G.R. No.

15574 September 17, 1919

SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.), petitioner,

vs.
JOAQUIN NATIVIDAD, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, respondent.

FACTS:
Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippine Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the
owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916,
of more than fifteen tons gross The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for
the purpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the Islands.
Application was made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs
for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector refused to issue the certificate,
giving as his reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens
either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. The instant action is the result.
On February 23, 1918, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2761. The first
section of this law amended section 1172 of the Administrative Code.
Counsel says that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal
protection of the laws because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning
vessels, and because classification of corporations based on the citizenship of one or
more of their stockholders is capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation
of its properly without due process of law because by the passage of the law company
was automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left
with the naked title to a boat it could not use .
ISSUE:

Whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can
deny the registry of vessel in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien
stockholders.

RULING:
YES, this is a valid exercise of police power. Common carriers which in the
Philippines as in the United States and other countries are, as Lord Hale said, "affected
with a public interest," can only be permitted to use these public waters as a privilege
and under such conditions as to the representatives of the people may seem wise. Act
No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &.
Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong
to that vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but does
fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power, and so
does not offend against the constitutional provision.

With full consciousness of the importance of the question, we nevertheless are

clearly of the opinion that the limitation of domestic ownership for purposes of obtaining
a certificate of Philippine registry in the coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippine
Islands, and to citizens of the United States, does not violate the provisions of
paragraph 1 of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916. No treaty right
relied upon Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is held valid and constitutional .

The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied

G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,

vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant

FACTS:

The Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a resolution which required all

Manguianes to stay in one permanent settlement. The said resolution was approved by
the Secretary of Interior as required under Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative
Code. This provision authorized the establishment of “non-Christian” sites to be
selected by the provincial governor, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order.

Petitioner Rubi and other Manguianes were recommended by the Provincial

Governor of Mindoro to take their habitation on an unoccupied land of Tigbao on Naujan
Lake and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they run in accordance
with Section 2759 of the Revised Administrative Code for a period not exceeding sixty
days. The Manguianes had to stay there for a reason of cultivation under certain plans.
Over 300 Manguianes were confined on a 800-hectare land whereas the land is under
the resolution of the Provincial Board. Then Dabalos, one of the Manguianes, was taken
by the provincial sheriff and imprisoned him at Calapan solely because he escaped from
the reservation.

The Manguianes used out a writ of habeas corpus alleging that they are deprived
of their liberty in violation of law by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board
creating the reservation. The validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code 1917
was challenged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is an unlawful

delegation of legislative power to the local government.

RULING:

NO. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful

delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a
department head. Accordingly, an exception to the general rule, sanctioned by
immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers
to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the
Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial
board. It held that under the doctrine of necessity, no one else was in a better position
to determine whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor, who is given
the discretion and option to execute the law as circumstances may arise.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of

the Administrative Code and held the that the resolution of the provincial board of
Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, since the degree of civilization
of the Manguianes was the primary consideration and that they were restrained for their
own good and the general good of the Philippines. Likewise, it does not deprive a
person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws as there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike
to all of a class, therefore a legitimate exertion of the police power.
G.R. No. L-15972 October 11, 1920

KWONG SING, in his own behalf and in behalf of all others having a common or
general interest in the subject-matter of this action, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 532 to avoid disputes between
laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to
decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded. The object of the ordinance was,
accordingly, the promotion of peace and good order and the prevention of fraud, deceit,
cheating, and imposition. The convenience of the public would also presumably be
served in a community where there is a Babel of tongues by having receipts made out
in the two official languages. Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such
purposes are permissible under the police power.

Chinese laundrymen protested, claiming that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class
legislation; contending that there are only fifty two Chinese laundrymen in the City of
Manila, (with reference to the count of the Collector of Internal Revenue) that it unjustly
discriminates between persons in similar circumstances; that it constitutes an arbitrary
infringement of property rights. The laundrymen and employees in Chinese laundries do
not, as a rule, speak, read, and write English or Spanish. Some of them are, however,
able to write and read numbers.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the
scope of police power

RULING:

Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible

under the police power. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No.
532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the
approval of the mayor of the city.

The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid
disputes between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers
of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded.

In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the
ordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the
guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal property rights.
The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all
public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos,
Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each every one of them
without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection for the
implementation of the ordinance is based in sec. 2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code.
Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected
by the ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish
or English, but mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that
the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or
property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the
enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power
of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police power is the control of private
interests for the public welfare.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a
preliminary injunction is denied.
G.R. No. L-20479 February 6, 1925

YU CONG ENG, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
W. TRINIDAD, Collector of Internal Revenue, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:

Act No. 2972, popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law was enacted,
prohibiting any person, company, partnership or corporation engaged in commerce, industry or
any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, to keep its account books in
any language other than English, Spanish or any local dialect.

On March 2, 1923, the agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in the exercise of their
legitimate functions, inspected the books of account of the Chinese merchant Yu Cong Eng.
Upon finding that said books were not kept in accordance with their understanding of the
provisions of Act No. 2972, a criminal case was filed against him.

Yu Cong Eng claiming that he neither reads, writes, nor understands the English or
Spanish language or any local dialect, assail the validity of Act No. 2972 on the ground that it
violates treaty and constitutional rights of Chinese merchants, domiciled in the Philippine
Islands; that it is is unreasonable and oppressive in nature thereby violating due process and
equal protection laws.

The law is defended by the city fiscal of Manila as a proper and reasonable exercise of
the police power of the Philippine Government, and of its power of taxation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not of Act No. 2972 violates due process clause.

RULING:

Act No. 2972 is valid and constitutional. It is not intended for the convenience of the
trader or the protection of the creditors, but has relation to the public welfare, to the power of
taxation, to the right of the government to exist.

Power of taxation is one of the strongest powers of the government. In order to bring
taxation imposed by a state within the scope of the due process of law, the case should be so
clearly and probably an illegal encroachment upon private rights as to leave no doubt that such
taxation by its necessary operation is really spoliation under the power to tax.

Chinese will not be singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile
legislation, for the law applies to all regardless of their citizenship.
G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009

ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner,

vs.
Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO.,
INC., Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services,

Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment
for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus
$700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.

On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded

employment contract upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he
would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.
Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the
Philippines, serving only two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine
months and twenty-three days.

Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was
declared illegal. On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision
of RA 8042. Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he
questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of
RA 8042.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on
non-impairment of contracts;

2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.

RULING:

1. No. Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package
he will receive is not tenable. As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No.
8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the employment contract between petitioner
and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly
the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the
parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have
incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.

But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not
be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause,
for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State.
2. Yes. The subject clause, the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8042, is declared unconstitutional.

Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor
sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and
welfare. There can never be a justification for any form of government action that
alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector,
especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as
placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose
protection no less than the Constitution commands.
G.R. No. 113911 January 23, 1998

VINTA MARITIME CO., INC. and ELKANO SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and LEONIDES C.
BASCONCILLO, respondents.

FACTS:

Leonides Basconsillo, private respondent, filed a complaint with the Philippine

Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for illegal dismissal against Vinta
Maritime Co. Inc. and Elkano Ship Management, Inc. Petitioners alleged that Leonides
was dismissed for his gross negligence and incompetent performance as chief engineer
of the M/V Boracay.

The POEA ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed. On appeal, the
NLRC affirmed the POEA. Likewise, the NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent is illegally dismissed.

RULING:

The absence of a valid cause for termination in this case is apparent. For an
employee’s dismissal to be valid, (1) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and (2) the
employee must be afforded due process. Petitioners allege that private respondent was
dismissed because of his incompetence, enumerating incidents in proof thereof.
However, this is contradicted by private respondent’s seaman’s book which states that
his discharge was due to an emergency leave. Moreover, his alleged incompetence is
belied by the remarks made by petitioners in the same book that private respondent’s
services were “highly recommended” and that his conduct and ability were rated “very
good “. Petitioners’ allegation that such remark and ratings were given to private
respondent as an accommodation for future employment fails to persuade. The Court
cannot consent to such an accommodation, even if the allegation were true, as it is a
blatant misrepresentation. It cannot exculpate petitioners based on such
misrepresentation. When petitioners issued the accommodation, they must have known
its possible repercussions.

Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires notice and
hearing. Before the employee can be dismissed under Art. 282, the Code requires the
service of a written notice containing a statement of the cause/s of termination and
giving said employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. A notice of
termination in writing is further required if the employee’s dismissal is decided upon.
The employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before termination of
employment can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice
which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss. The twin
requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process,
and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the
constitutional guaranty.

Illegally dismissed workers are entitled to the payment of their salaries corresponding to
the unexpired portion of their employment where the employment is for a definite period.
Conformably, the administrator and the NLRC properly awarded private respondent
salaries for the period of the effectivity of his contract.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. The challenged decision and

resolution are affirmed.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257 July 17, 2012

CRISELDA C. GACAD, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE HILARION P. CLAPIS, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Nabunturan,
Compostela Valley, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a Verified Complaint against Judge Clapis for Grave Misconduct
and Corrupt Practices, Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and
violations of Canon 1 (Rule 1.01, 1.02), Canon 2 (Rule 2.01), and Canon 3 (Rule 3.05)
of the Code of Judicial Conduct relative to a criminal case.
Petitioner alleged that she met Judge Clapis at the Golden Palace Hotel in
Tagum City to talk about the case of her brother. The prosecutor of the said case,
Graciano Arafol, informed the petitioner that the Judge will do everything for her favor
but on the pretext that in return she has to give P50,000.00 to the Judge. During the
meeting, the Judge, after being satisfied of the promise of the petitioner for that amount,
told her "Sige, kay ako na bahala, gamuson nato ni sila." (Okay, leave it all to me, we
shall crush them.)
When the case was set on hearing, the Notices of Hearings were mailed to the
petitioner only after the date of hearing. Judge Clapis started conducting the bail
hearings without an application for bail and granting the same without affording the
prosecution the opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. He set a
preliminary conference seven months from the date it was set, patently contrary to his
declaration of speedy trial for the case. However, the judge claimed that notices were
made verbally because of time constraints. Nevertheless, he stressed that both sides
were given the opportunity to be heard since in almost all proceedings, petitioner was in
court and the orders were done in open court. He admitted that his personnel
inadvertently scheduled the preliminary conference of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of the charges.

RULING:
Yes, the respondent Judge is guilty of the charges.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law
or standard of behavior in connection with one’s performance of official functions and
duties. For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be
corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent disregard of well-
known rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment.
The acts of Judge Clapis in meeting the petitioner, a litigant in a case pending
before his sala and telling those words, constitute gross misconduct. Judge Clapis’
wrongful intention and lack of judicial reasoning are made overt by the circumstances
on record. Judge Clapis cannot escape liability by shifting the blame to his court
personnel. He ought to know that judges are ultimately responsible for order and
efficiency in their courts, and the subordinates are not the guardians of the judge’s
responsibility.
 The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together, give doubt as to his
impartiality, integrity and propriety. His acts amount to gross misconduct constituting
violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly: Canon 2, Section 1 and 2;
Canon 3, Section 2 and 4; and Canon 4, Section 1.

We also find Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance of the law for conducting bail
hearings without a petition for bail being filed by the accused and without affording the
prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. Here, the act
of Judge Clapis is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment but a
patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error
produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the
law. If judges are allowed to wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by the law,
there will not only be confusion in the administration of justice but also oppressive
disregard of the basic requirements of due process.

WHEREFORE, Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley is dismissed from the service for Gross Misconduct
and Gross Ignorance of the Law, with forfeiture of all benefits due him, except accrued
leave credits, and disqualification from appointment to any public office including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
G.R. Nos. 187912-14 January 31, 2011

JOEY P. MARQUEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN 5th DIVISION and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, Respondents.

FACTS:

As per COA Audit Report, for the year 1996 to 1998 that the procurement of
several thousand rounds of bullets were grossly overpriced from VMY Trading, thus
issuing a notice of disallowance, reconsideration was later sought however, denied.
Marquez filed motion to refer prosecution’s evidence for examination by the
question documents Section of NBI insisting that his signatures on the vouchers were
forged. However, the prosecution said that, when confronted during the COA audit
investigation, Marquez never raised the defense of forgery. Instead, he insisted on the
propriety of the transaction. Thus he was estopped from alleging such and denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Public Respondent Sandiganbayan 5th Division committed
Grave Abuse of Discretion Amounting to Lack Or Excess Of Jurisdiction upon denying
the petitioner’s Motion to refer prosecution’s evidence for examination of the document.
RULING:
In connection with Sec. 14 Art.III of the 1987 Constitution that due process in
criminal proceedings requires that (a) the court or tribunal trying the case is properly
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that
jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused
is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing.
In the case at bar, Marquez was not afforded with reasonable opportunity to
present evidence hence he was deprived of his right to present his own defense. How
the prosecution, or even the court, perceives his defense to be is irrelevant. To them,
his defense may seem feeble and his strategy frivolous, but he should be allowed to
adduce evidence of his own choice. The court should not control how he will defend
himself as long as the steps to be taken will not be in violation of the rules.
Also, the delay was due to the denial of Marquez simple request. The fact that
Marquez did not raise this issue with the COA is immaterial and irrelevant.

Petition Granted Aside. The 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered
to allow the petitioner Joey P. Marquez to refer the evidence of the prosecution to the
Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation for examination
G.R. No. L-52364 March 25, 1983

RICARDO VALLADOLID, petitioner,

vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, Deputy Minister of Labor, and COPACABANA
APARTMENT-HOTEL, respondents.

FACTS:

Ricardo Valladolid, petitioner, in was employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephone

switchboard operator. He was subsequently transferred to the position of clerk-collector
by the president of JRM. The transfer was motivated by the interception of business and
confidential matters to a competitor hotel by (allegedly) Villadolid who was then working
as a switchboard operator and while serving in his capacity as clerk/collector, copies of
Accounts Receivables reached the competitor hotel (Tropicana Apartment- Hotel)
although said copies were not referred to them.
To finally and fully confirm suspicions that Ricardo Valladolid was the person
responsible for the aforementioned disclosures, a plan for the entrapment was
conceived by the Copacabana Apartment- Hotel. After the entrapment scheme had
been effected, Valladolid filed a written request for a 5-day vacation leave which was
extended to 30 days. When he went back to work, JRM refused to admit him and
instead asked him to resign. RM maintains that Valladolid left the office that same day
and never returned because he was reprimanded for his unauthorized absences.
Valladolid later filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with vacation and sick leave pay.

The Ministry ruled that the application for clearance with preventive suspension is
denied and respondent (JRM) is hereby ordered to reinstate the complainant
(Valladolid) to his former position without back wages and without loss of seniority
rights. Valladolid appealed the foregoing order to the Minister of Labor seeking
modification of the same, praying for the award of back wages from the time he was
illegally dismissed but the Deputy Minister of Labor (Inciong) dismissed both appeals
after finding "no sufficient justification or valid reason to alter, modify, much less reverse
the Order appealed from.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the non-award of back wages raised by Valladolid claiming that
the Orders of Deputy Minister of Labor are contrary to law and evidence.

2. Whether or not JRM was deprived of due process when the Deputy Minister of
Labor sustained the finding of respondent Regional Director that there is no
evidence to support the dismissal of private respondent.

RULING:
 Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct is not required, it being sufficient that
there is some basis for the same or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe
that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein renders
him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position. However, as this
was Valladolid's first offense, as found by the Regional Director, dismissal from the
service is too harsh a punishment, considering that he had not been previously
admonished, warned or suspended for any misdemeanor. Besides as clerk-collector, he
need not be given access to facts relative to the business of Copacabana, which, if
divulged to Tropicana would be to the former's prejudice.

The Regional Director ruled that the absences of Valladolid were unauthorized
but did gross neglect of duty or abandonment of work which requires a deliberate
refusal to resume employment or a clear showing in terms of specific circumstances
that the worker does not intend to report for work. But as Valladolid had been AWOL, no
error was committed by respondent Regional Director in ordering his reinstatement
without back wages.

JRM cannot claim that it was deprived of due process considering that
applications for clearance have to be summarily investigated and a decision required to
be rendered within ten (10) days from the filing of the opposition. As this Court had
occasion to hold there is no violation of due process where the Regional Director merely
required the submission of position papers and resolved the case summarily thereafter.

Hence, the Petitions for certiorari are DENIED.

G.R. No. 88709 February 11, 1992

NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, JUAN COQUINCO and CARLOS

COQUINCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORINO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Ex-
Officio Sheriff of Bulacan, UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, MANUEL L. CO,
GOLDEN STAR INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR
THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN, respondents.

FACTS:
On January 24 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of P2M from
the private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and to secure payment
thereof, the former executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land in Bulacan.
The mortgage was foreclosed for the supposed non-payment of the loan, and the
sheriff’s sale was held without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor and re-
publication of the notices on the change of date.

In this regard, petitioner NICOS filed an action for the annulment of the sale and
recovery of the land and other damages. UCPB defended that the foreclosure of the
mortgage was because NICOS failed to pay the loan in accordance to the promissory
note. The trial court then dismissed the petition for the lack of jurisdiction. The same
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), wherein the respondent court
likewise dismissed the contention with an order which the petitioners assail on the
principal ground that it violates Section 14 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

They claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and distinctly
explain how it was reached by the trial court. There is no adequate factual basis for the
decision that could justify its review and affirmance by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in giving the questioned decision.

RULING:

Yes, the Court ruled that the questioned order is an over-simplification of the
issues and violates both the letter and spirit of Article VIII Section 14 of the Constitution.
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it
was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. It cannot simply say that judgement is rendered in favore of X
and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action.
A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is
based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially
prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court
for review by a higher tribunal.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of
basis. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for revision,
within 30 days from notice, of the Order of June 6, 1986, conformably to the
requirements of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution, subject to the appeal in
accordance with law.

G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
INC., respondents.

FACTS:
ANG TIBAY, Represented by TORIBIO TEODORO manager and proprietor;
Petitioners, temporarily laid off 89 members of the National Labor Union Inc., due to the
shortage of leather soles. Petitioner filed an opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for
new trial of the respondent National Labor Union Inc. NATIONAL LABOR UNION INC.;
Respondent, avers the claim of Toribio that there was a shortage of leather soles on
September 26, 1938; That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Teodoro
Toribio was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., from work.
The averment of National Labor Unions Inc. is desired to be proved by the
petitioner with the “records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of
native dealers in leather”; that “the National Workers’ Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is
a company or employer union dominated by Toriobio Teodoro, the existence and
functions of which are illegal.”
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not a
mere receptive organ of the Government. The function of the Court of Industrial
Relations, as will appear from a perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative,
and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the determination
of disputes between employers and employee but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations has the power of due process?
RULING:
 Yes, the Court of Industrial Relations can administer due process. “The Court of
Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law
of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). The motion for reconsideration of the
Solicitor-General in-behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations denied. The
motion for a new trial granted and cause remanded with instructions

Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted,
and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations,
with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant
and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove.

G.R. No. L-49711 November 7, 1979

ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO., GONZALO P. NAVA, VIOLA S. NAVA,

FEDERICO S. NAVA, PERLA NAVA, HONORATO P. NAVA, ALEJANDRO S. NAVA,
PURIFICACION SISON, A. TORDESILLAS, GUIDO ADVINCULA, PEDRO ANGULO
and TOMAS MARAMBA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF MINES, GREGORIO E. MARTINEZ, ALEJANDRO
MENDEZ, NICANOR MARTY, VICENTE MISOLES, GUILLERMO YABUT, ANDRES
R. FIAGOY, MIGUEL A. MANIAGO, CASIMIRO N. EBIDO, ENRIQUE RIVERA,
SEVERINO MIVA, ELENITO B. MARTINEZ, LUCAS EDURAIN, FELIMON ENCIO,
EMILIO ILOCO, DIOSDADO MISOLA, ERNESTO VALVERDE, PABLO PABILONA,
ARMANDO MINAS, BARTOLOME MARAVE and CECILIO OOVILLA, respondents-
appellees.

FACTS:

Zambales Chromite Mining filed an administrative case before the Director of

Mines Gozon to have them be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of
69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. They are asserting their claim against the
group of Martinez and Pabiloňa. Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM
appealed the case before the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. During
pendency, Gozon was assigned as the Sec of Agri. And Natural Resources. He did not
inhibit himself from deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed his earlier decision
when he was still the director of mines. ZCM then appealed before the CFI of Zambales.

The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that the disqualification of a judge
to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply to
administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case
which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for
disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from deciding
their appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily and with bias,
prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed the case to the CA.
 The CA reversed Gozon’s finding and declared that ZCM had the rights earlier
attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that the factual
basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA reconsidered
after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA remanded the case
to the Minister of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed urging their own
contentions; ZCM wants the CA’s earlier decision to be reaffirmed while Martinez et al
demanded that Gozon’s finding be reinstated. The CA denied both petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due
process.

RULING:
The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon
had acted with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a
subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce
be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no
different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the
reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since
being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. The
SC affirmed the 2nd decision of the CA.
G.R. No. 211362 February 24, 2015

FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military Academy,
represented by his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his own behalf,
and BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE
HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC MEMBERS, and the
CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB), Respondents.

FACTS:

Cadet 1CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the
PMA. On November 19, 2013, a Delinquency Report (DR) was issued alleging that
Cudia was late for his class five days prior. Cudia claimed to have been dismissed late
from his prior class. However, Maj. Rommel Dennis Hindang, Cudia’s CTO, found that
the professor never dismissed her class late. On January 7, 2014, Maj. Hindang
reported that Cudia had violated the PMA’s Honor Code for lying. From January 20-21,
2014, the PMA Honor Committee (HC) held a hearing on Cudia’s honor violation, the
result of which was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. After a chambering session, Cadet
1CL Dalton John Lagura, the lone dissenter among the voting members, changed
hisstance, resulting in a 9-0 guilty verdict. Later on, then PMA Supt. Vice Adm. Edgar
Abogado approved Cudia’s dismissal.

Later that month, new PMA Supt. Maj. Gen. Oscar Lopez referred Cudia’s
case to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) for review.

Cudia’s parents filed a complaint before the CHR-CAR alleging human rights
violations against him. While the CRAB upheld Cudia’s dismissal, the CHR issued a
resolution holding that Cudia’s human rights were violated. However, the Office of the
President sustained the former and the AFP Chief of Staff.

ISSUE:

Whether the PMA's academic freedom authorizes it to impose suitable

disciplinary measures and punishment.
RULING:

Yes, as an academic institution, the PMA has the right to promulgate rules
necessary for the maintenance of school discipline, in accordance with Section 3(2),
Article XIV of the Constitution. It is within the PMA’s academic freedom to enforce its
Honor Code to promote discipline.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Cadet First Class Aldrin
Jeff P. Cudia from the Philippine Military Academy is hereby AFFIRMED.