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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
WICHITA FALLS DIVISION

§
LANDON PAUL GOAD; and §
SARAH LYNN JOHNSON, §
§
§ CIVIL ACTION NO: 7:23-cv-63 .
Plaintiffs, §
§
~ versus ~ §
§
§
JEFF LYDE,
§
CLAY COUNTY, TEXAS,
§
§
Defendants. §
§

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

COME NOW the Plaintiffs LANDON GOAD and SARAH JOHNSON,

Plaintiffs, complaining of the Defendants JEFF LYDE and CLAY COUNTY, TEXAS and for

their causes of action do respectfully allege as follows:

INTRODUCTION:

John Swenson, Justice of the Peace of Clay County Texas, described how:

“The treatment of Ms Johnson and Mr. Goad, and the Sheriff’s

disregard for this court’s order are matters of grave concern.”

Under the highly unusual circumstances of this case, the Justice of the Peace for

Clay County went to so far as to refer the Defendants in this case for prosecution arising from the

Defendants’ abuse of the Plaintiffs’ civil and constitutional rights as more fully described below.
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This Action seeks redress for the violation of the Plaintiffs’ rights and to ensure that

no Texas is ever mistreated the way the Plaintiffs were by Sheriff Lyde and Clay County.

I
PARTIES

1. Plaintiff LANDON PAUL GOAD, is a natural person resident at the

County of Clay in the State of Texas.

2. Plaintiff SARAH LYNN JOHNSON, is a natural person resident at the

County of Clay in the State of Texas.

3. At all times relevant to this suit, Defendant JEFF LYDE was the Sheriff of

the Clay County, Texas and may be served at his place of employment at the Clay County Sheriff’s

Office located at 215 W Gilbert St, Henrietta, TX 76365, or wherever he may be found.

4. Defendant Lyde is being sued in his individual capacity.

5. Defendant CLAY COUNTY, TEXAS is a governmental entity in Texas.

It may be served through its County Judge, Mike Campbell, at 214 N. Main St., Henrietta, Texas

76365.

6. JOHN DOES 1 – 10 are individual and government agencies whose true

identities are unknown to the Plaintiff at this time.

II
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

7. The Court has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1331and § 1343 since Plaintiff is suing for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

8. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1367.
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9. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391 because the Defendants are domiciled and reside in the Northern District of Texas and all

of the causes of action accrued in the Northern District of Texas.

III
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

a. The False Arrest of Plaintiffs and their

70 Hours in Custody without Seeing a Judge

10. Plaintiffs have always had a feisty relationship.

11. On Saturday afternoon, July 10, 2021 at around 2:45 P.M, Clay County

Sheriff’s Deputies Joshua Fergueson and Demonta Brooks attended to the Plaintiffs home on

New London Road, in Henrietta where the Plaintiffs were engaged in a spirited discussion with

one another.

12. While being questioned at their home about reports of a disturbance coming

from their home, the Plaintiffs explained to the Deputies that they had not engaged in any battery

or other assault against each other that night and that neither sought to press charges.

13. No probable cause existed for the arrest of either Plaintiff.

14. Nevertheless, both the Plaintiffs were arrested on the evening of July 10,

2021 for allegedly engaging in domestic violence against each other.

15. Each of the Plaintiffs was placed in a segregation cell for the evening.

16. On Sunday, the Plaintiffs were not brought in front of a judge.

17. On Monday, the Plaintiffs were not brought in front of a judge.

18. The Plaintiffs understood that in Texas, an arrestee on a misdemeanor

charge was required to brought before a Judge within 24 hours of their arrest, and an arrestee on a

felony charge was required to be brought before a Judge within 48 hours of their arrest.
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19. After the expiration of the 48 hours on the evening of July 12, Plaintiff

Johnson pushed the button for the intercom in her segregation cell, intended for use in emergencies.

20. Renee Weaver, the jail administrator, answered the call and asked Plaintiff

Johnson the nature of her emergency.

21. Plaintiff Johnson explained that 48 hours had elapsed since her arrest and

asked for her constitutional rights – including to be brought before a Judge – to be honored.

22. Ms. Weaver retaliated against Plaintiff Johnson by threatening to put her on

suicide watch not for any legitimate purpose, but to intimidate Plaintiff Johnson into silence and

into waive her constitutional rights.

23. At no time prior to the threat from Ms. Weaver, did Plaintiff Johnson

indicate that she was suicidal or make any representation that could be interpreted as threatening

self-harm. Her assessment upon admission also indicated that there was no indication of self-

harm.

24. Plaintiff Johnson was aware that if put on “Suicide Watch” she would not

be allowed to have a blanket, bedsheet, book, or mat, which were her only possessions in the cell.

25. Plaintiff Johnson complied with Ms. Weaver demand that Plaintiff Johnson

not assert her constitutional rights, but nevertheless Deputies Johns, Nash and Sharp entered

Plaintiff’s cell on July 12, 2021 and removed Plaintiff’s belongings but did not remove the shower

curtain.

26. To speak with her Mother who worked at a local ER, Plaintiff Johnson

feigned self-harm so she would be admitted to the local ER and speak with her mother – an

unsuccessful ploy.
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27. Upon Plaintiff Johnson’s return to the prison from the ER she was placed in

a tight room and was told by Jeff Lyde that Justice of the Peace Justice Swenson was responsible

for the Plaintiff remaining in custody without seeing a judge for more than 48 hours.

28. While in custody, the Plaintiffs heard the Deputies admit that they did not

have sufficient information to support “probable cause” and that Clay County Sheriff Jeff Lyde

had reviewed a draft Affidavit and advised the Deputies to change their testimony on the Affidavits

to reflect untrue information, but which would support “probable cause” for the Plaintiffs’ arrest.

29. On July 13, 2021 at 1:00 pm, (70 hours after being arrested) the Plaintiffs

were brought before Clay County Judge Mike Cambell, who set their bonds at $1,500.00 each.

30. The Plaintiffs bonded out immediately.

b. Plaintiffs Learn of Justice of the Peace Swenson’s Order

31. A few weeks following this incident (approximately mid-August 2021), the

Plaintiffs returned to Court for a hearing at which the Plaintiffs was given some of their file.

32. The Plaintiffs learned unbeknownst to the them at the time, on or about July

12, 2021, Deputy Demonte Brooks executed an Affidavit for Warrant of Arrest and Detention in

which he alleged exaggerated and untrue factual allegations about the Plaintiffs’ interaction with

each other on July 10, 2021.

33. The Affidavit was presented at the Magistration, which took place 46 hours

after the Plaintiffs were incarcerated.

34. The allegations in the Affidavit were so outlandish and thin, that upon

review, Justice of the Peace John Swenson for Clay County declined to sign the Warrant, holding

that: “Court finds no P[robable] C[ause] for arrest.”

35. Judge Swenson found “the cause is Dismissed”.

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36. Annexed to the Original Complaint as Exhibit A is a complete, true and

accurate copy of the Affidavit for Warrant of Arrest and Detention, which Judge Swenson declined

to sign.

37. Nevertheless, Defendant Lyde contacted the Judge and said words to the

effect of “they would be in jail in the morning and they would have a P[reliminary] C[conference]”.

38. This led the Judge to believe that another Magistrate must have signed a

warrant authorizing the Plaintiffs’ continued incarceration.

39. In fact, no other court official had authorized the Plaintiffs’ continued

incarceration.

40. Annexed to the Original Complaint as Exhibit B is a complete, true and

accurate copy of the Referral by the Justice of the Peace Swenson dated July 13, 2021, to the

District Attorney after the Judge learned of the manipulation of the probable cause affidavit and

the false imprisonment of the Plaintiffs. It describes some of the circumstances of the false

imprisonment.

41. Annexed to the Original Complaint as Exhibit C is a complete, true and

accurate copy of the indictment against Sheriff Lyde arising from (among other things) Defenday

Lyde’s actions toward the Plaintiffs described in this Original Complaint.

42. Annexed to the Original Complaint as Exhibit C is a complete, true and

accurate copy of the Notice of Extraneous Offenses against Sheriff Lyde alleging the manipulation

of the probable cause affidavit as against Plaintiff Goad, at issue in this Original Complaint.
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IV
CAUSES OF ACTION

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Claim Under Section 1983
(Plaintiffs against All Defendants)

43. Plaintiffs respectfully incorporate by reference all prior allegations in this

Original Complaint.

44. Defendants’ transactions with the Plaintiffs - including the false arrest of

the Plaintiffs, the unlawful detainer of the Plaintiffs and the false imprisonment of the Plaintiffs–

occurred under Color of Law.

45. Each of the Defendants deprived the Plaintiffs of their rights, privileges and

immunities under the U.S. Constitution and Federal Law.

46. Plaintiffs discovered the 1983 violation on or about August 2021, because

the Defendants intentionally hid and withheld information from the Plaintiffs that would have

informed them that they had suffered from False Imprisonment.

47. As a direct and proximate consequence of the Defendants’ deprivation of

the Plaintiffs’ rights, privileges and immunities under the U.S. Constitution and Federal Law, the

Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

Municipal Liability
Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services
Violation of the Fourth Amendment Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

48. Plaintiffs respectfully incorporate by reference all prior allegations in this

Original Complaint.
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49. Municipalities, including counties and cities, may be held liable under

§ 1983, Hampton Co. Nat’l Sur., LLC v. Tunica Cty., 543 F.3d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 2008).

50. A Municipality may be sued under § 1983 if a constitutional violation is the

result of a formal policy or governmental custom, Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d

161, 166 (5th Cir. 2010).

51. A Municipality may be liable under § 1983 if the execution of one of its

customs or policies deprives a plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights, Monell v. Dep’t of Social

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978).

52. “Under the decisions of the Supreme Court and [the Fifth Circuit],

municipal liability under section 1983 requires proof of three elements: a policy maker; an official

policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.”

Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).

53. A decision to adopt a particular course of conduct represents official policy

even if it is not intended to govern future conduct so long as the decision was made by a final

policymaker, Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452

(1986).

54. Where action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the

municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken

repeatedly, Id.

55. Municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where a deliberate choice to

follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials

responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question, Pembaur,

475 U.S. at 483, 106 S. Ct. at 1300.

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56. As applied here:

(i.) Decision by Final Policymaker

57. The Sheriff is the chief law enforcement officer for Clay County regarding

law enforcement.

58. Under Texas law, sheriffs are “final policymakers” in the area of law

enforcement for the purposes of holding a county liable under § 1983, James, 577 F.3d at 617;

citing Williams, 352 F.3d at 1013.

59. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Defendant Lyde was the Sheriff of Clay

County and was the “final policymaker” in the area of law enforcement for the purposes of holding

a county liable under § 1983, Id.

(ii.) Official Conduct

60. In this case, Sheriff Lyde and Clay County adopted a particular course of

conduct in the false arrest of the Plaintiffs on facts that the Justice of the Peace found insufficient

to support the arrest.

61. Sheriff Lyde and Clay County further adopted a particular course of conduct

in misleading the Justice of the Peace that another Judge had signed off on a warrant sufficient to

keep the Plaintiffs incarcerated even after an express judicial finding that no probable existed for

the continued arrest of the Plaintiffs.

62. This course of conduct by Sheriff Lyde represents official policy of Clay

County,even if it is not intended to govern future conduct because the decision was made by Clay

County’s final policymaker – Sheriff Lyde, See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481.

63. The continued false arrest of Plaintiffs was directed by Sheriff Lyde, the

person who establishes governmental policy and is by law the official policymaker in the area of
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law enforcement for the purposes of holding the county liable under § 1983, Clay County is equally

responsible whether that action was to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly, Pembaur, 475

U.S. at 481; James, 577 F.3d at 617; citing Williams, 352 F.3d at 1013.

64. In this case, (1) Sheriff Lyde, as the official policymaker for Clay County,

(2) adopted a particular course of action in the false arrest of the Plaintiffs, and the continued

incarceration of the Plaintiffs on the basis of facts that were determined to not support Probable

Cause, (3) which that the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to be free from illegal seizures under the

Fourth Amendment as a violation articulated in Franks v. Delaware and outlined in Count I, supra,

and (4) was the sole cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

False Imprisonment
(Plaintiffs against All Defendants)

65. Plaintiffs respectfully incorporate by reference all prior allegations in this

Original Complaint.

66. Plaintiffs willfully detained the Defendants.

67. Plaintiffs’ detention of the Defendants was done without the Defendants

consent.

68. Plaintiffs did not have authority of law to detain the Defendants.

69. Plaintiffs discovered that they had suffered from False Imprisonment in or

about August 2021, because the Defendants intentionally hid and withheld information from the

Plaintiffs that would have informed them that they had suffered from False Imprisonment.
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70. As a direct and proximate consequence of the Defendants’ deprivation of

the Plaintiffs’ rights, privileges and immunities under the U.S. Constitution and Federal Law, the

Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

V
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

71. Plaintiffs respectfully incorporate by reference all prior allegations in this

Original Complaint.

72. When viewed objectively from the standpoint of Defendants Lyde and Clay

County at the time of the occurrence, said Defendants’ conduct involved an extreme degree of risk,

considering the probability and magnitude of potential harm to others.

73. As a direct, proximate, and producing cause and the intentional, egregious,

malicious conduct by Defendants Lyde and Clay County, which was recklessly or callously

indifferent to Plaintiff’s protected rights, Plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive damages in an

amount within the jurisdictional limits of this Court against Defendants Lyde and Clay County.

VI
DAMAGES

74. Plaintiffs respectfully incorporate by reference all prior allegations in this

Original Complaint.

75. Plaintiffs’ injuries were a foreseeable event. Those injuries were directly

and proximately caused by Defendants’ conduct. As a result, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover all

actual damages allowed by law.

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76. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that Defendants’ conduct constitutes malice,

evil intent or reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights. Thus,

Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages against Defendants.

77. As a direct and proximate result of the occurrence which made the basis of

this lawsuit, Plaintiff was forced to suffer:

a. Deprivations of their liberty;

b. Incarceration and false imprisonment;
c. harm to their reputation in the past and future;
d. lost wages, fringe benefits, and diminished earning capacity;
e. Emotional distress, torment, and mental anguish;
f. pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; and
g. such other and further relief, general and special, legal and equitable,
to which Plaintiffs are justly entitled.
h.
78. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988, Plaintiff seeks to recover, and

hereby requests the award of punitive damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of court.

VII
ATTORNEY’S FEES

79. If Plaintiffs prevail in this action, by settlement or otherwise, Plaintiff is

entitled to and hereby demands attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

VIII
JURY REQUEST

80. Plaintiff respectfully requests a jury trial.

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PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays that judgment be

rendered against Defendants, for an amount in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of this

Court. Plaintiff further pray for all other relief, both legal and equitable, to which they may show

themselves justly entitled.

Dated: July 10, 2023

Respectfully Submitted,

Counsel for the Plaintiffs

Baruch S. Gottesman, Esq.

New York Bar No. 4480539
GOTTESMAN LEGAL PLLC
11 Broadway, Suite 615
New York, NY 10004
Phone: (212) 401-6910
Fax: (212) 859-7307
bg@gottesmanlegal.com
Counsel for Plaintiffs
Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice
to be Promptly Submitted

/s/ James P. Roberts

JAMES P. ROBERTS
State Bar No. 24105721
SCOTT H. PALMER
State Bar No. 00797196

SCOTT H. PALMER, P.C.

15455 Dallas Parkway,
Suite 540, LB 32
Dallas, Texas 75001
Tel: (214) 987-4100
Fax: (214) 922-9900
scott@scottpalmerlaw.com
james@scottpalmerlaw.com
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS
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JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
PCT. 1, CLAY COUNTY, TEXAS

John Swenson, Justice of the Peace

214 N. Main / PO Box
71
Cindy Davis, Justice Court Clerk
Henrietta, Texas76365
Cara Willis, Justice Court Clerk Office: ( 940)538-
6531
Fax: (940)264-4161

July 13, 2021

Hon. Casey Polhemus By Fax to 940/894-6203

th
District Attorney, 97 Judicial District
PO Box 55
Montague, TX 76251

RE: Magistration of Cases #JP-20211193 and JP-2021-193A

Dear Ms. Polhemus:

I request that your office investigate the Clay County Sheriff’s conduct in two case that this
court magistrated on July 12, 2021. JP-2021-193 is a family violence
against Sara Johnson, and JP-2021-193A is a family violence case against
her boy friend Landon Goad. They were both arrested at the same family
violence incident. They were held in jail for approximately 46 hours before
I was notified that they were ready for magistration.

At magistration I made a finding of “no probable cause for arrest” in both

cases. I noted on the PC Affidavit in each case that “ probable cause does
not exist” and that “the cause is Dismissed”. Later that day the Sheriff
contacted me and said words to the effect “that they would be in jail in the
morning and they would have PC. I assumed he was going to get a warrant
from another magistrate,
but on the morning of July 13, 2021, I found that they were still in jail on
the original arrest.
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On July 13, 2021, I contacted you for an appointment regarding this
matter. I then contacted the Sheriff’s Dispatcher to obtain a copy of the
original PC Affidavit that I had signed during magistration in the jail; I was
advised that it may have been destroyed.

The treatment of Ms. Johnson and Mr. Goad, and the Sheriff’s disregard for
this court’s order are matters of grave concern. Therefore I am requesting
that your office investigate the matter.

Very truly yours,

_______________________________________
John Swenson, Justice of the Peace
Encl: - copies of PC Affidavits
- Jail Roster Photo
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