Maurice SCHICK, Appellant, v. George J. REED, Chairman of the United States Board of Parole, et al. No. 72-1508.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. Argued June 18, 1973. Decided July 23, 1973. Rehearing denied Oct. 1, 1973. Facts: In 1954 the appellant Schick, a master sergeant in the United States Army, was convicted by a court-martial of the premeditated murder of an 8-year old girl, in violation of Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The court-martial sentenced Schick to death. In 1960, President Eisenhower commuted the sentence to a dishonorable discharge and imprisonment for life upon the express condition that Schick should "never have any rights, privileges, claims, or benefits arising under the parole and suspension or remission of sentence laws of the United States and the regulations promulgated there under governing Federal prisoners confined in any civilian or military penal institution or any acts amendatory or supplementary thereof." Schick was thereafter committed to the custody of the Attorney General and is now confined in the United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. In 1971, petitioner filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to require the members of the United States Board of Parole to consider him for parole. The United States Board of Parole has declined to consider him for parole
although in the absence of the condition attached to the President's commutation he would be eligible for such consideration.
Issue: Whether or not President Eisenhower's decision to commute Schick's death sentence on the condition that he never be granted parole was unconstitutional.
Held: On December 23 1974, the Supreme Court issued its decision affirming the ruling of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court dismissed Schick's claim that President Eisenhower's action was unconstitutional and that he exceeded his powers to commute criminal sentences because it imposed a condition not authorized by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Tracing the development and Court's interpretation of the President's powers to commute sentences, Chief Justice Burger argued that since the pardoning power is an enumerated one, any limit on it must be found in the Constitution and its use does not depend on statutes such as those found in the military code. Chief Justice Burger also argue that the no-parole condition attached to the commutation of the petitioners death sentence is similar to sanctions imposed by legislatures such as mandatory minimum sentences or statutes otherwise precluding parole; it does not offend the Constitution.
PHILIPPINIZED DECISION Given the same facts of the case, the ruling of the Supreme Court would still be the same. The Supreme Court will have dismissed Schicks claim that Presidents Eisenhowers action was unconstitutional. Taking into consideration the date of the conviction by final judgment, we may establish our ruling based on the 1935 Constitution. We must also review Philippine laws on pardons. Section 21 of the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 (commonly known as Jones Law) provided in part as follows: Sec. 21. That the supreme executive power shall be vested in an executive officer, whose official title shall be "The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.". . . He is hereby vested with the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures. . . . Then, Paragraph 6, Section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provided as follows: (6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the Congress. The President may exercise his power to grant commutations in this particular case. Executive clemency is granted for the purpose of relieving the harshness of the law or
correcting mistakes in the administration of justice. Since the exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President, it is allowed by the Constitution to grant commutation with restrictions and limitations as the President may deem proper to impose. In In Re Lontok 1, the petitioner convicted of bigamy and was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment was pardoned by the Governor General on the condition that he shall not again be guilty of any misconduct. Also, in the cases of Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of Bohol
2
and Infante v. The Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental 3, the
petitioner accepted a pardon subject to the condition that he would not thereafter commit a violation of the penal laws of the Philippines. When he was conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carried with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. The Chief Executive issues a conditional pardon and imposes the conditions in it in the exercise of his constitutional powers. The Chief Executive is vested with his authority not only by law (Sec. 64 [i], Revised Administrative Code), but by the very Constitution (Art. VII, Sec. 10 [6] granting him the power to attach such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. In line with this constitutional power of the Chief Executive, we should not, without good ground or valid reason, brush aside and hold invalid a condition imposed by the Chief Executive on a conditional pardon on the ground that it is oppressive and unjust, especially if to do so, we defy and ignore the weight of legal jurisprudence.
1 2
43 Phil 293 108 Phil. 353 3 G.R. No. L-4164 Dec. 12, 1952
