ALTAVAS VS.

CA 106 PHIL 940

There is no question that the petitioner was given an additional thirty (30) days within which to
submit her record on appeal, for on January 14, 1959, the Court of First Instance issued the
following order:

As prayed for in the ex parte motion of Attorney Jose Y. Torres, he is hereby given thirty (30) days
from today within which to submit his record on appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner contends that the order above-quoted extended also the filing of the notice of appeal
and the appeal bond. Petitioner's main argument is that her petition dated January 13, 1958
prayed for an extension of time not merely to submit the record on appeal but to perfect her
appeal, which includes the filing of the notice of appeal and appeal bond. The contention is
devoid of merit. The language used in the order is plain and unequivocal. It cannot be construed
in the manner suggested by petitioner. If the trial court really intended to extend also the period
for the filing of the notice of appeal and appeal bond, it could have easily stated so in its order,
or simply, the order would have granted "an additional 30 days to perfect the appeal." In fact,
the said court clearly explained the meaning of its order of extension as being limited to the filing
of the record on appeal when on March 1, 1958, it issued an order dismissing the appeal for the
untimely filing of the notice of appeal and appeal bond. Presumably, the reason of the trial court
in granting an extension only for the filing of the record on appeal is that the petition for
extension was predicated solely on the ground "that the record of the case is very voluminous
and the Record on Appeal will probably consist of 50 typewritten pages more or less so that it
would need much time to prepare, finish and file the Record on Appeal and furthermore due to
pressure of work her counsel cannot attend exclusively in the preparation of said Record on
Appeal.

In the case of Silverio Salva vs. Hon. Perfecto R. Palacio, et al., 90 Phil., 731, 52 Off. Gaz., p. 3089,
this Court has held that an extension of time granted to amend a record on appeal does not carry
with it an extension of the reglementary period for the filing of the appeal bond. Similarly, in this
case, we hold that the extension of time granted for the filing of the record on appeal does not
also carry with it an extension for the filing of the notice of appeal and appeal bond.
Rules of Courts, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law; and rules of
court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken,
are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly
and speedy discharge of judicial business.

IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT HON. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG

Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to
that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be
considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise
therefrom.

In the case at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly procedural
and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively suspended while
his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and
such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Besides,
there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office.
Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure,
no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.

PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., vs. EMILY ROSE GO KO

On September 1, 2000, Sec. 4 of Rule 65 was amended anew, by this Courts A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC,
FURTHER AMENDING SECTION 4 RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE this time
reverting to the old rule that the 60-day period of filing a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus under Rule 65 was to be reckoned from the date of receipt of the denial of the motion
for reconsideration of the assailed order or motion for new trial. The rule, as thus amended, now
states:

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 Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

There is no question that the amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98, which took effect
on September 1, 1998, were already in force, and therefore applicable when petitioners filed
their petition. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense. No
vested rights attach to procedural laws.

AURORA B. GO vs. ELMER SUNBANUN

In Neypes we held that a litigant is given another fresh period of 15 days to perfect an appeal
after receipt of the order of denial of his/her motion for reconsideration/new trial before the
RTC. We said:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to
the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution.

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Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Neypes, which we
rendered in September 2005, has been applied retroactively to a number of cases1[40] wherein
the original period to appeal had already lapsed subsequent to the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. Auroras situation is no exception, and thus she is entitled to benefit from the
amendment of the procedural rules.

Neypes vs CA

A party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional
Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying
his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be
availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after
the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Tan Jr. vs CA

The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending actions or proceedings admits certain
exceptions. The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication
provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it to pending
proceedings would impair vested rights. Under appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the
retroactive application of procedural laws in the event that to do so would not be feasible or
would work injustice. Nor may procedural laws be applied retroactively to pending actions if to
do so would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the courts.

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We hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given
retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly,
petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner
followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the
reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately
for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied
retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile
the retroactive application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be
penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the
period of redemption when he made the redemption. The subject lot may only be 34,829 square
meters but as petitioner claims, it is the only property left behind by their father, a private law
practitioner who was felled by an assassins bullet.

Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure on
the date of reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous. The manner of exercising the
right cannot be changed and the change applied retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of
redemption of the petitioner which is already vested.

LUCIA BARRAMEDA VDA. DE BALLESTEROS, petitioner, vs. RURAL BANK OF CANAMAN, INC

Since the RTC-Iriga has already obtained jurisdiction over the case it should continue exercising
such jurisdiction until the final termination of the case. The jurisdiction of a court once attached
cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and the Court retains jurisdiction until
it finally disposes of the case (Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 711).

When a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its
jurisdiction to proceed to final determination of the case is not affected by a new legislation

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transferring jurisdiction over such proceedings to another tribunal. (Alindao v. Joson, 264 SCRA
211). Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation (Bernate v.
Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 323).

Indeed, the Court recognizes the doctrine on adherence of jurisdiction. Lucia, however, must be
reminded that such principle is not without exceptions. It is well to quote the ruling of the CA on
this matter, thus:

This Court is not unmindful nor unaware of the doctrine on the adherence of jurisdiction.
However, the rule on adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute and has exceptions. One of
the exceptions is that when the change in jurisdiction is curative in character (Garcia v.
Martinez, 90 SCRA 331 [1979]; Calderon, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 459 [1980];
Atlas Fertilizer Corporation v. Navarro, 149 SCRA 432 [1987]; Abad v. RTC of Manila, Br.
Lll, 154 SCRA 664 [1987]).

For sure, Section 30, R.A. 7653 is curative in character when it declared that the liquidation
court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to assist in the adjudication of the disputed
claims against the Bank. The interpretation of this Section (formerly Section 29, R.A. 265)
becomes more obvious in the light of its intent. In Manalo v. Court of Appeals (366 SCRA 752,
[2001]), the Supreme Court says:

The requirement that all claims against the bank be pursued in the liquidation
proceedings filed by the Central Bank is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against
the insolvent bank and designed to establish due process and orderliness in the
liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice
and arbitrariness (citing Ong v. CA, 253 SCRA 105 [1996]). The lawmaking body
contemplated that for convenience, only one court, if possible, should pass upon the
claims against the insolvent bank and that the liquidation court should assist the
Superintendents of Banks and regulate his operations (citing Central Bank of the
Philippines, et al. v. CA, et al., 163 SCRA 482 [1988]).

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ATIENZA VS. BOARD OF MEDICINE

Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail
the Orders of the BOM, admitting in evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed Orders were
interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of an appeal separate from the judgment that
completely or finally disposes of the case.2[5] At that stage, where there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the only and remaining
remedy left to petitioner is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Embedded in the CAs finding that
the BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave abuse of discretion is the issue of whether
the exhibits of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence are inadmissible.

Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best
evidence rule; (2) have not been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are completely
hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the
exhibits are inadmissible evidence.

We disagree.

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To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings
before administrative bodies such as the BOM.3[6] Although trial courts are enjoined to observe
strict enforcement of the rules of evidence,4[7] in connection with evidence which may appear
to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:

[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but
admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their
rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant
or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.

PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO, NESTOR ROMERO, NILO ESPINA, EDDIE LADICA, ARMAN QUELING,
ROLANDO NIETO, RICARDO BARTOLOME, ELUVER GARCIA, EDUARDO GARCIA and NELSON
MANALASTAS, petitioners, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS

The petition is impressed with merit. The issue confronting the Court is not without precedent in
jurisprudence. The oft-cited case of Rabago v. NLRC5[9] squarely grapples a similar challenge

8
involving the propriety of the use of affidavits without the presentation of affiants for cross-
examination. In that case, we held that the argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the
affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence
are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where
decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only.

In Rase v. NLRC,6[10] this Court likewise sidelined a similar challenge when it ruled that it was
not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the
adverse party. To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the
summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the
application of the technical rules of evidence.

Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v. NLRC7[11] succinctly states that under Art. 221
of the Labor Code, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Further, it notes that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are
authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively
and without regard to technicalities of law and procedure, all in the interest of due process. We
find no compelling reason to deviate therefrom.

To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law
and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a
suppletory character and effect. The submission by respondent, citing People v. Sorrel, that an

9
affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value,
cannot find relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a
quantum of evidence different from that of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the
Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial
or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based
on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits.

ONG CHIA VS REPUBLIC

Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents
which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which,
justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered
as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value,"8[12] so it was
argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered.

The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 1439[13] of the Rules of Court which
provides that

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for,
except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.

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Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being
invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in
such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance
upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be
the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decision in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable
judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of
naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

SASAN VS NLRC

The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of
Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in
labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law
and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been
held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the
parties for the first time on appeal. The submission of additional evidence on appeal does not
prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.10[31]

In Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,11[32] we again

emphasized that:

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[T]he NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because
technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases.

The settled rule is that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal as
technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. In fact, labor officials are mandated by
the Labor Code to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily
and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due
process. Thus, in Lawin Security Services v. NLRC, and Bristol Laboratories Employees Association-
DFA v. NLRC, we held that even if the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact
that it was duly introduced on appeal to the NLRC is enough basis for the latter to be more
judicious in admitting the same, instead of falling back on the mere technicality that said evidence
can no longer be considered on appeal. Certainly, the first course of action would be more
consistent with equity and the basic notions of fairness.

For the same reasons, we cannot find merit in petitioners protestations against the documentary
evidence submitted by HI because they were mere photocopies. Evidently, petitioners are
invoking the best evidence rule, espoused in Section 3, Rule130 of the Rules of Court. It provides
that:

Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself x x x.

The above provision explicitly mandates that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. Notably,

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certified true copies of these documents, acceptable under the Rules of Court12[33] were
furnished to the petitioners. Even assuming that petitioners were given mere photocopies, again,
we stress that proceedings before the NLRC are not covered by the technical rules of evidence
and procedure as observed in the regular courts. Technical rules of evidence do not apply if the
decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful
look into the arguments contained in position papers and other documents.

PRIMO VS MENDOZA

Substantial evidence, quantum of proof in administrative cases

Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence.
The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe,
based on the evidence submitted, that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct
complained of. It need not be overwhelming or preponderant, as is required in an ordinary civil
case, or evidence beyond reasonable doubt, as is required in criminal cases, but the evidence
must be enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.

Non-hearsay v. legal hearsay, distinction

To the former belongs the fact that utterances or statements were made; this class of
extrajudicial utterances or statements is offered not as an assertion to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, but only as to the fact of the utterance made. The latter class, on the other
hand, consists of the truth of the facts asserted in the statement; this kind pertains to

13
extrajudicial utterances and statements that are offered as evidence of the truth of the fact
asserted.
The difference between these two classes of utterances lies in the applicability of the rule on
exclusion of hearsay evidence. The first class, i.e. the fact that the statement was made, is not
covered by the hearsay rule, while the second class, i.e. the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement, is covered by the hearsay rule. Pedroza's allegation belongs to the first class; hence,
it is inadmissible to prove the truth of the facts asserted in the statement.

The following discussion, made in Patula v. People of the Philippines3 is particularly instructive:

Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence
of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and,
therefore, the assertion can be received s evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject
to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an
assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted,
the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies
that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not
to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered
those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction
is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does
not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule
applies.

Non-applicability of strict technical rules of procedure in administrative or quasi-judicial bodies

is not a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules.

While administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, are not
bound by the technical rules of procedure, this rule cannot be taken as a license to disregard
fundamental evidentiary rules; the decision of the administrative agencies and the evidence it
relies upon must, at the very least, be substantial. that:

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In Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. Dumapis, we ruled that:

While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the
technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural rule should not be
construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. The evidence
presented must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to have probative value. Not only
must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Pinga vs Heirs of Santiago (The express power of the SC to promulgate rules of practice and
procedure)

The constitutional faculty of the Court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure, necessarily
carries the power to overturn judicial precedents on points of remedial law through the
amendment of the Rules of Court. One of the notable changes introduced in the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is the explicit proviso that if a complaint is dismissed due to fault of the plaintiff,
such dismissal is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in
the same or in a separate action. The innovation was instituted in spite of previous jurisprudence
holding that the fact of the dismissal of the complaint was sufficient to justify the dismissal as
well of the compulsory counterclaim.13

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 In granting this petition, the Court recognizes that the former jurisprudential rule can no
longer stand in light of Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Sarmiento vs Zarata (Reasons that would warrant the suspension of the Rules)

There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable
to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing
that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby. Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the present case.

The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does not affect the
substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum. The
required extension was due to respondents counsels illness, lack of staff to do the work due to
storm and flood, compounded by the grounding of the computers. There is no claim likewise that
said motion was interposed to delay the appeal.14[25] As it appears, respondent sought

extension prior to the expiration of the time to do so and the memorandum was subsequently
filed within the requested extended period. Under the circumstances, substantial justice requires
that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the issue of who is entitled to the possession of
the land in question.

Further, it has been held that a motion for extension of time x x x is not a litigated motion where
notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the

Ginente vs CA

16
application, but an ex parte motion made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties
to the action, in the absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties. As
a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by
the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his rights be not affected without an
opportunity to be heard. It has been said that ex parte motions are frequently permissible in
procedural matters, and also in situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an
exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might
tend to defeat the objective of the motion.15[26]

The Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation
of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts, in
rendering justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the
norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other
way around. As applied to instant case, in the language of Justice Makalintal, technicalities should
give way to the realities of the situation.

Private respondents reliance on technicalities should be placed in proper perspective lest it lead
to a great injustice and an abuse of the rules of procedure which are primarily established to
protect the rights of the parties. Technicality should not be relied upon to subject and defeat
substantive rights of the other party. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to
justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from
courts.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party-litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied
rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.

This Court, likewise, has held that (W)here compelling circumstances are cited by the appellant
that would warrant an examination and review by the appellate court as the reviewer of the
findings of fact made by the trial court, a liberal application of the rules becomes imperative and
conversely, an overstrict or rigid enforcement of the reglementary period for the filing of briefs,
extensions of which for justifiable reasons are after all addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, is to be shunned and avoided lest a grave miscarriage of justice be committed.

Further, this Court has declared that the higher interests of justice and fairness justify the setting
aside of respondent courts peremptory dismissal of petitioners appeal for failure to file
appellants brief within the original reglementary period due to a cause not entirely attributable

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It is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has consistently held that cases shall be
determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and
defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In so doing, the ends of
justice would be better served.16[27] Furthermore, this Court emphasized its policy that
technical rules should accede to the demands of substantial justice because there is no vested
right in technicalities. Litigations, should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not
on technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and the rules
of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help
secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims. As has been the
constant rulings of this Court, every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from constraints of technicalities.17[28] Indeed,
rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other matters
pending in court. A strict and rigid application of the rules that would result in technicalities that

to its fault or negligence and that the exercise of the Courts inherent right to reinstate an appeal
that was dismissed as the result of fraud, mistake or unavoidable casualty is fully justified under
the circumstances of the case at bar.

In the case at bar, the lawyers negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of
petitioners is a sufficient reason to set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. Aside from
matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the rules of the
most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower
court's findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (1) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules,
(4) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, (5) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

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tend to frustrate rather than promote justice must be avoided.

City of Dumaguete vs PPA

Procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application
of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must
yield to the latter.18[29] In Basco v. Court of Appeals,19[30] we allowed a liberal application of
technical rules of procedure, pertaining to the requisites of a proper notice of hearing, upon
consideration of the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, as illustrated in well-
settled cases, to wit:
The liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing is exemplified in
Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. CA:

Admittedly, the filing of respondent-spouses' motion for

reconsideration did not stop the running of the period of appeal
because of the absence of a notice of hearing required in Secs. 3, 4
and 5, Rule 15, of the Rules of Court. As we have repeatedly held,
a motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere scrap
of paper; it presents no question which merits the attention of the
court. Being a mere scrap of paper, the trial court had no
alternative but to disregard it. Such being the case, it was as if no
motion for reconsideration was filed and, therefore, the

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 reglementary period within which respondent-spouses should
have filed an appeal expired on 23 November 1989.

But, where a rigid application of that rule will result in a

manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, then the rule may be
relaxed, especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged
defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not
apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein.
Technicalities may thus be disregarded in order to resolve the
case. After all, no party can even claim a vested right in
technicalities. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided
on the merits and not on technicalities.

THENAMARIS PHILIPPINES INC. vs CA

T]here are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and
weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to
comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately
paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing
that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellants
fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of
substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound
discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.1wphi1 Thus, there should be
an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious
explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.

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In this case, counting 60 days from her counsels receipt of the June 29, 2009 NLRC Resolution on
July 8, 2009, private respondent had until September 7, 2009 to file her petition or a motion for
extension, as September 6, 2009, the last day for filing such pleading, fell on a Sunday. However,
the motion was filed only on September 8, 2009.30 It is a fundamental rule of remedial law that
a motion for extension of time must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be
extended; otherwise, the same is of no effect since there would no longer be any period to
extend, and the assailed judgment or order will have become final and executory.31

Additionally, as cited earlier in Labao, there should be an effort on the part of the litigant invoking
liberality to satisfactorily explain why he or she was unable to abide by the rules.32 Here, the
reason offered for availing of the motion for extension is the heavy workload of private
respondents counsel, which is hardly a compelling or meritorious reason as enunciated in Labao.
Time and again, we have held that the excuse of "heavy workload is relative and often self-
serving. Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule."

Thus, private respondents motion for extension should have been denied outright.

Notably, the CAs November 20, 2009 Resolution refrained from ruling on the timeliness of
private respondents motion for extension. Instead, it directly ruled on the Petition for Certiorari
as seen by its statement "[t]he Court x x x resolved to NOTE the petition for certiorari x x x, albeit
the same was filed fifteen (15) days late." To our mind, the foregoing pronouncement is an
indirect acknowledgment on the part of the CA that the motion for extension was indeed filed
late. Yet it opted to still entertain and "note" the Petition for Certiorari, justifying its action as
being "in the interest of justice."

We do not approve of the CAs ruling on the matter because, as the motion for extension should
have been denied outright, it necessarily follows that the Petition for Certiorari is, in the words
of petitioners, a "mere scrap of paper with no remedial value whatsoever."

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Alcantara vs PCIB

This Court had previously sustained that failure to attach all pleadings and documents, by itself,
is not a sufficient ground to dismiss a petition. In appropriate cases, the courts may liberally
construe procedural rules in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice. Lapses
in the literal observation of a procedural rule will be overlooked when they do not involve public
policy, when they arose from an honest mistake or unforeseen accident, and when they have not
prejudiced the adverse party or deprived the court of its authority.20[15] The aforementioned
conditions are present in the case at bar.

Furthermore, 14 days after petitioners receipt of the September 27, 2001 Court of
Appeals Resolution dismissing his petition, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration21[16] along
with the documents deemed by the Court of Appeals as lacking in his originally filed petition.
Contrary to the pronouncement made in the December 20, 2001 Court of Appeals Resolution
which denied the aforesaid Motion, petitioners subsequent submission should be deemed
substantial compliance with paragraph 3, Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.

There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance of
an appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. In these cases,22[17] we ruled

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that the subsequent submission of the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration
amounts to substantial compliance. The reasons behind the failure of the petitioners in these
two cases to comply with the required attachments were no longer scrutinized. What we found
noteworthy in each case was the fact that the petitioners therein substantially complied with the
formal requirements. We ordered the remand of the petitions in these cases to the Court of
Appeals, stressing the ruling that by precipitately dismissing the petitions the appellate court
clearly put a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case.23[18]

While it is true that the rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate
the ends of justice, and the swift unclogging of court docket is a laudable objective, it
nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial justice. This Court has time and again
reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the
attainment of justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid application of the rules must
always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to enhance
fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive
rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
Considering that there was substantial compliance, a liberal interpretation of procedural rules in
this labor case is more in keeping with the constitutional mandate to secure social justice.24[19]

Clearly, the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners special civil action for
certiorari despite subsequent substantial compliance with the rules on procedure, and in so

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doing, unduly upheld technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case. Ordinarily,
court procedure dictates that the Court of Appeals should be tasked with properly disposing the
petition, a second time around, on the merits.

PRIETO VS ALPADI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

It must be stressed that anyone seeking exemption from the application of the reglementary
period for filing an appeal has the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious
instances warranting such deviation.18 Parties praying for the liberal interpretation of the rules
must be able to hurdle that heavy burden of proving that they deserve an exceptional treatment.
It was never the Courts intent "to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity."19 Unfortunately for Prieto, she was unable to discharge this burden of proof.
Procedural rules should not be so easily brushed aside with the mere averment of the "higher
interest of justice," as the Court discussed in Building Care Corp./Leopard Security & Investigation
Agency v. Macaraeg20:

It should be emphasized that the resort to a liberal application, or suspension of the application
of procedural rules, must remain as the exception to the well-settled principle that rules must be
complied with for the orderly administration of justice. In Marohomsalic v. Cole, the Court stated:
While procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of justice, it is well-settled that these are
tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. The relaxation of procedural rules in the
interest of justice was never intended to be a license for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity. Liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules can be invoked only in
proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While litigation is not a game of
technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

The later case of Daikoku Electronics Phils., Inc. v. Raza, further explained that:
To be sure, the relaxation of procedural rules cannot be made without any valid reasons
proffered for or underpinning it. To merit liberality, petitioner must show reasonable cause

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justifying its non-compliance with the rules and must convince the Court that the outright
dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of substantial justice. x x x. The desired
leniency cannot be accorded absent valid and compelling reasons for such a procedural lapse.

We must stress that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" line is not some
magic want that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural
rules are not to be belittled, let alone dismissed simply because their non-observance may have
resulted in prejudice to a partys substantial rights. Utter disregard of the rules cannot be justly
rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction. (Emphases and citations omitted.)
Prieto cannot claim that she had been deprived of her day in court when her arguments in
support of her Demurrer to Evidence had been heard by the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, she does not lose her liberty at this point for she still has the opportunity to present
evidence in her defense before the RTC in the continuation of the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 97-157752.

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