ELECTRONIC WARFARE

ELECTRONIC WARFARE – THREATS, REQUIREMENTS

AND PRINCIPLES
• EW is a battle for control of the electromagnetic
(EM) spectrum.
• However, it is now recognized that a primary
function of the EM spectrum is as a carrier or a
provider of information which is essential to
any military operation.
• Thus, EW is an essential component of what is
termed information warfare (IW).
Cont…
,,,cont

Command and Directed

Control Energy
Weapons

X
Telephone Radio RADAR IR UV Gamma
Cosmic

Guided Weapons

Surveillance and Target Acquisition

Cont…
…cont

Military and commercial usage

 INFORMATION WARFARE

• Information warfare is an operation conducted in order

to gain an information advantage over the opponent.
• It consists in controlling one’s own information space,
protecting access to one’s own information, while
acquiring and using the opponent’s information,
destroying their information systems and disrupting the
information flow.
• Information warfare is not a new phenomenon, yet it
contains innovative elements as the effect of
technological development, which results in information
being disseminated faster and on a larger scale.
 COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE

C2W is mutually supported by intelligence to deny information to,

influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities.
This process is accomplished while protecting friendly command and control
capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare applies across
the operational continuum and all levels of conflict.

C2W can be used to:

• Deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command
and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control
capabilities against such actions.
• Maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to
friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to,
influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system.
The aim of this presentation is to provide an overview of
Electronic Warfare (EW).
• EM Spectrum
• Electronic Warfare – Threats, Requirements And Principles
• Electronic Surveillance (ES)
• Electronic Attack (EA)

• Electronic Defence (ED)

• Srli Lanka Signal Corps And Electronic Warfare
The EW “Family Tree” is shown below:
• SEARCH
The first step in the ES cycle is searching through the frequency spectrum
to identify electronic targets. These targets may be operating anywhere in the
electromagnetic spectrum.

• INTERCEPT
Once a search operator has identified a target of interest, the intercept
operator will be tasked to exploit that particular target so that as much information
as possible can be extracted from it.

• DIRECTION FINDING
The purpose of DF is to locate transmitters. DF sensors normally work in
groups of 3 or 4 known as a Baseline and will be tasked to take bearings on specific
target transmissions.
• ES Target Acquisition
The above diagram shows a baseline of 4 Direction Finding Platforms. It
should be noted that some of the individual lines of bearing (LOBs) are inaccurate,
causing a larger ellipse. These DF errors are caused by factors such as:

a. The accuracy and the techniques employed within the DF equipment.

b. Poor sighting of DF sensors and baseline.

c. Low signal to noise ratio atthe DF sensor.

d. Multipath.
• ANALYSIS
The information gained from intercept must be analysed by specialists
before it can be usefully turned into intelligence.
There are three subdivisions of EA :
1. Electronic Jamming.
2. Electronic Deception.
3. Electronic Neutralisation.
ELECTRONIC JAMMING
The deliberate radiation, re-radiation or
reflection of electromagnetic energy with the
object of impairing the effectiveness of hostile
electronic devices, equipment or systems.
There are several types of jamming:
1. Spot Jamming.
A spot jammer jams one frequency or a narrow band of
frequencies in specific use by the victim.
2. Barrage Jamming.
A barrage jammer jams over a band of frequencies
simultaneously.
3. Sweep Jammer.
A sweep jammer attempts a compromise between the
advantages of spot and barrage jammers.
4. Coherent Jamming.
Coherent jamming is used primarily against RADAR
targets.

5. Responsive Jamming.
Responsive jamming is a way of employing SPOT or
SWEEP jamming. A responsive jammer incorporates an ES
receiver which automatically searches a selected band of
frequencies to find frequencies of interest for which the system
has been programmed
ELECTRONIC DECEPTION
The deliberate radiation, alteration, absorption or reflection of
electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to confuse, distract or seduce an
enemy or his electronic systems.

There are 3 basic types of Electronic Deception:

Imitative
Imitative measures involve the introduction of radiations into enemy
channels which imitate his own emissions. Examples are:
1. Joining the enemy net as a bogus subscriber.
2. Recording enemy transmissions, editing the transmissions and replaying them
to pass false orders.
3. Replicating enemy RADAR signatures.
Manipulative
Manipulative measures involve the deliberate
release or alteration of friendly EM radiation in order to
convey a misleading impression to the adversary.

Simulative
Simulation is the creation of EM emissions in false
locations to represent friendly formations or actual
capabilities to mislead hostile forces.
ELECTRONIC NEUTRALIZATION
The deliberate use of EM energy to either temporarily or
permanently damage enemy devices which rely exclusively
on the EM spectrum.
Directed energy weapons are:
1. Acoustic beam weapons.
2. Plasma beam weapons.
3. Particle beam weapons.
4. Laser beam weapons.
5. Radio Frequency weapons (RF).
ELECTRONIC PROTECTIVE MEASURES
That division of EW involving actions taken to ensure
friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the
enemy's use of electromagnetic energy.

ELECTRONIC DEFENCE
The use of EM energy to provide protection and to ensure
effective friendly use of the EM Spectrum.

There are 2 sub-divisions of ED:

1. Active ED.
2. Passive ED.
ACTIVE MEASURES – TECHNICAL
1. Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS).
ACTIVE MEASURES – TECHNICAL
2. Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS).
OTHER ACTIVE TECHNICAL MEASURES

1. War Reserve Modes (WARM).

2. Burst Transmissions.
3. Frequency Agile.
4. Complex Modulation.
5. Cryptographic Protection.
ACTIVE MEASURES – TACTICAL
• Masking: An active ED measure that involves placing a spot or
barrage jammer in a position where it occupies the enemy ES
sensors whilst allowing our own communications to proceed.
PASSIVE MEASURES
Passive Measures are further sub-divided into Technical,
Tactical and Training measures. lt should be remembered that
the technical and tactical categories are different from their
active counterparts.

PASSIVE MEASURES – TECHNICAL

1. Directional Antennas.
PASSIVE MEASURES – TECHNICAL
2. Adaptive Combat Net Radio Antennas.
By altering the antenna polarisation and simple screening, the effect of
jamming can be considerably reduced.
3. Steerable Null Antennas.
Many antennas are Omni-directional; this means they can receive signals
through 360 degrees.
4. The Use of Reflectors.
Any object such as a building,
corrugated iron or even chicken wire
can be placed between the transmitter
and the enemy in order to reflect the
RF energy away from the enemy.
PASSIVE MEASURES – TECHNICAL
5. Traffic Flow.
Changes in traffic flow signpost changes in an
operation. For example prior to an attack or move orders
will almost certainly have to be passed over radio.

6. Equipment Characteristics.
If all units are similarly equipped and use identical
procedures, discrimination between nets becomes very
difficult.
PASSIVE MEASURES – TACTICAL
Siting
Emitter stations should be sited, if possible, so that they are screened
from the enemy ES installations. This reduces the possibility of intercept and also
of effective jamming.

Poor Siting - Passive Tactical ED Good Siting - Passive Tactical ED

PASSIVE MEASURES – TACTICAL
One way Rebroadcast
Once EA has been identified on a net, the net may ultimately have to be
reconfigured on new frequencies to allow effective communications.

Minimize Rebro Signature

Rebroadcast and relay stations are a significant signature, often operating
from a high point, identifying all stations on the net and providing an easy target
for ES and EA.

Minimize Emissions
Traffic is restricted to that of a certain priority and all traffic has to be
justified before release.
PASSIVE MEASURES – TACTICAL
Receiver Antenna Movement
The multi path effects on a jammer's signal cause jamming "holes".
Moving a receive antenna within the interference pattern allows the wanted
signal to be received whilst the jamming signal is self-cancelling.

Alternate means
The use of alternate means often follows from the imposition of a strict
EMCON policy. However, at all times, all alternate means should be used to
diversify the methods of communications.

Emission Control (EMCON)

Under a Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan (STAP), the commander
requires the gathering of timely and accurate information on enemy locations,
organization, strengths and future intentions.
PASSIVE MEASURES – TRAINING
1. Training ED training is often neglected due to lack of
awareness and knowledge. Even today, when radio communications
are switched off for long periods of radio silence, the staff become
very good at using alternate means and operators get little training
value.

2. Unit training
Defensive techniques must be designed to enable units and
formations to reduce the effects of enemy EW and SIGINT in peace
and war. They should cover all users from the commander to the
operator and should not be limited to radio systems.
PASSIVE MEASURES – TRAINING

3. Individual Training.
This must give operators knowledge of the threat to
his system and how to use his equipment to minimize the
threat. This will range from threat briefings to intensive
procedural training.
SRLI LANKA SIGNAL CORPS AND
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
 ELECTRONIC WARFARE

The purpose of electronic warfare is to deny the

opponent the advantage of, and ensure friendly
unimpeded access to the EM spectrum. EW can be
applied from air, sea, land, and space by manned and
unmanned systems, and can target humans,
communications, radar, or other assets.
 BRIEF HISTORY
• Army Electronic warfare Organization began to function after
the inception of war in 1983.
• First Electronic Warfare (EW) Squadron was started in 1991
at the Army Headquarters, Colombo, under Sri Lanka Signal
Corps.
• Role of the first EW squadron was to interception, jamming,
direction finding, and observation of sea using radars.
• The first EW squadron was converted in to an independent
squadron on 28 January 1997 with 19x officers and 90x ORs
with an approved organization.
• After the conversion of the EW squadron in to an
independent squadron, sub EW squadrons were raised as per
the operational requirement of the North and East.
FACTS FINDING INTERVIEWS
 SUMMARY OF ELAM WARS

• Eelam War I (1983 – 1987)

• Eelam War II (1990 – 1994)
• Eelam War III (1995 – 2001)
• Eelam War IV
 CONTRIBUTION OF EW DURING THE
LTTE CONFLICT
• operation Thrivida Balaya, the first combined security
forces offensive aimed at regaining the Jaffna town
since the outbreak of hostilities on the night of
10.06.1990.This would also be the first Electronic
warfare supported military operation in the history
• electronic Jamming of terrorist radio networks was
carried out with the few number of “YAESU FT - 420”
Jammers first time in the history of the Army.
• During the critical stages of operation consequent to
continuous jamming and transmission jammers got
heated up and the operational effectiveness of the
jammers deteriorated .
• Electronic Warfare involvement activities during
the operation Jayasikuru which consider as one of
the landmark military operation in Sri Lankan war
history. During this operation Direction Finding
capabilities had expanded from Mannar to
kokkuthyduwai keeping Madukanda as a control
station.
 FROM 1999 TO 2002
• The Signallers were deployed in all three theatres of
Operation
• Operation Ranagosa commenced during March 1999
in order to capture the West of A 9 road in the Mannar
sector.
• TDL 5000 and TDL 1626 Direction Finders were
deployed as per the tactical requirements in the
battlefield. In addition, modified Jammers were
utilized to disrupt enemy communication and Anritsu
726 UA Coastal Surveillance Radars were also deployed
along the Mannar coastal belt to hinder enemy boat
and foot movements.
• During the year 2000, the Security Forces
conducted a series of offensive Operations
including Opeartion Rivikirana and the series of
Kinihira Opeartions. In support of these
Operations, Man-portable Surveillance Target
Acquiescing Radar (MSTAR) was introduced to
optimize the capability of Electronic Support
Measure segment of the Electronic Warfare family
tree
• Operation Agni Kheela which was launched in
September 2001. By this time, TDL 1626 Direction
Finders were replaced by TDL 5000 Direction
Finders and this optimized the accuracy of the
target acquisition, pertaining to enemy radio
transmitting stations.
 HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN
WANNI THEATRE
• The TRC 274 VHF/UHF Jammer was also deployed in the
general areas of Oddusudan and Puthukkudiyiruppu in order
to disrupt the enemy communication networks.
• The Coastal Surveillance Radars and Battlefield Surveillance
Radars (BFSRs) were positioned along the coastal belt and
the FDLs, in order to prevent any LTTE infiltration and obtain
early warning of such movements.
• The Direction Finders and the Jammers modified by the
Signal Base Workshop were also deployed to provide the
required Electronic Support and Counter Measure activities.
• The mobile Direction Finders and radar were also fabricated
in order to achieve optimum direction finding capability.
 EXPANSION OF ENEMY COMMUNICATION NETWORKS AND
ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITY

• LTTE also had limited Electronic Warfare capability

• VHF (Very High Frequency) low band
administration net and communication network of
police is easily susceptible for LTTE monitoring
• LTTE has expanded their communication and EW
capability following order:
a. Long range High frequency (HF) communication.
b. Long range Very high frequency (VHF)
communication with repeaters.
c. Single channel micro wave links.
d. Satellite communication links.
e. Mobile telephone connections.
f. Frequency scanners.
g. Direction finder equipment.
h. High power broadcasting transmitters.
i. High speed data transmitting capability
LTTE HIGH-TECH SATELLITE
COMMUNICATION CENTER
 IMPORTANT FINDINGS
• In every fortnight officer commanding of Electronic
warfare squadron assigning with the task of brief the
divisional commander. There were some occasions
where Officer Commander directly contacted by the
Security Force Commander and Commander of Army
to asses real picture of the actual battle. it create more
analytical picture on LTTE future developments
• isolation deployment of Electronic warfare assets is in
vain when considering economic factor and need to be
grouped or be deploy as clusters to achieve desire
goals
Operational back ground of EW operator in late
nineties
• Even at end of the nineties, tactical level
commanders did not have much aware about EW
capability and hence they were not in a passion to
use EW affiliated information for their operational
planning.
• some occasions where EW operators sarcastically
pin down by the tactical level commanders with
their findings of the battle field.
• It is not advisable to grouping all available assets at
a single place without having proper threat
analysis.
• Officer commander EW squadron granted
permission of round the clock directly access to the
Divisional and Security Force commanders level for
frequent updates
• Military intelligence was clearly over turned by
electronic warfare
• local improvisation and new experiments
amalgamated to LTTE captured radio equipments
in order to earn more advantages
• majority of equipment (Direction Finding,
Scanners, costal surveillance Radar and jammers)
which we were used in Electronic warfare purposes
are commercial purposely manufactured ones
• Mobile Direction Finding Concept. Vehicle lorded
TDL5000 commercial Direction finder is classic
example for this modus of operand. This concept
even effectively detected foot movement of LTTE in
plane ground areas like Poonarin via their radio
communication and LTTE suspected boat
movements in general area Chalei, Nagarkovil,
thanankilappu and poonarin.
• Mobile Radar Concept. It was yet another developed
concept of EW troops where commercial Radars that
use in sea navigation purposes fixed in tractors in
order to move one place to another.
• Mobile Jamming Concept jammers operating as
clusters gain more effective results rather than
employ isolate.
• Development of software assisted system for the
protection of important findings of Electronic warfare
involves operations. information technology
integrated in to electronic warfare operations with
the assistance of WSO 2 an open source technology
provider, under the guidance of then chief signal
officer
• officer commanding of electronic warfare squadron
wasted with the authority over calling of artillery
fire assets and Malty Barrel Rocket Launcher
(MBRL) shoots during the period of Humanitarian
operation
• Direction Finders and Jammers operating close
vicinity of the FDL. It was first time in the war
history all available direction finding equipment,
monitoring equipment and jammers positioned
straight behind only 3 Km distance from Forward
Defense Line (FDL).
• Electronic warfare operations gathered information
leads operational planning staff to have more
accurate and logical deductions.
• Providing of timely and accurate information in
order to call Close Air Support.
• Introduce of Unman Areal Vehicle (UAV) operations
together with Electronic warfare operation turned
a new military step ahead in mid June 2008, could
obtain more accurate information lively and used
them outmaneuver LTTE as they unpredicted
• Electronic warfare play a major role as force
multiplier and synchronization matrix for number
of battles so that commanders at all level could
read and take appropriate actions soon.
SER LOCATIONSS FMN GR

1
Madukanda SLAF DET 749945

2
Omanthai HQ 10 SLLI 704077

3
Pampaimadu RES BDE 615945

4
Kalmadukulam HQ 15 SLNG 566049

5
Parayanalankulam HQ 16 SLNG 371932

6
Cheddikulam HQ 21 DIV 519796

7
Giants tank STF DET 166069

8
Pallaimunai HQ 13 SLNG 069132

9
Manthai HQ 11 SLA 102151

10
Buddangala HQ 6 SLNG 989079

11
Kiriibanwewa HQ 3 SLSR 052209

12
Kokkududuvai HQ 9 GR 157262

13
Sunny village SLN GAJABA 016207

14
Velankulam SLAF GP II 497973
• Self-developed skills of EW operators, their ability of
visualization of battle field, ability of differentiate
deception from the actual battle caused to have real
impact on total equation and which include:
a. Ability to identify whoever the LTTE top rank
leaders by his voice.it can be detect from where
ever.
b. Careful monitoring the art of passing down
orders for LTTE ground troops and their by decide
who is leading particular battle and oppositely, by
identifying the LTTE leader, EW operator had the
capability of predict LTTE modus of operand on the
ground.
 c. Constant monitoring can detect even small battle
field changes. (Attachment or detachment of troops,
gathering, changing of gun positions, command
location, leadership change) careful visualization can
obtain reliable predictions and depending on such
predictions that had achieved tremendous success in
numerous occasions.
d. By plotting mussel flash bearing in to map,
calculating approximate flying time of the round,
monitoring target correction of LTTE over very limited
radio conversation, EW staff accurately located the LTTE
gun positions and passed down information for
retaliation.
e. After having very sensitive monitoring
process, Electronic warfare staff had ability to
predict LTTE approximate operating locations
after plotting single bearing along a axis. They
assume distance in proportionate to signal
strength.
• liberation of general area Madhu and
Periyatampane. It was a classic example of
overturn of Electronic warfare information and
plays a penalty resulting loosing of over sixty lives
and more than hundreds of casualties
• Final battle of Wellamulliwaikkal totally control
with the use of EW assisted information and
absence of EW again would have changed the final
achievements.
• Confirmation of target taken by small groups and
long range reconnaissance petrol operating in LTTE
deep area by listening of LTTE radio conversation
create morale boosting factor for the team
members and commanders
EW backed commanders to keep command and
control during final phase of operation Jayasikuru.
Latter phase of the operation was an utterly chaos
situation and entire command and control yet to be
lost from security forces. Radio communication
network considerably breakdown and only electronic
warfare network was able to sustain for commanders
to handle the situation rather than achieving worst
damages.
Special Forces to closely coordinate with EW in order
to plan rescue mission
Isolate fishing boat at kokilai lagoon act as LTTE
observation point. It was the fine concentration
and skills of the EW operator who was manning
direction finding equipment at Kokkuthuduwi
detected that electromagnetic emission somewhere
at the Kokilai lagoon. It was an unfamiliar detection
for him and located at the exact place of the emission.
It was found a civil fishing boat located at the exact
place detected by EW staff. While searching, troop
recovered two LTTE carders carrying radio sets act as
observation/early warning post.
 LOCAL IMPROVISATIONS

Due to majority of equipment were marine ones, it

was difficult to find out spare parts, repair facility
within in signal base workshop. Further, allocated
funds also very limited for replace with new
equipment. Instead, technicians in work shop locally
modified or improvised some equipment obeying
basic principles earned extraordinary results in the
battle field.
 LOCAL IMPROVISATIONS.
a. LTTE captured ICOM hand hail couple with
Motorola 100 w output repeaters for jamming
purposes with increased distance.
b. ICOM hand hail couple to cougar SMT with 20 W
output used as modified jammer.
c. Sri Lanka Signal Corps amalgamate with Centre
for Research and Development (CRD) produced D-2
devises (Remote Control Claymore) which are used
very effectively by Special Forces, Commandos and
STF for their small group operations.
It was first and foremost source of information to reveal
and issued warning orders to the ground troops on
following:
a. Use of Baba/ parcilan mortars. The first use of
LTTE Charls Anthony group developed locally modified
mortar, range approximately 2 Km, portable, commonly
known as baba mortars against 8 SLLI troops deployed in
General area Thampane.
b. LTTE use of chemical agent. When the battle of
Thirumurukkandi, it was the first time in the
Humanitarian Operation that LTTE used chemical gas
generate mortar round. After its blasting reaction, it
generates gas which creates vomiting effects. But EW
staff gave very clear warning of use of chemical agent well
before both 10 SLLI and 8 SLLI those who underwent first
attack.
 ACHIEVEMENTS
• Detecting of LTTE Small Group deep operations -
Period LTTE deep operations emerging more
prominent in security forces control areas like
Cheddikulam, Madhu Road and Murunkan. Tamil
heroic Mahaviru Families those who living in urban
areas like Vavnia provided constant flow of information
to LTTE.
• EW Supported Helicopter to Land 20 Km ahead of FDL
for rescue mission. EW troops employed cluster of
mobile jammers and did barrage jamming in order to
hinder LTTE radio communication to the ineffective
level and there by virtually created a secure heli pad
20 Km away from Forward Defense Line
• Electronic Warfare staff to firstly detect LTTE Air Craft.

The Tamil tigers used fixed and rotary wing Air craft in
both conventional bomb attacks and 9/11 style kamikaze
runs. As such, LTTE is consider the first non-state actor to
have an Air force. It was a land mark achievements of
Electronic warfare operation by detecting from the
moment of air born LTTE air craft, its flying path from
place to place and giving early warning before other all
sources of information for further reactions.
EW staff prevent two suicide attacks targeting on 130
mm Artillary gun position and own headquarters.
1) Group 1- Suicide and destroy EW squadron
deployed at 16 SLNG.
(2) Group 2 -Suicide and destroy 130 mm Artillery
Gun Position located in 223 Brigade Headquarters.
(3) Group 3 - Reserve team for any failure of above
two options.
Electronic warfare staff clearly identifies the intent
and scheme of maneuver of LTTE via radio
communication. Constant monitoring ensures the
LTTE axis of advance towards the target and passed
down information rapidly to Brigade Headquarter
expecting artillery fire support.
• EW the only source who strongly told LTTE leader
remains in the Wellamulli wayikkal battle field.
It was yet another faith developed achievement
that only EW staff who with evidence strongly told
commanders to believing on facts that LTTE leader
remain alive on the battle field until he captured by
infantry troops on May 2009
• The battle of capturing Madhu church was a
landmark of pure collaboration of electronic
warfare and artillery in the early stage of the 58
and 57 division’s axis of advance. Battle of the
Vllamulliwaikkal heavily rallies on the Electronic
Warfare information while LTTE was committing
their do or die war effort.
EW detects friendly force members giving
information to LTTE. It was a great achievement of
find security forces personal giving information to the
LTTE on ransom basis. It was monitored by EW
monitoring systems after listening to their telephone
conversations. This information includes exact
trimming of air lifts and landings, timing for meals,
water souses, pay dates and etc.
Prevent of LTTE claymore attack targeting General
Officer Commander- 57 Division.

EW staff revealed that an attempt of assassinate then

General Officer Commander, 57 Division, Brigadier
Jagath Dias in between road running from Tandikulam
to Kalmadu by blasting a
claymore bomb. EW operator
personally contacts GOC
and informs the LTTE
attempt. General Officer
Commander narrowly escaped.
 LTTE attempt of assassinate 571 Brigade Commander

It was yet another claymore attack, planed by LTTE in the

area between Kalmadu and Mulliyakulamoperators
aiming then 571 Brigade Commander, Brigadier GV
Ravipriya. Conversation monitored and informed Brigade
Commander to take all precautionary actions. narrowly
escaped.
WORLD'S LARGEST HOSTAGE RESCUE MISSION
BECOMES SUCCESS WITH HELP OF EW
World's largest hostage rescue mission
becomes success with help of EW
World's largest hostage rescue mission has become a
success and over 30,000 have been rescued with shier
commitment of Electronic Warfare operation. It was
reported that at least over 30,000 civilians held
hostage by LTTE terrorists at Puthumathalan and
Amplalavanpokkani areas have been liberated with
clear and accurate information of EW staff
a. In year 1995, gang of LTTE suicide carders with
the aim of destroy Bell 212 helicopter landed at Palali
Air base were caught with the help of Direction
Finding.
b. Discover and inform LTTE suicide attempt of
destroy “Edithara” passenger craft anchored at
Kankasanthurei harbor.
c. Issuing of early warning to 516 Brigade on LTTE
122 mm artillery fire attack.
d. After monitoring LTTE radio conversation,
Electronic warfare staff reveals the LTTE intension of
attack Muhamle Forward defense line attack.
e. Reveal the attempt of LTTE attack on casualty
carrying Bell 212 helicopter at point penury.
g. Exact locations of LTTE bases at Kopai ,
Kolumbuthurei and Arealei clearly located and plan to
attack same by using artillery fire support.
h. In year 1997, retaliate the attempt of attack 22
Division by LTTE artillery fire.
i. Electronic warfare staff with Direction Finding
equipment and Radars, deployed at Nandikadal
lagoon in 591 Brigade AOR on 18.05.2009 could give
exact information of the attempt of Charles Anthony
group members in order to flee from the battle field
using ambulance belong to Army. By relying on exact
information of Electronic warfare staff, infantry troops
attacked to LTTE hijacked Army belong ambulance and
killed leader and other four.
f. One of the significant achievements of EW staff
was that one TRC 274 jammer stoppaged while in
operational deployment and technical staff
recommended to send it to the France for repair work
with estimated of cost of 1900000.00 LKR. It was
initiatives of then Lance Corporeal Kapila KA who
rectified it with only 9000.00 LKR and still it is in
working order.
g. Electronic warfare staff had unique capabilities
of obtain correct, accurate and timely information via
Direction Finding, Scanners than all other sources of
information. There were many occasions that Military
intelligence even depends up on Electronic warfare.
 DROWBACKS
Battle of General area Thampane (Temporally defeat).
There was a heavy LTTE resistance to the advancing
column of 57 division at General area Tampane. LTTE aim
was to launch a massive attack in order to push 57
Division advance column up to Omanthe with artillery fire
support. Intent with the break of 4 SLSR and 9 GR link
and then get a break through to maneuver towards
Kalmadukulam and Omanthe. Main effort with the LTTE
130mm and 152mm artillery fire support. H hour given as
1900 hrs. D-1 day EW staff monitors all LTTE radio
conversation and informed commanding officers, brigade
commander and Divisional commanders respectively.
It does not seem that our retaliation plan work out
according to the LTTE course of action and Divisional
Commander instructed to further monitor until D
day morning. EW operator very clearly informed by
experience that LTTE impose radio silence prior to
their major operation as a hobbit and monitoring
drill would not achieved much till D day morning.
There was very clam and quite environment
throughout day time.H-15 hours all LTTE radio
communication network stand on and start massive
attack with preparatory bombardment. LTTE artillery
round directly hit the Brigade Headquarters and
ammunition dump at Pampemadu.
LIMITATIONS OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE
INVOLVE OPERATIONS
• Availability of very limited equipment
• Out dated equipment
• Limited skillful staff those who fluent in Tamil
language
• Human errors
• Accuracy of information.
• Less reaction time
• Requirement of constant monitoring system
• Environment factors
Commercial purposely manufactured equipment’s
used to achieve military objectives
Absence of proper repair and replenishment system
Technical errors in comparison to ground
 REMEDIAL ACTIONS TO OVERCOME
LIMITATIONS
Constant training of Electronic warfare staff
Cordiality connections with sister services
Field trails and error calculations.
Attachment of Tamil language proficiency soldiers to
Electronic warfare squadrons
Assist of Headquarter - Chief Signal office
Operational commitment of Electronic warfare staff.
 OBSERVATIONS & SHORTFALLS IN
ARMY ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEM
a. Lack of integration & coordination with other
Intelligence agencies.
b. Inability to monitor telecomm networks, mobile
phones, IT networks & satellite links.
c. Unavailability of powerful jammers.
d. Unavailability of a proper ELINT system.
e. Lack of a proper Research & Development Wing.
f. Lack of an Island wide electronic warfare
network.