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Vision,
Mission Statement
& Core Values

VISION
To acquire strategic reach and capabilities across the spectrum of
conflict that serve the ends of military diplomacy, nation building
and enable force projection within India’s strategic area of influence.
In this endeavour, People First, Mission Always will be the IAF’s
guiding beacon.

MISSION STATEMENT
To be a modern, flexible and professional aerospace power with full-
spectrum capability to protect and further national interests and
objectives.

IAF CORE VALUES

The IAF leadership has identified three core values that must govern
whatever it does – in peace or war. These are:

Mission, Integrity & Excellence

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Air Power in
the Indian Context
Doctrine does not fight wars; people do. And although airmen may
prefer to be ‘doers,’ only those who can think rigorously but creatively
about future war are likely to be successful when crisis presents itself.
— Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger

AIR POWER IN PERSPECTIVE

The contemporary global environment is characterized by change and
the future is expected to be no different. In this dynamic environment,
it is essential to have a clear understanding of the attributes, limitations
and the potential of air power to enable its optimum exploitation for
furthering national objectives. India’s security environment is an amalgam
of its history, geography, culture, politics etc and thus the security
challenges facing India are varied, complex and dynamic. Therefore, for
India national security is an essential adjunct of overall national growth
and development. The new millennium has witnessed sweeping changes
with India emerging as a fast growing economy with a major stake and
influence in the global arena. As the nation marches ahead on the path
of socio-economic growth and seeks to fulfil the legitimate aspirations of
its citizens, it can ill afford to be complacent about the existing and future
security challenges. Seeking optimal solutions to these challenges would
be imperative for our uninterrupted growth and development.

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India’s response to these challenges through the years has always

been restrained, measured and moderate. This is because India’s national
security objectives have evolved against the backdrop of its core values
of democracy, secularism, peaceful co-existence and the national goal
of social and economic development. Even though as a nation India
has no extra-territorial ambitions, it is still essential that it possesses a
potent instrument of national power capable of deterring conflict and
maintaining peace.
Air power fulfils all these needs. The varied roles played by air power
have been demonstratively proven in the recent past. The aerospace
medium has enabled nations vastly removed in distance and time to
exercise their power and influence across continents with astonishing
rapidity. On the other hand, non-state actors have also exploited gaps
in air defence to fly passenger aircraft into buildings. The opportunities
and challenges, therefore, are manifold. It is only a clearly articulated
air power doctrine that allows nations to leverage and exploit its
tremendous potential.
Air power doctrine is primarily a derivative of the fundamental
principles that guide the application of air and space power and
offers innovative ideas for the optimum exploitation of the medium.
Fundamental principles draw on operational experiences and are time-
honoured ways for achieving optimum success. They are guidelines
that have worked in the past. Conversely, innovative ideas are futuristic
and are limited only by imagination and technology. The interaction
of these two constituents, makes an air power doctrine particularly
dynamic bound only by experience, imagination and technology.
Unless the unique attributes and limitations of air power are
understood, its sub-optimal utilisation would continue. History is
replete with such instances primarily because air power is the youngest
form of military power. Its relevance and application are yet to be
completely comprehended by military strategists and practitioners of
operational art. This is particularly applicable in our unique context.
It is a historical fact that various empires through thousands of years

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were entirely dependent on their armies and navies for survival. Armies
and navies have traditionally been visible manifestations of sovereign
might and capability. Thus, a generic appreciation regarding the utility
of armies, and to a certain extent, maritime power, is inherent in most
national psyches.
Air power, by contrast, only arrived in the last century and its
optimum exploitation only began in the past few decades. Hence,
its relevance, potential and applicability are yet to be fully absorbed
into our nation’s consciousness. Air power as a powerful and flexible
tool of national security, statecraft and overall development is yet to
be comprehended in full measure, leading to continued instances of
its sub-optimal utilisation. The full-scale utilisation of IAF during
conventional wars like the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars, its non-
utilisation during the 1962 Indo-China war and restricted use during
the 1999 Kargil conflict serve to illustrate the point.
Air power, in a classic sense is defined as the total ability of a
nation to assert its will through the medium of air. It includes both civil
and military aviation, existing and potential. In the modern sense,
air power which has evolved into aerospace power is defined as the
product of aerospace capability and aerospace doctrine. Air power
is the strength of an air force as opposed to an attendant capability. The
strength of India’s air power lies in the IAF with the capabilities of air
arms of the other services reinforcing that strength. Aviation related
research and development as also industrial capabilities have a force
multiplier effect. Space capabilities further add to the above to enhance
the aerospace power of the nation.
The IAF has played a pivotal role in the country’s security ever
since its inception nearly 80 years ago. The IAF was established as an
independent force on October 8, 1932 making it one of the oldest,
continuously functioning independent air forces of the world. Over the
years the IAF has evolved from being primarily a tactical auxiliary arm
of the Royal Air Force in India, to an independent professional strategic
force which endeavours to be at the forefront of national service.

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AIR POWER AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The dominant role played by air power in modern warfare, the high cost
of aircraft and allied equipment, and a host of other factors demand that
its capability and role in securing national interests be closely scrutinised.
The case of the IAF can be no different, since the strength of our nation’s air
power is rooted in the IAF. It is hence essential to understand the place of
the IAF in the national security matrix.
The Preamble to the Indian Constitution summarises our aims and
objectives as a nation which in turn determines our national security
objectives. These, in turn, dictate the military strategy, which is the
process of coordinating the development, deployment and employment
of military forces to achieve national security objectives. Military
strategy essentially is a combination of land, maritime and air strategies.
Since land, sea and air have their distinct characteristics, advantages
and limitations, the strategic options enabled by land, maritime and air
power are equally distinct.
Success in conventional conflict has historically hinged on the
destruction of an enemy’s fielded forces, followed by the capture or
capitulation of the enemy’s leadership. Hence, land and naval forces
had few options apart from fighting their way through even if it
meant having to accept significant attrition. The advent of air power
changed all that. Air power could circumvent the enemy’s land, naval
forces and directly attack the enemy leadership, their command and
control centres and other critical vulnerabilities, which would hasten
the enemy’s capitulation. This was illustrated in ample measure during
the 1971 Indo-Pak war when following the bombing of the governor’s
house in Dhaka by the IAF, Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire when most of
its military forces in the western sector were largely intact.
Air power can also decisively interfere with enemy land and sea
operations without the reverse being true. A striking example of this is
the battle of Longewala, wherein, Pakistan’s armour was decimated by
the IAF without reciprocal damage. The IAF dominated the skies and
hence it could operate freely as it pleased.

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Tempest over Kashmir Valley, 1948

The ability of the IAF to rapidly project military force and influence
statecraft has become increasingly evident post-independence. The
speedy aerial reinforcement of Srinagar during the 1947-48 conflict
with Pakistan was the first visible exploitation of air power by India
to further national strategy. Similarly, the aerial evacuation of King
Tribhuvan of Nepal in 1950 and his subsequent restoration to the

Poonch: Refugees being evacuated in 12 Squadron Dakotas

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throne paved the way for the Indo-Nepalese treaty of friendship. The
swift air landed operation undertaken by the IAF during Operation
Cactus in 1989 to airdrop Indian forces at Male was crucial in the
foiling of a coup attempt and the subsequent restoration of the
Maldives government.
In keeping with its mandate of enabling national development,
the IAF also plays a significant role in aid to civil population during
disasters, crisis etc. Notwithstanding the size of the country and
the varied terrain, it deploys swiftly and frequently across the
country for disaster mitigation and control. The IAF is frequently
deployed for supply drops as also aerial evacuation during natural
disasters such as earthquakes, cyclones, landslides, floods etc both
within the country and even beyond. For instance, during the 2004
Tsunami, the IAF undertook airlift and relief operations in the
Andaman & Nicobar Islands as also in the Maldives and Sri Lanka.
Its transcontinental reach was apparent when during Hurricane
Katrina the IAF rapidly responded and delivered aid and supplies to
St Louis, Mississippi, USA. The IAF has conducted numerous such
operations as for instance: evacuating thousands of people during
snowstorms in Jammu and Kashmir in 2005; airlifting of more than
100,000 Indian citizens from Iraq and Kuwait during Gulf War I
in conjunction with Air India and Indian Airlines which are the
other elements of Indian air power. The IAF also serves the ends
of democracy by periodically transporting paramilitary and civilian
personnel for election duties.
The role of the IAF in defending the skies on a daily basis is
carried out by fully armed aircraft on live Operational Readiness
Platforms (ORP) or Combat Air Patrol (CAP). These are capable of
launching within minutes to signal the resolve of the government of
India for deterring any aerial misadventure. All the above examples
demonstrate that air power enables force projection, both benign and
otherwise, to support national security objectives in more ways than
one.

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RECENT PERSPECTIVES
Following World War II, the invention of nuclear weapons changed the
concept of both warfare, and strategic deterrence. The emphasis during
the Cold War was on nuclear balance and strategic bombing was linked
to this balance. This led to the development of nuclear bombers and
high altitude interceptors. The large payloads carried by these aircraft
and the unmatched rapidity with which they could deliver them made
air power the instrument of choice. Achieving air superiority quickly,
proved crucial in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war for neutralising superior
Arab capabilities. The Vietnam War highlighted the limitations of air
power against low value low contrast target systems and the need for
Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) to reduce aircraft losses.
As air defences against aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes
improved, air forces around the world came to prefer the protection
offered by a high-speed low-level ingress while operating in a densely
hostile air defence environment.
The 1973 Arab-Israeli war clearly highlighted the potency of air
defence (AD) weapons and reinforced the importance of SEAD to
reduce attrition. In the 1980s, the Air Land doctrine was enunciated
by the US army. It highlighted the significance of manoeuvre warfare
and the synchronised application of air power to manipulate the
battlefield for swift success in wars. In the 1982 Bekaa Valley operations,
force multipliers such as RPAs, AWACS, and EW played a vital role in
gaining technological asymmetry and for creating conditions which
would quickly achieve air superiority. In the 1991 Gulf War, once again
medium and high attitude operations came back into favour to
prevent aircraft losses to shoulder fired missiles and highly lethal low
level air defences. This was also validated during the Kargil conflict of
1999. In the 1991 Gulf war technology created a paradigm shift albeit
selectively in the employment of air power. The enemy was treated as a
target system and air power was used strategically to carry out parallel
attacks on the enemy’s vital Centres of Gravity. In Kosovo, air power
was the only military instrument used to achieve coalition objectives.

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Air power’s ability to create strategic outcomes without transiting

territories on ground made it a primary instrument of choice.
However, subsequent air campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq along with
the Israeli experience against Hezbollah and other non-state actors have
yielded mixed results. The clear lesson is that while air power remains
an instrument of choice, its effectiveness depends to a large extent upon
the adversary, the kind of target systems that can be engaged through
the medium of air, and the ability of military and political leadership to
use it for maximum effect.
The major post Cold War innovations included stealth, precision,
extended reach, night sensors and enhanced computing power.
Leadership now became a viable target. A significant shift also took
place with the development of night fighting enabling technology that
reduced the flexibility enjoyed earlier by surface forces to manoeuvre
at night. Further, space became closely integrated with warfare and
was utilised for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
functions, secure communications, integrated early warning, weather
forecasting and navigation. Space based assets significantly enhanced
the potency of air power. Due to increased battlefield transparency,
it also became easier to discern enemy intentions. Use of precision
weapons at long range proved effective in causing a strategic
paralysis.
The media brought warfare into living rooms and therefore
significantly influenced the way in which wars were conducted. It
created international pressure and sensitivity regarding friendly losses
and collateral damage. Whilst short duration of wars meant there was
little time for the strategic effect to manifest itself, but the necessity of
making a swift strategic impact, increased especially when operating
under nuclear thresholds. With technological advancement, air power
provided the capabilities that linked tactical actions with strategic
outcomes that could prove crucial, especially in short duration wars.
With increasing globalisation, power concepts are moving away
from territorial acquisitions to the extracting of political/economic

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concessions. While traditional threats have reduced, threats from non-

state actors have increased. From attrition oriented warfare, war waging
concepts have rapidly moved towards Effects Based Operations,
wherein functional paralysis is more desirable than the physical
destruction of target systems. The Revolution in Military Affairs has
transformed the role of technology and doctrines in fighting wars. The
aim now is to isolate the enemy’s command and control structures,
augment psychological warfare and precision strikes on the critical
vulnerabilities deep inside enemy territory. These changes favour
employment of air power more than any other form of military
power.
The importance of sequential advantage in warfare has been
recognised and its relationship with force and space appreciated. As
such, air power today applies parallel force at all levels of war. The
strategic, operational and tactical levels themselves have been merged
and are now more related to functionality than to location or type of
targets. The networking of sensors, operators and decision makers has
significantly reduced the sensor-to-shooter time period. This has also
resulted in transforming linear warfare into non-linear warfare. The
increased focus today is on knowledge and effect and to apply forces
synergistically to achieve the desired outcome in the shortest period
of time, with minimum casualties and collateral damage.

AIR POWER AND JOINTNESS

The IAF has always been cognizant of the fact that air power delivers
best when used in synergy with the other components of military power.
The conflicts and developments of the past three decades indicate a
growing role for air forces. In fact, certain air campaigns conducted in
the 1980s and 1990s led to the emergence of a school of thought that
believed that wars could be won entirely by air forces. However, the IAF
does not subscribe to this view since it is based on the experiences of
air forces pitted against markedly inferior militaries with little or no air
power capabilities.

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In India’s case, it is clear that air power alone cannot win a war, but
at the same time, no modern war can be won without it. Our experience
indicates that in almost every war fought since independence, the IAF
has played a significant, and at times a pivotal role. It is also clear that
air power can best be exploited not only in synergy with the other two
components of the military, but also in tandem with diplomatic efforts
and other national civil processes. The spectrum of modern conflict
is significantly different and modern wars, whether conventional or
sub-conventional (with or without a nuclear overhang) cannot be won
singly by any one of the three primary components of military power.
Modern conflicts can be decisively influenced only by each component
of military power operating in synergy with each other and optimally
exploiting the unique attributes of its medium of operation (air, land and
sea) to achieve national objectives. Since the objective is common, joint
operations would be the most logical response to national challenges.
Integrated and joint operations are the cornerstone of modern military
operations and air power must be seen as the binding factor. This is so,
mainly because land and naval forces historically operated independent
of each other until the advent of air power. It is air power that enables
land and naval forces to undertake sustained operations beyond their
physical operating mediums, leading to the increasingly accepted
perception that air power is the lynchpin of joint operations.

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 3
Principles of War
and the Nature of
Air Power
The raison d’être, the reason for its (the air force’s) very existence, is to
try and neutralise the enemy’s various war potentials in wartime, by
every possible means and to protect one’s own.
— Air Chief Marshal PC Lal

BLENDING AIR POWER WITH PRINCIPLES OF WAR

The principles of war are the most fundamental form of doctrine. They
have evolved from the experience of previous wars and are designed
to provide a better understanding of combat operations. However, the
characteristics of wars have undergone significant changes due to the
considerable technological advances. These have led to changes in the
hitherto accepted principles and introduced a few new ones that reflect
the changing nature of warfare.
 Selection and Maintenance of Aim. This would be a combined
Politico-Military aim. In war, it is essential to identify an aim clearly
so as to provide a focus to all elements involved in warfare. Thereafter,
synchronised efforts must be made for its attainment. Since war is an
extension of state policy, military aims are based on political objectives.

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Further, multiple constraints including domestic pressures could

play an important role in defining the desired end state, especially in
asymmetric conflicts. The military aim should ensure maximum post
conflict advantage while being achievable. The aim must be decided
after due consideration of all politico-military factors and it should
be modified if there is a change in circumstances. All components of
national power should be focused towards attaining this aim.
 Intelligence. The key to air power is targeting and the key to
targeting is intelligence relating to the potential enemy’s intentions,
dispositions and the likely pattern of his operations. Intelligence is
vital for identifying the enemy’s crucial vulnerabilities, weaknesses
and strengths and his Centres of Gravity which in turn will help
in devising an effective strategy. A force needs precise intelligence
if it is to employ precision weapons. Intelligence also has a direct
bearing on the attainment of effect and managing change.
 Maintenance of Morale. Morale is a state of mind, but it is very
sensitive to material conditions. It remains high when it is based
on a clear understanding of the assigned task, periodic practical
training and discipline. It is especially responsive to good leadership
and effective leadership can sustain high morale even when all
other factors go against it. It is adversely affected by inferior or
inefficient equipment and poor administration. History shows
that success in battle is the best stimulant for morale. In the case
of asymmetric warfare, morale can play a significant role due to
the involvement of the civilian population. The factors important
for the maintenance of morale include dynamic leadership, sound
administration, discipline and the welfare of personnel.
 Offensive Action. In conventional wars, offensive action was
the prime means of seizing the initiative and establishing moral
ascendancy over the enemy. This entailed control over the purpose,
scope and intensity of operations while placing premium on early
action. In unconventional or sub-conventional conflict, the initiative
may not be with the state and pre-emptive action without proper

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intelligence may prove counterproductive. Hence, most states end

up reacting to situations rather than taking a pro-active approach.
However, the freedom to act at a place and time of one’s choosing
even while reacting to a scenario, would wrest the initiative from the
enemy at any level of conflict. In these circumstances, the emphasis
should be more on achieving and exploiting freedom of action
across all levels and dimensions of war as well as denial of the same
to the opponent. This would need accurate real time intelligence,
physical and information security, a sound and focused strategy,
technology savvy forces, effective deployment, synergy of effort,
prompt offensive action and sound logistics. The side that loses
freedom of action loses its ability to influence the conduct of war.
 Concentration of Force. Traditionally, success in war depended
on the ability to field forces superior to those of the enemy at a
particular time and place. However, modern concepts of warfare
look at systemic targeting and ensuring strategic paralysis rather
than the amassing of forces. It is better to concentrate decisive
fire power on crucial locations and vulnerabilities to achieve the
desired effect. Air power with its ability to circumvent the enemy’s
massed forces, coupled with superior technological capabilities that
go beyond visual range engagements and standoff weapons has
changed the focus from the earlier concept of concentrating mass
to concentrating fire power at the decisive point. Effects and not
mass lie at the heart of concentrating air power.
 Economy of Effort. Economy of effort is the principle of judiciously
employing available resources in warfare. However with the advent of
effects based operations, it may be more prudent to view this principle
as attainment of the desired effect. By shifting the focus to attainment
of effect rather than merely economising effort, the emphasis
shifts to the goal rather than the means. Further, economy of effort
automatically forms part of attainment of effect, because achieving
the desired outcome by causing functional paralysis is always more
economical than causing physical destruction of target systems.

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 Security. The physical protection of assets and information denial

is essential for all military operations since it enables friendly forces
to achieve their objectives despite enemy interference. Security of
key force multipliers such as Aerostats/AAR/AWACS would be
crucial for success in war. Adequate measures must be taken to
ensure their physical security on ground even against asymmetric
attacks. There is a need, therefore, to not only physically guard
these vital assets but also have electronic surveillance devices in
place to supplement physical surveillance both during peace and
in war.
 Deception and Surprise. Speed, reach and elevation endow air
power with a high degree of inherent surprise. Surprise plays
the greatest role in war, and its effect on morale is great. In some
operations, particularly when other factors are unfavourable,
surprise may prove essential to success. Surprise can be achieved
through a manoeuvre, or by exploiting a new doctrine and
technology. Its elements are secrecy, concealment, deception,
originality, audacity, timing and speed. Deception can be combined
with initiative and innovation to increase the element of surprise.
 Flexibility and Managing Change. Armed forces should be able
to adapt themselves to change. This could be termed as “Managing
Change” and goes beyond flexibility and can also be achieved by
flexibility in employing combat power. The change could occur in
the various dimensions of war – land, sea and air – and also at the
various levels of warfare – tactical, operational or strategic. The
purpose should be to derive maximum advantage from the altered
circumstances. It would require initiative, mobility and flexibility
to be encompassed into one philosophy. Air power best exemplifies
these attributes because it can be switched from one theatre or area
of operations to the other, from one target to the other or from one
role to the other.
 Synergy, Synchronisation and Cooperation. Modern wars
demand the joint and synchronised application of force by all

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elements of national power for achievement of national objectives.

This is even more valid in limited wars/asymmetric conflicts where
limitations of time, space or method demand synergy of effort. In
the future, there is a likelihood of large and varied forces including
non-military elements being employed; hence unity of command
may not be feasible at all times. It is here that coordination and
cooperation between different agencies becomes the guiding
principle. Joint planning, training, a clear perspective about
the functioning of the other services and the establishment of
supportive organisations will be essential to ensure synergy. This
would also enhance survivability.
 Generation & Sustenance of Favourable Asymmetry. The
increase in battle space transparency may reduce the impact of
surprise at all levels of wars. Therefore, the emphasis now has to
be, not only on, catching the enemy off guard but also on keeping
him off balance. This would require generating asymmetry at the
desired time and place, for wresting significant combat advantage.
The methods employed include generating surprise in terms of
time, space and force, a favourable differential in technology and
weapon systems at the decisive point, exploiting sound operational
art, formulating effective and synergistic strategy and maintaining
information superiority.
 Administration. A sound administration and responsive logistics
are a pre-requisite for success in military operations. A disregard
of sound logistics has led to failure in wars on numerous occasions
in the past. Sustainability is the ability of a force to maintain the
necessary fighting power during the time needed to achieve
military objectives. The physical and moral sustenance of
personnel, the maintenance and repair of equipment and aircraft,
the provision of combat supplies and expendable commodities
and the treatment, evacuation and replacement of casualties are
all aspects of sustainability.

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CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR POWER

Air power exploits the vertical dimension and its nature is a function
of the physical attributes of this dimension. The vertical dimension
is exploited not only as a medium of transit, but also for manoeuvre,
concealment, surprise and a host of other factors. An understanding
of the distinct characteristics and limitations of the vertical dimension
is essential to enable optimal exploitation of air power. These distinct
physical attributes make for the distinct characteristics of air power.
The core characteristics of air power are speed, flexibility, reach and
elevation. These attributes are shared with the space environment, but
in a different way, and on an entirely different scale; consequently, the
unique features of space power are dealt with separately. These core
characteristics make up the larger sub-set of characteristics which are
as follows:
 Flexibility & Versatility. The first set of characteristics of air
power can be placed under the heading of flexibility and versatility.
Flexibility consists of the ability to use combat power in ways suited
to the situation while versatility implies that the same weapons
platform can be used for a variety of missions. For example, a
modern multi-role combat aircraft like the SU-30 MKI can be used
for almost all roles that are assigned to modern fighter aircraft.
Similarly, most modern transport aircraft like the C-130 J Hercules
and helicopters like the Mi-17 V5 are designed as multi-role
platforms. Flexibility and versatility have a special relevance for the
IAF as aircraft and equipment costs are rising exponentially, and
there is need to extract the maximum value for taxpayers’ money.
In short, the IAF cannot afford to operate aircraft, which can only
be employed at one level of conflict or for one type of role.
 Mobility. The unique ability of aircraft to manoeuvre freely and
swiftly in three dimensions gives them the speed and the range to
apply military power where needed over a very large area. Mobility
has particular relevance in joint operations where forces need to be
moved and re-supplied at short notice within and between theatres.

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In many circumstances aircraft will be the only means of reacting

in the time available.
 Responsiveness. Associated with flexibility and mobility is the
characteristic of responsiveness. In a crisis, the use of air power will
normally be the option most readily available and usable by the
government. Air power can be used to demonstrate national resolve
quickly by deployment, or heightened states of readiness, and it is
the most readily available means for demonstrating combat power.
Air forces can also be used to establish and maintain a military
presence as an extension of diplomacy.
 Shock Effect. It is an effect that goes beyond mere surprise; it is an
effect which can induce confusion and psychological disorientation.
It is created by the aircraft’s ability to concentrate fire power and
deliver it with little or no warning. The shock effect of air power
has been enhanced greatly with the development of air launched
Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) and other specialist weapons.
 Concentration. The flexibility and responsiveness of air power
allows a commander to concentrate force. This is of vital importance
especially in a fluid tactical situation. The shock effect inherent in air
power is the product of its capacity to be concentrated in time and
space. However, the capacity to concentrate force can be dissipated
by inefficient command and control arrangements, inappropriate
division of responsibilities or dilution of core competencies. It
takes intelligence and sound judgment to determine where to
strike and the quantum of force to be used. If leveraged properly,
air power offers national leaders and military commanders the
capability to concentrate power in very effective ways. Historically,
concentration refers most obviously to offensive power, but it is not
limited to that. Apart from concentrating the offensive power of
strike aircraft, air power can be used, for example, to deliver land
forces in a concentrated form to the point on the battlefield where
they can have the maximum effect. The ability to move swiftly, to
concentrate and to descend from out of the blue gives the advantage

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of shock to air-landed or airborne troops. Concentration is also

applicable to large volumes of relief that can be delivered in disaster
and humanitarian relief contingencies. This ability to concentrate
quickly is the characteristic which must be exploited fully if air
power is to be used to its maximum potential, both as a tool for
force projection and nation building.
 Offensive Action. Only air forces have the ability to carry
offensive action deep into enemy territory while operating from
secure bases. Defensive action may prevent defeat, but wars can
be won only by offensive action. This principle of war, which
is also the central characteristic of air power, is often neglected
or overlooked by policy-makers unversed in the application of
military power. Offensive capability provides the best defence.
It changes one’s stance from reactive to active and allows one to
seize and hold the initiative in operations. The potential to apply
air power offensively is a positive contribution to deterrence. It
forces a potential aggressor to look at his own vulnerabilities and
divert resources to their defence. The effectiveness of deterrence
depends on the perception of the potential enemy regarding the
likelihood of success in relation to the costs and penalties he will
incur. Air power, with its inherently offensive characteristic can
raise the costs, and impose penalties that would be unacceptable to
the potential aggressor. Combined together, the core characteristics
of air power coupled with modern space enabled communication
systems, sensors; precision positioning and navigation capabilities
offer tremendous capabilities that can decisively influence both the
strategic and operational environment.
 Reach. The medium of air and the continuum of space does not
hinder the employment of air power. Isolated and distant targets in
difficult terrain do not prevent engagement of such targets from the
third dimension. Modern technology has matured to such an extent
that air power has unparalleled reach, and if exploited correctly,
will provide a tremendous advantage to the side exploiting it.

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LIMITATIONS OF AIR POWER

Like its strengths, air power has its limitations too. These limitations are
relative rather than absolute and need to be understood as such. Some
of these limitations are highlighted below and will enable a holistic
understanding of air power.
 Sustainability. The sustainability of air forces is frequently limited by
logistics, particularly in the case of technology intensive platforms.
This could prove critical in a long drawn-out war. Air forces
consume large amounts of resources; infrastructure demands are
extensive and expensive, and the training takes considerable time.
Sustainability becomes critical when air operations are prosecuted
well beyond national boundaries in expeditionary operations, the
likes of which have been undertaken by the US and its coalition
partners in Iraq and Afghanistan.
 Base Dependency. Air power operates most effectively from
permanent bases, although rotary wing aircraft can operate away
from fixed facilities. This dependence on a large supporting
infrastructure is a negative feature of air power. It results in air
power assets becoming concentrated at readily identifiable points
where they are vulnerable to attack. This dependence can also limit
the effectiveness of air power in a particular area if suitable airfields
are not available. The ability of aircraft to operate from short and
unprepared landing strips derives its strength from this limitation.
 Sensitivity to Technology. Air power is a product of technology
and because of this it tends to be more sensitive to technological
changes than the other two services. Even minor technological
innovations can have a major impact on air power effectiveness.
 Vulnerability. Air power assets are necessarily concentrated at
bases owing to their infrastructural requirements. Besides being
vulnerable in the air, they are high value targets when on the ground.
Protective measures such as Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS), can
reduce their vulnerability. However, by their very nature aircraft
are fragile and even comparatively low grade battle damage can

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have catastrophic effects. This limits the extent to which they can
be exposed to the risk of enemy fire.
 Impermanency. This limitation relates to air power’s inability to
hold ground. As such, air power is an impermanent form of military
force. The effects it creates are transient, and to sustain those effects,
operations have to be repeated or complemented by other arms of
military power.
 Political Constraints. The limitations of air power’s relevance,
especially in sub-conventional contingencies, lie not in its
capabilities, but in the political will to use these capabilities. Political
constraints on the use of air power can only curtail its effectiveness
and make it counterproductive. Managing perceptions regarding
the effectiveness of air power in diverse situations is key for shaping
political opinion on the employment of air power, particularly in
the sub-conventional domain.
 Weather. Notwithstanding the technical advances that facilitate
24x7 operations, air power continues to be more affected by weather
compared to land and maritime power.

SOURCES OF AIR POWER

Air power is a derivative as also an indicator of national power. The
ability of a nation to utilise all air power resources at its disposal
determines its air power capabilities. Air power, hence, is the sum total
of a nation’s aviation and related capabilities. It comprises national
aviation assets usually described as air forces, air arms and civil aviation,
along with their associated organisations, infrastructure, logistics and
personnel. The use of space, either independently or in support of air
power, is on the rise and consequently the term ‘aerospace power’ is
coming increasingly into vogue. The different sources of air power are
as follows:
 Air Force. This is the traditional term for the independent military
force that delivers air power. The capabilities of air forces reflect
national perspectives, priorities and strategic needs. It is only the air

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 principles of war and the nature of air power

forces, that are capable of employing air power to prosecute all the
air campaigns, and this is reflected in their structure, technology,
organisation, training and infrastructure. It is this that sets an air
force apart from an air arm.
 Air Arm. In exceptional cases, an air arm is an organic component
of armies, navies and para military forces, and provides a capability
that is not inherent in other elements of that surface force. However,
this arm would be in support of the tactical objectives of the surface
force unlike the objectives of the air force that are strategic in
nature. Air arms also tend to be much smaller than air forces. As a
result, they are not capable of prosecuting all the air campaigns. An
exception to this is the US which maintains large air arms integral
to its naval and land forces.
 Civil Air Resources. Civil aircraft and infrastructure also
contribute to a nation’s air power. They augment airlift capabilities
and if suitably modified, could also be used for combat support
operations.
 Space. The acquisition, exchange and exploitation of information
in the modern world have been revolutionised by the onset of the
space age. An important aspect of modern air power is that it is
really an ‘air and space power’. The demarcation between ‘air’ and
‘space’ is becoming increasingly irrelevant, and a modern air force
must be prepared to operate seamlessly in both elements. An air
force that can tap into space based assets can dramatically improve
its ability to prosecute a war quickly and with minimal risk.

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 4
Air Power Doctrine
and the IAF
A doctrine of war consists in a common way of objectively approaching
the subject; second, in a common way of handling it.
— Ferdinand Foch: Precepts. 1919

‘Doctrine’ is derived from the Latin ‘doctrina’ and signifies a code

of beliefs or a body of teachings. In military terms, doctrine refers
to the central beliefs that enable an organisation to optimally fulfil
its national obligations. Air power doctrine refers to the central
beliefs and principles of the IAF that guide the employment of air
power in the furtherance of national objectives. These beliefs have
been acquired from the study and analysis of experiences in conflicts
and crises, as well as field exercises, equipment tests etc in peace
time. Where experience is lacking, the IAF in its collective wisdom
analyses the theory and postulates action. Thus a doctrine is a guide
to the “best way to conduct Air Force affairs”

IMPORTANCE OF DOCTRINE
The national strategy is determined by the Union Cabinet and is
based on the National Security Policy. Its purpose is to combine
all components of national power, political, diplomatic, economic,
military, technological, informational, social and cultural, to

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 basic doctrine of the indian air force

safeguard national interests and achieve national security objectives.

The national strategy entails the coordinated employment of all
elements of national power. The doctrine offers precepts for the
development and employment of national power. For example,
India’s nuclear doctrine as operationalised by the CCS note of
January 4, 2003, guides the national strategy. The joint military
strategy decides the development and employment of military power,
along with the respective land, maritime and air strategies. Military
doctrine provides the conceptual framework for the role, scope and
application of military power and underpins the formulation of
military strategy.

LEVELS OF DOCTRINE
Apex doctrines relating to national security and military power,
offer precepts for the development and employment of power at the
strategic, operational and tactical levels. Accordingly, doctrines have
distinct levels that broadly correspond with the levels of war fighting,
viz. strategic, operational and tactical.
Strategic Level: This doctrine enunciates the fundamental and
enduring principles which guide the use of air forces during war
and crises. It establishes the framework for the effective use of air
power. For example, the tenet that: ‘control of air becomes a pre-
requisite for effectiveness of all military activities’ is an enduring
principle.
Operational Level: This translates the principles of the basic doctrine
into military action by prescribing the proper use of the air forces on
the basis of: distinct objectives, force capabilities, broad mission areas
and operational environments. An example of an operational doctrine
in consonance with strategic doctrine could be: ‘AOC-in-C employing
his air force in counter air operations by orchestrating a variety of roles
to achieve control of the air’.
Tactical Level: This converts basic and operational doctrine by
delineating the proper use of specific weapon systems to accomplish

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 air power doctrine and the iaf

detailed objectives. Tactical doctrine prescribes how roles and tasks are
to be carried out and is usually published in manuals such as those
brought out by the Tactics and Air Combat Development Establishment
(TACDE). For example if Mirage-2000 aircraft are flying escort to an
airfield attack package, then tactical doctrine would indicate how the
Mirage 2000s would be integrated and co-ordinated within the force
package.

THE DOCTRINAL LOOP

A doctrine is formulated on the basis of inputs. The output would
then provide the framework within which viable military capability
can be developed. These capabilities would require validation through
peace-time exercises or war experiences so that the feedback could be
employed to refine the doctrine further. The doctrinal loop is pictorially
depicted below.

Doctrine

Inputs Military Capability Outputs

Organisation
National Military Objectives Feed Back Force structure
Perceived Threats
Combat Experiences Training Plans
Lessons of War
Training results Capabilities
Exercises

Fig. 1: The Doctrine Loop

DOCTRINE AND TECHNOLOGY

Doctrine is derived from the past and developed in the present for
application in the future. Its true benefit is not what it tells us about
the past, but what it suggests about the future. The doctrinal process
therefore should analyse and influence the course of new and developing

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 basic doctrine of the indian air force

technologies. In the Indian context, it may not always be possible

for doctrine to drive technology due to resource and technological
constraints. Instead, doctrine may be limited to playing an interactive
role with technology. As such, our doctrine must be receptive to the
potential advantages that new technologies have to offer. India has
taken many strides in exploiting the new technologies for defence
applications. An example of technology driving doctrine is the evolution
of net centric warfare. Doctrine evolves post the absorption of such
technological developments.

DOCTRINE AND FORCE STRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

Doctrine is an important element in the development of future force
structures and capability requirements. Although force structures keep
changing they also exhibit enormous inertia and must be given the right
direction and impetus. The guiding influence of doctrine in relation to
force structure and capabilities can best be illustrated by an example. A
decision on whether or not to acquire Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)
will depend on a host of factors that include cost, maintainability,
operational characteristics and doctrine. The impact of doctrine on
this decision is not to select a particular type of RPA or the numbers
to be acquired, but to determine the applicability of this technology or
capability to the employment of air power. The doctrinal argument in
favour of its acquisition may proceed along the following lines:
In isolation, the RPA is neither an offensive weapon system like
an aircraft, nor a defensive weapon system like a SAM. The key to
its usefulness, however, is in the opportunities that the RPA offers to
other offensive weapon systems with its ability to provide real time
reconnaissance and intelligence that is so vital for targeting and making
the battlefield transparent. In addition, the use of RPAs for Battle
Damage Assessment would make air power more responsive and make
it unnecessary to risk manned aircraft for the same purpose.
The doctrinal argument thus supports the procurement of RPA
technology.

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 air power doctrine and the iaf

SUMMARY
This chapter highlights the following:
 Military doctrine could be defined as “a set of fundamental
principles by which military forces direct their actions in the quest
of national objectives”.
 Air power doctrine enunciates the “fundamental principles that
guide the employment of air power elements to achieve national
objectives”. It is a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs, war
fighting principles and terminology that determines and directs the
correct use of air forces in military operations.
 An air force doctrine determines the manner in which air forces
organise, train, equip, fight and sustain their forces.
 Doctrine is authoritative but its application requires judgment.

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 5
Structure of Air Power

Air Forces are defeated or weakened at least as much by their internal

illusions as by the enemy. The minute that, readiness data ceases to
be realistic; training is cut back or separated from realistic combat
conditions; effectiveness is exaggerated; equipment performance and
lethality are overstated; gaps in training and doctrine are ignored;
and an Air Force becomes a bureaucracy rather than a ruthlessly self
–critical fighting machine; an Air Force places itself in the position when
it must try to carry out in war the preparation it should have carried
out in peacetime.
— Anthony Cordesman

AIR STRATEGY
Air strategy could be termed as the process of coordinating the
development, deployment and employment of air power assets to achieve
national security objectives. Air power with its intrinsic characteristics
of speed, elevation and reach provides tremendous strategic options.
These strategies are then prosecuted by air campaigns which comprise
of a variety of air operations.
As aerial warfare evolved and the importance of command of
the air grew, a distinctive strategic area for application for air power
emerged. This involved operations to deter, contain or defeat the
enemy’s air power, a strategy which came to be termed as “counter
air”. Air forces can also be employed both independently of, and in

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co-ordination with the surface forces to attack vital target systems.

Historically, the purpose of an independent strategy was to weaken
the enemy’s ability to wage war and degrade his will to resist by
attacking his sources of power. In contrast, the purpose of the co-
ordinated strategy was to help friendly surface forces contain or
defeat the enemy’s land and naval forces. The operations mounted
to prosecute the independent strategy came to be known as the
“strategic bombing campaign”, while those mounted to prosecute
the auxiliary strategy were termed “tactical air support”, or more
recently as a “counter surface force campaign”. Counter air, strategic
air and counter surface force operations are the three elements of
air strategy. Historically, the choice between these three strategies
has tended to be one of emphasis rather than on their employment
in isolation. In most recent conflicts, air forces have undertaken to
prosecute all the three air strategies simultaneously, although the
resources devoted to each have varied considerably. Therefore, air
strategy would encompass all these options.

IAF’s Air Strategy

Counter Air Counter Surface Strategic Air

Campaign Force Campaign Campaign

Combat Enabling Operations

Fig. 1: Air Strategy

AIR CAMPAIGNS
Since each of these strategies is meant to achieve a specific aim, and
does so by using distinct methods, its prosecution requires a dedicated
“campaign”. Hence, an air commander may have to wage three distinct
but interdependent air campaigns in pursuit of his chosen air strategy.
The sheer flexibility and versatility of modern aerial platforms and

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 structure of air power

weapons allow a commander to conduct parallel operations by

prosecuting all campaigns simultaneously.
A definite order for the employment of air power can be discerned
in each air campaign. For example, the counter air campaign comprises
two basic air operations; Offensive Counter Air (OCA) and Defensive
Counter Air (DCA) better known in the IAF as Air Defence (AD).
Similarly, the strategic air campaign consists of conventional and nuclear
operations, and the counter surface force campaign consists of air land and
maritime air operations. An additional example would be air mobility
operations that would form part of the combat enabling operations.
Normally, control of the air should be the first priority for air forces.
This permits own air and surface forces to operate more effectively and
denies the same to the enemy. The required degree of control is achieved
through counter air operations. Thereafter, the air commander can deliver
combat power when and where needed, to attain military objectives at any
level of war. This he does by conducting strategic air and counter surface
force campaigns. All the air campaigns can be conducted independently,
parallel with, or in support of surface operations. A description of the
various air campaigns, as well as of the combat support operations is given
below:

Air Strategy

Counter Counter Surface Strategic Combat Enabling

Air Campaign Force Campaign Air Campaign Operations

Offensive Air Defence Air Land Maritime

Air Ground
Counter Ops Ops Air Ops
Air Ops
Conventional
Nuclear Ops
Ops

Strategic Political Psychological

Bombing Signalling Operations

Fig. 2: Air Campaigns and Support Operations

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 basic doctrine of the indian air force

OPERATIONAL ART
Operational strategy employs the forces earmarked for the military/
air campaigns. It can be defined as the art and science of planning,
orchestrating and directing military/air campaigns within a theatre to
achieve national security objectives. A campaign consists of a series
of related major operations, each of which may involve a number of
battles, which together seek to achieve a particular objective. Within a
campaign the capabilities of various forces must be combined to achieve
synergy and on a broader scale, separate campaigns must be combined
harmoniously to achieve war objectives. Whilst the air strategy is
developed at the Air HQ, the operational art for employing air power is
evolved at IAF Command HQs. For successful execution of operational
art a commander must have:
 An awareness of the national security environment and the political
aims
 A clear grasp of the military aim and the strategy
 Technological awareness

 An understanding of civil military affairs and media management.

TACTICS
Tactics are the art and science of employing forces at the battlefield. The
difference between tactics and higher levels of strategy is that tactics are
employed on the battlefield while operational strategy brings the forces
to the battlefield. Modern wars necessitate that tactics must keep pace
with advancements in technology and weapons. Failure to do so could
prove to be devastating, especially for the air forces. Tactics should be
designed to exploit the capabilities of equipment and weapon systems
to enhance effectiveness and reduce vulnerabilities. However, in some
circumstances, equipment may need to be adapted to fulfil tactical
requirements. Innovative and unpredictable tactics will always produce
positive results.

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 structure of air power

INTER-RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN AIR CAMPAIGNS

Each air campaign includes conduct of specific air operations,
which encompass various tactical level air power functions or “roles”.
These not only include combat roles but also combat enabling roles.
For example, the combat roles needed to prosecute OCA include
suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), airfield attacks, fighter
sweeps and escorts. To be fully effective these missions need to be
enabled by electronic warfare assets, surveillance and reconnaissance
information, airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), air-
to-air refuelling (AAR) and at times air transport support. Also
necessary, are a sound command, control, communications and
intelligence system, ground defences, maintenance, logistics and
administrative support.
Combat roles tend to be specific to a particular air operation,
combat enabling air roles can apply to many, if not, to all air operations,
while ground support activities apply to all air operations.
The air power roles are accomplished through a series of tasks,
which involve a number of missions and each mission may involve
one or more sorties. For example as part of air strategy, we would
execute a counter air campaign, involving OCA operations by
aircraft in SEAD role which could be tasked to target high power
radar inside the enemy territory. To accomplish this task, a mission
of strike aircraft (with appropriate force packaging) undertaking a
number of sorties would be planned. The structure of air power is
as follows:

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 basic doctrine of the indian air force

THE STRUCTURE OF AIR POWER AND

ITS INTER-RELATIONSHIPS

Air Power Characteristics

Air Power Doctrine

Air Strategy

Air Campaigns

Air Operations

Roles

Tasks

Missions

Sorties

Fig. 3: The Structure of Air Power

AIR CAMPAIGNS AND ENABLING FUNCTIONS

The relevance of the various air campaigns and enabling functions can
be better understood by viewing air power employment in its four basic
functions. These are:
 Control of the Air. This is achieved by a dedicated counter air
campaign through offensive counter air and defensive counter air
or air defence operations. Their objective is to gain and maintain
the required degree of control of air so as to permit effective
employment of all facets of air and surface power.
 Application of Combat Power. This is achieved through strategic
air and counter surface force campaigns. Here, combat power is
applied against surface targets and does not include the targets that
are specific to the counter air campaign. Typical roles for air land

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 structure of air power

operations are air interdiction, battlefield air interdiction, battlefield

air strike, tactical recce, search and strikes while anti shipping and
maritime air strikes are undertaken by the maritime air arm.
 Enhancing Combat Power. The air power roles contributing to
enhancement of combat power increase the mobility, lethality,
accuracy, survivability or flexibility of air and surface forces. This
is achieved by combat enabling air operations and air mobility
operations. Combat enabling air operations include airborne
assault, special air operations, special heliborne operations, air-to-
air refuelling, electronic warfare, surveillance and reconnaissance,
airborne early warning and search and rescue. Combat enabling
air operations also involve testing and evaluation and research and
development.
 Sustaining Combat Power. If air operations are to be successful
they need to be sustained and supported by combat enabling ground
operations. Runway rehabilitation, CBRN defence, ground defence,
passive air defence (including camouflage and concealment),
training, administration and HRD are some examples of these.

ROLES
The exact role that an air force will play would depend on the nature of
the threat, resources available and the unique nature of the campaign.
Usually, roles envisaged for the air force are as follows:
 Defence of national and island territories, against attacks from air
and space both during peace and war.
 Deterring an aggressor from carrying out hostile acts and if
deterrence fails to mount an effective response.
 During operations, achieve control of the air to the required degree
to provide full freedom of action to the air and surface forces.
 Applying direct pressure on the enemy’s power of resistance by
attacking his crucial centres of gravity.
 Synergising the combat potential of air power with that of the
surface forces to achieve joint military aims and objectives.

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 basic doctrine of the indian air force

 Deploying and employing forces to protect and project the national

interests in any out of country contingency operation.
 Assisting the government in disaster management or humanitarian
relief tasks.
 Executing counter terrorism and counter insurgency operations.
 Fulfilling international commitments requiring air power assets,
consistent with our national policies and interests.
 Providing viable second-strike capability in case of a nuclear
attack.

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 6
The Air Campaigns

THE COUNTER AIR CAMPAIGN

THE COUNTER SURFACE FORCE CAMPAIGN
THE STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGN

SECTION I

THE COUNTER AIR CAMPAIGN

Any one who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons against
an enemy who has complete control of air, fights like a savage, under the
same handicaps and with the same chances of success.
— Field Marshal Rommel

INTRODUCTION
With the increase in the effectiveness of air power, the need to contain
the enemy’s air power also increased significantly. As early as in World
War I, air power was used in airfield attacks, air to air combat and
offensive sweeps to seek and destroy enemy aircraft in the air as well
as on the ground, so as to achieve control of air. During World War II,
the need for a dedicated counter air campaign was realised not only for
the success of air operations, but virtually for all types of surface and
sub-surface operations. Various campaigns e.g. the Arab-Israeli war in

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 basic doctrine of the indian air force

1967 and the India-Pakistan conflict of 1971 highlighted the successes

achieved due to control of the air.

AIM OF THE COUNTER AIR CAMPAIGN

The aim of the counter air campaign is to achieve and maintain the
necessary degree of control of air. These operations are directed against
the enemy’s air power either in air or on ground with the objective
of preventing the enemy from using his air power effectively against
friendly forces, yet permitting own use of air power against him.

DEGREES OF CONTROL OF THE AIR

The three classical degrees of control of air are:
 Air Supremacy. Air supremacy exists, if the enemy air power
has been incapacitated to the extent that it is incapable of any air
interference. This is characterised as: firstly, not being limited by
time and space and secondly, being representative of the highest
degree of ‘control of air.’
 Air Superiority. Air superiority can be defined as a high degree
of dominance in air, which permits the conduct of land, sea
and air operations at a given time and place without prohibitive
interference from the enemy air force. This condition is said to exist
when, firstly, aircraft of all types can operate in all types of roles at a
given time and place without serious interference from the enemy
and secondly, it can limit the enemy’s air operations. Further, this
provides the additional advantage of information superiority due
to own ability to execute desired reconnaissance missions, while
preventing the enemy from doing so.
 Favourable Air Situation (FAS). FAS is limited by time and space
to a much greater extent and it assures a lower degree of control
of the air. Therefore, a higher degree of enemy air interference can
be expected. The level of control of air is such that it enables the
exercise of specific capabilities or conduct specific operations. An
example of FAS is when one acquires just the required degree of

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