merits of the petition, the CA found it unbelievable
that petitioners were not aware of the filing of the case against them as in fact, before
Entry of Judgment of the RTC's Decision, petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Set
Aside Judgment By Way of Special Appearance. Petitioners claimed that they only
knew of the case, when the RTC Decision was served on them. At the time
they filed the Motion to Set Aside Judgment By Way of Special Appearance, no
entry of judgment was known to them.
The rule is that jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant or
respondent cannot be acquired notwithstanding his knowledge of the
pendency of a case against him unless he was validly served with summons. 28

The Court has emphasized the importance of service of summons in order to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus:cralawred

x x x The service of summons upon the defendant becomes an important

element in the operation of a court's jurisdiction upon a party to a suit, as
service of summons upon the defendant is the means by which the court
 acquires jurisdiction over his person. Without service of summons, or when
summons are improperly made, both the trial and the judgment, being in
violation of due process, are null and void, unless the defendant waives the
service of summons by voluntarily appearing and answering the suit.

When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted

himself to the jurisdiction of the court. This is not, however, always the
case. Admittedly, and without subjecting himself to the court's jurisdiction,
the defendant in an action can, by special appearance object to the court's
assumption on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. If he so wishes to assert
this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to
have submitted himself to that jurisdiction. (Citation omitted)
29

As can be gleaned from the petitioners' Motion to Set Aside Judgment By Way of
Special Appearance, they consistently maintained that the RTC did not acquire
30

jurisdiction over their persons, due to invalid and improper service of

summons (for petitioner Nora Alvarez) and failure to implead one of the heirs
in the case (for petitioner Edgar Alvarez). It was notable from the said motion that
it was filed by way of special appearance, that is, to question only the
jurisdiction of the Court over their persons. No other affirmative relief was
being sought. Hence, the said filing of the Motion cannot be considered as a
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Fuckin remember rules sa summons,

diba sabi dun, although generally,
special appearance is deemed
submission to the court’s
jurisdiction which cures a defect in
the service of summons. Kapag ang
SP ay coupled with ONLY
questioning the jurisdiction of the
courts, it is not submission to the
court’s jurisdiction na macucure
defect sa summons. So dito, proper
lang AOJ kasi wala jurisdiction over
the persons ang korte dahil
improper service of summons.
 
  The Court explained: cralawred

As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have

submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, it has been held that the
filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with
motion for reconsideration is considered voluntary submission to the trial
court's jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional
appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to
challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be
considered to have submitted to its authority. (Citations omitted)
31

To repeat, the instant Petition for Annulment of Judgment was anchored on lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners. Annexed to the said petition are the
following documents: (a) the assailed RTC Decision dated December 18, 2007; (b)
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128750; (c) petitioner Edgar Alvarez's Certificate of Live
Birth; (d) proof of receipt by petitioner Nora Alvarez of the RTC Decision; (e) RTC Order
dated December 10, 2008, submitting for resolution petitioners' "Motion to Set Aside
Judgment by Way of Special Appearance"; (t) Entry of Final Judgment of the RTC
Decision; (g) Summons; and (h) Sheriff's Return. Added to these are the following
documents appended in the Motion for Reconsideration: (a) the Petition for
Consolidation of Ownership, (b) two copies of the Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase; (c) a Copy of the Motion for Leave to Intervene; and the (d) Motion to Set
Aside Judgment By Way of Special Appearance. Thus, on the bases of the allegations in
the petition as well as the appropriate supporting documents, there is a prima facie
case of annulment of judgment that could warrant the CA's favorable action.
The bottom line is that if the allegations in the Petition for Annulment of Judgment
turned out to be true, then the RTC Decision would be void and the CA would have
been duty-bound to strike it down. Thus, the CA has exceeded the bounds of its
32

jurisdiction when it outrightly dismissed the Petition on a very strict interpretation of

technical rules. The Court finds it more prudent to remand the case to the CA for
further proceedings to first resolve the above-discussed jurisdictional issue. 33

ANCHETA V CAMBAY
Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order
is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner." 36 On the other hand, "[t]he overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented the petitioner from having his day in court." 37 At this
juncture, worth reiterating is the rule that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it
was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief.38 This means that the remedy of annulment of judgment, albeit a "last
remedy,"39 is not an alternative remedy to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
or a petition for relief. It must show or allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through
no fault of petitioner.40 Notably, we have held in Jose v. Intra Strata Assurance
Corporation41 that "it is only extrinsic fraud, not lack of jurisdiction, which is excluded
as a valid ground for annulment if it was availed of, or could not have been availed of,
in a motion for new trial or petition for relief." 42 This is because a judgment rendered
without jurisdiction by the trial court is fundamentally void or nonexistent, and
therefore, can be "assailed at any time either collaterally or by direct action or by
resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is
invoked.

Thus, considering that the ground relied upon in the petition for annulment is lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of Ancheta and Dionila, it was not necessary nor was it
essential on the part of the CA to establish first, before it could have ruled on
the merits of the petition for annulment, whether the remedy of petition for
relief was earlier availed of by Ancheta. This is all the more so in this case where
the issue of lack of jurisdiction was not even categorically ruled upon by the RTC.
At most, Ancheta may have been barred from raising the defense of fraud in her
48
 However, this should not have
petition for annulment with the CA.
prevented the appellate court from ruling on the merits of
the petition for annulment filed before it, and definitively
rule on the issue of lack of jurisdiction raised therein.
Accordingly, we hold that while Ancheta had previously
availed of the remedy of a petition for relief with the RTC,
she is not precluded from filing with the CA a petition for
annulment of judgment – one that is essentially anchored
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. If she can prove that she and
Dionila were indeed not duly served with summons, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction
over them, hence, its August 31, 2005 Judgment would be void ab initio, and the CA
would thus be duty-bound to strike it down. We have observed, however, that instead
of fully addressing the issue of lack of jurisdiction raised before it, the CA opted to
dismiss the case outright based on a mere technical, albeit erroneous, interpretation of
the rules. This the Court cannot countenance. Lack of jurisdiction being a valid ground
for annulment of a judgment, and one which may negate the court's acquisition of
jurisdiction, including defective service of summons, it is a well-founded cause for an
action for annulment of a judgment. 

LLAMAS V CA
After a thorough evaluation of petitioners’ arguments vis-à-vis the applicable law and jurisprudence,
the Court denies the petition.
In People v. Bitanga,13 the Court explained that the remedy of annulment of judgment cannot
be availed of in criminal cases, thus —
Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of judgment to
the following:
Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments
or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.
a1f

The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in
a criminal case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such
recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal cases. Section 18, Rule
124 thereof, provides:
Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. – The provisions of Rules
42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in
original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable
and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to extend the scope of Rule 47 to criminal cases. As
we explained in Macalalag v. Ombudsman, when there is no law or rule providing for this remedy,
recourse to it cannot be allowed x x x.14
Here, petitioners are invoking the remedy under Rule 47 to assail a decision in a criminal case.
Following Bitanga, this Court cannot allow such recourse, there being no basis in law or in the rules.
In substance, the petition must likewise fail. The trial court which rendered the assailed decision had
jurisdiction over the criminal case.
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. 15 In this case, at the
time of the filing of the information, the applicable law was Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, 16 approved
on August 14, 1981, which pertinently provides:
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body,
except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which
shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
xxxx
Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in criminal cases. — Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within
their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding
four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos.

Article 316(2) of the RPC, the provision which penalizes the crime charged in the information,
provides that —
Article 316. Other forms of swindling.—The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times
such value, shall be imposed upon:
xxxx
2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although
such encumbrance be not recorded.
The penalty for the crime charged in this case is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
which has a duration of 1 month and 1 day to 4 months, and a fine of not less than the value of the
damage caused and not more than three times such value. Here, as alleged in the information, the
value of the damage caused, or the imposable fine, is ₱12,895.00. Clearly, from a reading of the
information, the jurisdiction over the criminal case was with the RTC and not the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC). The MeTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action because at
the time of the filing of the information, its jurisdiction was limited to offenses punishable with a fine
of not more than ₱4,000.00.

PACASUM V ZAMORANOS

As a rule, a judgment could not be collaterally impeached or called in question if rendered in a court
of competent jurisdiction, but must be properly attacked in a direct action.  A collateral attack is
29

defined as an attack, made as an incident in another action, whose purpose is to obtain a different
relief.  This is proper only when the judgment, on its face, is null and void, as where it is patent that
30

the court which rendered said judgment has no jurisdiction.  But "[w]here a court has jurisdiction of
31

the parties and the subject matter, its judgment, x x x is conclusive, as long as it remains unreversed
and in force, and cannot be impeached collaterally." 32

The reason for the general rule against a collateral attack on a judgment of a court having
jurisdiction is that public policy forbids an indirect collateral contradiction or impeachment of such a
judgment. It is not a mere technicality, but is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice which
should be followed by all courts.33

With respect to the divorce between Zamoranos and De Guzman, the Decree of Divorce was issued
on June 18, 1992 by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul, who was the presiding judge of the Shari 'a Circuit
Court, Third Shari'a District, Isabela, Basilan.  It states that both Zamoranos and De Guzman
34

appeared when the case was called for hearing. It further recites that both parties converted to the
faith of Islam prior to their Muslim wedding, and that it was Zamoranos who sought divorce
by tafwid, with De Guzman having previously delegated his authority to exercise talaq.  Thus, on its
35

face, the divorce appears valid, having been issued for a cause recognized under the applicable law
by a competent court having jurisdiction over the parties. And, as neither party interposed an appeal,
the divorce has attained finality.

Given the foregoing, we agree with the CA that the Decree of Divorce cannot be the subject of a
collateral attack. It is evident that Pacasum's persistence in pursuing the administrative case against
Zamoranos on the sole ground of bigamy is premised on the supposition that the latter's marriage
with De Guzman was still subsisting when she contracted marriage with Pacasum, which effectively
challenges the Shari'a Circuit Court's divorce judgment. As we have noted, however, the judgment
of the court is valid on its face; hence, a collateral attack in this case is not allowed. The collateral
unassailability of the divorce is a necessary consequence of its finality. It "cannot now be changed in
any proceeding; and much less is it subject to the collateral attack which is here made upon it."  As
36

no appeal was taken with respect to the divorce decree, it must be conceded to have full force and
effect.  The decree, insofar as it affects the civil status of Zamoranos, has therefore become res
37

judicata, subject to no collateral attack.

Furthermore, the proscription against collateral attacks similarly applies to matters involving the civil
status of persons. Thus, we have held that collateral attacks against the legitimacy and filiation of
children,  adoption,  and the validity of marriages (except void marriages)  are not allowed.
38 39 40

Zamoranos' civil status as "divorced" belongs to the same category, and Pacasum cannot impugn
it in an administrative case filed with the CSC, where the sole purpose of the proceedings is
to determine the administrative liability, if any, of Zamoranos.

RULE 39
HEIRS OF CASINO V DBP

The petition is not meritorious.

At the crux of the controversy is the determination of whether or not res judicata bars the filing of
Civil Case No. 2685-97.

Civil Case No. 1465 vis-a-vis Civil Case No. 2685-97

As discussed earlier, Civil Case No. 1465, lodged before the RTC Br. 8 of Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon, involved a complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage and foreclosure proceedings,
quieting of title, redemption, and damages filed by Baldomero, Aurio's father, against DBP, in
response to DBP's extrajudicial foreclosure of three parcels of land mortgaged by the Spouses
Casiño due to the latter's failure to settle their loan obligation with the former. After due proceedings,
the RTC Br. 8 rendered a decision dated August 3, 1990 dismissing the complaint.11 Baldomero
appealed the decision to the CA, which denied the appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the
RTC Br. 8 in a decision dated May 30, 1995.12 Thereafter, this Court denied Baldomero's Petition
for Review on certiorari challenging the CA's decision in a Resolution dated July 10, 1996.13

The records of the case would reveal that the Spouses Casiño first instituted Civil Case No. 1465
before the RTC Br. 8 in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. They prayed for the nullity of the foreclosure
proceedings conducted on March 24, 1977, among others.14 Notably, the Casiños also included in
their complaint an action for quieting of title over the parcels of land in question.15

On August 3, 1990, the RTC Br. 8 issued a Decision dismissing the Spouses Casiño's complaint,
thereby upholding the validity of the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings, and
effectively denying their action for quieting of title, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, plaintiff's Complaint and/or Amended Complaint is hereby
ordered DISMISSED. The counter-claim of defendants DBP and spouses Juanito and Leontina
Lavina are also DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.16

The Spouses Casiño appealed said decision to the CA.  On May 30, 1995, the appellate court
1âшphi1

issued a Decision dismissing the appeal, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, affirming, in toto, the Decision of the Court a quo
appealed from. With costs against Appellant.

SO ORDERED.17

Aggrieved, the Spouses Casiño then sought relief from this Court.

On July 10, 1996, the Court's Second Division issued a Resolution denying the petition of the
Spouses Casiño for its failure to sufficiently show that the CA had committed any reversible error in
the questioned judgment.18 Consequently, since no further motion or pleading was filed by either
party, an Entry of Judgment was issued by this Court, certifying that the Resolution dated July 10,
1996 has become final and executory on September 4, 1996.19

Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment."20 Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any
matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other
actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and
matters in issue in the first suit.21

The elements of res judicata are:

(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;

(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties;

(3) the disposition or the case must be a judgment on the merits; and

(4) there must be as between the first and second action identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action.22

In their Petition, the Heirs of Aurio do not dispute the presence of the first three elements, and
merely reiterated the RTC Br. 10's discussion regarding the fourth element in its Judgment dated
July 4, 2006.23 Particularly, the Heirs of Aurio adopted the RTC Br. 10's view that res judicata does
not apply in the instant case as the issues raised in Civil Cas No. 1465 are not identical with the
instant case, as the land mortgaged by Baldomero to DBP and subsequently sold to Green River is
covered by a different tax declaration with boundaries not identical to the subject property being
claimed by Aurio.24

This Court is not persuaded.

There is identity of subject matter

We agree with the CA in its conclusion that while the landholdings respectively claimed by
respondents and petitioners have different technical particulars, the evidence on record would
clearly reveal that the property subject of the writ of possession issued by RTC Br. 8 is part and
parcel of the property being claimed by petitioners.

It must be reiterated that at the outset, Aurio himself alleged in his complaint that the property in
litigation is the same property being subjected to a writ of possession by the RTC Br. 8 in Civil Case
No. 1465.25 There would be no sense in Aurio filing a third party affidavit in Civil Case No. 1465 and
subsequently filing the instant complaint for quieting of title, if he himself does not believe that the
property subject of the writ of possession and the property subject of the instant case is not the
same.

Moreover, the trial court's commissioned surveyor, Engr. Dimas S. Sario (Engr. Sario), clearly stated
in his survey report that: (a) the property claimed by the Bank which was sold to Green River "exists
on the ground identified as Lot No. 2528, Cad. 653, Lantapan Cadastre";26 (b) the property of Aurio
covered by TD No. 06532 existing on the ground covers Lot No. 2528, among other lots, all of Cad.
653, Lantapan Cadastre; and (c) the property sold by the Bank to Green River is enclosed in Red,
which is a portion of Aurio's claimed property enclosed in Green.27

Records would further reveal that Engr. Sario, in his testimony in open court, clarified and confirmed
that the land covered by TD No. 01915 and subject of a writ of possession issued by RTC Br. 8
indeed exists on the ground (contrary to the erroneous conclusion of the RTC Br. 10) as Lot No.
2528, Cad. 653, Lantapan Cadastre pursuant to No. 3 of Survey Report. The said testimony went as
follows:

Q: Alright, look again the survey conducted by Wenefredo Agripo, what are the boundaries there?

A: The boundaries there, on the North is by Public Land, on the East by Cawayan Creek, on the
South, by Manupale River and on the West by Kibulay Creek.

Q: And these boundaries exist?

A: Yes, your Honor.

Q: And this is identified as Lot No. 2528, correct?

A: Unnumbered lot.

Q: Do you know Geodetic Engr. Ricarte Abriol?

A: Yes, I knew him.

Q: Now by the way Engr. Sario, you stated earlier that you gave notices to the parties and that you
verified the records from the DENR?

A: Yes Sir.

Q: Before you went to the area?

A: Yes Sir.

Q:Did you come across a survey done by Engr. Ricarte Abriol, do you have that?

A: None.

Q: Then what did you do, what records did you verify? I will show you the record which is already
marked and presented by DBP and the Intervenor. This Exhibit "14," [is] this record must be there in
the DENR dated 1996?

A: As far as I know, this sketch prepared by Engr. Ricarte Abriol, this was a plan prepared by Ricarte
Abriol but the same found in the records of the Cadastral survey.

Q: And this lot really exists in the name of Baldomero Casiño?

A: Yes Sir.
Q: The person who mortgaged to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)?

A: Yes Sir.

Q: And this is Lot No. 2528?

A: Yes Sir.

Q: Mentioned also in the order of the Hon. Court, designating the Office of the DENR to conduct the
survey?

A: Yes Sir.

Q: And this is identical to the survey which you have shown to me done by Wenefredo Agripo?

A: This is basically a portion.

Q: Yes, but the boundaries are the same?

A: Yes Sir.

Q: And the area is the same?

A: Yes Sir.28

From the foregoing, there can be no doubt that there is indeed an identity of subject matter in the
instant case, on the one hand, and Civil Case No. 1465, on the other hand, at least to the extent of
the property subject of the writ of possession issued by RTC Br. 8.

There is identity of parties

Likewise, the CA did not err in finding that there is substantial identity of parties in this case.29 It was
correctly held that Aurio is not only an heir of Baldomero, but may also be considered a successor-
in-interest by virtue of the Kasabotan dated April 25, 1994, to wit:

Although the parties involved in the two cases are not exactly the same, there is substantially an
identity of parties for purposes of res judicata. The fundamental rule is that for res judicata to apply,
only substantial, not absolute, identity of parties is required. In fact, there is identity of parties not
only where the parties are the same but also those in privity with them, as between their successor-
in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and in
the same capacity, or where there is substantial identity of parties. In the present case, Aurio is not
only an heir of his father Baldomero, who instituted the first quieting of title case; Aurio is also
considered a successor-in-interest by title of Baldomero by virtue of the conveyance of the subject
property through the Kasabotan dated April 25, 1994.30

In Guerrero v. Director, Land Management Bureau,31 We held that:

There is identity of parties not only when the parties in the cases are the same, but also between
those in privity with them, such as between their successors-in-interest. Absolute identity of parties is
not required, and where a shared identity of interest is shown by the identity of relief sought by one
person in a prior case and the second person in a subsequent case, such was deemed sufficient.

Private respondents in this case, as successors-in-interest of Marcelo and Angelina Bustamante,

who initiated the first case that was ultimately decided by this Court as Republic v. Guerrero, have a
community of interest with the latter and, thus, meet the [test] of identity of parties. Private
respondents are bound by the previous ruling under the criterion of "privity of interest." They have no
more right to reopen an already terminated case.32

Similar to the above, Aurio is not only an heir of Baldomero, but is also the latter's successor-in-
interest by virtue of conveyance of the subject property through the Kasabotan dated April 25, 1994.
Therefore, Aurio and his heirs have community of interest with Baldomero who initiated Civil Case
No. 1465, and thus meet the test of identity of parties.

There is identity in the cause of action

For the last requirement, We do not find any error in the CA's finding that there is identity in the
cause of action.33 We hold that both Civil Case No. 1465 and the instant case have causes of action
that inevitably deal with quieting of title over the subject property.

This Court has previously employed various tests in determining whether or not there is identity of
causes of action as to warrant the application of the principle of res judicata. One test of identity is
the "absence of inconsistency test" where it is determined whether the judgment sought will be
inconsistent with the prior judgment. If no inconsistency is shown, the prior judgment shall not
constitute a bar to subsequent actions.34

The governing rule in this case is Article 476 of the Civil Code which provides:

Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in
fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may
be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any
interest therein.

As a rule, in an action for quieting of title, the plaintiff or complainant must demonstrate a legal or
equitable title to, or an interest in the subject property.35 He must likewise show that the deed,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that purportedly casts a cloud on his title is in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.36

In his complaint, Aurio alleged that he is the true, lawful, and absolute owner of the property being
subjected to a writ of possession by the RTC Br. 8 in Civil Case No. 1465.

Any affirmative relief that this Court may grant on said cause of action would necessarily affect the
validity of the real estate mortgage foreclosure proceedings and the resulting sale of the property
subject of Civil Case No. 1465; issues which could no longer be revived, as the same have already
been settled. Consequently, the rights of ownership and possession over such property would also
be affected.
In Civil Case No. 1465, Baldomero assailed the validity of the real estate mortgage foreclosure
proceedings dated December 28, 1975, which resulted to an auction sale that transferred ownership
of the subject land, among other parcels of land, to DBP as evidenced by the Sheriff's Certificate of
Sale. In fact, Baldomero, in his complaint, also prayed for quieting of title over the said land, which is
essentially the same relief sought by Aurio in the instant case.37

In dismissing the above complaint filed by Baldomero, the RTC Br. 8 Decision in Civil Case No. 1465
held that Baldomero lost his right to repurchase the subject land when he failed to assert such right
within the statutory period.38 The trial court likewise held that the unregistered parcel of land
covered by TD No. 01915 (the same property subject of the writ of possession issued by RTC Br. 8
that is being claimed by Aurio in the instant case) was indeed among those properties mortgaged to
and eventually foreclosed upon by DBP.39 The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, plaintiffs Complaint and/or Amended Complaint is hereby
ordered DISMISSED. The counter-claim of defendants DBP and spouses Juanito and Leontina
Lavina are also DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.40

As mentioned earlier, the above Decision was affirmed by the CA and this Court. Thus, there is no
dispute that the Decision of the RTC Br. 8, categorically dismissing Baldomero's complaint and/or
amended complaint is final and executory.

In the instant case, Aurio is essentially asking for the same relief as Baldomero in Civil Case No.
1465, and in effect, is collaterally asking for the nullification of the real estate mortgage of Baldomero
with the DBP and the subsequent foreclosure proceedings.

It bears stressing that the doctrine of res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar
by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.41

The second concept which is conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which was in
issue in a former suit and was judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and
persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action
between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction
on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper
authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a
particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the
issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment
will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the
same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question
was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. In this case, identity of cause of action is not required,
but merely identity of issues.42

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the validity of the real estate mortgage and the
subsequent foreclosure sale can no longer be attacked in a new complaint for quieting of title, more
so because the Decision in Civil Case No. 1465 has become final and an entry of judgment has
already been entered in our books. To put it simply, we have already ruled, in effect, that DBP is the
owner of the subject property as it was acquired by it through a valid foreclosure sale. Granting the
reliefs sought by Aurio and his heirs would be inconsistent with the ruling in Civil Case No. 1465 and
will disturb the final and executory Decision in the said case.
Moreover, the writ of possession that was issued as a result of the proceedings in Civil Case No.
1465 cannot be regarded as a cloud upon the alleged title of Aurio, as the said writ and/or the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 1465 were not shown to be "in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or
unenforceable." It is the claimant or plaintiff who has the burden of proof as a general principle of
due process, and in this case, Aurio has fell short in discharging his burden when he failed to prove
neither his alleged title to the subject property nor anything that could constitute a cloud upon that
title.

Thus, it is clear that the Decision of RTC Br. 8, which was affirmed by the CA and this Court,
constitutes res judicata to the extent of the property subject of the writ of possession, which is part
and parcel of petitioners' claimed property.

In this regard, We held in FELS Energy, Inc. v. The Province of Batangas,43 that res judicata, as a
ground for dismissal, is based on two grounds, to wit:

(1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an
end to litigation — republicae ut sit litium; and (2) the hardship on the individual of being vexed twice
for the same cause — nemo debet bis vexari er eadem causa.

A conflicting doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and dereliction of
individuals and prefer the regalement of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the
preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.44

By allowing this case to prosper and granting relief to the Heirs of Aurio, the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 1465, which lasted for about 13 years from the filing of the complaint up until its finality,
would essentially be for naught. Considering that res judicata is applicable in the instant case, public
policy dictates that the same must be dismissed.

The Court of Appeals did not err in including the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1465 in its statement
of facts.

Since the instant case is primarily hinged on quieting of title, it is crucial for the CA to ascertain all
facts relevant to such cause of action.

It is elementary that in a case for quieting of title, there are two elements involved, namely: (1) a
legal or equitable title over the subject property; and (2) a document, instrument, or proceeding that
constitutes a cloud on said title.45

In the instant case, it is clear that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1465 must be discussed
because such proceedings were the root of the RTC Br. 8's order to issue a writ of possession over
the Kibulay property, which is the property claimed by Aurio that he has a title thereto as admitted in
his complaint.

Thus, contrary to Aurio's claims, the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1465 were not alien and foreign
to the main case. The determination of whether or not RTC Br. 8's order to issue a writ of possession
constituted a cloud on Aurio's alleged title would necessarily hinge upon the validity of such order,
which would in turn necessitate the examination of the proceedings that led to issuance of such
order.
Moreover, while it is generally true that the lower courts' or tribunals' findings of fact must be
accorded high respect by the appellate courts or tribunals, such findings of fact are not binding upon
the higher courts and may be reversed on appeal.

In this case, the CA did not err in including the proceedings of Civil Case No. 1465 in its finding of
facts as the same is entirely within its jurisdiction, most especially since DBP and Green River Gold
raised mixed questions of fact and law in its appeal, specifically challenging the findings of RTC Br.
10.

Nevertheless, even if the factual circumstances of Civil Case No. l465 can be found in the records,
the CA just deemed it appropriate to lay down such facts in determining the instant case.

Thus, We do not see any cogent reason to disturb the CA's findings of facts as they are based on
the evidence on record. This Court is a trier of law and not of fact. In any event, this Court deems it
appropriate that a discussion of the proceedings in the Baldomero case is necessary in the proper
adjudication of the case at hand, given that the main issue here is the applicability of res judicata.
Verily, the CA did not commit any reversible error when it included said proceedings in the statement
of facts.

Tax Declarations, by themselves, are not conclusive evidence of ownership

While it is true that tax declarations may be considered as evidence of ownership, particularly with
regard to the possession in the concept of an owner, such tax declarations do not, by themselves,
prove ownership over the subject land.

It has been consistently held by this Court that tax declarations are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership and are not considered conclusive evidence of ownership.

In Titong v. The Honorable Court of Appeals (4th Division),46 the petitioner therein anchored his
claim of ownership "on the survey plan prepared upon his request, the tax declaration in his name,
the commissioner's report on the relocation survey, and the survey plan,"47 similar to Aurio in the
instant case. We ruled that the tax declaration issued in his name is not even persuasive evidence of
his claimed ownership over the subject land in that case, to wit:

Similarly, petitioner's tax declaration issued under his name is not even persuasive evidence of his
claimed ownership over the land in dispute. A tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive
evidence of ownership. It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. Because it does not by itself
give title, it is of little value in proving one's ownership. x x x48

Given this, the CA has correctly held that:

x x x At any rate, petitioner anchors his claim merely on the survey plan prepared upon his request
and the tax declaration that was unilaterally made out in his name. These documents do not
conclusively demonstrate "title" over the subject property. A survey plan is nothing more than a
paper containing a statement of courses, distances, and quantity of land, and refers only to a
delineation of possession. It is not conclusive as to ownership, nor is it considered a conveyance or
a mode of acquiring ownership. The same thing goes with TD No. 06532 in Aurio's name. It is settled
that a tax declaration is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership, and is not, by itself, a conclusive
evidence of ownership. Because a tax declaration does not give title, it is only of little value in
proving one's ownership. On the whole, Aurio's tax declaration under his name lends no evidentiary
support to his claimed ownership over the land in dispute. Besides, the gaping gap in the land areas
pictured in the tax declaration and in the commissioner's report is much too glaring to ignore. TD No.
06532 states that Aurio's property has an area of 163.3817 hectares while the commissioned
Geodetic Engineer's Survey Report shows that the land area is 192.700 hectares. Notably, there is
an apparent discrepancy of 29.3183 hectares. x x x49

Thus, the submitted TD No. 06532 of Aurio, even when coupled with the Survey Plan
(commissioned by Aurio himself for his own benefit), has little evidentiary weight compared to the
evidence submitted by DBP, particularly a final and executory court decision, affirmed by this Court
itself, declaring that DBP has, in effect, rights of ownership and possession over the parcel of land
covered by TD No. 06532.

In fact, when the evidence on record is considered, it is as if Aurio's Tax Declaration is seemingly the
"cloud" that should be removed from the title of DBP (now transferred to Green River Gold).

It must be reiterated that in civil cases, preponderance of evidence is the quantum of proof
observed, meaning that the party who has presented pieces of evidence that have more evidentiary
weight shall prevail. In this case, Aurio, being the plaintiff, failed to present evidence of such weight
as to overcome the evidence presented by DBP, and thus failing to discharge the burden of proof
required in his chosen cause of action, which is quieting of title.

The Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it held that the RTC Br. 10 committed grave
abuse of discretion in granting the motion for execution pending appeal in favor of Aurio.

Given the foregoing findings, We cannot find any reversible error on the part of the CA when it ruled
that the RTC Br. 10 acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for execution
pending appeal in favor of Aurio.

Cruz v. People of the Philippines50 discussed the purpose of a writ of certiorari, to wit:

The writ of certiorari is not issued to correct every error that may have been committed by lower
courts and tribunals. It is a remedy specifically to keep lower courts and tribunals within the bounds
of their jurisdiction. In our judicial system, the writ is issued to prevent lower courts and tribunals
from committing grave abuse of discretion in excess of their jurisdiction. x x x51

Jurisprudence has held that there is grave abuse of discretion when the lower court acted
capriciously and whimsically. In Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio,52 the Court explained:

x x x The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can
only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the
use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the
lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with
grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross.
x x x53
The records would show that the RTC Br. 10 acted in such manner. While it may be true that the
RTC Br. 10 based its order granting the motion for execution pending appeal on alleged facts, such
extraordinary writ of execution must still be based on good reasons.

Section 2(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. –

(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. – On motion of the prevailing party with
notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in
possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of
the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order
even before the expiration of the period to appeal.

After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the
appellate court.

Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due
hearing.

In Abenion v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation,54 this Court reiterated that the trial court's
discretion in allowing execution pending appeal must be strictly construed and explained
that the grant must be grounded on the existence of good reason, to wit:

In now declaring that the execution pending appeal was unsupported by sufficient grounds, the
Court restates the rule that the trial court's discretion in allowing execution pending appeal must be
strictly construed. Its grant must be firmly grounded on the existence of "good reasons," which
consist of compelling circumstances that justify immediate execution lest the judgment becomes
illusory. "The circumstances must be superior, outweighing the injury or damages that might
result should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons would make
of execution pending appeal, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, a tool of
oppression and inequity."55

In this case, the RTC Br. 10 granted the motion for execution pending appeal primarily based
on the advanced age of Aurio's spouse, Patricia, who was supposed to be sixty-five (65)
years old at the time.

While there is indeed jurisprudence wherein this Court has affirmed the granting of a discretionary
motion for execution pending appeal on the reason of advanced age, such jurisprudence does not
apply in the instant case. In fact, the circumstances in Republic represented by the Department of
National Defense v. Hon. Barroso, Jr.56 (Saligumba case) which was cited by the RTC Br. 10 to
justify its order,57 are not similar with the present case.

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the plaintiffs in the Saligumba case were aged 84
and 81 years old respectively and were both clearly in the twilight of their lives. On the other
hand, Patricia was around sixty-five (65) years old at the time the motion for execution
pending appeal was granted and there was even no allegation, much less proof, that she had
any life-threatening illnesses. It must be also noted that the Saligumba case was
decided via an unsigned Resolution, hence, only binding on the parties therein.
Citing again the abovementioned Abenion case, We explained what is considered as "good reasons"
particularly with respect to the advanced age of the plaintiff, to wit:

The sufficiency of "good reasons" depends upon the circumstances of the case and the parties
thereto. Conditions that are personal to one party, for example, may be insufficient to justify an
execution pending appeal that would affect all parties to the case and the property that is the subject
thereof. Thus, in Florendo, et al. v. Paramount Insurance Corp., the Court ruled that the execution
pending appeal, which was supposedly justified by the old age and life-threatening ailments of
merely one of several parties to the case, was unsupported by special reasons. As the Court
sustained the CA's reversal of the execution, it explained:

The Florendos point out that Rosario is already in her old age and suffers from life threatening
ailments. But the trial court has allowed execution pending appeal for all of the Florendos, not just for
Rosario whose share in the subject lands had not been established. No claim is made that the rest
of the Florendos are old and ailing. Consequently, the execution pending appeal was indiscreet and
too sweeping. All the lands could be sold for P42,000,000, the value mentioned in the petition, and
distributed to all the Florendos for their enjoyment with no sufficient assurance that they all will and
can return such sum in case the CA reverses, as it has in fact done, the RTC decision. Moreover, it
is unclear how much of the proceeds of the sale of the lands Rosario needed for her old age.58

Given the abovementioned case, even assuming that Patricia was indeed of advanced age,
such will not be considered as a good reason by itself, since it must be supported by special
reasons, which were not provided in this case. Verily, the RTC Br. 10 committed grave abuse of
discretion when it allowed execution pending appeal not based on good reasons.

In any event, the RTC Br. 10 clearly had no authority or jurisdiction to disturb the final and executory
decision dated August 3, 1990 of the RTC Br. 8, a co-equal court, in Civil Case No. 1465. We have
held that the "various trial courts of a province or city, having the same or equal authority, should not,
cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or
judgments."59 Despite this, the RTC Br. 10 acted capriciously and overstepped its jurisdiction when
it ordered the execution pending appeal merely by reason of Patricia's alleged old age. Verily, the
apparent old age of the Patricia would certainly not override the doctrine that a court cannot and
should not disturb the orders or judgments of a co-equal court, especially since the said decision is
already final and executory.

Therefore, the totality of circumstances considered, We see no error in the ruling of the CA that the
RTC Br. 10 committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
granted petitioners' motion for execution pending appeal.

CENTENNIAL GUARANTEE ASSURANCE V UNIVERSAL MOTORS

The petition is unmeritorious.

The execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general

rule that only a final judgment may be executed; hence, under Section 2, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court (Rules), the existence of “good reasons” for the immediate
execution of a judgment is an indispensable requirement as this is what
confers discretionary power on a court to issue a writ of execution pending
appeal.24 Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying
immediate execution, lest judgment becomes illusory, 25 that is, the prevailing
party’s chances for recovery on execution from the judgment debtor are
altogether nullified.  The “good reason” yardstick imports a superior
circumstance demanding urgency that will outweigh injury or damage to the
adverse party26and one such “good reason” that has been held to justify
discretionary execution is the imminent danger of insolvency of the defeated
party.27cralawlawlibrary

The factual findings that NSSC is under a state of

rehabilitation and had ceased business operations, taken
together with the information that NSSC President and
General Manager Orimaco had permanently left the
country with his family, constitute such superior
circumstances that demand urgency in the execution of
the October 31, 2007 Decision because respondents now
run the risk of its non-satisfaction by the time the appeal
is decided with finality. Notably, as early as April 22, 2008, the rehabilitation
receiver had manifested before the rehabilitation court the futility of rehabilitating NSSC
because of the latter’s insincerity in the implementation of the rehabilitation
process.28   Clearly, respondents’ diminishing chances of recovery from the
favorable Decision is a good reason to justify immediate execution; hence, it
would be improper to set aside the order granting execution pending appeal.

That CGAC’s financial standing differs from that of NSSC does not negate the order of
execution pending appeal. As the latter’s surety, CGAC is considered by law as being
the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation
of the latter, and their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable. 29 Verily,in a
contract of suretyship, one lends his credit by joining in the principal debtor’s obligation
so as to render himself directly and primarily responsible with him, and without
reference to the solvency of the principal. 30 Thus, execution pending appeal
against NSSC means that the same course of action is warranted against its
surety, CGAC. The same reason stands for CGAC’s other principal, Orimaco,
who was determined to have permanently left the country with his family to
evade execution of any judgment against him.

Now, going to the second issue as above-stated, the Court resolves that CGAC’s liability
should – as the CA correctly ruled – be confined to the amount of P1,000,000.00, and
not P500,000.00 as the latter purports.

Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules provides that the injunction bond is
answerable for all damages that may be occasioned by the improper issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction.31 The Court has held in Paramount Insurance
Corp. v. CA32 that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The bond insures with all practicable certainty that the defendant may sustain no
ultimate loss in the event that the injunction could finally be dissolved. Consequently,
the bond may obligate the bondsmen to account to the defendant in the injunction suit
for all: (1) such damages; (2) costs and damages; (3) costs, damages and reasonable
attorney’s fees as shall be incurred or sustained by the person enjoined in case it is
determined that the injunction was wrongfully issued. 33

In this case, the RTC, in view of the improvident issuance of the April 2, 2002
Writ of Preliminary Injunction,adjudged CGAC’s principals, NSSC and Orimaco,
liable not only for damages as against NCOD, Rolida, and Yap but also as
against UMC.Asmay be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision, the amount adjudged to the former group was P500,000.00,34 while it
was found – this time, contained in the body of the same decision – that damages in
the amount P4,199,355.00 due to loss of sales was incurred by UMC in the year
2002,35 or the year in which the latter was prevented from selling their products
pursuant to the April 2, 2002 Writ of Preliminary Injunction.  Since CGAC is
answerable jointly and severally with NSSC and Orimaco for their liabilities to
the above-mentioned parties for all damages caused by the improvident
issuance of the said injunctive writ, and considering that the total amount of
damages as above-stated evidently exhausts the full P1,000,000.00 amount of
the injunction bond, there is perforce no reason to reverse the assailed CA
Decision even on this score.

OCA V CORPUZ

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the conclusions and recommendation of the OCA and Investigating Judge
Costales.

There is no dispute that Lu’s counsel received the MTC decision on 13 September 1995
and filed a notice of appeal on the same day. Corpuz issued the writ of execution on 11
September 1995. Sheriff Lopez implemented the writ on the same day. In short,
Corpuz issued the writ, and Sheriff Lopez implemented the same, at least two
days before Lu’s counsel received the MTC decision. Clearly, this is an
improper procedure because the clerk of court issued the writ of execution
before the losing party received the decision. As held in Felongco v. Dictado, 9
reiterating the earlier case of Dy v. Court of Appeals, 10 the losing party must first
receive notice of the judgment before the court or its personnel can execute
the judgment. The reason is that if such judgment is immediately executed
without prior notice to the losing party, then such a party has no remedy if the
evidence or law does not support the judgment. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Moreover, even if the MTC decision itself ordered that "a writ of execution be
issued," this does not mean that notice of the motion for execution to the
adverse party is unnecessary. 11 The court cannot direct the issuance of a writ
of execution motu proprio. This is what Section 8 of Rule 70 12 provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay same. — If judgment is
rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal
has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution filed a sufficient bond,
approved by the justice of the peace or municipal court and executed to the plaintiff to
enter the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs
accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the
pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of the rent
due from time to time under the contract, if any; as found by the judgment of the
justice of the peace or municipal court to exist. . . .

All moneys so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited in the provincial or city
treasury, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the
court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds
of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise.
Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time
during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, of
which the defendant shall have notice, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the
execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession,
but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final
disposition thereof on its merits. (Emphasis supplied).

Section 8, Rule 70 explicitly provides that although execution is immediately

executory, judgment may be stayed by perfecting an appeal, filing a
supersedeas bond approved by the court and periodically paying the rents
during the pendency of the appeal. As explained in Kaw v. Judge Anunciacion, Jr.,
13 a party is not in a position to stay execution unless he receives notice of
the filing of a motion for execution. After all, a party has 15 days to perfect his
appeal and stay execution by filing a notice of appeal and supersedeas bond
and periodically depositing the rentals. Unless he receives a motion for execution,
he cannot take these steps to stay execution. While the MTC decision authorized
Corpuz to issue a writ of execution, its issuance prior to receipt by Lu of the
decision was precipitate and against all sense of fair play. Clearly, Corpuz
abused her authority.

Corpuz worked with the MTC-Urdaneta in 1974 as clerk and became a clerk of court in
1979 up to her retirement in 2002. 14 The fact that she was only a commerce graduate
will not mitigate the offense or its penalty. As clerk of court for about 23 years, Corpuz
should have been conversant with the specific requirements of the Rules of Court on
the signing and issuance of the writ of execution.

As clerk of court, Corpuz occupies a very sensitive position that requires competence
and efficiency to insure the public’s confidence in the administration of justice. A clerk
of court is a role model for other court employees to emulate in the performance of
duties as well as in the conduct and behavior of a public servant. A clerk of court cannot
err without affecting the integrity of the court or the efficient administration of justice.
15 Corpuz failed to meet these standards.
In his Report, Findings and Recommendation dated 23 October 2001, Investigating
Judge Costales stated that Corpuz "is already 64 years old and soon she will be on
compulsory retirement." 16 The OCA confirmed that Corpuz compulsorily retired on 5
May 2002 but her retirement benefits were withheld because of pending administrative
cases.

NOTICE MUNA OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION BEFORE THE

ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF WRIT OF EXECUTION!!!!!
the losing party must first receive notice of the judgment before the court or
its personnel can execute the judgment. The reason is that if such judgment is
immediately executed without prior notice to the losing party, then such a
party has no remedy if the evidence or law does not support the judgment. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO GR DIBA IS IMMEDIATE ENFORCEMENT, PWEDE ISTAY

UPON
NOTICE OF THE FILING OF THE WRIT FIRST
1. FILING OF A NOTICE TO APPEAL
2. FILING SUPERSEADEAS BOND
3. PERIODIC DEPOSIT OF RENTALS

VILLAREAL V MWSS

Ruling of the Court

The petition is granted.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that petitioner resorted to a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45, and not a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
The principle of hierarchy of courts does not find any application in this case. 23

In Ysidoro v. Justice Leonardo De Castro, et al.,24 this Court differentiated the nature of

the remedies provided under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court in this manner:

[A] review on certiorari under a Rule 45 petition is generally limited to the review of

legal issues; the Court only resolves questions of law which have been properly raised
by the parties during the appeal and in the petition. Under this mode, the Court
determines whether a proper application of the law was made in a given set of facts. A
Rule 65 review, on the other hand, is strictly confined to the determination of the
propriety of the trial court's jurisdiction — whether it has jurisdiction over the case and
if so, whether the exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not been attended by grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 25
Corollary, under Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules, it is provided that in all cases where
only questions of law are raised, the appeal from a decision or order of the RTC shall be
to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Section 1
of Rule 45 of which provides:

Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal

by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition
shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
Here, it is patently clear that petitioner does not question whether the RTC has
jurisdiction or authority to resolve his petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Rather, he
assails the wisdom of the RTC's very judgment and appreciation in upholding the
MeTC's issuance of the writ of execution in MWSS' favor. The error relates to a mistake
in the application of law and jurisprudence regarding Section 6 of Rule 39, and not to
an error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
This, obviously, is a question of law; consequently, direct resort to this Court is proper.

Execution may be either through motion or an independent action. The two

modes of execution under the Rules are available, depending on the timing
when the prevailing party invoked his right to enforce the court's judgment.
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules, states thus:

Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory judgment

or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry.
After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it
is barred by the statute of limitations.
"Execution by motion is only available if the enforcement of the judgment was
sought within five (5) years from the date of its entry." 26 This is a matter of
right.27 "On the other hand, execution by independent action is mandatory if the
five-year prescriptive period for execution by motion had already
elapsed."28 "[T]he said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be
enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court." 29 "[T]he action
must be filed before it is barred by the statute of limitations which, under the
Civil Code, is ten (10) years from the finality of the judgment." 30 Corollary, "[a]
final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five years or by action
for revival of judgment within ten years reckoned from the date of entry of
judgment."31 The date of entry, in turn, is the same as the date of finality of
judgment.32

By jurisprudence, for execution by motion to be valid, the judgment creditor

must ensure the accomplishment of two acts within the five-year prescriptive
period, as follows: (a) the filing of the motion for the issuance of the writ of
execution; and (b) the court's actual issuance of the writ.33
Here, the RTC Decision dated September 27, 2002 became final and executory on
December 15, 2002. By operation of law, December 15, 2002 is likewise the
date of entry of judgment. Consequently, the five-year prescriptive period for the
execution of the RTC decision by mere motion must be reckoned from December 15,
2002.

MWSS filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution of the RTC Decision on May 17,
2004. This is within five years from December 15, 2002 - the date when the decision
became final and executory. Thus, the first act was accomplished.

There is, however, non-compliance with the second act.

We held in Olongapo City v. Subic Water and Sewerage Co., Inc. 34 that:

In Arambulo v. Court of First Instance of Laguna, we explained the rule that the

jurisdiction of a court to issue a writ of execution by motion is only effective
within the five-year period from the entry of judgment. Outside this five-year
period, any writ of execution issued pursuant to a motion filed by the
judgment creditor, is null and void. If no writ of execution was issued by the
court within the five-year period, even a motion filed within such prescriptive
period would not suffice. A writ issued by the court after the lapse of the five-
year period is already null and void. The judgment creditor's only recourse
then is to file an independent action, which must also be within the
prescriptive period set by law for the enforcement of judgments .

This Court subsequently reiterated its Arambulo ruling in Ramos v. Garciano, where we

said:

 There seems to be no serious dispute that the 4th alias writ of execution was issued
eight (8) days after the lapse of the five (5) year period from the date of the entry of
judgment in Civil Case No. 367. As a general rule, after the lapse of such period a
judgment may be enforced only by ordinary action, not by mere
motion (Section 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court).

 x x x x

 The limitation that a judgment been enforced by execution within five years,
otherwise it loses efficacy, goes to the very jurisdiction of the Court. A writ
issued after such period is void, and the failure to object thereto does not
validate it, for the reason that jurisdiction of courts is solely conferred by law
and not by express or implied will of the parties. 35 (Citations omitted, emphasis
and italics ours and emphasis in the original)
As can be gleaned from the aforementioned discussion, the five-year prescriptive period
reckoned from the entry of judgment mentioned in Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules,
should be observed both by the winning party who filed the motion, i.e., judgment
obligee/creditor, and the court that will resolve the same. Simply put, the winning party
may file the motion for execution within the five-year period; and the court should issue
the actual writ of execution pursuant to the motion within the same period. After the
lapse of the five-year period, any writ issued by the court is already null and void, since
the court no longer has jurisdiction over the issuance of the writ.

Records show that after the filing of MWSS' Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution,
and Orlando's Comment/Opposition thereto, the MeTC issued an Order granting the
said motion only on July 28, 2014. More than a year after the grant, or on
October 26, 2015, the MeTC issued the Writ of Execution. Reckoned from the
entry of judgment on December 15, 2002, more than 12 years have elapsed
after the  actual  writ of execution was finally issued by the MeTC. This is
clearly beyond the five-year prescriptive period within which the court may
issue the writ of execution. By then, the MeTC was already stripped of its
jurisdiction. Thus, the writ of execution it issued on October 26, 2015 is null and void.

We can not subscribe to MWSS' insistence that Orlando's filing of his

Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, caused the delay
in the execution of judgment, which in effect operates as an exception to the rule that
execution by motion after the lapse of five years is no longer allowed.

As discussed earlier, a judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the
date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, before
barred by the statute of limitations, by action. However, there are instances where
this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years upon
meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one common denominator,   i.e.,
the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is
incurred for his benefit or advantage. 36

In Yau v. Silverio, Sr.,37 We stressed that:

[I]n computing the time limit for enforcing a final judgment, the general rule is that
there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by
agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an
appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a
party or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will
extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias.
Thus, the time during which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the
said time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor. 38
In this case, there is an absence of any showing on the part of MWSS that the
execution of the RTC decision was stayed "by agreement of the parties for a definite
time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a
supersedeas, by the death of a party or otherwise," or by any circumstance that would
further delay its implementation.

Orlando merely filed a comment to MWSS' motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution. He cannot be faulted in doing so. There is neither a law nor a rule
which prevents him from filing a comment. Apparently, the delay was not
brought about by the filing of the comment; but instead, the period within
which the MeTC acted upon it.

We conclude this ponencia with a reminder on the significance of prescriptive period for

the enforcement of judgments on the part of the winning party, as held in Villeza v.
German Management and Services, Inc., et al.:39

The Court has pronounced in a plethora of cases that it is revolting to the conscience to
allow someone to further avert the satisfaction of an obligation because of sheer literal
adherence to technicality; that although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is
desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the
rules will not serve the ends of justice; and that it is a better rule that courts, under the
principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or
the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would
result. These cases,  though, remain exceptions to the general rule. The purpose
of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgment by action is
precisely to prevent the winning parties from sleeping on their rights. This
Court cannot just set aside the statute of limitations into oblivion every time someone
cries for equity and justice. Indeed, "if eternal vigilance is the price of safety, one
cannot sleep on one's right for more than a 10th of a century and expect it to
be preserved in pristine purity"40 (Citations omitted and emphasis and italics ours)

PEREZ V MANOTOK REALTY

Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended provides:

Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory judgment

or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry.
After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it
is barred by the statute of limitations.

According to the above rule, a judgment may be executed on motion within five years
from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After that, a
judgment may be enforced by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
However, there are instances where this Court allowed execution by motion even after
the lapse of five years upon meritorious grounds. 34

In the case of Lancita, et al. v. Magbanua et al.,35 this Court pronounced:

In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although there is authority
to the contrary, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when
execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by
injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a
supersedeas, by the death of a party or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned
by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire
facias.36
The foregoing principle had been applied by this Court in several cases. As discussed
in Francisco Motors Corp. v. Court of Appeals:37

In Blouse Potenciano v. Mariano, we held that the motion for examination of the
judgment debtor, which is a proceeding supplementary to execution, and the
action for mandamus amounted to a stay of execution which effectively
interrupted or suspended the five (5)-year period for enforcing the judgment
by motion. In Camacho v. Court of Appeals, et. al., where after a final judgment, the
petitioner (obligor) moved to defer the execution, elevated the matter to the CA and
the Supreme Court, transferred the property to her daughter, in addition to the issues
regarding counsel and subsequent vacancies in the courts, we ruled that:

Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case where the delays were occasioned
by petitioner's own initiatives and for her advantage as well as beyond the respondents'
control, we hold that the five [5]-year period allowed for the enforcement of the
judgment by motion was deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended.
Once again we rely upon basic notions of equity and justice in so ruling.

The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgment or actions
is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights. Far from sleeping on their rights,
respondents persistently pursued their rights of action. It is revolting to the conscience
to allow petitioner to further avert the satisfaction of her obligation because of sheer
literal adherence to technicality.

We also subtracted from the five (5)-year period the time when the judgment
could not be enforced due to the restraining order issued by this Court, and
when the records of the case were lost or misplaced through no fault of the
petitioner. In Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Vda. de Villaroya, we likewise
excluded the delays caused by the auditor's requirements which were not the fault of
the parties who sought execution, and ruled that "[i]n the eight years that elapsed from
the time the judgment became final until the filing of the restraining motion by the
private respondents, the judgment never became dormant. Section 6, Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court does not apply." In Jacinto v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this
Court further held:

Granting for the sake of argument that the motion for an alias writ of execution was
beyond the five [5]-year limitation within which a judgment may be executed by mere
motion, still under the circumstances prevailing wherein all the delay in the execution of
the judgment lasting for more than eight [8]-years was beneficial to private
respondents, this Court[,]for reasons of equity[,] is constrained to treat the motion for
execution as having been filed within the reglementary period required by
law.38 (Emphasis omitted; citation omitted.)

Also, in Yau v. Silverio, Sr., the writ of execution could not be enforced for the full
satisfaction of the trial court's judgment within the five-year period by reason of the
petitions challenging the trial court's judgment and the writ of execution. This Court
held that the petitions suspended or interrupted the further enforcement of the writ. 39

In Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. (RCBC) v. Serra,40 RCBC sought to enforce against

Serra a decision that had already become final and executory. However, to evade his
obligation, Serra transferred the property to his mother who then transferred it to
another person. This prompted RCBC to file an annulment case. This Court held therein
that the delay in the execution of the decision was caused by Serra for his own
advantage. Thus, the pendency of the annulment case effectively suspended the five-
year period to enforce the decision through a motion. 41

In the case under consideration, the judgment sought to be executed is the July 15,
1999, Decision of the MeTC which approved the Compromise Agreement of the parties.
The writ of execution was issued on May 4, 2001. However, it could not be enforced
by the sheriff because petitioner filed an Amended Petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for issuance of a restraining order dated February 22,
1999 before RTC Branch 47 The petition was assailing the validity of the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 151271-CV before the MeTC on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. Thus, in his Return dated July 19, 2004, the sheriff reported that
on July 6, 2004, he served a copy of the Writ of Execution on petitioner. According to
him, what subsequently happened was as follows:

On July 12, 2004, the undersigned received a communication from defendant's counsel,
Atty. Alejandro G. Yrreverre, Jr. strongly urging the undersigned, under pain of
Contempt of Court, to desist from further taking action against the defendant alleging
that the Petition they have filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47,
Presided by the Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion, who issued an Order dated March 9, 1999,
requesting the undersigned from further taking action on this case, has not been
resolved with finality.42

Indeed, through an Order dated March 9, 1999, the RTC Branch 47 requested the
sheriff of the MeTC to hold in abeyance any action on the case, such as the
implementation of a writ of execution.

As stated earlier, on May 10, 2004, RTC Branch 47 dismissed petitioner's petition.
On appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed the RTC in a Decision dated March 23,
2007. Then, in a Resolution dated July 2, 2008 in G.R. No. 181948, this Court
dismissed petitioner's petition for certiorari. On November 17, 2008, this Court
denied with finality petitioner's motion for reconsideration. And in the instant
petition, petitioner is attacking the RTC and CA's ruling of granting
respondent's motion for execution. Because of petitioner's acts, there has
been a long delay in the enforcement of the July 15, 1999, MeTC Decision. The
enforcement of the MeTC's Decision by motion has been interrupted by the
acts of petitioner, the judgment debtor.

Under the circumstances of the case at bar where the delays were caused by petitioner
for her advantage, as well as outside of respondent's control, this Court holds that the
five-year period allowed for enforcement of the judgment by motion was deemed to
have been effectively interrupted or suspended.

This Court reiterates the principle that the purpose of the law in prescribing time
limitations for enforcing judgments is to prevent parties from sleeping on their rights.
This Court finds in this case that respondent, far from sleeping on its rights, was
diligent in seeking the execution of the judgment in its favor.
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final,
the winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that
result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon
any attempt to prolong them."43

VILLEZA V GERMAN MANAGEMENT

The Court finds no merit in this petition.

An action for revival of judgment is governed by Article 1144 (3), Article 1152 of the
Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus:

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:

xxx

(3) Upon a judgment

Article 1152 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations
declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final.

Apropos, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reads: chan robles virtual law library

Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. -A final and executory judgment

or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry.
After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it
is barred by the statute of limitations. (Emphasis supplied)

The rules are clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party
can have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five years from the
date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by
a motion after the lapse of five years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action
which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten
years from the time the judgment becomes final.

When petitioner Villeza filed the complaint for revival of judgment on October 3, 2000,
it had already been eleven (11) years from the finality of the judgment he sought to
revive. Clearly, the statute of limitations had set in.
Petitioner Villeza, however, wants this Court to agree with him that the abeyance
granted to him by the lower court tolled the running of the prescriptive period. He even
cited cases allowing exceptions to the general rule. The Court, nevertheless, is not
persuaded. The cited cases are, in fact, not applicable to him, despite his endeavor to
tailor them to fit in to his position. The same cases lamentably betray him.

Republic v. Court of Appeals9  deals with the stay of the period due to the acts of the
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losing party. It was impossible for the winning party to have sought the execution of
the judgment because of the dilatory schemes and maneuvers resorted to by the other
party.10
cra1aw

In Torralba v. delos Angeles,11  the running of the period was interrupted when the
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winning party filed a motion for the issuance of the writ of execution. The order of
ejectment was not carried out, however, due to the judgment debtor's begging to
withhold the execution of judgment because of financial difficulties. 12  The cra1aw

agreement of the parties to defer or suspend the enforcement of the judgment

interrupted the period of prescription. 13 cra1aw

In Casela v. Court of Appeals,14  it was the judgment obligor who moved to suspend the
cra1aw

writ of execution. The judgment obligee was not in delay because he exhausted all legal
means within his power to eject the obligor from his land. The writs of execution issued
by the lower court were not complied with and/or were suspended by reason of acts or
causes not of obligee's own making and against his objections. 15 cra1aw

Unlike the cases cited above, the records reveal that it was petitioner Villeza, the
prevailing party himself, who moved to defer the execution of judgment. The
losing party never had any hand in the delay of its execution. Neither did the
parties have any agreement on that matter. After the lapse of five years (5)
from the finality of judgment, petitioner Villeza should have instead filed a
complaint for its revival in accordance with Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. He, however, filed a motion to execute the same which was a wrong
course of action. On the 11th year, he finally sought its revival but he
requested the aid of the courts too late.

The Court has pronounced in a plethora of cases that it is revolting to the conscience to
allow someone to further avert the satisfaction of an obligation because of sheer literal
adherence to technicality;16  that although strict compliance with the rules of procedure
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is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the

rules will not serve the ends of justice; 17  and that it is a better rule that courts, under
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the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations
or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would
result.18  These cases, though, remain exceptions to the general rule. The purpose of
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the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgment by action is precisely to
prevent the winning parties from sleeping on their rights. 19  This Court cannot just set
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aside the statute of limitations into oblivion every time someone cries for equity and
justice. Indeed, "if eternal vigilance is the price of safety, one cannot sleep on one's
right for more than a 10th of a century and expect it to be preserved in pristine
purity."20
INFANTE V ARAN BUILDERS

The petition is unmeritorious.

Petitioner insists that the action for revival of judgment is an action in personam;
therefore, the complaint should be filed with the RTC of the place where either
petitioner or private respondent resides. Petitioner then concludes that the filing of the
action for revival of judgment with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, the place where the
disputed property is located, should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.

Private respondent is of the opinion that the judgment it is seeking to revive involves
interest over real property. As such, the present action for revival is a real action, and
venue was properly laid with the court of the place where the realty is located.

Thus, the question that must be answered is: where is the proper venue of the present
action for revival of judgment? cralaw library

Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after the lapse of
five (5) years from entry of judgment and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may be enforced by action. The
Rule does not specify in which court the action for revival of judgment should be filed.

In Aldeguer v. Gemelo,3 the Court held that:

x x x an action upon a judgment must be brought either in the same court where said
judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in
any other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions
in general. (Emphasis supplied)4

but emphasized that other provisions in the rules of procedure which fix the venue of
actions in general must be considered. 5

Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 provide:

Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of real

property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which
has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof,
is situated.

xxx

Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action for
revival of judgment is a real action or a personal action. Applying the afore-quoted
rules on venue, if the action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession
of real property, or interest therein, then it is a real action that must be filed
with the court of the place where the real property is located. If such action
does not fall under the category of real actions, it is then a personal action
that may be filed with the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant
resides.

In support of her contention that the action for revival of judgment is a personal action
and should be filed in the court of the place where either the plaintiff or defendant
resides, petitioner cites the statements made by the Court in Aldeguer v.
Gemelo6 and Donnelly v. Court of First Instance of Manila 7 . Petitioner, however,
seriously misunderstood the Court's rulings in said cases.

In Aldeguer, what the Court stated was that "[t]he action for the execution of
a judgment for damages is a personal one, and under section 377 [of the Code of
Civil Procedure], it should be brought in any province where the plaintiff or the
defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff" 8 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied). Petitioner apparently took such statement to mean that any action for revival
of judgment should be considered as a personal one. This thinking is incorrect. The
Court specified that the judgment sought to be revived in said case was a judgment
for damages. The judgment subject of the action for revival did not involve or affect
any title to or possession of real property or any interest therein. The complaint filed in
the revival case did not fall under the category of real actions and, thus, the action
necessarily fell under the category of personal actions.

In Donnelly, the portion of the Decision being relied upon by petitioner stated thus:

Petitioner raises before this Court two (2) issues, namely: (a) whether an action for
revival of judgment is one quasi in rem and, therefore, service of summons may be
effected thru publication; and (b) whether the second action for revival of judgment
(Civil Case No. 76166) has already prescribed. To our mind, the first is not a proper
and justiciable issue in the present proceedings x x x. Nevertheless, let it be said
that an action to revive a judgment is a personal one. (Emphasis supplied)9

The Court clearly pointed out that in said case, the issue on whether an action for
revival of judgment is quasi in rem was not yet proper and justiciable. Therefore, the
foregoing statement cannot be used as a precedent, as it was merely an obiter
dictum. Moreover, as in Aldeguer, the judgment sought to be revived
in Donnelly involved judgment for a certain sum of money. Again, no title or interest in
real property was involved. It is then understandable that the action for revival in said
case was categorized as a personal one.

Clearly, the Court's classification in Aldeguer and Donnelly of the actions for revival of

judgment as being personal in character does not apply to the present case.

The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment determine whether it

is a real action or a personal action.

The complaint for revival of judgment alleges that a final and executory judgment
has ordered herein petitioner to execute a deed of sale over a parcel of land in
Ayala Alabang Subdivision in favor of herein private respondent; pay all
pertinent taxes in connection with said sale; register the deed of sale with the
Registry of Deeds and deliver to Ayala Corporation the certificate of title
issued in the name of private respondent. The same judgment ordered private
respondent to pay petitioner the sum of  P321,918.25 upon petitioner's
compliance with the aforementioned order.

Pang gulo yung naka underline kaya sabi personal action daw pero sabi ng SC
real action.

It is further alleged that petitioner refused to comply with her judgment obligations
despite private respondent's repeated requests and demands, and that the latter was
compelled to file the action for revival of judgment. Private respondent then prayed that
the judgment be revived and a writ of execution be issued to enforce said judgment.

The previous judgment has conclusively declared private respondent's right to have
the title over the disputed property conveyed to it. It is, therefore, undeniable
that private respondent has an established interest over the lot in question;
and to protect such right or interest, private respondent brought suit to revive
the previous judgment. The sole reason for the present action to revive is the
enforcement of private respondent's adjudged rights over a piece of realty. Verily, the
action falls under the category of a real action, for it affects private respondent's
interest over real property.
chanrobles virtual law library

The present case for revival of judgment being a real action, the complaint
should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the
realty is located.

Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:

Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. - The Supreme

Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court
shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be
the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the
venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as
determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts over which the said branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power
herein granted shall be exercised with a view to making the courts readily accessible to
the people of the different parts of the region and making the attendance of litigants
and witnesses as inexpensive as possible. (Emphasis supplied) chanrobles virtual law library

From the foregoing, it is quite clear that a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall
exercise its authority only over a particular territory defined by the Supreme
Court. Originally, Muntinlupa City was under the territorial jurisdiction of the Makati
Courts. However, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7154, entitled An Act to Amend Section
Fourteen of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, Otherwise Known As The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1981, took effect on September 4, 1991. Said law provided for
the creation of a branch of the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa. Thus, it is now the
Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City which has territorial jurisdiction or authority to
validly issue orders and processes concerning real property within Muntinlupa City.
Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 when it denied petitioner's motion to dismiss; and the CA
did not commit any error in affirming the same.

VERGARA V GEDORIO

The crux of petitioners' arguments is that they were not notified of the motion filed by respondent
Special Administratrix Bolaño, submitting an inventory of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers,
which includes the property occupied by them. Such being the case, petitioners contend that the
order dated October 5, 1999 granting the motion and directing them to pay the rentals to Bolaño is
unlawful hence, their refusal to comply with it is not contumacious. 17 They also assail the
appointment of respondent Bolaño as Special Administratrix for having been made without the
required bond,18 and that she has no authority to file the motion for indirect contempt, as her powers
are limited.19

When service of notice is an issue, the rule is that the person alleging that the notice was served
must prove the fact of service.20 The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its
existence.21 In civil cases, service made through registered mail is proved by the registry receipt
issued by the mailing office and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with
Section 7 of Rule 13. In the present case, as proof that petitioners were served with copies of the
omnibus motion submitting an inventory of the estate of deceased Allers, respondent Bolaño
presented photocopies of the motion with a certification by counsel that service was made by
registered mail, together with the registry receipts. 22 While the affidavit and the registry receipts
proved that petitioners were served with copies of the motion, it does not follow, however, that
petitioners in fact received the motion. Respondent Bolaño failed to present the registry return cards
showing that petitioners actually received the motion. 23 Receipts for registered letters and return
receipts do not prove themselves, they must be properly authenticated in order to serve as proof of
receipt of the letters.24 Respondent also failed to present a certification of the postmaster that notice
was duly issued and delivered to petitioners such that service by registered mail may be deemed
completed.25

Nonetheless, even in the absence of proof of actual receipt by the petitioners, the subject orders
issued by the probate court are valid and enforceable. Petitioners cannot deny the fact that they had
actual knowledge of the said orders. They have admitted in their letter dated March 18, 2001
addressed to the probate court that they received the court's order dated October 5, 1999 "barely 2
months before," 26 or sometime in January 2001. Instead of complying with the said order, they
"froze" payment of their rentals for the reason that they are caught in the middle of the dispute and
are not sure to whom to give the rentals. When respondent Bolaño filed the motion to cite them in
indirect contempt, setting the hearing on May 11, 2001, again, records show that they had actual
knowledge of the same. In their second letter, dated June 11, 2001, addressed to the probate court,
they acknowledged that they knew of the hearing set on May 11, 2001, and the reason for their
failure to attend was due to financial constraints. 27 They likewise admitted in said letter that they
knew of the court's order dated May 11, 2001 finding them guilty of indirect contempt. 28 Petitioners
therefore cannot cry denial of due process as they were actually notified of the proceedings before
the probate court. Thus, under the circumstances, it is not imperative to require proof of a formal
notice. It would be an idle ceremony where an adverse party, as in this case, had actual knowledge
of the proceedings.29

When petitioners refused to remit the rentals to respondent Bolaño per Order dated October 5, 1999,
a written charge of indirect contempt was duly filed before the trial court and hearing on the motion
set on May 11, 2001. As previously stated, petitioners did not attend said hearing despite knowledge
thereof; instead, they wrote the court on June 11, 2001 asking that the contempt findings against
them be withdrawn. Clearly, they were given the opportunity to be heard, and as aptly stated by the
court, they were given more than sufficient time to comply with the Order dated October 5, 1999. 30

Despite the foregoing, we find that the trial court's finding of contempt and the order directing the
imprisonment of petitioner to be unwarranted. The salutary rule is that the power to punish to
contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and
not retaliatory idea of punishment. Court must exercise their contempt powers judiciously and
sparingly, with utmost self-restraint.31

In Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations,32 the Court quoted the pronouncements of some American
courts, to wit:

Except where the fundamental power of the court to imprison for contempt has been
restricted by statute, and subject to constitutional prohibitions where a contemnor fails or
refuses to obey an order of the court for the payment of money he may be imprisoned to
compel obedience to such order. [Fla.–Revell v. Dishong, 175 So. 905, 129 Fla. 9; Va.
Branch v. Branch, 132 S.E. 303; 144 Va. 244]. (17 C.J.S. 287).

xxx           xxx           xxx

. . . It has been said that imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for civil purpose
cannot be resorted to until all other means fail [Mich.–Atchison, etc. R. co. v. Jennison, 27
N.W. 6, 60 Mich. 232], but the court's power to order the contemnor's detension continues so
long as the contumacy persists [Ark.–Lane v. Alexander, 271 S.W. 710, 168 Ark. 700] (17
C.J.S. 289).33

which we hereby adopt as proper guidelines in the determination of whether the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the order of the trial court finding petitioners guilty of indirect contempt of court and
directing their imprisonment for their contumacious refusal to pay the rentals to the administratrix.

In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly
provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the Constitution,
refers to civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense. 34 It means any liability to pay
arising out of a contract, express or implied.35 In the present case, petitioners, as recognized
lessees of the estate of the deceased, were ordered by the probate court to pay the rentals to
the administratrix. Petitioners did not comply with the order for the principal reason that they
were not certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay the rentals because it was a certain
Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the subject property to them. Clearly, the payment
of rentals is covered by the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.

Moreover, petitioners cannot be validly punished for contempt under Section 8, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court to wit:

SEC. 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. — When the contempt consists in the refusal or
omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to perform, he may be
imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs it. (7a)

because herein subject order is not a special judgment enforceable, under Section 11, Rule 39,
which provides:
 SEC. 11. Execution of special judgment. — When a judgment requires the performance of
any act other than those mention in the two preceding sections, a certified copy of
judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon
the party against whom the same is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or
by law to obey the same, and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he
disobeys such judgment.

Section 9 of Rule 39 refers to the execution of judgments for money, thus:

SEC. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. — (a) Immediate payment on
demand. — The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding
from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of
execution and all lawful fees. The judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check
payable to the judgment obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter, the
amount of the judgment debt under proper receipt directly to the judgment obligee or his
authorized representative if present at the time of payment. The lawful fees shall be handed
under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over the said amount within the
same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ.

If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment,
the judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. The latter
shall turn over all the amounts coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of
court of the court that issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said amounts
to a fiduciary account in the nearest government depository bank of the Regional Trial court
of the locality.

The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the deposit to the
account of the court that issued the writ whose clerk of court shall then deliver said payment
to the judgment obligee in satisfaction of the judgment. The excess, if any, shall be delivered
to the judgment obligor while the lawful fees shall be retained by the clerk of court for
disposition as provided by law. In no case shall the executing sheriff demand that any
payment by check be made payable to him.

(b) Satisfaction by levy. — If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in
cash, certified bank check or other mode or payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the
officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature
whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution
giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be
levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the
option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real
properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.

The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment
obligor which has been levied upon.

When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment
and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to
satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.

Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in
either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as
under a writ of attachment.
 (c) Garnishment of debts and credits. — The officer may levy on debts due the judgment
obligor and other credits, including bank deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions
and other personal property not capable of manual delivery in the possession or control of
third parties. Levy shall be made by serving notice upon the person owing such debts or
having in his possession or control such credits to which the judgment obligor is entitled. The
garnishment shall cover only such amount as will satisfy the judgment and all lawful fees.

The garnishee shall make a written report to the court within five (5) days from service of the
notice of garnishment stating whether or not the judgment obligor has sufficient funds or
credits to satisfy the amount of the judgment. If not, the report shall state how much funds or
credits the garnishee holds for the judgment obligor. The garnished amount in cash, or
certified bank check issued in the name of the judgment obligee, shall be delivered directly to
the judgment obligee within ten (10) working days from service of notice on said garnishee
requiring such delivery, except the lawful fees which shall be paid directly to the court.

In the event there are two or more garnishees holding deposits or credits sufficient to satisfy
the judgment, the judgment obligor, if available, shall have the right to indicate the garnishee
or garnishees who shall be required to deliver the amount due; otherwise, the choice shall be
made by the judgment obligee.

The executing sheriff shall observe the same procedure under paragraph (a) with respect to
delivery of payment to the judgment obligee. (8a, 15a)

while Section 10 of the same Rule refers to execution of judgments for specific acts such as
conveyance, delivery of deeds or other specific acts vesting title; sale of real or personal
property, delivery or restitution of real property, removal of improvements on property
subject of execution and delivery of personal property.

The order directing the payment of rentals falls within the purview of Section 9 as quoted
above. Until and unless all the means provided for under Section 9, Rule 39 have been
resorted to and failed, imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for civil purposes
cannot be resorted to by the courts.36 In Sura vs. Martin, Sr.,37 we held that:

Where an order for the arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt of court (for
failure to satisfy a judgment for support on ground of insolvency) would, in effect, violate
the Constitution.

Thus, petitioners could not be held guilty of contempt of court for their continued refusal to
comply with the probate court's order to pay rentals to the administratrix nor could they be
held guilty of contempt for disobeying the writ of execution issued by the probate court,
which directs therein the Sheriff, thus:

Should lessees fail to pay the aforementioned amounts on rentals, then of the goods and
chattels of said lessees you may cause to be made the sum sufficient to cover the
aforestated amounts, but if no sufficient personal properties are found thereof to satisfy this
execution, then of the real properties you make the sums of money in the manner required
by law and make return of your proceeding under this writ within the reglementary period. 38

It was the sheriff's duty to enforce the writ.39

Under Section 9(b), Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, in cases when the execution calls for payment of
money and the obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or
other mode or payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the
properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for
value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to immediately choose
which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment
obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and
then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. The
sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor
which has been levied upon. When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient
to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as
is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees. Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and
other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like
manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.

The writ of execution issued by the trial court in this case commanded its sheriff to collect
from petitioners the rentals due from the property, and should they fail to pay, from
petitioners' personal/real properties sufficient to cover the amounts sought to be
collected.40 It was not addressed to petitioners. It pertained to the sheriff to whom the law
entrusts the execution of judgments,41 and it was due to the latter's failure that the writ was
not duly enforced.

In fine, the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the Decision dated November
16, 2001 of the trial court.

THE ORDER WHICH COMMANDED THE SHERIFF TO COLLECT IS NOT A SPECIAL ORDER

MIRANDA V SPS MALLARI

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

Before the Court delves into the substantive issues, the Court deems it proper to
discuss a preliminary procedural matter.

The present Petition originated from a "verified complaint for Recovery of

Possession with Damages." 18 The narration of facts both in the RTC Decision and the
CA Decision reveals that recovery of possession was sought by Spouses Mallari from
Miranda through an accion publiciana because there are no averments of facts that
would support an action for either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Besides, the
complaint was filed before a Regional Trial Court, a third-party complaint was even
allowed, and the proceedings were not summary as a full-blown trial was conducted.

Spouses Mallari's case against Miranda being an accion publiciana, a review of its
nature and attributes is in order.

Accion publiciana is a plenary action to recover the better right of possession

(possession de jure), which should be brought in the proper inferior court or Regional
Trial Court (depending upon the value of the property) 19 when the dispossession has
lasted for more than one year (or for less than a year in cases other than those
mentioned in Rule 70 of the Rules).20

The issue in an accion publiciana is the "better right of possession" of real property
independently of title. This "better right of possession" may or may not proceed from a
Torrens title. Thus, a lessee, by virtue of a registered lease contract or an unregistered
lease contract with a term longer than one year may file, as against the owner or
usurper, an accion publiciana if he has been dispossessed for more than one year. In
the same manner, a registered owner or one with a Torrens title can likewise file
an accion publiciana to recover possession if the one-year prescriptive period for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer has already lapsed.

Unlike forcible entry and unlawful detainer where there is an express grant for the
provisional determination of the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining
the issue of possession pursuant to Sections 16 21 and 1822 of Rule 70, there is no
express grant in the Rules that the court hearing an accion publiciana can provisionally
resolve the issue of ownership. Despite the lack of an express Rule, however, there is
ample jurisprudential support for upholding the power of a court hearing an accion
publiciana to also rule provisionally on the issue of ownership.

In Supapo v. Sps. de Jesus,23 (Supapo) the Court stated:

In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession
of the subject lot but they based their better right of possession on a claim of
ownership [based on TCT C-28441 registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo's
names24 ].

This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover
possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of
ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties
has the right to possess the property.

This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of
ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue
of ownership.25

The Court, recognizing the nature of accion publiciana as enunciated above and without
dwelling on whether the attack on Spouses Supapo's title was direct or collateral,
simply, and rightly, proceeded to provisionally resolve the conflicting claims of
ownership. The Court's pronouncement in  Supapo upholding the indefeasibility and
imprescriptibility of Spouses Supapo's title was, however, subject to a Final Note that
emphasized that even this resolution on the question of ownership would not be a final
and binding determination of ownership, but merely provisional:

Final Note
As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of
determining who between the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication
is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a
bar for the parties or even third persons to file an action for the determination of the
issue of ownership.26

Since the resolution of the issue of ownership in an accion publiciana, like forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, is passed upon only to determine the issue of possession, the
defense of ownership raised by the defendant (i.e., that he, and not the plaintiff, is the
rightful owner) will not trigger a collateral attack on the plaintiff’s certificate of title.

Given these procedural parameters, the Court now proceeds to determine who as
between Spouses Mallari and Miranda has a better right of possession over the subject
property.

Spouses Mallari anchor their right on their being the highest bidders in an execution
sale of the subject property that was conducted on September 12, 2003 27 to enforce a
judgment debt that they obtained against its registered owners, Spouses Reyes. The
notice of levy on execution and certificate of sale were duly annotated on April 3,
200328 and September 17, 2003, respectively, on Spouses Reyes' title. 29 In short,
Spouses Mallari claim that they are entitled to the possession of the subject property,
being its rightful owners by virtue of a registered execution sale.

On the other hand, Miranda claims a superior right as an owner of the subject property
by virtue of an unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 21, 1996 (Exhibit
"2").30 From then on, Miranda asserts that he occupied the subject property in the
concept of an owner and is the actual tiller thereof. 31

The RTC in its Decision, which is favorable to Spouses Mallari, made this finding:

There is no dispute that the entire process of satisfaction of the judgment debt is in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Still, the defendant [(Miranda)]
raised question concerning the ownership of the subject land. Defendant made self-
serving assertion that at the time of levy, the subject land is no longer owned by third
party defendant Domiciano Reyes. It is already transferred to and owned by the
defendant through a deed of sale executed prior to levy. As such, the execution sale is
no longer valid. The transfer of the land and its sale in favor of plaintiffs-spouses is
likewise invalid. This bare assertion of the defendant cannot be countenanced by the
court. It is baseless and unsupported by evidence. At the time of levy, the subject
parcel of land is registered in the name of defendant Domiciano Reyes and embraced in
TCT No. NT-226485 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija. It was a
clean title which did not reflect the adversarial claim on the lot of any person including
the defendant. As such, plaintiffs-spouses and the Court Sheriff correctly relied on it.
They validly conducted the levy and execution sale. The reliance on the clean title is in
accordance with the Supreme Court ruling[s] x x x that a Torrens title is generally a
conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein.

xxxx
Also, the Court is aware of the superior right of plaintiffs-spouses who first registered
the notice of levy and certificate of sale vis-a-vis the defendant who alleged a prior
unregistered sale and late registration of adverse claim. x x x 32

The CA, relying on Section 51 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the
Property Registration Decree, which provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or other
voluntary instrument shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall
operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the
Registry of Deeds to make a registration, and Section 52, which provides that every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry
affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register
of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive
notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering, ruled:

At bench, the Spouses Reyes [and] Miranda both claim that a sale covering the subject
property was made by the former to the latter in 1996. There is no dispute, however,
that the purported sale was not registered. On the other hand, the Notice of Levy
covering the subject property that was issued in favor of the Spouses Mallari was,
without a doubt, annotated on TCT No. NT-266485. The right, therefore, of the Spouses
Mallari prevails over that of Miranda's, in line with the jurisprudential rule that
preference is given to a duly registered levy on attachment or execution over a prior
unregistered sale. x x x33

Given the nature of accion publiciana, as explained above, the rulings of the RTC and
the CA on the issue of ownership should be considered as merely provisional and not
conclusive.

Since both parties, Spouses Mallari and Miranda, claim exclusive ownership over the
subject property, the right of ownership recognized in favor of one necessarily excludes
the other of such right since this is not a case of co-ownership.

Article 1458 of the Civil Code provides that by the contract of sale one of the
contracting parties obligates himself to transfer ownership and to deliver a determinate
thing, and the other to pay a price certain in money or equivalent. Pursuant to Article
1475 of the Civil Code, a contract of sale is a consensual one because it is perfected at
the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the
contract and upon the price.

As to transfer of ownership, Article 1477 of the Civil Code provides that

the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual
or constructive delivery thereof. Under Article 712 of the same Code, ownership and
other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted in consequence of certain
contracts, by tradition. However, the parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing
shall not pass to the purchaser until he has fully paid the price under Article 1478.

The Deed of Absolute Sale between Spouses Reyes, the then registered owners of the
subject property, and Miranda was executed in March 1996 and possession was already
transferred to Miranda, through constructive delivery when the Deed of Absolute Sale, a
public instrument, was executed conformably to Article 1498 34 of the Civil Code, and
through real delivery when actual possession was turned over to Miranda pursuant to
Article 149735 of the Civil Code.

Pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Civil Code on the contract of sale and
modes of acquiring ownership, Miranda acquired ownership of the subject property
when he took actual physical, or at least constructive, possession thereof.

The non-registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Nueva Ecija did not affect the sale's validity and effectivity. In the 1958
case of Sapto v. Fabiana36 (Sapto) penned by Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the Court stated:

The issue is whether the deed of sale executed by appellants' predecessors in favor of
the appellee over the land in question, although never registered, is valid and binding
on appellants and operated to convey title and ownership to the appellee.

The question is not new. In a long line of cases already decided by this Court, we have
consistently interpreted sec. 50 of the Land Registration Act providing that "no deed x x
x shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract
between the parties and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to
make registration" in the sense that as between the parties to a sale registration is not
necessary to make it valid and effective, for actual notice is equivalent to registration x
x x. "The peculiar force of a title under Act No. 492", we said in Medina vs. Imaz and
Warner Barnes & Co., 27 Phil., 314 (syllabus), "is exhibited only when the purchaser
has sold to innocent third parties the land described in the conveyance. Generally
speaking, as between vendor and vendee, the same rights and remedies exist in
relation to land not so registered." In Galanza vs. Nuesa, 95 Phil., 713, we held that
"registration is intended to protect the buyer against claims of third persons arising
from subsequent alienations by the vendor, and is certainly not necessary to give effect
as between the parties to their deed of sale." And in the recent case of Casica vs.
Villaseca, G.R. No. L-9590, April 30, 1957, we reiterated that "the purpose of
registration is merely to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a given
transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, and the non-registration of the deed
evidencing said transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their obligations
thereunder."37

Since ownership of the subject property had been transferred to Miranda in 1996, it
ceased to be owned by Spouses Reyes as early as then. Not being owned by Spouses
Reyes, the subject property could not therefore be made answerable for any judgment
rendered against them.

Section 9(b), Rule 39 of the Rules, which authorizes a "levy upon the properties of the
judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for
value and not otherwise exempt from execution" presupposes that the property to
be levied belongs to and is owned by the judgment debtor. Also, according to
Section 12, Rule 39, the effect of levy on execution as to third persons is to create a
lien in favor of the judgment obligee over the right, title and interest of the judgment
obligor in such property at the time of the levy, subject to liens and encumbrances then
existing. If the judgment obligor no longer has any right, title or interest in the
property levied upon, then there can be no lien that may be created in favor of
the judgment obligee by reason of the levy.
Based on Section 9(b), Rule 39 of the Rules, the purpose of a levy on execution is to
subject real and personal properties of the judgment debtor and make them answerable
to the obligation in favor of the judgment obligee in case the former is not able to pay
the judgment debt in cash, certified check, or similar means; and only
property incontrovertibly or unquestionably belonging to the judgment
obligor may be subject of a levy on execution.

In Gagoomal v. Spouses Villacorta,38 the Court held:

It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against
property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if property
belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another
man's indebtedness, such person has all the right to challenge the levy
through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. x x
x39 (Emphasis supplied)

In Bayer Philippines, Inc. v. Agana 40 citing Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. v.

Ramos,41 the Court ruled that the court issuing a writ of execution and the sheriff
making the levy act beyond the limits of their authority when the property levied upon
does not unquestionably belong to the judgment debtor, but to a third party, like
Miranda in this case, viz.:

xxx [T]he levy by the sheriff of a property by virtue of a writ of attachment

may be considered as made under authority of the court only when the
property levied upon unquestionably belongs to the defendant. If he
attach[es] properties other than those of the defendant, he acts beyond the
limits of his authority. Otherwise stated, the court issuing a writ of execution is
supposed to enforce its authority only over properties of the judgment-debtor, and
should a third party appear to claim the property levied upon by the sheriff, the
procedure laid down by the Rules is that such claim should be the subject of a separate
and independent action.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is well-settled pursuant to Balbuena v. Sabay43 (Balbuena) that a judgment debtor

can only transfer property in which he has interest to the purchaser at a public
execution sale and the principle of caveat emptor applies even to such sale:

Nothing is more settled than that a judgment creditor (or more accurately, the
purchaser at an auction sale) only acquires at an execution sale the identical
interest possessed by the judgment debtor in the auctioned property; in other
words, the purchaser takes the property subject to all existing equities
applicable to the property in the hands of the debtor. The fact, too, that the
judgment debtor is in possession of the land to be sold at public auction, and
that the purchaser did not know that a third-party had acquired ownership
thereof, does not protect the purchaser, because he is not considered a third-
party, and the rule of caveat emptor applies to him. Thus, if it turns out that
the judgment debtor has no interest in the property, the purchaser at an
auction sale also acquires no interest therein. 44 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Consequently, as held by the Court in Panizales v. Palmares,45 cited in Balbuena, the
purchaser acquires absolutely nothing if at the execution sale the judgment debtor no
longer has any right to or interest in the property purportedly belonging to him:

x x x "The Rules of Court provide that a purchaser of real property at an execution sale
'shall be substituted to and acquire all the right, title, interest, and claim of the
judgment debtor thereto.' (Rule 39, Section 24 [now Section 12].) In other words, the
purchaser acquires only such right or interest as the judgment debtor had on the
property at the time of the sale. x x x It follows that if at that time the judgment
debtor had no more right to or interest in the property because he had already
sold it to another then the purchaser acquires nothing." x x x "Under the
jurisprudence established by this Court a bona fide sale and transfer of real
property, although not recorded, is good and valid against a subsequent
attempt to levy execution on the same property by a creditor of the vendor." x
x x46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Based on the above rulings, a judgment creditor or purchaser at an execution

sale acquires only whatever rights that the judgment obligor may have over
the property at the time of levy. Thus, if the judgment obligor has no right,
title or interest over the levied property — as in this case — there is nothing
for him to transfer.

Applied to this, the levy made on the subject property could not have created
any lien in favor of Spouses Mallari because their judgment debtors, Spouses
Reyes, had no more right, title or interest thereto or therein at the time of the
levy. To recall, they had sold the property in question to Miranda a whole
seven years earlier. Needless to add, there was nothing that was sold and
transferred to Spouses Mallari at the time of the execution.

The jurisprudential rule that preference is to be given to a duly registered levy on

attachment or execution over a prior unregistered sale, which the CA adverted to in
ruling that the right of Spouses Mallari prevails over that of Miranda, is to be
circumscribed within another well-settled rule — that a judgment debtor can
only transfer property in which he has interest to the purchaser at a public
execution sale.

Thus, the former rule applies in case ownership has not vested in favor of the
buyer in the prior unregistered sale before the registered levy on attachment
or execution, and the latter applies when, before the levy, ownership of the
subject property has already been vested in favor of the buyer in the prior
unregistered sale.

In conclusion, the Court holds that Miranda has a better right of possession
over the subject property having acquired ownership thereof prior to the levy
on execution that Spouses Mallari had caused to be made upon the subject
property.

That held, the Court also adopts the Final Note in Supapo that the ruling in this case,
being one of accion publiciana, is limited only to the issue of determining who between
the parties has a better right to possession — and this adjudication is not a final and
binding determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the
parties or even third persons to file an action for the determination of the issue of
ownership.

The resolution of the issues on the dismissal of the third-party complaint and the
reconsideration of the CA Decision is rendered superfluous by the foregoing.

As to Miranda's claim for damages, the Petition has not alleged sufficient factual basis
to justify their award.

MY NOTES

-MIRANDA HAS A BETTER RIGHT KAHIT HINDI

REGISTERED YUNG TITLE NIYA

WHY?
- BEFORE THE LEVY, YUNG DEBTOR NILA MALLARI, SI
REYES, NABENTA NA YUNG LUPA KAY MIRANDA.

- SO NUNG BINILI NILA MALLARI YUNG LUPA SA

AUCTION SALE, AT NIREGISTER YUNG LEVY, WALANG
NATRANSFER NA RIGHT SA KANILA KASI NGA DI NA
SILA REYES MAY ARI NUNG LUPA

- SO THERE IS NO LIEN CREATED OVER THE SPOUSES

MALLARI

BIGTAS V STERLING BANK

PSALMC V MAUNLAD HOMES

We find no.merit in the petition.

The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties

unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone.17 An execution can be
issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in
court.18 The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor
not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one man's goods shall not
be sold for another man's debts.19 Thus, if the property levied by virtue of a
writ of execution is claimed by a third person who is not the judgment obligor,
Section 16 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the remedy of
such third party claimant, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. - If the property levied
on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such
person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating
the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy
and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep
the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond
approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the
value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same
shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for
the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the
action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing
of the bond.

The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to
any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent
such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a
separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same
or a separate action against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly
spurious claim.

When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or any
officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required, and in case the
sheriff or levying officer is sued for damages as a result of the levy, he shall be
represented by the Solicitor General and if held liable therefor, the actual damages
adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of such funds as may
be appropriated for the purpose.
Under the above-quoted provision, the third-party claimant may execute an affidavit of
his title or right to the possession of the property levied, and serve the same to the
officer making the levy and a copy thereof to the judgment creditor. This remedy is
known as terceria.20 The officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless the
judgment creditor files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party
claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. An action for
damages may be brought against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of the filing of the bond. The same section also provides that a third-
party claimant may file a proper action to vindicate his claim to the levied property. The
proper action mentioned in Section 16 would have for its object the recovery of
ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages
resulting from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third
party claim and it may be brought against the sheriff and such other parties as may be
alleged to have colluded with him in the supposedly wrongful execution proceedings,
such as the judgment creditor himself. If instituted by a stranger to the suit in which
execution has issued, such proper action should be a totally separate and distinct action
from the former suit.21

In this case, petitioner had filed an affidavit of third-party claim with the
sheriff and a motion for issuance of status quo order with the RTC to prevent
the sale of the levied properties at public auction, nullification of the levy and
restoration of the subject properties to it, which were denied by the RTC and,
consequently, the sheriff was directed to proceed with the implementation of
the issued writ of execution.

The RTC denied the third-party claim as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

As to the third-party claim by movant PSALM, this Court also resolves to deny the same
for lack of merit.

Section 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x

In this present case, aside from serving said affidavit of third-party claim to the Sheriff
of this Court, claimant PSALM also filed this instant motion for issuance
of status quo order to prevent the sale of the levied properties at public
auction, nullification of the levy and restoration of the subject properties in
the possession of PSALM. In effect, instead of the Sheriff requiring the
plaintiff-obligee to file an indemnity bond, the Court is constrained to resolve
the merit of the third-party claim filed by PSALM.

However, it must be emphasized that the resolution of this Court is limited only to a
determination of whether the Sheriff acted correctly in the performance of his duties. It
cannot pass upon the question of title to the property, with any character of finality. It
only treats of that matter in so far as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff acted
correctly or not.

After giving an opportunity to vindicate their claim and after a judicious examination of
the arguments posed by all of the parties, this Court finds that PSALM has not been
able to satisfactorily establish their claim of ownership over the subject
properties.

First, claimant PSALM has not presented sufficient proof of ownership over the
said levied properties. It merely claimed that the subject properties were
transferred by operation of law in view of the passage of EPIRA in 2001. It did
not submit any document evidencing ownership. It even failed to present any document
that the levied property is among those included in the inventoried property of PSALM.
The doctrine of "Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat" or "He who asserts, not
he who denies, must prove" is applicable in this present case.

Second, a careful perusal of EPIRA, particularly Sections 49, 50, 51 and 56, in relation
to Section 1 of Rule 21 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, would show that
ownership of NPC's assets, herein levied properties included, is not ipso jure or
by operation of law as there is the need to execute certain documents
evidencing transfer of ownership and possession. This Court agrees with the
plaintiff-appellee that these documents are conditions precedent that are needed to be
performed and executed in order to have a valid transfer.

Section 1, Rule 21 of the IRR provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

NPC and PSALM shall take such measures and execute such documents to effect the
transfer of ownership and possession of all assets, rights and privileges, liabilities
required by the Act to be transferred by NPC to PSALM.

Third, even if the transfer is by operation of law, it would be an injustice and

inequitable, to say the least, to interpret the aforesaid provision as to effect
the transfer only of the assets and properties of NPC but not its obligation and
liabilities. The assets and properties transferred should also account for the
liabilities and obligations incurred by NPC. In fact, Section 49 of the said law
explicitly states that PSALM should not only assume and take ownership of all existing
NPC generations assets, liabilities and 3PP contracts, real estate and other disposable
assets.

In the instant case, plaintiff Maunlad Homes, Inc. is already on the stage of reaping the
fruits of its labor after it had judiciously battled the case with the court a quo and this
Court. Injustice is manifest if they would not be awarded what is due them merely on
the ground of technicalities and evasive measures undertaken by its adversary. 22 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya,23 We held that for the remedy of terceria to prosper,
the claim of ownership or right of possession to the levied property by the third-party
claimant must first be unmistakably established, thus: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

x x x A third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation
of the judgment debtor may invoke the supervisory power of the court which authorized
such execution. Upon due application by the third person and after summary hearing,
the court may command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and
restored to the rightful owner or possessor. What said court can do in these instances,
however, is limited to a determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly
or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of judgment,
more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property not belonging to the
judgment debtor. The court does not and cannot pass upon the question of title to the
property, with any character of finality. It can treat of the matter only insofar as may
be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. It can require the sheriff
to restore the property to the claimant's possession if warranted by the evidence.
However, if the claimant's proofs do not persuade the court of the validity of his title or
right of possession thereto, the claim will be denied. 24

Independent of the above-stated recourse, a third-party claimant may also avail of the
remedy known as "terceria," provided in Section 17, Rule 39, by serving on the
officer making the levy an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the
judgment creditor. The officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless
such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the officer, indemnifies the
officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of the
property levied on. An action for damages may be brought against the sheriff
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the filing of the bond.

The aforesaid remedies are nevertheless without prejudice to "any proper action" that a
third-party claimant may deem suitable to vindicate "his claim to the property." Such a
"proper action" is, obviously, entirely distinct from that explicitly prescribed in Section
17 of Rule 39, which is an action for damages brought by a third-party claimant
against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the
filing of the bond for the taking or keeping of the property subject of the
"terceria."
Since the RTC denied the third-party claim for failure of petitioner to satisfactorily
establish its claim of ownership over the subject properties, the latter filed with the CA
a petition for certiorari assailing such denial and claimed that there is no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petition for certiorari was
dismissed by the CA for being a wrong remedy.

We affirm the dismissal.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be filed when any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. An adequate remedy has been defined as a
remedy which is equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient, not merely a remedy which at
some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment of the lower court
complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court
or tribunal.25
cralawred

Notably, petitioner cannot appeal from the denial of its third-party claim since
it is not one of the parties in the action where the writ of execution was
issued,26 as the unlawful detainer case was between respondent and the NPC.
Also, the denial of the third-party claim is not appealable as provided under the
above-quoted Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
since the remedy of a third party claimant is to file a separate and
independent action to vindicate his claim of ownership or right of possession
of the levied properties against the judgment creditor or the purchaser of the
property at the public auction sale. It is in this separate and independent
action that the issue of the third-party claimant's title to the levied properties
can be resolved with finality.

In Queblar v. Garduño,27 we declared: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The appeal interposed by the third-party claimant-appellant is improper, because she

was not one of the parties in the action who were exclusively Venancio Queblar as
plaintiff and Leonardo Garduno as defendant. Considering the provisions of said section
451 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 4108, 28 the appealed order
was not appealable. The appeal that should have been interposed by her, if the term
"appeal" may properly be employed, is a separate reinvidicatory action against the
execution creditor or the purchaser of her property after the sale at public auction, or a
complaint for damages to be charged against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in
favor of the sheriff.29 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Hence, petitioner's claim in their jurisdictional allegations in its petition

for certiorari filed with the CA that it was constrained to file the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 to protect its rights and interest over the subject properties
because of the absence of a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, is contradicted by the
procedure laid down under Section 16 of Rule 39, i.e., the third-party claimant may file
an independent action to vindicate its claim of ownership to the levied property. Where
a specific remedy has been laid down by our rules for the protection or enforcement of
rights, the same should be resorted to. In Solidum v. CA,30 We held: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

We have held that neither an appeal nor a petition for certiorari is the proper
remedy from the denial of a third-party claim. In the case of Northern Motors, Inc.
v. Coquia, the petitioner filed, among others, a third-party claim which was denied by
the respondent judge in the disputed resolution. Northern Motors, Inc. thereafter filed a
petition for certiorari to nullify the resolution and order of the respondent judge. In
resolving whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's third-party claim, the Court held: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Pursuant to [Section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court], a third-party

claimant has two remedies, such as, an action for damages against the sheriff
to be brought within 120 days from the filing of the bond, and a separate and
independent action to vindicate his claim to the property. In the case at bar,
petitioner's and intervenor's remedy against the bond proved to be unavailing
because of the disputed order of the respondent Judge canceling the
indemnity bond. Such an order as well as the order denying a motion to
reconsider the same in effect discarded or quashed the third-party claims.
What then would the remedy be of the third-party claimants?

In the recent case of Serra vs. Rodriguez, x x x this Court (First Division), thru Mr.
Justice Makasiar, ruled:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

From the denial of a third-party claim to defeat the attachment caused to be levied by a
creditor, neither an appeal nor a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy. The
remedy of petitioner would be to file a separate and independent action to determine
the ownership of the attached property or to file a complaint for damages chargeable
against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the provincial sheriff.
In Lara vs. Bayona, L-7920, May 10, 1955, this Court, thru Mr. Justice Concepcion,
later Chief Justice, in denying the petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the
lower court quashing the third-party claim of a chattel mortgagee, held: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Pursuant to this provision, nothing contained therein shall prevent petitioner "from
vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action." Neither does the order
complained of deprive petitioner herein of the opportunity to enforce his alleged rights
by appropriate proceedings. In short, he has another "plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law," and, hence is not entitled either to a writ
of certiorari or to a writ of prohibition.
The Court further held that since the third-party claimant is not one of the parties to
the action, he could not, strictly speaking, appeal from the order denying its claim, but
should file a separate reinvidicatory action against the execution creditor or a complaint
for damages against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff. The
rights of a third-party claimant should be decided in a separate action to be instituted
by the third person. In fine, the appeal that should be interposed, if the term appeal
may be properly employed, is a separate reinvidicatory action against the execution
creditor or complaint for damages to be charged against the bond filed by the judgment
creditor in favor of the sheriff.31 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

And in such separate action, the court may issue a writ of preliminary injunction against
the sheriff enjoining him from proceeding with the execution sale, 32 which is a speedy
and adequate remedy to immediately relieve petitioner from the adverse effects of the
lower court's judgment. Thus, the CA did not err in saying that Section 16 of Rule 39
provides a more expeditious and encompassing recourse from the denial of its third-
party claim.

Considering our foregoing discussions, We need not address the other issues raised by
petitioner regarding its right to ownership and possession of the levied properties.

AQA GLOBAL V PLANTERS DEV BANK

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

A writ of possession is an order by which the sheriff is commanded to place a person in

possession of a real or personal property. It may be issued under any of the following
instances:33 (a) land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No.
496,34 otherwise known as the "The Land Registration Act"; (b) judicial foreclosure,
provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a
party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; and (c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real
estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, 35 as amended by Act No. 4118.36 cralawrednad

The general rule is that after the lapse of the redemption period, the purchaser
in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased
who is entitled to the possession of the said property. Upon ex parte petition,
it is ministerial upon the trial court to issue the writ of possession in his favor.
The exception, however, is provided under Section 33, Rule 39 of the
Rules,37 which applies suppletorily to extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate
mortgages. Under the said provision of law, the possession of the mortgaged property
may be awarded to a purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party is
actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor: 38

SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom

executed or given. - If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the
registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and
possession of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed
and no other redemption has been made, and notice thereof given, and the time for
redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and
possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire period of one (I)
year from the date of the registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed
shall be executed by the officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and in the
latter case shall have the same validity as though the officer making the sale had
continued in office and executed it.

Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor
to the property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be
given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third
party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment
obligor. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, where a parcel of land levied upon on execution is occupied by a party
other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to order a hearing
to determine the nature of said adverse possession. 39 For the exception to
apply, however, the property need not only be possessed by a third party, but
also held by him adversely to the judgment obligor - such as that of a co-
owner, agricultural tenant or usufructuary, who   possess the property in their
own right  and  not  merely the successor or transferee of the right of
possession of,40  or privy to,41  the judgment obligor.

In this case, petitioners' claim of right of possession over the subject properties
is not analogous to any of the foregoing as to render such possession adverse to the
judgment obligor, KTC, under legal contemplation.

In the first place, Je-An's claimed ownership over the subject properties is based on the
January 15, 2003 Contract to Sell,42 which is legally insufficient to transfer title in its
favor absent a deed of conveyance duly executed by the vendor, Little Giant, and, at
most, affords it a mere inchoate right over the said properties.43 cralawrednad

Secondly, while records show that KTC acquired its rights and interests over the subject
properties from Little Giant through the February 24, 2003 Deed of Assignment, 44 Je-
An, the vendee under the January 15, 2003 Contract to Sell of the same properties,
was privy to the conveyance to KTC since its representative, i.e., Achurra, was the one
who executed the said deed of assignment in favor of KTC in behalf of Little Giant. Such
is apparent from the "Brief Statement of Claims and Defenses" 45 in the pre-trial46 brief
dated September 10, 2010 filed by Je-An and Achurra in Civil Case Nos. 69973 and
69988 before the same RTC - i.e., the consolidated cases for: (a) annulment of contract
to sell and deed of assignment, cancellation of titles, annulment of mortgage,
accounting and damages, filed by Diokno as representative of Little Giant and for his
own behalf against Je-An and Achurra; and (b) specific performance and damages
filed by Je-An, represented by Achurra, against Diokno - and is inconsistent
with Je-An's claim of adverse possession against KTC in this case.

Thirdly, it appears that at the time KTC executed the Mortgage 47 in favor
ofPlantersbank on February 28, 2003, titles over the subject properties were already in
its name sans any annotation of the January 15, 2003 Contract to Sell in favor of Je-An.
Moreover, the records are bereft of showing that at the time Plantersbank consolidated
its title over the foreclosed properties in 2011, any adverse claim 48 based on said
contract to sell and/or the purported rescission49 on August 1, 2003 of the February 24,
2003 Deed of Assignment between Little Giant (as represented by Achurra) and KTC
had been registered by Je-An, Achurra or Little Giant on KTC's titles.

Clearly, the stay of the implementation of the writ of possession prayed for by Je-An on
the basis of such inchoate right would becloud the integrity and derogate the
indefeasibility of the torrens title50 issued in favor of Plantersbank as a
confirmed owner, which the Court cannot allow. Corollorily, the enforcement
of the writ of possession cannot also be stayed in favor of AQA which merely
derived its possession from Je-An through an unregistered contract of lease.
The Court simply cannot subscribe to AQA's claim51 that its status as a tenant renders
its possession adverse to that of Plantersbank, in consonance with the ruling in China
Bank v. Spouses Lozada.52 In the said case, the "tenant" contemplated clearly refers to
an "agricultural tenant" who: (a) possesses the property in his own right; and (b) is
protected by Presidential Decree (PO) No. 1038 53 wherein a tenanttiller of private
agricultural lands devoted to crops other than rice and/or com shall not be removed,
ejected, ousted or excluded from his farmholding unless directed by a final decision or
order of the court for causes provided by law, which does not include sale of the
land54 - and not to a "civil law tenant."

It bears to emphasize that a civil law lease is a mere personal right.

It partakes of the nature of a real right when it is recorded on the title of the
lessor only in the sense that it is binding even as against third persons without
actual notice of the transaction.55 Under Section 51 of PD No. 1529,56 otherwise
known as the Land Registration Decree, "no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary
instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect
as a conveyance or bind the land" until its registration. In the present case, AQA's
unregistered lease with Je-An is, thus, not binding on Plantersbank.

Consequently, Je-An and AQA cannot be considered third parties holding the
subject properties adversely to KTC, the defaulting debtor mortgagor.
Resultantly, the general rule, and not the exception, applies to the instant
petitions, rendering it the mandatory and ministerial duty of the RTC to issue
the writ of possession in favor of Plantersbank as the confirmed owner, and of
the Sheriff to implement the said writ. As this Court ruled in St. Dominic Corp. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court:57

The right of the respondent to the possession of the property is clearly unassailable. It
is founded on the right of ownership. As the purchaser of the properties in the
foreclosure sale, and to which the respective titles thereto have already been issued,
the petitioner's rights over the property has become absolute, vesting upon it the right
of possession of the property which the court must aid in affecting its delivery. After
such delivery, the purchaser becomes the absolute owner of the property. As we said
in Tan Soo Huat v. Ongwico (63 Phil., 746), the deed of conveyance entitled the
purchaser to have and to hold the purchased property. This means, that the purchaser
is entitled to go immediately upon the real property, and that it is the sheriff's
inescapable duty to place him in such possession. (Citation omitted).
Nonetheless, the Court would like to take exception to the CA's ruling, limiting the
remedies of the adverse third party to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or
possession over the foreclosed property to a terceria and an independent separate
action once a writ of possession had already been issued, as in this case. In Gagoomal
v. Spouses Villacorta,58 the Court ruled that aside from such remedies, the adverse
third party may take other legal remedies to prosecute his claim, such as invoking the
supervisory power of the RTC to enjoin the enforcement/implementation of the writ of
possession, as what petitioners did in this case. Unquestionably, the RTC has a general
supervisory control over the entire execution process, and such authority carries with it
the right to determine every question which may be invariably involved in the
execution, and ensure that it is enforcing its judgment only against properties
irrefutably belonging to the judgment debtor.59 However, in such instances, the RTC
does not and cannot pass upon the question of title to the property, with any character
of finality, and can treat of the matter only as may be necessary to decide the question
of whether or not the person in possession holds the property adversely to the
judgment obligor. If the claimant's proofs do not persuade the court of the validity of
his title or right of possession thereto, the claim will be denied. 60 cralawrednad

In sum, while the Court finds the CA to have erred in ruling that the RTC was not
clothed with the supervisory authority to determine the nature of the possession of Je-
An and AQA, it correctly ruled against the propriety of staying the implementation of
the writ of possession against them.

BARRETE V AMILA

After carefully examining the pertinent pleadings and reports filed, the Court considers
that respondent Judge Amila acted arbitrarily and with disregard for complainant’s
rights when he ordered her incarceration on the ground of contempt for her failure to
comply voluntarily with the final judgment and the writs of execution ordering
evacuation from the premises and the delivery of possession of the property to
plaintiff. cralawnad

The records show that at the time complainant was arrested, no delivery of possession
of the subject premises had been made to the plaintiff; the writ of execution had not
yet been implemented.

The mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of complainant to vacate said

property did not constitute contempt. The contumacious act punishable under Rule
71 is:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 3 (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or

command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge, including the act of a
person who after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment
or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another
to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership
or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged
to be entitled thereto." (Emphasis supplied) chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The writ of possession was directed not to complainant, but to the Sheriff, who
was to deliver the properties to plaintiff Bungabong. As the writ did not
command the complainant to do anything, complainant could not be held
guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
judgment or command of a court. 5 Moreover, complainant could not be
punished for contempt under paragraph (b) of Section 3, Rule 71, for disobedience of
or resistance to the judgment of the trial court because said judgment was not a special
judgment enforceable under Section 9, Rule 39, Rules of Court, which reads as
follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 9. Writ of execution of special judgment. — When a judgment requires the
performance of any other act than the payment of money, or the sale or delivery of real
or personal property, a certified copy of the judgment shall be attached to the writ of
execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom the same is
rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and
such party or person may be punished for contempt if he obeys such judgment."
(Emphasis supplied) chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

When the judgment requires the delivery of real property, it must be executed in
accordance with Section 8 (d) of Rule 39, and any contempt proceeding arising
therefrom must be based on the second part of Section 3 (b) of Rule 71 (see underlined
portion of Section 3 (b), Rule 71 above) and not on "the disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court,
or injunction granted by a court or judge" in relation to Section 9 of Rule 39. 6

Neither can Judge Amila’s contention that complainant’s acts constituted direct
contempt be accepted. To constitute direct contempt, the alleged misbehavior must
have been committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or
interrupt proceedings before the court. 7 Complainant was not guilty of such
misbehavior.

In the instant case, complainant was arrested and detained for failure to comply
with the judgment of eviction, on the mistaken belief of respondent judge that she
was thereby guilty of direct contempt of court and thus could be summarily punished
with imprisonment. To make matters worse, complainant’s three (3) minor children,
who had no idea whatsoever about the controversy, were dragged into it when they
were incarcerated with their mother. chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Since complainant was not guilty of the alleged contempt, the order for her arrest had
no legal basis. Even if complainant had not been guilty of contempt, the method
employed by respondent Judge to compel compliance from her was not justified
because the same is not sanctioned by the Rules. In the case of U.S. v. Ramayrat, 8
the Court ruled that for execution of the final judgment, the Sheriff could have availed
himself of the public force (i.e., assistance of the police authorities), had it been
necessary to resort thereto. It was not up to respondent Judge to ensure execution of
the judgment by ordering the arrest of complainant. In the instant case, respondent
Judge acted with grave abuse of authority and misconduct in office in ordering the
arrest of complainant. 9

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE respondent

Judge Venancio Amila pay a fine equivalent to Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with a
WARNING that repetition of the same or similar offense will be met with a more severe
penalty.

SIA V ARCENAS
 The Court’s Ruling

The petition is without merit.

At the outset, it is essential to note that the petition in SCA No. V-7075 before the RTC
Br. 17 is primarily that of mandamus, seeking that the court, through the issuance of a
writ of mandamus, compel the City Treasurer to issue a Final Bill of Sale covering the
subject lots in petitioner’s favor pursuant to its mandate under Section 262 42 of
Republic Act No. 7160,43 otherwise known as the “Local Government Code of 1991”
(LGC).44 In fact, the RTC Br. 17 granted such petition when it declared valid the auction
sale where petitioner purchased the subject lots in supersession of EO 08-97, and
accordingly ordered the City Treasurer to issue the sought for Final Bill of Sale, viz.:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring Panay Railways Inc. and/or the subject [lots] as not exempt from real
property Taxes and declaring the auction sale of December 20, 1996 as valid and
binding;

2. Ordering the City Treasurer of Roxas City to issue in favor of the petitioner the Final
Bill of Sale over [the subject lots] described in the petition.

SO ORDERED. 45

As case law defines, a writ of mandamus is a “command issuing from a court

of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign,
directed to an inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or
person, requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which
duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed,
or from operation of law. It is employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, which, as opposed to a discretionary one, is that
which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or
the exercise of his or its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of
the act done.”46 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In this case, the judgment in SCA No. V-7075 primarily compels the City Treasurer
to issue the Final Bill of Sale covering the subject lots in favor of petitioner
pursuant to Section 262 of the LGC, a ministerial duty, which said officer unduly
refused to perform. Thus, it may be properly deemed as a judgment ordering the
issuance of a writ of mandamus  against the City Treasurer.

Given that the judgment in SCA No. V-7075 ordered the issuance of a writ
of mandamus compelling the performance of a ministerial duty, and not the
payment of money or the sale or delivery of real or personal property, the
same is in the nature of a special judgment47 – that is which a judgment
directs the performance of a specific act requiring the party or person to
personally do because of his personal qualifications and circumstances. 48 As
such, execution of the said judgment should be governed by Section 11, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SEC. 11. Execution of special judgments. – When a judgment requires the performance

of any act other than those mentioned in [Sections 9 and 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court], a certified copy of the judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution and
shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom the same is rendered, or
upon any other person required thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and such party
or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.

This is in consonance with the rule on service and enforcement of orders or judgments
concerning, among others, the special civil action of mandamus under Section 9, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, which states: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SEC. 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. – A certified copy of the

judgment rendered in accordance with the last preceding section shall be served upon
the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
concerned in such manner as the court may direct, and disobedience thereto shall be
punished as contempt. An execution may issue for any damages or costs awarded in
accordance with Section 1 of Rule 39.

The rule therefore is that the service and execution of a special judgment,
such as a favorable judgment in mandamus – as in this case – should be
deemed to be limited to directing compliance with the judgment, and in case
of disobedience, to have the disobedient person required by law to obey such
judgment punished with contempt.

In this case, it is undisputed that the City Treasurer obstinately refused to issue
the Final Bill of Sale in petitioner’s favor, despite the finality of the judgment
in SCA No. V-7075, as well as the issuance and service of the Writ of Execution
dated February 28, 2008 commanding him to do so. In view of such refusal,
the RTC Br. 15 should have cited the City Treasurer in contempt in order to
enforce obedience to the said judgment. 49 However, instead of simply doing
so, it granted petitioner’s numerous motions, resulting in, among others, the
issuance of a writ of possession.

A writ of possession is defined as a “writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment

to recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give its
possession to the person entitled under the judgment.” 50 It may be issued under the
following instances: (a) land registration proceedings under Section 17 51 of Act No.
496,52 otherwise known as “The Land Registration Act;” (b) judicial foreclosure,
provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a
party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real
estate mortgage under Section 753 of Act No. 3135,54 as amended by Act No.
4118;55 and (d) in execution sales.56 Proceeding therefrom, the issuance of a writ of
possession is only proper in order to execute judgments ordering the delivery of specific
properties to a litigant, in accordance with Section 10, Rule 39, 57 of the Rules of Court.

As already discussed, the judgment in SCA No. V-7075 sought to be enforced in the
case at bar only declared valid the auction sale where petitioner bought the subject
lots, and accordingly ordered the City Treasurer to issue a Final Bill of Sale to
petitioner. Since the said judgment did not order that the possession of the subject lots
be vested unto petitioner, the RTC Br. 15 substantially varied the terms of the aforesaid
judgment – and thus, exceeded its authority in enforcing the same – when it issued the
corresponding writs of possession and demolition to vest unto petitioner the possession
of the subject lots. It is well-settled that orders pertaining to execution of
judgments must substantially conform to the dispositive portion of the
decision sought to be executed. As such, it may not vary, or go beyond, the
terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce.58 Where the execution is not in
harmony with the judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has no
validity.59 Had the petitioner pursued an action for ejectment or reconveyance,
the issuance of writs of possession and demolition would have been proper;
but not in a special civil action for mandamus, as in this case.

Perforce, the CA correctly ruled that the Writ of Possession dated June 19, 2009 and
the Writ of Demolition dated August 28, 2009 issued in this case are null and void for
having been rendered beyond the authority of RTC Br. 15 in enforcing the judgment in
SCA No. V-7075. chanrobleslaw

MMDA V CONCERNED CITIZENS

Our Ruling

We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.

The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay

Can be Compelled by Mandamus

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. 8 A
ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment."9 It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person
executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist
and imposed by law."10 Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters
involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the
other.

Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and
liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the
part of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make
decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking feasibility studies
and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners’
duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise
of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion,
for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which discharge or spill they
are to contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on
whether or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the
MMDA’s ministerial duty to attend to such services.

We agree with respondents.

First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one
hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the
implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial
in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v.
Atienza11 in which the Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its
Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil players to cease and desist from operating their
business in the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" within six months from the effectivity of the
ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate
and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative
garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in
this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This
section defines and delineates the scope of the MMDA’s waste disposal services to include:

Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of
policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall
likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related
facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse
and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)

The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act
(RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec.
42 which provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the
operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, 12 enjoining
the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15,
2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such
effectivity, the use of controlled dumps.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a
proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated,
discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially
according to their judgment or conscience. 13 A discretionary duty is one that "allows a person to
exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform." 14 Any suggestion that the MMDA has
the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for
want of legal basis.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would
yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to
perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.
Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192, 15 is the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural
resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand,
designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and
implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water pollution,
the DENR, under the Act’s Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects of water pollution,
determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent
information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and technologies, to
prevent and abate such pollution."

The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an
Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area
Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of
RA 9275 provides:

Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible
for the implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein.
As such, it shall have the following functions, powers and responsibilities:

a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review or revise and
publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;

b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months
following the completion of the status report;

c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months
following the completion of the framework for each designated water management area.
Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management area governing board
every five (5) years or as need arises.

The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of
completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework. 16 Within twelve
(12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan. 17 Again,
like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275.

Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the
assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies and non-government
organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan
with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal
Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.

The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should
more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under existing
laws.

(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,18 is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control over
all waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro
Manila and several towns of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:
 (g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for
the proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x

(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It
can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and shall
monitor and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct,
operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewerage,
waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH,
is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and
safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country. 19 In
relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in
Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.

(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292), 20 is
designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the
conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local government units
(LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and
surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are
judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable basis.21 Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is
charged with coordinating with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards in
marine waters.22 More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under
Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution
for the development, management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.

(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked under
EO 29223 to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among others, flood
control and water resource development systems in accordance with national development
objectives and approved government plans and specifications.

In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide
services relating to "flood control and sewerage management which include the formulation and
implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control,
drainage and sewerage system."

On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and MMDA,
whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For
the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood control services.
The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services shall include the
removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros
(drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws.

(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and
Sec. 6 of PD 979,24 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of
enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the
Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance with the national rules
and policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for
the effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend
violators who:
 a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any
other floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner,
into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines;

b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or

deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or
from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of
any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing
therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall
float or be washed into such navigable water; and

c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on
the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be
washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or
otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of
pollution of such water.

(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was
signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to "perform all police
functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police
functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the capability to
perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to assume
and perform the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group
shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine
pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were
authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations. 25

(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish, develop, regulate,
manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and national
development."26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police authority within the
ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its
purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs
and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following:

xxxx

b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles,
as well as movement within the port of watercraft.27

Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78, 28 the
Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and
terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is
tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and
liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at
ports and apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine
territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.

(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary landfill
and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It
is primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which
would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction. 29

Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated are
dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid
waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non-
biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as enjoined
in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an environmental compliance
certificate.

Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition
may be allowed "when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks,
roads, parks and playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs,
and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways,
and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan,
Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay,
the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of such
structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable
laws in coordination with the DPWH and concerned agencies.

(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to
promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source
of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the
DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall formulate
guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment
and operation of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly
urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage management system shall be employed.

In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.1 31 of
Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and
monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict
enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of sludge collection
treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit.

(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is
mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all
levels.32 Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher
Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide educational
campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper use of the
environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is
directed to strengthen the integration of environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with
an emphasis on waste management principles. 33

(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and
revenues so as to effectively achieve the country’s development objectives. 34

One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water
Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner
consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and
marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to streamline
processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the
protection of water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic
instruments and of control mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic
national program of water quality management that recognizes that issues related to this
management cannot be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection,
water supply, public health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management
program for water pollution focusing on pollution prevention.

Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble objectives of
RA 9275 in line with the country’s development objectives.

All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and
complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We
need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.

Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the
cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents?

Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code

Include Cleaning in General

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a

degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies
concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such
water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain,

remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to
do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-
up operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the
persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.

When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, o, amended the
counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues,
however, to be operational.

The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:

SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26

hereof, any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the
applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up
any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have
been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency
cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same,
the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake
containment, removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be
reimbursed by the persons found to have caused such pollution under proper administrative
 determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality
Management Fund or to such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.

As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than real
since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the designation of the
DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations.

Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves
only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general.
They aver that the twin provisions would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and
(h), which defines the terms "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills," as follows:

g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants discharged

or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.

h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result
from accidents such as collisions and groundings.

Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government
agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific
polluted portion or portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that the application of
said Sec. 20 is limited only to "water pollution incidents," which are situations that presuppose the
occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding containment, removal,
and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g)
requires "cleanup operations" to restore the body of water to pre-spill condition, which means that
there must have been a specific incident of either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other
hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h).

As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the
application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only.
Contrary to petitioners’ posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the
coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed
covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses around the Manila
Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however,
emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the
operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents
contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.

To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow
reading of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of the
Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup
coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase "cleanup operations"
embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the
phrases "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills" do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the
chapter where said section is found.

Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government
agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act
even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has deteriorated to a
degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage." This section, to stress, commands
concerned government agencies, when appropriate, "to take such measures as may be necessary
to meet the prescribed water quality standards." In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of
water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly
applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the
mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the
cleanup work for the polluters’ account. Petitioners’ assertion, that they have to perform cleanup
operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do
not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier
discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific
duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them.
Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275
on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident.
In this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at
once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive
program of environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 &
20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents." 35

Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à-vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is

correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such
magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general
pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the
polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions "water pollution incidents" which may be
caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in
water bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand,
specifically adverts to "any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies," which may refer
to an individual or an establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the
waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water
pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can
validly be categorized as beyond the specific pollution incident level.

Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so
undermanned that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila
Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters
has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain, remove, or
clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step
in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152,
covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup situation.

The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-
term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as
important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the
rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise,
any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay
water quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275,
and other relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-
agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to
perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of
its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing
mandamus,"36 the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in
view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the
court to clean up the length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution. 37

The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures
which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital
Region (NCR) (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks,
and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the
major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the
major river systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list.
And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained
resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for naught.
The DENR Secretary said as much.38

Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or
the Water Code,39 which prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of
rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:

The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their
entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in
agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to
the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing
and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is
necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of
any kind. (Emphasis added.)

Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along
or near the banks of the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they
may not be treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly
contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the concerned LGUs,
have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial establishments set up, within a
reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their
industrial discharge, including their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major
rivers, and connecting waterways. After such period, non-complying establishments shall be shut
down or asked to transfer their operations.

At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to comply
with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage
problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there
reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is shocking. Some highlights
of the report:

1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and
Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off.
Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the
surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.

2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste
in the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by households that
lack alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an
understatement.
 3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains
of pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River
systems and Manila Bay.40

Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be established
as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be
taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:

Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.––No open dumps shall
be established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person,
including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5)
years following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)

RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which
ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly
complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.

In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping
of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps, open
burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal
facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends up in the Manila
Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water
bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized
transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550
which proscribes the introduction by human or machine of substances to the aquatic environment
including "dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual
products of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or
harmful liquid, gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-
made structure."

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme
necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge
their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need
to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them
by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark
cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former
splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks
ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and
cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take
responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation
and protection of the Manila Bay.

The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their
limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes
unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities
cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and
rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners’ hiding behind two untenable claims:
(1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the
cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste
management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that
the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political
rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. 41 Even assuming the absence of a
categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men
and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to
keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a
betrayal of the trust reposed in them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV
No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No.
1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or
supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-

government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and
maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under
DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and
other forms of contact recreation.

In particular:

(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural
resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency
responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement
its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and
conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination
meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful
implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.

(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the
Local Government Code of 1991,42 the DILG, in exercising the President’s power of general
supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs
under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila,
Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial
establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in their respective
areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR
(Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River,
the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the
Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment
facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and
regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments
and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial
wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and
the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,43 the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and
maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite
where needed at the earliest possible time.

(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the
DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the
efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.

(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, 45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore
the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite,
Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries
and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.

(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance
with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA
8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila
Bay.

(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 51346 and the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the
discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila
Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.

(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control
projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected
LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and
other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments
established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San
Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-
Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the
principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country
more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG,
affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall
remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA
7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting
waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.

In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed
by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its
territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of
sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the
appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003, 47 Sec. 27
of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.

(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year
from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper
facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The
DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set
up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, 49 the DepEd
shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and
like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and,
through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and
maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine
archipelago.

(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of
2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and
preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country’s development objective
to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our
marine waters.

(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP
Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing
mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive
report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.