National Transportation Safety Board ACCIDENT FILE CONTENTS: Transporation Mode UL AVIATION G aicuway O prretine 7 INTERMODAL 0 MARINE OO rattroad New Orleans, Loulstana Boeing 737-300, N75356 ~*~ TDENTINICATION OF ACCIOENT FTW 88-3f-A109 Accident File Contents, NTSB Form 6120.3 Factual Report, Aviation, NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement E Supplement F Supplement R Supplement Supplement T Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1/2 4.) Operations Group Chairman’s Factual Report Powerplant Group Chairman’s Factual Report FDR Group Chairman’s Factual Report CVR Specialist’s Factual Report ATC Group Chairman’s Factual Report Weather Group Chairman’s Factual Report 10.| Weather - ATC Radar Data Study Crew Interviews Landing Area Diagram Levee Diagram CFMI/Boeing CVR Frequency Analysis General Electric Technical Report 16.| General Electric Metallurical Report 17.) General Electric Materials Report 18] Aviat] Engineering Labortory Report 12 PAGE___oi PAGES| NTSB TIE NO 05/24/88 G-10-40 N nem , ee DESCRIPTION GF ITEM Doc | BW JootoR PHOTO] PHOTO} 29 12 13 u uM TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGESNAT@AL TRANSPORTATION SAFE.Y BOARD eae ACCIDENT FILE CONTENTS 2_OF_2_ PAGES [ERANSPORTATION MODE [x] avzaTToN [ ] HIGHWAY [ ] PIPELINE | NTSB FILE NO. ] MARINE [ ] RAILROAD { J xnTeRwopan [ IDENTIFICATION OF ACCIDENT New Orleans, Louisiana Boeing 737-300, N75356 05/24/88 FTW 88-2-A109 DESCRIPTION OF ITEM + Fuel Analysis Report Statement ox Party Representatives 21.] Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 3 22.{ Photographs (14 - 12 with Negatives) 7 Dispatch DocumentsFactual Report, Aviation, NTSB Form 6120.4FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION ACCIDENT/iNCIDENT National Transportation Safety Board ‘Washington, D.C. 20594NTSB Form 6120.4 Instructions Unless otherwise stated in the instructions or on the form, all date fields must be completed. Each data field requires either @ direct entry or ‘the entry of one or more x's in appropriate blocks that best describe the mishap circumstances. Multiple entry fields may require two or more responses. Enter all applicable responses in multiple entry fields. When the selections offered are inappropriate, a two digit "other" code shall be entered in the space that follows the word “other.” Do not make additional remarks in the margins as the automated data processor is not programmed to accept them. Any information which is needed to outline the sequence of events which preceded the oc::urrenee, to support probable cause determination or which is pertinent to crashworthi- ness studies should be addressed in the narrative report. "Other" Codes o1 Limited access to and/or limited time available at site. 02 Aireraft not recovered/missing. 03 Part/eomponent not recovered/not located. 04 Aircraft too badly damaged to determine. 05 Part/component too badly damaged to determine. 06 Information not pertinent to accident/incident. 07 Applicable personnel could not provide information or information not available to applicable personnel. 08 Applicable personnel would not provide information. 09 Not installed. 10 Records not located/not available. uw Information not entered on NTSB Form 6120.1. 12 See narrative report. ‘Supplements The following accident scenarios are provided to assist investigators in selecting the report forms which should supplement the basie NTSB Form 6120 4. lL A Cessna 172 collided with a snowbank during landing goaround at an airport. Weather was not a factor. The pilot said there was no powerplant or control malfunction. The pilot and one passenger received minor injuries. The pilot had recently been certificated as a private pilot. Complete supplemental forms F (Training and Proficiency), @ (Airport) and $ (Occupant list). A "Limited" investigation should be completed, 2. A PA~31, being operated by two pilots under FAR 135, crashed into a tower while being vectored to intercept the localizer at the destination airport. ‘The PA-31 struck the tower while being operated at an assigned altitude. Flight was in IMC. There were two fatal injuries and three serious injuries. CER personnel responded and treated the injured. ‘This accident requires an onscene investigation. Thus supplement A (Wreckage documentation), B (Cockpit documentation) and I (Crash kinematics) are required. Supple- ments E (Second pilot), F (Training and Proficiency) and U ere required because of the two pilot FAR 135 operation (even though proficiency may not be at issue). S is needed to list the occupants; T, to document the CFR activity and P, to cover the possible ATC involvement. R (Meteorology) is required to document the weather conditions. Copies of supplements K and L would be required to document injury/toxicology and seat/restraint damage information, respectively. YT NTSB AceidenUinehdent Womber National Transportation Safety Board FITIW1818 FACTUAL REPORT a Tile AVIATION 10 Jacewent | a x]urse 21 Xjineisen | 2[_JRAR Delepetes a a For cotision berween | © AVETaR Regisvaton Number [7 Fight Number auctat enter reg. no — N75356 + omer and tt no fo other avreratt A omer 96 | [i WearesiGnyrace B Buaie 90 Zip Coa Fats hambers ony | WY Resident Se Evan New Orleans LA 79189 a 12 Date of Accident os form Ov) | 1 Day ot Week Fvaicletuay ] 14 Laval Teme Tia ho clon | ¥6 Time Zone 95/24/88 Tu 1255 cor 16 Noralive Statement of Facts, Conditions and Circumalances Pertinent tothe Accidenlincident HISTORY OF FLIGHT On May 24, 1988, at 1255 central daylight time, a Boeing 737-300, N75356, landed safely, gear down, during a forced landing on a flood control levee in New Orleans, Louisiana, following a loss of power on both engines as the airplane was descending through 16,500 feet. The dual engine flameout occurred as the airplane encountered moderate turbulence, lightning, and heavy rain associated with a Video Integrator Processor (VIP) level 4 imbedded thunderstorm. The airplane, owned by Polaris Aircraft Leasing, being operated by TACA International Airlines, S.A. 2% TACA flight 110, and flown by a professional crew, had departed Belize City, Belize at, 1055 CDT, on a 14 CFR Part 129 scheduled international air carrisr flight. An IFR flight plan was filed and in effect and VMC conditions prevailed at the time of the landing, however, IMC conditions prevailed at the time of the power loss. None of the 3 flight crew members, 4 flight attendants or 38 Passengers were injured during the incident or the subsequent evacuation. The flight from Belize City was uneventful until its arrival in the New Orleans terminal area. The crew stated that they observed thunderstorms on their weather radar and requested vectors around the heaviest weather. The TRACON controller, who also observed the thunderstorms, indicated that the flight should deviate to the right, which the crew did. As they began their descent from flight level (FL) 350, the crew noted green and yellow returns on the radar with some isolated red cells to the left and right of their intended flight path. Prior to entering the clouds at 30,000 feet, the captain selected the engine ignition to Continuous and activated the engine anti-ice to both engines. The descent. was flown with the flight management system configured for LNAV and VNAV with the autothrottles engaged. The crew flew the airplane in solid IFR conditions from 30,000 feet until they broke out at about 3,000 feet. ‘Additional Persons Participating in this Accident/ncident Investigation (Name, adavess,allvaion. Contnue on page 2 necessary] Mr. John Abel John G. Young - NTSB Thomas Jacky - NTSB FAA SW-FSDO-BTR Allen E. Lebo - NTSB Jeffrey Gorney - NTSB Baton Rouge, LA James C. McLean - NTSB James R. Cash - NTSB Laura Levy - NTSB Dennis Grossi - NTSB Investigated By: 7 Date (Nos ford.) | 18 Agency wisp 09/07/90 Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Warren V. Wandel NTSB Form 6120.4 nev +30)NTSB Accidenl/Incident Wumber National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION ! FITIWUSS]TfaApipoys ST TO ELE ALEL LAL 11 According to the crew, they encountered heavy rain, hail, and moderate turbulence while descending at the turbulence penetration speed of 280 knots. At about 16,500 feet, both engines lost power and radar. contact was lost by the New Orleans Approach controller. The loss of radar contact occurred at 1243:41 CDT. Following the power loss, the captain instructed the first officer to handle the radios and assist the observer captain, riding in the jump seat, whom the captain had instructed to attempt to restart the engines. While the observer captain and the first officer started the APU and reestablished electrical power, the captain flew the airplane using the standby attitude indicator, altimeter, and the magnetic compass and turned toward the northeast in order to exit the area of heavy weather. The crew was able to establish APU and electrical power to the airplane at 1246:51 while it was descending through 10,600 feet. At that time the crew issued a Mayday call to New Orleans TRACON stating that they needed to get out of the weather and that they had no engine power. During the descent, the observer captain attempted windmilling restart procedures on both ergines without success and at least one starter assisted attempt on each engine. The starter assisted starts were successful in lighting off both engines, however, neither would accelerate above idle and the exhaust gas temperatures went above the limits, causing the EGT lights to illuminate. The captain ordered that the engines be secured fearing that the over temperature conditions would prove catastrophic. and aggravate the situation. At that point the airplane had descended into visual meteorological conditions in scattered clouds and rain between 2,000 and 3,000 feet and the crew had resigned themselves to a two engine out forced landing. The captain later Stated that he initially considered a 360° turn over Lake Borgne and ditching the airplane there, but he then sighted the Intercoastal Waterway and elected to ditch in it, as there were industrial complexes on either side and help would be much closer. Shortly thereafter, the first officer noticed a grassy area north of the waterway and pointed it out to the captain. The captain ordered the landing gear extended and called for full flaps. Using speed brakes and side slipping the airplane, the captain crossed over the vertical part of the embankment at the east end of the Tevee and touched down about 800 feet later. He then deployed ground spoilers, speed brakes and used the wheel brakes to stop the airplane about 2,500 feet from the initial touchdown point. The flight attendants were instructed to begin an inmediate evacuation. Following the successful evacuation, the captain returned to the airplane and secured all electrical power about 5 minutes after the airplane had come to rest. INJURIES TO PERSONS None of the 45 occupants were injured during the incident or the subsequent evacuation. One of the passengers was recovering from an appendix operation which ‘Attach adivons! papes at recessery /Page 24 2b 26.01.) NTSB Form 6120.4 (fev, 1-65) Page?[NTSB Accidenvincioent Number ‘National Transportation Satety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION Fy Ty My 8) 8) Ty Ay ty 9 9 6 Naraive Statement of Fac, Condiions and Circumstances Perinant to Bre ACSG®AUINCGSR TeSaivea} she had two days before the flight and another suffered from a cardiac condition and high blood pressure. Both were taken to area hospitals for observation, but were released later that evening. {CRAFT The airplane received minor damage as a result of its encounter with hail during the descent. The hail damage was limited to the radome and the leading edges of the horizontal stabilizers. There was no hail damage to either engine fan section and there was no damage sustained by the airplane as a result of the off airport landing. PERS! INFO! A review of the flight crew member’s personnel and training records indicated that all three, including the observer captain, were properly certificated and current for the operation that was being conducted at the time of the incident. It was noted that the incident airplane was the first 300 series 737 acquired by TACA International and each of the flight crew had been through 737-300 differences training during the 60 days preceding the incident. Fora complete crew history and their qualifications, please see the attached Operation’s Group Report. ‘AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The airplane was properly certificated in the transport category and had accumulated a total of 80.6 hours since manufacture. A review of the airplane's maintenance records and logs indicated that it had received its last "A" inspection on 5/20/88, about 9.9 hours prior to the incident and there were no open discrepancies which would have affected its airworthiness. At no time during the airplane’s brief operational history had there been any reported discrepancies or equipment failure that would have contriouted to the loss of engine power. The airplane was refueled in Belize and departed with 24,000 pounds of Jet-A and there was no other service. Calculations indicated that the airplane was within its prescribed limits for weight and center of gravity, both at takeoff and at the time of the incident. METEOROLOG} At the time of the incident, the New Orleans weather was dominated by a trough line which extended to the southwest through central Louisiana. The 1253 COT surface aviation observation taken at the New Orleans Lakefront Airport reported the weather as estimated ceiling 4,500 feet broken, 25,000 feet overcast, visibility 8 miles with a thunderstorm, temperature 77 degrees, dew point 71 ‘Attach edotonal pages as necessary (Page 2a. 2b. 2c. etc.) NTSB Form 6120.4 (rev. 1-24) Page?National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION f +{ wis} s} 1 Al a of 9 6 Raat Sate TA ESN and OURAN POTATOES LL SL AL A ot 9h degrees, wiads from 170 degrees at 16 knots, altimeter setting 29.88" Hg., with remarks-thunde”storm began at 1203 overhead through south through nortiwest moving east, occasional lightning in cloud and cloud to ground. The Lakefront Airport was located about 18 miles northwest of the point where the airplane experienced the power loss and about 5 miles northwest of the eventual landing site. Weather radar data, correlated with the ATC flight track data for TACA Flight 110, indicated that just prior to the loss of engine power, the flight entered an area of a level 4 echo with very heavy rain. A complete discussion of the weather conditions as they existed can be found in tie Weather Group Factuai Report which is attached. The crew received a company weather briefiug prior to their departure from San Salvador. They did not receive any updated weatner en route and were not aware of Convective SIGMET 20 or Center Weather Advisory (CWA) 3, both of which were in effect at the tim2 they enccuntzred the thunderstorm. Investigation revealed that both the SIGMET and the CWA had been transmitted, but not on a frequency during the time period that fiight 110 was monitoring that frequency. COMMUNICATIONS All communications between ATC and TACA flight 110 were normal up until it experienced the power loss at 1:43:41. Prior to that time, the controller had issued one deviation for weather and authorized the crew to deviate as necessary, Communications were reacquired at 1246:51 when the crew was able to reestablish electrical power to the airplane. At the same time as voice communications were Jost so was the airplane’s transponder return, therefore, radar data also did not exist for the same time frame. FLIGHT RECORDERS The flight data recorder, a Sundstrand UFDR (serial number 3955) and the cockpit voice recorder, a Fairchild A-100A (serial nunber 52350) were not damaged during the incident and the recording mediums were found to be in excellent condition. The majority of the inter-cockpit conversation was in Spanish while all of the radio transmissions were in English. Where applicable in. the transcript, both the English and Spanish versions were included. The translations were done by the two Spanish/English speaking menbers that were on the CVR group. After the flight crew secured the airplane and prior to the arrival of the NTSB on scene, FAA personnel, who were not familiar with the operation of the CVR, applied APU power back to the airplane for a total of 19 minutes and 37 seconds during two separate occasions. This resulted in the taping over and loss of Pertinent cockpit conversations and background noises during the critical portion of the flight. Attach adaivora’ pases a8 necessary iPage 28. 2b 2 e': NTSB Form 61204 (rev 1-60)(NTSB AccloenU incident Number National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION ! Fl tf Ww} 8] 8! tJ Al a} 9} 9) 16 Narraive Statement of Fac, Condiiona and Circumstances Perinent to the ACCGeTUIncidenl feSninced) "T_INFORMATION The airplane was successfully landed on the back side of flood control levee on the NASA Michoud Facility property. The levee was oriented about 070/250 degrees and ran along the intercoastal waterway. The levee itself which the airplane cleared on final was about 12 feet high and sloped downward about 30 degrees on each side. The landward side of the levee was about 8,762 feet in Jength between embankments and varied in width hetween 117 feet and 132 feet with a drainage canal on the north side which ran parallel to the levee located to the south. Examination of the area revealed that the airplane had approached from the gast, cleared the top of the levee, and then touched down on a heading of about 250 degrees, some 800 feet from the cistern base of the embanknent. Following initial touchdown, the airplane tracked true down the levee, despite a slight downward slope and the wet grass, and came to rest on a heading of 252 degrees. The left main gear came to rest 2,552 feet from its initial touchdown point. The airplane received minor hail damage to the radome,-nose paint, and the Jeading edges of both horizontal stabilizers as a result of the encounter with the thunderstorm. The number 2 engine turbine section was severely damaged as a result of over temperature conditions which occurred during the attempted air restarts and operation in a stalled condition during the descent. The number. 1 engine had no visible damage either due to hail or exposure to over temperature conditions for a prolonged period. Following an initial examination of the airplane, which included the securing of fuel and of1 samples and the borescope inspection of both engines, it was towed about 2 miles down the levee onto a private road within the NASA property. The airplane was ultimately secured on a hard stand adjacent to NASA's vertical assembly building at Michoud where it remained for the duration of the systems investigation and engine changes. Complete aircraft systems checks and examinations were conducted. No discrepancies or damage were noted other than the danage previously discussed. Following ‘an engine change at the number 2 position and takeoff power runs on both sides, the airplane was taken off from the private road. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION As there was no evidence of crew incapacitation in any form, toxicology samples were not requested nor taken. Attach adctional pages as necessary ‘Pape 2a 20 2¢.01¢) NTSB Form 6120.4 (rev. 180) Page?(NTSB Accidenv/incigent Number National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION ! FL 7] wy 8} 8f Tf Al 1 9} 9) 1 Narative Statement of Faca, Condilons and GircamstaicesPoinei o Whe RIGRTU TOR com oooo SURVIVAL ASPECTS This was a survivable accident in that there were no impact forces or fire. All of the airplane exits that were utilized operated normally as did their respective slides. All of the required over water survival equipment was aboard and found to have been properly inspected and stowed in the appropriate locations. None of the flight attendants or passengers complained about having any difficulties locating the required equipment. Likewise, they did not encounter any difficulties during the evacuation. TESTS AND RESEARCH As a result of this incident extensive research and testing were done on the CFM International CFM-56-3 engines that were installed on the airplane. The number 2 engine was torn down and inspected in order to determine the magnitude and origin of the over temperature damage which was observed during the field phase of the investigation. The number 1 engine was removed from the airplane prior to its return to service and subjected to extensive flight and ground testing to determine its water ingestion capacity. The water ingestion testing confirmed that the CFM-56-3 exceeded the 14 CFR Part 33° certification requirements. However it was proven that at both approach idle and flight idle Power’ settings the engine speed would decrease below the minimum self-sustaining speed when water ingestion was increased to those rates that were likely to be encountered in VIP level 4 and 5 thunderstorms. This was found to be true even though partial combustion continued in the combustor. In engines tested to that point, advancement of the power lever would not cause the engine to accelerate and the exhaust gas tenperature would rise significantly, to the point of causing over temperature damage similar to that found in the incident number 2 engine. Please see the Powerplant Group Chairman’s factual report for a complete discussion of the teardown examination and testing results and the remedial measures that were taken to eliminate the flameout occurrences. ‘ADDITIONAL DATA ELT: | The airplane was equipped with a Dayton Granger Dolphin EB-28W beacon, serial number 39092, which had a battery expiration date of 5/7/89. The unit was armed, but did not activate due to the iow "G" forces that were encountered. Wreckage Release: The airplane was released on 6/6/88. All of the retained Components were either returned or disposed of at the end of the investigation as per the operator’s instructions. ‘Artech adctione! pages as necessary (Page 2e. 2b, 2¢. oc) Page? NTSB Form 5120.4 res 1-04)NTSB AccidenVInciden! Number National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION Fir{wisisiifajifgio 16 Narrative Stalement of Facts, Condivone and Circumatances Penari to Une ACSGeAUIRGIGERticontriaedy degrees, winds from 170 degrees at 10 knots, altimeter setting 29.88" Hg., with renarks-thunderstorm began at 1203 overhead through south through northwest moving east, occasional Tightning in cloud and cloud to ground. The Lakefront Airport was located about 18 miles northwest of the point where the airplane experienced the power loss and about § miles northwest of the eventual landing site. Weather radar data, correlated with the ATC flight track data for TACA flight (110, indicated that just prior to the loss of engine power, the flight entered an area of a level 4 echo with very heavy rain. A complete discussion of the weather conditions as they existed can be found in the Weather Group Factual Report which is attached. The crew received a company weather briefing prior to their departure from San Salvador. They did not receive any updated weather en route and were not aware of Convective SIGMET 2C or Center Weather Advisory (CWA) 3, both of which were in effect at the time they encountered the thunderstorm. Investigation revealed that both the SIGMET and the CWA had been transmitted, but not’on a frequency during the time period that flight 110 was monitoring that frequency. 1 iS All communications between ATC and TACA flight 110 were normal up until it experienced the power loss at 1243:41. Prior to that time, the controller had issued one deviation for weather and authorized the crew to deviate as necessary. Communications were reacquired at 1246:51 when the crew was able to reestablish glectrical power to the airplane. At the same time as voice communications were lost so was the airplane’s transponder return, therefore, radar data also did not exist for the same time frame. ELIGHT RECORDERS The flight data recorder, a Sundstrand UFDR (serial number 3955) and the cockpit voice recorder, a Fairchild A-100A (serial number 52350) were not damaged during the incident and the recording mediums were found to be in excellent condition. The majority of the inter-cockpit conversation was in Spanish while all of the radio transmissions were in English. Where applicable in” the transcript, both the English and Spanish versions were included. The translations were done by the two Spanish/English speaking members that were on the CVR group. After the flight crew secured the airplane and prior to the arrival of the NTSB on scene, FAA personnel, who were not familiar with the operation of the CVR, applied APU power back to the airplane for a total of 19 minutes and 37 seconds during two separate occasions. This resulted in the taping over and loss of pertinent cockpit conversations and background noises during the critical portion of the flight. NTSB Form 6120.4 (rev. 1-24)‘Alrport/Approach/Landing Information National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION 24[] Not appieable (Go to Block 99) (NTSB Accident/incident Number FuT wi 8iSi Lj Aps 131 [Snow—compacted ]Water—choppy ee tgenuiter | 1{$Z]OM aiporvairsrip | (Nearest SM) = omag 2| Jon airport —sM ‘A Other A Other 3[ Jon airstrip A Other oo [— | te Se 1] None. 1PX]None v2|_|tpa FI sn Bee eis 31S<] Straight-in 3{_|sor 14L__| Par Pert | Eee = ren. Hees Se Home Hie Ele os Hise SH 1S one rome es” | SEs a 7 a a : = = a : |Gravel [—]snow—ary Rough e = — [40 Aircrat Model Sarton 737-3TD [at Saran Wo. A Other 23838 ‘Special Normal Restricted ny Limited NTSB Form 6120.4 (fev. 124) JAcrobatic [Setriene Provisional special tight Experimental (44 Type Airworthiness Certiicae (Mutiple entry) Jatmprairigite | stanaerd A OtherNTSB Accgentincident Number) National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION FITIWISIS/ TAI LI B19) Aircraft Information (continued) 48 Landing Gear (Musto erty) 1] Trieyete—tixea a Tailwheel— table 7[]Hu 10[_] ski 13 }Migh Ska 2158] Treycie—revractable 5] Taitwhaol—retacable mains 5 ~|rioat. 11] skiwneet af Taiwheotat ees et ]ampntian o[Jemerg tos 121 Isa Aone “8 No of Sons] 49 Stal Waring Sytem | 50-1 31 Taing Cerilcalon/Equlppea 32 Engine Type L4G inated 1 (Mutipe erry) 1] Reciorocaing—carturetor nome 1d] ves af_ no sD certtes 21] Reciprocating tus njcted 2f_]no A Other 2f] wot ceriiea 3] Turbo prop A Diner a] eauinpes 41) tarot 4[CTniotEavipped 5) Turbo tan A Other ef Turbo shat _A other Tat ——[ 53 Engine Manataclarer HH Engine Model and Series —] 58 Engine Rated Power 135 Number of Engine Engine A Horsepower am CFM Int., Inc.| C2M-56-3-B1] eo 20dtiee tos A Other Brock so © Other Engine Tine Time Since Major Pyoomee | SESE" [a twamm Po eines zeae Yoon engines enter 57 Engine No.1 BL BL Be cd 58 Engine No. 2 BL BL Bo 19 Type Maintenance Program (60 Type of Last Inepecton {F Dato Last napecion | 62 Time Since inepociion 1 Annual tL ]Annuat Performed ‘Hours 2|__|Manutacturer's inspection Program 2[ | 100 nour (Nos: for M, D, ¥) ‘A Other '3|_JOther approved inspection program (AAIP) sl laa 5/29/88 4 [bzfoonmons arworonoee iipclesieee eee nome A Other A Other (64 Source of Maintenance Information 65 Hazerdous Materials | Emergency Locator [_]rach 4 [<]Logbooks Records ‘on Alreratt [-tceneminer ELT) 2| etn sf estimate aDd]no 7 tata 3[]Hobbs 6|—JPiovoperator Report A Type) A Dine 8 one 68 Required x (5 Hazardous Matera Spl/Facior iL] ver 69 Operated x 2120 No |70 Aided in location 4 Omer ctacciantete’ | | X Owner/Operator Information 71 Registered Aira Owner : T2 Adsos Foon Embane Gi nove Polnnis Avkenafh Leasing» Coop, PA enee eee ee San Francisco, CA F4LiL 74 Address |__|Same as registered owner een KENnEQ, LA 7oOlaL B Other 78 Operator of Aircratt ‘| _|Samo as registered owner A Name TACA “Intl. Atelines, SA B dba A Other 76 Operator Designator Code TAIF "ago 4 NTSB Form 6120.4 (fev. 1-24)National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION NTSB Accisent/incident Number FIT WIBIBITIAI 11919] 7 Operator Status of This Alera Owner Lessee Renter ‘Owner/Operator information (coniinued) 4[._ Borrower st femur A Oiner ‘Type of Cortiticate(s) Held 1[_]owner 2| Lessee 3[ | Renter 78 Pilot Status of Teo Aer 1 4[Jeorrower 5} Uneuthorces 6X Employes A Other 78 None [ (Go to boc 6 80" Air Carrer Operating Corilicate (Check all applcablay [__]Fag carieridomestic (121) 4[ Large noicopter (127) Sartore ‘eee : [Jat cargo (41a) 6] Jon-demana [61 Operating Certificate Other operator of large alvratt [82 Operator Corticale 1[__] Rotorerat—extornl oad operator (199) 2[ | Agricuturalarerat (137) lation Flight Conducted Under 14.0FR 105 [[} crn sto [o}¢ore v2 hscrn 127 (CFR 133 14 CFR 103 4 CFR 125 h4 CFR 195 140FR 137 bedi ce ron ioe ‘Type of Flight Operation Conducted (Complete 84a, b, ¢ ONLY if flight was a revenue operation conducted under 121, 125, 127, 129, 135) te eae 15 seneduies 1 2[-_]Non-scheduies 2 Domestic international Bae 1 2 Passenger argo [58] Passenger/cargo 4[ J ait contract ONLY (Complete 86 ONLY if 84a, b, c is not applicable) 1 2 3| Personal Business Instructional (Including ai carver training) Aerial epplicat ; H Executive/corporate [Aerial observation [a ]reny Other work vse Public use 10[ "Poe. toning A Specity First Pilot information [87 Name (Last First, ntiay A Other & Other ‘Other Tor M.D, ¥) [Pe Age 29 vs AO + a Sar 1 Sg]Mate Female 1D3XDayiant Scattered SK Broken A Oher sf Iwan toan rin broken 3| fewest 4 nia eign ]rnin overcast 4[ obscures 5 a [Dusk Partial obscuration A tS DB reet AGL Oiner epee AGL 8 oer 8 omer Oe Tes Via ceca) 2 Wad remy 70 Wind Spees [108 Gis «8 sm 27. 11] variate s[_]caim 12XI None B AVR Feet A T2D_* magnetic: 2} uignt ang A cw st [767 Dew Pome 8 oer varie | 8 One D ote Te A 1B Rowe 8 ome Tar Resins fo Vay 7S Type ot Precpaton — 790 ina ot Precpton None one (0 book 200) rom pees (9 te Jeon ace ain) 13[ | snow grains ($0) 2) Swoderate Oust (0) Snow S) 12| | resin ciel (2 [Jha smoke (0) aaa) 12[ ee erat) Ronee Foo Bain shomers (rw) 141 oe pete shower PUN ce tog Feeeang an (2%) A Ober Ground o9 (GF) snow ower (SH) Blowing spray (1 Drzte Blowing aut (2) ic potas) Blowing sow (8S) 111] eowing sand (aN) Aone NTSB Form 6120.4 (Rev. +84)TNT5S Aceidentineidont Number National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION ‘Accident information 200 Airerat Damage 1] None 25] Minor 3f | Substanvat 4[[Joestroyes 201 Altcratt Fie 15] None af Jietignt 3[ Jon grow A 202 Explosion 1BSq{None 2) n-tighe nd | 3[ Jon grouna a Oiner None Residence Resieiia area (Commercial bid. Vehictors) J aiepor taciity Trees Crops | Fence Wires/potes Joiner property 206 tejury index (Most erat inary) iBd]none 2] winor 3[ —]Serous 7m Tajury Summary {Enter only one digit per block) | Fatal e Serious 217 Classttication 1L_Juss Registers aircratt on US. Soil, ‘Terrors and Possessions, or T International Waters 2[ Jus hegiserea aircratt on Foreign ~ Soi 35] US Registeres Arcrat operated by a Foreign Operator 212 Passengers 4[7 Foreign Registered Aircraft on U.S. 213 TOTAL ABOARD. ‘Soil, Tetitries or Possessions 5{_] Miltary Aieratt 214 Other Aircraft 215 Other Ground 7216 GRAND TOTAL EH Part Fallure/Incorreet Part ‘220 Pan FaturerMalnction (Maine aniiy7 2 [Se] Parvcomponent 41 3[Se}Parvicomponent #2 4[JPanicomponent #3 A Over ele aes 4 Bat Incorrect Par (Malipie entry) None Parvcomporent #1 Cratcomponent 3 A Diner Parvcomponentr2 ‘H Par/Component Part Component ¥2 Pati Component 3 Engine o Engine gi CFM INTL GEMSG@-3-B1 7213 '228_Pani Condition 229 Total Time. Flancout aI NA Bi 6o N/A 8 1glves 2[7]Nno NTSB Form 6120.4 (fev. 1-24) a] ves DignoSupplement E — Second Pilot InformationeS cond Plot Responsible National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION re mary (NTSB AccldenVincident Number 168 copiot__ 20) duatstucent 3D soley pict «C1 checkpiot 5 CI None (Plot Rated Passenger) A Other FE Wane Toast Frat ra Plot Cantante Wo Sire ars 4 a A Giner A Omer ‘A Otver is Gi fe Stie —F Gate atom aero YF 8 Roe re RENNER | Py 4a 1B Mate A Oer LA A Ober A Oe: 2 Fema [10 Seat Occupied (Mulipie ony) Profession 1Dtet 4D Front | 1 Bl Piotciviian 4 CD avrerat mechanic 7 0 octowéentist 100 ciergy 19 © Farmer/Rancher 2 Bl rion — sCrear | 201 Picrmittary 5D Business 80 Poice 11D Teacher 14 O Retires 301 comer —Aotner 31 onermittary 6 Lanyer 9D score 12 Cl Engineer A Other 2 Gerteat(e) (Moe entry) [12 Ratinge—Alrptane (Multipi entry) [14 RotoreralVGiaer/L.TA (Mutipi entry) 110 student 7. aatsary 1 Wone 1 None 20 Private 8D None 2 BB Single engine land 2 Helicopter 3B Commercia 9 BB Foreign 3 Bl muttiongine tana 3D Gyroplane 4D Aitine Transoon omer 40. Single engine sea 4D Airsnip 5D Fight instructor 5D Muttiengine sea 5D Free balloon 6.0 Fight Engine _|_ sO ciiaer FS instrument Ratiog | 18 Instructor Rating) (Mulipe erty) 7 Groundineiracior — ]10 Type Rating Endorsement Ths (Muttiple entry) 1B None 8. Gyropiane 10 Basic ‘Alreratt +O None 2D Avplanese 6 D cider 2D advanced 1B Yes 2 © Arciane 30 Arpane ME 7D instrmentairplane | 3D instrument 20 No (Goto ower 20) 3D Hetcopter 4D) Hetcopter 6D instrumentneicooter | _4 B None [18 Months Since Check/Endorsement | 20 BionnialFightReview | 21 monine Since Lat BFR hia Alrcratt 1B vee Months 2 20No ® omer Romer A Other f23 Medica! Conticste | 24 wosicl Ceinicate Vatety 25 Date of Last Medica (Nos for. MY) 1 None 1B Vata mediea-to waiverstimtations § C] No medica crate 2 Class 20) Valea meaicar-with wawersiimitations A Other 3/15/88 30 ciass2 31D Non vals medical fortis ight A O1er 4D chases 4D Bris L A Other 26 Medical Limitation 27 Medical Water 28 Statoment of Demonstrated Ability | 29 Correcting Lenses (Mutipi entry) 1 BI None 1 BH None Dyes 1B Not required 2D vision 2D Vision 2B No 2 0 Required tobe in possession A Specity 3 Ol Hearing A Oter 3 O Required, notin possession A Specity— 4 D1 Requires to be worn © omer © otter 5 D1 Required, not worn 6 D0 worn at time of accident ther P35 Source oT Pot Time 1D Piotiog 3 Faw 5D investigators Estimate 721 other Person 2D company 4 Bl PiiovoperstorReport__6 C) Relative A Other NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement E (1-2)National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION Ste RC fe This Mae ‘aes Ane Matengine| _Nignt_| Act! IF lnstrument Simulates 35 Total Time lz560) 933 2.590 | 1,000] 5a) 18f 6 Pilot in Commend (PIC) gas] 2 1833| 290] 10m 9B. o @ o 39 Last 90 Days 18D | 18D 188 | 3a] 15 40 Last 30 Days ow] co| o os | io! 5 47 Last 26 Houre o| C|S G| Mi 4 “@ Londings—Laat 90 Days— AN Averali—Day ]49 Landings—Laat 90 Days—All Arcrat—Night [44 Landings—Last 90 Days—This Make/Model— Day A Oter LL Aone Be A Otrer LL “5 Landinge—Lnst 90 Daye—Thie Mahe/iodel— | 45 Seatbelt Avaliable 47 Seatbelt Used “— 1 Bl ves 1B ves 20 No 20 No A Other A otter | [48 Shoulder Harness Available] 49 Shouldor Hamess Used 80 Aulopey Performed (This Pot) | 1 Toxicology Performed — (The Pot) 1Bives 1D ves 1D vee 2D No 2B No 2B No 1A omer ‘A Otner AOther NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement E (134) Page?Supplement F — Pilot/Second Pilot Training and ProficiencyPilot in Command Information 1 5D instructor 8 O mut 6B) instrument_9 0 Seapi 20 Priv 3 O commer National Transportation Satety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION ae a ee Rey TSB Reeidend incident Number Mi perinent coriieate or rating oblained More an 2 years Previous (0 accident, mink Xero. Fofock Ve " 2 Centicate andor Rating For Which Data Elements 3-9 Pertan 1Osudent «Dare 7D Singie engine (Mulia ontey) 13 D type rating A Other ‘Than Air (LTA) A Oner 7 Source of Fight Training 5 Recommending Fight instructor | 6 Recommending Fight insiucior Star 1 cers 3D military cine 10 Part-time 2D wcense A_Otner Omer 20 Fuustime A Otter 7 Flight Examines (Marie entry) Fight Examiner © FIGHT Schoo! Centcale 1 C1 FAnempioyee 3.01 Company employee 2 0 FAA designee: A Other A Oirer Recency of Experience (Complete only itoms related to accident.) Weeks F Goneon | Donan A ‘Since FLT Check orn Last omer [yes [2 No | Other [1 ves|2 No | Omer 10 Toliwhee! Landing 11 Crosswind Takeott/Lending 12 Short leld Tekeott/Landing 13 Go-Around 14 Actua/Simulated inetrument 18 Instrument Approach-Precieion 16 Instrument Approach-Nonprecision 17 Unusual Attitude Practice ctlee 19 Spin 120 Sim/Act Engine Out In Mutiengine 21 Simulated Forced Landing 12 X [42 122 100 Degree Accuracy Landing 23 Autorotation 24 Mountain fying 25 Prior Experience in Geographical Area Lest Year 1B Yes 20 no A_omner NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement F (1-24) 26 Prior Experience af Alport Alrsrp Last Year Page! ayNational Transportation Satety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION M pertinent coritcate or rat 4 BD ina X" hora and} rt {3H Geriicate and/or Rating For Which Data Clements 32°38 Perain. (Wulipie ayy [32 Total Fight Houre When 1G student «Date 7D Single engine 10D) Rotoreratt 13.0 Typerating | Cermeate Rating Obtained 20 Prive SCL instructor. 8 O Muttengine 11 O) Glider A otner 30 commerciai 6 £1 instrument 9) Seaplane 12 O) Lighter Than Air UTA) omer 33 Source of Fight Training {34 Recorimending Fight neuer [36 Recommending Fight instr Status 1 wceret 30 minary | Cevticate# 1 Parvime 20 wacen sar A Other her 20) Futsime A omer 36 Flight Examiner (MaTTpTeontry) 7 Fgh Examiner 1 D1 Fam empoyee 3 Company emptoyee 20 FAA designee A_Other A_Otner ‘Recency of Experience (Complete only items related to accident.) Weeks: © Ferrous. F Done on Sree ‘Since FLY Creek last last Fives [2 No [ Otter 39 Tallwhee! Landing 40 Crosswind Takeott/Landing 41 Shor feld Takeott/Landing 42 Go-Around 43: Actual/Simulated instrument {44 Instrument Approach-Precision 45 Instrument Approsch-Nonprecision 48 Unusual Attitude Practice 47 Sta Practice 48 Spin 49 Simv/Act Engine Out in Muliengi 50 Simulated Forced Landing 151 180 Degree Accuracy Landing ‘52 Autorotation, {53 Mountain tying ‘s4 Prior Experience in Geographical Area Last Year ‘55 Prior Experience at AirporV/Alratrip Last Year 1 Yes 1 Bl ves 20 no A_Other 2 A_otner NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement F (1-20 =Supplement R - MeteorologyNational Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION FT WSS TAL a4 Tu a eel y eo Complete this supplement for any accident in which weather conditions were considered a factor and an on-scene investigation was conducted. [Turbulence Forecast] Seveniy of Forecan! Tarbulence [3 Type of Forecast Turbulence] leing Forecast” [5 Severy of Forecast Tog] 1B ves +O Lint 1D inciowas 1D ves 1D trace. 2D norGoroniecks | 2D moderate 2 DB in thunderstorm 2B norco | 20 vgn 3 B severe 30 cee ar ‘ooieck 6)} 3B Moderate 40 extreme 4D Mountain wave 4D severe A Otner A otter A_Otner [6 Type of Forecast cing 17 Thunderstorm Forecast @ Level of Forecast Thunderstorm — —[@ Ii-light Weather Service Avaliable 10 Rime 1B ves 1D severe 1B ves 20 crear 2.0 NoGo ra block 101 2 BE Not severe 20 no 3D Maca A Other A Otner A Other [10 Io-tight Weather Service Used 111 Type af i-tight Weather Service Used Mulino sary) +O ves 1Date 6 O Company weather 2B No 2Orss 7D Contract weather A Other sDans 3 Qlvor 40 twee, A Otner sO eras “Weather Conditions At Accident Sile a iT weather information entered on Form 6120-4 is based upon pilot witness only. enter matooroTogical information {rom closesi/most pertinent weather observation facilly. Otherwise proceed to block 25 Fi Weather Obsernion Fly [Dc onI77 19 BkyrLoweal Cloud Condiion [# Lowest ang Ware onr77 ‘iaripte ont) 1 None 1D Clear A Feet AGL 20 Broken 2D Scattered 8 Other 3D Overcast 30 Thin broken 4D obscured 40 Thin overcast al Feet AGL 5 D Pariat obscuration 8 ther Fe Wasa aeamanT TW Tampa Dor Pa 0 Wd ectan — TWATEpS a ry) an rom 10 cam Bi mde 5 1 1D vanabie 20 Light and variable BAR a ea A magneve] Po D o1ner 8 Other 8 (Gusts) Knots © Othe A toentiver, 8B Time of observation zone — © Elevation feet MSL D Distance rom accident site NM E Direction tom accident site magnet Hg 8 Other ft Denshy Alltade [22 Type of Precipitation (alia Bry) = reat] 1 C1 None(Gots diock25) 5 Ch Rainshowers (RW) 9 LI teepetets iP) 19D lew crystals 10) 2D rain ia 6D Freezing rain ize) 10D) Snow petets (SP) 14 LD ice pet shower (PW) 3 Gl snow (5) 7 C1 snow snower sw) 11 CI Snow grins (SG) Other, 6D Heit ay 6D Drzae it) 12.00 Freezing drazie (ZU) P25 trtorany of Precipitation "24 Resticone to wlll (ulin env) 1D tignt 10 None 6D tee tog ci) 11D Blowing Sand (8N) 21 Moderate 2D raze 70 Groundteg (GF) A Other 3D Heay 3D oust co) 8D Blowing soray @v) A Other 4D smote (ki 2D Blowing dust 0) 5D Fog if) 10D Blowing snow (8) NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement R (1-04) Page t‘National Transportation Satety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION Sue ee ene} [25 Turbulence (Multiple entry) 1 None 1D tight 2B inctouds 2 Bl Moserate 3 Bl in munderstorms 30 severe 4D clear ar 4D Extreme 5 0 Mountain wave A Other A Other [28 Severity of tong Conditions 1D National Weather Service (NWS) 2 BB Weather anaiysis | Pilot report (Aircrat type 8 Otner =) '30 Source a cing Condition Information | 4D Fronal system 5.01 inversion [54 Pertinent Weather Message Issued (Mtpte entry) 1 O Amer 2 @ sicuer 3 Bl Center Weather Advisory (CWA) 44 BD Convective SIGMET A Other (Mattpte entry) 1D Turbulence otner 2D ting 3 BD Thunderstorm 4D other signiticant weather sOno NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement R (1-24) 140 Mountain wave A_Other 1B Brioting 2D Insight advisori (AIAMET, SIGMET, ote) 3 Dare 4 Pict observation 5 Bl Woather radar 601 stormscope A other 10 trace 1.0 National Weather Service (NWS) 20 tight 20 Weather analysis 2.0 Moca A Plo epon Aver pe 3B) Rime coare) 40 severe 8 oer BG : ie A Other Blo 5 Mixes 5 Gar 37 Thonn ACY Oar BE Sure of Trunaetors rman 1D None 6 B Lovet 5 (intense) 1 Bnws 2D Level + Light) 7D Level 6 (Extreme) 2 OD witness 3D Level 2(Moderatoy A Other 3B Weather analysis 40 Level a Heavy) A Pilot report (Aireralt type ) 5 Level 4 (very hoa B Other 3 Other Sgritean Weather (aa 67 1 B None 6 Cl Water spout 11D Downdratt 20 Tomado 7D Hurricane 12 D Vanabie cloud base 3D wind shear 8 O Funnel cloud 13 O Whirwing/dust devit Page?Supplement S — Aircraft Occupant and Injured Ground PersonnelNTSB Accldentincident Nomber National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION Sree c H Degree of jury cress 3 A Name (Cy 8 State) seitus | mihor SN RNOGA, Not Recorded! (36 sovls ) NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement $ (+24) Paget aSSupplement T — Flight Data Recorder (FDR)/Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)NTSB Accidentincigent Number National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION 5 Fight Data Recorder Source of Damage (Movin anta7] 1D Destroyed-tire 4 damaged-impact 1O Fire 2D dewtoyecsmpact $B Undamagea 2 impoet A Oter 95 & 3D Damagedstre A Otner I Recarsing Mean COnaTon THUS ory] TF ils ROO a 1 B aut parameters recovered 10 C7 No data recovered 2 C Partial loss—impacttire damage A Other 3 Dl Pant oss—preoccurence recorder matunction 4 aria os ue to mshaning 5D Compiete toss~ preoccurrence alle system mattunction 6 D Complete 1oss— preoccurrence recorder malfunction 7D Complete ios due to mishandling 8 Foil medium expended prior to occurrence 2 D1 Occurrence prior to oldest recorded data 1 Bi Not damaged by occurrence 2D Destroyed by impact 3D Destroyed by tre 4. Damaged by impact 5D Damages by tre 6 Dy Damaged by mishanting A Otner Cockpit Voice Recorder [& Cockpit Voice Recorder (GVA) inetaied 5" Cockpi Voice Recorder Model No, Bi vesrecovered = No 2D Yes-not recovered A Other Fi Cock Voice Recorder Conditon Recording Medium Condon [14 CAM Recording Guaihy 1D destoyedsie — a.omer | 1 OI Pingeraperabie 1D besroyes 1D excaten 2 01 Pinger operable 2.0 Damaged 2B satsactry A omer Bo 3 Bl Undamaged 3 OD Unsatstectory 40 Damaged-impact A Other €D Unveadabie 5 B Undamaged A Other [iS ROO Gualty of Recoraing Fé Recording Medium Quaily Loss Source [iF Cv Guaty Loss Source 1D Excetient 1B None. 1 BB None 2B satstactory 20 Fre 20 Fre 3. Unsatstactory 3 Ci Mechanica! 3. Mechanical 4D Unreadabie 4G eectnce! 4D etectrcat 5D Maintenance and engineering 5 D Maintenance ana engineering A Other ‘A Other nal Recording Media Recelved (Multiple envy) 1Q ovr 6D wWeecoraer 2B Tower 7D Commercial racto 3. center 8. Commerciat Tv 4 Dare 29.1 Motion picture tim 5 0 Personal recorder A other Paget NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement T (1-24)Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1/2FORM APPROVED FOR USE THROUGH fr¥in/o0 BY. GMB NO. 3147-0001, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD . PILOT/OPERATOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT a, 05 1988 This Form To Be Used For Reporting Civil Aircraft Accidents =~ ~~ ‘nvolving Comme ‘Aviation Aircraft z = 2 7 d J ‘Nearest City/Place, State, Zip Date of Accident LocalTime Zone | Elevation AtAccident Site NASA MICHOUD Assembly Facility (2aHoURcLocK} —— Feetst New Orleans, _MAY 24, 1988 12:55, cpr __| 0" Feet mst. jihi3 Miles OF An Aitper, Complete The Folowng Information — | Proximity To Airport 1.0 OnAirport 3.0) Within v2 5.0 Within Mite 7.0 within Mites 2.0 Within V4 Mile 4.0) Within a Mite 6.0) Within 2 Miles 8.08 Beyond3Miles [pentane iarportdont Runwayianding Surface And Conditions: site Landing from ° 1.Direcion: 279° 3 Wath: 130" NASA-MICHOUD |2'tongth-6000 @Surece: rags 5.Condiion: DRY, FIRM 1.0 Standing A.C) Takeo 5.0) Cruise 7.0 Approach 9.0 NoverManeuver 8.0 landing 10.9 2.0 Taxi 4.0 Climo 6.8 Descant tude Oti-Fight Occurence 16000Feet MSL [seret Number ‘Cort Max Grose W7| N-75356 BOEING 737-370 23838 135,500 Ibs Type OF Aireratt Type Ot Airworthiness Certificate ~ 1) Airpione 5.0 BlimpiDirgible 110 Normat 5.0) Resticted 2.0) Helicopter 6D Uttratight 2.0 Utiity 6.0) Limited 3.0 Glider 7.0 Gyroplane 3.0 Aerobatic 7. Experimental 4.0 Balloon 8 Specity |.) Transport 8. Specify Landing Goat 1-0 Theyete—F 7.0 sea FiighuCabin 2.) Trieyelo—Retractable 5.0) Tailwhecl—Ratractable Mains 8. C)SkiWnet Crew 3.0) Tailwheol—Fixes ___6.5 Amphibian 8: Specify Pax 136 Stal Werning System IFREquipped [Engine Type Installed 11 Yos 1.&) Yes 1.0) Reciprocating Carburetor 3.0 Turbo Prop 5.00 TurboFan 20 No 20) No 2.0) Reciprocating —Fuelinjected __ 4.5) Turboset 6.0) Turbo Shaft Engine Menufacturer Engine Model/Series Engine Rated Power Type OFFireEtinguishing CEM INT'L, Inc. cFMS6-3-B1 7 oo erences 2, ZODON bs. Thrust 2. Specify Ey [ais athig —~ ig. Sarai [ine Sinesinapecion EngineNo.1 | 10/22/87__| 721971 Wows | 80:43 Hours Hours] EngineNo.2 | 10/22/87 | 721973 _ Hours | 80. Hours Hours EngineNo3 |= eI Ss Hours. : Hours Hours| EngineNoa | = a = Hours | = Hours Hours ‘Type Of Maintenance Program Type OfLastinspection Da ion Performed 1.0 Annual 1 Annvat epee Mow) 2.0] Menufacturer’sinspection Program 20 100Houe Time Since Lastinspoction 3. Other Approved inspection Program (AAIP) 30) Aare —9391 Hours 3.83 Continuous Airworthiness 4.8) Continuous Airworthiness Aaagy egiTine | 5. Specity _ Hours Emergency ELT Manufacturer (Modei/Series [Serial Number battery Date (DUE) LecetOT | DAYTON GRANGER DOLPHIN E5-2B0_ “39092 ot o578778 i ‘Switeh Operated | idedin Accident Locetion Tn 2.0 of 3.08 Armed PES Ves 2.08 No [ho Nae Ne Registered Alrerat Owner “VAddress Four Cubsicaderu Center — POLARIS AIRCRAFT LEASING CORP. —— San Francisco, Calitornia “SGiI=a146— Operator OF Aircraft ~ — = 1.9 ‘Same As Restored Owner rc ng Asean er US. Mailing Addres: 2.Neme'TACA INT'L AIRLINES, S.A. oa Seg aus Eyre’ VS: Netting 4 3.085: Kenner, Lowtstana 7610. —— [NTSB Form 6120.12 (11/87 This form replaces NTSB Forme 6120.1 Rev. 10777) ond 61202 (Rev, 10/77, Page‘Operator Cortiiate Number! [Operator Designator Letter Designator) U.S. REGISTERED B-737 LEASED TO TACA Or Equivalent (M/D/Y) (13 /88:737-200/ 30001 Moke BOEING Model _737=200/=300. 205 TACA Purpose Of Fight And Type Of Operation Regulation Fight Conductor Under ‘Operator Authority FAR 121, 125, 127,129,138, L-EIFARSI (only) 4.CJFARI20 z.OraR33 | FARI2 Fania Revenue Operations 2C}FARSID S.CJFAR 125 BEFAR135 | 1.C]Domeatc 6.DRotorcrat Scheduled 3.CFAR 103 FAR 129 s.Orants7 | 2 Grieg Eqemeltoad | 2 )Non Scheduled ‘3.1Supplemental —-FARIZ5 3.Doomestic T.Dlargeairerat | 4 Dnternationsl FABI5 FARi2a 5.KlPessenger 3.Dinstructiona! {CJOn Demand 8.GgForeign 8.cerge 4 DexecutvesCorporete .B.commuter 7. Specity 5.Aerat Application er Pilot Name ‘Address ‘Nationality CARLOS DARDANO Kenner, Le. 70141 |savaDOREAN ‘Cartfeatals) 1-Student 3.2.Commerca! S.CFlightinstructor = 7. Military 8.2)None 2D Private 4.(BAlnine Transport —_ 8. OFlightEngineer 8.80Foreign 10: Specity Instrument Ratings) 60 Helicopter © | 1.0) None 6.0 Instrument Airplane 2.08 Singlengine Lond 7. Glider 2.8) Airptene 7. Instrument Helicopter 3.0) SingleEngine See 8.0] FreeBstioon | 3.0) Helicopter 8D Groundinstructor ‘4.19 Maltngine Land 9.0) Airship 8. Specty 5.71 Multiengine See 10. Gyropiane ‘Type Ratinge/Student Endorsements [Date OrBiennisiFightReview | BRAMrers (Simulator) 29237-20043 ma am flaaioaca that cesta BET 1.00 None. 3.0 Cless2 worm zac agoma| 3/0/00 |" pRoTuESTS OF LEFT EE — Soper aaj emsoemeed er prey LE None VBL” Crom | my eveincommand 3) Botts 6) Noone | 08 You Gasca 3H toe 20 someone ag manta cole Hise a Soares Fig Te normnton fy tyre coco a oo eae a cae Fabs Aabsrty Titi] Risers Aone a Cee [gneve fae laut genera pee ee ae ee fee eas ‘Total Time. 13410] 4,011] 7000. 6410 [1500 750 240° 110 Pilot in Command (PIC) | 10900] 1,343] 7000 2557 | 1000 500 120 100 — Last 90 Days 240 240 240 | 100 25 Last 30 Days. 85 85 85 20 6 reel os a t VHICoP ot 2, []Oual Student 2 C)Safey Pilot 4.[}.Chack Pilot 5. } None (Pilot Rated Passenger) Pict Pit GoniicataNa ‘hdcrose sonny DIONISIO LOPEZ 7 —__Kenner, La. 70141 | SaLVADOREAN Centeate(a ‘Eston 2.RCommercit SDF tghtinructor 7.0 Miltary 8. None 2.GPrvate DiAinine Transport SLFightEngineer ——«B}Foreign 10. Spealy Page?Ratings) 1.0) None 6.0 Hoticopter | 10) None 6.0) Instrumant Airplane 2.8) Singlengine Lend 7.0 Giider 2.B Airplane 7.0 Instrument Helicopter 3.0) Singlengine Sao 8.0) FreeBattoon | 3.7) Helicopter 8.0 Groundinstructor 4.8 Muttongine and 80) Aire 8. Speciy 5.[] Mutongine Sea 10.0) Gyroptane 5.0) Glider “Type Ratings/Student Endorsements ‘Date Of Biennial Fight Review leFRAWcreft (Simulator) EL SALVADOR: CO-PILOT BAC 1-11 eee js. Make BOEING CO-PILOT B-737 03/06/88 2, Mode! -737=200/—300 Medical Gerticate [DsteOftast Medics! [Limitations none Date OFBirth 1.00 None 3.0 Class2 OM 2.69 Class 4.03 cuss3_| 3/15/88 Waivers NONE a a Degree Of njary ‘Sent Occupied ‘Seat Bott Available 1. None 3.0 Serious 1.0 tk 3.0 Comer 5.0) Rear 1g ves 2.0) Minor 4.0 Foul 2.63 Rome 4.0 Front 2.0) No ‘Seaton ‘ShoulderHarnoss [Shoulder Harness [Source OfPiiot Fight Time information Used ‘Available sed 1-C) Pilottogbook “2. Company 1 Yes 1-8 Yes G8 Yes 123% OperotorsEstimete 5. Specify 20) No 2.0 No 2.0) No 3.0) FAARecoras Tristate] Aipiene | Airplone Instrument Lighter Fight Time AUAc_| &Model |singlaEngingMutiangine| Night _[—Fetual [Simufated |Rotorerat| Glider | Than ir “Tota Time 00 | 933 [19,000 [2500 [a000 |" 500 [80 Pilot in Commend (PC) 111833 10,000 [1833 | 200 | 100 [~~ 90 Instructor [toe Matted! es st 90 Days ago] 180 180. 30 3 8 = Last 30 Days 60 | 60 60 10 Last 24 Hours 6 6 6 1 ther Personnel N Degree Ofinjury Name Seat_| _Addross(Ciy&State) __| Crow cocovpant_| FAA] Fata Seious Minor None| 7, Soley, Arturol Jump [San Salvador, El Sal| x NONE 2. Rosales, MirndG/A-FW0| San Salvador, El Sal. x NONE. 3. Lovo, Ivette |C/A-AFT| San Salvador, El Salk. x NONE ‘4. Gutierrez, G.|C/A-FWD| San Salvador, El Sall. x NONE & Castillo, L. |C/A-AFT| San Salvador, El Sall. x — NONE. 3 see PAX MANIFEST NONE : Fgh Pian Filed 1.0 None 4.0 vennen 5.0) Company (VER) 6.0) Mitary VER) 1 Weather Was involved, State # Weather Breting Wes Obtained Or# Weather Reporte Weather briefing given to crew by TACA dispatch office in San Salvador prior to departure and hard copies of all pertinent enroute, station, alternates and forecasts given to crew [and on-fiteeith Nrse ‘Were Checked And How ft Was Accomplished Feon'On Board tect Take FoniType _—_—— Gallons 1.0 80167 4.0) 115/145 7. Specify 7 2G tootowteed Sh Jota 24000 _ pounds 5.5 roonse 8. Automotive | ‘ther Serviws. Any ro To Departure NONE ‘Souee Of Werther infomation Light Condon (Phot Opertor Weather Overton) wre 1.0) Down 3.0) Dusk 5.0 Dannight 2.05 Deviom 40) BrightNight Pages[Weather information At The Dew Point |Atimeter | Sky/Lowert Cloud Condition Setting +00 Clear 4.46 Overcest 5000 Feet GL N/A er] 2990 "Ho | 2.05 Scatered.2000_ Feeract 5.0) Perio! Obscuration : ind intsmengg | 2.0 oton —__Feeract 8.0) Obscurred 1 Direction SH Restriction To Visibity [Type Precipitation [Intensity OfPreciitaton 2, Velocity _8=. 1.0 Light 3.0 Heavy 3 Guste “AIO er PRECIPITATION RAIN/HATL _ |24&Modorate 4 Specity ‘Turbulence (Multiple entry) - 1.[] None ZC) Light 3] Moderate 4.8 Severe 5.) Extreme 6.) Clear Air 7.) In Clouds | Degree OF Aircraft Damage 1D} None 2[KMinor 3.0) Subetantia! 4.) Destrayed 3.0 tn-tight 4.0 OnGrouna Description Of Darvage To Aireraft And Other Property 1) HAIL DAMAGE TO RADOME (LOST PAINT) 2) HAIL DAMAGE TO HORIZONTAL STABILIZER (18 DENTS TO LH AND-21 DENTS TO RH BEYOND ‘AERODYNAMIC LIMITS) 3) OVERTERMP DAMAGE TO NO.2 ENGINE 2.GEYes List The Name Of ThePan, Manufacturer, artNo., Serial No, ‘And Describe The Fal Onran AtOverhaul SIMULTANEOUS FLAMEOUT ON BOTH ENGINES 80: 43poure 80:43p.0ure Collision Accident_NO- Hf Collison Accident Occurred, Complete The information For Other Alrerah Registration mark Alrcratt Manwtacturer arratt Type/Model [DegreeOtAircrattDemege 1.0 Destroyed 3.0) Minor 2.5) Substantisl 4.0) None Registered Aireratt Owner address — 3.8) Slide 5.0 Ledder 2.0) Auxiliary Lighting 4.6) Rope 6.0 Specity nod OF Exit (Sate Approximete Numgay Of Persons Using Each Of The Following) 1. Main Door 2. Auxi 3.6 UNDER INVESTIGATIONGontiicates) Flight Time This Accident ie 4.0) Ainine Teanspon 1.0) Student 3.0) Commercial 5.9 Fightinstructor 2.0) Private 4.0 Aitine Transport 6.0 FlightEngineor atings/Endorsements [Nae eee : — Cerificate) : 1.0 Student 3.0 Commerc 5.0) Flightinstructor 7.2) Foreign 2.0 Private 4.0] Aine Transport 6.0 FiightEngineor 8. Specity Ratings/Endorsements ~ Total Flight Time Name == FAA Gonificate No, adgess Certificates) : 1-0 Student 3.0 Commercial 7.0) Foreign 2.0 Priv 8 Specity Flight Time This Accident Tite ‘atings/Endorsements Total Fight Time Pomsparture, Int SEE ATTACHMENT Describe What Occurred In Chronological Order, The Circumstances Leading To inAind include A Sketch Of Wreckage Di Jed Destination And Services Obtained. ion f Peninent.Atach Extra Sheets if More Space ls Needed. State Point OF Departure, Tt ‘Date OfThisReport Signature OFPiiot/Operator | Signature Of | in Pllot/ Operator 1. Signature 2. Type Or Print Name DONALD _P. scorn. aa TACA_U. S. OPERATIONS MANAGER NTSB Accident No. FTW-88-M-A1og [Reviewed By NTSB Office Located At FE. Woeth, TXCAPT. CARLOS A DARDANO'S REPORT Flight TA 110 originating in San Salvador with a stop in Belize, destination New Orleans. We took off from Belize with 24,006 pounds of fuel and all papers in due order. Flight plan was to New Orleans and we maintained it at 35,000 feet of altitude. Having started the descent to New Orleans, and being on IFR condi tions, with the fasten seat belts sign on, the igniters on continuous and the radar on weather mode, we received instructions fromthe controller to deviate about 5 dégrees towards the right of our present course. We next turned on the anti-ice device since we did detect icing conditions. When we were flying at 280 knots, and under automatic conditions of flight and power, we started to correct our deviation towards New Orleans, as we have been already authorized. Suddently we found obstacles with weather conditions and descending from about 15,000 feet to 13,000 feet, we felt a strong sudden descent and we lost ali electric power. We did not know what was happening but we tried to re-start the electricity and then we concluded that we had lost all power in both engines. I ordered Capt. Soley to try to re-start the engines and told Pilot Lopez to advise the approach controllers of what was occuring; in the meantime I was trying to control the aircraft. Without knowing exactly what direction we were going, we encountered heavy tur- bulance and hail, combined with another sudden descent and lightning and after two or three minutes and pro- ceeding as per the check lists, we turned on the APU, which restored the electric system, as well as the hydraulic system. Capt. Soley continued trying to re- start the engines according to the instructions of our procedure check list (QRMB). Being still on IFR, we advised our emergency to New Orleans Approach Control, requesting vectors to reach the closest airport to try to land in those conditions. In the meantime we had advised our Senior Flight Attendant to prepare the cabin for a possible emergency landing. Having received instructions from the Approach Control as to what route to take, we asked for weather condi- tions in the airport we were approaching; at that moment we appeared to have restored one of the engines. We called Approach again and told them we needed vectors towards New Orleans and advised them that we have re- stored power in one of the engines; meanwhile, we continued trying to re-start engine #2, which appeared to be restored as well and we turned towards the dir- ections indicated by Control. We realized then that we had no power in either of the engines which sur- prised us, since we had received positive indications fromithe parameters; however, when we applied power-2- there was no response. We continued to obtain informa- tion on the closest airport at which we could land, but we concluded that we did not have enough altitude to cover the distance (about 5,000 feet) and land safely from our position. Having decided that an emergency landing would be necessary, we started looking for an appropriate place. We initially concluded that the best alternative was to land in the water. We established a plan towards a chosen spot at about 3,000 feet altitude, which was appropriate since it was near a place where we could get immediate help but at the same time without endangering people who were not involved in our emergency. While at about 1,000 feet, we noticed a field covered with grass and which was solid and will facilitate our landing. We decided this will be a safe place to land. We put down the landing gear and proceeded with complete landing procedures. Immediately after the aircraft came to a complete stop, we ordered immediate evacuation of passengers and we concluded our procedures.e Loge lel Gasdbow.~ Lau ME asad ay Le lef Dap rgasnwes ch Bulge aon 2000 hbs..obe eekly Foy Los py tthy an eee cL Ateassle. Ak yee = EA eae eee a ele BELO yb 09! oy ee nn GL, ye hf ahaango than 2 a aa pcre tr egress 2 > Lele ose. clugeo tin th guid esta tartan Boapulocns engl beef Leasagee pe Lata oi rine aghor ae Ai ante 15000. et L3POD ig Caen Bocas 2, Pfs Leary,a ° e Mh pal ghee A ool ohh grocipuem TT eg a A oo amar _ b-frtc aieks ee an . Pp Meloannnen seecnthesly ginal umactarrae, LE Bh hee. yoanmentllte og eaconnte negative youd a ofa ee eye ee a Se ry —hcrlhle, gece annie. parece ns Dum aes 4 amas et nn Sgr guint guamniberrn Z _ atulewinhns, goa 4 qprigga yllnbn iy, sponLjebe, ee Aaetiger pert 2 fe - EZ a LL ekg z (oes ecaleabbaee.. 47FIRST OFFICER DIONISIO LOPEZ On Flight 110 SAL-BZE-MSY, we had a technical problem with the aircraft more or Tess a half hour before arrival at New Orleans Airport. We began to descend from 35,000 feet approved by Houston Center, who transferred us to another frequency of Houston Center, and authorized a right hand deviation to continue with the descent direct to New Orleans, authorizing us to change frequency to New Orleans approach. Check list was passed adequately. Our Radar read yellow and green. We continued on to New Orleans. On those moments we began to feel a slight turbulence and requested that the flight attendants take their seats. The turbu- lance suddenly increased with ups and downs and almost immediately lost all electrical power on the circraft The Captain then noted that the power on both engines was lost. On board the flight deck as an observer was Capt. Arturo Soley. Capt. Dardano flew the aircraft; Capt. Soley was ordered to start the APU and attempt to start both engines. I handled the radio and assisted Capt. Soley. Capt. Soley selected igniter switches to the flight posi- tion. We started the APU and at this moment proceeded by the radio to declare an emergencyito New Orleans Approach Control. No. 1 Bus Bar was transferred to the APU generator and we proceeded to try to start both engines with APU source, according with the check list. Capt. Soley informed Capt. Dardano that #1 Engine was operating and proceeding to power the #1 Bus Bar with #1 Generator. I proceeded to notify New Orleans Approach Control that we had #1 Engine operating and we needed vectors to New Orleans. Approach Control told us to make a left turn which we executed while Capt. Soley and I proceeded by the check list to start the #2 Engine. When Capt. Dardano ex- ecuted the left turn, he applied power in order to main- tain the altitude requested by New Orleans Approach Control. The engines would not respond. I advised Control of both engines being out. Capt. Dardano con- tinued to pilot the aircraft. The Senior Flight Attendant was informed to prepare the cabin for an emergency landing. We concentrated on locating an adequate place to land, following the descent path chosen by Capt. Dardano I saw a dry flat grassy strip which looked good for a landing. I brought the strip to the attention of Capt. Dardano and he saw it and proceeded toward it. We lowered the landing gear, applied flaps and maneuvered accurately and proceeded to land the aircraft safely and smoothly.The emergency evacuation was accomplished without injury. We completed the appropriate check list and left the aircraft. Dionisio Lopez Baltram Co-pilotTE SE. Cllwer orieian Sid \0eez BerTRAS, - EN El vuces TA lo Sue SRE- DASY, TUUTMoS UW Pro BEE mA réenico eon La AE RONAVE, VARS 6 MWENOS PL] DEM ha row ALTES bE EO4R AE KHEROPVERTO D=& NUETA ORCEANS. COMENEI MOS Pr OESCECHNER GF 28.000 Pies SEEN GS APROIDAQSE (gel SL Heorreny Genre QUIEN NOS TRANSFERS A OTB ERECUENLS QELK Nes Pron Ceaitmd Y MOY Aoroalzo UNG RESII ALLO Mert LA Bermecaa &y- RA CONTINVAR QA SK HESCENSD P?PREcrd Ae NVEV4 ORLEAS ALTOREPAN DONOR ACAM- (Bink FREwWEevUn ANVEVA ORLEAS Bpcodt LA LigTm D]e cHeEa@vEen Fue COmPLETADA NOECVAOAMENTE: NUESTRO Lagyce 28M BA AMARING ¥ VERIE. JEON ON MANU Hetcurt AUT UA ORLERNY EN E528 Wo - [MEN TOS COMEN AH WAS ASENTIN UNA WIG ERA TORRUCERCER VY Pe bins ALO SOPRECAR GES QUE Toma Ran SOS ASEM LA TOR Bvt enw FAM GWTO DE REPENTE, {Cos ALTOS ¥ BAFOS ~p esse NINE De OTA MEATE (Peadiwes Te04 eveRGin ELecRaita EAA AERINANGE, Lae CAS e TAN Srypovces Nore. QvE Se Hager PEAVI GO POTENCA EN AmBeS UPtOhes, j 7 l i : : .ae @ e A BER8 Ye cn CABING De mAWIO COWS __ S88ERVADSEe SE ENCONTAAGA er (CA PL TARY - WPZTO RO Sec 2 _DAN.Oe108, voce Eb AYLON BALE OTR SE CE c€Ne NS HANannenR_ Ec_ARU- ¥ red TAL DE ARLANC AD AMBIS WACIINAS YO WANE TAGA RA REDD YARESTIY ae Cher ras foe : ELAR, 8 Oe IGNICe OS, ALA. POS ARRANCAR UO > exc Apo. L — CRP CaS Sey Le ees RA - BOC TANS sacs bert yo Proce di ALONE CPE? Dairee he AAU insect Je MoBUA. bb ue WS ROS TEN (AUS SC AOrmRHI OhE- fii 2 ok UG NECES TA GAAS Vecrorey = acre NOVA ORLEAN © Con reo be APROUM HEC) MOS defd HeSCERA WSS OW ULRACE ALA ERE fe Quy A Ele co TH Wyo ST MLEATA ITSEC CRCUIANS SOLE LY YD Price nramas Coy LA LISTA Je CHE BLES A EKCENOER Et Moyer se CoAm)o ce CARCI ___ Ute und APLico Boren PARA JIRAR POA KA TEE. y WAWTE NER CA ACURA REavenian A PkR Src Oontarun JeEA- PRoKiwr4ctow Kms mARoin PX_NO REL: _ Poa Qreeww.s NOTIE AVE AC CONTRAE BOS HWDAD MAGA AS ESTAR AN ADS 7 BAR ETC CARTAN KARDANO QA MUUT DrOTE ani Po EA PER OPAVES AA fere ee WE WADA. _ BUS PREPARARAN ME CAty NA Mea OA) _ HEARIiznec fe Ewerecevsy _ NOS Conic en TRA WOS PALA Leow <6 RN UW AYE AM NReEcwitthe PALA ATERLIERR. OO ——————_— _ fleA_ec cphéTAn) DARGANO JCUNA Faye - TERRA. ENGRAWADN ac. SE MRABA_ Bien PARA NUESTRAN jNTENcLON eS DE ATERLIBZACE, LECUFL CE MAny PESE AE CAPT TAN, VEL PROCEg Lb ptAeih CV. _ Pale os SC TREN De Aroen(2pez, Abel - CRIES FIAOS VMANIO LAA ues CoM Etc _ tre), YOCMRD RE LA KITA De CHedVeO _ Paen SC APrERRIZAGE YF (RICEH WOE A MICRA RAR AR Aery VALE, SPATE SEGURO MENTE — a oesTA CIRCA DEEMERGENCIO FueCAPT. ARTURO SOLEY'S REPORT TACA 110/24 MAY 1988 - Leg BZE/MSY I had been authorized by Capt. Dardano to remain in the cabin as an observer. During the descent and landing in New Orleans we suffered the simultaneous loss of both engines, and Capt. Dardano ordered me to be in charge of re-starting the engines. 1) I turned on both igniters on FLT. Then I turned on the APU, opened the fuel crossfeed valve. 2) No response in the parameters of the engines. 3) I put Bus Bar #1 on the generator of the APU. 4) I proceeded to start the engines with the APU as per the check list, with the help of Lopez. 5) I get starter cut-out and engine bus bar #1. I inform the Captain that we have restored power in #1. 6) I proceeded to start #2 with the same posi- tive results. 7) I inform the Captain of the satisfactory start of engine #2; however, he informed me that there was no power. 8) The EGT went up and then the red light appeared in both indicators. 9) I proceeded to cut start levers. There was not enough time to attempt to restart again as the Captain informed me that we had no more time and should secure myself for an emergency landing. 10) We completed the landing safely.Qe ponte Capt Antvre Solec DoA le BW -Hayo. NE potecod fine Jose Habeode Sido soTrerads pee ol capes Deaderto pres prerteneese go le cabs Geommbs enmo obseavader, deemwote al des erose 4 eteemtale 96 ewe calerrs seein — Uy peadida de onbes cmotmes sol mossmeste por le que el aaeter Bandave ame erdewro torae ami cang ef gwcendidy de hos rmorned 4 - Pose ambos igciees eo FIT acto Seeds eveewdi of aro abao ol roel eaoss teed Laltee 2- ato bobo nespoests gs los pararnnatess & los motores 3. Coloeo Le banes #1 eo al Gertandse { aro 4. parade 6 eocendee los amotones cov 2l npo & neveads & la lista & chegueo S- obtsegp srmate cotoot 4 bares 2o el nome $1 poroan A mora #1 eoceodds G- Peoceds al eweendids dl #2 ear los misonos tesolmdos posi tives al Qapmeo qok Teeenes T- Woes al capitan lel owcondids gaPispacoro del cemore #2 sa erbaeGe cme Io Fors Gre cancer de poteses 4 B- eer sole Cow loz Rojo am pmbo: tmdicadoees A. Pascebs x corte staat Lavtns 5 WO Thats nuguatmsote por see iwrormads por al capitan |, you ve hay tens 4 qe cme mseloee pace Vo ptmanirs (a de grea Gooch lo Coupleranos el arenerzale Ro Fora S0GueA Uf,CREW MEMBER NAME: MYRNA ROSALES 05-25-88 SENIOR IN CHARGE Previous to Flight 110 of May 24, which started in El Saivador, we carried out a briefing with location of emergency equipment in the cabin, as well as designation of duties and position of each flight attendant. Before take-off from Belize we carried out the demonstra- tion of life vests, exits, seat belts, and emergency demonstration cards as in regular procedure or routine. We prepared the cabin for takeoff, instructed the pas- sengers correctly as to use of seat belts, locations of emergency exits, etc. During the flight we had the following incident: A few minutes before landing, when the Seat Belt sign was already on, given that we already had initiated the decent, we also received an order from the Captain to keep the seat belts fastened. We flew into turbulence in the area following, we felt that the lights in the cabin went out and the emergency lights immediately came “ON" throughout the cabin. When the tur- bulence had calmed down, the Captain called me to tell me to prepare the cabin for an emergency landing, to which I proceeded, prepared the cabin, and instructed the passengers as to appropriate procedures, including the proper positions to take, location of exits and other steps to be followed by regulations. We then took our places. It is worth mentioning that everyone remained very calm and no one panicked. The landing was smooth. As soon as the airplane stopped completely, we checked exits and starte the evacuation in an orderly manner. All the Passengers remained calm. The flight attendants after having checked the cabin abondoned the airplane. The passengers were safely kept to- gether. We determined there were no injuries and were then transported to the NASA building. All doors and all slides functioned perfectly Myrna Rosalese Plage ashe edeswege > Ylopunr Conked Lbaewie of xule 10 Le! yp de Benge, gece euegen Aeckgaaitin cle sgeyeo ce tenengensccs en! ne, Ae Cams ta Aecgeestn Le hen ins oy proaceiaetn) AA cada Lgpenlante «Ake 2 he fryranceint Le geht) 0 ceadia’ a bn? pawsprrn elec how pnwcchiinitn Len Goagprcclan az cage scale Lo Aw Jae ciciorng e a ce, ewer n ole ee,CREW'S NAME: LUIS E, CASTILLO FLIGHT REPORT DATE: 24 May 88 FLIGHT NUMBER: 110 INTRODUCTION As in every flight before starting our duties, we had our pre-briefing in which our "Senior Flight Attendant" (Mirna Rosales) assigned me position #3. (Forward dem- onstration). In this position the crew memb er works in the Forward part of the airplane. My first duty is to check the emergency equipment of this part of the airplane, which was in perfect functional state and informed this to the Senior Flight Attendant. Following this I proceeded to do everything that is done in a normal flight. PRE-EMERGENCY MOMENT (5 MINUTES) In the leg BZE-MSY after having finished our Exclusive Service I started to prepare for landing when the captain informed us by the P.A. system to take our seats and se- cure ourselves since the seat belt sign had been on for approximately 5 minutes, and I had already checked that the Passengers had their seat belts securely fastened. At that time we secured the forward galley, and secured our- selves in the jump seat. Following this, rain started and turbulence began. Soon following this the lights went out, and the emergency light turned "ON". When the turbulence calmed down, Captain Dardano called Mirna and when she came out, she informed us to prepare the passenger cabin for an emergency landing. EMERGENCY (5 MINUTES) Immediately, we went out to the cabin to follow the planned emergency Steps per our Emergency Procedures while Mirna by the P.A. system informed the passengers that: We were going to have an emergency landing. We instructed the passengers to remove all sharp objects. We showed the passengers the emergency exits.