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International Negotiations: Foundations, Models, and Philosophies.

Christophe Dupont

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 INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION:
FOUNDATIONS, MODELS, AND PHILOSOPHIES
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION
SERIES

Series Editors

Daniel Druckman
George Mason University
Macquarie University (Australia)

William Donohue
Michigan State University

Editorial Board

Guy Faure, Sorbonne University

P. Terrence Hopmann, Johns Hopkins University
Linda Putnam, University of California at Santa Barbara
Bertram Spector, Center for Negotiation Analysis
I. William Zartman, Johns Hopkins University

VOLUME 9
 INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION:
FOUNDATIONS, MODELS, AND
PHILOSOPHIES

Christophe Dupont

Aurélien Colson, Daniel Druckman, and William Donohue

EDITORS

DORDRECHT
2013
Cover Design / Illustration: studio Thorsten /

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

ISSN 1871-3319
hardbound ISBN 9789089790545
paperback ISBN 9789089790552

Copyright 2013 Republic of Letters Publishing BV, Dordrecht, The Netherlands /

St.Louis, MO.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored
in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission
from the publisher.

Republic of Letters Publishing has made all reasonable efforts to trace all rights
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holders, so that the appropriate acknowledgements can be made in future editions,
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Publishing BV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright
Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA
Fees are subject to change.
 CONTENTS

BIOGRAPHIES xi

EDITORS’ FOREWORD xiii

PART 1: CHRISTOPHE DUPONT, THE QUINTESSENTIAL PRACTITIONER

TURNED SCHOLAR

Chapter 1 Cooperating to agree or confronting to defeat? 3

Interview with Christophe Dupont, May 2005
Chapter 2 Christophe Dupont’s legacy in the field of negotiation 27
Aurélien Colson
Chapter 3 Encounters with Christophe Dupont 35
Patrick Audebert-Lasrochas and Hubert Touzard

PART 2: SELECTED WRITINGS BY CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

Chapter 4 Negotiation as coalition building 47
Christophe Dupont
Chapter 5 The negotiation process 67
Christophe Dupont and Guy-Olivier Faure
Chapter 6 The Congress of Vienna negotiations 101
Christophe Dupont and Patrick Audebert-Lasrochas
Chapter 7 Frameworks and methods 149
Christophe Dupont
Chapter 8 Perspectives: Negotiation theory and practice – today and 171
tomorrow
Christophe Dupont

PART 3: BUILDING ON CHRISTOPHE DUPONT’S WORKS

Chapter 9 Frameworks, cases and risk: Dupont’s legacy 189
Daniel Druckman
Chapter 10 Negotiation: post-modern or eternal? 209
I. William Zartman

v
CONTENTS

Chapter 11 Diplomatic negotiation, evolution, and effectiveness 225

Paul Meerts
Chapter 12 Chiaroscuro in negotiations: Secrecy, transparency, and
asymmetry in international negotiations 233
Aurélien Colson
Chapter 13 Tipping points in the dynamics of peace and war 251
Sanda Kaufman and Miron Kaufman

Christophe Dupont’s professional experience and academic publications 273

Index 279

vi
 DEDICATION

This book is dedicated to my family, and the many colleagues – especially

at the ESC school in Lille, and Essec and Negocia in Paris-, to the members
on the PIN [program on International Neogtiation] Editorial Committee as
well as the Professors Druckman and Zartman, all of whom have been
instrumental each in their own way, in the development of my activity in
the conflict and negotiation field.

vii
Christophe Dupont
(1922-2010)
 BIOGRAPHIES

Aurélien Colson is associate professor of Political Science at ESSEC

Business School, and director of the Institute for Research and Education
on Negotiation (IRENE Paris & Singapore). A former advisor to the French
Prime Minister, he coordinates negotiation training programmes for the
French ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European Commission. In
addition to articles published in peer-reviewed journals on negotiation
process, post-conflict mediation and change management, he authored, co-
authored or edited six books translated into nine languages. In 2008 the
Institut de France awarded a Grand Prix to his research on secrecy and
transparency in international negotiations.

William Donohue is currently a distinguished professor of Communication

at Michigan State University. He received his Ph.D. from the Ohio State
University in 1976. Dr. Donohue has published extensively in the areas of
conflict, communication, negotiation and mediation while also conducting
workshops and other intervention activities focusing on communication,
leadership development, and conflict management. His co-authored book,
Framing Matters: Perspectives on Negotiation Research and Practice in
Communication, provides a broad understanding of the role of framing in
negotiation research. Dr. Donohue is a recent past president of the
International Association for Conflict Management and is on the editorial
board of several major journals.

Daniel Druckman is professor of Public and International Affairs at George

Mason University. He is also a professor at Macquarie University in
Sydney, a member of the faculty at Sabanci University in Istanbul, and has
been a visiting professor at National Yunlin University of Science and
Technology in Taiwan, at the University of Melbourne, and the Australian
National University. He has published widely on such topics as
international negotiation, nationalism, nonverbal communication, political
stability and research methodologies. He is the recipient of the 2003
Lifetime Achievement award from the International Association for
Conflict Management (IACM). He has also received outstanding book
awards for Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis (Sage
2005) and Evaluating Peace Operations with Paul F. Diehl (Lynne
Reinner, 2010).

xi
Christophe Dupont (1922-2010), after a career in international negotiations
as an economist at the International Monetary Fund and then the European
Investment Bank, has been active in the conflict and negotiation field as a
professor, consultant and researcher. He founded and directed the LEARN
research lab at Lille Business School (France), while contributing to the
establishment of negotiation research in France and beyond, notably
through the organization of the Biennale on Negotiation in Paris. He
authored or co-authored several books, including La Négociation:
Conduite, Théorie, Applications (4th ed. 1994), and La Négociation Post-
Moderne (2006). He has written extensively on negotiation, in particular
within the PIN series of books on negotiation. He inspired a generation of
conflict management scholars in the francophone world.

xii
 FOREWORD

Negotiation and conflict management research is thriving, as shown by the

success of international conferences, the vast number of research and
teaching programs held in an expanding list of countries, and the quantity
and quality of articles, books, dissertations, and working papers. Within
this growing and diverse community of researchers, each generation
witnesses the appearance of outstanding scholars. They excel in the way
they do research, and in how they share it with colleagues and graduate
students. They produce ground-breaking results, which in turn prompt new
waves of exciting research, and may even shift existing paradigms;
wherever applicable, their results also provide practitioners with useful
guidance. What is more, they inspire the next generation of researchers,
making sure that emerging scholars find the motivation to enter into the
demanding world of negotiation and conflict management research.
As a result, these individuals are considered to be the thought
leaders of our field. Of course, their contributions are already
acknowledged in a number of ways, notably through citations, public
recognition, panels on their work, and lifetime achievement awards. The
tradition of the liber amicorum, or festschrift, is sometimes invoked to
honour them – but only too rarely. While in Istanbul at the 2010 Annual
Conference of the International Association for Conflict Management
(IACM), the Editors thought it was time to launch a book series aimed not
only at honouring outstanding scholars who have opened new paths in
uncharted areas, but also at shedding new light on their legacy thanks to the
contributions of colleagues.
Each of the books in this series, titled “Careers in Negotiation and
Conflict Management Research,” follows the same overall outline.

 A Foreword written by the editors consists of reflections on lessons

learned from the career of the thought leader. The contribution of
this scholar will be put into perspective in order to highlight its
enduring meaning for new generations of researchers.
 Part 1 will be mainly biographical, and includes interviews
conducted by close colleagues. It will focus on the person behind the
scholar, and will attempt to shed light on key ideas and turning
points in the career, including important encounters with scholars in
other countries and continents.

xiii
AURÉLIEN COLSON, DANIEL DRUCKMAN, WILLIAM DONOHUE

 Part 2 will gather a selection of journal articles or book chapters

written by the thought leader, and which remain influential to this
day. Since the format of this book series limits the number of papers
that can be reproduced, the Editors will have tough decisions to
make.
 Part 3 will feature original chapters inspired by this person’s works,
and contributed by other scholars. They will establish bridges
between the thought leader’s legacy and their own on-going
research, thus illustrating the links between past, present, and future.
 Last, a comprehensive bibliography will be appended to each book,
detailing the professional career and academic publications of the
thought leader.

Whenever possible, each book launch in this series will provide an

opportunity to bring scholars together in order to prompt further exchanges
about the thought leader’s legacy. These panels could be held at the annual
conferences of the IACM, and/or on an ad hoc basis. Such gatherings are
also intended to prompt new suggestions for future books in the series.
Such a project would remain wishful thinking without the support
of key institutions and individuals. First and foremost, we would like to
thank the colleagues who accepted our offer to contribute a chapter to this
book: Patrick Audebert-Lasrochas (†), Guy-Olivier Faure, Sanda and
Miron Kaufman, Paul Meerts, Hubert Touzard, and I. William Zartman.
Our gratitude goes to our editors at Republic of Letters Publishing; their
patience proved inestimable, as was the quality of their editing. We also
thank publishers that gave permission to reprint previously published
articles or chapters. Support to cover translation costs was provided by the
Institute for Research and Education on Negotiation (IRENE Paris &
Singapore) at the ESSEC Business School.
The Editors’ choice for the first book in this series is Christopher
Dupont (1922-2010). One of us had recently coordinated a festschrift –
mostly in French – honoring this leading scholar in the French-speaking
world who had just passed away. He was considered to be a founding father
of negotiation research in France and beyond (Colson, 2011). A practitioner
turned scholar, Dupont bridged theory and practice; he knew how to look at
the reality of negotiation through the lenses of theories and concepts.
Dupont was one of the very first French-speaking academics who stepped
out of the French literature on negotiation and conflict resolution, and

xiv
 FOREWORD

whose command of the foreign literature was impressive – not simply the
classical works, but also the most recent journal articles and books, which
he continued to read during the last years of his life. As this foreword
depicts below, and as Part 2 of this book will show, Dupont analysed
important issues in negotiation, and did it in a fruitful manner which
remains inspirational to this day.
It is also important to note that his contributions are less well
known outside of the French-speaking academic community. Interestingly,
the original French festschrift rapidly sold out in the francophone world,
but failed to reach meaningful audiences elsewhere. Yet, whoever in the
English-speaking world happened to come across Dupont’s writing or,
better still, with Dupont himself, appreciated the originality of his approach
and the importance of his contributions. By exposing his writing to an
English-speaking audience, the Editors hope to call attention to the many
interesting ideas that we discuss in the section to follow.

CHRISTOPHE DUPONT’S CONTRIBUTIONS

Dupont’s scholarship was driven by an interest in the big picture. He was

drawn to framework-driven approaches that attempted to weave together
the parts of negotiation. These approaches also illuminate an interplay
between context and process, which was a strong theme in his work as a
practitioner and scholar. Context is important for negotiations conducted
within the sorts of bureaucratic organizations that employed Dupont earlier
in his career. Negotiators are constrained by their accountability to
departments on the next rung in the agency or corporate ladder. They are
also constrained by rules and regulations as well as by the norms created as
part of an organization’s culture. These features of organizational life are
well known to professional negotiators. Less obvious, however, is the way
that they impinge on the negotiation process and influence the options
considered for an agreement as well as for the implementation of the
agreement.
These connections are developed in the frameworks that became
evident to Dupont during his transition to the role of scholar. But he also
realized that further specificity was needed for the conduct of research.
This takes the form of propositions or hypotheses about the way that
particular aspects of context and process, considered as variables, relate to
each other. These then are the statements that are evaluated by conducting
experiments or by analyzing cases. He appreciated the results obtained by

xv
AURÉLIEN COLSON, DANIEL DRUCKMAN, WILLIAM DONOHUE

his colleagues who conducted experiments and contributed to this

knowledge by analyzing cases.
The articles reprinted in Part 2 of this collection provide examples
of his original contributions to the literature. His chapter on the negotiation
process with Faure in the Kremenyuk volume (2002) (chapter 5 in this
volume) illuminates the difficulties involved in defining process as well as
observing, analyzing, and evaluating it. Particularly impressive are the
distinctions made among six different approaches to studying the process
referred to as strategic, learning, decision making, psychological,
adjustment, and reactive processes. Looking forward, Dupont and Faure
proposed a research agenda that is both sensitive to the need for further
analytical clarity in research and for bridging theory with practical
applications.
His article on coalition building in the inaugural issue of
International Negotiation (1996) (chapter 4 in this volume) argues that
coalition building and maintenance are important parts of both bilateral and
multilateral negotiation. With regard to the former, coalition dynamics
occur during interactions between negotiators and various constituencies
that may compete for attention. These interactions are compounded in
multilateral negotiations by party coalitions, often along the lines of weak
and strong actors. Thus, he concludes that coalition building is a useful
metaphor for negotiation or, put more dramatically, that “thinking
coalitionally is ‘thinking negotiations’” (Lax and Sebenius, 1991). 1
His chapter on the Congress of Vienna with Audebert-Lasrochas in
the Zartman and Kremenyuk volume (2005) (chapter 6 in this volume) is a
good example of an enhanced case study (Druckman, 2005). 2 A complex
case with multiple actors, issues, and forums is understood through the lens
of concepts drawn from the negotiation literature. The mix of distributive
and integrative bargaining led to an outcome depicted as a “stable
equilibrium.” While generally satisfying the interests of the European
powers, the agreement was sufficiently ambiguous to leave open long-term
solutions to critical security issues. Nonetheless, the settlement was a
remarkable outcome when understood in relation to both the European
––––––––––––––
1
Lax, D.A. and Sebenius, J.K. (1991). “Thinking coalitionally: Party
arithmetic, process opportunism, and strategic sequencing.” In H.P. Young
(ed.) Negotiation Analysis. Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press.
2
Druckman, D. (2005). Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict
Analysis. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage.

xvi
 FOREWORD

political context at the time and the structural complexity of the Congress.
This chapter reveals that Dupont, the synthesizer, was also a keen analyst
of complex historical cases.
Dupont’s synthetic approach is reflected as well in his contribution
to the International Biennale on Negotiation, held on four occasions at
Negocia in Paris since 2003. Dupont took a very active part in organizing
the papers around key conceptual themes for three of the conferences,
especially the 2007 Biennale, which proved particularly memorable. He
organized this conference around a theme that received only limited
attention by negotiation researchers. For many of us in attendance, the
conference introduced us to a variety of projects on risk in negotiation. As a
result, we wondered why this theme did not emerge previously as a central
concept in the field, as it was in the more general field of decision making.
Dupont’s organizing skills were evident in the way that panels and
symposia were arranged. His marketing skills were evident in the range of
projects and researchers that presented their work. But, perhaps, most
impressive was his summary presentation at the conclusion of the
conference. He managed to capture the wide swath of projects on risk in an
orderly and provocative way, opening new areas for research.
The Biennale on Negotiation stimulated new thinking about risk.
One insight concerned the relation between risk and uncertainty. In
negotiation, these are decisions made in the darkness of unknown
consequences about prospective gains or losses. At the heart of this
challenge is the way that negotiators perceive the gamble they take with
each offer or the way that they react to the others’ proposals. But, the
gamble is not simply a hunch that springs from the negotiator’s momentary
thoughts or feelings. It is influenced by a panoply of factors in the
negotiating context and process. Considered as a profile of risk perceptions
(see chapter 9 in this volume), the factors can be organized into a
framework that connects the various parts of negotiation. This second
insight also connects Dupont’s summary of the conference to his penchant
for frameworks, particularly the one constructed a long time ago by Sawyer
and Guetzkow (1965) 3 (see chapter 7 in this volume).
A third insight builds on the profile idea by using it as a device to
compare cases. By depicting cases in terms of the risks involved with the
––––––––––––––
3
Sawyer, J. and Guetzkow, H. (1965). “Bargaining and negotiation in
international relations.” In H.C. Kelman (ed.) International Behavior: A
Social-Psychological Analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.

xvii
AURÉLIEN COLSON, DANIEL DRUCKMAN, WILLIAM DONOHUE

issues (high or low stakes), parties (mistrust or trust), process (ambiguous

or clear costs and benefits), conditions (high or low time pressure) and
implementation (supportive or non-supportive constituencies), it is possible
to compare them in terms of whether they present high, moderate, or low
risks. This would seem to be a useful tool for practitioners. It is also a
contribution to the scholarship that Dupont was keen on developing in new
directions.
Given these insights, how might we characterize Dupont’s
enduring legacy? One of the more striking aspects of Dupont’s thinking
was his unending quest to address the key questions facing negotiation
scholars. In chapter 8 in this volume Dupont poses six “interrogations” that
ought to serve as a permanent list of questions that scholars can use to
assess the value of their work. For example, the first question he posed was,
“Do we need a theory of negotiation?” He answered this question by
admitting that a broad consensus about a theory of negotiation is not readily
apparent and that what seems to be emerging are ever-evolving competing
frameworks that guide our understanding of negotiation. However, it is
apparent in reading Dupont’s scholarship over several decades that he
believed strongly in the value of theorizing about negotiation. While he
grasped the explanatory power of theoretical thinking, he also understood
the immense challenges associated with building a consensus about an
over-arching, comprehensive theory of negotiation. Nevertheless, he
wanted to hold our feet to the fire to continue thinking in rigorous
theoretical terms about this important process.
The second question he posed was, “Which theoretical frameworks
are more valuable?” Dupont was particularly attracted to theoretical
frameworks that sought to reveal the interplay between negotiator goals,
background factors, process, conditions, and outcome. He thought we
might achieve this objective through the cross-fertilization of
interdisciplinary thinking. When we pursue this objective we stand the
greatest chance of creating models that have both scientific and pragmatic
value. Indeed, one could argue that the robust nature of negotiation research
has lived up to this interdisciplinary standard. There are many journals
focusing on negotiation within many fields of study. The diversity is
expansive and impressive.
Dupont’s third question was more meta-theoretical: “Which
paradigms are most promising?” Dupont rightly feels compelled to ask this
question because of the recent flurry of paradigm shifts emerging in the
social sciences in general, and in the exploration of negotiation processes
specifically. While Dupont points out that most research in negotiation is

xviii
 FOREWORD

conducted from a covering-laws, experimental approach, a significant body

of research also explores negotiation processes from more of a systems
framework where multiple causation and feedback loops are prominent. A
third paradigm is more interpretive and often used to guide analyses of
cases. Clearly, Dupont does not take a stand on this issue by arguing for a
specific approach; rather, he does appear to prefer paradigms that allow
theoretical and conceptual flexibility as a means of better understanding the
diverse factors affecting negotiation outcomes.
Following this argument for paradigm plurality, Dupont shifts to a
focus on morality: “Do ethics and equity matter?” he wonders. Dupont
agreed with Raiffa’s claim that all negotiations involve concerns about
ethics and equity since they involve choices. Every choice is guided by
normative considerations, which are guided by ethical and moral
frameworks. It is also the case that researchers make choices that are
guided by ethical and moral considerations. The real issue for Dupont was
insuring that both practitioners and scholars explicitly examine these
considerations as they make either research or practical choices to insure
that they are conducting their craft in a transparent manner.
The fifth question for Dupont continues on this general path of
exploring negotiation from a broader perspective. He wonders, “Can
negotiation be learned?” While this question may seem odd since over 50
years of research in negotiation has been aimed at helping people learn
more about how to negotiate more effectively, Dupont’s intent appears to
be almost rhetorical. Certainly negotiators can and should continue to
expand their understanding of critical factors impacting outcomes; but they
should also view research about these factors with a critical eye. He
believes that the learners should be selective in what insights they derive
from research, particularly on the issue of the external validity of research
findings. Thus, the learner should always go back to the original studies
related to processes of interest rather than simply relying on secondary
analyses of key findings. Were these studies conducted in a manner that
translates effectively into practice? This Dupont directive is important since
neither researchers nor practitioners can afford to be uncritical in their
pursuit of knowledge.
Dupont’s final question focuses on the future: “What are some
important priorities for research?” Again, he challenges us to probe issues
that are both challenging and important. For example, he asks us to
differentiate between negotiation and decision making. What is the
difference? He asks us to focus more on understanding such vital processes
as turning points and communication patterns that impact on outcomes. He

xix
AURÉLIEN COLSON, DANIEL DRUCKMAN, WILLIAM DONOHUE

believes that the historical context of negotiation is critical, yet

understudied. And, Dupont was adamant that we must dig deeper into the
problem of understanding the more informal elements of negotiation when
parties simply try to “feel out” one another, or reduce ambiguity through
various casual, but revealing, interactions. He thought that such issues are
elusive, but critical.
These six questions and their answers provide an important legacy
for Dupont’s thinking about negotiation. They point us in some important
directions and make it clear that there is not one paradigm, or one research
program, or one set of standards that can be used to judge negotiation
research. Progress can only be made when we conduct the research
enterprise using the same kind of diverse and collaborative strategies as
Dupont wanted practitioners to pursue. Research, practice, learn, and reflect
might work to summarize Dupont’s career and his very important
contributions to our field. It is an inspiring legacy.

Aurélien Colson Daniel Druckman William Donohue

Paris Washington, DC East Lansing, Michigan

xx
 PART 1

ON CHRISTOPHE DUPONT,
THE QUINTESSENTIAL PRACTITIONER TURNED
SCHOLAR
 CHAPTER 1

COOPERATING TO AGREE OR CONFRONTING TO

DEFEAT?
INTERVIEW WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

In this chapter we present an edited version of an interview with Christophe

Dupont conducted by the Journal Negociations in May of 2005. 1

Négociations – How did your interest in negotiation arise? How does a

person “become” Christophe Dupont, author of a textbook that has become
a standard in French-speaking Europe (Dupont 1994)?

Christophe Dupont – It arose from an accumulation of many work and

academic experiences. Straight after graduating from HEC and Sciences
Po 2 , I found myself working in international organizations. So I got to
know, or more precisely I got a close look at, top-level ministerial
negotiations, and I found what went on extremely interesting. Of course, I
was only a mission observer to begin with, with a junior role, but that was
enough to get me incredibly interested. After a stint at the IMF, the
International Monetary Fund, then United Nations organizations, with
interesting missions involving a certain amount of negotiation, for example
the negotiations just after Cyprus gained independence and other activities
of the same kind; when I was with the United Nations Economic
Commission in Geneva, I joined the first team of what at the time was
called the “Common Market”, not at the Commission, but the EIB, the
European Investment Bank. That too gave me several opportunities to

––––––––––––––
1
Interview conducted by Sophie Allain and Christian Thuderoz in May 2005 and published
in Négociations, volume 2006/1, pp. 95-115; translated by Ann Gallon and edited by Daniel
Druckman. Printed here with the kind permission of Négociations and Éditions De Boeck.
Négociations is the leading, peer-reviewed, French-speaking journal in this field.
2
HEC is a French business school and “Sciences Po” is the Paris Institute of Political
Studies. Both educate France’s business, political and diplomatic leaders (Editors’ note).

International Negotiation: Foundations, Models, and Philosophies. Careers in Negotiation and Conflict
Management Research, Christophe Dupont. Aurélien Colson, Daniel Druckman, and William Donohue
(eds.), 3-25 © 2013 Republic of Letters Publishing. All rights reserved.
INTERVIEW WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT, MAY 2005

observe negotiation in progress between senior civil servants or high-level

representatives of member States.
When I moved to the university, I was given the job of teaching
postgraduate-level courses on negotiation; so that was when I built up a
certain volume of knowledge, developed from my own thinking but also
from the more systematic reading I had begun to do. As well as my
university post as associate professor, I worked part-time in a training
organization; I was lucky to be assigned to a small team of psycho-
sociologists; as a result, my viewpoint, which was predominantly an
international relations or economist’s viewpoint, was changed somewhat by
my time with that team; it showed me the importance of human factors in
negotiation. Through conversations and discussions with the members of
that team, the idea began to form that I could write a book, and that is how
my book La Négociation came into being: the first edition was published in
1982 and it was progressively enhanced until the final, fourth edition of
1994.
It was partly the result of my career and partly because I have
always preferred negotiation, mediation and conciliation to force, and even
to unilateral decisions; that certainly played some role in my interest for
this discipline.

Négociations – Let’s take a closer look at your career. You used to work in
international organizations. You say you observed top-level negotiations
there. Can you give some examples and tell us about your own role?

Christophe Dupont – Well, my first job was at the IMF, the International
Monetary Fund. At the time it was a slightly progressive branch compared
to the World Bank: you could feel the influence of Keynes! Admittedly,
that tendency has rather reversed in recent years. My job was to monitor
various countries’ economic and monetary programs, in the role of what
was known as a “desk” economist. For two years I worked on France,
which meant I made several trips to Paris, with the opportunity to observe
how the country’s top authorities addressed these questions with an
international organization. Next, I was transferred to Geneva, to the United
Nations Economic Commission where I was asked to work on three
countries in south-east Europe: Yugoslavia – this was in Tito’s time, and I
found it very interesting to see how that kind of economy worked; Turkey;
and Greece.
I traveled quite a lot in those countries and was able to observe
negotiations there, especially in Turkey, at the ministerial level. It was quite
different from what you might expect. When you leave college, you have

4
 COOPERATING TO AGREE OR CONFRONTING TO DEFEAT?

some fairly general, abstract ideas about what international negotiation is;
you soon come to realize that it is also a ritual that follows a highly specific
dynamic. In the case of Turkey, the ritual is the importance of
preliminaries, or the importance of the human relations aspect. For
example, it’s not customary to start by talking about the substance, not even
at the first meeting, which is based on very general discussions. Here’s one
story: Turkey’s problem was getting enough rain for the harvests. That was
a year of drought. The person directing the IMF delegation began the
negotiation by saying, “Minister, we are not rainmakers”, which was a
reference to the title of a film just out. A discussion on the theme then
followed lasting at least ten minutes, and the Turkish party declared, “Yes,
of course, but although you can’t get rain to fall, you can perhaps wish for
rain…” And so it went for quite a while. Eventually the problems were
aired, and then the tone changed, becoming more technical, and focused on
the problems.
That was my first experience. The thing that made the greatest
impression on me was my time in Cyprus in the early 1960s. Immediately
after the cease-fire – I was in Geneva at the time – the United Nations’
European Desk received a telegram from the then Secretary General of the
United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld, saying that a member of staff was
required to go to Cyprus as secretary of the Independence Mission. The
British troops were still there, there were still sporadic exchanges of fire at
the airport; my first task was to find buildings and offices to set up the
mission, and prepare all the logistics. After a few weeks, the mission had
around fifteen people, all in charge of a given specialization, for example
mines, irrigation, budget, and all of different nationalities. The negotiations
were to finalize the programs and decide on orientations, since we had been
asked to reflect on a development program for Cyprus. The aim was to
determine the economic priorities for the island, and plan the funding and
implementation of those programs. The British had made preparations for
the independence of Cyprus and there was a kind of virtual government in
place with about ten ministers and a small number of top civil servants. We
were in contact with these people who were going to take charge of the
island’s management and politics, including the famous Archbishop
Makarios. It was an extremely interesting experience for me…

Négociations – Then you returned to France to a university post. You

became a professor of negotiation at a time when negotiation was a new,
little-taught subject. How did it work at the time?

5
INTERVIEW WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT, MAY 2005

Christophe Dupont – It is a surprising story. At the organization I joined,

the CRC, which has since become part of HEC, there were about twenty to
twenty-five teachers working in different, fairly traditional sections such as
“Management training,” “Finance”, and “Marketing”. I was hired as an
economist, particularly because I had worked at the UN Economic
Commission in Geneva. But there was no economics department, so they
asked me which unit I wanted to be attached -- the financiers or the people
working on strategy, computer systems, or psycho-sociology. I chose the
last group, where I was fortunate to meet a relatively well-known psycho-
sociologist of the time, Claude Magny, who had a good deal of influence on
me. He opened my mind and took me beyond what was a fairly technical
framework of negotiation. As you say, yes, at the time negotiation was
rarely taught in executive management seminars. There was a little training
in labor negotiations, but it was taught in a very instrumental way, for
instance: “How to negotiate in a labor conflict, for example when the
premises are being occupied.” But there wasn’t any really systematic
reflection on negotiation. Claude Magny had pointed out that it was
necessary to get into this field. So we asked ourselves: how should we
prepare such a negotiation course?
This was the early 1970s and in France we were a long way from
negotiation as a discipline; but during the same period, in America, a
number of books were coming out that could have enlightened us
enormously; we were unaware of them. It is embarrassing to admit today,
but apart from a few books on labor negotiations, one of the textbooks
accepted as an authority at the time was Léon Constantin’s Psychologie de
la négociation (1971), a book that nowadays looks more like a work of
literature, more anecdotal than “scientific”. On the other hand – and this is
important – there was one book in French that was very important in our
approach to negotiation – and still is today! That is Francis Walder’s novel
Saint-Germain ou la négociation, which won the Goncourt Prize in 1958. It
contains thought on negotiation that is beginning to be very structured. That
does not mean that French diplomats and business managers were unaware
of how to negotiate; but they negotiated without too much concern for its
foundations. Thgis strikes me as a bit odd; France had a school in the 16th,
17th and even the 18th century that produced very interesting things, less
about negotiation for that matter than about the negotiator himself. The two
ESSEC IRENE conferences 3 , one held in 2003 on the sources of thinking
––––––––––––––
3
Institute for Research and Education in Europe; “The sources of European negotiation.
French diplomatic thinkers in the classic period”, ESSEC IRENE conference, June 2003; cf.
Alain Lempereur & Aurélien Colson (ed.), Négociations européennes. De Henri IV à

6
 COOPERATING TO AGREE OR CONFRONTING TO DEFEAT?

on negotiation, and the other last year on Talleyrand, the “Prince of

Negotiators”, reasserted the importance of this French school of
negotiators, which has practically disappeared in France, but not elsewhere:
oddly enough, a number of these 18th/19th century texts on negotiation exist
in English (and other) translations, but are no longer available in French.
Why was nobody interested in negotiation in France in the late
1960s? I think some time went by before we realized that negotiation
wasn’t just an art. I am thinking about the title of Howard Raïffa’s book
The Art and Science of Negotiation. We thought it was all art, experience,
and the predominant thought of the time – as Alain P. Lempereur and
Aurélien Colson noted in their book (2004) – that it was simply a matter of
intuiting the craft. We did not think about proper research hypotheses to be
formulated in this discipline. This was a big difference from America,
probably because of the contemporary issue of nuclear deterrence and the
way it was handled, particularly by Thomas Schelling as reflected in his
1960 book Strategy of Conflict. Clearly, this could have been the start of
structured thinking on negotiation. Although Schelling only addressed
certain subjects: tacit negotiation and tactics such as threats, commitments,
promises, this was a very important starting point. Then Fred Iklé (1964),
and Richard Walton and Bob McKersie came along; Walton and McKersie
proved in A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, published in 1965,
that it was possible to have what was late called a “negotiation model”.
Things really started moving after that. North American
universities began to consider negotiation a relevant subject for courses
with the accompanying scientific research. As a result, an academic field
quickly formed, but that didn’t happen in France. Chronologically, the first
academic work on negotiation published in France was Hubert Touzard’s
contribution of 1977 4 .

Négociations – Did that have an impact on your own thinking and if so,
how? Could we even talk of intellectual dependency on that field?

Christophe Dupont – Personally I approached negotiation less analytically

than globally, and I think that’s reflected in my 1982 book. Maybe because
of my multidisciplinary background, I have always been interested in a
diversity of viewpoints and opinions. That has made me immune, so to
––––––––––––––
l’Europe des 27, preface by Jean-Pierre Jouyet, postface by Hubert Védrine (Paris, A2C,
2008). “Talleyrand, prince of negotiators”, ESSEC IRENE international conference for the
250th anniversary of Talleyrand’s birth, February 2004, directed by Alain P. Lempereur.
4
See Touzard’s contribution to this book in chapter 3.

7
INTERVIEW WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT, MAY 2005

speak, to a certain dependency. I’ll acknowledge I have influences, but no

dependency. The influence is considerable, and shared by many of the
people I have worked with, for example Guy-Olivier Faure and Alain
Lempereur. They are very influenced, perhaps more than me, by this North
American contribution, but without being restricted to Walton and
McKersie: quite the contrary! It was a real discovery at the time to see what
the American approaches could offer. In the years after 1968, there was a
good deal of curiosity about what they were doing across the Atlantic; we
were (already!) questioning the way our university system worked.
Circulars were sent out to junior professors, suggesting that they should to
go to America for six months or a year in various disciplines. In fact that is
how the French school of finance came into being… Although the main
disciplines concerned were obviously finance, marketing and strategy, the
human relations field did refer to negotiation and the work of Walton and
McKersie. They taught at Harvard and MIT, and these institutions, like
other universities, had agreed to take junior French professors for six-
month year-long placements.

Négociations – You haven’t mentioned the work of Anselm Strauss, but he

was an attentive observer of negotiations, especially in hospitals,
publishing articles on the subject in the mid-1960s 5 . Do you consider that
Strauss is not central to this North American stream of negotiation?

Christophe Dupont – That is right. This is an interesting discussion for

your journal Négociations, which raised the question in its very first issue. I
have said it before and I will now have the chance to say it again, I am in
favor of a broad cross-disciplinary approach that recognizes each and every
school of thought. In my opinion, Strauss’ approach, which goes quite far
in emphasizing context – and is extremely broad in the fields studied – is a
sociological approach. This is one of the journal’s foci: reassessment of the
role of negotiation in the societal system. I’m not denying the importance
of that focus, which is essential, especially for labor relations. Walton and
McKersie also assigned considerable importance to this contextual aspect.
As for myself, and this brings us back to the question of influences, I am
part of a school that focuses more on the sequence of events, the how, the
process and determination of the outcome. But this school acknowledges
––––––––––––––
5
Anselm Strauss et alii, “The Hospital and its Negotiated Order”, in E. Friedson (ed.), The
Hospital in Modern Society, New York, Free Press, 1963. See also: Anselm Strauss,
Negotiations. Varieties, Contexts, Processes, and Social Order, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass,
1978.

8
 COOPERATING TO AGREE OR CONFRONTING TO DEFEAT?

that when studying a negotiation, it is important to examine the context, but

maybe a more immediate or proximal context than the distant and complex
environment studied by Strauss.

Négociations – So without being “intellectually dependent” on the great

American names in negotiation, which of their contributions do you
consider the most important?

Christophe Dupont – My own major influences were probably David Lax

and James Sebenius (1986), the authors I feel closest to as regards analysis
of negotiation. Things are different as regards orientations: I find myself
closer to Dean Pruitt, for example, especially in what he sets out in his
book with Peter Carnevale, Negotiation in Social Conflict (1993). But as
regards the way to study a negotiation, I think David Lax and James
Sebenius are among the people who have influenced me the most. I’ve also
been influenced by William Zartman, maybe because we see each other
relatively often and he is quite creative. He comes to Europe with new
ideas, and that cannot leave you uninfluenced. The same goes for Daniel
Druckman, who I’m lucky enough to be working with at the moment, and
has a pretty remarkable breadth of knowledge – he’s just as interested in
international relations as in the psychological aspects of negotiation, and
he’s really extraordinarily knowledgeable about all those problems. In
contrast, I’m less in agreement with – and have been less influenced by –
the work of Roger Fisher or William Ury…

Négociations – Let’s look at these authors one by one, starting with Lax
and Sebenius. You say they’re an important influence. Why, and on what
points?

Christophe Dupont – Trying to see the essential contributions to

negotiation theory in the last thirty years, I think we have the idea or
concept of “value creation” and the battle to appropriate that value. The
term value should be understood here as it is used in negotiation theory,
that is, not value maximization for shareholders, as they say in financial
theory, but the creation of net overall benefits for the parties in a
negotiation. That is a major contribution, and, by the way, one that’s very
well addressed also by Lempereur and Colson in their book. What is a
negotiation? In substance, you could say it is the attempt at trying to fit
things together that resist such a fit. There is an opposition between the
party’s aims that conflict with a joint desire to attain an acceptable
agreement. This means that something has to give if we are to arrive at an

9
INTERVIEW WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT, MAY 2005

agreement. One way to achieve this is to ask how to create “value”

common to both parties, while recognizing that at some stage it will all
have to be shared. I think that this is a fundamental idea for negotiation.
The other major idea, but now I’m going back in time a bit, is the
famous distinction made by Walton and McKersie between integrative and
distributive negotiation, or cooperative and conflictual negotiation. I do not
think you can get away from that. It is one of my points of disagreement
with Fisher and Ury. I have some different ideas of my own – and this
confirms my state of non-dependency: I believe that there is two types of
negotiation. This idea is not widely accepted Rather negotiation is
considered to be mixed, in the sense of having both cooperative and
distributive elements simultaneously. If we accept that these dual elements
of cooperation and conflict necessarily exist in all negotiations, it should
still be possible to assert that negotiations an be “predominantly” or
“essentially” cooperative or distributive.

Why say such a thing? I see it as a matter of intent. When a

negotiation begins and because of the situation, because of the other party,
or because of the circumstances, it is decided to pursue a genuinely
cooperative negotiation, this defines the intent; this intention will not
however prevent deadlocks or conflicts of interest at some point; but, and
this is the essential point, those episodes will be accepted and handled in
such a way that a quick, positive return is possible. For example, in these
conflictual episodes – let us say, when you come to the question of price
while negotiating a sales contract – not all the tools recommended by
distributive negotiation will be used; for example, no real threats will be
made, but rather allusions or warnings. Lax and Sebenius make interesting
proposals in this respect: reconfiguring the problem, relating the issue
under discussion to complementarities, and so on. The cooperative intent is
still there.
Now let us consider distributive negotiation. This will involve use
of destabilization and fairly aggressive tactics. But despite this, there will
still be cooperative aspects at some point. Why? Because a technical
problem will slow things down, or it becomes clear that the negotiation
may be heading straight for a breakdown; at that point, the negotiators say,
“Let’s take a break, or let’s call in an expert, or mediation”; that’s
cooperative. So even in the distributive negotiation you have elements of
cooperation; but the intent remains distributive. It is still based on a power
struggle, which is the ABC of distributive negotiation: you build up a
power struggle and make maximum use of it, up to a point where the rope
might break. Despite the cooperative episode, there will always be an

10
 COOPERATING TO AGREE OR CONFRONTING TO DEFEAT?

ulterior motive, which is to get quickly back to the power struggle -- to

impose my own preferences, my preferred choices or solutions, conceding
just enough for the other party to agree to sign and to avoid breakdown.
That is the difference between the two stances. And it is hotly debated,
since every negotiation is said to be mixed or hybrid; but from discussions
with negotiators, and in the light of my own observations, I believe that it is
relevant.

Négociations – Can’t we also say that in a negotiation you have a shift

from one form of negotiation to another?

Christophe Dupont – That’s a good question. I think things can move from
a cooperative episode to a distributive episode, or vice versa, but that’s not
a shift from one type of negotiation to another. The key word is the intent;
either there’s a genuine intent to be cooperative, or else the intent is to stay
in the distributive mode. Having said that, matters become more complex if
the context changes while the negotiation is in progresses.

Négociations – Is that why you have a, let’s say, qualified opinion

regarding Fisher and Ury’s model?

Christophe Dupont – I want to make sure there is no misunderstanding.

Two camps have grown up with regard to Fisher and Ury, the pros, and the
antis who criticize them fairly harshly for a number of reasons. The
misunderstanding is that I prefer not to take sides in this argument. Like
defending a doctoral thesis, I’ll begin by saying there are some very good
things in Fisher and Ury’s approach. They have managed, in four points, to
lay down principles which, while not really new, are reformulated in a very
clear, comprehensible way. That is undeniably a merit and it is why many
people in businesses and organizations like this approach. Also, these
authors acknowledge that they are not doing theory-based research on
negotiation. Rather, they are more interested in giving prespcriptions.

What do they say? They begin with the opinion that what is
observed in negotiations is not terribly good, the outcomes are often
suboptimal. This is where I begin to part company from them: in substance
they are saying there are only two ways of negotiating: “the old way”, with
two columns, soft negotiation and hard negotiation, and the new way, their
way. I find this description problematic: the “old way” includes certain
features that distinguish “soft” from “hard”, giving the impression that “soft
negotiation” is in the end simply the old “cooperative negotiation”. But I

11
INTERVIEW WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT, MAY 2005

believe that it is quite different! Cooperative negotiation is not necessarily

“soft”, it can in fact be very hard. I reject the idea that, on the one hand, we
have “soft” or “hard” negotiations – the traditional method, roundly
criticized by Fisher and Ury – and on the other hand principled negotiation,
considered to be a magic formula; I do not think a contrast of that kind
captures what happens in negotiation.
However, returning to the prescriptive, Fisher and Ury do show
that cooperative negotiation has many advantages. It is good that they say
so, and show that it can be helped by certain principles. That said, there are
distributive negotiations where a principled approach does not hold the
keys to success, which leads me to conclude that principled negotiation is
only one specific case of cooperative negotiation. I tend to identify it with
negotiations that I call “strictly cooperative”, where agreement is reached
quickly in a kind of meta-negotiation, with almost total good faith, where
almost full information is exchanged – which is not very realistic – and
where people refuse to state positions – although it’s not clear how you can
negotiate if you don’t state your interests in a position. But it must be
acknowledged that Fisher and Ury, and Bruce Patton, in the 1991 edition of
Getting to Yes, tried to provide answers to all these questions.
I think that the three closing chapters of their book could be more
convincing. In the situations they examine – when the other party has more
power; when it refuses to play by the rules; and when negotiating with
difficult people – they offer solutions that are by no means uninteresting. It
is however one thing to write them and another to put them into practice. I
have yet other reservations and qualifications. One is the lack of analysis of
power. Although they do not say that power is unimportant, they do imply
that it is more a result than a driver of negotiation. Even in cooperative
negotiation, there is one thing that cannot be overlooked, and that is the
power of the negotiators. Even when the aim is to stay in a cooperative
perspective, there is power there, and that power must be controlled. So the
view that power does not play an important role is debatable in my view.
Another frequently-accepted reservation is that principled
negotiation can be manipulated. A negotiator can ask his counterpart to
negotiate in a principled mode in order to elicit a frank exchange of
information in order to weaken him. Fisher and Ury retort that all that is
needed is some experience – which is true: an experienced person is less
likely to be vulnerable to this gambit. It is still a potential danger. Then
there are the questions of “win-win”. Cathelineau, in an article published
after his book Négocier gagnant (1991), offers a good expression: he
comments that the “win-win” idea has become fairly popular today – to
such an extent, it should be noted, that Richard Holbrooke, the former US

12
 COOPERATING TO AGREE OR CONFRONTING TO DEFEAT?

negotiator in Kosovo, recently used it himself in with regard to the Israel-

Palestine conflict but as “www,” like the worldwide web, for “win-win-
win”! Cathelineau adds, “Agreed, this is ‘win-win’, but there may be one
capital W and one small w…” And this small w is something that is
ultimately accepted by one of the negotiators as long as he has not made
any mistakes and knows his BATNA, but it’s so asymmetric that it will
create revenge, frustration and dissatisfaction. Thus, I have some
reservations from that point of view…
This finally brings me to Fisher and Ury’s principles. As I said
earlier, they are well-formulated. But when you look a bit closer, doubts
arise. Take the principle of “separating the people from the problem”. It’s
certainly a good thing before a negotiation to prevent personal hostilities or
disagreements from polluting the fundamental discussion. But while the
negotiation is in process you cannot constantly separate emotions from the
subject under discussion. What you initially sought to eliminate in order to
create a relationship that is professional, stable, and balanced will still rear
its head at the slightest incident. Consequently, I do not believe that you
can remove all personal-type problems throughout the entire negotiation.
Then there is the “Interests and positions” principle. That is a difficult one.
First, what are the interests? They are clear in some negotiations, much less
so in others. You then have the problem of proximity between the concepts
of interests, objectives and stakes – not to mention the question of whether
we include values or symbols in conjunction with interests, and to what
extent?
Let’s go further. What is “positionalism”, that is to say the idea of
positional bargaining? For Fisher and Ury, it is negotiating by holding fast
to successive claims or refusals, with every movement giving rise to battles
of technique or argument; hence the idea of defending a fortress, which
does not lead to effective and presumably optimal outcomes. When this is
the case, then they are quite right; but believing that a negotiation can be
successful when interests alone are put forward, without taking other
concerns, risks, emotions or even techniques into account is difficult to
demonstrate. In contrast, it is impossible to disagree with their third
principle, the one about options. The fourth principle, about objective
criteria, is problematic again. They say it is the search for a shared criterion
that will ultimately be adopted, even if it is not the best option. I worry that
the search for a common criterion will set off a new negotiation –
potentially more difficult than a negotiation on interests. We already know
it is much more difficult to negotiate about principles than interests. And

13
INTERVIEW WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT, MAY 2005

finally, they did not put this in their last book, but it is well-known that this
is their fifth principle although they are not its inventors: BATNA 6 . This is
an important idea. Yet on closer examination there is plenty that could be
said, for instance that the BATNA changes as the negotiation progresses, or
in response to the changing environment. Fisher and Ury say that the
negotiator must try to raise his BATNA, must seek other solutions. I agree.
As well, negotiators attempt to make the other’s BATNA less attractive.
Well, that looks distributive to me! This is the same apparent contradiction
as in the book’s full title: Getting to Yes, Negotiating Agreement Without
Giving In. How can you reach an agreement if neither side will make any
concessions? True, they give some answers; they say, for example, “We’ll
reconfigure, we’ll make the pie bigger.” But there will have to be a
concession, a giving in, somewhere. For all these reasons, I think there are
problems with a “principled negotiation” message.
I wrote a research paper a few years ago at the Lille business
school, entitled La négociation raisonnée. Ce qu’elle est, ce qu’elle n’est
pas, ce qu’elle pourrait être (Principled negotiation: What it is, what it
isn’t, what it could be). I concluded with the following sentence: “There
must be a balanced evaluation of principled negotiation”. Anyway, this
method has been so popular worldwide, including in France, that we cannot
ignore it. But maybe it’s up to French researchers to develop these concepts
in more detail, give a European sensitivity to principled negotiation.

Négociations – How do you explain this popularity?

Christophe Dupont – First reason: Fisher and Ury came along at the right
time. What was the situation in the early 1980s? Key books had been
published, as we’ve discussed; then there was a explosion. Thanks to the
work of Schelling, Walton and McKersie, Iklé, Carl Stevens (1963) and
many others, researchers started to develop reflection based on real-life
examples, like William Zartman with North-South problems; this type of
––––––––––––––
6
BATNA: Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement. Fisher and Ury argue as follows:
the reason you negotiate is to produce something better than the results that could be
obtained without negotiation. Hence the relevance of a measurement standard: the BATNA.
Being what the negotiator considers the best solution apart from negotiated agreement with
the other party, the BATNA enables him to avoid negotiating with his eyes closed. He can
always compare each proposal with the BATNA and select the ones he considers most
advantageous. A large section of chapter 6 in Fisher and Ury’s book is devoted to the
BATNA, its drawbacks and advantages. The concept derives from Thibaut and Kelly’s
(1959) earlier idea of comparison level for alternatives. (Thanks to Dan Druckman for
pointing this out.)

14
 COOPERATING TO AGREE OR CONFRONTING TO DEFEAT?

research opened up in the mid-1970s. In the space of three or four years

several books came out that have become today’s classics in the literature
on negotiation – for example, Rubin and Brown (1975), Zartman (1976),
and Druckman (1977). And after this profusion of books, that were actually
fairly technical – admittedly, they are demanding books – came a little
book, written in a readable style and using marketing formulas, that became
very popular. Fisher and Ury benefited from that. They should, by the way,
have cited all their predecessors whose work they used, even if only in
footnotes Anyway, they came along at the right time, and with a very
accessible book; they took a prescriptive rather than an analytical approach
– which is easier; and they managed to collect quite a few anecdotes. So
people were surprised at such a different book. And, it sold very well.

Négociations – The book also, we think, offered a very rational

presentation of negotiation, asking us to put aside questions of value and
ideology in order to succeed at negotiation. It all looked very pragmatic…

Christophe Dupont – Yes, I agree. There is a search for rationality in

Fisher and Ury’s book. Their first piece of advice, “Separate the people
from the problem” went down very well, because people are not sure what
to do in negotiations that involve tension and hostility. And here was a
proposal to talk things over nicely, use “professional negotiation”, and all
would end well. Indeed this is a caricature, but the book is presented in that
way.

Négociations – One possible explanation for the popularity of this

approach is that the unions from the late 1980s onwards in Quebec and
Canada were coming out of a period of severe confrontations with
employers. There had been conflict-ridden negotiations, positional
bargaining, but without much in the way of results. Here was a proposal to
operate differently, and they were being told it would give better results…

Christophe Dupont – That is true. At the end of the revised edition of their
book written with Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1994), Walton and McKersie
refer to Fisher and Ury’s work in connection with methods to trigger the
process of mutual understanding. But that’s all; so clearly they do not
attach much importance to the work. Having said that, Fisher and Ury’s
method is also explained – and this has been positive – by the deadlocks
reached in certain conflicts and the tendency (frequently observed in the
US) to provide arguments for everything. According to Fisher and Ury, it
was possible to approach negotiation, not as a debating contest or purely

15
INTERVIEW WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT, MAY 2005

tactical maneuvers, but by centering the argument on consideration of the

parties’ respective interests and the joint search for “rational” solutions.

Négociations – Let’s stay in this intellectual vista. Other contributions and

other influences. What in your opinion of those of Dean Pruitt?

Christophe Dupont – Pruitt is an extremely rigorous researcher. He

belongs to the experimental school. The aim is to establish and test
hypotheses using questionnaires or simulations. He often uses a group of
100-150 students, generally doing psychology or management, for
exercises that enable the observer to confirm or reject one or more
hypotheses, for example: Is there an association between a particular
dependent variable in negotiation, and one or a series of independent
variables that are given or manipulated, such as concession behavior, initial
demands, attractive of alternatives, levels of aspiration, or team structure?
Pruitt has conducted a large number of experiments; but he has always
taken care to acknowledge certain difficulties associated with these
approaches. Most importantly, he has always taken a broad view of the
phenomena of negotiation. That means he is not trapped in a single
dominant paradigm; a lot of research in negotiation concerns maximization
of gains; this interest is understandable – after all, Raïffa (1982) and others
have written very interesting things about gain maximization. But saying
that the sole aim of negotiation is maximization is problematic.
At a working session in Washington, organized under the PIN
program 7 to prepare the book edited by Guy-Olivier Faure on anecdotes
(2003), a discussion arose at one stage as to negotiators’ objectives. I
defended the idea that three positions were possible in the battle for
appropriation and sharing: the first is the capital W: “I’ll take everything for
myself, leaving the other person just enough to make sure he will still sign
the agreement”; in other words, as the North American expression goes;
“Winner takes all”. Secondly, there’s the Nash equilibrium, which is
formula for evaluarting alternative solutions in terms of utilities. The third
position, the one I was defending, was that the best negotiation lay perhaps
between this central equilibrium point and the maximal point. Why?
Because it is a question of fairness. Negotiation is not splitting things fifty-
fifty or ignoring the demands made by the other side. It is a situation where
you take the other party into consideration and give him or her something,
even though it would be perfectly possible not to, given a favorable power
––––––––––––––
7
The Processes of International Negotiation Program under the aegis of the IIASA,
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (www.iiasa.ac.at).

16
 COOPERATING TO AGREE OR CONFRONTING TO DEFEAT?

balance. But you do, because you are going to meet again, because there
are precedents, because you have some ethics, or some such reason. It is
also right that the party that has negotiated best, or made use of a greater
advantage, should be rewarded in some way; although the question remains
of how the other party and his legitimacy should be taken into
consideration. So I asked my colleagues at the PIN meeting where they
stood on a graph that I prepared. The graph represented these three points,
with each person’s BATNA on the bottom left where the graph began.
Several of them placed themselves near that point, which is neither 50/50
nor 100/0. Dean Pruitt takes a similar kind of view. It is all very well, he
says in substance, wanting to maximize utilities, but could not negotiation
contribute something different from total maximization? These are very
practical problems. With today’s competition – as seen in mass retail, for
example – should you try to kill the competitor, or kill the subcontractor, or
should you instead go about things differently, even if the approach is a bit
rough and ready? Slightly similar philosophical considerations about “all or
nothing” can be found in initial pages of Walder’s novel. For example, he
says: “Truth is not the opposite of lies, betrayal is not the opposite of
service,” That’s how I personally see cooperative negotiation. That’s what
Pruitt presented, but with supporting arguments.

Négociations – Let’s move on. What in your opinion of the contributions of

William Zartman?

Christophe Dupont – Zartman is a multi-interest, creative person! The first

time I met him I was impressed with his imagination: whenever you see
him, he tells you about a new idea, or else he’s advanced his own previous
thinking. He’s made important contributions to the whole field of
negotiation. His “diagnosis-formula/detail” model contributes to
understanding international negotiations. In other negotiations, I am not so
sure you can identify a first phase with a really definite formula; it takes
shape during the negotiation, by proposals, counterproposals, arguments,
maneuvers. Following the diagnosis phase, Zartman posits two major
moments in a negotiation: formation of a general framework of agreement,
then working out the details. The details can be described in various ways.
Otomar Bartos, for example, constructed an interesting model of
convergence through concessions and counter-concessions (1977); Pruitt
developed a model to study the methods and consequences of reciprocity –
or a lack of reciprocity – in the negotiation process. But I think the main
contribution made by Zartman is the idea of a “formula.” He also has many
other contributions to his credit. For example, his analysis of the structural

17
INTERVIEW WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT, MAY 2005

dimension of negotiation – and power in particular – brings new ideas and

is sometimes contrary to received thinking. So too does his analysis of ripe
moments and hurting stalemates.

Négociations – And, your thoughts about Daniel Druckman?

Christophe Dupont – His contribution goes into several fields too; he

covers everything. I have a lot of respect for him, because I have had the
chance to see him in action, as I am working on a really interesting research
project with him. This project arose from an article he published in
International Negotiation a few years ago (1998). The article argues that it
must be acknowledged that negotiation practitioners and theorists move in
two separate worlds. The former think theory has little to do with practice,
and is complicated and abstract; the latter tend to be isolated from practice
and have little dialogue with practitioners. Druckman said that there was
perhaps a way to reconcile the two, by showing the practitioners that theory
can be of use to them. Using the resources of George Mason University, he
and a team worked for more than a year examining the many journals
devoted to negotiation. One hundred and sixty articles were identified, and
they selected what they considered scientifically validated findings. They
then drew up a list of twelve, later expanded to sixteen, themes such as
integrative agreements, culture, alternatives, the rigidity/flexibility
dilemma, the role of third parties in negotiation.
When I read that article, I sent him a note saying I was interested in
this approach. He replied immediately and suggested taking the same
approach for France. At the time Druckman was working on a host of
projects in other areas but was keen on devoting more time to one of his
favorite research topics, negotiation. That was how this ambitious project
started, based on narratives, i.e. 4-5 page documents showing, for a given
subject such as integrative bargaining, that it is preferable to do one thing
rather than another. With a young assistant at Lille business school, we
noted that there was relatively little to be drawn from the books and even
less from the articles published in French, but that we could use doctoral
theses. And so we in our turn wrote some twelve narratives, each a few
pages long, containing the propositions we considered validated. These
were followed by questions and case/simulation exercises to use these
validated recommendations and put them into practice. We compared our
results with Druckman’s findings. In a working session with him and his
assistants – I was with Alain Lempereur, who was a participant in the
project – we said two things. One was that we cannot work like you. Over
the course of thirty years you have interacted with hundreds of researchers,

18
 COOPERATING TO AGREE OR CONFRONTING TO DEFEAT?

had access to vast resources, been doing numerous laboratory experiments,

and so on; we’re not at that stage yet although we can accept findings that
are internally valid and replicated. We can do that also because they have
worked in the past. And in these narratives we’ll put recommendations, not
always drawn from laboratory experiments, but in some cases based on
other approaches, such as those from history or diplomacy – I’m thinking
of Alain Plantey’s work (2002) – and refer to a “wisdom” born of
experience and observation.
The second point was that we will try to see whether certain
differences in the approaches to negotiation taken by the North Americans
and the French can be explained by the choice of themes resulting from our
respective reviews and from the methods used to produce the findings or
insights. Druckman approved. Taking this approach, I think some
reconciliation has occurred between theory and practice. But one needs to
know how to present the theory appropriately as is attempted in this
collaborative project with Druckman. We enjoyed our joint training with
this approach at the Parisian Business School Negocia.

Négociations – At the Negocia Biennial conference 8 in December 2003,

you called for a “decompartmentalization of negotiation”. How, in your
opinion, can we “decompartmentalize” and develop negotiation in French-
speaking Europe?

Christophe Dupont – First, you have to decide what to develop. Do we

want to develop knowledge, or practice, or negotiation training? The
answers to this question will shape the aim of the enterprise. What I think
we should start with – this is a proposal, a wish, and it will probably put me
rather on the researchers’ side, but then I will broaden my approach – is to
show that negotiation has its own autonomy, that it is a discipline in its own
right. We need to stop putting it sometimes in marketing, sometimes in
international relations, sometimes in human relations, which is what still
happens at management schools. No, as America has demonstrated to us,
negotiation deserves to be taught as a separate program. So we could have
professors of negotiation just as we have professors of marketing or human
sciences. But I suppose that this is a long way off.
Second, in more practical terms, and small steps are being made in
this direction, we need to being the two sides closer to a dual theory-
practice perspective. First, bringing the disciplines closer, which is partly
what your journal Négociations and the Negocia Biennial conference
––––––––––––––
8
An international conference on negotiation held in Paris every other year.

19
INTERVIEW WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT, MAY 2005

attempt to do. The overarching theme is cross-disciplinarity. We need to

build bridges that create shared knowledge and mutual interest. Some
practitioners are receptive to that, but many are still hostile or indifferent;
researchers do not really know how to go about it; they often lack access
points and contacts. Practice would oblige them to focus on useful
hypotheses, not going in too many directions. Practice is always a bit
restrictive, like: “That’s not what happens in real life…”
Third: I think that the proportion of books offering in-depth
reflection and rigorous methods is small in France and in the French-
speaking world. The market is driven by rather simplistic and anecdotal
“magic formulae” guides. True, there are some interesting contributions of
that kind, for instance the book by Patrick Audebert-Lasrochas, Bien
négocier (2005). But generally it would be desirable to raise the standard
and renew thinking. Many books simply say and repeat the same thing in
different forms: what we need in my opinion is more distance, more vision,
more overall strategy rather than just piecemeal tactics. Fourth: we should
increase the number of initiatives, conferences – like the Negocia Biennial
events – and journals – and that gives me a chance to pay tribute to
Négociations, with its clever plural title. Negocia has had the audacity and
bravery to organize conferences where people could meet and compare
their approaches, including from an international standpoint.
Fifth, we should establish balanced partnerships with other
countries, particularly in Europe. There is a lot being done on negotiation in
the Netherlands. A few years ago I was invited to teach a course at
Rotterdam’s Erasmus University, where I found out that the basic course in
negotiation, a stand-alone discipline, covered some 84 hours. This is worlds
apart from the traditional 22 hours devoted to it in French management
schools! At the GFN 9 – the French Negotiation Group – which came out of
PIN, we tried to set up links with the Italians and the Swedes; some
meetings were held, including one at the Swedish Embassy and another in
Rome, both very well organized; but we were unable to go any further
because we did not find the necessary funding. The Netherlands and
Sweden are two promising examples, and we need to succeed in developing
international partnerships with them, and also with Belgium, Switzerland
and Canada. My sixth proposal is to encourage doctoral theses on
negotiation. And, finally, we should examine the possibilities of forming an
association, in a spirit of cooperation but not rivalry, without trying to carve
out a dominant position and in a spirit of sharing and complementarity.

––––––––––––––
9
Groupe français de négociation.

20
 COOPERATING TO AGREE OR CONFRONTING TO DEFEAT?

Négociations – Do you think it would be possible to set up a “French-

speaking Negotiation Society”? Because we have the following problem:
we all work separately in our own teams and research centers, and
currently the negotiation field lacks recognition and identification as a field
in its own right in the disciplinary societies.

Christophe Dupont – A Society of that kind would be conceivable, but

only if it is very broad, if it encompasses questions of negotiation but also
mediation and conflict. A consortium-type arrangement is another
possibility. That is how they started at Harvard for PON, between Harvard
Business School, Tufts University and MIT 10 . That could be a medium-
term vision. In France, we also have the example of ESSEC’s Institute for
Research and Education on Negotiation 11 , and Michel Ghazal and the
Centre européen de la négociation (European Negotiation Center). All
these could have been part of a single society in the first place, but that did
not suit the various groups’ intents, interests or priorities. Perhaps we
should look at how the IACM, the International Association of Conflict
Management 12 , has developed. In the space of some twenty years, it has
become practically an institution. Its congress attracts more than two
hundred participants in most years.

Négociations – We’re coming to the end of the interview. Let’s raise the
question of the “ideal negotiator”. Your textbook ends with the “effective”
or “ideal” negotiator. You say there are certain requirements to achieve
this objective: “clear-sightedness, common sense” on one side and
“flexibility and firmness” on the other. Roy Lewicki and Joseph Litterer, in
their textbook Negotiation (1985) also say that the effective or ideal
negotiator is a person who grows in the role, who increases his or her
skills. So negotiating skill includes self awareness or “working on
yourself” before you can even claim to change the other party’s
preferences?

Christophe Dupont – In my opinion there’s no such thing as the ideal

negotiator. But there are ideal negotiators. It all depends on the fields and
the situations. I remember an article published a few years ago about

––––––––––––––
10
For the consortium and programs of Harvard’s Program On Negotiation
see http://www.pon.harvard.edu/.
11
See www.essec-irene.com.
12
The IACM also publishes Negotiation and Conflict Management Research. See
www.iacm-conflict.org.

21
INTERVIEW WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT, MAY 2005

Airbus. The author described and compared the two chief negotiators at
Airbus: a Frenchman and an Englishman. They were totally different in
every way. I found this striking, because both of these managers were
considered very good negotiators. In fact their profiles were different, but
one of them succeeded in certain situations, and the other in different
situations. Airbus’ skill thus lay in deciding to use one of them for certain
types of problems and the other for other types of problem. So there is no
ideal profile. If you want to sum up, you could say it is a negotiator who is
very good at adjusting to different situations: Comfortable with the
distributive approach, and comfortable with the integrative approach. The
problem is that when you try to define those attributes, for example to
establish negotiator profiles, you end up with extremely long and very
eclectic lists. Iklé takes a slightly ironic tone in discussing the question of
the ideal negotiator; he calls it the “complete negotiator” (1964, 253),
mentions the long lists of required qualities and finally says you could add
almost anything to the list! Nonetheless I think that if you want to be a
negotiator, you need to develop a good deal of lucidity and judgment; you
need a keen sense of the other, and thus a sharp eye; you need good people
or interactional skills. You must have character, a “strong personality” –
this is similar to what Fisher and Ury said about the “soft” negotiator; even
in cooperative mode, you have to be able to say no when necessary. You
need a cool head and patience; creativity to get out of deadlocks; and
integrity.
I’d like to make an important comment: these qualities can’t be
arranged in order of importance. Any classification would be open to
challenge; no ranking is possible. So I tend to define a good negotiator as a
skillful, informed negotiator, but not necessarily a “tough” negotiator.
Behind this skillfulness is a kind of cocktail, in variable proportions. These
are all skills that can be learned through training and experiuence. That is
the subtitle of the original French edition of the book by Alain P.
Lempereur and Aurélien Colson (2004): “Good negotiators are made, not
born…”. Their idea is that negotiation is learned. In this regard, Picasso’s
observations about his drawing skills are relevant: Without training or
regular practice, his art would not be appreciated by others or be in
demand. To the extent that negotiation is a scientific field, we can all
benefit from the research on how to develop and improve empathic and
tactical skills as well as systematic thinking. We do not know the extent to
which celebrated negotiators such as Talleyrand benefited from his
opportunities to negotiate or to practice their craft. We do know that
modern negotiators do benefit from the accumulated knowledge on the
practice of negotiating, many through classroom teaching or tutoring.

22
 COOPERATING TO AGREE OR CONFRONTING TO DEFEAT?

We need to be wary of terms such as “lucidity, judgment.” We are

becoming aware that a particular quality is often accompanied by its
opposite. This relates to the sentence from Walder’s novel: “Truth is not the
opposite of lies.” Further if we approach negotiation entirely as rational
actors, we risk losing spontaneity. In talking of the ideal negotiator, you can
say that it is an attitude we should tend towards, that we can change
according to the circumstances, but I cannot see any possibility of really
defining the ideal negotiator. “First, know yourself and work on yourself”:
so I agree with the expression that to know others, you have to know
yourself; that is when you realize the role played by your own biases,
prejudices, received ideas, and clichés. People are generally unaware of
them during the process of negotiating. For example, you may be unaware
that you are imposing assumptions based on stereotypical notions of how
the British negotiate. This may contribute to less flexible behavior on the
part of your British opponent. Understanding yourself aids in detecting
others: for example, sensitivity to attributional biases in yourself may
increase your sensitivity to these biases in others.

Négociations – One final question. Your book La négociation. Conduite,

théorie, applications, the fourth edition of which came out in 1994, is now
out of print. Will it be extended or followed by another project?

Christophe Dupont – You are right, you cannot get it in bookshops any
more, which is a pity for students, as it was their “handbook” for a long
time. But the publisher, Dalloz, is refocusing commercially on its well-
known strength: legal matters. To bring out a fifth edition, I would have
had to change – in practice, reformulate or even add – many passages,
because there have been an enormous number of new contributions in ten
years. So it is better to make a new start! That is what I am doing at the
moment, and I hope in my turn to contribute something new with a good
deal of originality. I have already chosen the title. There will be five
chapters, two of which are practically finished. If all goes well, I hope to
present the manuscript in spring 2006. 13

Thank you for providing the opportunity to share my thoughts about

negotiation with the reading audience.
––––––––––––––
13
This book has since been published with a foreword by Daniel Druckman: La Négociation
post-moderne. Bilan des connaissances, acquis et lacunes, perspectives, Paris, Publibook,
coll. sciences humaines et sociales, 2006. Chapters 7 and 8 in this volume are translated and
edited versions of chapters from that book.

23
INTERVIEW WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT, MAY 2005

Editors Note: Christophe Dupont dedicated his last book to his family and
to the many colleagues that have been instrumental in the development of
his work in the field of conflict and negotiation. These include colleagues at
the ESC School in Lille, at ESSEC and Negocia Business Schools in Paris,
as well as members of the Program on International Negotiation (PIN),
and particularly Professors Daniel Druckman and I. William Zartman.

REFERENCES

Audebert-Lasrochas P. (2005). Bien négocier. Paris, Éditions d’Organisation.

Bartos O. (1997). “Simple Model of Negotiation: A Sociological Point of View”,
in Zartman W. The Negotiation Process. Theories and Applications. Beverly
Hills, Sage.
Cathelineau M. (1991). Négocier gagnant. Paris, InterÉditions.
Constantin L. (1971). Psychosociologie de la négociation. Paris, PUF.
Druckman D. (1977). Negotiations. Social-Psychological Perspectives. Beverly
Hills, Sage.
Druckman D. and Robinson V. (1998). “From research to application: Utilizing
research findings in negotiation training programs”, International Negotiation,
3, (1): 7-38.
Dupont C. (1994). La Négociation. Conduite, théorie, applications. Paris, Dalloz
(4th edition).
Faure G. O., ed. (2003). How People Negotiate. Resolving Disputes in Different
Cultures. Dordrecht, Kluwer.
Fisher R., Ury W. and Patton B. (1991). Getting to Yes. Boston, Houghton Mifflin.
Iklé F. C. (1964). How Nations Negotiate. New York, Harper and Row.
Lax D. and Sebenius J. (1986). The Manager as Negotiator. New York, Free Press.
Lempereur A. P. and Colson A. (2004). Méthode de négociation. Paris, Dunod. 2nd
edition, 2010.
Lempereur A. P. and Colson A., ed. by Pekar M. (2008). The First Move. A
Negotiator’s Companion. Chichester, Wiley.
Lempereur A. P. and Colson A, ed. (2008). Négociations européennes. De Henri
IV à l’Europe des 27, preface by Jean-Pierre Jouyet, postface by Hubert
Védrine. Paris, A2C.
Lewicki R. and Litterer J. (1985). Negotiation. Homewood, Irwin; 2nd edition,
1994.
Plantey A. (2002). La négociation internationale au XXIe siècle. Paris, CNRS
Editions, new edition.
Pruitt D. and Carnevale P. (1993). Negotiation in Social Conflict. Pacific Grove
(CA), Brooks Cole.

24
 COOPERATING TO AGREE OR CONFRONTING TO DEFEAT?

Raïffa H. (1982). The Art and Science of Negotiation. How to Resolve Conflicts
and Get the Best Out of Bargaining. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Rubin J. and Brown B. (1975). The Social-Psychology of Bargaining and
Negotiation. New York, Academic Press.
Schelling T. (1960). Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Stevens C. (1963). Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation. New York,
McGraw-Hill.
Thibaut, J.W. and H.H. Kelley (1959) The Social Psychology of Groups. New
Yoprk : John Wiley & Sons.
Touzard H. (1977). La médiation et la résolution des conflits. Paris, PUF.
Walder F. (1958). Saint-Germain ou la négociation. Paris, Gallimard.
Walton R. and McKersie R. (1965). A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations.
An Analysis of Social Interaction System. New York, McGraw-Hill.
Walton R., McKersie R., and Cutcher-Gershenfeld J. (1994), Strategic
Negotiations. A Theory of Change in Labor-Management Relations. Boston,
Harvard Press.
Zartman W. (1976). The Fifty per cent Solution. New York, Doubleday.

25
 CHAPTER 2

CHRISTOPHE DUPONT’S
LEGACY IN THE FIELD OF NEGOTIATION

AURÉLIEN COLSON

Through his career at the International Monetary Fund (1947-1959), the

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (1959-1961), and then
the European Investment Bank (1961-1970), Christophe Dupont had many
occasions to experience that special moment just before negotiation
proceedings, when the doors close, the various parties take their place at the
table, and enter into negotiation. Little by little, they gauge one another’s
positions, exchange information, assess the task at hand and its challenges,
think of solutions, and work towards an agreement, or admit that one is not
possible, at least for the time being. Thus, negotiations are either
suspended, or broken off, or concluded. Once negotiations start, eventually
they come to an end, even when they turn into a cycle of ending and
starting over again, or blur into the kind of “continuous negotiation” so dear
to Richelieu.
Christophe Dupont once entered into negotiations – and he never
came out. Behind the practitioner negotiator appeared indeed the researcher
and teacher. Right up until the end of his life, he stayed in touch with the
latest developments in the field of negotiation and was a pioneer for
innovative research. He inspired an entire generation of scholars in the
French-speaking world and beyond, advised corporate and public sector
negotiators, and was a mentor to countless students of all ages. From the
publication of his seminal work in 1982, now a classic, right up to his most
recent opus published in 2006, also on its way to becoming a reference in
the field, Dupont tirelessly worked to extend the bounds of negotiation
research. With his vast knowledge, endless curiosity, and impressive
mastery of literature on the subject, he knew how to analyze any situation,
put it into perspective, and connect theory with practice.
An eminent figure among the true masters of negotiation, Dupont
knew how to listen, give others their space, and share ideas. Deep down, he
undoubtedly would have preferred to have been a diplomat, but in fact he

International Negotiation: Foundations, Models, and Philosophies. Careers in Negotiation and Conflict
Management Research, Christophe Dupont. Aurélien Colson, Daniel Druckman, and William Donohue
(eds.) 27-33 © 2013 Republic of Letters Publishing. All rights reserved.
AURÉLIEN COLSON

did live as a kind of diplomat: he was a conveyer of ideas, an intermediary

between disciplines, and a facilitator for fruitful exchanges between
reflection and action. Always with an elegance and discretion that were no
barrier to his tenacity, Dupont embodied the very qualities that Sir Ernest
Satow identified as the definition of diplomacy itself: “the application of
intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the
governments of independent states” (1917). As a diplomat, his style could
be described as more English than French, in keeping with Harold
Nicolson’s formulation of this dichotomy (1939) 1 :
Professional British diplomatists display little initiative, take no pains to
impress others with their intellectual brilliance (…). On the other hand it is
impossible to ignore the fact that the British diplomatist is exceptionally well
informed, manages to acquire and to retain the confidence of foreign
governments, is imperturbable in times of crisis, and almost always succeeds.
(p. 71)
Conversely,
So convinced is the average Frenchman of his own intellectual pre-eminence,
so conscious is he of the superiority of his own culture, that he finds it
difficult at times to conceal his impatience with the barbarians who inhabit
other countries. This causes offence. Their superb intellectual integrity tempts
them to regard as insincere the confused fumbling of less lucid minds and to
feel irritated. It thus occurs that French diplomacy, with all its magnificent
equipment and its fine principles, is often ineffective. (p. 80-82)
Dupont was also a diplomat in the sense that he always chose his words
with the utmost care, refused all extravagance, and firmly held to the belief
that one does not need to raise one’s voice to be heard. He commanded
respect. These qualities proved to be consistent with the research
perspective he suggested in 2008 at an international symposium on
negotiation at Cerisy-la-Salle 2 : “to replace [in negotiation] an approach
based on self-interest with one based on setting an example”. He then
raised the question, “Does the world need ‘imposing negotiators’, or rather
clear-sighted, creative and inspired negotiators?” To sum up, if that is even
possible, Dupont’s mark on negotiation research, he invited us to redefine a
negotiator as someone committed to fulfilling his responsibilities to the

––––––––––––––
1
A dichotomy that was not to the advantage of the quai d’Orsay, but bien sûr we must
hasten to add that it is clearly outdated.
2
“Acquis et perspectives de la négociation”, a presentation made at the international
symposium Penser la négociation en modernité avancée (Cerisy-la-Salle, France, May 29 -
June 3, 2008).

28
 CHRISTOPHE DUPONT’S LEGACY IN THE FIELD OF NEGOTIATION

society he is part of, while also being concerned with the legitimacy, and in
turn, the durability of the agreements and policies he helps establish.
This issue is all the more important since negotiations now take
place in a context of increased societal democratization coupled with the
rapid development of information technologies, which make them
increasingly subject to calls for transparency, and therefore exposed to third
party observation. If negotiation is, as Dupont defined it, “an activity where
different participants confronted both with diverging views and
interdependence interact with one another and choose (or find it necessary)
to voluntarily seek a mutually acceptable solution” (1994, 11), making the
process more transparent significantly extends the scope of this interaction.
This opens up a field for reflection and research based on two concepts that
are central to political science, but too rarely explored in relation to
negotiation (Colson, 2007): the responsibility of the negotiator, and the
legitimacy of the negotiated agreement. What are the limits of the
negotiator’s responsibility? Does it end once the constituents are satisfied,
or does it extend beyond that? For what and to whom is the negotiator
accountable? To what extent must the negotiator take into account the
“common good” and “public interest” issues now that growing
transparency makes it increasingly possible to verify that they are factored
in? Similarly, to what extent does the consent of the parties to a negotiated
agreement suffice to guarantee its legitimacy? To what extent should the
legitimacy of an agreement rely on principles governing its wider context,
or the motivations of other stakeholders in the extended perimeter? Is it
therefore possible to distinguish what can be called the “limited legitimacy”
of a negotiated agreement, meaning that the agreement is acceptable to the
parties present – from its “extended legitimacy” where the agreement
complies with a much wider context that includes stakeholders that are
involved, but not necessarily present? All these questions point to areas for
research and investigation that underscore how political science can
contribute to enriching knowledge on negotiation.
With hindsight, maybe Dupont’s overarching contribution was to
launch the patient process through which negotiation would be recognized
as an academic field in France. This remains a challenge to this day. For
one thing, the French university system finds it difficult to welcome “new”
topics as fully-fledged academic disciplines, as Groom (1994)
demonstrated for instance as far as International Relations are concerned.
Furthermore, France is a country which “does not like negotiation”, as
trade-unionist Jean-Paul Jacquier (2002) put it. Indeed negotiation is at
odds with the ingredients of what Furet, Julliard, and Rosanvallon
described as the “exception française” (1988). Since the 1789 Revolution,

29
AURÉLIEN COLSON

France has been profoundly shaped by a culture of antagonism, which

leaves little room for compromise – even the French word compromis is
only four letters away from its cousin compromission, which means
treason. Furthermore, the French society has been, and to some extent
remains, very state-centric. As a result, both the executive and the
legislative branches have been suspicious towards civil society; for the sake
of equality, unilateral decision making has been usually preferred at the
expenses of negotiated processes. This specific political context explains
why negotiation remains to this day under-used in political and industrial
relations arenas, and oftentimes criticized on different grounds (Colson,
2009).

ENTRER EN NEGOCIATION: A FESTSCHRIFT

To honor the memory of Christophe Dupont and pay homage to his

outstanding contribution to the wide-ranging field of negotiation, “tradition
does not run counter to innovation”, to paraphrase the opening lines of
Francis Walder’s book, Saint-Germain ou la négociation (1958) 3 . Thus, the
age-old tradition of the “liber amicorum”, a collection of chapters compiled
in honor of an eminent scholar, is an effective way to infuse with
innovation the still-young field of negotiation. Also termed “mélanges” in
French, Festschrifts remain quite rare in English and even more so in
French, which makes particularly unique the edition in 2011, following
Christophe Dupont’s passing away in 2010, of the book Entrer en
négociation: Mélanges en l’honneur de Christophe Dupont (Brussels,
Larcier). Let me once again thank warmly the contributors who
enthusiastically responded to the invitation and wrote a chapter with
Christophe in mind 4 .
This book tries and echoes “a proposition, a wish” formulated by
Christophe Dupont himself in 2005 when questioned about negotiation
developments in Europe 5 . He was determined to “demonstrate that the field
of negotiation is autonomous, and a separate discipline in its own right”.
––––––––––––––
3
“La vérité n’est pas le contraire du mensonge, trahir n’est pas le contraire de servir, haïr
n’est pas le contraire d’aimer, confiance n’est pas le contraire de méfiance, ni droiture de
fausseté”, p. 11.
4
William Zartman, Christian Thuderoz, Hubert Touzard, Anne-Brigitte Spitzbarth, Jacques
Rojot, Alain P. Lempereur, Philippe Mermet, Paul Meerts, Sanda Kaufman, Miron
Kaufman, Guy Groux, Bruno-André Giraudon, Gaspard Gantzer, Guy-Olivier Faure,
Bernard Dugué, Daniel Druckman, Arlette Donnay, Aurélien Colson, Jean-Michel Bonvin,
Lionel Bobot, Farid Baddache, Patrick Audebert-Lasrochas, and Saïd Abass Ahamed.
5
In his “Grand Entretien” interview published in Négociations, volume 2006/1, pp. 95-115.
See Chapter 1 of this book.

30
 CHRISTOPHE DUPONT’S LEGACY IN THE FIELD OF NEGOTIATION

Although many tend to think of negotiation as a cross-disciplinary field that

includes contributions from many different horizons, it is true that Dupont
worked long and hard for negotiation to be recognized as an academic field
of its own, subject to the highest academic standards, based on rigorous
peer-reviewed research, and providing innovative concepts.
In keeping with this wish, Dupont set forth three imperatives that
inspired Entrer en négociation. The first was to “bring research teams
together”. As Festschrifts are essentially collective works, Entrer en
négociation thus brings together 23 contributors hailing from very diverse
institutions. Some belong to complementary circles and networks, while
others are more independent, but all were very happy for a seat at the same
table. In the same spirit, panels were organized around the book and in
memory of Christophe Dupont, namely at the 2010 Paris Biennal
Conference, and then at the 2011 IACM Conference in Istanbul. To “bring
disciplines together” was Christophe Dupont’s second imperative. Entrer
en négociation therefore includes chapters that fall under political science,
international relations, sociology, philosophy, law, history, social
psychology, business and management, and even physics. Finally, since
Dupont’s third imperative is to “bring together professionals and
researchers”, Entrer includes contributions not only from academic
researchers, but also from both practitioners and professional trainers in the
field. A fourth “imperative” to which Dupont certainly would have
acquiesced has also been added by the book’s scientific committee 6 : to
bring together different generations. Consequently, articles by some of the
most internationally reputed names in the field appear side by side with
contributions from rising scholars of a younger generation. Even more
authors would have liked to contribute to Entrer en négociation, but
unfortunately were unable to do so due to scheduling constraints,
professional or personal obligations 7 .
The challenge posed by an anthology of this kind is to present the
contributions in a logical fashion, when paradoxically, it is their very
diversity that makes the work so compelling. In the case in point, the idea
was to capture the various dimensions of Christophe Dupont’s professional
life, one that was punctuated by important Encounters (Part 1), that led him
to enter into the world of negotiation, and to never leave it. Dupont loved
––––––––––––––
6
Aurélien Colson (ESSEC), editor; Daniel Druckman (The University of Southern
Queensland & George Mason University); Guy-Olivier Faure (Université Paris V); Alain P.
Lempereur (ESSEC); Christian Thuderoz (INSA); and I. William Zartman (Johns Hopkins
University).
7
Sophie Allain, Viktor Kremenyuk, Valérie Rosoux and Pierre-Éric Tixier are nonetheless
associated with this homage to Christophe Dupont.

31
AURÉLIEN COLSON

dialogue and collaboration, so it was with four hands (with Patrick

Audebert-Lasrochas), and even four pairs of hands (along with Guy-Olivier
Faure, Laurent Mermet, and Hubert Touzard) that he co-wrote several
books. Similarly, he was a pivotal figure for the Process of International
Negotiations network, contributing chapters in most of the collected works
edited by Guy-Olivier Faure, Viktor Kremenyuk, Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Gunnar
Sjöstedt, and I. William Zartman. As these publications show, Dupont
conceived negotiation, above all, as an area of Research (Part 2). He
willingly accepted invitations to participate in not only symposiums, but
also informal seminars. Making the trip from Brussels to Cergy-Pontoise,
in the outskirts of Paris, he thus participated in almost all 22
interdisciplinary research seminars on negotiation (Séminaires
Interdisciplinaires de Recherche et d’Echange sur la Négociation,
SIRENE) organized by ESSEC IRENE. While he loved exchanging
research ideas with colleagues, he never separated theory from practice
when it came to both his own actions as a negotiator during the early part of
his career, and discussing others’ behavior in his books and articles. Hence
the focus of Part 3 on Industrial relations and corporate negotiations, and
of Part 4 on Diplomacy and international negotiations. Last but not least,
Dupont always found it in his heart to share the fruits of his experience and
research as a teacher and trainer. Honoring this spirit of Sharing is the
focus of the last section of Entrer en négociation.
This festschrift tried and attempted to do justice to Christophe
Dupont’s protean career in the field of negotiation. As this career was
international, and since his works can certainly stimulate further research
beyond the French-speaking academic community, I was very pleased
when Daniel Druckman and William Donohue suggested that we co-edit
International Negotiation: Foundations, Models, and Philosophies, in
which parts of Entrer en négociation have found their way.

REFERENCES

Colson A. (2007). Secret et transparence à l’égard de tiers en négociation.

Contribution à une histoire de la négociation internationale. Doctoral
dissertation, Université Paris V-Descartes & University of Kent.
Colson A. (2009). « Penser la négociation en science politique: retour aux sources
et perspectives de recherche ». Négociations, 2009/2, pp. 95-108.
Colson A., ed. (2011). Entrer en négociation: Mélanges en l’honneur de
Christophe Dupont. Brussels, Larcier.
Dupont C. (1982). La Négociation: conduite, théorie, applications. Paris, Dalloz;
new, revised and expanded editions: 1986, 1990, 1994.

32
 CHRISTOPHE DUPONT’S LEGACY IN THE FIELD OF NEGOTIATION

Dupont C. (2006). La Négociation post-moderne. Bilan des connaissances, acquis

et lacunes, perspectives. Paris, Publibook.
Furet F., Julliard J., and Rosanvallon P. (1988). La République du centre. La Fin
de l’exception française. Paris, Calmann-Lévy.
Groom AJR (1994). “The World Beyond: The European Dimension”, in Groom
AJR and Margot L. (ed.). Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to
Theory. London, Pinter, pp. 219-236.
Jacquier J.-P. (2002). “La France, un pays qui n’aime pas négocier”. In Thuderoz
Ch. and Giraud-Héraud A. La négociation sociale. Paris, CNRS Editions.
Nicolson H. (1939). Diplomacy. 4th ed., Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study
of Diplomacy, 1988.
Satow E. (1917). Guide to Diplomatic Practice. 5th ed. revised by Lord Gore-
Booth and Desmond Pakenham. London, Longman, 1979.
Walder F. (1958). Saint-Germain ou la négociation. Paris, Gallimard.

33
 CHAPTER 3

ENCOUNTERS WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS AND HUBERT TOUZARD

A GREAT RESEARCHER, ALWAYS READY TO SERVE OTHERS

by Patrick Audebert-Lasrochas

Every one of us has had, in his or her professional life, an encounter that
has changed the course of his or her career. That was exactly the case for
me when I met, practically by accident, an exceptional person, Professor
Christophe Dupont.

From Lille to HEC: a journey alongside Christophe Dupont

It was late 1974. I had been made redundant by my employer. At the time I
held the position of Southern Europe Sales Director for a decorative textile
manufacturer. I suffered the full effects of the textile industry crisis that
was particularly rampant in Northern France. I was then offered a training
course reserved for executives laid off for economic reasons. Having never
pursued higher education during my youth, I discovered a new universe:
The University of Science and Technology of Lille and its management
school, the IAE. Eighteen months later Jean-Pierre Debourse, the Dean of
IAE, made me an entirely unexpected job offer: a full time staff position at
IAE Lille. I accepted the offer without the slightest hesitation – and without
even knowing what the position actually entailed!
The following month, during a meeting with the executive staff and
professors, Jean-Pierre Debourse introduced a new professor, retired from
the European Investment Bank (EIB) in Luxembourg: Christophe Dupont.
Christophe had been giving finance classes as a part-time lecturer at the
University of Lille I for a number of years. Louise Raman, one of his
students, had told her husband, Professor Jean-Pierre Raman, that she had a
“super” finance professor who was wasting away among the masses of
teachers at the University of Lille. Jean-Pierre Raman quickly introduced

International Negotiation: Foundations, Models, and Philosophies. Careers in Negotiation and Conflict
Management Research, Christophe Dupont. Aurélien Colson, Daniel Druckman, and William Donohue
(eds.) 35-43 © 2013 Republic of Letters Publishing. All rights reserved.
PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS AND HUBERT TOUZARD

Christophe Dupont to Jean-Pierre Debourse who immediately hired him to

join the IAE team.
It was the very first faculty meeting for me, and apparently one of
the first for Christophe Dupont. Coincidentally, I was sitting next to him
and, just as it often happens in these situations, I discovered the individual;
as it is commonly said, "we hit it off from the start." One of the goals of
this meeting was to put together teams according to subject matter. Finance,
Marketing, HR among others. At the time, Christophe Dupont was first and
foremost a finance person; he had helped to reconstruct the Central Bank of
Cyprus. Many years later he told me that as a pure economist and financier
he had discovered during this mission the very important, if not to say
fundamental, role of negotiation in management. He had then focused on
deepening his knowledge and research in negotiation, systematically going
through all the specialized literature – exclusively North American at the
time period – with a fine-tooth comb.
Earlier in my life, I had worked as a salesman, then head of sales
and sales director in different private companies; we thus had, among
others, one point in common: “negotiation.” Returning to the above-
mentioned meeting: Jean-Pierre Debourse asked Christophe Dupont (who
had conveyed his passion for negotiation), with whom he would like to
work in the field of negotiation. Christophe Dupont's answer was frank and
rapid: with Patrick Audebert. That is how our friendly and intellectual
collaboration, which lasted more than twenty-five years, began. Life’s
coincidences are often surprising…
We remained in a state of uncertainty for several months – finance
and negotiation, or one without the other? During this period, Christophe
Dupont was writing his doctoral thesis, in which one part focused on
finance, the other on negotiation; a real dilemma knowing that we were
equally passionate about finance. We carried on our work in both subject
matters, and Christophe Dupont published his first book, the only book in
French about negotiation worthy of its name at the time (Dupont, 1982). It
very quickly became apparent to us that tools available for project
managers were greatly lacking, in particular in project financing and
negotiation.
At IAE, negotiation appealed to us so much that it became our
principal preoccupation. During several years, we had developed a
technique while consulting in numerous companies (Arianespace, PSA
Peugeot-Citroën, Danone) in France and abroad. The scenario was always
the same: Christophe Dupont was the head, and I was the legs. I ran the
groups, Christophe Dupont gathered the ideas and summarized them. It was

36
 ENCOUNTERS WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

a period of intense production: articles written together, and the creation of

case studies.
Since 1970 Christophe Dupont had also been a professor at CRC-
Groupe HEC. He brought me into this institution as a part-time lecturer and
for many years I conjointly taught a seminar that is still included in the
program: “Business Negotiations.” Christophe Dupont’s pedagogical
approach to this seminar was truly innovative; first by developing a
complex negotiation case study and secondly in the way he conducted it:
the participants played the role of the buyer and four peers played the role
of the suppliers.
Christophe Dupont had accepted at the time to be my thesis
supervisor. He brought me along, advised me, and put a great deal of
himself into helping me make my thesis happen. The subject matter was, of
course, focused on negotiation. He then, just a few years later, helped me
again to receive my accreditation as Director of Research.
Thanks to Christophe Dupont, over the years I was given the
opportunity to meet and work with the “stars” of negotiation research. All
of these professors and researchers worked with Christophe Dupont, as at
the time he was the head of the Negotiation Department at CRC. A while
later, Christophe Dupont decided to cut back on his teaching
responsibilities in order to concentrate on research. Two things happened
following this decision. I became a more frequent contributor to all the
seminars given within the CRC: internal, international, and social
negotiations. And Christophe Dupont asked me to write a handbook of
applied exercises in negotiation based on the theories he developed in his
own work, published by Dalloz; the second handbook written together
(Dupont and Audebert, 1994).
A few months later, I was named director of the Negotiation
Department at CRC (HEC). How? I never knew officially, but I remain
convinced that Christophe Dupont had something to do with it. Two years
later, Christophe Dupont announced to me that he would really be retiring
from the CRC and IAE in order to exclusively dedicate his time to leading
the LEARN 1 laboratory, and that he was “handing things over,” notably the
organization and the conducting of negotiation seminars. I panicked! For
the past fifteen years, we had been doing everything together, including
running seminars and now he was dropping me... I would never be able to
do it all alone! I thought, at the time, that Christophe Dupont, without ever
saying anything to me, wanted me to spread my wings and become
––––––––––––––
1
Laboratoire d’Enseignement, d’Analyse et de Recherche en Négociation
(Analysis, Research and Teaching Laboratory, Lille School of Management).

37
PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS AND HUBERT TOUZARD

autonomous. Today I realize that he was perhaps right; yet, I still miss him.
However, Christophe Dupont didn’t completely abandon me, for he helped
me a great deal – and that’s an understatement – when I was writing my
first solo work on negotiation (1995).

The man behind the researcher

There had been an osmosis between us during the course of all those years;
I remember that from Lille I would drive him back to his father-in-law’s
house in Sally-la-Bourse or to the CRC. Our discussions always turned
around negotiation; on the highway I would often take the next rest stop
and park the car in order to take notes – I was afraid that I would forget
what he had been saying. We would also get together every year, for one
week in his Provence house in Vallauris. The ritual never changed: work in
the morning, writing articles or books, lunch in a restaurant, a long walk
through the town’s streets and a final work session at the end of the day,
when we would put “to music” all of our ideas expressed during our walk. I
have wonderful memories, friendly and intellectual, of these sessions.
Another example of this osmosis: how many times, during the course of all
these years, did we ask ourselves the following question: “But whose idea
was it?” without, very often, being able to find the answer, our
collaboration was so close. I know, however, that most of the time the ideas
came from him.
With Christophe Dupont in retirement (not entirely…), and me at
the HEC, our meetings were fewer and further apart, but Christophe never
forgot to include me in his research activities. Christophe Dupont was
strongly involved in the Process of International Negotiation Group (PIN)
and in the Institute for Research and Education on Negotiation (ESSEC
IRENE), producing several works collectively or on his own, of which the
most recently published one is an absolute gem (Dupont, 2006). For any
student who wishes to do research or a doctoral thesis in negotiation,
everything they need is in this work. As an aside, and I might be revealing a
secret, Christophe Dupont told me while writing the book that this work
represented his “legacy.”
How can one define Christophe Dupont? He is a very discreet man
with great modesty. Being quite the opposite, many colleagues have often
asked me the question: “But how do you get along, you are both so
different!” I don’t know the answer, but it’s true that in twenty-five years
we have never had a quarrel, neither in our personal relationship, nor in our
intellectual discourse – it’s all to his credit, for I don’t have a very good
reputation when it comes to arguments; and concerning intellectual
exchanges, he was almost always right… He is one of those very rare

38
 ENCOUNTERS WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

professors of whom it can be said: “The student hasn't outgrown the

teacher."
Rereading these last few lines, and reaching back into my limited
memory, I realize that I know very little about his private life although we
have spent many years in close proximity. So I’ll share some bits and
pieces about him, sincerely hoping not to offend his sense of modesty.
Christophe Dupont finished high school during World War II; he suffered
greatly from the cold and the shortages of food during his stay at a Catholic
boarding school in Belgium. He attended HEC, which was in Paris at the
time, and then entered Sciences Po. He told me that once, with some other
students, they were messing about at the Place de l’Etoile and that, having
to dodge shots from the German army, they ended up taking refuge in a
urinal! Before the end of the war, he was called up for military service; he
served with the artillery regiment and was present at the great battle of the
Royan pocket. His mission was to wire microphones in order to measure
the canons’ impact. After his postgraduate studies, he wanted to enter ENA
(French elite school of public administration) but the IMF ended up
grabbing him and taking him to Washington. I am convinced that
Christophe Dupont would have loved to pursue a diplomatic career. But life
decided otherwise – luckily for us!
As for his family, Christophe Dupont is married to Françoise and
has three children who have brilliant careers themselves. He lives part of
the year in Wezembeek, near Brussels, and the other half of the year in his
charming house in Vallauris where he cultivates his talent as a wonderful
gardener. Finally, the only point where I have caught up with him: we are
both very happy grandfathers…
A last detail: Christophe Dupont always traipses around with small
notebooks filled with Post-It notes and papers, in practically every one of
his pockets. The notes and pieces of paper are often covered with scribbling
and cross outs in every which way. If you ever meet him, ask him for a
telephone number, or an address, just to see one of his little notebooks. The
most surprising thing of all, is that he knows exactly where to find
everything!
Aurélien Colson asked me to write these few lines; I realize I have
expressed impressions and emotions rather than methodologies or research
protocols that are so dear to Christophe, but I hope that his family, friends,
colleagues and peers will find one of the facets of Christophe Dupont’s
personality in this account: “A great researcher, always ready to serve
others.”

39
PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS AND HUBERT TOUZARD

ENCOUNTERS WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT,

ENCOUNTERS WITH NEGOTIATION,

by Hubert Touzard

My contribution to this compilation paying tribute to Christophe Dupont

will take a biographical and personal turn. I’d like to speak about how I
came to work on negotiation and how I met Christophe.
I began my academic career in Strasbourg at the beginning of the
1960’s under the leadership of Didier Anzieu, who was a young social
psychology professor and who was establishing the first connection
between group psychology and psychoanalysis. It was a period when
business executives were discovering group dynamics, such as how to
manage a group of collaborators so that each individual would not only be
efficient, but would also thrive in their work. Didier Anzieu had brought
my friend and colleague Jean Muller and myself into this adventure, which
was the group training of executives.
And then one day, he was asked to work on a several-day-long
negotiation training seminar. That was something entirely new in 1962-
1963 and suddenly we were all thrown into a new universe: that of
negotiation. Wanting to well-document ourselves we read Walder (Saint-
Germain ou la négociation, 1958), which had won the Goncourt prize
several years before, and it was at this time and for this occasion that I
developed my first simulation model: a negotiation between partisans and
opponents of the nuclear deterrence politics promoted by General de Gaulle
that was an object of great debate at the time. Here is an example of how
coincidence can contribute to creating a field of research.
Indeed, for conducting training seminars quickly led me to
conducting research: I was fascinated with the question of negotiation and I
concentrated all of my efforts on researching this subject. At the time I was
working on American studies concerning leadership, and I started reading
the literature on negotiation. I discovered an entire field of research, and the
existence of arbitration as a social practice in resolving labor disputes in
North America. In France, arbitration was mentioned in labor laws but it
was still rarely used, while in the United States there was already a plethora
of literature on this theme: numerous reports from arbitration bodies
concerning this quite frequently used technique and reports from arbitrators
recounting their activity. For me, what really trigged things was a small,
unexpected book that took an inventory from 1945 to 1959 of all the
publications on arbitration and mediation of labor disputes and international
conflicts, written by Jean Meynaud and Brigitte Schröder (1961). After
having read this book, which revealed that the reference literature was

40
 ENCOUNTERS WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

essentially American, an indication of the absence of research in France on

this question, I became interested in learning more about arbitration and
negotiation and it seemed natural that this should be the subject of my
doctoral thesis.
And then fortune smiled upon me. At the 1964 International
Congress of Applied Psychology in Ljubljana, I met two eminent American
colleagues, Fred Fiedler and Harry Triandis. I spoke to them about my
project, and they invited me to come work with them at the Group
Effectiveness Laboratory at the University of Illinois. A Fulbright research
grant and another one from the CNRS enabled me to go to Urbana for a
year with my family.
The object of my research was to map out the arbitrator’s role
within Fiedler’s contingency theory of leadership effectiveness. What
behavior should be favored by the leader of a group so that the group will
be as effective as possible: should the leader be task-oriented or
relationship-oriented? According to Fiedler, it depended upon the group’s
situational conditions. Where should the arbitrator situate himself within
the far and wide-ranging universe of the leader’s tasks? I thus elaborated
my first experiment on arbitration and learned a great deal about
experimentation methodology in social psychology. I also used that year to
read all the leading works that had been published by North American
social psychologists and practitioners of negotiation and mediation. I thus
had the opportunity to read, shortly after its publication, the now classic
work by Walton and McKersie (1965). The laboratory experiment, co-
jointly developed with a colleague from India (whose research was
centered on the theme of learning a foreign culture) put together, within a
three-person group, an American, an Indian, and an American arbitrator.
The group’s task was to negotiate educational norms and standards about
which the two cultures were opposed. The results demonstrated that the
most successful arbitrators were those who were relationship-oriented,
favoring interpersonal relations, instead of those who were task-oriented,
favoring the content of the negotiation. This had been my initial hypothesis
within the framework of the Fiedler model.
Once I returned to France, I defended my thesis at Nanterre
University and obtained my first appointment as a professor at the
University of Lille III. For a number of years afterwards I did very little
negotiation research, as all my time was taken by my duties as a professor,
as well as being Director of UER (Research and Teaching Unit) and Vice
President of Research.
But it was during that period that I met Christophe Dupont. It was
the very beginning of a long series of encounters and exchanges in Lille

41
PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS AND HUBERT TOUZARD

and elsewhere. I had finally met a specialist, both a practitioner and a

researcher in the field of negotiation. I was no longer alone! When I
returned to Paris as a professor at René Descartes University Paris 5, I was
able to pick up my research again. I was finally given the opportunity to
teach in my field of research and supervise masters’ research and doctoral
theses on conflict and negotiation. My students and I could observe,
analyze bits of real negotiations and conduct laboratory experiments.
At that time the entity we called the “Groupe Français de
Négociation” was born, bringing together Christophe Dupont, Guy-Olivier
Faure, Laurent Mermet, and myself. Later we were joined by a few other
colleagues, including Sophie Allain.
For me, it was a magnificent experience of cross-fertilization. We
all wished to move forward in the analysis of the complexity of negotiation.
Our fields were different, our methods of approach were varied, but
complementary, to the point that we decided to write a book together, like a
string quartet (1998). It was during these encounters that I was able to
better know Christophe. I liked his open-mindedness, his concern for
extensive documentation and reference material, his desire to be abreast of
all the current literature and research, his analytic rigor, and his ability to go
from theory to practice. I also appreciated his concrete experience in
negotiation and training in the field, which he conducted with great leaders,
his gift for dialogue and exchange and his friendliness. Thanks to
Christophe, the themes of negotiation are present in managers' minds.
Thanks to the numerous new editions of his books, each one brought up to
date, French business executives can learn about theory without being
afraid to waste their time, for concrete illustrations are always present to
give them the desire to go further and understand more. Yet above all, his
body of work encourages them to use theoretical approaches to better
negotiate; in other words, allowing everyone to use negotiation not just to
end a dispute, but also to develop better relationships with one another.

REFERENCES

Audebert-Lasrochas P. (1995). Profession négociateur. Paris, Éditions

d’Organisation.
Dupont C. (1982). La Négociation: conduite, théorie, applications. Paris, Dalloz,
new editions: 1986, 1990, 1994.
Dupont C. (2006). La négociation post-moderne. Paris, Publibook.
Dupont C., Audebert-Lasrochas P. (1994). La Négociation: exercices et
applications. Paris, Dalloz, 1994.
Dupont C., Audebert-Lasrochas P. (1999). Prévisions financières et tableau de
variation d'encaisse. Paris, Economica.

42
 ENCOUNTERS WITH CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

Faure G.-O., Mermet L., Touzard H., Dupont C. (1998). La négociation. Situations
et problématiques. Paris, Nathan.
Meynaud J., Schröder B. (1961). La Médiation. Tendances de la recherche et
bibliographie (1945-1959). Amsterdam, North-Holland Publ.
Touzard H. (1977). La Médiation et la résolution des conflits. Paris, Presses
Universitaires de France.
Walder F. (1958). Saint Germain ou la négociation. Paris, Gallimard.
Walton R. E., McKersie R. B. (1965). A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations.
An Analysis of a Social Interaction System. New York, McGraw-Hill.

43
 PART 2

SELECTED WRITINGS BY CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

 CHAPTER 4

NEGOTIATION AS COALITION BUILDING

CHRISTOPHE DUPONT *

Researchers of negotiation have developed various models and metaphors

to describe and explain the process and behavior that results in negotiation
outcomes. In multilateral negotiations, coalition building and dynamics are
striking phenomena. Can the study of these two concepts – quite apart from
their specific contribution to multilateral negotiation analysis – also serve
as a metaphor for negotiation in general and international negotiation in
particular?
International negotiations can take many forms. They can differ on
the number and types of actors, number and types of issues, and the variety
of stakes and roles exhibited. Perhaps the most discriminating factor is in
relation to actors. Actor differentiation is not only a question of size, but a
matter of status as well. Size helps distinguish between two and “n” actor
negotiations, that is, between bilateral and multilateral negotiations. 1
Zartman's formulation sums it up well, “Two's company and more's a
crowd” (Zartman, 1994:1). What theory and practice show is that as soon
as there are more than two actors, coalitions turn out to be a major variable
in understanding and explaining the process and outcome.
Can the concept of coalitions be applied to bilateral negotiation
encounters as well? Multilateral negotiations sometimes have been
interpreted as a multiplicity of dyadic interactions. From this interpretation,
a grand theory of coalitions might include the study of dyadic negotiations
as a subcategory. 2 In addition, many two party dealings are bilateral only in
––––––––––––––
*
Reprinted with authorization from Dupont, C. (1996). “Negotiation as coalition building”.
International Negotiation 1 (1): 47-64.
1
The literature sometimes distinguishes between plurilateral and multilateral negotiations,
the former being characterized by a smaller number of participants. Differences do exist, but
they are relatively limited. See Zartman (1994).
2
Characterizing multilateral negotiation as interacting dyads has been suggested by several
authors, including Preeg (1970), but this view is not shared by all (see Touval, 1989).

International Negotiation: Foundations, Models, and Philosophies. Careers in Negotiation and Conflict
Management Research, Christophe Dupont. Aurélien Colson, Daniel Druckman, and William Donohue
(eds.) 47-66 © 2013 Republic of Letters Publishing. All rights reserved.
CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

a formal sense; any one actor may be involved in “behind the scenes”
multiparty interactions in which coalitions may well exist or develop.
Constituencies and third parties are often not present at the negotiation
table but their roles in extending the bilateral interaction should not be
dismissed lightly. They can give rise to the dynamics of “two-level games”
(Putnam, 1988).
Status is a second element to consider in multilateral international
negotiations. An obvious dimension is between private and public actors. In
business encounters, actors generally have a private status, but there are
many instances where a private negotiator has to deal with government or
public protagonists. Fayerweather and Kapoor (1976) present several case
studies that illustrate the complexity of networks in which international
corporate negotiators have to operate at both internal and external levels,
resulting in a mix of private and public status. The status typology raises
the question of whether the coalition phenomenon operates similarly
between international corporate negotiations (private) and conference
diplomacy (public). Much research and analysis on coalitions has been
conducted using public negotiations that can be assessed within their real
world settings. Laboratory experiments provide an important alternative
context for empirical analysis and have yielded many theoretical
propositions on coalition formation, duration and maintenance, and process
and outcome impacts. However, there are fewer opportunities to evaluate
coalitions within private negotiations. Conference diplomacy is thus a
privileged terrain from which to study coalitions as a major element of
negotiations (Young, 1991).
In this article, several aspects of coalition theory and practice are
highlighted that are of great relevance to negotiation processes and
behaviors. The first section deals with the role of coalitions in international
multilateral negotiations. The second section approaches the problem of
planning coalition formation. The third section examines the issue of
strategic action and influence, and the last section explores similarities
between coalition building and dynamics and negotiation in general.

1. FUNCTIONS OF COALITIONS
IN INTERNATIONAL MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS

A characteristic which is often recognized as a distinctive feature of

multilateral negotiations is complexity. Complexity relates both to the
number of parties and the number of issues. 3 The main function of
––––––––––––––
3
A third important dimension is complexity of roles (see Section 3.)

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 NEGOTIATION AS COALITION BUILDING

coalitions is to facilitate the attainment of outcomes through increased

power despite complexity, but minimal conditions are required. As will be
seen below, coalition functions are extremely relevant to a metaphoric view
of negotiations.
The diplomatic conference setting is a clear case of coalition
building to reduce size and issue complexity. This type of diplomacy,
although present in earlier times (note the Congress of Vienna in 1814),
grew in importance in the post-World War II period as a result of the
ascendance of international organizations. Conferences are characterized by
a large number of participants. Each national delegation comes to the
conference with its own objectives and expectations, with the result that
even an interpretation of the meeting’s goal, the substance of the agenda,
and the procedures may not be altogether clear from the outside.
The establishment of coalitions of national participants on the basis
of a proximity of interests or values or due to power considerations
operates to simplify and give the conference a more manageable structure.
The emerging coalition patterns provide a way to organize the preliminary
debates so that subsequently it is easier to steer the various paths of action
more clearly. In this manner, coalitions help increase the visibility of
actors, countering the saying “the more, the messier.” However, if
coalitions play the role of facilitators in this sense, they may do it at the risk
of excessive polarization.
What is true of actors applies also to issues. Generally, conference
diplomacy confronts many issues that participants value differently.
Because of their proximity, members may find it appropriate to coalesce to
facilitate structuring and organizing of the various negotiation processes
(designing common platforms or package deals, for instance) that are
typical of multilateral negotiations.
Another function of coalitions in multilateral negotiations is to give
power to their members to help them achieve their objectives. A common
platform, incorporating the minimal demands of each separate coalition
member, is easier to handle and negotiate than the sum of individual items.
Coalitions can have different goals. Members congregate to force a
decision upon others – either to have an agreement concluded (whether
through the sanction of voting or on the basis of consensus) or, conversely,
to prevent an agreement from being enacted. This concerns not only the
decision making process itself, but often, and more crucially, the contents,
substance and formulation of the decision. Coalitions may strive, for
example, for an optimal or merely satisfactory (minimal) content or they
may endeavor to deprive the agreement of certain clauses, conditions or
rules that their members do not want.

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

The functions of coalitions are rather easy to depict in conference

diplomacy (Kremenyuk, 1991). Is it the same in other smaller multilateral
settings or groups? There are, of course, differences: the number of actors
is definitely lower, the contexts are different, and the contents of the
agreements are most often not comparable (they are likely to be more
tangible than in conference diplomacy). In international business or
interorganizational negotiations, the entities involved, belonging more to
the “plurilateral” than to the “multilateral” category, may develop
coalitions to function as strategic forces. One of the standard laboratory
cases (Caplow, 1968) analyzes the potential behaviors and strategies of
several firms planning a merger in the form of “two against one.” To cope
with the varied architecture of decision making in international dealings,
coalitions can also function to promote joint interests (“objective allies”),
past relationships, the vision of future opportunities, or cultural ties, for
example. These coalitions may be “de facto” (and as such depicted only
during and after the event) or they may be organized or structured
institutionally for the long term. 4

2. PLANNING FOR COALITION FORMATION AND MAINTENANCE

If a party in an international multilateral negotiation chooses a coalitional

strategy, planning for coalition formation and maintenance starts with the
exploration of the prerequisites (or minimal conditions) for this course of
action. This planning usually includes an evaluation of stability and
duration. Such issues are at the center of coalition theory and practice. This
section examines the purposes and types of potential coalitions, coalition
building, and coalition maintenance from both conceptual and practical
perspectives. Behaviors and strategies are addressed in the following
section.

Purposes and Types of Coalitions

Coalitions can have many objectives depending on the type of negotiations,
issues and stakes. Several typologies can be constructed. One distinguishes
coalitions that unite groups pursuing common goals (particularly to attain
some form of a binding agreement) from coalitions whose goals are limited
––––––––––––––
4
For examples of “natural, de facto coalitions,” see Young (1991). This raises the question
of what constitute the minimal requirements for a group to be considered a coalition. On one
end of the scale, coalitions can be defined as groups that are more than “interest groups” (as
defined by Bacharach & Lawler (1981); on the other end, several conditions are strictly
enumerated. See Stevenson, Pearce & Porter (1985), p. 256-268.

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 NEGOTIATION AS COALITION BUILDING

to specific issues. Both types may be present in conference diplomacy or

international economic negotiations. In the latter case, de facto limited
coalitions may be formed in international business deals among engineeers
of competing camps, uniting them to make a specific design prevail. One
also can visualize local subsidiaries uniting on a specific issue against
corporate headquarters, or in a joint venture negotiation, two or more
competing organizations cooperating in coalitions to force the parent to
adopt formulas that they prefer.
A somewhat wider and more ambitious classification can be
derived from an analysis of multilateral negotiations distinguishes five
distinct categories. These include broad-based, hard-core coalitions made
up of members who are close on key issues (for example, the Six in the
Single Europe Act (SEA) negotiations); intrabloc groupings, for example,
the Nordic countries in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) negotiations; issue-specific (single issue) coalitions (the Cairns
group in the Uruguay Round negotiations); opportunistic alignments and
tactical alliances; and finally, groups of external actors (the GATT
secretariat in the Uruguay Round) (Zartman, 1994). What distinguishes
each coalition type from another are several key features such as degree of
visibility, cohesion, strength of the links that cement the group, behaviors,
and strategies.
This typology rests on a broad definition of coalitions. Stevenson,
Pearce and Porter (1985) are more demanding; they enumerate several
distinctive features for a group to be considered a coalition. They must be
interacting, deliberately constructed, independent of an existing structure
(of a large group of which they are part) and of its goals, and acting in a
concerted way. While the former typology may not meet these
requirements strictly, it does exhibit many of these characteristics and can
be demonstrated in concrete cases (see, for instance, the SEA and Uruguay
Round negotiation cases in Zartman, 1994).

Coalition Building and Maintenance: Theory

Research on coalitions has been active since the 1960s. Coalition formation
has been a major theme: why and how are these groups planned and built.
The “why” question may be linked to the functions of coalitions, but it may
also be approached from another angle, the motivational dimension. The
focus then turns to power and influence, policy goals and demands,
individual versus group expectations and preferences, and constraints and
opportunities. The motivational dimension is obviously linked to behaviors
and strategies (see Section 3).

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

The “how” of coalition building revolves around the determination

of so-called “winning” or “dominant” coalitions. In theory, a “winning
coalition” is one for which there is no alternative of forming another
coalition that would replace it. This concept, which has often been
expressed in mathematical terms, is more stringent than that of a simply
“dominant coalition” which leaves open the possibility for “minority
coalitions.” Minority coalitions may, under certain conditions, be
“effectively winning” as illustrated in politics by minority governments.
Several schools of thought have searched for a rigorous definition
of “winning” or “effectively winning” coalitions. There is a divide that
separates formal, deductive theories based on mathematical models and
descriptive/inductive theories. A major difference between the two derives
from the fact that in the search for a high degree of generalization (hence,
of abstraction), the formal theories have either concentrated on a few
(sometimes one or two) key parameters, for example, size or “distance,”
whereas the descriptive/inductive school has been more inclined to take
account of ad hoc or specific factors that depict the process of coalition
building as multi-dimensional. For instance, one of the major supporters of
the latter school (Pridham, 1986), in a study of political coalitions forming
and ruling over a government, enumerates no less than seven categories or
components, themselves subdivided into many subvariables. By contrast,
formal researchers, such as Riker (1962), retain the single dimension of
political distance, a concept that has subsequently been enlarged as
ideological “closeness.” This methodological difference can be explained,
in part, by diverging priorities on the question of “coalition maintenance”
defined as being continuous and dynamic, that is, subject to constant
changes in expectations and behaviors, and strongly dependent on
contextual conditions, which is considered central to the process by the
descriptive school.
Although the influence of the descriptive school has had an
important impact on current thinking about coalitions, the deductive school
has provided fundamental research results that cannot be ignored. This
school has drawn on two theoretical bases: game and decision theory.
Coalitions have been studied as a particular case of n-person games. The
payoff is a key parameter that explains and predicts coalition building and
is associated with coalition membership. A central problem is how payoffs
are obtained and then distributed. Thus, authors like Caplow (1956)
focused on the power dimension, Gamson (1961) assessed the minimum
resources for joining a coalition and “equity” in respect of payoff
distributions, Komorita and Chertkoff (1973) emphasized the role of
bargaining and the compromise between “equality” and “equity.”

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 NEGOTIATION AS COALITION BUILDING

Compared to this emphasis on tangible resources, political theorists have

preferred to tie the analysis to the concept of “distance” (Riker, 1962;
Axelrod, 1970). Their emphasis also has been put on size, particularly the
so-called “minimum size” problem.
Recent contributions have endeavored to make assumptions, such
as pure rationality, unitary actors, and strict arithmetic calculus of a
winning coalition, less stringent and have applied both cooperative and
noncooperative game theory. An illustration of a modern game theory
application to a real case of coalition building in a diplomatic setting is
given by Brams, Doherty and Weidner (1994).
Research on coalition building and maintenance covers several
fields, some of them abstract, for example, ad hoc games in controlled
laboratory experiments (Murnigham, 1978), and others dealing with real
conditions, such as in Zartman (1994). Coalitions within organizations
constitute yet another field (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981; Pfeffer, 1981;
and Stevenson, Pearce and Porter, 1985). Lax and Sebenius (1986) have
studied coalitions from a dynamic standpoint, emphasizing different
approaches to building a coalition (for example, strategic sequencing,
luring others to join or to defect, and bandwagoning). These authors have
distanced themselves from pure game-theoretical approaches and
emphasized the influence of organizational features, such as their history
and power structure.
Additional approaches have sought to improve our knowledge on
coalition building and maintenance, among them, cognitive and decision
theories. Cognitive theory (see Neale and Bazerman, 1991) emphasizes
biases in judgment in group negotiations and limits on rationality. Other
aspects studied are the impacts of over-confidence, the ability to decode
others' cognitions, and attitudes toward risk. Decision theory is less
concerned about coalition prediction than on internal coalition dynamics –
clarifying how a given actor has weighed and selected options according to
its own preference/value scales and the assumed scales of the other
members of the group. By “simulating preferences of the various parties to
a multilateral negotiation,” decision analysis can “uncover significant
milestones in the decision making within each party, identifying the
elements that are critical and examining the process of option selection and
modification” (Spector, 1994: 78). Joining or quitting a coalition is one of
those “significant milestones.”

Linking Theory to Practice

The difficulty is to link this theory to practice. Parties to a multilateral
negotiation may be reluctant to rely too heavily on theoretical models

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

because they may not be completely clear about the utilities, preferences or
attributes of the other parties. Moreover, they may feel strongly that process
factors, such as individual behaviors, power shifts and unforeseeable
contingencies or circumstances, will change continuously during the course
of a negotiation, thus modifying the conditions under which decisions have
to be made, including the best path toward agreement, congregating with
others, and changing postures and positions. 5 Such considerations apply
both to coalitions as a specific phenomenon and negotiations in the general
case.
These issues are relevant for practitioners because the planning
process for multilateral negotiations needs to include a preview of coalition
alternatives. This can be based on experience, personal assessments of the
particular situation, and the availability of information. Such a qualitative
analysis can be supplemented and enriched in many cases by using decision
support tools such as game theory and decision analysis. The trend appears
to be moving toward increased use of these tools as software capacities
become more easily available and user friendly. 6 Particular attention should
be paid to several important issues in the planning process.
1. It is important to explore both benefits and costs derived from coalition
membership, including the opportunity cost of organizing or joining a
particular coalition amidst the network of alternatives. Clearly, the more
tangible and divisible the benefits, the easier the choice between the
many options and the closer “reality” will be to what the various theories
“predict.” It is likely that the smaller the size of the coalition, the easier
the evaluation task. The major difficulty is that, in many multilateral
international negotiations, benefits and costs may have a low degree of
tangibility and divisibility; a “principle” or contractual clause may have
clear content and meaning from a legal perspective but not necessarily in
terms of the interpretation of the negotiators or their constituencies.
While there are ways to overcome this difficulty by using preference
analysis, the distance between abstract computations and reality should
not be underestimated.
2. Asserting the opportunity costs of organizing, joining or quitting a
coalition cannot be separated from the problem of resources. This is best
––––––––––––––
5
An experienced diplomat gives the following description of the process: “the architecture
of a negotiation uncovers itself gradually; it is not sequential but complex, made up of
synchronic, concurrent and simultaneous processes, of impulses and retroactions,
reservations and projections” (Plantey, 1980: 491).
6
Evidence of this trend is the increased use of computer simulations of negotiations. See
Nyhart and Samarasan (1989).

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analyzed in terms of power (see Section 3). To become a member of a

coalition presupposes that an actor is willing to bring some resources to
the group. These resources may be its capacity to vote (still stronger, its
right to veto), its capacity to persuade or influence the network of its
relationships, and possibly, its financial or economic capacities. The
reason this is linked to opportunity costs is because being part of a
coalition implies a transformation of individually-held resources into a
collective form. A balance has to be struck between the loss of individual
freedom and the benefit of collective action.
3. Size is another important prerequisite for effective coalitions. Neither
theory nor practice offers simple definite solutions. There are situations
in which large size is a necessary condition for success. This is usually
the case when decisions are based on voting, although the question is
complex and brings forth questions of veto options and consensus rules.
Small coalitions can sometimes achieve their objectives if there are
enough neutral or passive followers and irresolute opponents. But in
other cases, small size may be a key to effectiveness (Kravitz, 1987).
Thus, the optimal size of a coalition – as seen from a practical planning
viewpoint – depends on the merits of the case.
4. Leadership is another crucial factor determining effectiveness; it must be
considered a key element of the planning process. The importance of
leadership in the decision making process has been underlined by
organizational and small group theory. Strong leadership is often a
prerequisite for effectiveness, yet leadership that is too strong may be
counterproductive because it might stimulate defensive reactions, reduce
group cohesiveness and create opportunities for other coalitions to be
formed. Moreover, strong leadership might provoke the escalation of
conflictual elements in the negotiations. Leadership is crucial because of
its capacity to mobilize the members of coalition groups. Leaders can
often uncover the true deep-seated interests of members (actual and
potential), stimulate their motivations and be action-oriented.
5. Interacting with leadership is the cohesion of the group. Cohesion is not
only needed to ensure effectiveness, but to guard against the ever-present
danger of dislocation. The search for a common position may lead to
friction on account of the diversity of views in a coalition on what is to
be achieved, how and at what pace. Leaders may be overly ambitious to
keep a coalition intact, while followers may be reluctant to make
excessive demands or be overly aggressive. In very complex
negotiations, tension within the coalition can result from the existence of
cross-cutting issues. Establishing minimal cohesion has to be planned
and this requires close analysis of motivations.

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6. A final factor that is strongly linked to the previous ones concerns the
need for proximity among coalition members. Proximity – or a least
compatibility – relates to interests in a material sense, but may also be
connected to similarities in values or ideologies (Riker, 1962). This has
been one of the major foci of the political analysis of coalitions (the
other focus being power). Several models use the concept of “ideological
distance.” While this concept has been criticized by organizational
theorists, it has proven useful in analyzing certain negotiations because it
accounts for the quantification of “distances” in terms of preferences in
decision analysis models and it can be the basis of a factual qualitative
analysis. Whether based on an empirical assessment of the situation or
on a more ambitious analysis of interests, values and ideological
proximities, the criteria for partner selection requires information,
experience and judgment on the part of negotiators. 7
These six issues emphasize the need for practitioners of multilateral
international negotiations to pay attention to the planning process regarding
coalition formation. Each of these factors provides clues as to the patterns
and prerequisites of coalition activity in negotiation. They can help decision
makers select the best choice between various coalitions and adapt them as
circumstances require. Most of these concepts are basic to negotiations as
they are to planning for coalitions in general.

3. COALITION BEHAVIORS AND STRATEGIES

Coalition behaviors and strategies are influenced by the role patterns that
develop among members within and outside the group. Externally, they
depend on several factors of which power balance, intensity of stakes and
type of decision making are the most visible.

Roles and Behaviors

In any coalition, members adopt a limited number of roles. Those roles may
coexist within a coalition or they may characterize rival coalitions in a
negotiation. A useful typology was proposed by Sjöstedt, Spector and
Zartman (1994). It includes five possible roles that can be assumed in any
multilateral negotiation; the types are relevant as well for coalitions.

––––––––––––––
7
Having access to information and the corresponding possibility to give and obtain
information from prospective or active members of the coalition should be considered as an
important resource for coalition builders.

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 NEGOTIATION AS COALITION BUILDING

In coalition analysis, emphasis is placed on leaders who intend to

and, in fact, do drive the process. Drivers are leaders who “try to organize
the participation to produce an agreement that is consonant with their
interest” (Sjöstedt, Spector & Zartman, 1994: 11). They perform much of
their work in the prenegotiation process. They scan possible allies, make
issues and stakes more salient in preparation for mobilizing resources, and
attract or push members into coalitions through persuasion and possibly
other forms of political or economic pressures, that is, they commit their
members to take certain behaviors and get involved in concerted actions.
Drivers coordinate and control during the negotiation, with special care to
avoid disruptive actions and constant effort to ensure organizational
maintenance and stability. They also initiate actions that channel the
process toward agreement. This concept of driver leadership is close to that
of “entrepreneurship” in Lax and Sebenius (1991).
In coalition, leaders may play appropriate roles as conductors.
“Conductors, also called managers, also seek to produce an agreement but
from a neutral position, with no interest ax of their own to grind” (Sjöstedt,
Spector & Zartman, 1994: 11). Conductors may find it relevant to join a
coalition but they may do so with mixed motivations and as a result of
opportunistic strategies. Their presence can be useful for the coalition, for
example, by adding voting power or increasing the chance of being
allocated certain influential positions in conference procedure, but they will
also introduce some elements of instability due to their lack of clear
personal interest. Although it is difficult to imagine strong coalitions
comprised only of conductors, it is not unrealistic to imagine specific issue
groupings of participants acting as conductors to enable the negotiation of
an agreement on certain points of the agenda.
Conductors are rather close to defenders as “single issue
participants concerned more with incorporating a particular measure or
position in the agreement than with the overall success of the negotiations”
(Sjöstedt, Spector & Zartman, 1994: 11). The difference appears to be a
matter of degree. Conductors are benevolent neutrals, interested in the
conclusion of an agreement and they are usually in favor of consensus
decisions. Defenders have focused preoccupations and find themselves
opposing dominant coalitions on certain points and cooperating on others to
the extent that the specific issue of interest is resolved in accordance with
their interests.
The fourth role suggested is that of brakers. Brakers seek to block
an agreement and protect their freedom of action, often in reference to a
limited number of issues. In less stable coalitions, members that may agree
in general may act as brakers on certain limited issues. This can also be part

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of a deliberate strategy to “sell” their participation to oppose concessions

on these issues. But the role is rather characteristic of a different type of
coalition: minority groups opposing the dominant coalitions.
Finally, cruisers are participants “with no strong interests of their
own and so available to act as followers” (Sjöstedt, Spector & Zartman,
1994: 11). Cruisers are close in some way to conductors in that they have
no high stakes or interests and adopt an attitude of neutrality, but they differ
in their degree of activity.
Each role in a coalition has an impact on behaviors and strategies.
Drivers can be expected to design and push strategies and stimulate
behaviors to achieve agreement. A decisive factor will be the degree of
leadership acceptance by the group and the capacity of leader to energize
the coalition. A coalition directed by strong drivers and supported by a few
influential conductors can be expected to perform better than a coalition
made up of a few weak drivers, some defenders on specific sub-issues and
quite a large number of cruisers.
To be operational, this role typology must be supplemented by two
additional aspects: role determination within the coalition and role stability.
If one confines the analysis to leadership (clearly a crucial role in a
coalition), the question to be addressed is why is it that certain members
emerge as leaders providing the stimulus for the formation and operation of
a coalition? Certainly, ad hoc factors may intervene: experience,
indisputable superior status, the capacity to inspire and mobilize,
circumstances (for example, the need to activate a slow-moving negotiation
or unblock an impasse), and tradition. But two key determining factors are
high motivation (a dimension that can be analyzed in terms of stakes,
interests, principles and values) and bargaining strength (which essentially
is based on resources, for example, know-how in handling a multi-actor
setting and interpersonal or institutional relationships, and the capacity to
mobilize including clarity of purpose, determination and the ability to
reward or sanction). Leadership can be planned; it involves delicate
contacts and prenegotiations or can occur naturally during the course of
negotiation.
Role stability is often difficult to comprehend because role changes
develop slowly, are elusive, and may be masked or denied from the outside.
Several reasons help to explain an ever-present possibility of changes in the
role pattern within a coalition. First, there is the natural phenomenon of
“erosion” that results from the gap between expectations and reality and
from frictions in day-to-day interactions. (Contrary to the erosion
phenomenon, a coalition that obtains quick and important results may
increase cohesion and even become attractive to outsiders). Second, a

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common platform – by necessity of compromise – is often couched in

rather general terms or formulas and a confrontation on details may give
rise to tensions or even to the emergence of small factions. This
development has been observed in many international negotiations. It can
be analyzed as well in terms of counter-coalitions, one of their extreme
raisons d'être being to “divide so as to reign.” Apart from the capacity to
reward prospective deviants or marginal members of the dominant
coalition, counter-coalitionists may use certain disruptive techniques – the
threat to retaliate in some other field or, more subtly, to influence the
debate by fragmenting issues and creating a complex cross-cutting between
the various groupings. The Uruguay Round negotiations provide recent
illustrations of this eventuality (Sjöstedt, 1994).

Behaviors and Strategies

Multilateral negotiations can be viewed as a network of actors, in which
groups or sub-groups are formed that are called coalitions. These groups
are constituted to gain influence through concerted behaviors and
strategies. An analysis of coalitions, therefore, cannot be separated from the
problems of power distribution, mobilization and impact within the
network. The power problem can be approached from several angles:
sources and bases, impact on outcomes, and incorporation in strategies.
The network of actors, either plurilateral or multilateral, is
characterized by individual or concerted efforts to reach objectives, some of
which are common and others are contentious. Two cases are generally
observed: either there is a large dominant coalition (in the plurilateral
situation, such coalitions may consist of only a few negotiators) or several
coalitions compete. In the latter case, competition may concern general
issues (for example, appropriateness of a general agreement in terms of
principles, contents or binding arrangements) or specific issues, without
questioning the need for overall agreement.
Exerting power is obviously easier in the dominant coalition case,
except in situations where parties are given a veto right and nothing
prevents that right from being used. Another limitation may result when
consensus rules are in place, which indirectly can force a coalition,
however dominant, to attenuate its objectives by means of concessions (for
example, by watering down the severity of a clause) to permit consensus.
Whereas some concessions can be minor, they also can be substantial when
the stakes are very high (see Lodge (1994), for instance, on the Single
Europe Act negotiations).
Power struggles are more vivid when several coalitions are present
in the network. Intercoalition competition leads each group to tap the

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various sources of power at its command. The political and organizational

literature provides a discussion of the repertoire of these sources, including
authoritative structure, personality, expertise and opportunity, and the
command of resources (this factor being at the root of many theories on the
formation of “winning coalitions”).
Within a coalition, power is always present but it often takes the
form of tangible or intangible, explicit or implicit, influence. Generally,
influence works through persuasion, which can range from the logic and
strength of argumentation (including the intrinsic value of principles) to
tradeoffs (issue-specific and compensation). Much depends on the
bargaining strength of participants, past experience in relationships,
prospects of cooperation in the future (an important factor in both
multilateral business negotiations and diplomatic settings), and cultural
sensitivity, as well as the creativity and capacity to coordinate and mediate.
As mentioned for roles, the influence pattern is not static and likely to
evolve for the same reasons as listed above. Internal developments within
coalitions are also very much dependent on specific contextual factors, for
instance, in organizations, visibility of the issues, the hierarchical structure,
the reallocation of resources, and discretion in job responsibilities
(Stevenson, Pearce & Porter, 1985; Bacharach & Lawler, 1981). A final
factor in the power balance is the degree of procedural formality within the
coalition and the more or less binding character of commitments.
The bargaining power of a coalition may also be analyzed by
referring to “power dependence” theory (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981) which
posits that, given two coalitions A and B, A’s “power depends on the
degree to which B receives greater benefit from the relationship with A,
than B can get from alternative groups” (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981: 149-
150). This formulation leads to a breakdown of the dependence dimension
into four elements: A's benefit from alternatives, B's benefit from
alternatives, values that A attributes to outcomes, and values that B
attributes to outcomes. The theory derives from this formulation a measure
of the degree of “toughness” that will be embodied in the strategies of
competing groups. The theory attempts to classify tactics, such as seeking
alternatives, threatening to leave the relationship, blocking outcome,
avoiding conflict, and granting status.
Intercoalition competition is also based on counteractions These
can materialize as efforts to induce members of a rival coalition to abandon
it or assume a less active and more neutral role, or to take direct actions
(modifying contents, delaying tactics, threats, etc.) that prevent the
opponent from progressing toward a sought-after agreement. These
countertactics may be based on “tit for tat” conditional retaliation

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(matching), escalation or blockage and they make compromises more

difficult to reach. The capacity to shift the balance so as to be detrimental to
the leading coalition is limited by several factors, such as distance in the
power relationship, behaviors and strategies of third parties, and,
importantly, the degree of mutual dependence among coalitions; if two
coalitions both have high coercive power, the cost of sanctions and threats
can become too risky (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981: 180). In point of fact,
deterrence theory can be seen as having many applications in intercoalition
power struggles. In particular, the parameters of this theory can be used to
model power factors in the intercoalition relationship.
Among competing coalitions, a point of interest concerns the
influence of minority coalitions when they show a willingness and capacity
to be active in the process of negotiations. An historical illustration is
provided by the role that the so-called Cairns Group played in the Uruguay
Round negotiations. This coalition showed strong leadership, precise
formulation of goals and priorities, strong identification with a common
single issue, great solidarity, firmness on goals but flexibility on means, an
adequate power base, and skills in devising and executing strategies
(Dupont, 1994). If effectiveness was measured more in terms of procedures
than substance, this minority coalition would have proved an important
factor in the negotiation process.

Effectiveness of Coalitions: The Problem of Outcomes

The degree of success or effectiveness of a coalition depends largely on its
type (majority versus minority coalitions, general versus issue-specific) and
on the nature and precision of its objectives. Goals may be general (a
satisfactorily worded declaration in an international conference, for
instance) or can be very specific in terms of the substance or contents of the
agreement, but generalizations about which is more successful are difficult
to draw. Outcome assessments of coalitions are influenced by many of the
factors outlined in this article: bargaining strength (the power-influence
factor) and its evolution over time, the role pattern and its likely changes
(minor or crucial), size (a key factor in certain circumstances, but not so in
others), leadership, resources and payoffs, cohesion, organizational
features, procedures, and strategies and counterstrategies.
Not all coalitional behaviors may appear to be beneficial in
achieving the common good. This is why the distinction between
predominantly cooperative and predominantly competitive negotiations
may be useful in coalition analysis. Cooperative negotiations can be viewed
in terms of action-oriented coalitions working toward a mutually acceptable
outcome, essentially through persuasion and influence. Competitive

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

negotiations can be seen from the perspective of confrontational coalitions

involved in a search for a minimally acceptable outcome that can be
achieved by competitive more than by consensual strategies. Coalition
members may achieve short-term gains whereas “the overall organization
may be hurt in the long run” (Neale & Bazerman, 1991: 109).

4. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN COALITION BUILDING

AND DYNAMICS OF NEGOTIATION

The analysis of coalitions exposes a number of features that are similar to

what is observed in most types of negotiations. This resemblance can be
approached from two different perspectives: first, from a sequential
viewpoint, embracing negotiation from prenegotiation to the face-to-face
encounter, conclusion and immediate aftermath, and second, by comparing
concepts and factors in coalition and negotiation theories.
As was discussed earlier, the two main functions of coalitions are
complexity reduction and power enhancement derived from uniting
dispersed forces. These functions are at the center of the negotiation
process as well. Despite the many ways agenda issues can be dealt with and
even though the process is rarely simple and linear, negotiation actors
behave so as to transform the expectations of substance and outcomes
toward potential convergence and mutually acceptable (even if asymmetric)
agreement. This process is akin to complexity reduction. The way a
coalition operates bears a close resemblance to the way an actor in a dyadic
or multilateral negotiation manages to identify the salient points in the
agenda, explores and tests the opponents’ interests and behaviors, exerts
influence or pressure, and adjusts positions to induce or force agreement.
Minority coalitions often act to achieve goals on certain substantive
issues and to negotiate the contents of proposed formulas and details of
agreements inspired by the majority, the “winning” coalitions. Their means
can involve foot dragging, systematic use of objections, recourse to
precedents or norms, insistence on repeated redrafting, and threats of
impasses and breakdown. It is striking that the semantics used to describe
coalitional and negotiation processes appear to be interchangeable. From a
sequential viewpoint, similarities are also striking:
- Coalition building, including planning, role development,
cost/benefit assessment of membership, and assessment of coalition
size all are equivalent to prenegotiation activities.
- Coalition behavior, including strategizing and transactions, the use
of coalition resources, coalition leadership, exercise of roles, and

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 NEGOTIATION AS COALITION BUILDING

use of power balances are equivalent to negotiation and end-game

activities.
- Coalition maintenance, including leadership and cohesion issues,
dispute resolution within the coalition, changes in interest
proximity over time, changes in membership and sustainability
issues are all equivalent to post-agreement negotiation and
agreement implementation activities (Spector, 1995).
Similarities can also be observed between the concepts and
relationships extant in negotiation theory and coalition theory. Walton and
McKersie's (1965) four negotiation activities – integrative, distributive,
attitudinal and intra-group – are also useful in coalition analysis. The
important nuance introduced by Lax and Sebenius (1986) concerning the
first two dimensions (reconceptualized as “value creating” and “value
claiming”) is also relevant for coalitions. Coalitions are formed and
organized to create and increase value for their members, yet members also
seek to claim value (reward/benefit) according to the power they command
and the measure of attractiveness that the coalition has for them. It is clear
that this analysis underlies both negotiation and coalition theories and
practice. Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965), Druckman (1977), Rubin and
Brown (1975), Zartman (1982), and Kremenyuk (1991) define concepts
and factors that are equally applicable to understanding negotiation and
coalition processes.
Our analysis of coalition functions, the planning of coalition
formation and maintenance, and coalition roles, behaviors and strategies
provides clues to enrich negotiation thinking. This is especially true
concerning analysis of interactions between constituencies and negotiators
in dyadic encounters and in multilateral negotiations. Bacharach and
Lawler's contribution (1981) on organizations is at the same time a good
synthesis of coalition theory and practice and of negotiations generally. It is
legitimate, therefore, to consider coalition building and dynamics not only
as a special case of the negotiation process and outcome, but as either a
basic ingredient of negotiation or a valuable metaphor of negotiation itself,
embodying concepts and factors that mirror or mimic negotiation
dynamics. The parallel study of negotiations and coalitions is therefore a
worthwhile endeavor. In short, “thinking coalitionally” (Lax and Sebenius,
1991: 153) is “thinking negotiations” as well.

REFERENCES

Axelrod, R. (1991) Conflict of interest. Chicago: Markham.

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

Bacharach, S. and E. J. Lawler (1981) Power and Politics in Organizations. San

Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Brams, S., A. Doherty and M. Weidner (1994) “Game Theory: Focusing on the
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Multilateral Negotiation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Caplow, T.A. (1956) “A theory of coalitions in a triad,” American Sociological
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Caplow, T.A. (1968) Two Against One. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prenctice Hall.
Druckman, D. (ed.) (1977), Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Dupont, C. (1994) “Coalition Theory: Using Power to Build Cooperation,” in I. W.
Zartman (ed.), International Multilateral Negotiation. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass.
Fayerweather J. and A. Kapoor (1976) Strategy and Negotiation for the
International Corporation. NY: Ballinger Publishing Company.
Gamson, W.A. (1961) “A theory of coalition formation,” American Sociological
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Kaufmann, J. (1989) Conference Diplomacy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Komorita, S.S. and J.M. Chertkoff (1973) “A bargaining theory of coalition
formation,” Psychological Review 80: 149-162.
Komorita, S.S. (1974) “A weighted probability model of coalition formation,”
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Kravitz, D.A. (1987) “Size of smallest coalition as a source of power in coalition
bargaining,” European Journal of Social Psychology 17: 1-21.
Kremenyuk, V. (ed.) (1991) International Negotiation. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass.
Lax, D.A. and J.K. Sebenius (1986) The Manager as Negotiator. New York: Free
Press.
Lodge, J. (1994) “Negotiating the Single Europe Act in the European Community,”
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Murnighan, J.K. (1978) “Model of coalition behavior: game theoretic, social
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Murnighan, J.K. (1991) The Dynamics of Bargaining Games. Englewood Cliffs,
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Neale, M. and M. Bazerman (1991) Cognition and Rationality in Negotiation. New
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Nyhart, J.D. and D. K. Samarason (1989) “The elements of negotiations
management: using computers to help resolve conflict,” Negotiation Journal
5,1: 43-61.
Pfeffer, J. (1981) Power in Organizations. Boston: Pitman.

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Plantey, A. (1994) La Négociation Internationale, 2nd edition. Paris:CNRS

Editions.
Pridham, G. (1986). Coalitional Behavior in Theory and Practice. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, R. (1988) “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games,” International Organization 42, 1: 427-460.
Raiffa, H. (1982) The Art and Science of Negotiation. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Riker, W.H. (1962) The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Rubin, J.Z. and B.R. Brown (1975) The Social Psychology of Bargaining and
Negotiation. NY: Academic Press.
Sawyer J. and H. Guetzkow (1965) “Bargaining and negotiation” in H.C. Kelman
(ed.), International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis. New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Weston.
Shapley, L.S. (1953) “A value for N person games,” Annals of Mathematical
Studies 28: 307-317.
Sjöstedt, G. (1994) “Negotiating the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade,” in I. W. Zartman (ed.), International Multilateral
Negotiation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Sjöstedt, G., B. Spector and I. W. Zartman (1994) “The Dynamics of Regime-
Building Negotiations,” in B. Spector, G. Sjöstedt and I. W. Zartman (eds.),
Negotiating International Regimes. London: Graham and Trotman.
Spector, B. (1995) “Post-Agreement Negotiation: Conflict Management in the
Aftermath of Successful Negotiation,” in B. Spector, G. Sjöstedt and I. W.
Zartman (eds.) Getting It Done: Post-Agreement Negotiation and International
Regimes (forthcoming).
Spector, B. (1994) “Decision Theory: Diagnosing Strategic Alternatives and
Outcome Tradeoffs,” in I. W. Zartman (ed.), International Multilateral
Negotiation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Stevenson, W.B., J.L. Pearce, and L. W. Porter (1985) “The concept of coalition in
organization theory and research,” Academy of Management Review 10: 256-
268.
Sjöstedt, G. (1993) International Environmental Negotiation. Newbury Park, CA:
Sage.
Touval, S. (1989) “Multilateral negotiations: an analytical approach,” Negotiation
Journal 52: 159-173.
Walton, R.E. and R. B. McKersie (1965) A Behavioral Theory of Negotiations.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
Wilke, H.A. (ed.) (1985) Coalition Formation. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
Young, H.P. (ed.) (1991) Negotiation Analysis. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of
Michigan Press.

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Zartman, I.W. and M. Berman (1982) The Practical Negotiator. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Zartman, I.W. (1994) International Multilateral Negotiation. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass Inc.

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 CHAPTER 5

THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND GUY-OLIVIER FAURE *

Understanding what constitutes the essence and the reality of the

negotiation process has been a major concern of theoreticians in this field.
Most contributions on the subject attempt to identify the key elements that
help clarify its definition, analysis, and evaluation. Seminal works such as
those of Ikle (1964), Walton and McKersie (1965), Raiffa (1982), Schelling
(1960), and Zartman (1978) opened the way to more specific approaches.
Substantial research has been carried out in recent years toward new
concepts and improved methodologies, but many differences in approaches
and opinions still exist. Theoreticians and practitioners are still trying to
determine the “common elements in the analysis of the negotiation
process” (Zartman, 1988) and characterize this activity in a more
systematic way. One of the best examples is Zartman’s presentation (1994)
of the process and its dynamics consisting of an enumeration of the six
“consensus assumptions” and the “several alternative dimensions of
interaction that shape the course of the negotiation process,” this leading to
“three types in the actual bargaining”: “deductive,” “constructed,” and
“inductive” (pp. 25-26). This opens the door to formulate and eventually
test hypotheses “that specify in more detailed ways how process affects the
outcome, often depending on various intervening variables.”
This chapter is organized around four topics: process defined,
process observed, process analyzed, and process evaluated.

PROCESS DEFINED

Although the concept of process is ever present in the literature on

negotiation, there is no simple-or even single-way to define it. The
––––––––––––––
*
Reprinted with authorization from Dupont, C. and G. O. Faure (2002), “The negotiation
process”. In V.A. Kremenyuk (ed.), International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches,
Issues. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

International Negotiation: Foundations, Models, and Philosophies. Careers in Negotiation and Conflict
Management Research, Christophe Dupont. Aurélien Colson, Daniel Druckman, and William Donohue
(eds.) 67-100 © 2013 Republic of Letters Publishing. All rights reserved..
CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND GUY-OLIVIER FAURE

difficulty does not lie in the sequential nature of the negotiating activity.
Negotiation – especially international negotiation – is seen as a sequence of
stages, either organized in well-articulated patterns, as in many instances of
“multiconference diplomacy” (Kaufmann, 1988; Plantey, 1980), or
overlapping and developing over time in a rather haphazard or even
confused way. The crucial problems consist of identifying the forces behind
the dynamics observed, the reasons why such stages seem to be useful,
their roles and functions, and the way in which they are instrumental in
solving the basic challenge of negotiation to reach a joint decision, where
there were once substantial and distinctive differences to preclude, at least
temporarily, the use of alternative modes of decision making. In other
terms, it is a process of combining conflicting positions into a common
position, under a decisive rule of unanimity (Kissinger, 1969). Faure (2001)
discusses the very definition of negotiation from cases drawn from a great
variety of situations and cultures. Although no current theory pretends to
have succeeded to decode the process entirely, most contributions show a
preference for the identification of a few key factors. Modern research is an
effort to shift from a partial to a more global view of the process.

Partial Analysis
A first group of approaches, “Avenue I,” defines negotiating activity as a
series of sequences during which negotiators propose joint strategies,
presenting demands and offers, proposals and counterproposals, tending
typically to converge as a result of an exchange of concessions (Bartos,
1974). The problem is then to explain the rules or “laws” governing the
sequence of concessions, for example, whether the process is exclusively
past-determined or future-oriented. Analyzing concessions as a central part
of the negotiation process may also lead to the exploration of concession
behaviors – for example, competitive, coordinative, or integrative behaviors
(Pruitt, 1981) – and to devising concepts – for example, security points and
comparative costs accounting for convergence, an approach favored by
authors interested in economic theory.
“Avenue II” focuses instead on power, this approach being
identified as “structural analysis.” Bacharach and Lawler (1981), for
instance, write that power is a central element of bargaining, pervading all
facets of the bargaining relationship. Zartman and Rubin (2000) compare
situations of power balance with asymmetrical negotiations. “Power,”
however, is difficult to define, not only as a concept but also as an
analytical tool, which explains why there are subcategories in this
approach. One of them, which is commonplace among practitioners but
does not rally most theoreticians, emphasizes the role of “tactics” in a broad

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 THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

sense.
A third approach, “Avenue III,” appears to be rather concerned
with processes summarized in terms of “persuasive debate.” Negotiation is
an exchange of information, signals, messages, and arguments designed to
influence the other party to agree to act jointly rather than unilaterally.
Strategic analysis of process, “Avenue IV,” is an effort to use
game-theoretical matrix, either in improved standard models, notably the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (Axelrod, 1984; Brams, 1975, 1990; Zagare and
Kilgour, 2000; Murnigham, 1991; Avenhaus and Canty, 1996), or in
designs centered on the concept of critical risk (Snyder and Diesing, 1977).
These approaches contain elements that overlap and thus are hard
to classify. It is often difficult to distinguish process as an end from process
as a means. The most glaring example of this overlapping is shown by
behavioral analysis (“Avenue IV”). This postulates that it is not possible to
separate process from actors. Thus negotiators themselves become the
center of ~nalysis (Rubin and Brown, 1975; Jonsson, 1989).

Toward More Global Approaches

Structuring variables in a global interactive model is a major preliminary
step in decoding the reality of negotiation (Sawyer and Guetzkow, 1965;
Faure, Mermet, Touzard, and Dupont, 2000). Theoreticians have tried to
integrate the various parameters of the process into more global concepts
and methodologies. Integration has been approached from essentially two
directions. One of these argues for “the introduction of a particular model
to clarify the nature of the process of negotiation” (Zartman and Berman,
1982). This is a three-stage process model of negotiation; it is descriptive,
as it can be applied to a number of concrete international negotiations, and
prescriptive, as it conveys the message that if “it cannot tell anyone how to
win” or “how to do best,” it can pretend “to learn to do better.” The model
emphasizes that “negotiation is not a finite process” and hence that “it is
not possible to provide a deterministic theory or winning strategy for the
process, ... indeed the essence of the process is to juggle, combine,
eliminate, and change” a number of key elements (“positions, stakes,
issues, demands, and minimums of the parties”) that “are not known, and
even when known are not fixed, and this may involve changing one’s own
values as well as those of the party or parties.” This “integrative” analysis
emphasizes a process by stages (including prenegotiations).
A second direction is an effort to balance interpersonal skills and
analysis. Analysis helps decode inefficiencies in negotiating agreements.
Such theories, though abstract, aim to provide insights for the practitioner
(Raiffa, 1982). The effort has produced a number of theory-based but

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND GUY-OLIVIER FAURE

practice-oriented concepts, such as the “best alternative to a negotiated

agreement” (BATNA) and “principled negotiations” (Fisher and Ury, 1981)
or “security point” (Zartman and Berman, 1982).
After Walton and McKersie (1965), who distinguish two groups of
variables contributing to the basic negotiation activity, those relating to
distributive bargaining and those pertaining to integrative bargaining, a
result of these efforts has been the attempt to regroup the “parameters,”
“variables,” or “ingredients” into a dynamic formula that combines the twin
forces of “value creating” and “value claiming” (Lax and Sebenius, 1986).
These two factors had been identified before, but it was not until the early
1980s that the concept was articulated with precision and detail. Process is
now described as the ever-present tension and eventual balance between the
two intertwined dimensions of searching for joint gains and competing
claims. Balance is reached through “reconfiguration.” The tension involves
tangible as well as intangible aspects. In addition, analysis can be
descriptive (what is observed), prescriptive (how process can be improved),
or normative (how it should be improved-that is, a problem of values).

PROCESS OBSERVED

Although some negotiations develop a distinctive pattern, it is often

accepted by theoreticians, and generally observed in practice, that most
negotiations can be broken down into a number of phases that have definite
functions. The process may be fuzzy, the phases may be of differing
duration, they may overlap or backtrack, and confusion may appear in the
succession of events. Nevertheless, looking at the whole sequence, one sees
the process as distinctive and original. Whereas this feature applies to
negotiations in general, it is particularly striking in the case of international
negotiations. In these negotiations, it is helpful to separate the preliminary
phase from the formal event.

Preliminary Contacts and Prenegotiations

Most international encounters, especially in the diplomatic arenas, are
preceded by preliminary contacts, either unofficial or informal. This is
sometimes referred to as “Track II” talks (Putnam, 1988), as opposed to
“Track I” talks, which represent official procedures. Track II talks start
before the formal opening of the negotiations and take on special
importance during the course of the negotiations; in fact, recesses and
social events are especially designed to encourage the dual development of
contacts and negotiations. Detailed descriptions of this phase are available
in the literature (see, for example, Kissinger, 1969, 1979; Iklé 1964; de

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 THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

Bourbon-Busset, 1962; Putnam, 1988; Walder, 1958).

Multistage Negotiations
International negotiations are generally multiple-actor, multiple-issue,
multiple-stage events, a rebounding of “rounds.” A particular aspect of this
development is its dynamics, more specifically, the way that the situation
leading to negotiation “matures” (Zartman, 1984). Even before the
concerned parties make contact, they have explored the pros and cons or
even the mere possibility of negotiating. A prenegotiation phase then “deals
with the obstacles to negotiation as well as hurdles in negotiation”
(Saunders, 1991). Maturity does not apply only to preconditions for
negotiating; the concept also has implications for issue formulation and the
role of learning.
Another important factor of the dynamics is the existence of two
phases: a “formula” phase, during which negotiators narrow their
divergence of interpretations of problems to be negotiated, select negotiable
issues, and define broad principles, which are apt to be the basis for
possible workable solutions; and a “detail” phase, in which principles
agreed upon are worked out (Zartman and Berman, 1982).
Finally, from a more formal point of view, rules and procedures are
instrumental in the dynamics. A case in point is the “diplomatic
conference,” for which practitioners have presented detailed descriptions.
Negotiators point out that the rules are subject to manipulation (Kaufmann,
1988). Practitioners also mention the importance of the conference’s
geographical settings, its agenda preparation and formulation, the role of a
chairperson, and the pressure of constituencies as well as the “human
setting” (Plantey, 1980).

Punctual Face-to-Face Exchanges

Face-to-face exchanges often exhibit definite patterns. Rather than concen-
trating on the dynamic aspects of the process that are the theoretician’s
greatest concern, many trainers in negotiation and a number of practitioners
focus their attention on these successive phases that are observed in the
time sequence of the encounter. The classical pattern generally begins with
an opening, then proceeds with an introduction, a ritual phase, a phase of
information, an exploration and test phase, an adjustment, and then a
concluding phase. Practical guides for negotiators contain details, advice,
and anecdotes regarding each sequence (Karrass, 1970; Nierenberg, 1973;
Corcos, 1982; Kennedy, 1983; Saner, 2000).

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND GUY-OLIVIER FAURE

PROCESS ANALYZED: THINKING THE PROCESS

If the object of the study is unique, there are many ways to approach it. A
specific rationale corresponds to each approach, which reduces reality and
emphasizes some variables that are supposed to play a decisive role in the
causation. Faure (l991a) distinguishes three basic schools: the formalized
approach, the comprehensive school, and the experimental approach. Each
explanatory variable refers to an implicit or explicit theory of interaction.
Before studying their role in the negotiation process, it is useful to link
them to some approaches of bargaining indicated here as prominent
examples.
The formalized or strategic approach relies on the idea that the
outcome of a negotiation results from the players’ strategic choices and
refers to the decision-making theory (Raiffa, 1982; Brams, 1975). The
negotiation defined as a learning process puts forth an adaptive dynamic,
leading to a convergence of positions. Such a process is implemented by
the perceptions of the bargainers. Learning is seen as a factor that raises the
propensity to cooperate (Cross, 1977).
Negotiation may also be defined as an adjustment process in which
concessions are exchanged according to an incremental logic based on the
evaluation of the costs that each party has to pay (Zeuthen, 1930). Such a
model has been brought closer to reality by integration of the negotiator’s
activity to redefine the problem and to introduce an evolutionary
perspective in the game setting (Shakun, 1988). The model may also focus
on expectations instead of concessions (Coddington, 1968).
In the comprehensive approach, the concept of negotiation as a
joint decision making process refers to a two-phase activity: exploring to
find a formula of agreement and then adjusting the details (Zartman and
Berman, 1982). In the same joint decision-making framing, negotiation
may be thought of as an information-exchange process established to reach
“some kind of outcome” (Gulliver, 1979).
Most often substantiated by experimental works, negotiation can be
considered as a psychological process setting up a kind of influence game
between perceptions and expectations. A change in the negotiator’s
bargaining behavior will modify the perceptions and expectations of the
other party, which will in turn affect the negotiator’s behavior. If
convergence of positions is sufficient, an outcome will be reached (Spector,
1978). The psychological process may also be captured by the role of a
goal-expectations combination and its influence on demands and
concessions (Pruitt, 1981). The part played by the negotiators through
motivational and interpersonal orientation also enables a better
understanding of the logic process (Rubin and Brown, 1975).

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 THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

Negotiation may be thought of as a reactive process in which each

bargainer’s concession is a direct and calculated response to the other’s
previous concession (Druckman, 1977a). The concept of fairness may be
introduced as a major variable in guiding the search for balanced
concessions (Bartos, 1978). An overview of the relationship between the
theoretical approaches and the explanatory variables is presented in
Table 1.

Approach Variables Significant contributors

Strategic approach Players’ strategies Raiffa
Learning process Perceptions – adaptation Cross
Issues Zartman
Decision-making process
Information Gulliver
Perceptions – expectations Spector
Psychological process Goal or expectation Pruitt
Orientation Rubin and Brow
Concessions Zeuthen
Adjustment process Concessions – issues Shakun
Expectations Coddington
Concessions Druckman
Reactive process
Concessions – fairness Bartos

Table 1. Overview of Theoretical Approaches to Negotiations.

Intervening in the Process

Among the many factors operating in a negotiation, a number of them are
directly or even exclusively manipulated by the bargainer. These can be
grouped into three categories: types of moves, communication variables,
and referential variables.

Types of Moves
The action of a negotiator is organized around an objective. This is what
Clausewitz ([1832] 1976) calls a strategy, meaning the coordination of
tactics as a global conception of action. In negotiation, two main categories
can be distinguished: accommodation strategies, which favor the reaching
of an agreement, and confrontation strategies, aimed at maximizing the
negotiator’s gains. According to what is at stake or the existing level of
antagonism, the bargainer will adopt a strategy belonging to one of these
categories. Accommodation strategies are cooperative or coordinative and
potentially integrative. They correspond to a varying-sum game.
Confrontation strategies are considered as competitive, distributive, and

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND GUY-OLIVIER FAURE

deriving from a zero-sum game. Complex negotiations often call for mixed
strategies. But far from merely adding the advantages of both formulas,
their use raises a basic difficulty. In effect, the implementation of these
strategies requires the use of antithetical tactics (Walton and McKersie,
1965). Not only does the strategy lose its coherence, but the negotiator may
also suffer a weakening of his or her position. Axelrod (1984) gives a
response to this important problem. In a conflictual environment there
exists a global strategy capable of inciting the cooperation of the other
party, the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy. Experimentally tested by the Prisoner’s
Dilemma and compared with other strategies from random to
Machiavellian exploitative strategies, the TFT strategy leads to the highest
overall score.
Another type of move is openers. The first offer is critical in
creating the setting within which the game is to be played. The initial offer
influences the perceptions of the bargaining set by the negotiators. A low
offer expresses an attempt to reduce the other party’s level of aspiration.
Experimental studies show that a low initial demand increases the
likelihood of an agreement (Bartos, 1974; Hamner, 1974), but negotiators
attain higher outcomes if they start with extreme rather than moderate
demands (Chertkoff and Conley, 1967; Hinton, Hamner, and Pohlen,
1974). However, in either case (search for an agreement or search for high
gains), adopting extreme positions may produce countereffects. For
instance, making an initial offer at the level of the expected settlement is
not an effective means of reaching an agreement (Komorita and Brenner,
1968). One may hypothesize that such a tactic may raise the level of
aspiration of the other party and provide very few possibilities of making
any more concessions. Very high demands may also lead to a failure
(Hamner, 1974), since the other negotiator may see no possibility of a fair
agreement or may not take the demands as a serious proposal. The
credibility level of the first offer depends on cultural norms. For example,
starting at a quarter of the market price to buy a jewel in Senegal would not
surprise anybody. But if the same were done in Sweden, the seller would
just walk away. Pruitt (1981) suggests that there is an inverted U-shaped
relationship between the bargainer’s demand and the outcome of the
negotiation: low and very high demands lead more often to failure;
moderate demands lead to agreement at a satisfactory level of profit.
Concessions, a major component of process dynamics, result from
the belief that they will elicit reciprocal concessions from the other party.
The negotiator is kept in a dilemma: the more he or she concedes and
thinks an agreement will be reached, the further he or she will be from the
initial goal. The nature and size of the concessions give information about

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the bargainer’s subjective utilities and are indications about one’s

perceptions of the opponent. The negotiator may use concessions as a
device to misrepresent his or her real needs or preferences. There are two
ways to look at a concession: as a sign of goodwill or as a sign of
weakness. In the first case, the concession made requires reciprocation. In
the second case, it elicits tougher behavior, because it leaves space for a
higher expectation. A useful question to ask is under what conditions these
reactions occur. Some experimental work tends to show that reciprocation
(or matching) takes place when there is a prominent solution or when the
other party is viewed as firm. Mismatching occurs when there is no other
basis for predicting where the opponent is going. Pruitt (1981)
conceptualizes the former type of reaction as strategy imitation and the
latter as tracking behaviors. Behavioral literature on negotiation attempts to
identify, describe, and explain “the conditions that determine the ways that
negotiators behave and the effects of this behavior” (Pruitt and Carnevale,
1993, p. 193). Based on a “dominant paradigm” (self-interest
maximization), this literature brought further identification and
characterization of variables, putting in evidence the relevance of cognitive
approaches to account for judgmental biases and errors of negotiators
during the process of negotiation, or utilizing research findings negotiation
training programs (Druckman, 1995; see also Druckman, 1993, 1994;
Neale and Bazerman, 1991; Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993).
A comprehensive review of one of the keystones of behavioral
research – the work of Walton and McKersie (1965) updated in the 1990s –
contrasted the robustness of certain basic tenets of the approach and with
limitations such as the need to adapt the approach to new contextual and
theoretical developments; this behavioral contribution could be described
both as a “museum piece” and a source of inspiration.

Culture and Communication Variables.

Culture and communication represent two elements of the process that are
particularly important in international negotiations. Although communi-
cation is, strictly speaking, an intervening factor and culture rather an
influencing variable, these two dimensions are grouped in this section
because in international negotiations, culture and communication
constantly interact.
Culture may be considered a central issue in international
negotiations. Negotiation literature has confronted the ambiguity of the
concept (Hofstede, 1980; Schein, 1985), and substantial efforts have been
made to clarify connections between culture and negotiating behavior and
styles (Faure and Rubin, 1993). Practitioners and theoreticians differ on

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how they visualize the problem, and several approaches are taken
competitively. Thus a first approach focuses on “what negotiators do rather
than what they think” (Janosik, 1987, p. 385); a second is based on the
proposition that culture centers on a small number of core values, norms,
and ideologies; a third assumes that heterogeneity is the rule (and “that
tension, not consistency, typifies the component parts of any culture,” p.
389); and a fourth takes the view that a negotiator’s behavior cannot be
defined culturally by a few distinct factors but that many variables and
constraints must be taken into account. Thus in a given negotiation,
“nationality or culture does have an important role to play, but any
generalization about the negotiation/culture nexus might require
modification to account for age, gender, and the negotiating environment”
(p. 391). Modern research has attempted to classify in some detail the
predominant national negotiating styles (Weiss and Stripp, 1985;
Constantin, 1971; G. Fisher, 1980; Graham, 1993; Salacuse, 1999;
Elgstrom, 1999; Cohen, 1991). Faure and Rubin (1993), basing their
observations on case studies, show how culture influences the negotiation
process and distinguish three different levels of impact: behavioral,
cognitive, and identity. The behavioral level is relatively easy to be reached
and dealt with, but the two other levels are far more difficult to manage and
are often the invisible stumbling block in international relations.
Communication is a medium through which negotiators verbally
and nonverbally send and receive messages relating to the process. These
include information exchanges (including issues interpretation, disclosures,
misrepresentations, and statements on actors’ intentions); influence and
argumentation tactics (designed to modify the opponent’s perceptions); and
the use of signals, messages, and attitudes to shape the relationship. Linked
to communication in negotiation is the question of language patterns
(discourse style, question / answer sequences, timing and coding of
messages, symbolic or ritualistic dimensions, degree of congruence of
verbal and nonverbal cues, qualifications of statements) .
Research on the role of communication in negotiation has often
emphasized a psychological perspective, but a growing body of studies has
also focused on systems interaction analysis (highlighting the sequential
patterns of messages). Other tendencies and research avenues also appear
promising. One analyzes information from the viewpoint of how it alters a
negotiator’s stance through changes in values and attitudes rather than
centering on intentions and payoffs. A second possibility is to differentiate
more systematically between detailed, multiple (as opposed to global)
functions of messages (through working and content analysis). Similarly,
taking the view that messages do not fit into discrete, dichotomous

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categories but may fulfill contradictory goals, integrating cognitive

processes and contextual features would improve understanding the role of
communication in negotiation (Jablin, 1988). Looking at communication as
a systemic, circular, and comprehensive process-linking messages and
signals to context and actors and emphasizing feedback effects
(amplification, correction, and adaptation patterns) is a promising approach
for research in negotiation.
Such understanding is vital in international negotiations. Efficient
communication is made more complex and risky by cultural and language
difficulties. Poor handling of the communication process in these
negotiations has often been noted as a possible cause of failure. Typical
mistakes may be classified in an impressive list ranging from “availability
heuristics” to “errors in attribution,” use of self-reference criteria, and
stereotypes (Jonsson, 1989). Modern communication theory has also
pointed up the fact that international negotiations may at times look like
games in which negotiators (players) are trapped by codified behaviors
without being able to “communicate on communication” or “negotiate on
negotiation.” Failing to distinguish between activities (information,
messages, initiation) of different degrees or orders may prevent negotiators
from being efficient and may lead them to impasses and failures. Similarly,
international negotiators seem at times to “play games” without being fully
conscious of the rules by which the game has been initiated and is to be
played: Are negotiators really playing the same game? Do they accept the
same rules? Have they even started to agree on these rules?
Metacommunication theory (that is, the theory of logical types) can throw
light on these often neglected aspects.
Language is also an important issue in international negotiations.
This is so because it is the vehicle for exchange of meanings (and problems
abound in this respect) and also because it influences the formal setting of
negotiations (for example, diplomatic language is obviously not the same as
business language). Issues concerning language are manifold. Some are
practical and punctual (for example, use of interpreters, advantages or
drawbacks to the use of one or several languages), whereas others are of a
more general nature. One such general issue is the link between language
and stress. Linguists have a lot to contribute to the analysis of the language
of negotiation, which in fact is very specific and definite (Hansberger,
1985). International negotiators are, in addition, confronted with the
problem of differentiation of words and expressions. It is not neutral – for
example, in “listening techniques” – to choose words, sentences, and
intonations appropriate to different sub activities such as inviting them to
talk, keeping them talking, showing readiness to listen, and showing

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interest and understanding. Words should support and reinforce, confirm a

concession, and link up with them (Hansberger, 1985).
Another communication variable is influence and persuasion.
Much of the process of negotiation consists in trying to change the beliefs
of the other party. Persuasion is one of the less costly of the many ways to
achieve an acceptable agreement. If, instead of making a concession, a
bargainer succeeds in bringing an opponent’s views into line with his own,
he will be saving his concession. Walton and McKersie (1965) consider
that settlement can be achieved through influencing the other’s perceptions
of utilities. This can be done in two ways: manipulating utility parameters
and manipulating opponents’ perceptions. Laboratory experiments show
that to the extent that a negotiator can convince the other side that he or she
has a right to make a particular demand, the probability of acceptance of
that demand increases (Rubin and Brown, 1975). Persuasion and debate
may be particularly efficient in problem solving or conflict resolution if the
conflict is grounded in misunderstanding (Rapoport, 1960).
The number of variables possibly playing a role in the negotiation
process is, however, presumed to be rather large (Druckman, 1995),
perhaps exceeding one hundred, and – a challenge for the future – their role
is as yet not fully or convincingly understood (or verified), an additional
difficulty being to establish the independent variable that would permit one
“to determine why a negotiator selects one path over another (and what
kind of parameter is involved)” (Zartman, 1998, p. 23).
For example, the issue of reciprocity has been tackled extensively,
from the angle of the “social exchange theory,” in International
Negotiation (Larson and Druckman, 1998). Fairness – together with related
concepts such as justice, equity, fair division, and ethics – is also one of the
themes that, though not new, has received a lot of attention (see, for
example, Denoon and Brams, 1995; Pruitt, 1997a; and Zartman and others,
1996). An interesting development has been the study of links between
these concepts and other central ones that have also been prominent in the
literature: power and asymmetries, negotiators’ satisfaction, stability and
durability of agreements (Pfetsch and Landau, 2000). Pruitt and Carnevale
(1993), in a major contribution on the behavioral analysis of negotiation,
have made the point that an important limitation to the “dominant
paradigm” is its indifference to (or even ignorance of) such concepts (and
realities) as “other-interest in negotiation” and “social norm,” including
fairness.
Threats are another communication variable. A threat is a
communication that indicates that its author intends to harm a target if the
other does not meet the stated demands. Two types of threats can be

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distinguished (Schelling, 1966): compellent threats, which require a

specific action to avoid punishment, and deterrent threats, which tend to
prevent the target from doing something. Threats are often considered
measures of last resort. They may concern an expected concession or
settlement and are supposed to harm the outcome of the negotiation, the
possibility of an agreement, or even sometimes the opponent. The use of a
threat may elicit a counterthreat and start a process of escalation. Three
conditions must be fulfilled to make a threat efficient: it must be credible, it
must reach the target, and the target must be able to comply with the
demand (Watzlawick, 1976).
An efficient threat is a threat that works without any further action
on the part of the source. If the threat must be carried out, its cost may be
more than just verbal. Experimental studies demonstrate that the
effectiveness of a threat is a function of the source’s credibility, that is,
one’s reputation for being capable of carrying out other threats of the same
kind (Horai and Tedeschi, 1969). The effectiveness of a threat also depends
on the amount of damage expected for noncompliance and its comparison
with the cost resulting from complying (Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma,
1973).
Threats, warnings, and fait accompli often trigger escalation
processes. Faure and Zartman (2001) have investigated the topic in order to
provide a better understanding of what constitutes an escalation, what kind
of rationale it develops, when a deadlock is most likely to occur, and how
the process may shift from conflict escalation to negotiation.

Referential Variables
Referential variables are factors to which the negotiator refers consciously
or unconsciously to guide his or her behavior during the process. One of
these factors is saving face. The concern about face is universal, although
its importance varies according to culture and society. In some cultures, to
lose face is nothing more than one of many problems with which a
negotiator has to deal; in others, it may become a matter of life and death.
“Face maintenance” can be defined as “the desire to project an
image of capability and strength or conversely to avoid projecting an image
of incapability, weakness, or foolishness” (Druckman, 1977b, p. 276). A
negotiator may express a concern about saving face when he or she is
exposed to the other party, an audience, a third party, or constituents. Open
proceedings therefore increase the likelihood of having to use face-
maintenance devices. A high-conflict context will also contribute to the
importance of face saving (Deutsch, 1973). Experiments show that face
maintenance has a slowdown effect on the rate of concessions made by a

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negotiator (Johnson and Tullar, 1972). The presence of a mediator may

help considerably to facilitate concession making, because concessions
made in response to the mediator’s own suggestions do not appear as a sign
of weakness, as they would if presented as a response to the other party’s
demands (Pruitt and Johnson, 1970).
If face maintenance is a purpose of the negotiator, it is just as
important to be wary of neglecting the other party’s face. Carelessness in
this aspect may lead to paying the price for a “face restoration” in order to
complete the negotiation.
Other referential variables include values and interests. The
negotiation process may focus on several types of issues, leading the
bargainers to construct their general approach on one of them. Two
categories can be distinguished: conflicts of values and conflicts of interest.
A conflict of values is a situation in which the parties hold different or
incompatible values, ideologies, and principles and in which each party
tries to make its own prevail. A conflict of interest corresponds to a
discrepancy between the parties’ preferences concerning the distribution of
a scarce resource. A third and common situation is a mix of both conflicts
in a complex interplay.
Touzard (1977) shows that negotiations concerning values are the
most difficult to bring to a positive end and are very often avoided. It is far
more difficult to agree on principles than on the concrete consequences of
their implementation. Moreover, the emotional basis of ideological
positions makes them hard to abandon explicitly. To give up a principle one
has always stood for is an unacceptable demonstration of weakness to the
adversary. Often conflicts of values have to be settled with a mediator.
As far as interests are concerned, according to Pruitt (1981), they
should never be regarded as inherently opposed, and negotiation is by no
means the only method to solve the divergence. Mixed negotiations in
which values and interests are at stake lead to significant observations. Lall
(1966) observes, on the one hand, that in case of a conflict concerning those
two domains, even highly ideological countries choose to make their vital
interests prevail. On the other hand, Axelrod (1970) shows that predictions
concerning coalition formation and duration improve significantly when
made on the basis of ideological similarity, rather than solely on the basis
of maximizing utility.
Another interesting observation relates to the precedent that could
be set up through negotiated principles concerning the way of reaching an
agreement in case of recurring negotiations. Bargains may settle a first
dispute with a rather unfavorable outcome in order to establish accepted
principles that will yield higher gains in the forthcoming negotiations (Lax

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and Sebenius, 1986).

Influencing the Process

The school of prescriptive models, the most prominent of which is Fisher,
Ury, and Patton (1991), attempts to answer doubts, perplexities, or
criticisms of their approach. Part of the controversy could be seen in Fisher
(1991); it also led “to a mixed evaluation” by Pruitt and Carnevale (1993,
p. 125), for whom the approach raises “big ifs” (for example, are situations
described by Fisher and Ury all that common?). The principled negotiation
approach has, however, met with popular success, but it also runs into the
problem of cultural differences in the concept of negotiation (see, for
instance, Faure, Mermet, Touzard, and Dupont, 2000). One can also
mention the observation made by some authors that if centering on interests
(needs) is a key to a good negotiation (by opposition to positions or
demands), there are also complementary strategies that make sense under
given circumstances, such as rights or power (however questionable this
last one may be, as is shown in Zartman and Rubin’s Power and
Negotiation, 2000).
A number of factors that are not manipulated by the negotiators and
that do not intervene directly in the bargaining process still have an
influence on it. These include the negotiator’s culture, personality, and
social status; the available information, which includes whether the
proceedings are open or closed, the number of parties involved, the
constituents, and third parties; and structural conditions, such as the
complexity of the negotiation and time constraints. Culture as an
influencing factor has already been mentioned as it relates to
communication patterns, and the number of parties, the role of
constituencies, and the existence of a third party – a mediator – are
described extensively in other sections of this chapter. The variables
influencing the process are grouped into three categories: personal
conditions, information conditions, and structural conditions.

Personal Conditions
Considering that individuals are the participants in negotiations, their
personality may play an important part. Research has given considerable
attention to a limited number of parameters: risk-taking propensity,
intolerance for ambiguity, self-esteem, need for achievement,
cooperativeness, and authoritarianism. Examining a number of
experimental studies, Rubin and Brown (1975) suggest that high-risk takers
seem more interested in maximizing their own gain than in maximizing
mutual gain. Bargainers who have a high tolerance for ambiguity are more

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likely to behave cooperatively than those who have a lower tolerance.

Individuals with a negative self-concept (directly related to self-esteem)
tend to bargain more competitively than those with a positive view of
themselves. Cooperative bargainers are individuals who have more trust in
the other party. At the other end of the spectrum, competitors behave
competitively regardless of the other’s behavior (Kelley and Stahelski,
1970c). Authoritarian negotiators, who score high on a scale characterized
by a power orientation, defer to others in power, are generally suspicious
and cynical, and behave more like competitors than cooperators, according
to experiments that studied the relationship between authoritarianism and
bargaining (Kelley and Stahelski, 1970b). Other parameters may play an
important role. For instance, the bargainer may have a personal and
normative conception of what a negotiation is. The process viewed as a
game, a style exercise, a place for conviviality, or a fight will have
consequences on the bargainer’s behavior.
A negotiator’s status refers to a position in the social structure to
which the negotiator belongs. This concept is strongly related to prestige,
and the bargainer’s status has a significant influence on the negotiation
process. The review of experimental findings made by Rubin and Brown
(1975) shows that bargainers display considerable deference toward other
parties with high status. This deference is expressed in various ways, such
as compliance with their threats (Faley and Tedeschi, 1971) or adoption of
a submissive behavior (Grant and Sermat, 1969). When the other negotiator
has a lower status, the bargainer tends to behave in an exploitative way
(Swingle, 1970).

Information Conditions
The available information can be of crucial importance in the monitoring of
the negotiation by each party. An efficient negotiator needs information on
the situation, the context, what is at stake, and the other party’s needs,
goals, means of action, personality, and values. Information reduces
uncertainty and sometimes may enable a bargainer to make a prediction
concerning the other’s behavior and the evolution of the negotiation. Three
different types of information can be distinguished: public, private, and
secret. The possession of private information gives more possibilities and
more power in the relationship. Withholding secret information – that is,
information that nobody suspects the negotiator of having – gives an even
better bargaining position. In high-conflict situations, it is the most wanted
type of information. But public, or shared, information may also raise the
level of efficiency of a negotiation in the case of a cooperative relationship.
Some laboratory experiments confirm this observation. The more

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negotiators know about each other’s gains and losses, the higher they raise
their joint gains (Siegel and Fouraker, 1960). In the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
cooperative choices are less frequent when gains and losses are not known
than when this information is available (Pilisuk and Rapoport, 1964).
In a problem-solving orientation on negotiation, information
exchange is the only way to build integrative agreements (Walton and
McKersie, 1965). To obtain joint benefits requires the discovery of new
possibilities of gains and the creation of solutions to expand the size of the
pie. This can be done only if each negotiator knows the real needs of the
other party. Sharing information can be seen as a way to create value.
Common practices in international negotiations, such as compensation or
logrolling, can lead to an efficient end if everyone becomes aware of the
others’ priorities.
Another aspect of information is the accessibility of the
proceedings. Audiences, such as the negotiators’ constituencies, negotiation
team members, observers, the public, or journalists, may play an important
part in the way bargainers behave. What seem at stake in such a case is not
only the outcome of the negotiation but also the image and the reputation of
the negotiator. Saving face, for instance, becomes a real issue in some
situations. Audiences may affect bargaining behavior in different ways
according to their relationship with the negotiator. They provide feedback
on their perception of the process, leading to a complex network of
interactions. The existence of open proceedings implies that negotiators
have to satisfy to some extent the requirements of different audiences. This
concerns not only the outcome but also the way it is reached and results in
an additional set of constraints for the bargainer.

Structural Conditions
Multilateral negotiations introduce a complicated network of issues and
relationships related to the variety of viewpoints expressed by the parties,
increasing the complexity of the process. Interdependencies among the
diverse issues may be difficult to assess, and the consequences of adding,
dropping, or modifying issues can be extremely difficult to foresee. Thus
complexity induces uncertainty and influences the negotiators’ behavior.
From field observations and laboratory simulations, Winham
(l977a) shows that in complex negotiations, bargainers develop simplified
cognitive structures to facilitate their task. He further observes that
concession making loses much of its meaning, because parties may not be
able to estimate the value of the concessions received. Finally, agreement is
facilitated because complexity strengthens the authority of the negotiator
vis-a-vis his or her constituents.

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Resorting to a metaphor, the bicycle traffic in Beijing, Faure

(l995a) draws observations that go beyond what can usually be perceived at
the negotiating table and provides basic clues to understand the process in
its hidden dimensions.
From case studies on which different analytical frameworks,
including organization, coalitions, leadership, and decision theories, are
applied, Zartman and Associates (1994) conclude that the main
characteristic of multilateral negotiations, complexity, cannot be simply
reduced but has to be managed with specific tools in order to reach efficient
outcomes.
Time is another aspect of structural conditions. The time dimension
intervenes in several ways during the negotiation process. The elapse of
time leads to a decline in demands over time (Kelley, Beckman, and
Fischer, 1967); time pressure has positive effects on the achievement of the
agreement (Pruitt and Drews, 1969). Under time pressure, negotiators set
lower minimal goals and larger and more frequent concessions (Pruitt and
Johnson, 1970), but the pressure results in diminished joint benefit (Yukl,
Malone, Hayslip, and Pamin, 1976). Imposing a deadline is a usual way for
a bargainer to avoid being involved in a process in which he or she could
face time costs. It is a way to reverse pressure by stating openly the
possibility of a breakdown.
Time not only influences the concession-making process, the goals,
and the demands but also leads to a situation ripe for settlement. The ripe
moment is a particular time when the parties start to perceive the possibility
of modifying their positions toward a solution (Zartman, 1989). Choosing
the right moment to suggest a solution to a conflict is crucial for a
negotiator. If it is too early, the solution may be rejected because
negotiators still think they can get more; if it is too late, the suggestion will
not be considered because the conflict will have gone too far and the parties
will no longer be willing to come to an agreement. The notion of the right
time is strongly connected with the idea of ripeness.
Time is more than what can be read on a wristwatch and cannot be
reduced to its own measure. Another view is to look at it as an active
variable, structuring the process of negotiation and operating differently
according to cultures (Faure, 1981).
Finally, anticipation of the next negotiation is the last structural
condition to consider. Recurrent negotiations are frequent, and the
anticipation of the next meetings may play an important part in the
bargainers’ behavior. As mentioned, the negotiator has long-term interests
and may choose a strategy of anticipation focusing less on outcome and
more on principles, which could place the bargainer in a better position for

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further negotiations.
The conclusion of a negotiation leaves, for those who participated
in it, a kind of aftertaste that will work as a background factor for future
negotiations and contribute in one way or another to their climate. This
psychological and emotional balance sheet, which is established in a more
or less conscious way at the end of a negotiation, has all the characteristics
of a spontaneous appraisal. Knowing that the other party will make a
similar evaluation, each negotiator may anticipate such a practice and take
it into account at the time of the settlement. Moreover, the recurrent aspect
of many negotiations offers possibilities to ask for compensations or to start
to retaliate if the aftertaste is bitter.

PROCESS EVALUATED: SOME RESEARCH ISSUES

Bridging competing approaches or theories of negotiations have raised

another interesting question: Is it possible to learn lessons from a
comparison of the ways by which different “schools” tackle a given
negotiation situation, problem, or case? This line of research has received
several applications in the past decade, one of the most elaborate being
projects undertaken by the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN)
group. This network has assembled theorists as well as professionals to
make them react on several situations, each through the lenses of his or her
discipline or experience. The situations scrutinized have been varied:
multilateral conferences, environmental negotiations, international
economic negotiations, and negotiations on policies sustaining
development (Sjostedt, 1993; Kremenyuk and Sjostedt, 2000; Zartman and
Associates, 1994; Boyer, 1999).
In another approach, a similar methodology was used to compare
on the basis of several situations the explanatory quality of negotiation
analysis and (neoclassical) economic theory (Kremenyuk and Sjostedt,
2000). The authors conclude that both approaches are complementary (in
international economic negotiations) and help each other comprehend the
process so that a useful synergy can be attained. Economic theory is
“unsuitable for the analysis of process developments,” but “the structural
dimension of interaction of economic negotiation represents an area where
economic analysis may particularly enrich negotiation analysis” (p. 340).
Gaps in the theory were clearly pointed out by Pruitt and Carnevale
(1993, pp. 194-203): reliance on the self-interest premise (whereas “many
negotiations ... involve parties who have some degree of genuine or
strategic concern about the other party’s welfare, other-interest or other
concern”), ignoring (or giving only limited importance to) the social
context and norms, looking at “negotiation as a stand-alone process,” and

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failing “to distinguish between individuals and groups.” The authors then
proceed to show how such gaps could be tightened or closed and they
propose an agenda for further research.

Efficiency of the Predictive Models

With predictive models, one must confront the problem of indetermination
of the outcome. If negotiations were processes in which the outcome could
be determined in advance, predictive models would be more effective. In
fact, such models encounter a basic difficulty: the more predictive they are,
the further from reality they remain. The highest efficiency of these models
concerns heuristics and can be achieved when these are used as Weberian
ideal types. By simplifying situations, they become a tool enabling the
researcher to make better sense of reality. However, in no circumstance
should the model be confused with reality.

Insufficient Knowledge of Variables

Some variables of the process are insufficiently understood, badly captured,
poorly operationalized, and little researched. Among them, power is one of
the most questionable and controversial.

Sequential Negotiation Theory

Modern theory posits that negotiation is a “mixed-motive” activity:
negotiators act both cooperatively (trying to increase jointly the value that
each party intends to derive from the agreement) and competitively (each
party trying to obtain the best part of that value to meet individual
objectives). While creating value consists of permitting conditions that
allow each negotiator to move away from the best alternative that would be
available outside negotiation, claiming value tends to force each party
closer to that alternative. This description is based on observation,
empirical findings, and theoretical analysis (using utility theory in a broad
sense). It shows that there is tension between two types of activity. Its
elements (its forms and manifestations), its relative intensity, and its degree
of efficiency constitute the building blocks of process analysis.
Because the observation of process centers on its sequential
aspects, a crucial issue has been the relative importance of cooperation and
competition in the various phases observed in the development over time
during a negotiation. An interesting illustration of the coexistence of
cooperation and competition is presented by anthropologists studying
disputes and negotiations from a cross-cultural perspective (Gulliver,
1979). A developmental – or processual – model of negotiation is thus

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shown to exhibit the changing mix of predominance of antagonism and

coordination (cooperation). In prenegotiations, antagonism clearly
dominates, as this period is characterized by disagreement and perhaps
even crisis. Prenegotiations presuppose an adequate amount of
coordination, but competition arises with agenda definition and becomes
predominant when negotiators are exploring the field with the emphasis put
on differences. Coordination makes way with the narrowing of differences
and parallel emphasis on tolerable agreement. A balance between the two
elements is evidenced in the preliminaries to final bargaining and final
bargaining itself. Coordination predominates at the final stages of
“ritualization” and execution of outcomes (at least in regard to its early
implementation). This description fits well with views of other contributors
in the anthropological field.
Apart from the fact that the description intends to be general
(applying to diverse cultures), it raises the question of transitions (turning
points) from one stage to another. Practitioners agree that such turning
points do exist and that sensing them is one of the attributes of experienced
negotiators (Druckman, Husbands, and Johnston, 1991).
Recent contributions concerning the process of negotiation take the
view that in negotiations, the competition aspects are predominant in the
first stages. This may be explained by a number of observed behaviors,
strategies, and tactics at this stage, such as a tendency to bid high (to
safeguard room for subsequent maneuvering), initial limited trust until
credibility and goodwill are tested and established, confusion between
positions and interests, and fear of appearing weak or flexible from the
start. Because negotiation is risky, risk-adverse negotiators tend to act
defensively or deliberately seek destabilization of the opponent to gain
initial advantage. Academics could help improve current practices by
clarifying the role and limits of initial first-stage competition and offering
methodological and ethical rules to make the process more transparent,
understood, and efficient.
Some issues do not seem as yet convincingly solved. One is how to
reconcile the observed general tendency for a competitive initial stage with
the logic of either the formula-detail description or the efficient-frontier
assumption. Finding the “formula” seems to imply a sufficient amount of
cooperation and coordination, in contrast to “details,” which would seem to
call for strict competitive bargaining. Similarly, the momentum toward the
efficient frontier – although it may conceivably combine both cooperative
and competitive moves – would normally appear to be initially cooperative,
as the immediate preoccupation of negotiators centers on how to take steps
to improve the joint zero-utility position.

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Another issue is the displacement of zero-utility points during the

course of negotiation: this may be either cooperative (for some reason
contributing to – or allowing – the opponent’s raising of his or her BATNA
or the lowering of one’s own) or competitive (the reverse). Transforming,
enlarging, or deleting issues from the start may conceivably be a strategy
that can be either cooperative or competitive. Another issue concerns the
often observed changes in the negotiation climate during various phases:
such changes again may be toward more cooperation or more competition.
Finally, the problems remain of whether cooperation and competition
predominance results from situation or behavior, how stable this
combination is, and to what extent there can be changes in the mix during
the negotiation.

The Place of Ethic

Ethics reflect the values of the negotiator and the implicit code of good
behavior in a negotiation. With respect to morals, certain actions are
acceptable in some cultures but rejected in others. For instance, bluffing
may disqualify the opponent and as a consequence also disqualify the
relationship. Threats also raise questions: Is it a legitimate practice? How
far can a negotiator go without going too far? Besides, the object of the
threat may vary considerably: Does it refer to not making any more
concessions? Withdrawing a concession already made? Breaking off the
negotiation? The threat may even aim at the negotiator personally. Whereas
research with a descriptive or predictive purpose can avoid dealing with
ethics, this is no longer possible when research takes a prescriptive stand.
Any normative approach necessarily includes ethical aspects. For instance,
there has been a long-standing, strong moral belief that mediators must be
neutral and impartial to fulfill their role. Faure (1989) has shown through
international case studies that efficiency does not depend on the respect of
such ethical constraints. In numerous cases, it is noncompliance with these
conditions that enabled the mediator to be truly efficient. Thus morals and
efficiency may appear to be antagonistic. How far an acceptable end can
justify the use of less acceptable means is a question negotiators may have
to confront. Dealing with hostage takers is a typical example of such an
ethical dilemma: Must one compromise with criminals? Answers vary
according to times and cultures.

The Process in Action

In international negotiations, the processes in action are relatively well
understood. A more sophisticated approach could be reached through a

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differentiation of the issues at stake: economical, political, ecological, legal,

and so on. Exploring the relationship between process and the various types
of issues could require different intellectual approaches.

PENDING RESEARCH ISSUES

At least six challenging propositions raise the need for refocusing or

deemphasizing the dominant paradigm or paradigms in the existing
theories.
A first one – already mentioned – has been presented by Pruitt and
Carnevale (1993), who question the ability of the “dominant paradigm”
based on the maximization of self-interest to be the most appropriate to
describe and explain real-world negotiations. As indicated previously, this
paradigm is unable to capture other phenomena in actual negotiations, no
matter how they are observed.
A second criticism, expressed in several forms in the 1990s, has
concerned the need to deemphasize the all-inclusive dyadic approach of
negotiation. Except for specific situations, dyadic encounters cover in fact a
reality of plural or multilateral interactions; hence additional or
substitutable hypotheses, concepts, propositions, and findings would have
to be taken into account. A major concept in this respect is complexity
(Zartman, 1998). Such refocusing is also a part of other challenging
propositions.
The third challenge has been subsumed in Mnookin and Susskind’s
recent contribution: “negotiating on behalf of others” (1999). Most
negotiations are conducted through agents (which is now the norm rather
than the exception in every field: diplomatic, labor, political, commercial,
and even personal negotiations). The relationship between principals and
agents is a key variable in the process that academicians and analysts have
often neglected. Adapting theory to account for these two-level games is
thus needed.
A fourth challenge is that existing theories give inadequate (if any)
weight to the cultural factor. Yet as shown by Faure and Rubin (1993),
Cohen (1991), Elgstrom (1999), and Weiss (2000), this factor cannot be
ignored or treated marginally. Culture does make a difference, as Faure and
Rubin’s book suggests (in the same book, however, this claim is not denied,
but its relativity is emphasized by Zartman [pp. 17-21]). Salacuse (1999)
makes the point that “practitioners invariably point to differences in culture
as among the more difficult, yet intriguing, elements they have faced”
(p. 199). Taking at the same time a broad view of the case, Salacuse
suggests that “culture in a negotiation can be much more than an obstacle;
it can be a weapon, a fortress or a bridge.” As to Faure and Rubin, who

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draw “lessons for theory and research,” they conclude the comparative
analysis (which has been the methodology of the enterprise) by saying that
the important question is to determine the specific situations when culture
plays a role and the conditions (cognition, perception) and ways (strategies,
tactics; behavior) through which its impact is organized (1993, pp. 210-
213).
One lesson is the necessity to sharpen the research focus. To some
extent, it is also a quest for refocusing the whole field of negotiation. This
point is even transformed into a challenge of the dominant paradigm by
Cohen (1991, p. 153): when theorists posit a universal paradigm of
negotiation (usually involving such features as the “joint search of a
solution,” “isolating the people from the problem,” and the “maximization
of joint gains”), they are in effect proposing an idealized version of the
low-context, problem-solving model, an alternative and quite different
model of negotiation that is just as self-consistent and valid in its own terms
as the first.
The fifth challenge relates to the assumption that all that is needed
to understand a negotiation is knowing what happens at the table
(microprocesses) or what constitutes the background conditions,
understood as the immediate circumstances surrounding the interaction
(macroanalysis). The point is made, however, that this is simply not enough
(particularly in repeated encounters or when there is an ongoing
relationship). Faure (1991b), telling about the purchase of carpets in a very
special environment, Peshawar during a civil war, shows how essential it is
to take the context into account in order to understand the process and
capture the meaning of the various actions undertaken.
It is also important to situate the negotiation in its prenegotiation
aspects: precedents, past experience derived from the relationship, links to
other negotiations (Watkins, 1999), “ripeness” of the issue (Zartman, 1997;
Lieberfeld, 1999; Pruitt, 1997b), gradual search for and eventual discovery
of the “formula,” adaptive learning (considering that negotiations should
not be analyzed “in isolation from other negotiations and experiences that
may have shaped the behavior and expectations of the bargainers”; Cross,
1996, p. 153), precoalition and coalition moves (Boyer and Cremieux,
1999), and so on. How the past is embedded in and shapes the present is
particularly documented in international negotiations such as the European
Union, to which International Negotiation offers a full issue (Lodge and
Pfetsch, 1998), or the Middle East peace process (Pruitt, 1997a). In the case
of the EU, viewing ongoing negotiations from a network approach (Pfetsch,
1998; Jonsson and others, 1998) still strengthens the notion of the
prenegotiation-negotiation link.

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A last challenge has to do with the role of power and asymmetries

in negotiation. The challenge assesses the question of how central (a
minority view), important (a majority view: power is important but not
sufficient to explain process and outcome in negotiations), or merely
subsidiary (another minority view) power and power use are in the process
toward an agreement; deemphasizing – while at the same time reanalyzing
– the role of power has again become an important issue on the research
agenda (see Lax and Sebenius, 1991a; Fisher, 1991; Zartman and Rubin,
2000).
In the Zartman and Rubin contribution, the authors combine the
twin aspects of power and asymmetries, and the question is asked, how can
weaker parties negotiate with stronger parties and still get something? One
of the goals of the analysis is to evaluate the merits of two different
schools, one arguing that power asymmetries are evened by the negotiation
process and the other that differences in power do make a difference in the
way negotiations proceed and the outcomes that result. In the effort to
answer this question (it has also been a research topic of social
psychology), the authors aim at bringing about refinements in the
conceptualization of power (p. 12) and at testing the experimental validity
of seven hypotheses using a comparative analysis of several cases. Most of
these hypotheses, though not all, seem to have achieved validity (a result
sometimes different from those in laboratory experiments). The most
important conclusions, apart from the reconceptualization of power as an
action, not separating source and effect (p. 13), are, first, that resource
power asymmetries do not yield corresponding asymmetries in the exercise
of power (p. 286); second, that “system maintenance” such as relationships
and other external involvements tend to outweigh the momentary
calculation of power and interests (p. 288); third, that “one’s aggregate
power position, using power as resources, is not an accurate indicator either
of the relevant issue of parties going into negotiations or their perception of
their power relationship” (p. 288); and, last, that there is a “surprising
effectiveness of weaker parties ... to level the playing field” (pp. 289-290).
In other words, “once the game becomes the one known as negotiation, the
rules change and everyone becomes empowered by this transformed
reality” (p. 290).

EXPANDING THE FIELD

Negotiation analysis has been extended to practically all fields where

interactions develop between actors confronted with some form of conflict
or project. In the first edition of this book, some chapters dealt with
situations outside the traditional areas, such as international, political,

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commercial, labor, terrorist, nuclear, or interpersonal negotiations. This

tendency to embrace an increasingly larger area can be observed in the
decade as evidenced, for instance, by the variety of themes covered by
International Negotiation, the Negotiation Journal, and other journals such
as the Journal of Conflict Resolution (in which topics address negotiation
issues occasionally). This tendency is both a source and a by-product of the
claim of the discipline to have its autonomy; at the same time, this growing
heterogeneity raises the question of its frontiers and the need to explicitly
explain the minimal criteria that must be met to be considered
“negotiation”; this in turn leads to defining and redefining the minimal
commonality of elements entering in its definition. Developments on ethics
are also part of the expanded field (see, for example, Murnigham, 1991).
Extension is also a feature applicable to the field of teaching and
learning, whether in higher or continued education. This continued to
attract attention in the 1990s, as witnessed by the choice of this theme for a
whole issue of International Negotiation in 1998 and an innovative
methodology by Druckman and Robinson (1998). The role of the PIN
network regarding international negotiation training has been summarized
by Meerts in an article in PINPoints, the network newsletter (2000).
“Teaching Ideas” is a current section of the Negotiation Journal with the
twin aspects of evaluating practices – as, for instance, the “state of the
practice” by Lewicki (1997) – or drawing attention to points of
“educational innovation,” such as interdisciplinary inquiries and the use of
analogical reasoning (Gillespie, Thompson, Loewenstein, and Gentner,
1999), feminist perspectives (Landry and Donnellon, 1999), the use of
anecdotes (McKersie, 1997), and teaching over the Internet (McKersie and
Fonstad, 1997). The contribution of Weiss (2000), evaluating his own
teaching practices and comparing them with a “range of experiential
methods,” is also worth studying. That teaching methods can indeed be
varied is also shown by Murnigham (1991), pointing to the usefulness of
bargaining games as a way to learn more about the process of negotiation,
given the multitude of strategies and their different degree of effectiveness
in a given situation.
A third orientation for further research has been in the effort to
bridge theory and practice, such as to see to what extent extending research
findings to practice is feasible and useful to the practitioner, a point
mentioned earlier (Druckman and Robinson, 1998) and also taken up by
Watkins (1999), who attempts to combine theoretical propositions and
practical advice. That this preoccupation has not been ignored in recent
years is again evidenced by formulations to this effect by the two major
journals on negotiation: the “In Practice” section of the Negotiation Journal

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and the claim by International Negotiation to be a “journal of theory and

practice.”
A number of contributions during the past decade have shown a
definite preference for a combined approach of theory and practice. The
substantial number of books published by IIASA all bear the same concern
and end up with a twin chapter on lessons for research and for practice.
Sunshine (1990) has published a “practitioner’s handbook” designed “to
provide practical training for mid-career lawyers and legal advisors from
developing countries” and used as the textbook for training at IDLI in
Rome; in a different vein, Shell’s (1999) approach to information-based
bargaining is meant to facilitate the sifting of the good advice from the bad
in the popular writings on bargaining. The lesson is that in the final
analysis, one cannot learn negotiation from a book. But a theory-based
practice is no doubt the best way to reconcile these two pillars of the
negotiation activity.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Negotiation research has progressed over the past thirty years, but much re-
mains to be done about the still unexplored areas and issues and about
arriving at more conclusive demonstrations or validation of many existing
(sometimes only preliminary) propositions.
The progress to be made in understanding the process (and
outcomes) of negotiation should be directed along three main lines:
 Consolidate the many, as yet insufficient, propositions already
available, building on existing concepts and refining them.
 Develop new ideas, new methodologies, new hypotheses, and new vali-
dating tests.
 Find the proper mix of theoretical exploration and applications in the
real world.
Perhaps an agenda for research for the next decade should look at
what has happened in the past ten years and be formulated to cover selected
areas:
 Further characterization and clarification of the central concepts;
 Filling and closing remaining gaps, reflecting on the need to refocus or
deemphasize the dominant paradigms;
 Continuing to extend the field with respect to new (or insufficiently
explored) areas, to teaching, and to bridging theory and practice.

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 CHAPTER 6

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS

CHRISTOPHE DUPONT
AND PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS *

Among the rather large number of international negotiations designed to

put an end to an armed conflict, those that took place in Vienna from
November 1814 to June 1815, in common with those in Osnabrück and
Münster 170 years earlier, are often regarded as a major event in diplomatic
history. As 1814-1815 marks a turning point in the organization of Europe
and thus has far-reaching significance from the short- as well as long-term
viewpoint, a wide range of specialists have attempted to identify the impact
of the Congress of Vienna on future international developments. Not
surprisingly, their views and assessments have not always converged.
The contents and analysis of this chapter are oriented toward
neither political science nor historical science but rather follow a
negotiation analysis approach, directed to the question: to what extent were
the negotiations forward or backward looking in pursuing peace and/or
justice? It has proven not only useful, but indeed necessary, to start the
chapter with a narrative and context to describe the negotiations. The next
part, focusing on analysis, turns to the structure and process of the Vienna
congress. An assessment of the negotiations follows in terms of the
questions addressed by this book, and a short conclusion sums up the most
significant characteristics of the Vienna negotiations. At the end of this
chapter, Table A1, giving a chronology of events leading up to the
Congress of Vienna, and Table A2, providing a chronology of the Congress
of Vienna itself, have been designed to clarify the complex development of
events.

––––––––––––––
*
Reprinted with authorization from Dupont, C. and P. Audebert-Lasrochas (2005). The
Congress of Vienna negotiations. Chapter 3 in I. W. Zartman and V. Kremenyuk (eds.).
Peace versus Justice: Negotiating Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes. Lanham
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Many thanks to Valentine Cailliau, ESSEC IRENE.

International Negotiation: Foundations, Models, and Philosophies. Careers in Negotiation and Conflict
Management Research, Christophe Dupont. Aurélien Colson, Daniel Druckman, and William Donohue
(eds.) 101-148 © 2013 Republic of Letters Publishing. All rights reserved.
CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS

PROLOGUE AND CONTEXT

Narrative
For most historians and political analysts, the 29th Bulletin issued by
Napoleon on 28 November 1812 ordering the retreat of his army after the
disaster against the Russians at the Berezina River was the first in a series
of events that led to the downfall of the Napoleonic empire. Emperor
Napoleon I signed his (first) “unconditional abdication” some 16 months
later on 6 April 1814. The Treaty of Fontainebleau, detailing the fate of the
emperor and the Bonaparte family and the departure of Napoleon to the
“new” principality of Elba, was ratified on 11-12 April 1814. The First
Peace of Paris was signed by the four “allies” – Austria, Great Britain,
Prussia, and Russia – and France (then represented by the new Bourbon
king, Louis XVIII, and Talleyrand). The treaty enumerated a number of
provisions regarding frontier and territorial arrangements.
Of key importance for this chapter, a secret article of the treaty
provided that “the relations from which a system of real and permanent
balance of power is to be derived shall be regulated at the congress based
on principles determined by the allied powers among themselves.” In fact,
the first mention of a conference to finalize the treaties signed by the allies
during the campaigns of 1813 and early 1814 and to design a new system
for post-Napoleonic Europe can be traced back to the Langres Protocol of
29 January 1814, in which it was stipulated that, “eventually a Congress ...
should be held at Vienna to settle such questions as might remain for
discussion once peace has been signed with France.”
The context of the Vienna negotiations cannot be understood
without reference to the major events that occurred in the military, political,
and diplomatic negotiating spheres during the extremely confusing period
between the French retreat from Russia and the occupation and capitulation
of Paris on 31 March 1814. So complex and fluctuating were these events
that it is opportune to list them chronologically (see table A1) to bring out
the clearly visible links between the three spheres. Four major
developments need special mention from the perspective of negotiation
analysis.
First, and especially important, were the discussions at Basle in
January 1814 between three sovereigns or their representatives that led to
the Langres Protocol. The main protagonists were the Austrian Prince
Metternich and the British Lord Castlereagh. The Russian emperor, Tsar
Alexander I, did not participate in person. Castlereagh had prepared a
memorandum in London in December 1813 in which he clearly indicated

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what would (and should) be the allies’ negotiation objectives. An important

point was that the two diplomats would work to induce the Russian
emperor to adhere to the concept of a “grand alliance” to define a common
agenda for future peace negotiations. This alliance would emphasize “the
common interest;” a concept implying in particular that a satisfactory
solution had to be found for the extremely important and complex questions
of Saxony and Poland, a problem that raised the issue of compensation for
the powers that would be hurt by the loss of territories. When confronted
with the protocol, Alexander made clear his reservations so that, by
February 1814, it was not at all clear what priorities had been agreed upon
among the four allied powers. To avoid disturbances at a time when the
major concern was the defeat of Napoleon, the intricate questions of Poland
and Saxony were therefore left hanging, as were the meaning and substance
of the term, “the common interest.”
The second major development was the Congress of Chatillon in
February-March 1814, where the rift between the four allied powers
became critical. Apart from issues of general consensus (for example, the
exclusion of the issue of maritime rights as demanded by Castlereagh and
the distinction between “natural” and “former” frontiers in imposing
limitations on French territory), profound disagreement appeared on certain
priorities, notably whether to conclude a treaty that put difficulties
temporarily on one side (the position of Metternich and Castlereagh) or to
deal first with Poland and Saxony (the position of Emperor Alexander of
Russia and the Prussian Prince Hardenberg). Equally important was the
impact of military ups and downs in March 1814 (first favorable to
Napoleon, thereafter favorable to the allies) – an important observation in
that it pointed up the correlation between external occurrences and
negotiation processes.
The third major development was the signature (1 March) and
ratification (9 March) of the 1814 Treaty of Chaumont establishing the
Quadruple Alliance between Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia.
The alliance was a major effort to obtain some unity of purpose among the
four allies. Signed on a simple card on a restaurant table at Chaumont, this
treaty can be considered as the major stepping stone to the Congress of
Vienna. Although it identified the outstanding issues and objectives for the
alliance, it failed to clarify at least two basic questions with which the
future congress would be confronted: Poland and Saxony. The treaty
mentioned five issues: the continuation of war, the objectives of a future
treaty, the financing of the war (mainly from British money), the duration
of the alliance (at least “twenty years after cessation of hostilities”), and
mutual assistance. The future agenda of Vienna and some future

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developments in and after Vienna can be seen clearly from this description.
The fourth development was the First Treaty of Paris, signed by the
four members of the Quadruple Alliance on 30 May 1814 after a whole
month of internal negotiations dominated by a series of proposals and
counterproposals. The treaty was the sanction of Napoleon's downfall and
the foundation for new relations with Bourbon France. A few days after a
scheme presented by the Prussian plenipotentiary Hardenberg was refused
by the three other negotiators, Castlereagh advanced his own ideas at a
conference to which Talleyrand was invited. The discussions concerned not
only frontier rearrangements in Europe but such matters as the fate of the
colonies, the war reparations question, and the restitution of works of art.
(It is interesting that these questions appeared in one form or another some
130 years later at the peace negotiations after the two “world wars” of the
twentieth century.)
Finally, on 30 May, the negotiators were able to agree on the
“limits” of France (frontiers as of 1 November 1792 plus a few additions)
and two important secret clauses: the independence of the German states
and the convening of a congress where the four allies (not France) would
design a new system based on a “real and permanent balance of power.”
These developments are of interest for negotiation analysis because
of the contextual factors that seem to be crucial in most negotiations: the
slow and often confusing maturation of issues, positions, postures, and
strategies of the actors; the critical impact of external events on the
bargaining strength of the negotiators; the uncertainties that made it
difficult, if not impossible, to anticipate fully and with sufficient assurance
the risks involved; the simultaneous presence of areas of agreement and
disagreement that negotiations needed to reconcile; and the differences in
intentions, expectations, motives, priorities, objectives, and strategies of the
protagonists. All these factors were visible in the prologue, lasting nearly a
year, to the Congress of Vienna negotiations that opened formally on 1
November 1814.

Context
The sociopolitical and economic conditions prevalent in Europe just before
the Congress of Vienna can be expressed in a single phrase: great
exhaustion. After two decades of intense warfare all over the continent
there was a profound desire to attain some form of stability or, as it was put
at the time, “repose.” Only a few segments of society and its governing
bodies did not share such feelings. In France most of Napoleon's generals
and close advisers (such as Caulaincourt) wanted peace even at a high
price, while the anti-Napoleon clan, in particular the royalists fighting for

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the restoration of the monarchy, but even opportunistic politicians, too,

such as Talleyrand, hoped that the end of the war would provide badly
needed stability as well as demographic and economic recovery.
In other European countries, apart from the desire for some sort of
revenge which was not shared by all the allies, the attitude was much the
same. Yet, as future developments in the nineteenth century would soon
show, combined with this longing for peace and stability there was a
momentous pressure in several countries for internal unification (Germany,
Italy) or independence (Greece). These feelings provide a contextual factor
framing the negotiations at Vienna; several protagonists, perhaps most
strikingly Metternich, feared the impact on the new system of “stable and
permanent” relationships of any force or movement inspired by the ideals
of “liberty” and other values advocated by either the French Revolution or
“Bonapartism.”
The primary purpose of the Congress of Vienna was clearly to
finalize the seven treaties or conventions that were signed before the war
ended. As the congress was concluded by the Final Act on 9 June 1815, it is
not necessary at this point to consider Napoleon's temporary return to
power – the so-called hundred days – that finally and definitively sealed his
fate in June 1815 after the Battle of Waterloo and led to the Second Peace
of Paris. These treaties left unsettled some major questions (Poland,
Saxony) and other more minor, yet not unimportant, issues. There was no
progress at the prenegotiations in July 1814 in London; on the contrary,
they probably added to the confusion and uncertainties. A major procedural
point, still undecided, was whether a single instrument or a series of
separate arrangements should be signed. Another question that
subsequently proved to be of great consequence concerned the degree of
French participation at the congress; it had been ruled that France's
plenipotentiaries would not be invited to negotiations dealing with the
definition of the new “system.” Thus, as the Vienna congress formally
opened, the number of issues for which a definite agreement had been
reached fell far short of initial expectations; the Vienna agenda was simply
enormous (see section entitled Analysis, below).
The need to complete, consolidate, and finalize the existing treaties
was therefore a major backward-looking task for the congress. A second
and equally crucial point was the intention of the main powers (and most of
the smaller states) to seize the opportunity of designing a new system of
international relations, a task already formulated in the Treaty of Chaumont
and the First Peace of Paris of 1814. To quote Harold Nicolson, “And
although the great protagonists of that age (Alexander and Talleyrand,
Metternich and Castlereagh) were obliged to consider the rights and interest

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of their own countries, yet they were fully aware that more important than
any such sectional desires was a general European interest, namely an
assurance of, hence an acquired sense of, security, and a passionate need
for civil repose” (1946, 57). Thus, a new system had to be established to
satisfy those aims and make them permanent: the concept of the “concert”
was born.
One of the background factors impacting the process of any
negotiation is the posturing of the actors which, as well as issue-linked
strategies and tactics, includes temperamental traits and negotiating styles.
There were four, and subsequently five, major protagonists and their
advisers in the delegations; some, if not all, of their real intentions were
kept hidden – a phenomenon that is difficult to decode even today, given
that it is so often analyzed on the somewhat superficial basis of their
correspondence or autobiographies. This difficulty is compounded by the
tendency to resort to secret clauses (of which there were many in the events
leading up to the congress), by the many instances of “double play” and,
most importantly, by the successive shifts in position and alliances resulting
from changes in external circumstances and the circular need to adjust
strategies to the reactions of the other protagonists. A description of the five
protagonists and a summary of their main personality traits and styles are
given in the next section.

ANALYSIS

The Vienna Congress negotiations are examined from two complementary

perspectives: first, there is an overview of the structure of the negotiations
(including a brief summary of the sequence of events), then an analysis of
the main factors involved in the process.

Structure
The Congress of Vienna opened officially on 1 November 1814 and lasted
a little under eight months. The Final Act of the congress was presented in
a unique plenary session and signed by the “great powers” on 9 June 1815.
The congress was suspended during the “hundred days” (from 1 March to
18 June 1815), the period during which Napoleon escaped from Elba,
attempted to regain his lost status and power, and fought a new campaign
that ended at Waterloo on 18 June 1815 and led to the signing of the
Second Peace of Paris on 20 November 1815. What happened during this
time bears little resemblance to what happens at a modern-day international
conference. In fact, the congress was a series of negotiations of different
types and at different levels: some were conducted, to use modern

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terminology, “at the summit,” at one of two levels – the sovereign and the
ministerial level; some were conducted at the plenipotentiary level, with
councils being the exclusive preserve of the “great powers”; some took
place, with little or no coordination, in committees in which delegates of
only a small number of states were represented; and others were conducted
bilaterally in parallel outside the congress. These organizational
arrangements, in fact, often proved confusing.
The problem of organization arose as soon as the main
representatives of the four allied powers (Castlereagh, Hardenberg,
Metternich, and the Russian foreign minister, Count Nesselrode) held their
first meetings in Vienna in late August and early September 1814, before
the congress opened. Several key issues had to be settled. Which powers
would be given the task of organizing and directing the congress? On what
basis (i.e., authority) would they act? What to do with France? What to do
with the “smaller powers”? The discussions on these matters proved not
only difficult but crucial for future developments.
Most important was the composition of the groups that would be
entrusted with the direction of the conference and the principles of justice
on which that composition would repose. Proposals and counterproposals
were made: “the Four” (Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia), “the
Six”(the Four plus France and Spain), until a distinction was finally made
between an “inner council” of the Four that would deal with the territorial
questions, a committee of the “six powers of the first order” that would deal
with other arrangements, and subsequently, “the Eight” (the Six plus
Portugal and Sweden) that would deal with residual matters. The exclusion
of France from the inner council of the Four, although provided for in the
Treaty of Chaumont, became the strategic device used by Talleyrand (in the
oft-cited meeting of 20 September) to prevent the Quadruple Alliance from
having the sole higher direction of the congress. Talleyrand presented the
Four with a series of arguments that had the effect of postponing the
plenary session that they had planned to convene to assert their authority
over the congress. Talleyrand’s main reasoning rested on the “principle of
legitimacy,” the Four having “no historical, legal, logical or moral
justification” to exercise authority over the whole congress. His main tool
was the alliance he had managed to organize with the “small powers” on
the grounds that the latter would have decisions imposed on them that they
had no hand in making (de Talleyrand [1891] 1996, 206).
The result of this turbulent and somewhat confusing beginning to
the congress was the creation of a complicated structure in which the
forums where the various issues would be discussed were hierarchically
determined. Higher decisions were to be discussed and negotiated by the

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“great powers”; more routine questions were to be dealt with in

committees, of which there were ten (see Table 6.1 and Table 6.2).
These loose and cumbersome organizations and procedures have
often been criticized. Nicolson in his classic Congress of Vienna notes that
the major weakness of the congress was that “the various diverting bodies
acted without authority or legal justification” (1946, 144-45). He writes,
“The Eight, as signatories to the Peace of Paris, assumed the formal
direction of the Congress without authorization from any of the other
Powers. The German Committee… was illegally constituted” and
“exceeded its terms of reference.” Not only was the legal foundation of the
congress (as an international conference as opposed to a treaty negotiation
by a small number of parties) controversial but even its own “de facto
distribution of functions” was not observed with any logical consistency.
Thus, Nicolson concludes, “the Congress… never had a settled or agreed
plan of procedure. It functioned in spurts of improvisation interspersed with
pauses during which the big Four sought to discover which of the many
lines open to them was the line of least resistance.” It was on this
unsatisfactory situation that Talleyrand built a strategy aimed at obtaining
recognition of France as a key actor of the congress, and in this he
succeeded. These deficiencies and infringements were categorized by
Talleyrand as being without respect for “the public law” and the “sacred
principle of legitimacy.” Castlereagh saw them as a lack of “methodizing.”
Additional points regarding the organization of the congress are
also of interest. The issues of non-negotiability on the subject of maritime
rights had been evoked by Castlereagh as early as Basle and Chaumont, and
others sought to delete from the agenda issues considered as not yet
“mature.” When such issues are not of crucial importance, such a course of
action may prevent an impasse, especially in the early stages of the
negotiation. If, however, they are crucial elements, as was the case with the
questions of Poland and Saxony, then the uncertainty created is bound to
complicate the negotiation process still further.
As shown in table 6.1 and figure 6.1, issues were debated and
negotiated in conflicting and sometimes mutually overriding circumstances.

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Table 6.1 Distribution of Functions at the Congress of Vienna Negotiations

The Higher Direction of the Congress The Separate Committees

The Four The Eight German Committee
The Five (including Formal direction of Slave Trade Committee
France from 9 January the Congress Swiss Committee
1815) reserve for Committee on Tuscany
themselves the central
Committee on Sardinia and Genoa
questions, e.g. Poland,
Saxony Committee on the Duchy of
Bouillon
Decide together on the creation of the various Committee on International Rivers
separate committees and appoint (with a few Diplomatic Precedence Committee
exceptions) their members. Statistical Committee
Drafting Committee

Table 6.2 Forum of Negotiations on the Main Issues

Main Issues Forum

Procedures The Eight
France The Four
Poland and Saxony The Four, then the Five
Italy The Eight (plus two committees)
Switzerland and Germany The Four, the Eight, and the German committee
Spain Mainly bilateral
Netherlands Mainly bilateral
Slave trade Committee + bilateral
The Jewish question German committee
Diplomatic precedence Committee
Drafting the Final Act Committee

There is a particularly striking illustration of this in the bilateral or small

group encounters on the issue of Poland which was discussed in various
separate meetings in October 1814, first between Castlereagh and
Metternich, then between the two and Hardenberg, and finally between the
three and Alexander. These separate sessions may be considered a typical
device through which protagonists tend to clarify different intentions and
positions, but at Vienna they were often ways of interfering with the
organizational structure of the congress. The decision-making system was
further complicated by the fact that the congress had two directing bodies:
the council of the Four (which became the council of the Five in January

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS

1815 with the admission of Talleyrand), which was formally in charge of

the conduct of business, and the informal, yet supreme, body of allied
sovereigns who met daily in the afternoon while the ministerial council met
elsewhere in the morning. To function properly, this dual structure
presupposed that the sovereigns, given their contacts with and their
authority over their plenipotentiaries, would largely agree on proposals and
arrangements that the former had negotiated. This did not, however, always
prove to be so, especially in the case of Alexander and Nesselrode.
To add to this list of difficulties, the way in which invitations were
made and roles were assigned contributed to the unsatisfactory and peculiar
ambiance of the conference. This situation points to the importance of a
proper assessment of the legal and procedural aspects of international
conferences, as well as the need for thorough preparation, two dimensions
underlined by all authors dealing with such conferences (e.g., Kaufmann
1988 or Plantey 1994). Article XXXII of the Treaty of Paris was the basis
on which invitations were made to “all the powers engaged on either side in
the present war” to attend the congress. To quote Nicolson again, “every
country, whether great or small, responded to the invitation and sent
expensive delegations to Vienna.” The result was the presence of more than
a hundred parties that were diverse and heterogeneous in the extreme:
thirty-two members of German royalty (but not the king of Saxony), two
delegations from Naples, representatives of the sultan of Turkey and of the
pope, and even some private delegations. The variety, the rivalries, the
misunderstandings, the formation of small clans or subcoalitions, the need
to be or look busy (including being involved in the more mundane
occupations) created this special congress atmosphere that has retained the
attention of so many observers and authors, and still continues to inspire
interest some 190 years later.
A secret article of the treaty stipulated that only the four great
powers of the Quadruple Alliance would deal with and decide on the
questions relating to the “system of real and permanent balance of power in
Europe.” As this was secret and thus not communicated to the would-be
participants at the conference, not even to Portugal, Spain, and Sweden,
who were signatories of the peace treaty, the other parties were distressed
that their presence in Vienna did not involve active participation. As only
some were allowed to be members of committees, and as there was no
plenary session except for the presentation of the Final Act in June 1815,
they found many reasons for resentment and were thus motivated to align
themselves with Talleyrand in an effort to upgrade their status (at which
only Talleyrand succeeded).
While the activities and influences of the minor delegations cannot

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be considered insignificant, it is clear from the records that the congress

was actually dominated by the stature and power of a small number of
personalities, namely, the major representatives of the Five: Emperor
Alexander I of Russia, Lord Castlereagh of Great Britain, Prince
Hardenberg of Prussia, Prince Metternich of Austria, and Talleyrand
(Prince de Bénévent) of France. These men were supreme (the tsar) or top-
level dignitaries, holding the highest positions (foreign secretary, emperor,
minister) in their country. At every moment of the negotiations they acted
as key protagonists, and, although constrained (except for the emperor) by
their hierarchical links to the sovereigns (the Prince Regent in England,
King Frederick William III of Prussia, Emperor Francis I of Austria, and
King Louis XVIII of France), they conferred upon themselves a rather large
degree of initiative. They did, however, have to take account of public
opinion at home, especially in the case of Castlereagh, and of the mood of
the top army commanders. Furthermore, their actions could not be
separated from the influence of their close advisors, most often members of
their own delegations, including Gentz for Austria, Nesselrode or
Razumovsky for Russia, and Humboldt for Prussia. More specialized
experts also played an important role either in the committees or as senior
consultants for the plenipotentiaries, Stein (Prussia) being perhaps the most
conspicuous example.
According to the Peace of Paris, the congress was to open on
1 October 1814. Because of the difficulties mentioned above, and
especially because of the interventions of Talleyrand (on 30 September and
5 October), the Four and then the Eight decided on 30 October that the
plenary sessions would be postponed. The official opening of the congress
was now declared to be 1 November.
During the first weeks of the congress – and in the absence of a
precise, detailed agenda – the activities were disjointed; the higher councils
continued their negotiations (already under way before Vienna) on the most
intricate issues (such as Poland and Saxony, and the corresponding
territorial questions); the committees were busy with their own
organization, appointments, and limited agenda; numerous bilateral or
small group discussions were meeting in parallel with the congress and, last
but not least, the delegates occupied themselves with all sorts of
entertainment and intrigues. The committees held numerous meetings and,
in general, were in a position to present their conclusions and proposals by
February; it remained only for Gentz, as the head of the drafting committee,
to fit the separate agreements into the pattern of a Final Act, a task he
successfully performed between February and June 1815.
The sequence of events and successive rounds of negotiation that

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constitute the story of the Congress of Vienna were dominated by the

crucial question of remapping the European states and territories. The map
of Europe had been entirely remodeled by Napoleon through his successive
military victories; at Vienna the objective was to get rid of those changes.
Rather than restoring the pre-Napoleonic frontiers, however, the intention
was to take a fresh view as to how new territorial arrangements could be
associated with such concepts as “equilibrium” or “balance of power.” This
inevitably raised the question of (re)defining the status of Poland, which
inevitably raised the question of Saxony and Prussia, which inevitably
raised the problem of “compensations.” These three dimensions were
linked: redefining Poland (only partly reconstructed by Napoleon when he
formed the Duchy of Warsaw) meant a loss of territory for Austria, Prussia,
and Russia, which in turn set a requirement for a full or partial
recomposition of Saxony, which again entailed territorial compensations,
notably for Austria (its sights set on Italy and Illyria), and Prussia (keen to
expand into Germany). These were all backward-looking implications of
forward-looking solutions.
At the higher level, the first few months of the congress were spent
on the key question of Poland and Saxony; these were complex
negotiations that evolved in several stages showing positional shifts (see
Figures 6.1a and 6.1b). Having solved these questions in January 1815, and
following preliminary discussions and committee work, the higher levels
turned their attention to the problems of Germany and Italy. A specialized
committee of Austria, Bavaria, Hanover, Prussia, and Württemberg had
been constituted on 14 October 1814 to deliberate on Germany, but
disagreements within the committee had caused its sessions to be
suspended as from the end of November. Negotiations were then held
bilaterally in small groups discussing many contradictory proposals, and a
new, enlarged committee was formed in April 1815; it arrived at an
agreement on 9 June, at the very moment of the Final Act.
The negotiations on Italy were interspersed with political and even
military developments involving Murat (king of Naples and brother-in-law
of Napoleon), Ferdinant (king of both Sicilies), Lord William Bentinck, and
Prince Eugene (viceroy of Italy). In fact, as the fate of Murat was an
essential issue, the negotiations were led essentially by Metternich and
included emissaries of Louis XVIII (but not Talleyrand). Similarly,
negotiations over the other Italian territories were conducted in meetings
that included Austria, France, and Great Britain. Negotiations on
Switzerland led to an agreement on 29 March 1815.
On other questions, for example the redistribution of colonies, the
abolition of the slave trade, the Jewish community in Germany, the

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navigation of international rivers, and the problems of diplomatic

precedence, there were discussions by the Four or the Eight, committee
meetings, and frequent parallel diplomatic negotiations that had started
before the congress and continued throughout its duration.
The Congress of Vienna was not interrupted by the escape of
Napoleon from Elba. Although some major protagonists left Vienna
(among them Wellington, who had succeeded Castlereagh in February
1815), some issues were yet to be negotiated, an important one being
whether there would be a comprehensive treaty assembling the conclusions
of the committees. The conclusion was that a Final Act would be drafted
and signed by seven powers at the only plenary session of the congress.
(Spain, although a member of the Eight, refused to sign because of
disagreement on the “rights of the Spanish Bourbons” to various Italian
principalities.) The Final Act contained 121 articles. After being presented
with the draft treaty the delegations were invited to sign the Final Act
separately. The numerous delegations of the congress had no choice but to
sign; only the Holy See and Turkey did not adhere to the Final Act.
The decisions on which the Four or the Eight had agreed were
embodied in the treaty, as were the arrangements worked out in the various
committees. Thus, there emerged from the negotiations a new map of
Europe with considerable territorial changes and the Napoleonic
distribution of frontiers having been eliminated. In particular, a kingdom of
Poland with a corresponding constitution was created; it was not a large
territory, as Krakow was given the status of a free city and Austria and
Prussia each obtained part of the territories they had claimed from the start:
the province of Galicia for the former, Posen for the latter. The territorial
composition of the Confederation of German States was another important
change to the benefit of Prussia. Italy was also the subject of territorial
rearrangements; the kingdom of Holland was given authority over the
future Belgium; colonies were (re)distributed among some of the
participants.

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS

Figure 6.1a – Proximities or oppositions of stakes, interests, and postures

of the five major protagonists at the Congress of Vienna on the question
of Poland: initial preferences and positions (before the opening of the
congress).

Notes
(A) Castlereagh’s initial preference was for a truly independent and strong Poland,
which implied granting her a large territory. Austria and Prussia would be
“compensated” (Prussia gaining Saxony and part of the Rhineland).This was
opposed by the other powers (in August 1814). This – in addition to
Talleyrand's efforts to move closer to Alexander (June-July 1814) – made
Castlereagh change his plans: he convinced Talleyrand to side with Great
Britain and to work toward an alliance with Austria and France opposing
Prussia and Russia. (This new alliance materialized only after the “crisis” of
the congress following the dispute between Metternich and Alexander in
November.)
(B) Metternich’s initial position was to prevent Russia from obtaining Poland. He
was mainly preoccupied with Italy and Illyria. He was not opposed to Saxony
being given to Prussia. He was in disagreement with the preoccupation of
members of his delegation (Stadion, Schwartzenberg) with the growing
influence of Prussia. He shared with Prussia “common fear of France and, still
more, of French ideas” (Taylor 1948, 40).
(C) Prussia’s main preoccupation and priority was to obtain Saxony and (in line
with the wishes of King Frederick William III of Prussia) to align Prussia with
Russia on Poland.
(D) Alexander’s strong intention was to create an enlarged Poland under Russian

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influence and to grant her a liberal constitution.

(E) Talleyrand’s position on Poland derived essentially from his suspicion and
fear about any increase in power on the part of Russia and Prussia.
Considering that a large independent Poland was not realistic in the prevailing
conditions, he was in favor of maintaining the status quo, which would also
prevent the partition of Saxony.

Events
1. June-July 1814: Talleyrand approaches Alexander.
2. August 1814: Metternich, Hardenberg, and Alexander oppose the Castlereagh
plan.
3. September 1814: Talleyrand tries to convince Metternich to support Saxony.

Figure 6.1b – Proximities or oppositions of stakes, interests, and postures

of the five major protagonists at the Congress of Vienna on the question of
Poland: position shifts at Vienna.

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS

Phase 1:
 1/a Castlereagh attempts to convince Alexander to renounce the plan to
recreate a large “independent” Poland. He fails (September-November
1814).
 1/b Castlereagh then tries to put pressure on Alexander by presenting a
“united front” with Hardenberg and Metternich in October.
 1/c Metternich sees the emperor. This leads to a breakdown of the
relationship between Metternich and Alexander (31 October).
 1/d Talleyrand tries to convince Castlereagh to prevent the partition of
Saxony (October).
Phase 2: Hardenberg presents a proposal (27 November). Krakow and
Thom to be declared neutral; Prussia to gain the whole of Saxony.
Metternich opposes this scheme. Alexander maintains plan (21 November).
Phase 3: Talleyrand presents a new scheme (19 and 26 December) against
“annexation of Saxony,” gets support from minor German States, persuades
Castlereagh and Metternich to sign a secret treaty (3 January 1815). War is
just avoided.
Phase 4: Under pressure, the Five agree on a compromise arrangement on
3 February 1815.

PROCESS

Three subsections each deal with a major factor behind the process: stakes,
interests, and power; the human setting; and the strategic game.
As far as stakes, interests, and power are concerned, the intentions
and objectives (and hence posturing and strategies) of any negotiation are
related to the confrontation of the actors’ stakes and the interests that lie
behind them. Given the correct power balance, negotiation is the bridge that
will lead from separate or even conflicting stakes and interests to
convergence; at the end of the negotiations, the initial zone of non-
agreement will become a zone of agreement. Applying these concepts to
the Vienna negotiations makes it possible to decode the elements and forces
that laid the path from the beginning of the congress to the Final Act eight
months later.
The major actors clearly had both common and separate stakes in
the negotiations. 1 In common they had the need and desire for “repose” and
––––––––––––––
1
At Vienna there were more than the “major actors” (in this chapter, “the Five”). Covering
them all in the analysis would prove extremely burdensome and complex. Furthermore, the
“dominance” of the Five was such that it makes sense to restrict the analysis to them.

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a return to peace, as well as the procedural need to finalize the seven

treaties that had already come into existence since the end of 1813. If one
looks beyond the commonly shared need, however, two major sources of
differences are revealed. The first concerns the meaning, content, and
objective of the form of justice that would be the basis of future European
relations. Would there be “a permanent equilibrium based on a global
balance of power” (Castlereagh); a system devised to restore “order,”
secure dynastic legitimacy, and prevent further territorial changes
(Metternich); a way to make an enlarged Prussia the leader of the German
Confederation and prepare for German unification (Hardenberg); an
idealistic (and subsequently a “holy”) system to preserve some of the
results of the eighteenth century Enlightenment while permitting Russia to
control Poland and leave open its eastern frontier (Alexander); or the
restoration of France as an equal partner in Europe and a partner in new
alliances (Talleyrand)? Clearly the major actors' expectations, born of the
stakes they held in the negotiations, were not unified. The path to
reconciling these differences was neither linear nor simple. It is generally
agreed that none of the actors’ separate expectations were fully met; yet a
compromise was finally reached in the form of a new system of diplomatic
relations in European affairs which came to be known as the “conference
system” or “the Concert of Europe” (see below).
The second source of differences was the question of the territorial
“remapping” of Europe. The stakes involved in such a redistribution were
obviously very high: each protagonist embodied a desire for extension or
conservation of territory for both security and dynamic reasons. An
interesting feature of the Congress of Vienna is that so many territorial
issues were linked one to another that it proved extremely difficult to solve
a single one without assembling the whole puzzle. The stake was to
conserve, gain, or restore power and security; the interest behind this was
expressed in terms of concrete claims over well-defined territories or states.
It is perhaps the way the Polish issue presented itself and how it was solved
that shows the negotiation process at Vienna in the best light. Interests were
formulated in terms of successive proposals that combined claims to
acquire territories and counterclaims to prevent others from gaining control
of them. See Figure 6.1a and Figure 6.1b which illustrate this pattern that
characterized the congress negotiations. The tables summarize, albeit too
succinctly and hence imperfectly, an extremely intricate sequence of
events, maneuvers, shifts and turning points, episodes of cooperation and
confrontations, advances and regressions, but, in the end, the attainment of
a compromise. In terms of process analysis, these developments point to
several considerations. The human factor as well as the fluctuations in

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strategies are analyzed below. What may retain our attention at this
juncture is principally the interference between such factors as subjective
preferences, external circumstances, and the role of time. As was seen in
Figure 6.1a and Figure 6.1b, the Vienna negotiations, at least those
concerning Poland and Saxony but also those on a number of other issues,
such as the German Confederation or Italy, started with different
motivations, expectations, and intentions on the part of the major actors.
A first observation would be that the actors did not share the same
degree of involvement. Once their major objectives were seen to be
attainable – security and exclusion of maritime rights for Castlereagh;
reinsertion into the Concert of Europe and minimal concessions on frontiers
for Talleyrand – the British and French representatives realized that the
stakes of the negotiation were not as essential for them as for the three
other partners, especially Russia and Prussia. According to Nicolson
(1946), France had little to lose at the Congress of Vienna, having already
abandoned her conquests under the Peace of Paris. She also had much to
gain, however, namely, her position and influence as a Great Power.
Regarding Castlereagh, Nicolson comments that Great Britain could be
seen as occupying a neutral or even mediatory position, as it had no
previous obligations in the matter and no direct interest in either Poland or
Saxony. In contrast, Metternich (although seeing himself as a mediator or
intermediary between Alexander and the others but above all between
Alexander and Hardenberg) viewed the negotiation as a high-stakes
situation. Not only was there a difference in the size of the stakes but also a
problem of making them compatible. This proved very difficult, as shown
by the sequence of events from October to December 1814. The crux of the
problem was to lower the demands and expectations of Prussia and Russia;
Metternich tried this by maneuvering, Castlereagh by combining persuasion
and pressure, and Talleyrand by confronting the adversaries with a new
coalition capable of envisaging an armed conflict. The “crisis” became a
turning point in the negotiation, the result of which was the compromise
arrangement of February 1815 reproduced in the Final Act.
It was therefore a superposition of superordinate (common) goals,
diplomatic maneuvering, and power factors that cleared the way for a
compromise. Power, its sheer weight and successive shifts, was certainly
closely linked to armed strength. Alexander was the most powerful actor
before the Vienna congress on account of his victories in Russia, although
Castlereagh after Vitoria and Waterloo, and Metternich with his large army,
could subsequently challenge this leadership. Power, however, also has
other components: in spite of some controversial personal traits or
behaviors, Talleyrand became a prominent figure in the congress because

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of his negotiating skill, his lucidity and vision, his cleverness in finding and
uniting allies, and his resourcefulness in making the most of social events
and personal connections and relationships. This illustrates how weakness
in tangible power sources, and even perceived power, can at times and
under certain conditions be transformed into a more favorable negotiating
posture (Zartman and Rubin 2000).
Constraints were another of the elements affecting the power
balance. This factor was particularly important in the case of Castlereagh,
who met strong home opposition in Parliament and finally returned to
London after the end of the Polish negotiations to be replaced by
Wellington. The other negotiators also had their problems with their
authorities at home, and Alexander both with his commanders and his
people. Similarly, it was not easy for Hardenberg and Humboldt to
disregard the attitudes of the younger generation and intellectuals in
Prussia. Moreover, plenipotentiaries, particularly those of the Austrian and
Prussian delegations, often had problems with their own teams over lack of
consensus. For at least some of the plenipotentiaries, however, notably
Talleyrand, the difficulties, hazards, and slowness of communications
(using the unusual channel of notes carried by messengers) were welcome
as they increased the distance and provided room for initiatives and
autonomy. A constraint of a different sort was the dependence on money:
Britain’s influence on its other allies also had to do with her generous
financing of war operations and the maintenance of their armies.
As far as the human setting is concerned, the Congress of Vienna
witnessed the dominating personalities and skills of the five
plenipotentiaries who negotiated in the names of their sovereigns. Although
it is recognized that, as individuals and as a select group, they exercised the
most influence over the process, they operated under the control of the
established powers with whom they continuously conducted discussions,
exchanged notes and instructions, and prepared decisions in an interactive
manner. The degree of autonomy, and therefore the room for maneuver,
was different for each: Russia was a case apart because Alexander was
simultaneously emperor and “his own plenipotentiary”; Talleyrand
prepared draft instructions himself and had them approved by Louis XVIII;
Castlereagh did much the same in his relationship with his prime minister,
Lord Liverpool, and with the Prince Regent; but Metternich seems to have
had a closer working relationship with Emperor Francis I of Austria than
Hardenberg had with Frederick William of Prussia.
Another type of influence was the role of the members of the
delegations. The real influence exerted by Count Nesselrode, Count
Razumovsky, and Baron Stackelberg (Russia), Count de la Besnardière and

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Dahlberg (France), Gentz (Austria), Lord Cathcart and Lord Stewart (Great
Britain), and Humboldt (Prussia) was often limited to specialized expertise.
Some members in or outside the delegations were influential because of the
ideas they supported – for instance, Stein – or because of their technical
efficiency – for instance, Hoffman – or because of their relentless passion
for a cause – for instance, Czartoriski. Commentators have also often
pointed to the influence of women, most prominent among them being
Talleyrand’s niece Dorothée, countess of Périgord, and Wilhelmine de
Courlande, duchess of Sagan, who was the origin, although not the main
cause, of the mutual distance between Alexander and Metternich. 2
Finally, among the factors influencing the negotiators was the
whole impact of the ambiance that surrounded and even characterized the
congress. The endless series of social events and festivities gave
opportunities to the negotiators, almost as a matter of course, to follow their
particular ways of discussing matters outside the formal setup of organized
meetings. Issues and positions were debated, argued, and decided in
bilateral, trilateral, or small group encounters here and there in Vienna
between dinners and dances. It is also important to note that these
negotiators not only knew each other very well but also shared the same
codes of etiquette and were all prominent members of a society in which
status, power, influence, and wealth were concentrated in a very small and
elite minority of personalities. It would be both nonsensical and
anachronistic to analyze the human setting of these negotiations without
understanding the social rules, traditions, ethics, and constraints that
constituted the basis not only of the personal and diplomatic relationships
but also of the political references of the time. For instance, although only
partly shared by Alexander, the idea that monarchy and the role of dynastic
ties were almost “natural” and constituted a superior system to a republic
goes a long way toward explaining so many episodes of the negotiations at
Vienna.
Such were the background factors in the human setting of the
congress. Certain personalities and skills emerged within this complex
context, however, and these personalities were extremely different. The
description of their traits is the subject of many publications. The
negotiators knew each other extremely well, they had common
acquaintances, they shared the same social festivities, they knew exactly
what role diplomacy could play in negotiations such as these. What is
––––––––––––––
2
For a vivid, although in part fictional, description of the love affair between Talleyrand and
his niece, Dorothée, see Waldeck (1995). This is the translation of a book that was first
published in the United States and awarded a French literary prize.

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important is the degree of proximity that characterized their relationships.

For example, Alexander's rapport – at least for a time – with Talleyrand
contrasts with his tense relationship with Metternich. Some, such as
Nesselrode and Talleyrand, were personal friends, while others, such as
Metternich and Alexander, were strongly and mutually antipathetic. In fact,
all had difficulty combining trust and mistrust as they all knew that
disinformation, secret clauses, half-truths or half-arguments, or objections,
as well as spying, were current practices, almost a rule of the game within
limits; yet these people belonged to the same “order” and shared common
ideals for Europe and thus, in the end, knew that they had to agree, even at
the cost of weak compromises. Often they would act secretly and behind
the others’ backs. Talleyrand goes as far as saying that they were
“frightened” of each other. These protagonists had strong personalities and
great intelligence. They also shared the same tendency to be inscrutable and
enigmatic.
A similar analysis could apply to their political or ideological
convergences; although they had different views, especially on Saxony,
they came to share a similar vision about Poland and agreed on similar
“principles” relating to the restoration of the monarchy in France, as well as
a profound distaste for the ideas of the French Revolution. This made it
easier for Austria, France, and Great Britain to constitute the secret Triple
Alliance in January 1815.
Metternich once described himself as “bad at skirmishes but good
at campaigns.” He was ingenious but deceitful, often hesitant and playing
for time, attached to compromises, with a distaste for extremes; he had
great talents as a diplomat although he was inclined to resort to complicated
maneuvers and was often “wordy and superficial,” according to Talleyrand;
even though he was denied, for example, by Wellington, the stature of a
statesman, his vision of a “society and nations” was insightful. He
contributed much to the concept of the “Concert of Europe.”
Alexander was moved by strong sentiments of pride and
mysticism. 3 Influenced by proponents of “liberation,” he saw himself as
both a “conquering soldier” and a Christian theocratic leader. As a
negotiator he was not easy to deal with: moody, secretive, sometimes
provocative, impertinent, or violent, often uncertain, and incalculable. He
had to contend with his own emotional instability, but many commentators
recognize his great gifts and his sensitivity. He was the dominating figure
in Europe until his image suffered from his behavior in July 1814 in
––––––––––––––
3
For Alexander, the legitimacy question, on which his convictions were opposed to those of
Talleyrand, had a “mystical” meaning. See Arkhanguelski (2000, 250-59).

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London, his quarrel with Metternich, and the instability of his relationship
with Talleyrand. His scheme of the “Holy Alliance” also contributed to his
loss of influence.
Castlereagh was seen by his fellow negotiators as being somewhat
aloof, imperturbable, enigmatic, well-mannered, and showing great tactical
skills. In common with Metternich, he had a taste for moderation and, ever
the perfect diplomat, he showed a great ability to adjust to changing
circumstances while sticking to his guns. Although he had to face strong
opposition at home, he did not hesitate to maintain a degree of autonomy.
Influenced by the philosophy of Pitt, he was the negotiator who best
formulated the concept of “just equilibrium,” but he is also considered as
not being fully realistic.
Finally, Talleyrand was a person who inspired both admiration and
distrust. His main assets as a negotiator were his sense of vision, his ability
to argue, his capacity to react with “elasticity and speed,” and the care he
took to arrive at a negotiation fully prepared. He was a conciliator and a
realist; at the same time he believed in constant maneuvering and was
considered by many as versatile (as his career showed), at different times
baffling, cunning, opportunist, and cynical. He is often accused of
corruptness. His main contribution to the Congress of Vienna was the
strength with which he defended the twin principles of “legitimacy” and
“public law.” He was able to play a significant role in the negotiations,
although his position was unfavorable at the start, by combining a lucid
analysis of the conditions of the times, well-prepared interventions, a gift
for argumentation and persuasion, as well as a capacity to adjust to
circumstance, to combine firmness and flexibility, and to design
appropriate strategies that, according to Nicolson (1946, 154), were based
on a “sense of proportion and the sense of occasion.” In several cases
Talleyrand was imaginative and offered solutions to break impasses. True,
he inspired mistrust in most of the protagonists, yet they considered him as
a major actor of the congress, a negotiator whose skills they would
recognize (although these judgments must be evaluated within the context
and moral framework of the times).
As far as the analysis of the Vienna congress negotiations as a
strategic game is concerned, the negotiators, in order to meet their
objectives, devised different strategies based on a variety of moves and
instruments. These can be regrouped into four main categories: coalition,
power, principle, and devices. The Quadruple Alliance was both a military

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and a political coalition. 4 Once victory over Napoleon was secured, it

became the instrument by which the congress was to be organized and
directed. The ambition of the Four was to keep its direction under their own
control. Acting unilaterally as a group with a shared, identical, and
immediate military need was considered a winning strategy that would
make the whole of Europe adhere to its principles and decisions. 5 Yet the
negotiations were dominated by the strategic game of issue-linked and
opportunistic coalition making and counter-coalition making and, at the
same time, the actors were constantly preoccupied with measures to avoid
finding themselves in a minority.
Even before the congress assembled in Vienna, the coalition had
had to deal with two major challenges: internal disagreement on procedures
and Talleyrand’s success in opposing the coalition scheme. Talleyrand
played a role in the formation of two different types of coalition that were
used as a strategic device. The first was in relation to the distinction
between the “great powers” and the “smaller powers” (“sous-alliés”) that
allowed only the former to have decision-making authority. As he was not
yet admitted to the first group, Talleyrand managed to rally the members of
the second group to contest the ambitions of the dominant coalition,
winning him (but not them) a place among the great powers. Talleyrand
used a coalition-making strategy for a second time to change the pattern of
alliances. This happened in the last months of 1814 when, with the help of
Castlereagh, he succeeded in forming a three-member coalition of Austria,
France, and Great Britain against the alliance of Prussia and Russia. This
counterstrategy was formalized in January 1815 in the secret Triple
Alliance Treaty.
Gaining or maintaining power was a constant strategy of the
protagonists to ensure that their views prevailed. As mentioned above,
power at Vienna was closely connected with current or potential military
power. The capacity to mobilize numerous and efficient forces was used as
a means of pressure and even as concrete threats (in December 1814, for
instance). Other sources of power were also used strategically, a case in
point being financial resources, which were a major asset for British
diplomacy (as already mentioned) in the pre-Vienna Treaty of Chaumont.
Another less obvious, but nevertheless effective, use of power was the
capacity to take advantage of personal connections and social activities.
––––––––––––––
4
The Grand Alliance or Quadruple Alliance was formalized at Chaumont (1 March and
9 March 1814). The treaty detailed the objectives of the four great powers. The alliance held
for twenty years after the cessation of hostilities.
5
This was clearly formulated in the Alliance Protocol of 20 September 1814.

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Power was also derived from “principles” and negotiating ability.

The process of negotiations at Vienna was very much influenced
by the emergence of concepts and principles of justice that constrained the
negotiators to finally agree on decisions that they would not have made,
had they not taken these concepts and principles into account. The notion of
“common interests” was often at the forefront of the discussions, but the
major concepts dominating the negotiations were “just equilibrium”
(Castlereagh), “order” (Metternich), and “legitimacy” (Talleyrand). These
concepts, analyzed below, raised several controversies; they were used
strategically, and their impact was crucial to the outcome of the
negotiations and to future developments.
Of the common integrative devices used as part of the negotiation
strategies, the most frequent technique was trade-offs and compensations,
sometimes hard to separate from distributive bargaining, especially where
territory was concerned. The negotiators used persuasion as a means of
bringing people to arrangements, but when persuasion ran up against its
limits, other means such as pressures, threats, and escalation were invoked.
The negotiations proceeded mostly by proposals, often designed to clarify
the situation, which were considered as “flying a kite,” or by making
tentative efforts to test reactions, thus opening the way to counterproposals.
Negotiators proved generally ready to adjust to changing situations,
combining both flexibility and firmness. When this was not the case, it led
to deadlock and even crisis. The “spirit of compromise” was often present,
however, as a powerful adjunct to persuasion.
As the substance of the negotiations involved territorial questions,
distributive orientations were inevitable. Negotiators did not hesitate to
redistribute territories and status as if they were pieces of a gigantic puzzle
in an effort to give every party some minimal satisfaction although, in the
process, they often neglected the will of the people or the lessons of history.
Intrigue contributed to a distributive atmosphere. Metternich and
Talleyrand worked behind the scenes, distorting information, showing a
preference for secrecy over transparency. Many anecdotes relate to these
stratagems that were all the more feasible because the whole atmosphere of
the congress was a fertile ground in which they could flourish.

ASSESSMENT

There are many angles from which to assess negotiations such as the
Congress of Vienna: inter alia, history, political science, international

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relations, and social psychology, not to mention literature and fiction. 6 The
assessment here is derived from negotiation analysis, where the focus is on
the achievements that these negotiations have made, the deficiencies,
weaknesses, or controversies they have raised, and the lessons that can be
learned as a result. In pursuing this analysis, the guideline is whether the
Congress of Vienna negotiations were forward looking and to what extent,
as well as how and to what extent some of their characteristics are still
relevant to modern times.
Most scholars and diplomats agree that the negotiations at Vienna
and their outcome should be credited with having laid the foundations for
several decades of peace in continental Europe. True, the continent
witnessed several local if more limited wars – for example, in Spain and
Greece – to which one could add the occasional colonial or external
expeditions – for example, to Algeria and Mexico. Yet, the fact is, that for
more than half a century from the Congress of Vienna to the Austro-
Prussian war in the late 1860s and the Franco-German war in the early
1870s, no new major conflagration involving the powers in Europe either
directly or indirectly took place. 7 Hence, one of the more substantial aims
of the congress (repose/peace/security) was indeed achieved, even though
some questions may also be raised in this respect, as indicated in the next
section.
On the credit side of the congress, and much in line with the
fundamental questions raised in this book, is its attempt to embody, both in
the negotiations and in the Final Act, a series of principles which, while not
entirely immune from second thoughts and from power or opportunistic
considerations, served as guidelines or actual constraints. These principles
were not really invented at Vienna, as the ideas had appeared in the
literature and philosophies of the eighteenth century Enlightenment and
were formulated in such concepts as “common interest,” “just equilibrium,”
“public international law,” and “legitimacy.” Formalized in a treaty that
practically all Europe accepted, these concepts of justice can be seen as an
effort to frame the relations between nations in respect of rules and
practices, an effort that is certainly forward looking and that is still in
search of appropriate formulas and reformulations at the present time.
This credit granted to the congress also has its limits. Awareness
and formulation of principles is a necessary first step, but the real issue is
their relevance and the appropriateness, and principally the value, of such
––––––––––––––
6
See Dupont (1996) and Zartman (1994) for a general analysis of the negotiations process.
7
Some political analysts put the Crimean War (1854) as the end date of this continental
peace.

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ideas. In discussing the matter of the “new order” in Europe formulated at

Vienna, we shall again have to raise some intricate questions.
The Vienna negotiations, while not really the origin of the
farsighted concept of the conference system, were at least at the beginning
of an awareness of it. Moreover, this system was in effective operation, as
planned, for only about a decade. The idea of a conference system implied
that the main powers would organize periodic conferences to review the
implementation of the treaties, exchange views on the state of international
affairs, and in that way prevent the possibility of a resurgence of armed
conflict. Although this was later to become a topic of great significance and
still is today, the conference system also dealt with the problem of
“guarantees,” on which it was unable to agree. The concept of treaty
guarantees may appear natural and simple; yet there is a fair distance
between the principle and its actual implementation, limits, and contents.
At Vienna the issue was complicated by the attempt in the last days of the
congress to enlarge the Final Act to include other dimensions; this later led
to the Alliance Solidaire and the “Holy Alliance,” along with the important
matter of what support to give to the existing dynasties, a cause to which
Alexander was much attached and that created some confusion. Hence,
many questions arose that are still burning issues today. Should there be a
recognized right of intervention of external actors in certain domestic
situations that violate (or are seen to violate) “internationally agreed”
principles or even “policies”? What kind of interventions or pressures can
be envisaged? The congress did not solve these problems; nevertheless, it
did not ignore them altogether, and that makes Vienna a milestone in
diplomatic doctrines and practices. So complex and delicate were these
problems that the conference system did not, in fact, materialize. The next
meeting was held at Leibach in 1821 at a time when localized armed
conflicts were in full swing in northern Italy and Greece; that meeting
foreshadowed the end of the coalition structure. A final meeting was held at
Verona in 1822.
Closely connected with the principles and the concept of the
conference system is the notion of the European concert. Views on whether
this was a real achievement, simply a convenient formula without much
content, or, more importantly, a factor of unequivocal progress are still of
significance today (see, for instance, Pantilla 2001). Other points that need
further examination include the meaning and validity of the “balance of
power” and “just equilibrium” concepts and the impact of the concert on
future European developments, such as the opposition or reconciliation of
“order” and “progress.”
What was meant by “balance of power” and “just equilibrium” is

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best explained by the difference of opinion between Castlereagh and

Talleyrand. 8 For the former, “just equilibrium” which should be the
cornerstone of the negotiations (“the first object of attention” leaving
“minor points of interest subordinate to this great end”), 9 was a broad
concept defined as a balance of power ensuring – through military strength,
diplomatic influences, and economic factors – that no state could exert
leadership in continental Europe and that a state could thus be prevented
from launching a war against other states. It was “just” because it was an
“ideal” derived from clearly identified sources of power and so designed as
to be the best way to attain stability. As, at the start of the negotiations, this
balance did not exist, it followed that the negotiating process had to focus
on territorial and state arrangements (notably in regard to France, Holland,
Italy, Poland, Saxony, and the Rhine) that would establish countervailing
powers and influences, thus neutralizing any possible ambitions on the part
of the various states, notably France, and assuring “absolute equality of
power between all the states.” Talleyrand's views were different. He was
convinced that a “general equilibrium” was not only unrealistic but also
unnecessary. “Equilibrium consists in a relation between the power of
resistance and the power of aggression. If Europe were composed of States
so related to one another that the minimum of resisting power of the
smallest were equal to the maximum of aggressive power of the greatest,
then there will be a real equilibrium. But the situation of Europe is not, and
will never be, such. The only equilibrium that the present situation admits
is artificial and precarious and can last only so long as certain large States
are animated by a spirit of moderation and justice which will preserve this
equilibrium” (Nicolson 1946, 154-55). Thus, Talleyrand designed a
strategy of negotiation that partly conflicted with that of Castlereagh:
Poland should ideally be independent but as the conditions required were
not present, the “most advantageous solution” was to return to the status
quo after the last partition. This meant that the territorial (and political)
demands of Prussia and Russia should not be accepted for reasons not only
of “equilibrium” but also of “legitimacy” (in this case, regarding the king of
Saxony). Thus, one of the major facts about the negotiating process at
Vienna was the way this difference of opinion was circumscribed by these
two extreme protagonists, leading to a solution halfway between their
respective positions. Metternich gradually and finally agreed to this
compromise. Once the crisis of December 1814-January 1815 was
overcome, this proved acceptable also as a “forced” compromise by Prussia
––––––––––––––
8
This was clearly formulated in the Alliance Protocol of 20 September 1814.
9
Note from Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, 11 November 1814.

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS

and Russia. 10
Order was the second preoccupation of the congress, perhaps most
emphasized by Metternich and Talleyrand, and most questioned by
Alexander. For Metternich the future of Europe had to be organized on the
restoration and maintenance of “order”. This had first and foremost a
dynastic foundation (and from this perspective he was supported by
Talleyrand). This dynastic preoccupation explains why the Congress of
Vienna is sometimes called a “council of princes,” which is tantamount to
saying that the Europe of Vienna was to be a Europe of kings and
emperors, including mutual dynastic arrangements (existing ties and the
attempt to establish new ones) as a part of the process. Alexander had other
thoughts about Europe but again he found it necessary to agree. It had been
a constant preoccupation of Metternich’s that the congress should
encompass “the Austrian idea” based on the principles on which the
Habsburg Empire rested: “tradition, dynastic rights, and international
treaties” all this combining in the “rule of law” On this, there was no
possible compromise. So sensitized was the congress to this dimension that
it failed to understand (and to draw the implications and consequences of)
the surge of nationalism that would soon characterize nineteenth-century
history. The dynastic focus required “order,” that is, the repudiation of
ideas and movements advanced notably by the French Revolution; it also
meant that many of the negotiators had clear reservations about, or were
even opposed to, “liberation” or “progressive” ideas and movements that
were already emerging in many parts of Europe. It also led to the reputation
of the congress as having been “reactionary.”
The conflict arose from the opposition between the coalition and
Alexander over the regime to be applied to Poland. The Russian emperor
had in mind a “liberal and independent” Poland backed by a liberal
constitution and with a “Christian” orientation; this hardly accorded with
the pattern of arrangements emphasizing “restoration” and “order.”
Escalation during the last months of 1814 culminated in the switch in
coalitions and even went as far as threatening the continuation of the
congress. The difficulty of obtaining a balance between “liberation” and
“order” initially created ambiguity in the outcomes and subsequently led to
a gradual dissolution of the system.
Restoring peace and formulating certain farsighted concepts and
principles, even though neither was fully successful or immune from
––––––––––––––
10
Alexander's views at the start of – and during – negotiations were far away from this
solution. (It was probably accepted because of the renewed danger from Napoleon in March-
April 1815).

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ambiguity, were not the only items that are generally ascribed to the credit
side of the Vienna negotiations. An additional point, often recognized, is
that the congress showed some moderation and leniency vis-à-vis France;
in contrast, the situation was to become much worse for that country in the
Second Peace of Paris in respect of territorial questions, reparations, and
occupation. The congress also made a courageous and necessary effort to
seize the opportunity to tackle questions that might otherwise have been
ignored, such as the neutrality of Switzerland, the abolition of the slave
trade, the regime of international rivers, the reform of diplomatic
procedures, and the establishment of statistical data and standards. Putting
these on the agenda of the various committees led to advances, gave the
opportunity to engage in trade-offs, provided a basis for punctual
agreements, and prepared for future technical cooperation.
Political analysts have raised the question as to whether the
outcomes of the Vienna negotiations really did contribute to the stability of
Europe in the longer perspective. Was the balance of power reached at
Vienna – the “remapping of Europe” – an equilibrium that would prove a
sure and durable safeguard for the future? Vienna produced a shift in the
center of gravity of Europe that was accentuated in the last decades of the
nineteenth century. Was the equilibrium between the Five or, by extension,
the Eight an ideal distribution of power, or did it merely foreshadow later
disturbances? The question is not theoretical: there were diverging views
within delegations and in public and political opinion at home and, even
today, controversies on these points continue to divide political analysts.
Looking at less problematic questions and focusing more on the
negotiation process, several points can be addressed that show certain
limitations or deficiencies of the congress. The point has already been made
that there was evidence of a lack of preparation at the congress, and that a
dissymmetry was established between the great powers and the smaller
powers. An additional deficiency was the lack of transparency: in Vienna
the problem was not so much a lack of transparency as such (as confidential
diplomatic practices often prove useful) but the abuse of secret treaties or
clauses, to which should be added misrepresentation.
Diplomatic intrigues and personal rivalries also interfered with the
smooth functioning of the process. Double dealing, working behind the
scenes, maneuvering to destabilize or divide, threats and counterthreats
often characterized the behavior of negotiators. Territories were exchanged
as mere chess pieces to be used as trade-offs (“as beasts” wrote one
diplomat) without due regard for the habits and preferences of the
inhabitants or for historical or socioeconomic considerations. The concept
of “compensation” was indeed necessary to reach a global settlement, but

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS

the way it was applied remains problematic.

A final point, on which answers are difficult to formulate, is the
degree to which negotiators at Vienna had hidden objectives, ambitions,
and agendas in their minds. Nicolson, who has on the whole a positive
assessment of Castlereagh and Talleyrand, wonders whether in the former
the expressed intention of “common interest” and justice did not hide a will
to use the congress to reorganize Europe in such a way as to foster British
leadership by a combination of undisputed maritime power (maritime rights
were excluded from the negotiations), to create a somewhat divided
neutralized continent, and, at the same time, to provide for some form of
British isolationism. As far as Talleyrand was concerned, were the
principles of “public law” and “legitimacy” and his skillful maneuvering
during the congress mere stratagems or devices to prepare the future of a
strong and ambitious power that was beginning to get back on its feet?
Were Metternich’s real intentions to use the congress to consolidate the
currently dominant position of Austria in central Europe and gain absolute
control of part of Italy and Illyria? Was Hardenberg’s main, if not sole,
preoccupation to lay the foundation for the domination of Prussia over
Bavaria and other German kingdoms? Was Alexander’s support of an
independent Poland merely a device to gain control of a part of central
Europe and leave the door open for development of a future policy against
the Ottoman Empire? These are, in large part, speculations. Do they
deserve further analysis? They are, in any case, unanswered questions and
the subject of many controversies. Furthermore, how far is the distance, in
any negotiation, between expressed intentions and concealed intentions? Is
the stability of a solution obtained by an agreement, especially under a
compromise, a function of this distance? How are future developments a
mere reflection of this gap?

CONCLUSION

From the point of view of negotiation analysis, two terms sum up the
Vienna negotiations: complexity and ambiguity. The context and the issues
were complex, as were the structure, process, strategies, and outcomes. To
their credit, the Vienna negotiations represented a significant step forward
in clarifying the existing state of affairs. To unify a confused situation,
imaginative formulas embodied in principles, concepts, and precepts were
found and implemented, and the congress did succeed in re-establishing, at
least for a time, more stable conditions known as the Concert of Europe and
somewhat later as the conference system. A notion of more or less equal
partners – “a just equilibrium” – was devised, not in an ideal form but as a
partly stable system.

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Complexity led also to ambiguity. The “equilibrium” achieved

proved stable and, for most actors, acceptable, but was this only in the short
or medium term or even a circumstantial or temporary device? “Principles”
were laid down, but did they reflect real or hidden intentions? Were the
formulas essentially devised to define a line of least resistance as the only
way to reach a much-needed agreement? Was the Congress of Vienna a
relative success only because Britain and the continent were exhausted after
Napoleon? Was security obtained (and “restoration” and “order”
proclaimed) at the cost of ignoring ideas with a flavor of liberalism and
progress? Was the Congress of Vienna not ambiguous on the problems of
colonies, minorities, and smaller states? Were some assumptions made by
the various participants on the desirability of a given pattern of power in
Europe either unrealistic or lacking in lucidity (Taylor 1948, 41)?
Ambiguity applies also to the orientation of the congress. Was it
forward or backward looking? It was indeed farsighted in many respects,
especially in terms of principles and concepts, despite the recorded
limitations. It was backward looking because negotiators diagnosed the
future situation as a mere continuation of the past so that balance-of-power
considerations, territorial rearrangements, and compensations were at the
core of the process while trust building and transparency of intentions were
relegated to a secondary role; moreover, at times, negotiators judged it
expedient to require the observance of the official principles by others
rather than by themselves. The idea of revenge and opportunism at times
dominated the thinking of some actors.
All in all, the Congress of Vienna was a typically mixed
negotiation, both distributive (strategies of power, threats, destabilization,
hard bargaining for concessions and compensation, and interpersonal
disputes) and integrative (references to principles, efforts to integrate
separate interests into some commonality, acceptance of moderation to
solve some intricate issues, frequent recourse to persuasion, logic-based
argumentation, appeal to “reasonableness” and realism, adherence to
consensus, attempts at mediation, and efforts to arrive at a balanced or
near-balanced agreement). Hence, the Vienna negotiations cannot be easily
or exclusively placed into either the peace or justice category; indeed,
placing them predominantly in either one or the other category is not really
convincing. It is perhaps more balanced to characterize them as forward-
looking but somewhat ambiguous negotiations that were, nonetheless, a
milestone in the long and arduous road toward constructiveness in
international affairs.

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APPENDIX: THE CHARACTER AND CONTRIBUTION OF TALLEYRAND

Talleyrand, minister of foreign affairs of the restored Bourbon king,

Louis XVIII, was the plenipotentiary for France. Many commentators, for
example, Nicolson (1946) and Schumann (1964), consider that this
diplomat, whatever one’s opinion on other aspects of his personality and
private life, showed great skill in negotiating in Vienna – meaning, in the
context of the time, his mixture of distributive and cooperative styles. The
judgment of Talleyrand’s performance is generally founded on the fact that,
given the very weak position of France at the end of the Napoleonic wars,
the outcome of the congress for that country was not a diplomatic defeat. It
must be noted, however, that this success should be tempered by the remark
– made by one of the leading commentators on Talleyrand – that even if
“Talleyrand played a role in Vienna that gave him a remarkably great
stature in history his action did not result in any practical consequences for
France” (Lacour-Gayet 1928, 823). These remarks raise the question as to
how much real influence Talleyrand had on the outcome of the congress; in
other words, the impact of his negotiating methods, as well as his
personality traits, behavior, style, and skills, on the negotiating process.
A characteristic of the negotiating skill of Talleyrand was his
emphasis on the importance of rigorous preparation. 11 Talleyrand's views
of what constitutes good preparation are detailed in his memoirs. He insists
on the necessity of the negotiator being fully aware of the context (“the
circumstances”) and of clearly defining the main lines along which the
argumentation should be organized and defended, in this case that “France
wanted only what she had, that she had frankly repudiated the heritage of
conquest,” that she was in favor of “moderation” and that “if she wanted to
be heard in Europe it was in order to defend the rights of the others against
all forms of invasion" (de Talleyrand [1891] 1996, 206, and 340).
The instructions that the plenipotentiary was to receive before
joining the congress were prepared by Talleyrand himself, and this is
considered a nice illustration of intelligent preparation for an international
conference. In particular, when setting objectives, Talleyrand took account
of the interests of others; having had the opportunity to become acquainted
with the future protagonists, he was able to anticipate the likely zones of
disagreement; finally, he prioritized objectives for the difficulties ahead in
reverse order. Preparation also meant the choice of the members of the
delegation and giving each an assigned (but not communicated) role, not
––––––––––––––
11
On several occasions Talleyrand showed his surprise at the lack of preparation of the
other actors, which he calls – to borrow an expression of Castlereagh’s – a lack of
“methodizing.” See Nicolson (1946).

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forgetting those who he thought might play an unofficial but active

function. In a complement to the preparation of the talks, Talleyrand was
awarded heightened status (Prince of Bénévent), a not-insignificant social
advantage at that time.
The activity of the diplomat followed a planned sequence:
obtaining information, cultivating social contacts (Metternich, Nesselrode),
and asking to be granted the position merely of “observer” at the
preparatory meeting on the organization of the congress. This was obtained
more for reasons of diplomatic civility than for anything else. Yet it proved
to be a key element of strategy because Talleyrand had anticipated that the
first major goal should be his presence in a committee of the coalition: it is
within this structure that he showed a great ability to argue and persuade.
Although he showed a gift for improvisation, his interventions were, in
fact, often the result of long prior meditation in a relaxed atmosphere.
As a negotiator Talleyrand was able to design strategies appropriate
to the case. This was the recourse to “principles.” “I shall be soft and
conciliatory but positive, advancing nothing else than principles and never
departing from them.” These included “public law” and “legitimacy.” His
shrewdness was to invoke principles for others rather than for himself. He
also decided to stick to his proclaimed course of conduct by refusing
“deals.” 12
Other facets of his style were his self-imposed rigor in drafting
documents and his gift for organizing social events, which became an
integral part of the congress. The Kaunitz palace, which his delegation
occupied, rapidly gained a reputation as the place where it was important to
be invited and to be seen. Did Talleyrand, as many others at the congress,
have recourse to money to foster his policies? Although the facts are
somewhat obscure, it seems proved that he was “rewarded,” at least by
Murat, Ferdinant IV, the king of Saxony, and the margrave of Baden
(Barras 1896, 262).

––––––––––––––
12
One illustration is Alexander’s proposal to give way over Saxony in return for support on
Naples, to which Talleyrand replied, “You talk about a deal and I cannot concur. . . . You
are moved by your will and your interest, but as for me I am obliged to respect principles
and principles cannot be compromised” (de Talleyrand [1891] 1996, 286).

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Table A1 – Chronology of Events Leading up to the Congress of Vienna

Date Relevant Events

Year Day, Month Military Political Diplomatic
1812 3 December Napoleon
concedes defeat
after retreat from
Russia and
returns to Paris.
18-30 Convention of
December Tauroggen signed
(without
authority of
Prussian king)
between Russia
and Prussian
general, Yorck,
an ally of
Napoleon. Yorck
declares his corps
neutral, allowing
Russians to
defeat and pursue
French.
1813 28 February Russia & Prussia
sign the Treaty of
Kalisch against
France, their
coalition soon
joined by Britain,
Austria, and
Sweden. Prussia
restored to 1806
borders, losing
large section of
Prussian Poland;
gains Warsaw.
25 March War of liberation
from France, led
by Frederick
William III,
begins in Russia.

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 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS

Date Relevant Events

Year Day, Month Military Political Diplomatic
3 May Napoleon wins
the battle of
Lützen.
20 May Napoleon wins
the battle of
Bautzen.
1813 1 June Napoleon
accepts Austria’s
“good offices”
for an armistice.
4 June Armistice of
Pläswitz (first
until 10 July,
subsequently
extended to 10
August).
24 June Treaty of
Reichenbach
between Austria
(Metternich) and
Prussia
(Alexander I).
Four demands
are addressed to
Napoleon.
26 June Metternich and
Napoleon meet at
Dresden.
Napolean resists
Metternich’s
demands.
Metternich
presents four
new demands;
Napoleon
accepts Austria’s
mediation;
meeting at
Prague on 10

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS

Date Relevant Events

Year Day, Month Military Political Diplomatic
July; 10 August
as deadline for
the negotiations;
temporary
suspension of
military
operations.
10 July Prague
Conference
(without Great
Britain)
1813 21 July British Victory at
Vitoria (Spain).
The main armies
of the Allied
Powers are
unified.
21-30 Napoleon loses
August Battle of
Grossbeeren,
Katzbach, and
Kulm Victorious
at Dresden.
16 October Napoleon wins
the first battle of
Leipzig.
18-19 Napoleon is Saxony and,
October defeated at the thereafter, Italian
second battle of and German
Leipzig, the troops under
“Battle of the Napoleon’s
Nations”. command desert
to the allies.
2 November Napoleon Statesmen and
withdraws his diplomats gather
armies across the at Frankfurt.
Rhine.
4-8 Metternich

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 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS

Date Relevant Events

Year Day, Month Military Political Diplomatic
November announces the
“Frankfurt
Proposals”
through French
General Saint
Aignan by which
Napoleon would
continue to rule,
but within
France’s “natural
frontiers”.

1813 18 Caulaincourt
November (adviser to
Napoleon and in
favor of peace)
replaces Maret as
French Foreign
Minister a few
days after
Maret’s message
to Metternich.
5 December Caulaincourt
accepts the
Frankfort
Proposals. The
Allies do not
respond.
26 December Castlereagh
writes “A
memorandum of
cabinet” after
several
conferences with
Austria (Count
Lieven and
Baron von
Wessenbetgh)
and Prussia
(Baron von

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS

Date Relevant Events

Year Day, Month Military Political Diplomatic
Jacobi). In
December there
are tumultuous
debates in the
House of
Commons.
Opposition
(Whig) criticism
of Castlereagh.
28 December Castlereagh, on
his way to Basle
to meet the other
plenipotentiaries
of the alliance,
stops at The
Hague to try to
arrange “a
dynastic link
between Great
Britain and
Holland”
(proposed
marriage of
hereditary prince
of Holland and
Princess
Charlotte of
Wales). The
scheme later
fails.
1814 19-22 Metternich and
January Castlereagh meet
for bilateral
negotiation at
Basle. They first
disagree on the
military/political
diagnosis.
Metternich
considers that the
main problem

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 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS

Date Relevant Events

Year Day, Month Military Political Diplomatic
will not be
France but
Poland. They
discuss who
should succeed
Napoleon on
(regency under
Marie-Louise;
Alexander’s
proposal to
appoint
Bernadotte).
They reach
agreement on
several important
questions
(exclusion of
maritime rights
in future
negotiations;
Holland; the fate
of Saxony and
Prussia; the
concept of “just
equilibrium” and
“balance of
power”;
compensations).
1814 23 January Metternich and
Castlereagh visit
Alexander at
Langres. Austria
and Russia refuse
to arrange a
treaty and
proclaim a
“general
alliance” without
first solving the
Polish question.
Agreement
reached on some

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS

Date Relevant Events

Year Day, Month Military Political Diplomatic
less-important
issues: “former
frontiers”,
Holland,
maritime rights,
a congress to be
held at Vienna,
restoration of the
Bourbons.
5 February- Numerous battles Chatillon
19 March in eastern and Conference
southwestern opens, is
France (some suspended 10-17
favorable at first February (French
to Napoleon, victories);
then to the resumes 18
Allies). February, is
dissolved 19
March.
1 March Allies resume
offensive.
9 March Treaty of
Chaumont is
signed stipulating
the formation of
the “Grand
Alliance.”
31 March Allies occupy Capitulation of Treaty of
Paris. Paris. Talleyrand Chaumont
receives published.
Nesselrode and
Alexander in his
own house in
Paris.
1 April Talleyrand
convenes senate.
Provisional
government
installed.

140
 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS

Date Relevant Events

Year Day, Month Military Political Diplomatic
2 April Senate votes
abdication of
Napoleon.
4 April Caulaincourt and
Ney go to Paris
with offer of
abdication of
Napoleon in
favor of his son
(king of Rome).
Talleyrand has
discussions with
Alexander who
demands
unconditional
abdication and
suggests that a
kingdom be
given to
Napoleon, finally
Elba (later
refuses Tuscany).
6 April Senate votes a
new constitution
calling
Louis XVIII to
the throne.
8-10 April Caulaincourt,
Alexander,
Nesselrode, and
Talleyrand
negotiate issues
relating to the
fate of Napoleon
and Marie-
Louise.
11 April Treaty of
Fontainebleau:
“A Treaty
between the

141
CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS

Date Relevant Events

Year Day, Month Military Political Diplomatic
Allied Powers
and His Majesty
the Emperor
Napoleon” is
accepted by
French
plenipotentiaries.
12 April Napoleon
attempts suicide
(poison),
recovers, ratifies
the treaty.
16 April A convention is
signed, but the
future Louis
XVIII agrees to
the future Treaty
of Paris (30 May
1814).
23 April Napoleon starts
travel to Elba,
arriving on 4
May
27 April Castlereagh signs
not all but a few
clauses of the
treaty.
29 April Hardenberg The Hardenberg
presents a scheme stipulates
scheme for a that Saxony and
general the left bank of
settlement Rhine be given
to Prussia;
Austria be given
Tyrol and some
concessions in
Italy; Russia
would obtain
most of Duchy of

142
 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS

Date Relevant Events

Year Day, Month Military Political Diplomatic
Warsaw, except
Tarnopal and
Krakow (to
Austria); a
German
federation
constitution to be
drafted; minor
compensations
given to Bavaria.
Baden, and
Piedmont
(Alexander
refuses proposal,
demands Thorn
[held by Prussia],
first wants peace
treaty with
France);
Metternich also
objects.
9 May A conference of
the four allied
powers is
established.
9-21 May Negotiations
continue between
the allies,
notably on
Poland
(Krakow),
colonies,
monetary
provisions
(reparations), and
restitution of
works of art. On
21 May no
agreement is
reached. The
decision is taken

143
CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS

Date Relevant Events

Year Day, Month Military Political Diplomatic
to sign a treaty
with France
(without having
solved the
various
difficulties
between the
allies).
30 May First Peace of
Paris is signed.
June-July Allies agree that In London (“The Allied sovereigns
no military London and
action should Interlude” plenipotentiaries
start before the [Nicolson]), an meet in London;
congress antagonism start negotiations
convenes, develops on the date and
especially in between agenda of the
Poland and Alexander and congress to be
Saxony, Mainz, the other parties. held in Vienna.
and the left bank Also alienates The Polish
of Rhine. Talleyrand and question remains
Louis XVIII. The a key point of
possibility of an disagreement
alliance between Castlereagh tries
Austria and to set 15 August
France appears. for the opening
of the congress.
Alexander asks
for delay and
obtains 1
October as
starting date.
(Ministers would
meet prior to
opening.)
8 August Castlereagh
meets Talleyrand
in Paris. Warns
against alliance
between France

144
 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS

Date Relevant Events

Year Day, Month Military Political Diplomatic
and Russia;
obtains
Talleyrand’s
agreement.
24 August Castlereagh
seeks, without
success, to obtain
Hardenberg’s
agreement on an
agenda (Prussia,
Poland, etc.).

Table A2 – The Congress of Vienna

Date Relevant Events

Year Day, Month Military Political Diplomatic
July- Plenipotentiaries
September arrive separately
at Vienna
(Metternich had
been in Vienna
since 18 July),
e.g., Castlereagh
on 13
September,
Talleyrand,
Alexander, King
Frederick
William III
(Prussia) on 28
September. A
great number of
delegates from
various other
territories also
arrive.
13 September- The question of
1 October “small powers”
is raised.

145
CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS

Proposals
(Castlereagh)
and
counterproposals
(Hardenberg and
Humboldt) are
discussed.
20 September A compromise
scheme is
achieved.
30 September Talleyrand is
invited by
Metternich to a
“private
conference”
which, in fact,
proves decisive
for future
developments.
12 October The opening of
the congress is
postponed until
1 November.
1 November Negotiations of
1814 to 9 June the congress;
1815 drafting of the
Final Act starts
just before
Napoleon’s
return from Elba.
Treaty is signed
on 9 June 1815.
1 March Napoleon
escapes from
Elba.
March-June Napoleon after Second
arriving in Paris abdication of
starts new Napoleon (21
campaign that June). Napoleon
finally ends at is exiled to St
Waterloo (18 Helena.
June). Restoration of

146
 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS

Louis XVIII as
king of France
29 November Second Treaty
of Paris.
Second half of The allied and
1815 various chiefs of
state discuss
Alexander’s
proposal of a
“holy alliance”
(not signed by
Great Britain;
other Powers
merely
“adhere,” many
with
reservations).

REFERENCES

Arkhanguelski, A. 2000. Alexandre Ier, le feu follet. Trans. Wladimir Berelowitch.

Paris : Editions Fayard. (The book, in the original Russian, is published by
Vagrius, Moscow).
Barras, P. 1896. Mémoires, Tome IV. Paris : Edition G. Duruy.
De Talleyrand, C. M. 1996. Mémoires, Tome II, 206. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale.
(First published in 1891).
Dupont, C. 1994. La Négociation, conduite, théorie, applications. Paris : Dalloz.
Kaufmann, J. 1988. Conference Diplomacy, 2nd edition. Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Lacour-Gayet, G. 1928. Talleyrand, 1754-1838. Paris: Payot. (A new edition in
three volumes was published by Payot in 1930, 1946, 1979 and again in 1991.)
Nicolson, H. 1946. The Congress of Vienna: a Study in Allied Unity, 1812-1822.
Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers.
Pantilla, R. 2001. “The concert is back, and it seems to be working”, in
International Herald Tribune, page 8, 28 December.
Plantey, A. 1994. La négociation internationale. Paris : CNRS Editions.
Schumann, M. 1964. « Le pondérateur de l’équilibre, ou Talleyrand et sa
politique ». In Talleyrand, eds. J. de Lacretelle, J. Audiberti, A. Conte,
M. Dunan, L. Joxe, M. Missoffe, and M. Schumann, 243-77. Paris : Hachette.

147
CHRISTOPHE DUPONT AND PATRICK AUDEBERT-LASROCHAS

Taylor, A. J. P. 1948. The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918. London: H. Hamilton.

(Paperback in print: Chicago, III.:University of Chicago Press, May 1976.)
Waldeck, R. 1995. De pourpre et d’azur. Paris : Denoël.
Zartman, I. W., ed. 1994. International Multilateral Negotiation. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Zartman, I. W. and J. Z. Rubin. 2000. Power and Negotiation. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.

148
 CHAPTER 7

FRAMEWORKS AND METHODS 1

CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

Researchers in negotiation have stressed the importance of structuring their

findings into frameworks or models; concurrently they have developed
methodologies that are science – oriented, hence justifying the results
obtained by their research. Frameworks (including propositions) and
methods are the topics of this chapter.

FRAMEWORKS AND PROPOSITIONS

In this section a distinction is made between frameworks and

propositions. Frameworks attempt to capture a phenomenon in its entirety.
They identify relevant variables but are less deterministic and somewhat
looser than models in the identification of interactions among the variables.
Propositions relate essentially to the association between variables often
identified in frameworks. Among the frameworks discussed are those
developed by Sawyer and Guetzkow, Walton and McKersie, the processes
on international negotiation (PIN) program, and the approach taken by Lax
and Sebenius.

Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965)

This framework is still relevant; it is a point of departure for many research
efforts testing the validity of the selection and influence of the variables
mentioned; its design (organized by clusters of variables) has proven to be
useful to analyses of process dynamics. It is also of interest for practice
since it gives guidelines for information search and preparation of the
negotiation.
––––––––––––––
1
Translated and edited from Christophe Dupont, La Négociation post-moderne. Paris:
Publibook, 2006

International Negotiation: Foundations, Models, and Philosophies. Careers in Negotiation and Conflict
Management Research, Christophe Dupont. Aurélien Colson, Daniel Druckman, and William Donohue
(eds.) 149-169 © 2013 Republic of Letters Publishing. All rights reserved
 The original framework (1965) has been actualized and extended
by Druckman (1973,1977a). In its original and successive forms, the
framework consists of six groups of variables. These groups relate to a
particular moment of a negotiation distinguished as “antecedent”,
“concurrent” or “consequent” variables. The framework helps researchers
to capture the negotiation process either “ex ante” or “ex post”.
As shown in figure 1 and table 1, antecedent variables refer to
preconditions and background factors; concurrent variables relate to
process (e.g. information exchange, bargaining tactics, proposals) and
conditions (number of parties, time pressure, external events); “consequent”
variables are regrouped in “outcomes” (agreement or stalemate,
satisfaction) and “implementation” (stability, renegotiation).

Figure 1. The Sawyer-Guetzkow/Druckman framework

Source: Druckman (2005):31

This framework is popular. It has been used as an organizing

device for surveys of literature on negotiation (Druckman, 1973, 1977) and
such other topics as nationalism and war (Druckman, 2000), chapters in an
edited collection (Druckman, 1977a), case analyses (Ramberg, 1977;
Bonham, 1971), comparative, cross cultural studies (Graham et al., 1994),
and training materials (Druckman and Robinson, 1998, Druckman, 2006).
It has also guided the discussion of topics and assignments in classes on
international negotiation (e.g., Druckman, 1996). More generally, this mix
of research and pedagogical applications illuminates the value of
frameworks. This variety is due, at least in part, to the broad relevance of
the categories within the boxes as well as the substitutability feature of the
framework. Categories (or variables) can be added or subtracted depending
on relevance to the context and type of application. An intact structure (the
boxes) is complemented by a flexible set of variables (categories inside the
boxes).

150
 Table 1: List of variables

Preconditions (3): Preparation; issue structure (e.g. type, number, complexity,

framing; goals and incentives

Background factors (8): cultural similarities or differences; alternatives;

negotiator experience; relationship among parties; cognitive factors;
ideological factors; bargaining orientation; power dependency structure

Process (8): bargaining tactics; information exchange; proposals; concessions;

phases; impasses, turning points, role of affect

Conditions (6): time pressure; number of parties; third parties; open of secret
proceedings; constituent accountability; external events/context

Outcomes (2): types of agreements or stalemate; perceived satisfaction2

Implementation (4): renegotiation; stability; consequences for violation;

domestic/international support

Total: 31 variables
Source: Druckman (2005:31)

The idea of using a framework for case analysis is referred to as an

enhanced case study. This means that the framework is a lens for viewing
the conditions, processes, and outcomes of particular cases. Rather than to
analyze the case in terms of only a few concepts – such as power or
convergent bargaining – the framework-driven analyst seeks to capture
negotiating processes in a larger context. The exercise of moving between a
broad vision and details is useful. It gives cases theoretical relevance while
grounding concepts in an empirical bed of data. This interplay between
theory and data contributes to and advances the scientific study of

––––––––––––––
2
The term ‘outcomes’ can be defined or measured in several ways. This is noted by
Underdal (2002). First, outcomes can be defined by the observation that parties have agreed
(or not) and on the terms and conditions of the agreement. “Efficiency” is another way of
defining outcomes, for example on a Pareto efficiency curve or bargaining frontier. A third
definition stresses stability or the durability of an agreement when it is implemented,
including violation of its terms by one or more of the parties. A fourth definition focuses on
the optimality of pay-offs in relation to power and equity considerations. Still another
definition takes into account the distance between initial positions and the actual results,
distinguishing between tactical positions and expected results. The relation between
processes and outcomes may depend on the way that the outcome is assessed.

151
negotiation. It is the hallmark of teaching about research on the subject:
Student term papers consist of comparing two or more cases with a version
of the Sawyer-Guetzkow framework (see Druckman, 2010). Other
interesting examples of this approach are discussed in Druckman 2005
(chapter 6).

Walton and Mc Kersie (1965), with Cutcher-Gerschenfeld (1994)

This framework was first presented in 1965 and subsequently revisited and
enlarged (1994). The influence of the first framework, which depicts a joint
problem-solving process, is widely evidenced in the negotiation literature;
the revised version is an adaptation to changed realities. The revision is still
focused on labor-organizational negotiations but offers a wider lens by
adding several strategic elements. A major reason behind the extension of
the original framework was the need to adapt to changes in the workplace
since the eighties. As the authors state: “existing theories of negotiation,
including that proposed in the 1965 edition of Behavorial Theory, do not
fully address the paradigm-breaking nature of the current change efforts.”
(1994: 19). The authors observe that the two main actors of labor
negotiations – employers and unions – have fundamentally changed, hence
the need for a revised representation of negotiation processes and
outcomes.
The framework is based – like Sawyer and Guetzkow – on the
distinction and articulation of several sets of “forces” leading to
“outcomes”. This is shown in summary form in figure 2 and table 2.

Figure 2. The Walton – Mc Kersie – Cutcher-Gerschenfeld model (1994)

Source: Strategic Negotiations (1994):42

152
 Table 2. Detailed elements of the framework

Forces shaping negotiators’ choices

Desirability of change : anticipated objectives of initiating party and

responses (e.g. social contract objectives); priorities; impact on substantive
issues

Feasibility of change : anticipated responses of parties; relative bargaining

power, enabling factors

Negotiation processes : types of bargaining (integrative and distributive);

intergroup altitudes; management of internal differences

Negotiating strategies : types (forcing, fostering, escape)

Negotiating structures : frequency of interaction / number of channels;

individual and institutional levels; degree of centralization; number of
parties

Substantive outcomes : terms relating to issues such as wages, benefits,

rules, security

Social contract outcomes : meta-rules of the game such as commitment

versus cooperation
Source: Strategic Negotiations (1994): 42-60

This framework highlights an interplay among contextual and

situational forces, on the one hand, and strategies and structures on the
other. The role of power and strategy is emphasized more than in the other
frameworks reviewed in this chapter. Yet, despite its evident complexity,
the framework has been shown to guide empirical analysis as shown in the
fourteen case studies included in the 1994 book. These studies are also
examples of enhanced case studies.

The PIN Framework

The Processes of International Negotiations program (PIN) at the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) has adopted a
framework designed to help researches describe and analyze negotiations,
especially those related to international relations. It has guided analyses by
PIN researchers and served as a useful grid designed to improve the
preparation, conduct and post-evaluation of real negotiations. It consists of
five major elements (or components) that play a major role in the

153
negotiation. These five components are shown in figure 3 and are more
detailed in table 3.

Figure 3. The PIN framework

Source: derived from Kremenyuk, ed. (1991, 2002): 39-63, 71-126

Table 3. Elements of the different components of the PIN framework

Actors
Stakes, relationships, orientations, experience
Structure
Power balance (components, symmetries, degree of stability)
Strategies
Diagnosis, objectives, alternatives, modalities/types (e.g. integrative,
distributive)
Process
Initial positions, information exchange, communication patterns, arguments,
nonverbal behaviour, language, proposals and counterproposals, concessions,
tactics (cooperative, conflictual), third party interventions, phases
Outcomes
Agreement parts (types such as full, partial, or conditional agreement),
satisfaction level, implementation of agreement, issues to be renegotiated
Source: derived from Kremenyuk (1991,2002)

The PIN program illuminates another type of application for

organizing frameworks. The program uses the framework to provide
coherence for diverse projects, researchers, and audiences. Beginning with

154
the edited chapters in the original Kremenyuk book (1991), the program’s
steering committee has produced books in such areas as the roles of culture
and power in negotiation, environmental negotiations (including disputes
over water resources), approaches to multilateral cases, escalation
processes, justice vs. peace, formal models, professional negotiation
cultures, and preventive diplomacy. Although the framework is not made
explicit in many of these books, it provides a guide and common
vocabulary for authors from different disciplines and countries. A
particularly valuable contributions is the effort made by the editors to
introduce and integrate the contributions in each book.
This function served by frameworks extends the earlier effort by
Druckman (1977) to use the Sawyer and Guetzkow framework as an
organizing device for his book on social-psychological perspectives. The
PIN project expands this approach to a variety of themes. Looking back, it
would be interesting to use the PIN framework to organize the panoply of
book projects completed to date. Looking forward, it would be interesting
to use the framework to detect gaps in topic coverage for future projects.

The framework of Lax and Sebenius (1986)

This framework depicts negotiation in terms of functions, described as raw
material, dynamics, limits. They consider negotiator interests as essential
material reflected in stated positions but also influencing negotiating
techniques. Interestingly, they use the anatomical term ‘stapes’ (bones in
the middle ear that transmit sounds to the inner ear) to refer to the way
interests are reflected in the process of communicating. Value creating and
claiming are the dynamics, akin to the distributive-integrative bargaining
distinction made by Walton and McKersie (1965). This distinction has
resonated throughout the literature as the action/agent complement to the
descriptive distinction between competitive and cooperative bargaining. It
was differentiated more precisely by Odell’s (2002) strategic categories,
where various combinations of defensive and offensive posturing are
placed on a scale between the anchors of pure value claiming and pure
value creation. The BATNA concept is imported from Fisher and Ury
(1981) to define limits in concession making, known also as resistance
points.
The value creating/value claiming distinction is considered to be a
universal tension in attempts to resolve conflicts. Although negotiation is
an activity intended to produce settlements, negotiators prefer settlements
that favor their own interests. This dilemma is addressed by experienced
negotiators who will often demonstrate flexibility as evidenced by altering
their positions in the form of compromise or concession. A more creative
approach to flexibility is re-framing, where, rather than position change,

155
negotiators re-conceptualize the way that issues are defined. Ongoing
research on turning points suggests that re-framing is encouraged when
negotiators are limited by unattractive alternatives: The pull of weak
BATNAs keep negotiators in the game; the push of new ideas releases them
from the process with a good outcome. These sorts of empirical findings
draw attention to relationships between parts of the Lax and Sebenius
framework as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Lax and Sebenius Framework (1986)

Source: adapted from Lax and Sebenius (1986).

PHASES AND TURNING POINTS

Although the four frameworks summarized above are highlighted, the

contributions made by other approaches should not be overlooked. Two
themes in particular are relevant to both theory and practice. One focuses
on phases, the other on strategies. The three phases elucidated by Zartman
and Berman (1982) distinguish between the sequential activities of
diagnosing (pre-negotiation) conceptualizing (formulae) and bargaining
(details). Other renditions of the stage concept include Pruitt’s (1981)
distinction between distributive and coordinative activities, Druckman’s
(1986) distinction among monitoring, debating, and bargaining, and
Gulliver’s (1979) elaborate proposal of eight chronological stages. These
schemes share the ideas of sequential progression, alternating antagonistic
and coordinative behaviour, and partially overlapping stages.

156
 The transition between stages is punctuated by turning points.
Considerable progress has been made in understanding phase transitions.
Druckman’s (2001) three-part turning points framework distinguishes
precipitating factors (as external or internal) departures (as abrupt or non-
abrupt) and consequences (as escalatory or de-escalatory). The case-study
research has shown that departures occur often following negotiating crises.
This work has come a long way toward enhancing our understanding of
negotiation as a dynamic process. More recently, the research on turning
points has moved from retrospective case analysis (explaining known
outcomes) to proscriptive experimentation (predicting unknown outcomes)
(Druckman, Olekalns, and Smith, 2009; Druckman and Olekalns, in press).
Knowing how to produce a turning point, a forward-looking perspective,
addresses the problem of resolving impasses.

Propositions
Propositions are attempts to depict relationships among factors that are
thought to impact on negotiating behaviour or outcomes. Examples of
factors are shown in the various frameworks above. They include both
exogenous (in the context) and endogenous (in the process) influences. This
generally involves determining the influence of some variable on the
negotiation process or outcome. An examples of a proposition is: When a
negotiator is closely integrated with the group being represented, he or she
will be reluctant to concede or problem solve which, in turn, produces
impasses. Another example is that attitudes toward risk influence
cooperation, leading toward or away from agreements.
Other examples of propositions come from a vast experimental
literature on negotiating behaviour. Pruitt posited that coordination between
negotiators depends on motivation and trust. In his words: “Tracing the
origins of coordinative behaviour to a goal of achieving coordination may
seem obvious or even tautological. But it is a necessary feature of theory
because it allows us to relate various antecedents of this goal to the
incidence of coordinative behaviour and to say how trust interacts with
these antecedents” (1981: 16). He then presents experimental evidence that
generally supports this proposition. Bacharach and Lawler (1981) have
advanced that a negotiator’s power depends on how dependent he or she is
on the other party, this dependence being a function of two things: 1) the
existence of alternatives to achieve the outcome and 2) the value attributed
to this outcome. This leads to the conclusion that B’s power resides in his
or her relationship with A and to the alternatives to this relationship that are
available to B. B’s capacity to overcome A’s resistance depends on the
value that A attributes to the relationship and to the alternatives available to
A.

157
 More complex relationships among variables are found in recent
studies. Druckman, Olekalns, and Smith (2009) evaluated the propositions
that negotiating crises lead to impasses when negotiators have low affective
trust; however, crises produce progress toward agreements when trust is
high. In their archival analysis of speeches, Donohue and Druckman (2009)
posited and found that backward-looking (forward-looking) rhetoric
reduces (increases) trust that, in turn, leads to a lack of (fosters) progress
toward agreement. These studies illustrate the importance of variables that
mediate the relationship between an independent (IV) and dependent (DV)
variable: trust mediates the relationship between events or rhetoric and
outcomes. Similarly, in their study on peace agreements, Druckman and
Albin (2011) showed that equality mediated the relationship between
conflict difficulty (IV) and the durability of the agreements (DV). Equality
also mediated the relationship between procedural (or process) justice and
durability (Albin and Druckman, 2012).
The examples above are only a sampling of the sorts of
propositions that have been evaluated by empirical research. An ambitious
attempt to inventory variables explored and findings obtained over the past
four decades would no doubt uncover the extent to which certain
hypotheses are supported with some consistency while others are not. This
exercise was performed in a preliminary way with studies completed during
the 1960s and 1970s by Druckman (1973, 1977). A distinction was made in
that survey between replicated and non-replicated findings. A recent update
– based on a much larger literature – revealed that many findings are
counter-intuitive. For example: anger can be effective (produce
agreements) if directed at the issues and task rather than the other
negotiator; flattery can backfire (extend impasses) if it is perceived as
ingratiating. Another example: too much time spent on developing
alternatives to negotiated agreements can produce a self-centered negotiator
who hears only his/her own arguments. And, a third example: concessions
(softness) are more effective when preceded by toughness. These are some
of the surprises from research-generated knowledge. They also suggest
ways of improving practice.

METHODOLOGIES 3

The purpose of negotiation research is to arrive at a better understanding of

the various facets of this type of social interaction. The questions examined
cover a broad spectrum that includes what negotiation is (how it comes
––––––––––––––
3
Readers who would like to delve deeper into the subject of methodologies are advised to
consult more specialized sources, such as Druckman (2005) and Carnevale and De Dreu
(2006). See also Mesdagh and Buelens (2003).

158
about, when and why people negotiate, its basic components and what
makes it different from similar activities or processes), how it is conducted
and with whom (the negotiation process, its mechanisms and functioning)
and its outcomes and their consequences. Some disciplines, particularly
sociology, have extended the concept of negotiation and placed it within the
broader context of society. By comparing the various elements of
negotiation, researchers attempt to discover common factors, patterns,
causes, influences or interactions. Ideas derived from theories (or other
sources) must be defined precisely as part of a research design that guides
the conduct of the investigation.
A hallmark of negotiation research is the idea of structured
approaches to the production of knowledge. This entails clear definitions of
concepts, translating the concepts into variables, hypotheses about
relationships among variables, and the procedures used to evaluate the
hypothesized relationships. Based on the philosophical idea of falsification
(Popper, 1959), hypotheses are subject to refutation: confirmation of
hypothesized relationships depends on how often the hypothesis has
survived attempts at refutation. Confidence in the outcome of hypothesis-
testing is stronger for laboratory experiments than for other methodologies.
Thus, our discussion begins with an overview of the experimental method. 4

THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD

This method encompasses both laboratory and field research. In both

settings, an investigator usually seeks to explore the impact of only a few
independent variables on a variety of measures (dependent variables). The
objective is to discover causal relationships between the independent and
dependent variables. Confidence that causal relationships have been
discovered turns on the use of control groups, which are easier to establish
in the laboratory than in the field. For detailed treatments of this method in
the context of studies on negotiation, the reader is encouraged to consult
Pruitt (1981) and Druckman (2005, chapters 3 and 4), and Pruitt (2006).
The questions addressed in experiments typically have to do with
possible links between situation (e.g., teams vs. individuals, constituency
pressure) or process variables (e.g., distributive or integrative bargaining)
on the one hand, and negotiation outcome (e.g., impasse or agreements,
distributive or integrative outcome). on the other. Many experiments have
––––––––––––––
4
There are quite a few social science methodologies adapted for use in research on
negotiation. The emphasis in this section on experiments and case studies is based on their
popularity among researchers. For treatments of other methods the reader is encouraged to
consult Druckman (2005) and Carnevale and De Dreu (2006). Both these books are
reviewed by Donohue (2007).

159
been conducted to evaluate theory-derived hypotheses, largely in the
institutional context of universities with large groups of students drawn
typically from undergraduate classes in psychology departments. The data
are often analyzed with statistical techniques that meet rigorous
assumptions and provide a basis for making inferences to the larger
population of negotiators, or at least student negotiators. The results of
these types of studies are reviewed and validity issues are discussed in
Carnevale and De Dreu (2006) and at conflict management conferences,
notably at the International Association of Conflict Management (IACM).
A broad spectrum of research questions and hypotheses examined
with the experimental method can be found in articles reported in such
journals as Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, Group
Decision and Negotiation, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, and the International Journal
of Conflict Management. Examples of variables that have been manipulated
are:
- the type and intensity/gravity of conflict
- the negotiation task
- types of issues
- cultural and gender differences among negotiators
- the objective of the negotiation or the goals of the negotiators
- the negotiation structure (the number of parties, the composition of
- negotiator groups or delegations, the status of the negotiators, place,
time, formal or informal setting, and symmetrical or asymmetrical
bargaining power)
- the negotiators’ motivational orientations
- the other negotiator’s use of tactics, including threats, ultimatums,
deceit and casuistry
- the other negotiator’s language and concessions (magnitude,
sequence, reciprocity)
- time pressure
- availability of alternatives
The above list is only illustrative. It calls attention to the
considerable variety of factors that have been investigated in experiments.
We have learned much about the external and internal forces that drive
negotiation toward outcomes. These insights take on broader relevance
when they are placed in more general frameworks such as those discussed
earlier in this chapter. It is the combination of data collected and analyzed
from well-designed and implemented experiments and the synthesis of
findings in terms of a framework that renders the experimental method a
valuable technology for generating knowledge about negotiation. However,
this combination does not insure that the findings are applicable in

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particular negotiating contexts. Nor does it suggest practical relevance to
particular conflicts. A gap remains between laboratory-based knowledge
and the application of that knowledge.
One attempt made to bridge this gap is an approach to training that
utilizes experimental findings. The approach, introduced in an article by
Druckman and Robinson that appeared in 1998, is based on applying
thematic summaries of research findings to specific cases. Sixteen themes
have been used to organize the research: examples are achieving integrative
agreements, alternatives, time pressure, culture, power, representation,
turning points, and third party effects. Trainees or students review the
summaries, referred to as narratives, and respond to a set of discussion
questions focused primarily on counter-intuitive findings: for example,
anger is beneficial when it is not directed at the opposing negotiator but
used to signal commitment; cooperation or willingness to concede is more
effective following a period of competition or firmness.
The knowledge is then utilized with cases in a series of exercises
that provide experience in four roles: an analyst (understanding the case in
terms of selected narrative themes), a strategist (devising an approach that
resolves the issues), a performer (role plays in a negotiation simulation),
and a designer (constructing exercises using the narrative themes). Learning
benefits have been reported for each of these roles and for different
populations such as students and diplomats (see Druckman and Robinson,
1998). Particularly interesting is the comparison of learning gains for the
designer and role-play exercises (Druckman and Ebner, 2008). The
approach has been used in several countries in different parts of the world
(see Druckman, 2006). One of these countries was France where Dupont
collaborated with Druckman to bring the approach to a group of advanced
students at Negocia, a business school in Paris. Dupont added several new
thematic summaries that captured research on negotiation being done in
France. Examples are risks, threats and ultimatums, and trust.
An advantage of this sort of exercise is the connection made
between analysis and interpretation. By placing experimental findings in a
case context, students/trainees develop an appreciation for the value of
research-based knowledge for understanding, design, and implementation
of negotiation. By bringing these elements together, the gap between the
cultures of research and practice is bridged.
Although this is just one of many approaches to negotiation
training, it may be the only systematic attempt to address issues concerned
with the relevance of experimental findings for the sorts of high-stakes
negotiations that are conducted by professionals. The feedback, including
data--based evaluations, suggests substantial learning gains made by
participants. But, there are gains for the researchers as well. One gain is an
opportunity to judge the extent to which experimental knowledge is

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applicable to complex cases. Another is to provide additional settings for
validation: Do the cases replicate or contradict relationships obtained in the
laboratory? A third gain is that the cases provide an arena for generating
hypotheses ripe for evaluation by experiments. By moving back and forth
between laboratory and cases, a researcher develops an appreciation for the
way that negotiation occurs in a variety of contexts. That appreciation
highlights the role played by context, which is important for the
development of contingency or situation-specific theories of negotiation.

CASE STUDIES

The case-study method is frequently used in negotiation research. Working

from a description of negotiation that encompasses everything from the
initial context to the outcome and the performance of the agreement, the
case-study method may be simply exploratory or may seek to address the
validity of a given concept, hypothesis or proposition. The method may be
applied to a specific situation or be used to compare several situations. In
the latter case, it attempts to find similarities and/or patterns. In this way it
may reveal possible relationships of association, influence, and
conditionality. But the objective is also to understand the role of
circumstances that may be specific to a given negotiation, such as the
perceptions, communication and the relationship between negotiators in
that case.
Whether based on historical sources or on observations made in
situ, this method has contributed to our understanding of the details of
negotiation. The study of cases that illustrate either typical or exceptional
negotiation situations has encouraged the formulating, evaluating and
refining of many of the concepts that now form the state-of-the-art of
negotiation research. Discrepancies between what theory would expect and
what empirical research shows leads to a gradual adjustment of the
dominant paradigms. There are many examples of how case studies have
influenced the development of theory. The early books on negotiation,
which referred to cases of international negotiations (Schelling, 1960; Iklé,
1964) or the world of industrial relations (Walton and McKersie, 1965),
were also the first to put forth negotiation models and propositions. The
comparison of real-life situations described in case studies has provided
data for such authors as Zartman, Hopmann, and Druckman to develop new
concepts and evaluate propositions. Examples include the sequence from
diagnosis to formula to detail, the distinction between relative and absolute
power, and the relationship between crises and turning points.
One particularly convincing illustration of how the comparative
method can be applied to particular cases is the PIN group's research on

162
multilateral negotiations, focusing on the cases of the Single European Act
(1993) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1986-1993)
(Zartman, 1994). Information gathered about these cases was used to
demonstrate the applicability of different approaches, including decision
analysis, game theory, small groups, coalition theory, and leadership. The
blind man and the elephant analogy is apt: the approach became a lens
through which the case was understood. The same negotiation could be
construed as a case of deciding among alternative options, as one in which
coalition dynamics determined the outcome, or as an example of the roles
played by different leadership roles. Indeed, all of the theorized processes
were relevant ways of depicting the cases even as some concepts applied
particularly well at certain junctures of the process. This sort of holistic
analysis is a feature of the case study method.
The interpretive aspect of case studies encourages researchers to
draw on a broad canvass. This approach opens the scholarly chest of
relevant concepts. Rather than to demonstrate confirmation or refutation of
hypothesized relationships among a small set of variables, as is done in
experiments, the case-study researcher highlights the way that various ideas
capture the way particular cases unfold. (See Zartman, 2006, for an
example of how this is done.) The various concepts are organized by the
frameworks discussed earlier in this chapter.
It is a flexible approach to research that emphasizes details at the
cost of measurements that lend themselves to statistical analysis. The losses
may however be offset by a multi-method strategy that combines case
studies with experiments. Good examples of studies that move between the
methods are Hopmann and Walcott 1977) and Beriker and Druckman
(1996). Further, case studies have been shown to be particularly useful in
the classroom. When the familiarity acquired from reading cases in
different issue areas are buttressed by interpretations that derive from
theories, two teaching goals are accomplished: learning about how real-
world negotiations occur and learning how to be an analyst. Examples of
the way cases are used for teaching can be found in most issues of the
Negotiation Journal and in some issues of International Negotiation. (See
also the French literature contributions by Vuillard and Kesselman [2004]
and by Marjollet and Bouquet [2004].)
The main weakness of case studies however is that no matter how
meticulously and rigorously they are prepared and described they can never
do full justice to the complexity of reality. There is always a risk of
"deformation" arising from the ambiguous relationship between the
observer and the observed. As an old saying goes – the concepts are clear,
the statistics are indisputable, but the events are untidy. We may say that
the case-study method's main quality is that it provides an in depth analysis
of particular situations or events. However, the nuances captured are gained

163
at the expense of generality: cases are rarely chosen by systematic sampling
methods. In his appraisal of case studies, Zartman noted that “much more
sophistication is still hoped for” (2006:12). Yet, even sophisticated case
studies are limited by selective sampling, and this may be inevitable. The
limitations are addressed by a coordinated multi-method approach where
cases are complemented by experiments and surveys.

SOURCES OF DATA

Data take many forms in research on negotiation and, more generally, in

social science. These forms are related to research methodologies: For
example, behavioural observations and self report data from experiments,
events, informant observations, narrative accounts and oral histories from
case studies, self-report and aggregate data from surveys. These sources are
summarized in the following table, along with the strengths and weaknesses
of each, drawn from Druckman (2005:344-345).

Table 4. Sources of Data

Information Source Strengths Weaknesses

Behavioral observations Easy to observe. Does not reveal motives

Relatively reliable coding or explanations for the
for analysis. behavior.
More difficult to record in
studies of groups or other
large units of analysis.
Self-reported perceptions, An important source fiar Relatively weak
opinions, or attitudes subjective data that can be correlations wth
assessed on scales for behavioral observations.
quantitative analyses. Difficult to control for
Primary data from survey various response biases.
questionnaires.
Expert judgments Informed judgments based Can be inaccurate despite
on experience with a topic expressed confidence by
or area. the experts (sometimes
over- confidence).
Subject to response
biases.

164
Informant observations As with experts, Inaccurate memory for
informants are often events that occurred in the
skilled and experienced distant past.
observers. If not sampled,
If sampled, accounts can observations are limited to
be representative of a particular vantage points.
larger population. Comparability across
informants can be
problematic.
Events A source for historical Subject to observer biases.
time-series analyses. Intentions of actors are
Relatively easy to code rarelv revealed.
reliably. Comparability across
Though not always events can be problematic.
apparent, the meaning of
events can be inferred
from interviews with
actors.
Verbal statements from Often the only record of Lack of control over the
documents past activities or events. production of the material.
Suitable for content Often incomplete
analysis. coverage on variables
of interest.
Difficult to evaluate
importance of missing
information.
Narrative acounts Information about Non-representative
perceptions and subjective accounts of events.
meaning of experiences
and events.
Elaborations may provide
more complex
interpretations than other
verbal accounts.
Oral histories and other Valuable for documenting Inaccurate – and
introspective reporting an actor’s role in a sometimes self-serving –
process, institution, or recall of distant events.
career. Subject to attribution
Can provide an elaborate biases and limitations of
account of historical vantage point.
events. Difficult to compare
different reports of similar
activities, especially if the
interviews are open
ended.

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Unobtrusive data Avoids subject reactivity. A lack of control over the
Can capture trails (or data production.
traces) not recoverable by Interpretations may be
asking questions. ambiguous, especially
Indicators of activities not when other data are not
known by other methods. available.
as in archaeology. Subject to observer biases.
Aggregate data Indicators of societal or May mask small group or
systems-level variables. individual variables.
Major source for Controversial rules for
demographic or aggregating data obtained
population data. from smaller units
Useful for capturing (groups, organizations,
cyclical political or cities, or regions).
economic processes.
Computer simulation data Direct and controlled Eliminates human or
evaluation of competing cultural factors.
theoretical interpretations Analyses can be based on
or assumptions. fairly simple assumptions
Useful for evaluating about human behavior,
alternative policy such as consistent utility-
scenarios. maximizing actors.
Can be compared to
empirical cases.

Secondary data Often the only source of Lack of control over the
available data. conditions of collection.
The basis for research Often collected for other
syntheses, including meta- purposes.
analyses. Lack of coverage
Useful as baseline data for ofvariables which may be
comparison with new of interest to analysts.
(primary) data collections.

CONCLUSION

Several frameworks and methodologies were presented in this chapter.

Special attention was given to the frameworks developed by Sawyer and
Guetzkow, Walton and McKersie, the PIN project, and Lax and Sebenius.
These frameworks have had a substantial impact on the way that
negotiation is conceptualized. They have also been used to provide
guidance for preparing a negotiation, monitoring progress leading toward
an outcome, and performing ex post assessments. The discussion of
methodologies highlights experiments and case studies. These are the most
frequently-used approaches for doing research on negotiation. The research

166
has clarified hypothesized relationships among variables identified by the
frameworks. It has also called attention to the contingent or conditional
feature of these relationships. We have learned that negotiation processes
are intertwined with the contexts in which negotiation occurs. The interplay
between context and process stands out as the key research challenge to be
addressed in experiments and case studies, but especially in studies that
employ both approaches.

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 CHAPTER 8

PERSPECTIVES: NEGOTIATION THEORY AND

PRACTICE – TODAY AND TOMORROW 1

CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

The concept of “post-modern” negotiation refers to the question of how

tomorrow’s research and practice can adjust to a post-modern world
characterized by swift changes and increasing uncertainties. It is not a
critical view of negotiation dynamics or an attempt to refute models or to
distance itself systematically from observed practices. It is quite simply a
concept that is articulated around some reflections, interrogations and
perspectives of the present state of negotiation research and practice by
determining the strengths and weaknesses of knowledge claims and
research-driven practices, while also looking for opportunities and threats.
Such an analysis forms the substance of this chapter and prepares the
general message of the book.

STRONG POINTS: WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED SO FAR?

What do we know now? Do we have a robust understanding of the “raison

d’être”, the nature, the essence of negotiation including its components,
processes and outcomes? Are some strategies and tactics better than others?
Can we characterize “good” and “median” negotiators? Are some research
methods better than others at answering these key negotiation questions?
What about the best ways to teach, learn, and practice negotiation? No one
can dispute the fact that we know the phenomenon and its applications a lot
better than say thirty or fifty years ago. While we have not reached a point
where all questions have been dealt with, certainly many of them have been
at least clarified. Models that explain the process and the determination of

––––––––––––––
1
Translated and edited from Christophe Dupont, La Négociation post-moderne. Paris:
Publibook, 2006.

International Negotiation: Foundations, Models, and Philosophies. Careers in Negotiation and Conflict
Management Research, Christophe Dupont. Aurélien Colson, Daniel Druckman, and William Donohue
(eds.) 171-186 © 2013 Republic of Letters Publishing. All rights reserved.
CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

outcomes do exist and while not infallible are relevant, robust and are a
potential base for applications.
A way to make this assertion credible is to refer back to the list of
questions Iklé (1962) raised about negotiation decades ago. It becomes
clear that for some of these questions (e.g., “does negotiation require a will
of compromise?”), scholars including Pruitt (1982), Druckman (1977) or
Zartman (1976) provide extensive responses to this issue. Generally, the
answer is yes, negotiation does require a will of compromise. Specifically,
Zartman conceptualizes willingness as a ripeness issue where all sides
finally realize that the costs of continued conflict outweigh the benefits of
negotiation. Pruitt views it as a strategic choice that parties make when they
have turned the corner and turn to negotiation as their best choice to resolve
the conflict. Similarly, Druckman’s work would argue that negotiators
achieve an incremental convergence toward agreement that reflects a steady
(but often bumpy) progress toward a common will to resolve the dispute.
But what about questions like: “if the conflict concerns several
issues, it is best to deal first with the most easily solved, [but then], “will
not the most difficult points become yet more difficult to solve?” It is well
known that opinions differ on this question. Theory would seem to support
the view that in such negotiations the first stages are (must be) competitive
which ultimately give way to more cooperative attitudes and actions; yet
some practitioners would rather favor a more harmonious (cooperative)
start to the negotiation to establish a cordial climate. Work by Adair and
Brett (2005) provides a good example of how the negotiation dance evolves
over time as disputants search for joint gains.
Another issue relates to the viability of seeking to establish “soft”
versus “hard” limits. Research in negotiation has demonstrated
contradictory results in more than one case. A good example is the
“toughness dilemma” for which Zartman and Kremenyuk (2005) have
compared the validity of various approaches. Given the difficulty of
reconciling the various research results the authors admit that ambiguity
prevails. They also draw attention to the difficulty of finding a crucial or
predominant independent variable to explain outcomes.
Many authors have also explored the issue of power in negotiation
including its definition, its influences, and the opportunity of its use for
strategic or tactical reasons. Zartman and Rubin (2002) conclude that
negotiations mediate the a-priori power distribution such that initial power
differences often dissolve as each recognizes the necessity of the other’s
assent. Thus, the issues of power symmetry and asymmetry are really
negotiated continuously along with the issues in dispute. Consistent with
this view, Lempereur and Colson (2004) have shown the shifting nature of

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 PERSPECTIVES: NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE – TODAY AND TOMORROW

power when studying a number of cases. They conclude that it is illusory to

talk about power in general in a negotiation since all depends on specific
circumstances that account for power shifts.

WEAK POINTS: WHAT NEEDS TO BE ACHIEVED?

While negotiation research has demonstrated some strengths, it also

exposes some important needs. A key weakness characterizing the
discipline relates to the difference between theoretical outcomes and the
possibility of transferring them to practice. This challenge is well-known
and is often mentioned in the literature and at negotiation meetings and
congresses (Dupont, 2003). Professionals list a number of shortcomings
including poor generalizability to a broad set of contexts and limited
relevance and lack of realism. The first point is dominated by the
singularities of the contexts, the objects, the actors, and the stakes. What
may be demonstrated and hold “true” in a given (“purified”) experiment
(framed in its own particular design) may well be irrelevant in a concrete,
complicated and ever-shifting context.
Another key weakness is that of the validity of the “dominant
paradigm” of rationality. This foundation refers to the assumption that
negotiators always strive to maximize their individual interest in a rational
process. A key example of this dominant paradigm is found in Bazerman
and Neale’s (1993) book in which they explore the kinds of biases that
negotiators often confront that compromise their ability to negotiate in their
own best interests. However, the relevance of this assumption has been
questioned by a number of authors, especially Pruitt and Carnevale (1993).
In fact, Bazerman (2000) himself in a more recent publication traces the
shift away from an exclusive focus on rationality toward the study of how
negotiators subjectively understand the negotiation in a more global sense.
In addition, too many theories and observations are limited to the
dyadic negotiation context. Many situations leading to negotiations are not
typically dyadic (e.g. multi-actors, multi-issues, etc) and furthermore the
point has been made that many negotiations are really pluri-level
negotiations or negotiated “on behalf of others” (Mnookin & Susskind,
1999). Similarly the coverage of the field is often limited to “traditional”
situations (e.g. diplomatic, labor or commercial negotiations) at a time
where it becomes clear that many other forms or modalities should be
studied in depth.
In the same way, existing theories and research have had some
difficulty integrating a clear sense of the issue of culture into their
conceptual frameworks. However, especially in diplomatic negotiations,
culture does matter although in some circumstances (e.g. better knowledge,

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT

similarity of education, common rituals) its influence may be reduced

(Zartman, 1993). What is true on one side of a frontier might not be “so
true” on the other side as a popular maxim says (Faure 2003). Another
point of relevance refers to the insufficient attention paid to various aspects
of the process, referred to by Jonsson (2007) as the “neglected aspects of
negotiation” (in particular the social dimension).

WHAT IS THE VALUE OF THEORY FOR PRACTICE?

Based on this analysis of the weak and strong points of the negotiation
discipline we are able to provide a summary of the main research findings
that have strong implications for practice. Research results and theoretical
contributions have led to a number of clarifications on the language and
concepts of negotiations. Practitioners often use negotiation language and
concepts directly derived from theory, for instance BATNA (best
alternative to negotiated agreement), ZOPA (zone of possible agreement),
value creation and distribution, win-win agreements and so on.
More fundamentally, research provides important insights into the
mechanisms of negotiation. It has uncovered key elements of the
negotiation process, its dynamics (e.g. stages, turning points) and its
outcomes. It has produced analyses of many insights into issues such as
power, trust, escalation, face and honor. It has been useful in identifying
structures, strategies and tactics such as packaging, fall-back solutions, or,
for complex multilateral negotiations, the procedure of a single negotiation
text.
Practitioners are invited to reflect not only on how these elements
play a role in negotiation, but also on factors that complement them such as
the importance of the three ships--relationship, ownership (defending the
home turf) and craftsmanship (creativity) (Avenhaus & Zartman 2007). To
select a few examples in the field international relations and diplomacy,
one can list the following:
- RAINS (international negotiation on air pollution) [Avenhaus and
Zartman, 2007, pp. 197-228]
- NCLOS (International negotiation on a Law of the seas) [Avenhaus
and Zartman, 2007, pp. 211-228]
- KOSOVO (research findings supported the view that air strikes
should be effective to provoke a negotiation leading to the
settlement at Dayton) [Solana, 1999]
For a more general evaluation good references are found in the
IIASA-sponsored Project on International Negotiation (PIN) publications,
which number about fifteen books to date. Each of these contributions

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deals with a given theme or problem. A series of concrete descriptions of

the “various situations involved is intertwined with research, theoretical
considerations and applications. The books end with a detailed analysis of
“lessons for theory and practice”. These books have so far focused on
international relations and diplomacy and generally show that a theoretical
approach offers practical advice for practitioners.

INTERROGATIONS

When thinking about the future for negotiation scholars and practitioners, a
series of questions should be examined. Six of these are addressed below.

Do we need a theory of negotiation?

Authors have not hesitated to pose this question because the quest for an
over-arching theory of negotiation has its appeal. It could identify the key
variables contributing to success while providing both scholars and
practitioners with a common language for thinking about negotiation.
Gulliver (1979) wrote that an over-arching, comprehensive theory of
negotiation cannot be formed because of the complexity of the real-world
variables, most of which can hardly be specified, such as mental processes
of the negotiators, combined with the high degree of uncertainty introduced
by various contextual factors.
In marked contrast are those authors who have adopted a more
open or nuanced position. For example, Raiffa (1982) suggested that while
there is no comprehensive theory of negotiation, extant research and
thinking can help negotiators and interveners to guide their strategic
choices in many different ways. Similarly, Rubin (1983) stated that
research findings can facilitate the solution of the disagreements because
the extensive body of literature in psychology and related fields makes it
possible to identify a few themes and questions that impact on negotiation.
So, to answer the question, it appears that there is some consensus that
while a comprehensive theory of negotiation may not emerge, findings
from research drawing on different perspectives can be very informative.

Which theoretical frameworks are more valuable?

Nevertheless, there still is the question of which theoretical frameworks are
most useful in providing strategic directions for negotiations and
interveners? To answer this question it might be useful to turn to the classic
paper by Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965) in which they provided a model of
negotiation that included the antecedents of goals and background factors,
the concurrent elements of process and conditions, and the consequent

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element of negotiation outcome. Based on this model, the objective for

theory is to provide frameworks that allow researchers to focus on
elaborating these elements of the negotiation model to see how they
function collectively.
Meeting this objective is best accomplished by cross fertilization—
drawing upon a number of disciplines and concepts that have potential for
practitioners. For example, a study was undertaken by the PIN group to
compare how negotiation is dealt with in economics (and other disciplines)
compared to the analysis by negotiation theoreticians (Kremenyuk &
Sjostedt, 2000). The conclusion is that economists have contributed to the
body of knowledge by developing the implications of such concepts as
optimality, equilibria, and transaction costs.
Finally, apart from the two aspects mentioned above, a third
consequence is that meta-analysis seems to be a very promising way to add
to present knowledge. Druckman’s (1994) negotiation meta-analysis paved
the way for others in the field by identifying a sub-set of variables that can
dramatically influence negotiation outcome. Thus, to answer the question
posed in this section, the theoretical frameworks that are most valuable
have the ability to stimulate both theoretical and pragmatic thinking about
negotiation processes and outcomes.

Which paradigms are most promising?

This is perhaps one of the most important questions since negotiation
research has been conducted from a number of different paradigms as
Druckman and Diehl (2006) recently pointed out. In their book, Pruitt and
Carnevale (1993:203) concluded with the following statement about the
importance of approaching negotiation from a number of different
paradigms: “Most experimental studies on negotiation belong to the
traditional dominating paradigm treating negotiators as unitary decision-
makers, focussed on their own interests and without sharing a past history
or an involvement in the future. We have drawn attention on the possibility
to take into account other’s interests, the importance of social contexts
including social norms, interpersonal relationships, group decision –
making, mediation and the broad category of choices on conflict resolution
modes for which negotiation is only one.”
The (French-speaking) Journal Négociations has recently published
a number of articles emphasizing the need to take account of broader
concepts than those on which most current theories are based. For example,
Kuty (2004) has shown the importance of symbols and values. To this
sociological school should be added the group of authors who insist on the
need to enlarge the concept of “interest” and integrate the often neglected

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aspect of emotions since they generally enter into the interest equation for
negotiations.
In addition, cognitive factors are now often considered as an
essential ingredient for understanding a negotiator’s behaviors (Jonsson,
2002) as well as propositions that do not rely exclusively on the description
of negotiators as maximizing and rational individuals (Leroux, 2005).
Analyses of international relations and labor conflicts, by their focus on
power and manipulation, raise doubts on simpler models of negotiation that
emphasize rationality such as game theory. Even when conditions are
relaxed the assumption of rationality often does not apply in concrete
settings. Raiffa (1982), whose contributions to rational decision-making are
well known, has acknowledged the fact that an opponent may not act
rationally. He advises the actor to behave in a rational way even when the
opponent is acting irrationally. This situation is therefore asymmetric.
The answer to the question of which paradigms to favor emerges
from this pluralist frame. The best paradigms are those that are open to the
exploration of the diverse factors that influence negotiation outcomes.

Do ethics and equity matter?

Should negotiators integrate ethical concerns into both their research and
practice? This point has become a recurrent topic in the literature (e.g.,
Young, 1994). Raiffa (1982) provides a most illuminating comment about
ethics by noting that it is not simply possible to avoid ethical considerations
in negotiation. Every choice is guided by normative considerations of right
and wrong. Should negotiators lie, be quietly misleading, or be open and
honest? Raiffa suggests that normative frameworks about ethics are not
intended to provide guidelines for designing final decision-making since
these frameworks are often contradictory in the kinds of ethical advice they
provide. Instead he pleads in favor of a heuristic approach which asks
negotiators to continuously explore the balance of selfish and altruistic
considerations in making choices. The challenge is to require self reflexions
that reconcile standards and realities. Raiffa notes that negotiation is an
activity for which there exists a “gray zone”, in which questions of
balancing interests of self and others is a constant challenge.
Related to this ethical issue is the question of equity in
negotiations. Does the outcome of a negotiation have to be equitable? The
approach can be descriptive (are negotiations equitable in general?) or
prescriptive (how is equity achieved?). Equity may not be synonymous
with justice and many contributions have studied this question. Various
authors integrate the concept of equity in their definition of negotiation
while others side step the difficulty by preferring the concept of “mutually

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acceptable solutions”. These two positions are not irreconcilable at least in

theory, especially if the criterion of optimization is the reference to joint-
gain maximization.
However one can wonder if this consideration plays in current
practices. It would rather seem that a given negotiator seeks to maximize
his/her own interest under the constraint of granting the opponent an
outcome sufficient to entice him/her not to break off the negotiation. The
result is that outcomes may or may not represent a “fair” or “equitable”
solution. Instead they may represent what Simon (1957) refers to as an
acceptance of an outcome that is simply “satisfying” to both parties, which
often leads to “intermediate” outcomes that fall short of joint maximization
(i.e., a Nash solution) (Nash, 1950).
Given these considerations, the answer to the question of whether
ethics and equity matter is that both issues always matter; they are what
drive choices and strategies in negotiation. While there are no firm a-priori
standards for judging ethics and equity, these considerations require
constant exploration and consideration by negotiators as they work toward
joint solutions.

Can negotiation be learned?

As Lempereur and Colson (2004) have stated: “one is not born a good
negotiator, one becomes it.” This maxim is expanded throughout their
contribution by detailing how a gradual increase in the knowledge and
skilled behavior is the result of training and experience. As Ikle (1964)
stated, the idea of a “complete negotiator” is somewhat of a myth since so
much depends on the contexts and the situations that are out of a
negotiator’s control. Thus, the profile of a complete negotiator is less
associated with the skills needed to apply training to manage the diverse
contexts and situations they face.
As a result, the answer to the question of whether negotiation can
be learned is that, yes it can, but with considerable interaction between
acquired skills and the negotiating contexts that are difficult to control; in
other words, the key is learning how to apply key negotiation principles in
real-life contexts. Given that negotiation is a learned process, it is important
for scholars and practitioners to continually appraise the external validity of
both experimental models and executive training programs. Druckman
(2005) contends that comparative studies are particularly important because
they reveal contingencies – the similarities and differences between cases
that have implications for the way a negotiation may be managed. They
have also been used to evaluate the validity of negotiation typologies (e.g.,
Druckman, 1999).

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What are some important priorities for research?

It is customary for authors on negotiation to conclude their work with a list
of questions yet to be solved and of research orientations. These lists are
useful since they are a first step in evaluating a research agenda for the
future with the indication of priorities. For example, Druckman (1977: 41)
argues that there is a need to build theory that will help understand the
structure, objectives and functions of negotiation. Among the questions he
asks is how does negotiation differ from other decision-making systems?
How can scholars conceptualize and operationalize intangible elements that
are important yet very abstract? Druckman’s (2001) research on turning
points is a good example of last question. Turning points can be
precipitated by external or internal factors that change the direction of a
negotiation. Yet there are many different ways of thinking about and
assessing turning points as his research has demonstrated.
Another dimension consists in gaining an in-depth knowledge of
the communication exchange process. How do negotiators establish
communication patterns that either facilitate or inhibit their ability to
identify and process complex issues while managing their various
contextual constraints? The Putnam and Roloff (1992) book presents a
comprehensive list of communication and negotiation topics. More recent
research in communication and negotiation has focused on a wide range of
contexts such as hostage negotiation (Donohue & Hoobler, 2002) and
environmental negotiation (Brummans, Putnam & Gray, 2008). The basic
conclusion of this research is that communication structures that evolve
during negotiations have a very significant impact on outcome.
Yet another illustration of an inventory of the topics to be studied
in a more in-depth manner was proposed by Pruitt (1981) and Pruitt and
Carnevale (1993). They identified four topics that bear further exploration
to better understand the negotiation process: the prehistory of negotiation,
implementation of the agreement, decision-making processes within
delegations and, multilateral negotiations. They mentioned also the
relevance of exploring further the differences between the various
modalities of joint decision-making, in particular behaviors in the phase
when parties “feel out” and test each other. Other issues cited as research
priorities include understanding the impact of culture, gender, and other
background factors on negotiation outcomes.
In answering this question about important priorities for research it
seems clear that there are questions about how negotiation differs from
other activities, questions about the interaction between individual and
contextual factors that might influence the direction of the negotiations,
questions about how communicators use language and structure interaction

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patterns to become collaborative or competitive, and questions about

elusive features of the negotiation process.

PERSPECTIVES AND CHALLENGES: TWO SCENARIOS

Concluding a new book is often a delicate matter, as authors feel inclined to

propose views about the proximate future. In this case the question we must
examine is, what is the most likely and also the most desirable vision for
the future of negotiation research? The answers to these questions may be
very different. The field may be going in one direction that is not
necessarily likely to advance it significantly, or it may be the case that the
field is currently progressing in an exciting and productive manner.
The question is worth asking because it is the responsibility of all
researchers to make a case that their scholarship is aimed at pushing
forward our understanding of the many topics and issues presented
previously. What direction is the field likely to go, or could go if scholars
were committed to this progressive vision? Two polar opposite scenarios
are examined. While the first one could be termed “traditional”, the second
may be more provocative. No claim for a probability of occurrence is made
(besides any forecast is subject to reveal sooner or later its fragility). They
are aimed at stimulating reflections about the conditions which would
transform them in terms of challenges to be met.

A “traditional” scenario
The lower risk scenario is labelled “traditional” in the sense that it
recognizes a commitment to the accumulation of knowledge through the
gradual improvement and refinement of concepts and techniques that are
currently well known. This research would continue to progress without
any fundamental questioning of existing foundations and paradigms. The
focus would be placed on refinements and some reformulations. The
principal models (analytical, experimental approaches, game theory
applications) remain the central theoretical references whereas “principled
negotiation” dominates the practice. Naturally one would expect specific
advances or nuances formulated on certain propositions but the priority is
not aimed at a vision of challenging existing paradigms and frameworks.
Regarding methodologies, comparative analysis would be a
standard road to discovery. Triangulation and meta-analysis will also be a
most-used technique, given the diversity of findings and sometimes their
contradictory results. There would be a tendency to study fields which are
often neglected (so far strongly concentrated on the domains of diplomacy,
labor or trade negotiations). New technologies would have an impact on

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research and practice. Cultural factors will be taken into account in the
formulation of research models and propositions. Systems of values
regarding thinking, worldviews, or even ideologies would be considered
more important than present theories assume. Actors of different systems
would be tempted to be more autonomous in their thinking and practice of
negotiation.
This scenario is essentially a prolongation of tendencies, whether
hard or soft. Research advances are seen as a continuing trend with – often
– punctual findings but with no major fundamental change which would put
in evidence a renewed vision, a major and innovative synthesis, a surge of
really innovative ideas.
This scenario should not be assessed in negative terms. Progress is
often a “slow walk”. It may be considered as realistic insofar as it takes
account of difficulties and gaps which are a characteristic of the state of the
art. Hence the main effort in this scenario would be to reduce difficulty and
gaps rather than questioning existing paradigms despite their deficiencies.
This scenario would however produce an important development: progress
in bridging part of the gap between theory and practice. Yet, not
questioning some bases – or questioning them in a limited way – excludes
fundamental changes in the thinking and practicing of negotiation.

The scenario of challenges and departures

This scenario can be defined by its departures with the preceding one.
These departures are less in terms of methodologies than of reflexions,
preoccupations and orientations. It might be useful to call this the “new
negotiation” scenario. It challenges the traditional paradigm by considering
negotiation as a fundamental process of human interaction rather than
primarily as a dispute resolution tool.
The first issue of departure in this new negotiation scenario
concerns what Jönsson (2007) has called the “neglected aspects of
negotiation theory.” For example, conventional theories tend to
underestimate, ignore or exclude the “social aspects” of negotiation. These
aspects refer to social factors that are often difficult to access thoroughly
with the more traditional paradigm. For example, Jönsson argues that many
investigators do not pay sufficient attention to the social and political
context that can impact negotiations. He also suggests that insufficient
attention is paid to the norms that mark the limits of distributive tactics.
These tactics shift as interactions progress as do the procedures that
disputants use to organize the bargaining process, and the levels of trust
between the parties.

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Too little attention is paid to such factors as the interdependence of

parties and their inclusion in social, economic, and political networks.
These networks are often very complex and add layers of issues that parties
are obligated to address. Issues of loyalty and identity dynamics within
these networks in the form of symbols and linguistic structures and their
respective interpretation codes play an important role in determining
outcomes. Thus, the first principle upon which this new negotiation
scenario is based is the idea that present theories created within the
traditional frame lack sensitivity to the social context. Understanding
human negotiation and decision making depends on being aware of the
broader human social networks and orientations within which those actions
occur.
A second issue that is often raised about the traditional scenario
emerges from the field of sociology and argues that theories of negotiation
are often limited to instrumental concerns such as techniques and tools
aimed at maximizing outcomes. This limitation has been raised most
poignantly in France (e.g. Thuderoz’ work concerning labour negotiations
and articles in the journal Négociations). Based on a sociological analysis
of how group identities evolve through extensive social interactions this
author argues that the whole concept of negotiation should be revisited to
give more emphasis to understanding: a) the diversity of the many different
forms of negotiation and how those forms vary in terms of the kinds of
agreements (or impasses) they yield, b) the connection between individual
interests and their group identities and how they impact the process of
negotiation, c) the link between compromises made at the bargaining table
and the promises made to constituents, and d) the emotional component of
negotiation and its impact on rationality as noted recently by De Carlo
(2004).
Thus, the second point of departure for the new negotiation
scenario argues for viewing negotiation as a more diverse process through
which individuals explore and express their identities, their commitments to
one another, and the emotional orientations that reify those identities.
Putnam’s (Putnam, Wilson & Turner, 1990; Putnam, 1994; Putnam, 2004)
research in teacher negotiations takes this broader view by exploring how
teachers used negotiation to shape their internal and external identities by
using various argument structures and rhetorical tropes to inject passion
and commitment into the process.
A third departure point focuses on concerns that Zartman (2005)
has raised about the viability of the traditional paradigm. He proposes that
scholars should shift their negotiation research agenda to focus more on the
consequences of agreements rather than on their causes. The issue is

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whether negotiated agreements work more to solve temporary conflicts

rather than contributing to building a better future in the broader sense. The
consequences of agreements that look backward focus more on addressing
justice themes while those looking forward deal with more durable
solutions aimed at forging a better long-term relationship.
This departure from the traditional paradigm is interesting in that it
asks scholars to think more comprehensively about the negotiation process.
The issue is not just what drives agreements, but what happens to them
over time. The idea is that the negotiation probably never stops. Any
implementation process involves on-going discussion and debate and often
intense negotiations. If we take this ‘consequences directive’ to heart, then
the new negotiation paradigm clearly involves looking both backward and
forward at the same time to best understand the negotiation process.
A fourth concern with the traditional paradigm deals with its ability
to understand the imbedded nature of ethical and moral issues in
negotiation. Often these issues assume a lower priority in the traditional
paradigm or are treated as simply additional variables or considerations that
might drive the outcome. Yet, ethical and moral perspectives that surface as
issues of justice, equity and equality typically play a more imbedded role in
actual negotiation contexts. For example in many diplomatic, labor or
business negotiations the parties often interact within a historical context in
which issues of justice and equality are an ongoing part of how they frame
their immediate substantive issues even if concerns about justice and
equality are not overtly integrated into the discussions (e.g., Druckman and
Albin, 2011).
The point is that the traditional paradigm might treat these kinds of
issues as perceptions impacting the desire to cooperate or compete. In
contrast, the new negotiation paradigm would look at how these issues are
interlinked in the broader negotiation context both in terms of how they
drive the process and how they impact implementation. Research in the
traditional paradigm reveals how important justice considerations are in
driving negotiation processes (e.g., Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, 2008). A
more expansive exploration of these ethical and moral issues is an
important component of the new negotiation paradigm.
Finally, the fifth departure point for the new negotiation paradigm
consists of examining how negotiation can be integrated more fully into the
social fabric within which it occurs, more ambitiously, to explore how
negotiations can transform societies and nations. It is important to
understand negotiation’s place in decision-making systems, its contents,
processes and outcomes. We should not let the uncertainty of taking this
broader perspective hamper our efforts to rethink how we view and study

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negotiation. Let us not see it as simply one of a list of tools for problem
solving; rather let’s think of negotiation as a socially integrated process of
human connection and deliberation. Society evolves because people
negotiate, not just in the narrow sense of proposals and counter proposals,
but in the broader sense of discussion, debate, reflection and
transformation. Taking this approach, new questions and issues would be
on the research agenda. And, perhaps new norms and views on what it
means to cooperate and compete might emerge.
Societal transformations will inevitably oblige us to reconsider,
moderate or create concepts, models and recommendations. New ways of
thinking about complexity, power, and political interferences will arise in
the course of exploring the role played by negotiation as a transformative
activity. The focus of this scenario is on the interplay between negotiation
processes and consequences and social orders. A start in this direction was
taken some time ago by Strauss (1978) in his attempt to embed negotiation
processes in social orders. Perhaps now is the time to revisit the insights
from this work as we consider the possibilities of negotiation for
understanding the human condition.

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 PART 3

BUILDING ON CHRISTOPHE DUPONT’S WORKS

 CHAPTER 9

FRAMEWORKS, CASES, AND RISK: DUPONT’S

LEGACY

DANIEL DRUCKMAN

Christophe Dupont has been a member in very good standing of the

invisible college of researchers whose careers have been devoted to the
study of negotiation and related conflict-resolving processes. His
contributions certainly merit fellow status in the college. I have had the
pleasure of benefiting from these contributions, both as a consumer of
knowledge and as a collaborator in training workshops. As a consumer, I
have found many of his case analyses to be insightful and his reviews of the
field comprehensive. As a collaborator, I have expanded my repertoire of
useful concepts and training materials. I draw on these experiences in the
first part of this chapter. That part places Christophe’s contributions in the
context of an expanding field of study and practice. In the second part, I
develop the theme of the 3rd International Biennale on Negotiation,
organized at Negocia by Christophe. That theme was risk and negotiation.

UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIATION: A WORK IN PROGRESS

In his 2006 book, La Négociation post-moderne, Dupont heralds the

considerable achievements of scholars who have devoted a good deal of
their careers to the study of negotiation. Although many of these scholars
are from universities in the United States, the American influence should
not be over-estimated: Dupont does a good job in documenting the
important contributions made by non-Americans and, particularly, by
French researchers. Nor should it be under-estimated: The field flourished
with the inaugural issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution (JCR)
published at the University of Michigan in 1957. On the heels of this new
publication, a number of compelling insights appeared. These included
Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959) concepts of comparative level and
comparative level for alternatives (preceding the idea of a best alternative
to a negotiated agreement [BATNA]), Schelling’s (1960) tacit bargaining

International Negotiation: Foundations, Models, and Philosophies. Careers in Negotiation and Conflict
Management Research, Christophe Dupont. Aurélien Colson, Daniel Druckman, and William Donohue
(eds.) 189-208 © 2013 Republic of Letters Publishing. All rights reserved.
DANIEL DRUCKMAN

and focal points (appearing initially in the JCR), Siegel and Fouraker’s
(1960) levels of aspiration, and Douglas’ 1957 article on bargaining phases.
It is not surprising that these ideas came from four different disciplines –
social psychology, economics, management science, and industrial
relations. The development of this field as an inter-disciplinary pursuit
mirrors the mix of its pioneers.

Metaphors
A result of the mix is variety in the approaches taken by researchers. The
approaches are discussed by Dupont and can be understood in terms of
metaphors. Game and decision theorists regard negotiation as a puzzle to be
solved. From the different preferences for outcomes, opposing negotiators
search for a solution that satisfies or optimizes the outcomes or “payoffs.”
Raiffa’s (1982) applications of decision theory are good examples of this
metaphor. Many social psychologists construe negotiation as though it were
a bargaining game. Bargaining behavior is influenced by a number of
features of the experimental situation. Sawyer and Guetzkow’s (1965)
framework defined these features and many of them surface as explanatory
variables in the rash of books published in the late 1970s. For
organizational theorists, negotiators are representatives of large groups who
face a challenge of managing relations among them. Walton and
McKersie’s (1965) idea of the boundary role conflict captures this
challenge. This idea was a forerunner to the later work on two-level games
in international politics (Putnam, 1988). For international relations
theorists, negotiation is part of a larger context of diplomatic politics. For
many students of negotiation, this metaphor can be traced to Ikle’s 1964
book. His typology of negotiating objectives is a lasting contribution that
continues to receive attention in the empirical literature (e.g., Druckman et
al., 1999). Each of these approaches is well represented in Dupont’s book.
The number of metaphors can be expanded to include other
approaches that have guided the work of negotiation theorists. In his 1978
book, Strauss called attention to the role played by negotiation in creating
and sustaining social orders. The focus here is on cooperative arrangements
or regimes that serve to regulate interactions in such areas as trade, the
environment, or security. This is part of a more general sociological or
structural approach discussed by Dupont and favored by many of the
French writers on negotiation. Emerging literatures on identity politics and
discourse analysis have influenced the way we think about negotiation as
well. Reflecting changes in world politics, the identity metaphor is an
attempt to capture internal conflicts over issues of autonomy and
independence. The issues are intangible, emotional, and ideological – the

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very features that have long been regarded as being “non-negotiable” (see
Zartman, 2001). Focusing on the construction of meaning through
communication, the discourse metaphor highlights the importance of
subjective elements in negotiation. Much can be learned about negotiation
by analyzing the way negotiators individually and jointly develop
narratives (or stories) about their needs, preferences, and desires. These
metaphors reflect and shape what Dupont refers to as the post-modern era.

Models and Methods

A field’s maturity can be measured by the extent to which the phenomenon
of interest can be modeled. In this regard, the study of negotiation has
achieved a certain amount of maturity. It has progressed from concepts and
metaphors to rather precise models. Most notable perhaps are the modeling
efforts of game theorists and decision analysts. The ideas of Nash equilibria
and Pareto optimality as well as the bargaining frontier are popular solution
metrics. With regard to negotiating process or dynamics several recent
developments should be mentioned. These include negotiation support
systems, stochastic models, and computer modeling of system dynamics.
Advances in electronic decision aids have contributed to the resolution of
impasses. Building on Coleman’s (1973) work, stochastic modeling shows
promise for identifying transition rates that signal stage changes or turning
points during the negotiating process. Sophisticated computer modeling has
enhanced our understanding about the way that policy-making groups
progress toward consensual decisions. These non-linear models are
particularly useful for identifying shifts from contentious to problem-
solving behavior within negotiating delegations. We look forward to further
advances in each of these domains.
The maturity of a field is also assessed by progress in developing
and applying empirical methodologies. By this measure, negotiation
analysis is quite mature. A sense of the multi-method flavor of this field is
captured in Dupont’s book. Long and vibrant traditions of experiments and
case studies have characterized this field. Dupont has been an active
contributor to case study analysis. Both these methodologies have
progressed with the design of increasingly complex simulations and more
analytically rigorous case studies. Experimental knowledge about
negotiation has enlightened us about situation-process-outcome
relationships; case studies have provided insights about the larger contexts
within which negotiation occurs. For both approaches, content analysis has
been a valuable tool, particularly when used to compare findings from
experiments to cases or between different kinds of cases. A trend in the
direction of combining experiments with case studies is evident. So too

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have more studies appeared that combine large-N quantitative with small-n
qualitative approaches. The quantitative studies – including time-series
analysis – are useful for establishing relationships between variables; the
qualitative studies – including focused comparisons – are useful for
discerning the mechanisms responsible for the obtained relationships. The
increasing sophistication of research on negotiation – taking advantage of
developments in methodology – portends a new era of scholarship.
Along side the explosion of experimental studies is an increased
body of work on domain-specific negotiations. Studies abound on the way
that security issues are negotiated between and within nations, on peace
agreements, on multilateral trade talks, on conferences that address
environmental issues, on attempts to seek freedom for hostages, on regional
organizations and regimes, and on the role of cultural factors. The
contributions made by these studies include further understanding of the
processes and politics of the domain as well as an evaluation of the
relevance of concepts such as negotiating stages, the strategic use of
alternatives, integrative agreements, and turning points. Many of these
types of studies are discussed Dupont’s book.

Programs
The popularity of negotiation analysis is due in large part to three
collaborative international programs. Each of these programs has
contributed to the growth of the field by providing opportunities for
publication. The Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) project at the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria has
produced a large number of edited books on a wide range of topics
including, most recently, peace and justice, escalation and negotiation, and
diplomatic games. Christophe Dupont has been an active contributor to
these books. The Washington Interest in Negotiation (WIN) group has
edited the Journal International Negotiation for a decade. Bridging theory
and practice, the 30 thematic issues produced to date showcase the work
being done by most scholars in the field. The Project on Negotiation (PON)
at the Harvard Law School has published the Negotiation Journal for two
decades. Among its many contributions the Journal has regularly published
insightful analyses of both domestic and international cases, as well as
theory papers, research reports, teaching approaches, and research digests.

Practice
The impetus for the study of negotiation comes also from the world of
practice. An increased demand for skill development stems from several

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developments. One is the growth of the profession. Whereas formerly the

negotiation profession consisted primarily of diplomats and those with
responsibilities for representing large organizations in collective
bargaining, it is now a commonplace career path in a wide variety of public
and private organizations. Another development is the rise of executive
training programs pioneered by entrepreneurs such as Karrass (1974) and
Nierenberg (1971) or by faculties of schools of management. A parallel
increase in diplomatic academies and colleges connected officially and
unofficially with governments’ foreign ministries has provided
opportunities for advancement in the Foreign Service. These socializing
experiences have also encouraged the emergence of professional sub-
cultures of negotiators. A third development is the publication of popular
books such as the one by Fisher and Ury (1981). These books, based less
on research than on practical experience, have produced a shared lexicon
for talking about negotiating. Considered side-by-side with vibrant research
programs, these contributions have engendered widespread interest in the
topic. And, there may be no better person for capturing this field than
Christophe Dupont, the quintessential practitioner-turned-scholar.

Reflections
On a personal note, I recall my first interaction with Christophe. It occurred
in the late 1980s during a meeting at IIASA. He asked what I had been
working on lately, commenting that he missed my writing on negotiation in
recent years. Indeed I had been spending more time on other topics while
building a consulting practice in Washington, DC. His remark caused me to
reflect on this change of interest. I realized that I hade been away from the
negotiation literature for too long. Returning “home” in the early 1990s, I
have not looked back. My research contributions, stimulated in part by the
time I spent at IIASA’s PIN project, led to the development of an approach
to negotiation training that incorporates research findings. Christophe
picked up on our 1998 article with Robinson (appearing in International
Negotiation) on this approach. This then led to an active collaboration
including a recent joint training seminar at Negocia in Paris. So, thanks
Christophe for setting me on the right path, thanks for the collaboration,
and, most of all, for turning to scholarship after a long and distinguished
career as a practitioner in International Organizations. We have all
benefited from your second career. Much of what you have learned is
conveyed by your 2006 book. It provides a portrait drawn on both an
historical and contemporaneous canvass of ideas, models, and research
findings.

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RISK IN NEGOTIATIONS

The Biennale conferences held at Negocia in Paris provide opportunities to

showcase basic and applied research on broad themes. Christophe’s choice
of the risk theme for the 2007 conference provided a panoramic display of
projects from around the world. For many of us in attendance, the
conference opened a window on a variety of new projects. I was pleasantly
surprised to learn about the flurry of activity on this topic. One result was to
stimulate my thinking about risk. Another was to include summaries of this
research on risk in my training materials. In this part of the chapter, I
present a conceptualization of risk in negotiation.

Defining risk
Actions taken or decisions made in the face of uncertainty are considered to
be risky. The key to this definition is the idea of uncertainty, which means
that consequences of actions are unknown. The risk for a decision maker
(or negotiator) is the prospect of losses. For this reason, decisions made in
light of uncertainty are gambles. In this part of the chapter I discuss a
number of factors that contribute to the perception of increased or
decreased risks. The discussion is organized in terms of the parts of
negotiation: issue area, parties, process, conditions, outcomes, and
implementation. The parts are organized in terms of the framework shown
in Figure 1. Drawn from Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965) and Druckman
(1973, 1977), the framework captures both relationships among the parts of
negotiation through time and the factors within each part that increase risk
perceptions. These factors are discussed in the sections to follow. The
framework is also the basis for a concluding discussion on profiles of high
and low-risk negotiations.

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ANTECEDENT CONCURRENT CONSEQUENT

ISSUES PROCESS OUTCOMES

• Security Issues • Difficult to calculate • Impasse, asymmetrical
benefits from agreement
• High stakes
agreement options
• Backward-looking
• Multiple issues
• Asynchronous settlements
concession exchanges
• Emphasis on short
• Tough tactics, walk out consequences
• Unilateral concessions

PARTIES CONDITIONS IMPLEMENTATION

• Mistrusting relationship • High time pressure • Non-binding
agreements
• Limited negotiating • Public talks
experience • Self-regulating
• High accountability to
agreements
• Unattractive constituents or
alternatives principals • Sources of conflict
unresolved
• Rewards or norms • Biased third parties
encourage risk-taking • Divided (or limited)
• Sudden external
constituent support for
events
the agreement

Figure 1 – Profile of Risk Perceptions

Issue area
Perceived risk has been shown to vary with negotiation issues. Results from
a study of turning points showed that, unlike trade and environmental
negotiators, security negotiators made few concessions and offered few
proposals of their own for possible agreement (Druckman, 2001). An
interpretation is that these negotiators are sensitive to possible losses rather
than potential gains, making them less likely to take risks. Thus, progress in
these talks depended less on their own initiatives than on such external
interventions as mediation or outside events. These outside interventions or
events transfer the risk or burden from the negotiators to the events. In a
sense it provides a “cover” for making concessions: blame it on them, not
us! This is also an area where there are fewer self-regulating agreements.
Monitoring regimes include commissions or institutions that tightly

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monitor the implementation of agreements, as will be discussed in the

section below on implementation.
I have argued that the lack of cooperation in security talks has
hindered the development of international regimes (compared to the trade
and environmental areas). And, in a circular way, the lack of a cooperative
regime serves to reinforce the very negotiating behaviors that have
prevented the emergence of such regimes. In contrast, trade and
environmental regimes have been shown to facilitate coordination in
negotiations, which, in turn, bolster the strength of these cooperative
regimes. This circular relationship between negotiation and regime
formation also illustrates a link between micro-level processes and macro-
level structures. (For more on levels of analysis, see Druckman, 1980,
2003).
Another way of thinking about issue area is in terms of sources of
risks. For security issues, the risk involves human lives, ultimately the
destruction of a civilization or culture. For trade and environmental talks,
the risks involve economic losses, although the well-known trade offs
between public health and industrial development in North-South
negotiations on measures to protect the environment raise awareness of
implications for survival. As the more basic need, questions of survival
would seem to trigger risk-aversion. Perceived risks are likely to increase
when attempts are made to develop the security implications of
environmental or trade issues. This is done, at least in part, to raise the
profile of those talks and has been referred to as “securitizing” the talks
(see, for example, Homer-Dixon, 1994). A possible consequence of such
framing is to stall progress or produce safe agreements. More generally, as
the stakes increase, negotiators perceive greater risk in the possible
outcomes.

Parties
Typically parties approach negotiation with mutual mistrust. This attitude
contributes to suspicions or attributions about the other’s intentions and
reluctance to share information. It also leads to heightened perceptions of
risk, which, in a circular way, increases mistrust. The result is continued
impasse or agreements that manage (rather than resolve) the conflict.
Effectively negotiated, cease-fire agreements can increase the kind of trust
referred to as calculus based, which is increased confidence that the other
party will abide by the terms that often include monitoring provisions. They
do not increase the kind of trust that produces lasting resolutions, often
referred to as identity-based trust (Lewicki et al, 1998). Comprehensive
agreements depend in part on moving up the trust ladder. A recent study of

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peace agreements showed that the best agreements followed a process of

movement from initial periods of mistrust to later periods of knowledge and
identity based trust (Irmer and Druckman, 2007). Several empirical
questions are suggested: How is trust developed during the negotiation
process? Does increased (decreased) trust reduce (increase) risk
perceptions? And does reduced (increased) perceived risk increase
(decrease) trust? Answers to these questions will help to unravel the
circular relationship between trust and risk.
Another aspect of parties is confidence in their negotiating skills.
Less-confident negotiators – or those with less training or experience – may
be unwilling to take risks. Similarly, negotiating representatives who lack
security or have peripheral status within the groups they represent may be
hesitant to choose less certain courses of action or be reluctant to sign an
agreement that leaves implementation issues undefined. But, there may also
be differences in experience between the negotiating parties. A less-
experienced party is likely to be more cautious than his/her more
experienced counterpart. This dynamic may lead to any of three possible
outcomes: an exploited inexperienced party yields to the other’s
preferences, an experienced party agrees to the other’s preference for a safe
agreement, or an impasse occurs as neither yields to the other’s preference
for a more or less risky outcome. These are among the hypotheses yet to be
evaluated.
The role of alternatives also comes into play as an influence on risk
perceptions. The increase in negotiating power that results from attractive
alternatives may decrease the perception of risk. Alternative power protects
a party from settling on undesirable terms. It provides him or her with the
advantage of choosing from a larger set of possible agreements. A cautious
negotiator with attractive alternatives can hold out for less risky outcomes.
An adventurous negotiator with attractive alternatives can increase the
pressure on the counterpart to accept his or her preferred offers. However, a
negotiator’s orientation as cautious or adventurous, risk-seeking or risk-
averse is also influenced by culture.
The distinction made between individualist and collectivist cultures
has been useful (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995). An implication from this
research is that members of individualist cultures are more risk seeking
while those is collectivist cultures are likely to be more risk averse. Further
clarification of the relationship between culture and risk comes from recent
research summarized by Carnevale and Leung (2001). The research shows
that individualists respond primarily to reward structures while collectivists
respond primarily to group norms. Risk is evaluated in terms of these
motivators: individualists are more likely to take chances if the rewards for

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doing so are substantial; collectivists will take risks if the group’s norms
encourage them. Thus, the key distinction between these types of cultures is
the source of risk. The propensity to be risk seeking or risk averse depends
on either the reward structure (for individualists) or on norms (for
collectivists). For individualists risk varies with the payoffs to be gained
from the negotiation. The stakes are understood in terms of payoffs. For
collectivists, risk varies with the group’s assessment of the importance of
the talks. The stakes are construed in terms of group values. This then has
implications for the negotiating process.

Process
Decision making in negotiation is a combination of probabilistic and
preferential thinking. Risk can be understood in terms of subjective
probabilities rather than utilities. In this way, estimating potential risk is a
cognitive/information processing activity. It deals more with expectations
than with preferences or desires. Thus, it is calculable with the step-by-step
procedures developed by decision theorists working in the context of
negotiation cases: For examples, see Raiffa (1982) on the Panama Canal
talks, Ulvila (1990) on the Philippines base rights negotiations, and Ulvila
and Snyder (1980), on multilateral Coast Guard oil tanker negotiations. Of
interest is the impact of this approach on the negotiation process. It orients
the process toward a problem-solving discussion (especially when all
parties agree to perform the calculations), provides information about the
other’s preferences and interests, defines the issues and underlying interests
more clearly, provides a shared vocabulary, coordinates expectations, and,
by finding optimal outcomes, produces better agreements. In other words,
the metric-driven process provides a more precise way of evaluating gains
and losses, thereby reducing the perception of risk – by reducing
uncertainties about the other’s preferences and about the future. It also has
the effect of increasing calculus-based trust, which, as I discussed above, is
a correlate of risk.
Another way of inducing predictability in the negotiation process is
by encouraging reciprocity. Referred to as a concession-making dance
(Druckman, 2007), an exchange of concessions is considered to be a
defining feature of bargaining. A challenge for negotiators is to define the
terms – as a quid pro quo – of the exchange. Variants on the idea of tit-for-
tat (TFT) have been shown to guide the process, particularly the pattern
referred to as comparative reciprocity (Stoll and McAndrew, 1986).
Bargainers respond primarily to a difference between them in the size of
concessions made in a previous round (Druckman and Harris, 1990). They
adjust their moves to close an asymmetry in concessions. A strong

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preference for synchrony is not, however, limited to concession making. It

has been found to occur also for negotiating rhetoric and perhaps extends to
nonverbal expressions, turn taking, and perceptions of the conflict (Taylor,
2008). Although the predictability that results from these behavioral
patterns reduces perceived risk, it steers the process away from the sort of
exchanges of information that lead to better agreements. Perceptions of
fairness that derive from predictable exchanges are important to sustaining
the process; the less predictable, and risky, attempts to share information
about values and needs are more likely to produce integrative agreements
(Conlon et al, 1994).
Avoiding risk can mean missing out on opportunities. Negotiators
are torn between settling on available terms and holding out for better
terms. A key is to foster trust, which, as Malhotra as pointed out, is
particularly elusive under high stress, high stakes conditions. He lists a
number of strategies for influencing perceptions of trustworthiness at the
bargaining table (Malhotra, 2004). Many of these strategies deal with clear
communication, especially when unilateral concessions are made.
Emphasizing the relational, rather than the deal-making, aspect of
negotiation, a unilateral concession – labeled as such – can build the
confidence needed to move the process away from impasses or escalatory
TFT spirals toward problem solving (Druckman, 1990). But, it may also be
the case that increased toughness, such as “playing hard to get” or walking
out at critical moments, can invigorate the process. Case-study evidence
has shown that crises often precipitate departures in the direction of
progress (Druckman, 2001). The challenge for negotiators is to balance
risk-reducing and risk-inducing moves to achieve the dual aims of settling
conflicts and resolving them.

Conditions
Two conditions that influence perceptions of risk are the publicity
surrounding negotiation and time pressure. Public talks play into the hands
of hardened constituencies and other parties with interests in the outcome.
Negotiators are inclined to play it safe, which often means steadfastly
adhering to publicly stated positions. We have plenty of evidence, from
experiments and cases, to affirm the relationship between publicity and
inflexibility (e.g., Druckman, 1993; Druckman and Druckman, 1996):
Simply stated, it would be risky to concede in the eyes of supporters,
because such actions incur reputation costs. On the other hand, the risks of
impasse are heightened if concessions are not made. Private venues allow
for exploratory discussions, which include tacit bargaining, that could
improve the chances to carve out an acceptable agreement. Opportunities

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for improved joint outcomes occur when all negotiating parties recognize
that both their own and the others’ constituencies expect to win. This
recognition encourages a change of venue, usually out of the limelight of
the media. Known as a boundary role dilemma, a variety of communication
tactics have been described by Walton and McKersie (1965) and Schelling
(1957). Most important is the way that the agreement, hammered out in
private, is communicated to principals. A challenge for all parties is to sell
the agreement to supporters who have been kept at a distance from the
process. A risk is rejection of the agreement because of limited information
about the trade-offs that ensued and reduced confidence in the veracity of
their representative.
Time pressures increase the perception of risk in two ways: by
speeding the process and by forcing a decision. The former reduces the
opportunities to probe for important information that would contribute to a
reduction of risk. The temptation is to reach for a settlement that fails to
address the source of the problem. The latter, known also as a decision
dilemma, increases the attractiveness of alternatives to the terms on the
table. However, the party with the more attractive alternatives can walk
away without incurring the risks associated with a sub-optimal agreement.
Time pressure can also be beneficial if it helps to seal a good agreement
ready to be signed by all parties. It reduces the risks entailed by impasses
(Druckman, 1990a).
Third parties are often needed to bring conflicting parties to the
table. A reluctance to “speak with the enemy” turns on perception of risks.
This may involve a weighting process that often comes down in favor of
continued fighting. We have learned quite a lot about the conditions for
negotiating, particularly about the escalating costs of violence (Zartman,
2000). We know less about strategies used by third parties to encourage
combatants to talk. Perhaps communications intended to reduce the
perceived risks of negotiation play an important role. Properly framed,
messages can effectively induce parties to come to the table – where they
will face other risks associated with possible agreements.
Mediators can also induce parties to re-evaluate the costs of various
possible agreements. This re-evaluation is influenced by changing
perceptions of risk. Interestingly, biased mediators have been shown to be
more effective than neutral mediators in producing durable outcomes. In
attempting to protect the interests of their clients, biased mediators are
more likely than neutral mediators to provide security guarantees and
justice provisions that increase the durability of the agreement. They can
also deliver concessions to the other side that they would be reluctant to
make on their own (Kydd, 2006). This two-fold function of biased

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mediation – protecting and delivering – influences risk calculations. But,

risk is also influenced by events over which negotiators have limited
control. Leadership and policy changes, new developments in related talks,
and unexpected events can alter the evaluation of the negotiator’s three-fold
choice – to stop talking, to pause, or to go for the available terms (Ikle,
1964). Each option carries risk in a rapidly changing environment within
which the negotiations are embedded. In such environments active
negotiators play more the passive roles of monitors of changes (Druckman,
1978).

Outcomes
Negotiation outcomes include impasse (no agreement), capitulation or
asymmetrical agreements, symmetrical compromises, and integrative
solutions. These types of outcomes turn on the distinction between
settlement and resolution. The former emphasizes getting deals; the latter
promotes longer-term relationships. The distinction also suggests a trade
between short and long-term risk. To the extent that settlements – whether
symmetrical or asymmetrical – facilitate the calculation of costs and
benefits, they reduce short-term risk: Distributions of benefits and losses
are known. The risk in the long term is that the sources of the problem have
not been addressed. To the extent that resolutions improve relations among
the parties, they reduce long-term risk. The risk in the short term is that
immediate benefits are difficult to calculate.
It is also the case, however, that perceptions of agreements change
over time. What seemed like a fair deal at the time it was negotiated is re-
evaluated in light of new developments. For example, shifting coalitions of
trading partners, new information or discoveries, and depreciation or
obsolescence of products can cause signatories to agreements to re-evaluate
their obligations. The problem is further aggravated when parties have
different perceptions of the changing value of agreements. The impact of
these events – over which parties have limited control – on agreements can
be reduced by scheduled reviews or re-negotiations. Nonetheless, they
threaten the durability of the agreement as discussed in the next section.

Implementation
Provisions for implementing agreements influence risk perceptions as well.
Distinctions between binding and non-binding and self-regulating vs. non-
self regulating agreements are relevant. Binding agreements – such as
treaties – are more difficult to negotiate but less risky to implement.
Likewise, self-regulating agreements are easier to negotiate but run the risk

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of heightened suspicions about breaches. Thus, perceived risk is linked to

the durability of agreements. Increased risk that an agreement will be
breached – as in non-binding, self-regulated agreements – can lead to
accusations that unravel its terms. Interestingly, we found that binding
agreements are easier to negotiate in bilateral than in multilateral talks:
More knowledge of one’s negotiating opponent reduces the perceived risk
(Druckman, 1997). We know less about the impact of different types of
monitoring protocols on perceived risk. The key distinction is between
relying on contractual provisions or on regime-based norms. The former
would seem to reduce the need to depend on trust, defined either as
predictability or shared identities. The latter increases the importance of
trust development. This suggests a couple of research questions: Are
binding provisions (and sanctions) written into the agreement more
effective in preventing breaches than normative (regime-based) provisions?
Do the contractual provisions reduce the perception of risk more or less
than relying on cooperative norms?
The durability of agreements may also depend on the extent to
which the sources of conflict are addressed in the provisions. Recent
research on peace agreements showed that durability is influenced by the
number of justice principles contained in the text of the agreement. Fewer
violations occurred when more principles of distributive justice were
included. More specifically, principles of justice moderated the impact of
the intensity of the conflict environment: More principles reduced the
negative impact of intense conflict environments; they also reinforced the
positive effects of less intense environments (Druckman and Albin, 2011).
These findings were accounted for largely by one of the four principles,
namely, equality. An implication of these findings is that agreements that
address the sources of conflict – in these cases, a lack of perceived equality
– are more likely to be successfully implemented.
There is an interesting circularity in the relationship between
outcomes and implementation. On the one hand, favorable outcomes –
particularly when sources of conflict are addressed – improve the chances
for successful implementation. On the other hand, favorable prospects for
implementing the agreements improve the chances that the parties will
reach agreement. These prospects turn on the views expressed by
constituents. Expectations for smooth implementation encourage sealing
the agreement. Strong support for the agreement, especially when
symmetric, facilitates the implementation stage. However, it is also the case
that constituencies are not monolithic. Divided constituencies pose
problems for implementation. The mix of hawks and doves on both sides of
the Israeli-Palestinian divide has caused problems for implementing peace

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agreements, most notably those that emerged from the Oslo process. The
support that is signaled to each party by the other’s unity bolsters the
chances for successful implementation (Malhotra and Ginges, 2005).
Unified constituencies also reduce the opportunities that spoilers will
emerge to unravel agreements (Stedman, 2000).

Profiles of Risk Perceptions

The framework shown in Figure 1 organizes the factors that influence risk
perceptions. These factors can be regarded as a profile of risk in
negotiation. The figure presents them in the direction of high risk. An
example of a high-risk negotiation is the case of talks between the Aquino
regime in the Philippines and the National Democratic Front (NDF)
insurgency (Druckman and Green, 1995). The two-week negotiation in
1986 – shortly after the Aquino regime took office – ended in an impasse,
leading to escalation of the internal conflict. The negotiation was risky for
both parties: Concessions made by regime negotiators would be viewed
with skepticism by constituents; NDF concessions could have resulted in
co-optation which would have de-moralized the movement. The talks can
be depicted as follows:
 Issues: high-stakes, multiple security issues;
 Parties: mutual mistrust, no record of past negotiations, rewards for
risk-taking on both sides;
 Process: difficult to calculate benefits/costs, asynchronous concession
making, tough tactics by NDF negotiators;
 Conditions: high time pressure, front-page daily newspaper coverage in
the Philippines, high accountability, biased third party;
 Outcome: impasse, joint dissatisfaction;
 Aftermath: divided constituencies, sources of conflict unresolved,
return to fighting.
An example of a relatively low-risk negotiation is a trade tariffs case
between South Korea and the United States about export of Korean
manufactured running shoes in 1977 (Odell and Lang, 1988). Although
difficult at times, the talks produced an agreement on quotas and tariffs that
satisfied both delegations. The negotiation can be depicted as follows:
 Issues: a few trade issues, moderate stakes ;

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 Parties: knowledge-based trust between allies, previous negotiating

experience by both delegations, somewhat attractive alternatives for the
Koreans, rewards for being risk averse;
 Process: calculable costs and benefits, concessions made on both sides,
moderately tough tactics used by the Korean delegation;
 Conditions: moderate time pressure, private talks largely ignored in the
US media, US negotiators accountable to the shoe industry, no third
parties, no external events;
 Outcomes: compromise agreement reached, long-term market access
taken into account;
 Implementation: ratified treaty with occasional breaches in the short
term, mostly unified constituent support on both sides.
An example of a moderate risk case is the 1975-76 negotiations
between Spain and the US over bases in Spain, described in Druckman
(1986). Although this was a difficult negotiation, lasting much longer than
expected, it did result in an agreement to extend the mutual defense pact
between these allies. A security risk for both sides was non-renewal of the
bases. Spanish attempts to link base rights to NATO membership placed
the bases in jeopardy. However, a lack of alternatives for both sides assured
the eventual agreement. The negotiation can be depicted as follows:
 Issues: several high stakes security issues;
 Parties: knowledge-based trust between allies, previous negotiating
experience on these issues, unattractive alternatives for both, risk-
taking rewards only for Spain;
 Process: some uncertainties (due to world events) in attempts to
calculate costs and benefits, asynchronous concessions (more given by
the US during the process), tough tactics by Spain;
 Conditions: high time pressure (previous agreement expires), private
talks with limited media coverage, high accountability to constituents, a
sudden external event (death of Franco);
 Outcome: asymmetrical agreement favoring the US, long-term
consequences taken into account through the Treaty on Friendship and
Cooperation;
 Implementation: binding ratified treaty, sources of conflict unresolved,
somewhat divided constituencies on both sides.
These examples illustrate how the framework’s factors can be used to
judge the likely risks confronted by negotiating delegations. The profiles
shown above are a form of risk assessment. But, the framework also

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highlights connections between the factors. The connections may be

reinforcing or offsetting. Reinforcing connections are illustrated by a set of
factors that move in the same direction, toward either low or high risk.
Offsetting factors are illustrated by a set of factors that lead in different
directions, leading to moderate risks. Examples for each category of risk
are the following:
 High risk (reinforcing factors): security negotiations conducted in a
climate of mistrust and time pressure will produce tough tactics that
result in impasses.
 Low risk (reinforcing factors): bilateral trade talks conducted between
allies (mutual knowledge-based trust) in private will encourage
calculations of costs and benefits resulting in a durable agreement.
 Moderate risk (offsetting factors): asymmetrical alternatives (more
attractive for one of the parties) in a climate of trust (parties are allies)
and high time pressure produce asynchronous concessions that lead to
one-sided agreements. These agreements will be stable in the short run.
The systematic analysis performed in this chapter is compatible with
Christophe Dupont’s approach to scholarship. The interweaving of
frameworks, cases, and risk is a hallmark of his work. I was pleased to add
his narrative on research findings about risk to my training package. I am
doubly pleased to having been given an opportunity to contribute to this
volume in honor of one of my favorite colleagues. It is my hope that the
combination of analysis and synthesis illustrated here serves as a guide for
basic and applied research in the field.

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 CHAPTER 10

NEGOTIATION: POST-MODERN OR ETERNAL?

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN *

“Do we need a theory of negotiation?” and “What theory do we need?”

asks Christophe Dupont in his masterful summation of negotiation research
and analysis. The question is basic and important, and his subsequent
discussion carries the same informed insights that are the hallmark of his
lifetime of work in the area of negotiation. Dupont’s La Négociation :
Conduite, théorie, applications (1982, first edition) stands with a few other
leaders in the field such as Roy Lewicki’s (2001) book by the same name
or Terrence Hopmann’s (1996) work on The Negotiation Process and the
Resolution of International Conflicts as a comprehensive synthesis of our
knowledge of the subject, and as the only such work not just in French but
to come from the whole European continent. In an attempt to pursue his
discussion by taking up Dupont’s challenging question, the following
discussion will assert that we have plenty of negotiation theories, none of
them conclusive, that a single authoritative theory is impossible and an
attempt to assert one is undesirable, and that instead some new directions
and new analytical questions are the worthy and inviting avenues of further
research (and further analysis in Christophe’s next work, for he is eternal
and indefatigable!).
Dupont’s search for an answer to his own question begins with the
affirmation that we do not now have such a theory, so it is worth beginning
the following attempt to grapple with his provocative question with a
discussion of that assertion. Theory can have many meanings, but the
applicable one here is “an analytical model that explains a phenomenon
using specific terms of analysis to order empirical data.” With this
definition, it is clear that there may be many different theories explaining a
single phenomenon, made possible by using different terms of analysis.
––––––––––––––
*
Reprinted with authorization from Colson, A. ed. (2011), Entrer en négociation. Mélanges
en l’honneur de Christophe Dupont. Bruxelles: Larcier, chapter 4.

International Negotiation: Foundations, Models, and Philosophies. Careers in Negotiation and Conflict
Management Research, Christophe Dupont. Aurélien Colson, Daniel Druckman, and William Donohue
(eds.) 209-224 © 2013 Republic of Letters Publishing. All rights reserved.
I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN

And indeed, there are many theories purporting at least to explain outcomes
in negotiation.

OLD NEGOTIATION THEORIES

This observation in fact agrees with Dupont’s (2006, 142-143) own

references. I too (Zartman 1989/1991) have divided the analysis of
negotiation into five “schools,” which may be equated with different
theories of negotiation. The structural school provides an explanation using
means of power as the explanatory variable, asserting that the strongest
wins. The strategic school employs ends or the relative evaluation of
outcomes as an explanation, through game theory. The processual school of
economic analysts uses concession rates as their analytical variable
whereby the party least cost resistant concedes. The behavioral school uses
personality types as its variable and explains outcomes by the mis/matching
of personalities. The integrative school envisions a staged process in which
the explanation of outcomes is given through appropriate actions in each
stage.
None of these theories is wrong; all have epistemological or
ontological weaknesses, as Dupont points out. The integrative approach,
while most useful practically and justified by reality, is weak as theory; its
explanatory variable is soft and its analytical propositions are overly
general. Even more challenging, the prize lessons of integrative
negotiation—negotiate by constructing a new frame of concession and
compensation are not satisfactory—is beyond any theorizing by its very
nature, since it depends on inventing a new perception of stakes “outside
the box.” The behavioral school is no better, since personality types are not
the subject of much consensus and the matter of appropriate matches is the
subject of little research (Schell 1999). The processual school is exemplary
theory, so rigid as to be unreal and beyond the reach of real world data;
furthermore, once concession rates are ascertained, the game is over.
Processual analysis as a paradigm rather than a theory is the basis of an
understanding of negotiation, since it is a process by nature, but The
strategic school tells best when negotiations will not occur, and when
loosened to include the variant termed “negotiation analysis” it tells how to
avoid negotiation (Young 1991; Raiffa et al 2002; Avenhaus & Zartman
2007).
This leaves structural analysis, which might be thought to combine
with process, as it does in many social science theories, to provide a
clinching approach. Unfortunately, the basic analytical element, power, is
theoretically weak, despite its key importance for political science, for
example. In its classical definition as resource possession, it is crude and

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often wrong: Resources do not produce a determinate result. In its

behavioral definition, as the ability to move another party in an intended
direction, it is one-sided and consequentialist. In its articulated definition,
as an action/exercise intended to move a party in a given direction,
separating source, action, and consequence, it opens up the phenomenon to
research that has not yet been conducted.
But in any case, power is a curious concept because it depends on
its target! Not only is the notion itself subjective but its action or effect
depends on its object. If the Other does not want to be moved and can
resist, there is no power. Or alternatively, there is a power contest, leaving
measurement of the variable as difficult as before. Furthermore, there is a
counter-element contrasting with power, comprising such elements as
commitment and justice (Zartman et al 1996; Zartman & Kremenyuk 2005;
Albin 2001; Berton, Kimura & Zartman 1999). These elements stand
behind the ability (power?) to refuse power, and yet they are even more
impermeable to theorization than power itself. Indeed they may be part of
power—a resource—but unstable and intangible. More on this below, but
for the moment, it leaves structural analysis only heuristic and illustrative.
None of this is new, but it bears repeating. On this background we
can return to the initial question about the need for a theory of negotiation,
precondition to the second question about which theory. The very nature of
theory, as discussed, indicates that at best there is a need for theories and
that any pretension at a single theory is open to challenge from others using
other terms of analysis. The incomplete theories mentioned above, and
others, can stand a good deal of refinement but even that will not put them
in a position to claim to be the theory of negotiation, and to pursue that
claim would be pointless.
But in addition to such limitations, which may be termed
procedural, there are also substantive limitations. Theorizing about
negotiation—as opposed to a looser notion such as paradigm selection or
approach—runs up against a very soft subject related to the nature of the
process itself. First, negotiation is both symmetrical and asymmetrical at
the same time. On one hand, any analytical knowledge available to one side
is available to the other, so that every move has a counter-move and every
counter-move has a counter-counter-move, and so on. This does not means
that both ides have the same information; rather, they both tend to have
incomplete information and negotiate under uncertainty (Avenhaus &
Sjöstedt 2009), although they may not have the same information gaps and
uncertainty. On the other hand, all negotiations are asymmetrical in power
(to return to that uncertain but necessary concept). There is no symmetry in
the real world, as opposed to the laboratory (which poses a real problem for

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experimentation), and even so-called equals may well by asymmetrical in

different things.
Second, negotiation is a matter of choice, not necessarily rational in the
sense usually used, but rational by other criteria. As long as humans can act
erratically stupid and unexpectedly brilliant, the best that theories can do is
to tell how it’s done when it’s done best. That’s no small beer, but it is a
limit to scientific method.

NEW NEGOTIATION APPROACHES

As a result, a more helpful tack could well be to seek to ask new questions
and look for new angles of negotiation analysis. A good half a dozen come
to mind about ways of looking at negotiations: Negotiation as a choice of
partners, as an establishment of relations, as a contest of alternatives, as a
confrontation of power (redefined), as a process of elimination, or as
problem-solving. This article will examine three of these, leaving space for
others to pick up the challenge.

Negotiation as a choice of partners

Instead of studying (and conducting) negotiations as a search for an
agreeable outcome between two positions or interests, what Dupont (2006,
142-143) calls the predominant paradigm, negotiations can be considered a
search for appropriate partners, with the general shape of the outcome
being inherent in the choice of parties. Negotiation has been analysed
almost universally as an encounter between parties attempting to resolve
the incompatibilities—that is, the conflict—between their positions on
given issues. It has been defined as the process combining conflicting
positions into a common outcome, under a decision rule of unanimity. The
focus is on the issue and the divergent positions held on its substance; the
assumption is that the common outcome will be found somewhere in
between the conflicting positions through concessions and compensations
or overcoming their incompatibilities through construction or reframing.
This image of the prenegotiation situation is captured clearly in game
theoretic presentations, either in matrical or the extended form where
outcomes are graded according to their attractiveness to the two defining
parties. In all this, the parties are assumed, and are relevant only to the
extent that they are bearers of the incompatible positions.
But what if the parties are not evident? What if the conflicting
positions are indeed present but disembodied, not fully represented by any
actor but awaiting their formulator and spokesman? What if a number of
parties are the grist of the conflict but they are not fully aware of what they

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are fighting for, only aware of whom (in the plural) they are fighting
against? And what if, in addition, the ideational conflict concerns notions of
identity and its implications, things done to and by people identified in
ascriptive terms, yet with no consensual representative and spokesman for
the aggrieved and/or the aggriever? Negotiation in these conditions
becomes merely a philosophical exercise, irrelevant to the conflict, a game
of ideas in search of actors, a decision-making process awaiting decision-
makers. Yet this is the condition of many of the world’s current conflicts.
Aggrieved groups await saviors who offer ‘identity’ in periods of social
disintegration, groups whose only purpose is to fight, to whom identity give
purpose and prospect. After a while the problem becomes that the party
cannot change without losing its identity.
Of course, the role of parties as opposed to substantive issues is
recognized in the current approach to negotiation analysis. The parties are
present at the side of the matrices and at the levels of the extended form of
game theory analysis, and they are the agents of concession, compromise
and construction. In structural analysis, they are the bearers of power and in
process analysis they are the vehicles of the process. Even in ripeness
theory, it is the parties who hold the perceptions that constitute the principle
elements of ripeness. The two-level approach to negotiation incorporates
different types of actors and bases analysis on their relationship, although it
is not the actors but their positions on the issues that determines the
dynamic. In all of these, the actors are assumed to exist as the beginning
point of the analysis, much as economic concession analysis and game
theory assume a fixed opening position in precise terms. None of this is
realistic in many current conflicts, or if/when it finally is, some of the mot
important dynamics have been glossed over, just as concession and game
theoretic analyses did for the substantive process.
Under these conditions a different approach to negotiation is
required. It will begin with a different definition of the subject: Negotiation
is a process of identifying an appropriate partner and constructing a joint
pact. The focus in this approach is on the parties, who become the vehicles,
representatives and articulators of the positions but whose selection for
treating these matters and for the establishment of a pact is the subject of
the negotiation; it is the pact, not the settlement of the issue, that is their
outcome. This approach requires more detailed treatment of several
aspects: the nature of the pact, the nature and process of the selection, and
the relation between the actors and the issues.
Starting at the end, negotiation is defined as the process of
constructing a pact between the parties. To begin with, a distinction has to
be made between sides and parties. A side is the spectrum of actors,

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collective and individual, who are implicated in the rebel and government
elements of the conflict, whereas “party” refers to the groups or individuals
representing the sides and engaged in the negotiations. Not all parties on
either side will be involved in the negotiations, only those accepted by each
side as partners in a future pact. The pact is an agreement to cooperate in
the establishment of future relations and the handling (management or
resolution) of the conflict. It sets out the terms of that management or
resolution, but it also engages the parties to cooperate together in a new
political relationship. As such it includes and also excludes, in two major
decisions. The pact recognizes and legitimizes the parties involved, each
acknowledging the other’s status as representative of its side. It also
codifies a decision in regard to spoilers, whether they should be included at
the cost of substantive difficulty or excluded at the cost of procedural
difficulty. Finally, the pact codifies substantive decisions on the content of
the agreement and the issues of the conflict it covers.
References to well-known situations illustrate these questions. A
most interesting case is the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in
Sudan. The natural and accepted representative of the South was the
Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA/M), but the
representative of the North was more significant. It could have been either
the government or governing party (Sudanese National Congress [SNC])
that held power in the North, or the opposition parties that most observers
agree represent the majority of the Northern population, or both. A pact
with the opposition parties was already tried, in the Koka Dam agreement
of 1986, which made no major impact on the conflict. So it was the
government, to the exclusion of the majoritarian parties, that made the pact
with the SPLA/M, letting the latter into a joint government, excluding the
other parties, and strengthening the SNC for the upcoming elections. At
Oslo in 1993, the Israeli government chose to recognize and make a pact
with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), to the exclusion of and
against Hamas; the Oslo Agreement gave birth to the Palestine Authority
(PA) governing an autonomous Palestinian area. After the 2006 election
that brought Hamas to power, some movement was begun to renegotiate a
new and fuller pact between the PLO/PA and Israel, again to the exclusion
of Hamas. Negotiations in South Africa in the early 1990s were dominated
as much by the question of who was making the transitional pact out of
apartheid as by the contents of the pact itself. Although the Conference for
a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and its successor, the Multi-Party
Conference, were ostensibly multilateral meetings of all political parties,
they were in fact bilateral pacting sessions between the African National
Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP), operating under but not

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involving the NP-dominated government; to come to fruition at the end,

this bilateral pact was opened slightly to include the Inkatha Freedom Party
(IFP). In Rwanda in 1993, the overarching question in the negotiations
between the Rwandan People’s Front (RPF), the Rwandan National
Movement for Development (MRND), and the opposition parties was
whether the racist and ultimately génocidaire Coalition for the Defense of
the Revolution (CDR) would be included or not (Leader 2001). The final
pact between the three groups was not wholeheartedly accepted by any of
them and was destroyed by the excluded spoilers, who would doubtless
have made any agreement impossible if included. In each of these cases,
and many others, negotiations were dominated by a choice of pacting
partner and an exclusion of others, with the choice of parties to the pact
determining its substantive contents. It would be silly to discount the
intricate negotiations that went on over the substance of the emerging
agreement, but what was negotiated was determined by who negotiated it.
Thus it is not merely that the guest list characterizes the signatories
of pact; it also determines its formula for agreement. In Sudan, the
inclusion of the SPLA/M meant that a secular state with religious freedom
in at least the South would be the outcome, but the selection of the SNC as
the partner meant that the SPLA/M would be brought into a government
where the SNC held critical elements of power, including control of the
election process in the North. The basis of the Oslo Agreement was the
mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO, one as a state and the other as the
movement representative of its people, an unequal status that was reflected
in all the provisions of the agreement. In South Africa, the two leading
parties were recognized as the parties sharing power in the transitional
government that would institute free and fair elections and majority rule. In
Rwanda, the selection of the parties, even without the CDR, determined an
agreement that none could live with and where the MRND’s adherence was
never fully confirmed. In all these cases, the inclusion of the parties to the
pact determined its basic formula, rather than the reverse.
Thus, it is the process of selecting the parties that is the major
focus of the negotiations. There is also a temporal element in this contest.
In the course of the rebellion, when the petition phase fails, it is followed
by a consolidation phase in the conflict (Zartman, 1996). Within the rebel
side, factions evolve and turn to a contest among themselves for leadership
and representation of their reference group. This contest tends to be more
violent that the conflict with the government itself, and its outcome
determines the strategy and tactics that the rebels will adopt when they do
turn their guns on the government. Although this contest determines who
will eventually negotiate for the rebel cause and with the government, it

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puts those negotiations on hold until leadership is decided. Even afterward,

it can continue to pose problems for substantive negotiations in the form of
spoilers and single-shooters if the selection process for leadership is not
conclusive or if the tactic represented by the winning leadership faction
flags. In this phase negotiation is counterproductive and even subversive to
consolidation, and parties who would try to negotiate the conflict before the
leadership contest is decided will find themselves in danger. Selection of a
spokesman is dependent on the outcome of the consolidation phase of the
rebellion, although it can also influence it, one way or another. Meanwhile,
the substantive negotiation process may have to wait, till the selection of
parties is accomplished.
But the temporal element is not over. As negotiations proceed and
the possibility of payoffs for participation become apparent, the number of
parties proliferates. Break-away groups adopt a single-shooting strategy,
hoping to gather the goodies of an agreement for themselves, or else a buy-
in strategy in which they seek to share some of the collective benefits. Left
out, they become spoilers—tactical spoilers, in Stedman’s (2000) term—
holding out until they can eek out the last drop of power from their position
(Shapley and Shubik 1954).
How then is selection accomplished? Within the rebellion, factional
leadership will be negotiated by two criteria: the physical strength of the
various factions and the proposed tactics’ appeal to their referent group.
The first indicates that the contest for leadership will be an active political,
and soon violent, conflict among the factions, as noted. Intimidation, group
battles and, more often, individual assassinations are characteristic. The
second is less direct and empirical evidence is often hard to find, both for
the analyst and the participants, making it more uncertain and prolonged
(Lilja 2010, 2011). Putative leaders have to prove that they accurately
represent the tenor of opinion among the group they propose to represent;
this is indeed the material of any political campaign, but there is no
scheduled election to confirm the decision: It is a campaign without a
formal ending. On the government side, there are similarities, but big
difference. Assassination and pitched battle generally do not take place, and
the campaign is generally ended by a formal selection of government
spokesmen. However, interagency and intra-leadership conflicts may well
continue after formal selection has been accomplished.
Negotiating selection is indicated by ripeness theory as well. In
addition to the two substantive elements of ripeness, mutually hurting
stalemate and way out, the need has often been emphasized for a third,
procedural element, the presence of a valid spokesman (Zartman, 1989).
Although necessary, the first two are insufficient if there is no

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representative and authoritative party to speak for its side, feel the existence
of the other two subjective elements, and undertake to negotiate as a result.
In this entire process of selection by negotiation, the relation between the
procedural (selection) and substantive negotiations has to be kept in mind
by the participants as well as analysts. Selection negotiations determine the
scope of substantive negotiations, and the intended Zone of Possible
Agreement (ZOPA) of substantive negotiations determines the range of
selectable parties. However, at the same time, the internal dynamics within
each side also influence the range of selectable parties and the ultimate
selection process. The first prize for pacting purposes is to do deals with
core identity groups; the second prize however is to do the same with
meaningful breakaway or softer identity groups. The first option may
produce meaningful peaces, the second weakens the opposition in terms of
backing but has the risk of hardening it and pushing it to more radical
action. This may of course suit those who seek to vilify it as evil. At best it
may produce a fragile peace subject to ongoing attacks and raise the
question also of who defines spoilers. Spoilers for radical elements are
those who enter pacts and erode group solidarity, for the peacemakers they
are the ideological recalcitrants. At some point the softliners might have to
become tougher than the hardliners in the interests of the larger whole.
There are many examples to illustrate this process. Consolidation is
the normal process in any revolt, illustrated along others by the internecine
battles among the Algerian nationalists in the 1950s, the Angolan
nationalists in the 1960s that lasted out the century, the Eritrean nationalists
in the 1960s, the Tamil nationalists in the 1970s, and the Sahrawi
nationalists in the 1970s, putting off negotiations until the movement had
achieved a dominant voice. Preparation and maturation for negotiations
was a major problem for Renamo in Mozambique throughout the 1980s, for
the RUF in Sierra Leone in the 1980s and 1990s, and for the ELN in
Colombia, further delaying substantive negotiations until the rebel
organizations were consolidated and then trained to negotiate, not always
with success. Proliferation bedeviled the rebel movements in Liberia in the
1990s, the Burundian rebels in the 2000s, the Southern Sudanese rebels in
the early 2000s, and the Congolese rebels during the War of Zairean
Succession in the 1990s, among others. The Darfur rebels in the 2000s
never did consolidate and their negotiations were plagued by maturation
and proliferation problems throughout the early 2000s. In Colombia, in the
mid-1980s when the government offered a normalization process for the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the movement
underwent a “soft split,” the moderates forming the Patriotic Union (UP)
with the skeptical assent of the radical wing. Success of the opening was

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cut short by the assassination of most of its leaders by right-wing

paramilitaries. In the PLO, the attempted opening in the 1970s met a
similarly violent end but from the radical core of the Organization, who
assassinated moderate leaders open to contacts with Israel.
More developed negotiation processes of selection occurred in
other conflicts. In 1998, US mediators made contacts with various factions
in the Kosovo Liberation Amy (KLA) in an effort to seize the moment
when negotiations with Serbia appeared possible. The attempts ended up in
the constitution of a heterogeneous delegation to formal negotiations at
Rambouillet, although earlier chances of productive contacts that might
have foreclosed a Serbian offensive were missed. In the Oslo talks the two
sides actually negotiated appropriate representatives from either side.
Preceding Oslo, Israel sought informal contacts with the PLO in the
shadow of the stalled Madrid/Washington talks. The Oslo themselves
began with discussions between private Israelis and authorized PLO
officials, after Israel had tested the official status of the Palestinians by
requiring them to produce a procedural change in the behavior of the
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Washington talks. After five rounds
of talks, the PLO delegation told the private Israelis that they would
continue no further until they could talk with Israeli officials, which
produced the arrival of Uri Savir and then Joel Singer as official
representatives. In the following decade and thereafter, Israel and the
Palestinian Authority (Fatah) are actually negotiating with each other over
the appropriate spokesman for the Palestianians, including the role of
Hamas and the selection of a leader to succeed Mahmous Abbas, including
quintuple life sentenced Barghouti.
In Northern Ireland, the British held secret talks with Sinn
Fein/IRA representatives as the Belfast process began to take shape,
gradually brining in appropriate Republican spokesmen, a process that
continued all the way until the Good Friday Agreement, when Sinn Fein
was excluded on two occasions as punishment for infringing the Mitchell
Principles and then let back in to continue the talks. In South Africa,
businessmen and even official representatives of the government began
contacts with African National Congress (ANC) leaders as early as the mid-
1980s, finally shaping the terms of a formula—non-violence in exchange
for legality—that was the basis for the release of Nelson Mandela, the
unbanning of the ANC, and the beginning of the negotiations (Zartman
1996). These are just some salient and condensed examples of the long and
delicate process of negotiation over spokesmen that precedes and
determines the subsequent substantive negotiation process, overshadowing
it in importance. The South Africa lesson was the number of levels of

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pacting which took place up and down and across society to stabilize the
political deal-making process and create a groundswell of momentum for
the final outcome, breaking down rigid stereotypes at all levels in society,
not just a simple reliance on political deal-making.
In sum, in order to analyse negotiations in internal identity conflicts
so characteristic of the current era, a new approach is needed to the
negotiation process, focusing not on the usual subject of substantive
determination of outcomes, but on negotiations to select negotiating parties
out of the conflicting sides, and even appropriate spokesmen for these
parties. Once that selection is negotiated, within but also between the sides,
the outlines of the ensuing subsequence agreement have already been
designed, opening up the process for a final agreement as a pact between
parties in the name of sides. Yet the selection negotiations are always open
to upsets and never fully completed until the final pact is signed.

Negotiation as a beginning of relations

Instead of studying (and conducting) negotiations as a search for a final
outcome ending a conflict or a problem between two parties, negotiations
can be considered to be the beginning of a new relationship between those
parties. Negotiation has been analysed and evaluated almost universally as
an attempt to resolve the incompatibilities—that is, conflict—between
parties’ positions on given issues. The definition as the process combining
conflicting positions into a common outcome points to an agreement at the
end of the process (otherwise it is a failure), and the basic analytical
question has been: How to explain outcomes. This analytical posture
mirrors the practitioners’ stance: Get the job done and go home.
But what if negotiation were analysed only as the beginning of the
process of establishing a relationship between parties, with negotiation
standing in regard to relationship in the same way that prenegotiation
stands in regard to negotiation. Getting an agreement would be seen as only
the first step, with a longer (endless?) period constituting the subject of
analysis. Some work has actually been done directly to open this analytical
orientation (Strauss 1978; Thuderoz 2003), showing the way as pioneers.
Stabs in this direction already appear. General negotiation analysis
has moved into post-conflict reconstruction, agreements (Spector &
Zartman 2003), and implementation; a surge of study has gone into the
question of durability (Gartner & Melin 2009); and some new work has
looked at the distinction between agreeing formulas (Conflict Management)
and resolving formulas (Conflict Resolution) (Zartman 2007) and between
backward- and forward-looking outcomes (Zartman and Kremenyuk 2005).
In this work, however, the aftermath is the “downhill” side of negotiation,

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rather than the “uphill” side of a much longer process. Similarly, some
work has focused on developing relationships (Saunders 2009) but they are
seen as “circum-negotiations,” parallel or pacing discussion that
complement the negotiation process and the idea of relationship is seen
(unclearly) as a positive interaction. Similarly, those who denigrate
Management or Resolution in favor of Transformation (Burton 1979)
remain on an idealized and philosophic rather than an empirical and
analytical level.
Very basic problems remain, not the least of which is: Where to
end? Current studies indicate that forward-looking negotiations should not
only end the conflict or fix the problem, but also contain mechanisms for
resolving renewed and new conflict and problems. Negotiation as relation-
building, however, needs to focus further than mere establishment of
mechanisms; it must analyse and evaluate their performance—till when?
Durability studies have taken a 5-year limit out of the blue, impelled by
their quantitative methodology to have a final date, but the limit is as
artificial as it is necessary. Other criteria may be envisaged, such as change
or orientation or relation, continuing provision of new mechanisms,
overcoming tests, and so on. Such questions are part of the new analytical
orientation.
It is difficult to give concrete examples of a path not taken, but
some stand out clearly, at least in outline. The 1979 Washington Peace
Treaty between Egypt and Israel was a successful negotiation that
established an unbroken relation between the two countries for three
decades. That relation was marked by further negotiations regarding Taba,
and disturbed by wars in 1983 and 2006 and rumors of wars in between.
Currently, the two conduct ambivalent relations over the Palestine question.
While there have been good studies of Egyptian-Israeli relations since 1979
as ongoing negotiations (Stein 2005), we are still looking for a study that
provides analytical propositions to guide a conceptual study of negotiation
as relation-building.
Post-agreement negotiations over international regimes have a
built-in mechanism for continuing the negotiation process through regular
Conferences of Parties (COPs) (Spector and Zartman 2003). The 1992
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) set up provisions for
readjustment that led to the Kyoto Protocol, whose last COP was the first
conference for the successor protocol. Since he process is ongoing, no
analysis of negotiations as relation-building has been undertaken. Winham
(1986) made a great step forward by analysis the trade negotiations in the
Tokyo and then Uruguay Round as negotiations, but their is a real

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opportunity to look at the regime-building process through the World Trade

Organization (WTO) as negotiation as relation-building.

Negotiation as a contest of alternatives

Instead of studying (and conducting) negotiations as a search for an
agreeable outcome (or as the beginning of a relationship) between two
positions or interests, negotiations can be considered a contest between
alternatives, with the shape of the outcome being dependent on the strength
of the non-negotiatory options of the parties. Negotiation has been analysed
almost universally as an encounter between parties attempting to resolve
the incompatibilities—that is, the conflict—between their positions on
given issues. The focus is on the issue and the possibility of finding an
outcome that satisfies the needs and demands of both sides; the assumption
is that an acceptable outcome lies somewhere in between the conflicting
positions and that the negotiation process is designed to locate it through
concessions and compensations or create it through construction
(reframing).
But what if that was seen to be only the apparent dynamic, the
result of the parties’ pitting their security points or BATNAs—the
outcomes they can achieve without negotiation—against each other? A
party who can obtain pretty much the same without negotiating as with is in
a strong position and can bargain hard; a party who cannot cannot.
Interestingly, parties negotiate against each other’s positions but also
against each other’s security point, trying to reinforce their own and
weaken their opponent’s. In the course of this bargaining, outcomes more
or less fall into place. Outcomes are determined, not by the parties efforts to
reconcile interests and find a solution (de Callières 1716/2000) nor by the
choice of negotiating partners as noted above, but by the competing
strength of alternatives of the parties.
This of course is a structural analysis with power defined or
determined in a new and specific way, not far from arguments on justice
put forward by Barry (1989) in counter to Rawls (1971). However, unlike
current definitions of power, it does not depend on possessions and it
specifies, as the relational definition does not, what it is that enables the
inflection of one party toward the other’s positions. What those positions
are matters less, for this approach, than the value of an outcome without
negotiation. Resources are relevant, but not as a means of pressure on the
other party, only as the source of a preferable alternative. Power has
sometimes been called “the ability to do without [an agreement]” and the
security point specifies the sources of that ability.

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The evaluation of the alternatives and their worth to each party is

subjective, researchable in their records of the parties, but the existence of
alternatives is objective. Thus, negotiation involves two acts—the
inflection of each other’s objective alternative and the inflection of each
other’s perception of its alternatives. The latter comes first, as in any take
on negotiation, for the process is essentially a battle of persuasions. Parties
work to bring out favorable perceptions of their own proposals and
unfavorable appreciations of the other’s proposals. But in Negotiations as
Alternatives, the persuasion would focus essentially on the alternatives that
give meaning to the actual positions. When this does not work, the parties
try to actually move the other’s security point.
His approach is not foreign—it may be noticed—to ideas about
ripeness: Parties move to negotiation when their alternatives to it are
stalemated, painful (Mutually Hurting Stalemate), and inferior to an
outcome they believe they can achieve together through negotiation (Way
Out). However the Alternative Approach carries this key element through
the entire negotiations, so that every move after the initial opener continues
to reflect a battle of security points. At the same time, the parties cooperate
to craft an outcome that will be better than their security points, although
again, how much better depends on the relative strength of the BATNA for
each party. Whether this be adopted as a coherent approach or not, it is
curious that the relative strength of security points has not been used more
by analysts as a key to their understanding of the mechanics of the
encounter.
Practitioners do use it, although not as much as they could either.
Parties in a conflict who try to improve their ground position as they move
into serious negotiations are bargaining with their alternatives, as are
parties with different time costs (rotting rates) (Cross 1969). Reagan at
Reykjavik convinced Gorbatchev that the Soviet security point was much
less than what the US could obtain without a negotiated agreement and so
had a stronger position in the great bargaining. Other examples would have
to depend on research into actual transcripts.

RÉ-ORIENTATION POUR DEMAIN?

Dupont poses the question at the end of his penetrating work as an

interrogation and a challenge. The old is not worn out; both practitioners
and analysts have a lot to learn from and improve about it. (The work of the
Processes of International Negotiation [PIN] Program at the International
Institute of Applied Systems Analysis [IIASA] that Dupont has often
contributed to [1993/2003, 1994, 2009] shows the inexhaustible supply of
topics still to be explored). But it never hurts to look for new ways to frame

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the question and devise the answers. I have proposed six, developed one,
and outlined two others. There are doubtless still more out there. I hope we
take up Christophe’s challenge, both to dig deeper into the old frame and to
pursue the search for new ones.

REFERENCES

Albin C. (2001), Justice and Fairness in International Relations, Cambridge :

Cambridge University Press.
Avenhaus R. & Sjöstedt G., eds. (2009), Negotiating Risk, Springer.
Avenhaus R. & Zartman I. W., eds. (2007), Diplomatic Games, Springer.
Barry B. (1989), Theories of Justice, University of California Press.
Berton P., Kimura H. & Zartman I W, eds. (1999), International Negotiation:
Actors, Structure/Process, Values, St Martin’s Press.
Burton J. (1979), Deviance, Terrorism and War: The Process of Solvng Unsolved
Social and Political Problems, St Martin’s Press.
Callières, François de (1716/2000), De la manière de négocier avec les princes.
Translated and published by Houghton Mifflin.
Cross J. (1969), The Economics of Bargaining. Basic Books.
Dupont C., Faure G. O. (1993/2003), “The Negotiation Process,” in Victor
Kremenyuk, ed., International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues.
Jossey-Bass.
Dupont C. (1994a), La Négociation, Paris: Dalloz.
–– (1994b), “Coalition Analysis,” in I William Zartman, ed., International
Multilateral Negotiations. Jossey-Bass.
–– (2006). La négociation post-moderne, Editions Publibook Université.
Dupont C. & Wanis A. (2009), “Structural Approaches,” in Franz Cede & Guy-
Olivier Faure, eds., Unfinished Business: Saving International Negotiations
From Failure, IIASA.
Gartner S. S. & Melin M. (2009), “Assessing Outcomes: Conflict Management and
the Durability of Peace”, in Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I.
William Zartman, eds. The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution. Sage.
Hopmann P. T. (1996), The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of
International Conflicts, University of South Carolina Press.
Leader J. (2001), Rwanda struggle for Democracy and Peace 1991-1994,
Washington, The fund for Peace.
Lewicki R, Saunders D. & Minton J. (2001), Essentials of Negotiation. McGraw-
Hill.
Lilja J. (2010), Disaggregating Dissent. University of Uppsala.
–– (2011), “Outbidding and the decision to negotiate”, in Mark Anstey, Paul
Meerts, I. William Zartman (eds.), To Block the Slippery Slope: Reducing
Identity Conflict and Preventing Genocide, Oxford.

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Raiffa H., with John Richardson and David Metcalfe (2002), Negotiation Analysis,
Harvard Belknap.
Rawls J. (1971), A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press.
Shell G R (1999), Bargaining for Advantage, Penguin.
Shapley L. S. & Shubik Morton (1954), “A Method of Evaluating the Distribution
of Power in a Committee System”, American Political Science Review IIL
3:787-792.
Spector B. & Zartman I. W., eds. (2003), Getting It Done: Post-Agreement
Negotiations et International Regimes, USIP.
Stedman S. J. (2000), “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” in Paul Stern and
Daniel Druckman, eds, International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War,
National Academy Press.
Strauss A. (1978), Negotiations: Varieties, Contexts, Processes, and Social Order,
Jossey-Bass.
Thuderoz C. (2003), Négociations : Essai de sociologie du lieu social, Paris, PUF.
Winham G. (1986), International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiations.
Princeton.
Young H Peyton, ed. (1991), Negotiation Analysis. University of Michigan Press.
Zartman I. W. (1989/1991), “Common Elements in the Analysis of the Negotiation
Process,” in F. Mauter-Markoff, ed., Processes of International Negotiatio,
Praeger, reprinted in J. William Breslin & Jeffrey Z. Rubin, eds, Negotiation
Theory and Practice. PON Books.
––, ed. (1995), Elusive Peace, Brookings.
–– et al (2006), “Negotiation as a Search for Justice”, International Negotiation, I,
1:79-98.
––, ed. (2007), Peacemaking in International Conflict, USIP.
Zartman I. W. & Kremenyuk V., eds. (2005), Peace vs. Justice: Negotiating
Forward- vs. Backward-Looking Outcomes, Rowman & Littlefield.

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 CHAPTER 11

DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION, EVOLUTION,

AND EFFECTIVENESS

PAUL MEERTS *

Christophe Dupont greatly contributed to the academic interest in

negotiation processes in France and abroad (Dupont 1994). He is truly the
father, or perhaps the grand-father now, of the French negotiation scene.
Negotiation processes understood here in general, but also and foremost
between states and in international organisations where states are the
constituent members – diplomatic negotiation: negotiation as a tool in
international relations, more specifically in international politics. More
interestingly Dupont added the historical dimension to negotiation thinking,
in particular those of the negotiation processes during the Congress of
Vienna in 1814-1815 (Dupont 2003 and 2005). His focus on French
negotiation history, shared by others like Alain P. Lempereur (2002),
Aurélien Colson (2008) and Lionel Bobot (2008) is in line with French
thoughts about these kinds of processes. Its real value is to add the
historical dimension to Anglo-Saxon academic negotiation discipline which
– in the perception of the author of this contribution to Christophe’s
“Festschrift” – tends to be too much contemporary and quantitative.
A problem however is the centrifugal dynamics of academic
disciplines. They tend not to overlap and have their own ‘gurus’, turning a
blind eye to those of neighbouring academic arenas. Even within the
domain of negotiation, different circles are often not aware of the work
done next door. Academics in the field of negotiation are often separated by
methodological approaches and country affiliations, creating watertight
boundaries to interdisciplinary cooperation. It is here that the Processes of
International Negotiation (PIN), Programme of the International Institute

––––––––––––––
*
Reprinted with authorization from Colson, A. ed. (2011), Entrer en négociation. Mélanges
en l’honneur de Christophe Dupont. Bruxelles: Larcier, chapter 4.

International Negotiation: Foundations, Models, and Philosophies. Careers in Negotiation and Conflict
Management Research, Christophe Dupont. Aurélien Colson, Daniel Druckman, and William Donohue
(eds.) 225-232 © 2013 Republic of Letters Publishing. All rights reserved.
PAUL MEERTS

for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), tries to fill the gap. The same
problem occurs between political science, sociology and psychology, the
networks sometimes do overlap, but more has to be done. The
‘negotiationalists’ know of Christophe and his work, he is a real ‘guru’ in
our field, but do – for example – the historians? Adam Zamoyski’s latest
book, Rites of Peace, is silent about the work of Dupont and of other
negotiation analysts (Zamoyski, 2007). It is high time ‘negotianalists’ are
going to spread the negotiation message into other areas than the social
sciences, foremost into the history realm. The works of Dupont will be
instrumental in the endeavour to have the study of international –
diplomatic – negotiation not only accepted as an asset to social sciences,
but to historical sciences as well 1 .
Outside France several limited, direct (Cohen 2000, Meerts 2005
and 2006, Tischer 2008) and indirect attempts (Numelin 1950, Mattingly
1955, Hamilton 1995, Beckman 1996, Holsti 1991 and 2004) have been
made to understand the significance and structure of negotiation processes
and behaviour in diplomatic history. More should be done on this, as
history gives us some insight into interstate negotiation processes and
negotiators then and now. The value of such research is not purely
historical. Comparisons (Meerts and Beeuwkes 2008) with modern political
interstate negotiation processes add to our understanding of problems and
opportunities we face in our attempts to regulate the relations between
countries in a peaceful way. Research on the interconnectedness between
political systems and bargaining is still to be pulled off the ground, but
without Dupont’s contribution this new branch on the academic negotiation
tree would never had a chance to blossom.

POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND NEGOTIATION PROCESS

Indeed, to what extend does the international and national political system
influences the course of the national and international processes of political
negotiation? And more interestingly perhaps, to what extend does the
negotiation process empowers or weakens the political system in which it
has been contained? The political system is the riverbed, the negotiation
process the water. We might assume that a broad riverbed will give the
water a smooth opportunity to reach its end-stage, the sea. While a narrow
one will force the water into a wild stream with a lot of turbulence,
especially if a part of the surrounding soil hampers the water and forces it
to circumvent these rocks and stones, or even fall down from great height.
––––––––––––––
1
The 13.2 issue of Bertam Spector’s International Negotiation on the Evolution of
Diplomatic Negotiation might be helpful in this respect as well, as does the PIN book on
Evolution, in the planning for a book conference in 2010.

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Making the river inaccessible to boats, thereby being useless as a

connection between to places. And this is what the negotiation process
should do: take us from A to B, but the political environment might be an
unavoidable obstacle. Or ice might prevent shipping, we have frozen
conflicts that cannot be solved through negotiation processes, the issue
becomes intractable for diplomatic bargaining.
We might postulate here that tight political systems, like
dictatorships, will give less operational value to negotiation. Forcing others
will be more common than bargaining with them. Open systems, like
democracies, will give ample opportunity to negotiation as a tool in
political decision making. However, these open systems will have to be
strong and not weak. A weak democracy is open to pressure from other
sources than peaceful processes and might thereby undo the effectiveness
of negotiation. We can clearly observe this in international organisations. If
they are relatively well organised, like the European Union, the process of
negotiation will indeed be quite efficient and effective, thereby making the
use of force less relevant of the sustainability of the political processes.
Whereas a weaker international organisation like the Organisation on
Security and Cooperation in Europe cannot produce such effective
negotiation outcomes. It tends to generate more backward- than forward-
looking outcomes.
But the negotiation process also influences the structure and
strength of the political system of which it is its life-blood. It might erode
the riverbed, it might strengthen it through sedimentation, or it could do
both at the same time. Depending on the spot in the riverbed we are
examining. Some political systems are created through bargaining process,
but most of them need a revolution and a lot of violence before the peaceful
processes could be embedded and made effective. The French – and
perhaps the Russian – revolutions come to mind. In other cases, like that of
Britain, The Netherlands and Switzerland, an evolutionary process could
more or less do the job. In the case of The Netherlands and Switzerland the
very nature of the confederal state structure allowed negotiation to be the
predominant tool in decision making. However, the process of negotiation,
once it got started, socialised politicians in to peaceful policy making. The
problem is the start, but after that the bargaining process will help to
strengthen the political system it is part and parcel of. We can even observe
this in an international/supranational body like the European Union, where
diplomats of twenty seven countries are taught to use negotiation by the
process itself. Even those of euro-sceptic countries like the United
Kingdom (Hemery and Meerts 2006). We postulate that negotiation
influences politics in an evolutionary way, time is needed.
In order to enhance the effectiveness of negotiation as a tool in
conflict resolution, mankind created structures to encompass these

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processes, providing stability to them. Originally in the form of families,

clans, tribes, villages, city states. Later on as multinational and then
national states, international and supranational regimes and organisations
(Spector and Zartman 2003). Political systems and negotiation processes
developed hand-in-hand. Without the system no effective negotiation,
without substantial bargaining no political stability. The one cannot be
separated from the other, at least not in diplomatic and political negotiation
processes. And even commerce needs some structures, written or unwritten
rules and regulations, the market place, the judge to punish if things go
wrong. Some structure is needed. In that sense the borders of the river and
of the countries are both an obstacle and limitation, as well as a stabiliser
needed to provide effectiveness. The boundaries in and of negotiation are
many, but depending on the circumstances they will generate positive or
negative effects. In general one might postulate that boundaries, like
political structures, are vital to negotiation effectiveness.

DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION PROCESS, PAST AND PRESENT

What is there to be said about the diplomatic negotiation process in past

and present? What are the differences, what do they have in common? In
order to get some insight into this question of comparison, we will present
four factors as a kind of measurement: the impact of technology and regime
building, as well as the roles of trust and power. Of course other elements
can be thought off as well. We postulate that these four have a distinct
value for understanding negotiation processes today and yesterday, while
we might see some differences, though on the whole the essence of
negotiation has not really changed over the centuries. One might say: the
water is still the same, but the riverbed changed over time. This still gives
value to the study of negotiation history as it shows to us that the struggle
for success has always been the same, but the circumstances have been
different. What is effective in one situation is disastrous in another. These
are lessons for the future.
An important difference between diplomatic negotiation processes
of past and present is the question of the relevance of the bargaining
process in conflict management. If warfare and negotiation are seen as
alternatives – if they both are politics by other means – warfare has been
the priority tool in interstate conflict till the twentieth century. This is an
interesting paradox as no other era has seen such massive warfare as the
bygone century. On the other hand, no other period in European history has
witnessed such substantial periods of stable peace. Throughout the
centuries negotiation became a more relevant tool, though for a long time
warfare remained the preferred means to settle problems. In Europe
negotiation gained strength because of four developments.

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 DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION, EVOLUTION,AND EFFECTIVENESS

Technology
The first one being the development of technology. If anything
characterises human history, then it is the change in technological devices.
One can question the development of culture, are we at a higher level than
in the past? Maybe not. One can state that art did not develop into a higher
stage, who is to judge the quality of Rembrandt’s work compared to
modern and ancient art? One can question the development of the human
psyche, of human health. Are we better off than in the past? Maybe we can
acknowledge that our political systems came to some sort of ripeness. But
for sure we can prove that technology evolved in a positive way, it reached
a higher standard than in classical times, medieval times or the renaissance.
Technology influenced warfare in the sense that it created more destructive
weaponry than ever. At the same time it gave diplomacy the sophisticated
tools needed to forge organisations channelling negotiation processes. It
contributed to the availability and speed of information facilitating effective
negotiation. While technology made warfare an often too dangerous sword
to wield, it made negotiation a more effective toll to bridge the gap.

Regime building
The second development is that of regime building. Not having any
regimes to stabilise negotiation processes and securing its outcomes,
contributed to the idea that bargaining could be – at best – a side-show in
warfare. Trust has always been THE problem in negotiation. As long as we
cannot be sure about the intentions of the other side and his or her
willingness to stick to an agreement, negotiation is too weak an alternative
for warfare. Negotiators tried to deal with this problem in different ways.
They were swearing pious oaths, asking all the available Gods to bless the
treaties they forged. As this clearly did not guarantee any solid
implementation of any holy pact, negotiators thought of other ways.
Strengthening relationships for example, or exchanging hostages. Or, like
in the 17th century, asking guarantors (like France and Sweden in the Peace
of Westphalia) to help implementing the treaty. In the 18th century, after the
in essence multi-bilateral Peace of Utrecht, the number of conferences
multiplied in an attempt to stop wars ravaging the continent and making
bargaining a dominant mode in conflict management. In the 19th century,
starting with the multilateral Vienna Conference, the meetings between
heads of states and diplomats became a systemic feature, but ongoing
organisational were still lacking. This changed after the first (Peace of
Versailles) and then the second (Conference of San Francisco) devastating
wars of the 20th century by creating regimes of ever better quality and
strength. Not only on a regional, but also on a global level.

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PAUL MEERTS

Trust
Regimes, transforming negotiations into ever more rationalised tools, dealt
with the problem of trust in an effective way. The development of trust is
the third remarkable trend in the evolution of interstate negotiation. A lack
of trust has always been around. Without institutions to force parties to live
up to agreements, procedures and secrecy have been dominant
characteristics of diplomatic negotiations in the past (Colson 2008).
Procedures helped to create some kind of defence against intrusions of
trust. Though rules and regulations are still important today, their functions
completely changed. Nowadays they help us to manage complexity, in the
past they shielded us against some effects of treason. Secrecy has been a
major issue in early European diplomacy, much more than today.
Ambassadors had to be versed in publicly representing their monarchs as
well as dealing with issues under complete secrecy. Being able to keep
secrets, to be specialised in treason, having a poker-face and the like. These
were the qualities of the effective ambassador-negotiator. Distances, time-
lags, transport problems, communication distortions, it all helped secrecy.
Nowadays there are still secrets in diplomatic negotiation for sure. But the
issue is not a dominant one. Modern authors on negotiation even plea for
openness as a means to further the effectiveness and the speed of
negotiation processes. Though it remains unwise to show your trump-cards
‘in public’. And therefore corridor-work is still an essential part of
bargaining. Also for cultural reasons. Open concession making can lead to
losing face. And therefore negotiators might refuse to give in openness,
only in informal sessions.

Power
The fourth evolving element is power. The political context changed.
Power is today more equally distributed than in the past, even
internationally. Though it is still more bluntly used in international relations
than in national politics. At least in and between democracies. This clearly
has to do with an evolution in human history: the development of
democracy, creating more distribution of power, protection of minorities
and human rights. The idea that states should not be wiped out just like
that, even out of the rationality that the stronger state might use them in the
future against other major powers, gave minor powers a rightful and
legitimate niche in international politics, and therefore in international
bargaining. Negotiation is situational, contextual. Major changes in the
political context will influence the character and the effectiveness of
international negotiation processes.

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 DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION, EVOLUTION,AND EFFECTIVENESS

CONCLUSION

Can we conclude, then, that negotiation evolved into a more valuable and
legitimate instrument in international conflict and international relations
than other methodologies like first and foremost warfare? Yes, indeed. This
does not mean – at all – that warfare has lost its significance. And in many
cases it is easier to go to war than to open negotiations. But given the
present level of technology, regime strength, the instruments to compensate
for lack of trust, and the attempts to respect minor powers, it can indeed be
hypothesised that negotiation evolved into one – if not the main – tool in
international conflict management and conflict resolution. In itself this
issue might be the beginning of an evolution of research papers helping us
to understand the main trends in the development and usefulness of
international negotiation processes for the theory and practice of the study
of international relations. With disasters and scarcity ahead, the world
might well want to learn from the experiences in the past, to be better
equipped in dealing with the future. But at the same time it seems clear that
some of the old mechanisms will not be sufficient in face of the threats we
have to face. New tools have to be invented, but hopefully the invention of
new tools in the past will teach us how to avoid their pitfalls.
Nevertheless, the real nature of the process of diplomatic
negotiation did not change much over time, for the simple reason that
human nature did not change. Human culture did, however, and with it the
habits and ways to deal with international negotiation processes. It is
Christophe Dupont who pointed out that the qualitative historical
dimension is a necessary supplement to quantitative contemporary
negotiation research. This is not only a service to France, but to the world
as well, as this “Festschrift” illustrates.

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Bobot L. (2008), « Talleyrand & Carême or the Alliance of Negotiation &
Gastronomy », Negotiation Journal (upcoming).
Cohen R. and Westbrook R. (eds.) (2000), Amarna Diplomacy, the Beginnings of
International Relations, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Colson A. (2008), « The Ambassador, Between Light and Shade, The Emergence
of Secrecy as a Norm in International negotiation », International Negotiation,
13.2.
Dupont C. (1994), La Négociation. Conduite, théorie, applications, Paris, Dalloz.
–– (2003), « History and Coalitions: The Vienna Congress (1814-1815)”,
International Negotiation, 8.1, p. 169-178.

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Dupont C. and Audebert-Lasrochas P. (2005), « The Congress of Vienna

Negotiations », in Zartman I. W. and Kremenyuk V. (eds.), Peace versus
Justice: Negotiating Backward and Forward Looking Outcomes, Lanham,
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Hamilton K. and Langhorne R. (1995), The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution,
Theory and Administration, London and New York, Routledge.
Hemery J. and Meerts P. W. (2006), « Training for Practice, A Practical
Approach », The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, The Hague, 1.2, p.197-208.
Holsti K. J. (1991), Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order
1648-1989, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
–– (2004), Taming the Sovereigns. Institutional Change in International Politics,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Lempereur-Pekar A. (2002), Préface à François de Callières : De la manière de
négocier avec les souverains, Genève, Librairie Droz.
Mattingly G. (1955), Renaissance Diplomacy, London, Jonathan Cape.
Meerts P. W. (2005), « Turning Point Westphalia: Negotiation Processes
Establishing a New political and Legal Order in Europe », in Zartman I. W. and
Kremenyuk V. (eds.), Peace versus Justice: Negotiating Backward and
Forward Looking Outcomes, Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
–– (2006), « Is Negotiation War by Other Means? », PINpoints Newsletter,
Laxenburg, n° 27, 13-15.
Meerts P. W. and Beeuwkes P. (2008), « The Utrecht Negotiations in Perspective,
The Hope of Happiness for the World », International Negotiation, 13.2.
Numelin R. (1950), The Beginnings of Diplomacy, London, Oxford University
Press.
Spector B. I. and Zartman I. W. (2003), Getting it Done: Post-Agreement
Negotiations and International Regimes, Washington D.C., United Nations
Institute of Peace Press.
Tischer A. (2008), « Claude de Mesmes, count d’Avaux (1595-1650). The perfect
ambassador of the early 17th Century », International Negotiation, 13.2.
Zamoyski A. (2007), Rites of Peace, The Fall of Napoleon & The Congress of
Vienna, London, Harper Perennial.

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 CHAPTER 12

CHIAROSCURO IN NEGOTIATIONS:
SECRECY, TRANSPARENCY, AND ASYMMETRY
IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

AURÉLIEN COLSON

Christophe Dupont and I enjoyed discussing this topic whenever we met in

a research seminar. Both the former practitioner and the always active
researcher in Christophe helped me analyze the difficult interplay between
secrecy and exposure in negotiation processes, especially on the
international stage.
Contemporary society is marked by growing demands for
transparency, aimed at exposing political authorities and organizations to
public observation and scrutiny (Moynihan, 1997 & 1998; Brin, 1998;
Rideau, 1998). Diplomatic negotiations are no exception to this imperative,
supported by the democratization of societies and the development of
information technologies (Colson, 2004, 2009). These demands are
justified for legitimate reasons that cannot be brushed aside, including:
citizens’ right to information, executives’ duty of accountability, respect of
the negotiation mandates that the people have conferred on their legal
representatives, and the protection of both the general public interest and
legitimate minority interests. All of this could pay the price of secret and
opaque decision-making processes.
This modern imperative echoes the urging of the Enlightenment of
18th century Europe to prohibit diplomatic secrecy. Before the French
Revolution, Gabriel Bonnot de Mably wrote: “It would do honor to the
intelligence of those citizens whose governments do not allow any secret
political agreements, to ban their practice throughout Europe” (1757). It
came once again to the forefront on January 8, 1918 when Woodrow
Wilson delivered his speech outlining his famous Fourteen Points, topping
his list with a call for: “Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after
which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but
diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view” (1918,

International Negotiation: Foundations, Models, and Philosophies. Careers in Negotiation and Conflict
Management Research, Christophe Dupont. Aurélien Colson, Daniel Druckman, and William Donohue
(eds.) 233-249 © 2013 Republic of Letters Publishing. All rights reserved.
AURÉLIEN COLSON

XLV, 534-539). Arguments against diplomatic secrecy once again gained

ground in Seattle in 1998 when public objection to the World Trade
Organization negotiations held behind the closed doors of the “green
rooms” led to demonstrations that ultimately stopped the proceedings.
Today, calls for transparency have reached an unprecedented level spurred
by the dual pressures of increased democratization in societies and the
development of new information and communication technologies – as
illustrated in late 2010 by the WikiLeaks scandal (Colson, 2010).
This imperative runs against a well-established and assumed
tradition in negotiations, especially diplomatic ones: confidentiality
towards stakeholders, i.e. third parties which hold a stake in that
negotiation, but are not party to the negotiation process (Colson, 2008). For
François de Callières, there was no doubt that “secrecy is the weapon of
negotiation” (1716, 185). Wilson himself negotiated the Treaty of
Versailles behind the closed doors of a hotel room with Clemenceau and
Lloyd George. Jules Cambon, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs
between the two World wars observed: “As long as we have been
responsible for our country’s interests abroad, we know that the day
secrecy is banished from negotiations, there will cease to be any
negotiations at all” (1926, 32). This conviction was obviously shared by
Henry Kissinger during his secret negotiations to reestablish relations
between China and the United States, as well as by the leaders of the secret
talks starting on January 20, 1993 to establish contact been Palestinian and
Israeli leaders, ultimately resulting in the Oslo Accords (Watkins &
Lundberg, 1998). For several strategic, tactical and psychological reasons,
including audience effects and face-saving issues, the negotiating table has
to be protected from the rest of the world by a bubble of secrecy.

RECONCILING THE TRADITION OF SECRECY

WITH MODERN DEMANDS FOR TRANSPARENCY

Thus there is a dilemma – or a tension (Mnookin et al., 2000) – between the

tradition of secrecy and today’s demands for transparency (Colson, 2007,
Ch. IV). Research and analysis of diplomatic practices demonstrate this
dilemma, which can be summarized as follows: depending on the degree of
transparency to third parties, and all other things being equal, either the
process of negotiation is more arduous, but the agreement reached is
stronger and more legitimate; or else the process is easier but the resulting
agreement is weaker and lacks legitimacy. Indeed, the greater the
transparency towards third-parties over the course of the proceedings, the
more opportunities there are for participation (but also interference) of
interested third-parties, and hence the negotiators have a greater capacity to

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 CHIAROSCURO IN NEGOTIATIONS

integrate key stakeholders’ motives and constraints into their agreement,

and also steer clear of potential deal-breakers. This effectively not only
strengthens the resulting agreement, but also guarantees its legitimacy and
facilitates its implementation. However, working towards and reaching the
agreement in such an inclusive and transparent manner is that much more
difficult, to the point that it may even halt process altogether and make an
agreement impossible.
The process leading up to the Oslo Accords is a good illustration of
this dilemma. Given the context of extremely tense relations between the
two camps, negotiations were unimaginable without the condition of
secrecy. However, precisely because the negotiation process was secret, the
agreement that was ultimately reached lacked legitimacy in the eyes of
those who could have facilitated (or on the contrary, hampered) its
implementation (Kelman, 1997). This is what Zartman (1997) termed the
“reentry problem”. The Oslo process provides an illustration of the leading
cause of this problem.
In the context of a closed and secret series of interactive sessions among
fellow human beings, trust and cooperation can be established, but it has little
impact on the outside world that has not been through the experience. Indeed,
the reentry problem is only magnified by the gap between the new partners
and their old adversarial reference groups. The more the new partners have
been won over by the cooperative process, the more they become suspect of
being hoodwinked by the old adversary in the eyes of the reference groups.
The only convincing evidence against this suspicion would have to come
from the agreement itself, which can easily be discounted as a trick by the
devious opponent, the more positive the evidence of the agreement appears to
be (Zartman, 1997, pp. 206-207).
Given this dilemma, the question is how can we benefit from the
advantages of secrecy without ignoring demands for transparency, and still
avoid the drawbacks of both? Just how transparent do proceedings need to
be, and to what extent do they need to be secret? How to limit their
exposure without making them totally opaque? There is no single, right
answer to these questions, or to finding the correct dosage between secrecy
and transparency for the negotiation process. It depends on a number of
factors and contextual variables. These include the nature of the
relationship between the negotiators, the status of the negotiations, the
political risks and the deeper issues at stake, the scale of the concessions
that need to be made, and the predicted intensity of their impact (Gilboa,
2000).
To get this dosage right, there are several ways secrecy and
transparency can be combined. Most of them are based on two determining

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concepts which can be combined as needed (Colson, 2007, Ch. V). The
first concept is that of temporary secrecy where confidentiality is confined
to limited period of time, alternating with transparency according to a
sequence of events associated with the different stages in the negotiation
process, but with the reentry problem described above. The other concept is
that of partial secrecy, where confidentiality is restricted to a limited scope.
This line between what third-parties know and what they do not may be
conceptual (in terms of the subjects of negotiation or the agenda for
discussions), and/or physical (in terms of the actual, physical space used for
the negotiation proceedings).
One example of partial secrecy was the method used by the French
Minister of Foreign Affairs Hubert Védrine during his term from 1997 to
2002 1 . In his experience, increased transparency effectively gives a major
role to public opinion in negotiation processes. Yet, public opinion favors
“the crystallization of positions”, meaning that it has a tendency towards
over-simplification and exaggerated antagonism. “It is not in the nature of
public opinion to yield to compromise: it either rejects entirely, or else it
wants absolutely,” explains Védrine. This is why he also affirms that
“negotiation is not possible without managing public opinion.” He finally
concludes: “It is necessary to once again legitimatize discretion in
negotiations.” This essentially means managing secrecy in relation to
various external stakeholders. For example, during his negotiations with
Madeleine Albright, then United States Secretary of State, Védrine
classified the items on the agenda along two axes: whether an agreement
had been reached, and whether there were opportunities for exposure or, on
the contrary, for discretion.
From this, four categories can be distinguished:
(a) Points that negotiating partners agree on, and that they want to
make public (typically items which show how strong the
partnership is);
(b) Points that partners agree on, but that they want to keep secret from
third-parties (typically items which are very sensitive, which would
create a wrong precedent, and/or which would appear as
weaknesses from the viewpoint of domestic constituency for
example);
(c) Points that partners disagree on, and that they want to keep as
secret as possible (typically items they should have agreed on, but

––––––––––––––
1
Interview on April 7, 2005.

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 CHIAROSCURO IN NEGOTIATIONS

failed to, and which therefore point at the fragility of the

partnership);
(d) Points that partners disagree on, but that they can make public
(typically items which demonstrate to domestic audiences that the
negotiators did not give in).
Thus, given this breakdown, choosing the correct dosage between
secrecy and transparency towards third-parties, and determining how they
are to be expressed constitutes in itself an important item in the
negotiations. In the words of Alain Plantey, former adviser to Charles de
Gaulle when he was President of the French Republic: in negotiations, “the
boss is whoever (…) decides what remains secret” 2 . To analyze thoroughly
this challenge requires determining whether there is symmetry between the
actors, meaning whether they all have an interest in maintaining secrecy, or
on the contrary, if they all have an interest in transparency; or if the
relationship is asymmetric, where one party counts on secrecy, but the other
on transparency.
This approach is part of a theory that asserts that the negotiation
process itself, understood here as the organization of discussions and the
choice of prevailing procedural guidelines, must be a separate subject of
discussion, preferably in advance of any exchanges on substantive issues
(Lempereur & Colson, 2004). The correct dosage of secrecy is therefore a
subject of negotiation in and of itself that must be discussed as early in the
process as possible. Hence the importance of the “pre-negotiation” phases
designed to defined the “shape of the table” and the rules for
communication and confidentiality (Stein, 1989).
How can this tension between secrecy and transparency be
managed when the negotiating parties disagree? The degree of transparency
can become a negotiation point of its own. What tactical approaches can
allow for asymmetry between the involved parties in their preferences
regarding secrecy? The various possible configurations need to be mapped
out before assessing the potential consequences on the durability of the
interplay between secrecy and transparency.

THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES AGREE ON THE BALANCE

BETWEEN SECRECY AND TRANSPARENCY

The first question is to determine the level of secrecy that the negotiators
agree to maintain together in relation to third parties, such as in the
––––––––––––––
2
Keynote speech by Alain Plantey at the ESSEC IRENÉ symposium on “The sources of
European negotiation”, Paris, June 18, 2003 (cf. Lempereur & Colson, 2008).

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AURÉLIEN COLSON

scenario described by Védrine. The typology of possible situations is

further expanded when the exchange of information between negotiators at
the table is also taken into consideration.

Asymmetry in choices of secrecy towards third-parties

As indicated above, the pre-negotiation phase should allow the involved
parties to agree on the level of secrecy required towards stakeholders. To
consider the various possible scenarios, here we take the example of a
bilateral framework between negotiators A and B, each with an interest in
either a predominantly secret negotiation, or a predominantly transparent
negotiation. Thus it is possible to arrive at a symmetry of preferences
between A and B (where both have an interest in secrecy towards third
parties, or the opposite where they both have an interest in transparency), or
else an asymmetry (where one party prefers a predominantly secret
configuration and the other a predominantly transparent process). Four
scenarios are therefore possible, denoted S 1 , S 2 , S 3 and S 4 in Table 1.

A prefers

secrecy transparency

secrecy S1 S2
B prefers
transparency S3 S4

Table 1.

In the configuration S 1 , both negotiators have the same interest in

maintaining secrecy towards third-parties. This was the case, for example,
for the Skybolt air-to-ground missile negotiations between Britain and the
United States. In the fall of 1962, the US decided against supporting this
nuclear missile project which Great Britain needed for its own nuclear
deterrence strategy. The level of secrecy was to the extent that: “Much of
what occurred was not recorded; everything recorded was classified. The
recollections of participants remain available, but memory lapses are
compounded by discretion” (Neustadt, 1970, 30-55). In this configuration
where the preferences for secrecy are symmetrical, the decisions made on
the process do not pose any particular problems.
Conversely, in the configuration S 4 , both negotiators have the same
interest in transparency in relation to third parties, though perhaps for

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 CHIAROSCURO IN NEGOTIATIONS

different reasons. For example, during the second Iraqi crisis, it was as
much in the interest of the Iraqis as it was in the troika of the French,
Germans, and Russians to reveal the existence of negotiations on the
deployment of United Nations inspectors sent to find evidence of
hypothetical weapons of massive destruction (Blix, 2004). For the Iraqis,
this transparency was a way to communicate a minimal degree of
cooperation, and could also help delay an American military attack. For
France, Germany, and Russia, this transparency helped prove that the
possibility of a negotiated agreement even existed, while also providing the
benefit of a positive image on the international scene.
Variations on this S 4 configuration include situations where at least
one of the negotiators chooses transparency for tactical reasons. The
negotiator in question will try to convince a partner and/or an audience that
they are acting in good faith and want to negotiate, but the ultimate
objective is actually to improve the negotiator’s image, save time, gain
third-party support, mislead the opposing party, obtain information, and
even sabotage the negotiations (Iklé, 1964). In particular, the increased
degree of transparency might allow stakeholders to interfere with, or even
intervene in, the negotiation process: they become quasi-negotiators
(Colson, 2009). This can be planned by one of the negotiators in the interest
of building a coalition of quasi-negotiators intended to impact the balance
of forces at the table.
On the other hand, the S 2 and S 3 configurations are marked by their
asymmetrical preferences which can stem from several different sources.
For one negotiator, exposing his or her participation to negotiations can be
considered a mark of recognition, which makes their transparency an
objective in and of itself. For another, it may be the reverse: the mere fact
of participating in the negotiations represents a concession, or a risk so
great that their condition is that the process remains hidden from third
parties. This was the case for the talks between the Polisario Front and
Morocco on the Western Sahara. For the Polisario Front, the very existence
of negotiations constituted a mark of recognition and proof that the
question of the region’s status was being addressed, two particular points
that Morocco most certainly did not want to substantiate (Mohsen-Finan,
1997; Leveau & Mohsen-Finan, 2000). Other sources of divergence also
exist. To once again cite the second Iraqi crisis, the negotiations between
the US and Britain before military operations were deployed illustrate this
asymmetry. From the American point of view, the very idea of negotiation
was contrary to the objectives set and the political choices made by the
American president (Danner, 2005). Conversely, for British Prime Minister
Tony Blair it was essential that these negotiations be exposed for two

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AURÉLIEN COLSON

reasons. First of all, because it was in his interest to be presented as George

W. Bush’s key interlocutor. Second, since he was confronted with Britain’s
public opinion largely opposed to the country’s participation in any military
action, he had to make sure to obtain a mandate in correct and due form by
the United Nations Security Council, or at the very least, demonstrate his
best efforts in this direction given that “public opinion in the UK favored
trying to make international institutions work before resorting to force”
(Woodward, 2004, 177-178).
There are two possible outcomes for this type of asymmetric
situation. In the first, the negotiators’ preferences are so divergent that an
agreement on the process is not possible and there are no negotiation
proceedings at all, on the condition that the involved parties have not yet
reached a mutually hurting stalemate (Zartman, 1985). In the second
outcome, the divergence in the negotiators’ preferences is overcome, either
because they were not so polarized to begin with, or because the solutions
away from the table, or BATNA, do not allow at least one of the
negotiators to postpone the negotiation any longer.
Hence, one of two things can happen. If there is agreement to
maintain secrecy, the negotiator who wanted transparency concedes to a
more confidential process, and in doing so, gains a tactical advantage: the
power to, at a later date, expose the negotiations that the other party wanted
to keep secret. Meanwhile, the negotiator who preferred secrecy wins in
terms of procedural decisions, but in doing so opens the door to a new
source of vulnerability in terms of leaks, indiscretions and revelations
subject to unilateral decisions that can be made by the other party.
Conversely, if there is agreement to ensure transparency, there is a higher
probability that the negotiator who preferred secrecy will not agree to
cooperative efforts, which thus reduces the chances of reaching a final
agreement (Colson, 2007, Ch. IV).
This last interaction between secrecy towards third-parties and the
negotiating table dynamics must also be taken into account to complete the
typology described above.

External vs. internal secrecy in negotiation

To consider all of the possible scenarios that determine the balance between
secrecy and transparency, another factor must be taken into account. In
addition to the external secrecy in relation to third parties that the
negotiators may prefer, it is necessary to also consider internal secrecy: one
negotiator keeping secrets from another. Withholding of information is part
of classic distributive strategies (Walton and McKersie, 1965). As a result,

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the different possible situations can be schematized according to the matrix

below.
In regard to one another,
the negotiators
rely predominantly on…
secrecy transparency

In relation Secrecy S5 S6
to third-parties,
the negotiators rely
predominantly on… transparency S7 S8

Table 2.

The S 5 configuration describes negotiations that are opaque and

competitive. In relation to any other external stakeholder, this approach
may be considered “aristocratic” in the sense that it is hidden from public
view. In addition, the negotiators limit the information exchanged between
one another, which usually triggers distributive, or even manipulative
behavior.
Conversely, the S 8 configuration refers to exposed and cooperative
negotiations. This approach can be said to be “democratic” in the sense that
the exchanges are transparent enough to allow interested third parties to
intervene; in addition, the negotiators optimize the exchange of information
between them, and turn towards integrative, joint-problem solving,
approaches.
The S 6 configuration describes negotiations that are opaque, but
cooperative. They are “aristocratic” in the sense that they unite a few
negotiators who isolate themselves from the rest of the world, but it is this
very isolation that is reassuring and allows those involved to cooperate and
optimize the exchange of information between them.
Finally, exposed and competitive negotiations correspond to the S 7
configuration. They are “democratic” since their exposure allows for third-
party observation, and even intervention, but the negotiators limit the flow
of information between one another. In this configuration, the transparency
to external third-parties does not encourage participants to exchange
information at the negotiation table.

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AURÉLIEN COLSON

THE DURABILITY OF THE BALANCE

BETWEEN SECRECY AND TRANSPARENCY

One consequence of asymmetry in negotiators’ preferences in terms of

third-party secrecy is that the durability of the balance is compromised.
When one of the involved parties ends up consenting to a secret process
against its will, the chances are greater that it will betray the secret.
For example, in the asymmetric negotiations mentioned above
between Morocco and the Polisario Front regarding the Western Sahara, it
was revealed ten years after the events that extremely high-level secret
negotiations were held in Rabat in September 1996. A delegation from the
Polisario Front, led by Bachir Mustapaha Sayed, had been received by
Driss Basri, the all-powerful Minister of the Interior at the time and
strongman for the regime of Hassan II, and by the crown prince, the future
Mohammed VI 3 . The minutes from this secret meeting were published in a
weekly newspaper over several pages. Secrecy was absolutely central, to
the point that the crown prince himself acknowledged, in the first lines of
the leaked verbatim account: “HM [Hassan II] informed me only today of
the meeting” 4 . The newspaper mentioned that these minutes “were,
according to several sources, communicated to Spanish secret services by
the Polisario Front”. Driss Basri confirmed their authenticity and supposed
that they had been translated from Arabic into Spanish, and then into
French. For the weekly in question – providing a clear illustration of the
modern demand for transparency such as discussed at the beginning of this
chapter – “supplying public opinion with the substance of negotiations that
directly concerns it is essential” 5 . Further, it is especially revealing to find
that call for transparency in a country where freedom of the press is still
limited. From the perspective of the negotiations themselves, it is crucial to
note that these revelations were made when Mohammed VI was preparing
an official visit to the Western Sahara. By revealing that the King, crown
prince at the time, had participated in secret negotiations with the
independence movement, the Polisario Front could highlight their status as
a fully-fledged negotiating partner.
This particular case invites discussion on the very possibility of
ensuring the durability of a social interaction that includes secrecy, as
––––––––––––––
3
Aboubakr Jamaï, F. Iraqi, O. Brousky (2006), “Quand le Roi négociait avec le Polisario:
minutes des réunions”, Le Journal Hebdomadaire, No. 246, March 11-17, 2006, pp. 18-25.
Another Moroccan journal, Assahifa, also published these minutes.
4
Ibidem, p. 20, our translation.
5
Aboubakr Jamaï (2006), “Le pourquoi d’une publication », Le Journal Hebdomadaire,
No. 248, March 25-31, 2006, p. 3, our translation.

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 CHIAROSCURO IN NEGOTIATIONS

discussed in the seminal work of Goerg Simmel (1908). Then it will be

useful here to review some recommendations by professionals in the field
that can help maintain secrecy for as long as possible.

Betraying the secret:

Parallels between secret societies and negotiations
For a secret society, the sociological structure studied by Simmel in his
Soziologie, just as for negotiations, secrecy carries with it its own antidote:
betrayal. According to Simmel, the appeal of secrecy is inextricably linked
to that of its opposite, betrayal:
In secrecy there is a tension that is released the moment the secret is revealed.
This is a major event in the evolution of secrecy, where all of its charms are
heightened and culminate once again at this moment – in same the way […]
that a spendthrift’s sense of power when he has money intensifies in the most
perfect and delectable way the instant he opens his hand to spend it (Simmel,
1908, 369).
Therefore, the appeal of secrecy is inseparable from the capacity for its
betrayal: “A secret is kept by the awareness that it can be betrayed and that
one therefore has the power to potentially alter the course of destiny”, as
Simmel points out. The dynamics between these two “opposing interests:
one to conceal and the other to reveal” determines the sociological
interaction that provides a context for secret societies, and also, for our
purposes, secret negotiations. On one hand, there is the “practical interest
and definite appeal of secrecy,” but on the other hand, “the sense of
superiority that it carries” is only “fully realized the moment the secret is
revealed”, according to Simmel.
This possibility for revelation, and therefore betrayal, even exists at
one’s own expense. This is “the inner risk of being exposed, which is
similar to the fascination with the void”. The pleasure of talking and pride
in showing that one knows what is being hidden from others are the
enemies of a negotiator sworn to secrecy. For instance, in July 1993, during
the secret proceedings between the Israelis and Palestinians, one of the
members of the PLO delegation, Maher El-Kurd, did not return to Oslo
because he had not “demonstrated the absolute discretion required
following his conversations with Yasser Arafat’s advisors. As a result, he
was exiled to Canada” (Savir, 1998, 61).
Confronted with the risk of betrayal, according to Simmel’s
analysis, secret societies arm themselves with various techniques to protect
their own existence. “A secret is something so precarious and the
temptation to betray it so great that in many cases the path that leads from

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AURÉLIEN COLSON

silence to indiscretion is so narrow” that trust becomes an absolute

necessity (Simmel, 1908, 382). To reinforce this trust, secret societies rely
on vows, rules, and threats of punishment as a systematic way of ensuring
their members’ discretion and even absolute silence. As Simmel reminds
us, “the Pythagorean brotherhood required its novices to keep silent for
several years” since the ability to keep a secret means the person
undoubtedly has other positive qualities: “if one can manage to remain
silent for years at a time, one is probably capable of resisting other
temptations besides talking as well”. There are equivalent mechanisms in
the world of negotiation. From the time resident ambassadors were first
employed to the present day, when confronted with calls for transparency,
the capacity for discretion is still a standard measure for assessing the
quality of a negotiator.
To cite more similarities, the structure of the secret society broken
down by Simmel echoes the sociological structure of diplomatic
negotiations. Simmel noted that “the large number of degrees of initiation
in secret societies” is justified as way to “make sure that a novice who has
not yet been put to the test does not hold any secrets to betray” (397). To
this end:
Within the fundamental secret that surrounds the entire secret society itself, a
progressive secrecy further protects its deepest, most essential core […].

This is precisely the case since the lower levels of the society create a
transition, a passage towards the true center of secrecy, and gradually seal off
the deterrent sphere that surrounds it. This more safely protects the society
than any brutal or radical alternative where one has to be either completely
in, our completely out.
In this chain of successive degrees “the intermediary always has a dual role,
both to connect and to separate” (398). Through breaking with the binary
nature of secrecy – keep or betray – by placing it at the end of a chain
where each progressive degree is a transition, this hierarchical structure
makes it possible for a secret core to coexist with a known periphery. This
is clearly the most interesting model because this gradation is also found in
negotiation, and echoes the way foreign affairs departments are monitored.
At the lowest level there are people who help prepare the negotiations
themselves, but are not direct participants. Then there are the officials who
are allowed in the negotiating room, but who cannot actually sit at the table,
and certainly do not speak. Next, there are a couple of people who can sit at
the table and participate in the negotiations, but who cannot nonetheless
determine the whole strategy themselves. Above these people may be a
delegation leader who sets this strategy, and who is the only one with the

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 CHIAROSCURO IN NEGOTIATIONS

right to participate in private conversations with his opposite number.

Finally, at the top of the pyramid is the principal leader, the ultimate
authority who appears rarely and only in certain cultural contexts. For
example, during his negotiations in China, Pascal Lamy met the ultimate
authority figure, Jiang Zemin – the only leader with the power to say if the
agreement was valid or not – only at the very last minute (Lamy, 2002, 13).
This reflects Simmel’s analysis of invisible leaders whose role is essential
at the head of secret societies.
Negotiation practitioners also mention some other factors that
facilitate the durability of secrecy, which we will now discuss briefly.

Maintaining secrecy:
Negotiation practitioners’ recommendations
The aim here is not to provide an exhaustive review of the techniques
negotiation professionals use to ensure the durability of secrecy appropriate
for any given international negotiation. However, we will outline a few
points concerning three essential factors: the people involved, the place,
and the moment in time.
In terms of the people involved, a comment made by Simmel
regarding secret societies is also relevant for negotiation: “The weak point
of the secret society is that secrets are not kept forever – it is not wrong to
say that a secret kept by two people is already no longer a secret” (380).
Hence the number of people involved is of primary importance. The
smaller the number, the greater the chances of keeping the secret in
question over a long period of time. While preparing his secret visit to
Beijing, Kissinger took advantage of his close personal relationship with
President Nixon to avoid informing the US Secretary of State William
Rogers before the very last minute. At the beginning of the Oslo Accords
process, the number of Israelis who were aware of the talks could be
counted on two hands. Even within the government itself, only the Prime
Minister and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense were told. At the
end of the process, Uri Savir estimated that in all, no more than a hundred
people were informed. Code names were used for the main actors. Yasser
Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin were each referred to as “the Old Man”; Abu
Mazin (also known as Mahmoud Abbas) was “the Holy-Ghost”, Peres was
“the Father”; lead negotiators Abu Ala and Uri Savir were both “Number
One”. Taking on a false identity was typical: the day after the accords were
signed on September 13, 1993 in Washington, Peres wanted to hold a secret
meeting with Jordan’s King Hussein. He had to cross the Allenby Bridge
that separates the two countries to reach Amman “disguised in a round felt
hat and a fake moustache” (Savir, 1998, 105).

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AURÉLIEN COLSON

In configurations with less secrecy, for example during closed-door

diplomacy mediation talks, a factor determining the durability of the dosage
in media exposure consists of naming a single spokesperson for all of the
parties present at the negotiating table. At Camp David in 1978, this person
was Jody Powel, the Presidential Press Secretary. At the Dayton peace talks
on Bosnia, State Department Spokesperson Nicholas Burns assumed this
role.
The choice of location is also a factor in maintaining secrecy, even
in closed door configurations. Unexpected, faraway places, or those
difficult to access are typical, like a military base in Dayton, Ohio, for the
sensitive discussions to end the war in the former Yugoslavia. For
configurations with complete secrecy, this is even more so the case. For the
Oslo Accords process, a capital city far away from the usual major
diplomatic centers was chosen, and the Norwegians provided the material
conditions for secrecy by making available unobtrusive facilities to both
delegations in the surrounding countryside. For example, on August 13,
1993, the negotiators were offered champagne by the aristocratic owners of
the luxurious Borregaard Manor, who were told they were going to host a
group of business men from the Middle East. For the talks in Paris on
September 9 and 10, 1993 in preparation for the historic meeting on
September 13 in Washington, Savir did exactly the opposite of what
journalists expected. They assumed that if there were any secret talks, they
would not be held in central Paris. So the negotiators held the talks at the
Hotel Bristol, in the very centre of Paris, all booked under the last name of
Larsen, but with different first names: Ulaf, Terge, Alf, etc. (Savir, 1998,
88). Another example of taking the opposite course occurred 18 months
later in May 1995 when the choice of location for two-part talks on the
most sensitive of topics: redeployment and the appendix on security of the
intermediary agreement. The Israeli ambassador in Rome, Avi Pazner, was
responsible for finding a location to ensure absolute discretion. He confided
in the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Susanna Agnelli, who happened
to be the sister of business tycoon Gianni Agnelli, a friend of Peres. Gianni
Agnelli offered to make available to the negotiators the Fiat training center
in Turin.
Finally, the moment of time chosen is important. Through his
experience as a top negotiator in the European Commission’s “agricultural
marathons”, and in the 1988 New Caledonia conflict settlement, former
French Prime Minister Michel Rocard observed the “obvious fact” that:
“nighttime is better than daytime for long negotiations and is a better
guarantee of secrecy. It was in Brussels where I learned this totally reliable
technique” (Rocard, 1998).

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 CHIAROSCURO IN NEGOTIATIONS

CONCLUSION
CHIAROSCURO IN NEGOTIATIONS

The last examples underscore the last paradox associated with secrecy: the
most unlikely negotiations are those that are in the most need of secrecy; at
the same time, equally unlikely are perhaps those for which secrecy is the
least difficult to maintain, precisely because it conceals a hypothetical
meeting generally considered to be inconceivable.
This chapter has been aimed at exploring the interactions that make
it possible to effectively manage the tension between secrecy and
transparency in relation to third parties in diplomatic negotiations. The
discussions of several international relations examples highlight both the
importance of the right dosage of secrecy and the impossibility of relying
on a single model applicable to all contexts and issues. Different ways of
delimiting secrecy according to a theme-based or spatial axis – different
stages in location – or according to a time axis – different stages in time –
have been studied, as well as their consequences. However, the inherent
dilemma in managing secrecy and transparency does not necessarily
disappear, as the discussion of the reentry problem, in particular, shows.
This tension is also inevitable because these two components
merge to create an indissoluble chiaroscuro. Secrecy is not mutually
exclusive of transparency. To the contrary, it is precisely a reasoned and
clearly delimited use of secrecy that allows for greater transparency in other
respects, and vice-versa: transparency is not mutually exclusive of secrecy.
Indeed, demands for transparency and the need for additional visibility
create the very need to enforce, in a legitimate way, additional secrecy
where – and only where – it is absolutely indispensable for the negotiation
to proceed in an effective manner. The ultimate challenge – linked to the
negotiator’s sense of responsibility and accountability – is to maintain in a
legitimate way a necessary level of secrecy in a world subject to pressing
demands for transparency.

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 CHAPTER 13

TIPPING POINTS
IN THE DYNAMICS OF PEACE AND WAR

SANDA KAUFMAN AND MIRON KAUFMAN *

Every action of great men, that seems to them an act of their own free will, is in an
historical sense not free at all, but in bondage to the whole course of previous
history, and predestined from all eternity.
LEV TOLSTOI, War and Peace
In the two-party political system of the United States, most elected officials
belong to either the Democratic or the Republican Party, mirroring the split
in the population at large. Such is the case with members of Congress –
House and Senate –, the federal legislative branch of American
government. Among both Republicans and Democrats there are
intransigent hardliners who toe a strict party line and do not countenance
deviations, and more flexible ones who are able to work with members of
the opposing group to solve governance problems. Although since the
Nixon presidency (1969-1974) a polarizing tendency has impeded inter-
party cooperation, perceived by hardliners as co-optation, some legislators
from both parties are able to collaborate on specific pieces of legislation.
Interestingly, the public often clamors for inter-party cooperation (and
consistently rates poorly the polarized Congress), and the legislators often
run for elections on claims of flexibility and ability to cooperate with
members of the other party. Once elected, however, many consider
cooperation to be a political gift they are unwilling to grant their opponent.
The dynamics of legislative impasse, polarization, or successful joint
decision making in Congress can be examined in terms of the proportion of
legislators on each side that is intransigent or flexible.
This kind of split within a group roughly between intransigents and
flexibles can be found in many situations in which joint decisions are
––––––––––––––
*
Reprinted with authorization from Colson, A. ed. (2011), Entrer en négociation. Mélanges
en l’honneur de Christophe Dupont. Bruxelles: Larcier, chapter 20.

International Negotiation: Foundations, Models, and Philosophies. Careers in Negotiation and Conflict
Management Research, Christophe Dupont. Aurélien Colson, Daniel Druckman, and William Donohue
(eds.) 251-271 © 2013 Republic of Letters Publishing. All rights reserved.
SANDA KAUFMAN AND MIRON KAUFMAN

necessary but fraught with conflict 1 . For example, in environmental groups

some members prefer to continue to wage conflict rather than engage in
any kind of compromise with a polluting industry or regulatory agency,
while others prefer some arrangement to no arrangement at all in order to
ensure more immediate protection for a threatened natural resource. In
ethnic conflicts between two groups within a country, as in Spain, Northern
Ireland, Belgium, Kosovo, the Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, China, India
or Sri Lanka, within each of the disputing groups there are typically some
who would continue to fight until their side prevails, whenever that might
come (failure to prevail is inconceivable to them), and others who prefer a
peaceful accommodation in their lifetime. In international conflicts too, as
in the Cyprus dispute, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in many other
hot foci around the world, within each of the countries involved some
would rather fight to victory (intransigents do not countenance defeat)
while some prefer to negotiate a settlement.
While examples of such situations as described above abound, the
impetus for the model proposed in this article was the Cyprus conflict,
where the two disputing groups, Turkish and Greek, have gone through
several rounds of rapprochement and hostilities rejecting several peace
proposals. Zyia Önis and Suhnaz Yilmaz (2008) described the ebb and flow
of Greek-Turkish relations in Cyprus and the contextual factors – the
European Union, NATO, various entities in the non-monolithic Greek and
Turkish political landscape, and even the Kosovo crisis and the 1999
earthquake in Turkey – that have affected it directly and by influencing the
opinions of the two populations and their inclination towards concessions
needed for peace. This case relates well to our model, since it operated
among the two populations attitudes changes of the kind we posit as the
source of the conflict dynamics leading or not to peace among warring
factions.
Our model draws on the physics of complexity to capture the
interaction dynamics during repeated encounters among two conflicting
groups, each with an internal dichotomous split between flexibles and
intransigents. We begin with some definitions of concepts used in the
model and its interpretation. Then we describe the model, showing some of
the outcomes – impasse, peace, or war – that tend to prevail after a number
of decision rounds with different assumptions about its six parameters: the
initial proportions of flexibles and intransigents in each group, and their
respective susceptibilities to be swayed by arguments from the
––––––––––––––
1
There is likely a range of opinions, but when considering a proposed decision to continue a
dispute or settle it, individuals opt for one of the sides.

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 TIPPING POINTS IN THE DYNAMICS OF PEACE AND WAR

corresponding opposing group. We illustrate the usefulness of the model by

discussing what can be gleaned from it qualitatively about two international
conflicts. We end with suggestions for how the model could be further
refined.

SOME CONCEPT DEFINITIONS

The complexity of the world is contrasted with the simplicity

of the basic laws of physics.
GOLDENFELD & KADANOFF, 1999
To model situations involving two groups whose conflict unfolds in time
punctuated by rounds of decisions, we borrow concepts from statistical
physics, including complexity, critical phenomena and phase transitions,
renormalization group, and chaos. We briefly define and review them and
their usefulness to our problem.
Complex systems comprise numerous interacting parts. While their
interactions may be simple, the net result is in general complex. In Per
Bak’s (1986) words: “The laws of physics are simple but nature is
complex”. Complexity does not characterize exclusively natural
phenomena. The ideas of complexity and self organization have been
applied in economics and other social sciences. For example, Paul
Krugman 2 (1995) explained the emergence of polycentric urban areas by
postulating a differential equation describing the dynamics of businesses
that interact with one another through forces of attraction and repulsion.
This model exhibits self-organization as in complex systems in which
randomness and chaos seem to spontaneously evolve into unexpected
order. Krugman’s theoretical model was validated by Mukesh Kumar,
William Bowen and Miron Kaufman (2007) for the real case of the
Northeast Ohio economy. Another example is found in the work of
Christophe Dupont (2003), who discussed the role coalitions have played in
reducing complexity at the Vienna Congress. The system of two groups in
conflict we model here has the makings of complexity.
The interactions between the parts of complex systems are in
general nonlinear. Consequently, the systems can be chaotic, meaning that
their dynamics are sensitive to initial conditions (Feigenbaum, 1983; May,
1976). An example made familiar by Edward Lorenz (1994) 3 is the
––––––––––––––
2
2008 laureate of the Nobel Prize in Economics.
3
To describe the sensitivity to initial conditions of a chaotic system, Lorenz (1994) used a
metaphor that became known as the butterfly effect. He asked: “Does the flap of a butterfly’s
wings in Brazil set off a tornado in Texas?”

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SANDA KAUFMAN AND MIRON KAUFMAN

weather. In the realm of social sciences, Alan Beyerchen (1992) discussed

nonlinearity in the context of the unpredictability of war in Clausewitz’s On
War. Chaos is achieved through the period doubling route in the logistic
map used to model ecological populations. Our model equations are
inspired by population dynamics equations somewhat similar to the
mapping of ecological populations.
The complexity and chaos theories emerged from the study of
phase transitions and critical points (Kadanoff, 1971) in statistical physics.
The renormalization group solution of this class of problems (Berker and
Ostlund, 1979; Fisher, 1998) originated many ideas that made their way
into current studies of complex systems. This formalism is useful in solving
numerous applied physics problems such as the thermodynamics of solids
(Kaufman and Diep, 2008). We too are using in our model phase diagrams,
fixed points, and universality classes that were first developed in the
renormalization group theory.
Malcolm Gladwell (2000) used the notion of tipping point to
analyze behavior in social life examples. An athletic shoe company,
spreading rumors, teen suicide, and teen smoking were conceptualized
using physics metaphors such as the critical mass in nuclear chain reaction,
the percolation threshold or the boiling point in phase transitions. In our
model, we find such a tipping point: a moment of critical mass, threshold,
or boiling point that when reached renders the momentum for change
unstoppable.
We use these concepts in the next section, as we propose a dynamic
model for the nonlinear interaction of two groups in conflict, and explore
its path in time and its chances of ending in peace or war.

THE FLEXIBLES-INTRANSIGENTS MODEL

“Es gibt nichts praktischeres als eine gute Theorie.”

IMMANUEL KANT
We consider the interaction dynamics between Group 1 and Group 2, be
they conflicting countries or interest groups inside one country. The
members of each of these two groups have either of two types of
inclinations: flexible / peace-oriented or intransigent / fight-oriented. The
group members participate directly (for example, through referenda) in
decisions to come to an agreement / make peace or not, whether that means
going to war or simply continuing to wage an ongoing conflict by any
means; or indirectly, through political support for leaders who propose the

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 TIPPING POINTS IN THE DYNAMICS OF PEACE AND WAR

different options. 4 Thus the respective proportions of flexibles and

intransigents in each of the two groups matter to the decision. In the class
of situations under consideration, many rounds of decisions – sometimes
lasting for many years – precede the final moment of opting for peace or
war.
Many real long-drawn situations go through episodes in which
opposing groups are called to make decisions to continue their conflict or
settle it. This is one reason such conflicts have been deemed “intractable”
or resistant to resolution in the short run 5 (Burgess and Maiese, 2004).
Many contextual factors affect the decision episodes, including the
international political climate and alignment of forces, economic factors,
and specific decisions by indirect stakeholders that may alter the direct
parties’ interests, alternatives and resources. We consider some of these
factors to be captured in the arguments people utilize in each group to
persuade the others to continue the struggle or make peace, while others
factors can account for sudden shifts in the path of conflict within the
model.
One effect in time of the episodic interactions between Group 1 and
Group 2 is to alter the initial intra-group proportions of flexibles and
intransigents, until the two-group system reaches a tipping point towards
peace or war. The nonlinear dynamic model we propose helps explore
various outcomes of the interactions in time between the two groups with
respect to the decision to opt for a peace accord or not.
We denote by N 11 and N 21 the number of flexible individuals in
Group 1 and Group 2 respectively, and by N 12 and N 22 the number of
intransigent individuals in Group 1 and Group 2 respectively. Let n 11 be the
fraction of Group 1 that is flexible (F in Figure 1), and n 12 the fraction of
Group 1 that is intransigent (I in Figure 1); n 21 is the fraction of Group 2
that is flexible, and n 22 the fraction of Group 2 that is intransigent.

––––––––––––––
4
Dictators claim they act in response to such support when they make unilateral decisions,
though this does not necessarily correspond to the reality of public sentiment. However,
public opinions are difficult to ascertain in contexts lacking freedom of speech. Therefore,
this model does not represent conflicts in which decisions are made unilaterally by an entity
in power.
5
In this context, the short run is a shorter time period than the life span of the observer’s
generation; intractable conflict often spans more than one generation, sometimes persisting
over many decades and even centuries.

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SANDA KAUFMAN AND MIRON KAUFMAN

η1 η2
I I

F μ1 μ2 F
Group 1 Group 2
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the interactions between the four
subgroups: Group 1 flexibles (F) and intransigents (I); and Group 2
flexibles (F) and intransigents (I).

These fractions are:

N
n  11
(1)
11
N 11  N 12
n 1  n
12 11
(2)

N
n  21
(3)
N N
21
21 22

n 1  n
22 21
(4)

We denote by μ 1 and μ 2 the susceptibilities of flexible people in each group

to the peace openings of flexibles in the other group; η 1 and η 2 are the
susceptibilities of the intransigents in each group to arguments of the
intransigents in the other group (Figure 1). Specifically, we assume that
over a time interval Δt 6 the fractional change in the proportion of flexible
individuals in one group is proportional to the fraction of flexibles the other
group The fractional change in intransigents in Group 1 is proportional to
the fraction of intransigents in Group 2. Similar changes are assumed for
Group 2:

––––––––––––––
6
Throughout, we express time in units of Δt, during each of which there is a decision or
move that effectively settles or continues the conflict; we set Δt to be 1.

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 TIPPING POINTS IN THE DYNAMICS OF PEACE AND WAR

N (t  t )    (t )
11
1 n (5)
N (t ) 11
1 21

N (t  t )    (t )
12
1 n (6)
N (t ) 12
1 22

N (t  t )    (t )
21
1 n (7)
N (t ) 21
2 11

N (t  t )    (t )
22
1 n (8)
N (t ) 22
2 12

Together, equations (1) to (8) yield the following two equations describing
the path in time of conflict between Group 1 and Group 2 in terms of the
proportion of flexibles in each group in any time period:

n (t )   n (t ) n (t )
11 21 11
n (t  t )  1

1   n (t ) n (t )  n (t ) n (t )
11
1 21 11 1 22 12
(9)
n (t )   n (t ) n (t )
21 11 21
n (t  t )  2

1   n (t ) n (t )  n (t ) n (t )
21
2 11 21 2 22 12

This model has four susceptibility parameters – μ 1 , μ 2 capturing the

influence of flexibles in one group on flexibles in the other group, and η 1 ,
η 2 capturing the influence of intransigents in one group on intransigents in
the other. We assume these susceptibilities to remain constant in time for
two groups. Two additional parameters, the starting proportions n 11 0 and
n 12 0 of flexibles in each group, describe the initial conditions.
What happens over time in this model to the likelihood of a joint
decision to conclude a peace agreement when in each of the two groups the
peace-oriented people interact with the intransigents of their own group?
The outcome depends on the initial conditions (proportions of flexibles and
intransigents at the outset), as well as whose arguments will hold sway in
each group. Peace can prevail at the “tipping point” corresponding to the
moment when in both groups the proportion of flexible, peace-oriented
people exceeds the proportion of intransigents (reflecting a simple majority
here, though other decision rules can be used if specified in terms of
proportions necessary to prevail).

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SANDA KAUFMAN AND MIRON KAUFMAN

impasse 1=0.6 1=0.4 2=0.12=0.9 peace

tipping line

Peace region:
2-Flex Group 2

 All initial
0.8 conditions lead to
flexibles,

tipping point
0.6
Any point represents
a pair (n 1 , n 2 ) of initial
Group

proportions of flexibles
for each group
0.4
Proportion of

0.2 Conflict region:

 All initial
conditions lead to

0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 impasse
war
Proportion of flexibles, Group 1
Group 1-Flex

Figure 2. Morphology of model variables and results – peace, war,

impasse, tipping fixed points, tipping line and peace and war regions

For a fixed set of values of the four susceptibilities (μ 1 = 1; η 1 = 0.1; μ 2 =

0.1; η 2 = 1), the phase diagram example in Figure 2 illustrates qualitatively
all phase diagrams obtainable with our model and their elements. In the
plane (n 11 ,n 21 ) – the fractions of flexibles in Group 1 and 2 – there is a
tipping line separating the peace and the war regions. The tipping line is
composed of two segments starting at the impasse fixed point (1,0) or (0,1)
and flowing towards the tipping fixed point. All else being equal, a point in
the peace region will evolve over time to the peace fixed point (1,1) while a
point in the war region will evolve to the war fixed point (0,0).
To show the dynamics captured by this model and the kinds of
insights that can be gained from using it, we focus on two cases: one

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 TIPPING POINTS IN THE DYNAMICS OF PEACE AND WAR

symmetrical in terms of the susceptibilities (A, in Figure 3) and one

asymmetrical (B, in Figure 4).

Figure 3: Case A - symmetrical susceptibilities: μ1 = 0.2; η1 = 0.8; μ2 =

0.2.; η2 = 0.8 and two different initial proportions of flexibles and
intransigents (subcases i and ii).

In case (A), the susceptibility values are set symmetrically at μ 1 =

0.2; η 1 = 0.8; μ 2 = 0.2.; η 2 = 0.8. To see how the initial conditions affect
the evolution of the system, we look at two sub-cases differing only in the
initial proportions of flexibles: (i) n 11 = 0.5; n 21 = 0.5; and (ii) n 11 = 0.5; n 21
= 0.95. Figure 3 shows the change in time of the proportions of flexibles
n 11 and n 21 for these two sets of initial conditions. The first graph displays
the evolution of flexibles in Group 1 in cases (i) and (ii), and the second
graph represents the flexibles in Group 2 in cases (i) and (ii).
The initial condition in subcase (i) with half the population in each
group being flexible leads to war in the long run: eventually, after a
duration t, the intransigents carry the day, and n 11 = n 21 = 0 – both lines
level off at 0. In subcase (ii) the initial proportion of flexibles in Group 1 is
the same before, but now there is very large proportion of flexibles in
Group 2. This leads to peace as the flexibles prevail, i.e. eventually n 11 =
n 21 = 1. Note that the length of time for convergence on war or peace may
exceed the lifetime of the initial generation, so the peace case may be
experienced by the two groups as intractable conflict while it unfolds.

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SANDA KAUFMAN AND MIRON KAUFMAN

Figure 4. Case B - making peace (subcase i) or going to war (subcase ii),

with asymmetrical susceptibilities μ1 = 0.1; η1 = 1.0; μ2 = 10; η2 = 1.0
and two different initial proportions of flexibles and intransigents.

In case (B), the susceptibility values of μ 1 = 0.1; η 1 = 1.0; μ 2 = 10;

η 2 = 1.0 are asymmetrical; the intransigents of Group 1 are influenced by
the inflexible in Group 2 more then the flexibles in Group 1 are influenced
by the flexible in Group 2. The opposite is true for Group 2, where the
flexible are very strongly influenced by the flexible in Group 1. The time
evolution of flexibles and intransigents in Case B is shown in Figure 4.
Subcase (i) evolves to peace while subcase (ii) evolves to war. Note that the
proportions of flexibles in the two groups do not reach the value of 1 (or 0)
in the same time period. In subcase (i), Group 2 gets to 1 sooner than
Group 1.
Besides the tipping line and the tipping point shown in Figure 2,
the model can yield turning points – extrema in the time evolution of n 11 or
n 21 akin to the positions at which a pendulum swings back. Such turning
points have the same meaning of departure from the current course as in
Daniel Druckman 7 (2004). For example, in case A, at time t=18, Group 2
––––––––––––––
7
Druckman’s turning points are about events that occur in a chronological sequence which
the author, in his previous work, has incorporated into a framework for case analysis. The
framework covers three stages: precipitants that trigger change; departures which are
reactions to precipitants; and consequences, referring to the direction the negotiation takes
as a result of the departure. Building on his earlier work, Druckman used examples of a less-
bounded international negotiation and cases culled from the headlines to demonstrate the
framework's generality. He then considered this concept at the individual, relational, and
collective levels to probe the psychological and social processes that occur before, during,
and after departures (turning points); and which may be in fact the underlying impetus for
departures.

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 TIPPING POINTS IN THE DYNAMICS OF PEACE AND WAR

has a turning point (a minimum) in subcase (ii). In case B for initial

condition (i), the proportion of flexibles n 11 of Group 1 declines until it
passes through a turning point (minimum) at t = 3, after which it rises
steadily and reaches the value 1. For initial condition (ii), the proportion of
flexibles n 21 of Group 2 begins by rising up to a turning point (maximum)
at t = 6, after which it declines steadily until it drops to 0.

Phase (Flow) Diagram;1=0.2; 2=0.2 ;1=0.8; 2=0.8

1
n21

0.5

0 0.5 1

n11

Figure 5. Phase diagram for the symmetrical case A.

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SANDA KAUFMAN AND MIRON KAUFMAN

Phase (Flow) Diagram;1=0.1; 2=10 ;1=1; 2=1

1
n21

0.5

0 0.5 1

n11

Figure 6. Phase diagram for the asymmetrical case B.

Figures 5 and 6 display phase diagrams corresponding to the two

special cases A and B considered above, one symmetrical and one
asymmetrical in susceptibilities. They show the region of pairs of initial
conditions that leads to conflict and the region of initial conditions that
leads to peace, separated by the tipping line. As in Figure 1, the axes are
n 11 , n 21 , the proportions of flexibles in each group. The flows in this space
are governed by five fixed points. Four are located at the corners of the
square (n 11 , n 21 ): the peace fixed point (1,1), the war fixed point (0,0), and
the two impasse fixed points (1,0) and (0,1). The fifth, the tipping fixed
point, is located inside the square, on the tipping line connecting the two
impasse points. The degree of stability of each fixed point can be evaluated
by computing for each the eigenvalues of the following 2X2 Jacobean
matrix:

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 TIPPING POINTS IN THE DYNAMICS OF PEACE AND WAR

  n11(t  t )  n11(t  t ) 
 
  n11(t )  n 21(t ) 
  (t  t )  n 21(t  t ) 
 n 21 
  (t )  n 21(t ) 
 n11

Table 1. List of five fixed points: their location coordinates n 11 , n 21 in terms

of the susceptibilities, and their Jacobian eigenvalues Λ 1 , Λ 2 representing
their degrees of stability

The eigenvalues Λ 1 and Λ 2 for each fixed point are shown in Table
1. Value larger than 1 signal a flow away from the fixed point, meaning
instability; eigenvalues smaller than 1 mean a flow towards the fixed point,
meaning stability.
The peace fixed point, where both proportions of flexibles are at
their maximum, n 11 = 1 and n 21 = 1, is stable and attracts flows from a whole
region of the phase diagram, the set of pairs of initial proportions of
flexibles that eventually evolve to peace (as in Figure 6). The war fixed
point, where both proportions of flexibles are at their minimum, n 11 = 0,
n 21 = 0, is also stable and attracts flows from a whole region of the phase
diagram, the set of pairs of initial proportions of flexibles that eventually
evolve to war. All points on the tipping line separating the peace and war
regions flow into the tipping point, as one direction is stable Λ 2 < 1. Both
impasse fixed points anchoring the tipping line, one where n 11 = 1 and n 21 =
0, and the other where n 11 = 0 and n 21 = 1, are unstable.

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SANDA KAUFMAN AND MIRON KAUFMAN

In the next section, we discuss the flexibles/intransigents model in

the context of two examples of current conflicts. The qualitative analysis of
these two examples will surface both the insights the model can offer and
the need for further development.

DISCUSSION – TWO CASES

I know I am among civilized men because they are fighting so savagely.

VOLTAIRE
Can the seemingly simple model proposed here help to understand the
conflict dynamics in any real example? We argue that at a first level this
model can be instructive qualitatively and at the next level it can be
quantified for more precision. The kind of information it can yield in a
particular case is consistent with the view expressed by Druckman about
prediction (Kaufman, 2008). He proposed that an important contribution of
our analyses of conflicts consists not in being able to predict outcomes, but
rather in helping plumb the possibilities by producing scenarios and
analyzing their consequences in order to derive useful strategies for a range
of possible outcomes. Our model can make this kind of contribution. It
allows us to explore possible outcomes corresponding to different initial
conditions and different susceptibilities of the flexibles and intransigents in
two conflicting groups.
The intractable conflict between the Turkish and Greek population
of Cyprus, as described by Önis and Yilmaz (2008), has been going on
since the 1950s. Cyprus is an island of 3,572 square miles that in recent
history was a British colony before achieving independence in 1960. After
conflagrations and attempts at power sharing that lasted until 1974, the
Turkish population (roughly 20% of the total of 1.1 million) formed a
separate political entity on the northern third of the island. The balance
comprises three parts: the south under control of the Republic of Cyprus, a
United Nations-controlled green line that separates the north and the south,
and a British-controlled area (about 3% of the territory) devoted to military
bases. Predictably, the Greek-majority Republic of Cyprus is heavily
influenced by Greece while the Turkish north is under the political and
economic influence of Turkey. Greece and Turkey have themselves gone
through cycles of heightened tension since the 1930s, with Cyprus a bone
of contention even during calm periods (Önis and Yilmaz, 2008). At
various points in time since 1974, the two population groups have been
queried through referenda about reunification. The Turkish minority
consistently rejected accommodation, while the Greeks expressed
willingness to accept proposed unification plans. In 2004, however, a

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 TIPPING POINTS IN THE DYNAMICS OF PEACE AND WAR

reversal occurred: 65% of the Turkish minority voted for the unification
plan while 70% of Greek majority rejected it.
Although those directly involved in the conflict and students of the
political intricacies of Cyprus recent history might rightly claim that many
aspects of this conflict are important and do not easily lend themselves to
simplification, we argue that the Cyprus conflict can be usefully described
by our model: It entails two groups in conflict, within which there are
flexibles and intransigents whose proportions vary in time for all the
reasons that detailed narratives are better able to capture.
What can the model reveal that corresponds to reality and is not
readily apparent from the historical or political analysis narratives?
Figure 7, based on the phase diagram of Figure 5, corresponds qualitatively
to narratives describing the Greek-Turkish dispute in Cyprus. Judging from
narratives and results of previous rounds of referenda, it seems that within
the Greek population there was higher susceptibility among the flexibles to
be persuaded by Turkish flexibles, while within the Turkish population the
intransigents were more susceptible to persuasion by Greek intransigents.
Point 1, firmly planted in the “war” region, represents the state of affairs
preceding the latest referendum of 2004, with a relatively larger proportion
of the Greek population and a relatively low proportion of the Turkish
population opting for unification. The dynamics of this situation would thus
inexorably lead to continued conflict. However before the latest
referendum, believing the proportion of flexibles on the Greek side to be
the same as ever, and reacting to promises of inclusion in the European
Union conditioned upon unification, a large proportion of the younger
Turkish population decided to approve the reunification plan 8 – a situation
qualitatively corresponding to point 2 in Figure 7.
This apparent shift illustrates how the dynamics in this model can
be altered, and how a system seemingly headed for continued conflict can
skip the tipping line and become set on a course toward peace under the
effect of external forces (in this case, the European Union promise).

––––––––––––––
8
Personal communication with Yilmaz, December 2007.

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 SANDA KAUFMAN AND MIRON KAUFMAN

   

22
proportion of Turkish flexibles

0.8

0.6 3
P(continued
0.4 conflict) 1

0.2

0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
proportion of Greek flexibles

Figure 7. Phase diagram corresponding qualitatively

to the Cyprus conflict.
However, in a surprise reversal possibly caused by several factors,
including the political interaction between Greece and the Greek politicians
of Cyprus, and the European Union’s decision to admit the Republic of
Cyprus regardless of unification, the Greek leadership persuaded the public
to vote against the referendum. As a result, the situation has arguably
skipped the tipping line a second time (point 3 in Figure 7). Owing to a
feeling of betrayal pervasive among flexibles, the Turkish intransigents
have had their hand strengthened; the proportion of Greeks favoring
compromise has also declined (as reflected in the referendum vote) and the
system is again in the war region of the phase diagram, headed for
continued conflict.

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 TIPPING POINTS IN THE DYNAMICS OF PEACE AND WAR

A second case on which we illustrate the insights that can be

derived from the proposed model is the Israeli-Palestinian intractable
conflict, relatively better known to students of international disputes.
Nevertheless, even history scholars have difficulty agreeing on a precise
onset and timeline for this conflict. Most might agree, however, that this
dispute has been waged through negotiated and armed conflict episodes
during the better part of the 20th century and is still ongoing. Israel has a
population of about 7.3 million that is 75% Jewish. The Gaza Strip to its
south has about 1.3 million people. In 2008, after a protracted series of
armed incidents between Israel and the Gaza Strip, both sides have agreed
to a “tahadye” (truce).
In the terms of our model, at least during the last decades of the
20th century to the present, there has been a relatively high susceptibility
among Israeli flexibles to their Palestinian counterparts. In contrast, at least
in the Gaza Strip, the susceptibility of Palestinian flexibles has been
considerably lower (Kristoff, 2008). The phase diagram of Figure 8 (based
on Figure 6), represents this conflict qualitatively. Based on susceptibilities
qualitatively similar to those Nicholas Kristoff described among the
disputing populations, point 1 represents the tahadye of 2008. It is on the
tipping line because although it is a peace move, it is unstable and could
also tip into the war area. In fact, since the truce was concluded it has been
increasingly violated by rocket attacks from Gaza followed by Israeli
reprisals. Therefore, the system might tip into the peace or war region
depending not only on the dynamics of the system itself, but also on
external events such as the elections outcome in the United States and the
global financial crisis. However, in this case the war region appears
considerably smaller than the peace region, suggesting a seemingly
counterintuitive conclusion: this conflict has currently a better chance of
moving toward peace than the lower-intensity Cyprus conflict. However,
the latter does not receive nearly the same level of international attention
and intervention possibly because its effects are perceived as less
consequential to others than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

267
SANDA KAUFMAN AND MIRON KAUFMAN

1=0.01 1=0.99 2=92=1

0.8
11 P ( pe a c e )
2-Flexin Israel

0.6
of flexibles
Group

0.4
P(peace) = 0.66
proportion

P(continued
conflict)
0.2

0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
proportion of flexibles in Gaza
Group 1-Flex

Figure 8. Phase diagram corresponding qualitatively to the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict.

Our analysis of both cases is qualitative by necessity, since the actual

susceptibilities of the flexibles and intransigents in each group have not
been evaluated. Instead, we used values that correspond to current
narratives. For example, for the Cyprus case based on results of past
referenda we assessed the susceptibilities of both Turkish and Greek
intransigents to arguments for continuing the conflict to be higher than
those of the flexibles (a roughly symmetrical situation). Also based on
surveys and reports we assessed the Israeli-Palestinian case to be
asymmetrical for flexibles, with the susceptibility of Israeli flexibles to
peace arguments exceeding that of Palestinian flexibles.

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 TIPPING POINTS IN THE DYNAMICS OF PEACE AND WAR

The value of the analysis hinges thus on whether our interpretation

of the narratives has merit, as well as how sensitive this model is to the
assessed susceptibility values. Whereas the match between real and guessed
susceptibilities cannot be established without further research and an
attempt at estimating these values with real data, the sensitivity of the
model can be evaluated by testing model results with susceptibility values
selected from ranges that remain consistent with the narratives, to check
how robust the conclusions are to our assumptions.

CONCLUSIONS

Loyalty to a petrified opinion never yet broke a chain or freed a human soul.
MARK TWAIN
Borrowing from the physics of complexity, we have proposed a
parsimonious nonlinear model for describing conflict dynamics between
two disputing groups who in different time periods make decisions that lead
to continued fighting or to a peaceful resolution. This model exhibits many
of the complexities of real conflicts, including tipping points, turning
points, war, peace and impasses. Although it seems driven only by the
parties’ choices, appearing to ignore the powerful influence of the larger
context in which conflicts are embedded, the model does allow to some
extent for the testing effects of contextual changes. The model is
“Tolstoian” in the spirit of the opening quote, in that in the (unlikely)
absence of any external influences, the two conflicting groups with their
fixed susceptibilities are set on their path to war or peace from the initial
moment. However, we have shown the potential utility of this model in
deriving insights about possible conflict paths and shifts among paths.
It is conceivable that using this model to investigate likely paths
(scenarios) in specific disputes might assist in the development and
evaluation of various intervention strategies. For example, two important
factors in the fate of a conflict in the terms of this model are the current
fractions of flexibles and the size of the peace region compared to the war
region as defined by the trajectory and shape of the tipping line. The larger
the peace region the greater are the chance of reaching peace.. Intervention
and external events present opportunities for shifts that can either flip a
conflict from the war to the peace region, or hasten the convergence on the
peace fixed point by fostering turning points. An analysis of situations
using this model can assist in selecting the strategy that has the greatest
likelihood of addressing obstacles to peace. If it is found that a relatively
small shift in the susceptibilities positions a situation on the path for peace,
we could explore strategies that can accomplish this, including various

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SANDA KAUFMAN AND MIRON KAUFMAN

kinds of training and non-first track diplomacy approaches. If, however, a

specific situation appears less responsive to such changes, resources could
be devoted to other means of producing a shift from the war to the peace
region, such as diplomacy, economic incentives or threats of curtailing aid.
A first next step in improving the accuracy and usefulness of this
model is an assessment of its sensitivity to the values of the four
susceptibility parameters, since a more robust model is more useful for
analyzing conflict situations and testing various scenarios. Other directions
for development include devising empirical methods for assessing the
susceptibilities of flexibles and intransigents, and the consideration of more
than two conflicting groups. Finally, various intervention scenarios could
be evaluated for their effect on the conflict path, to help select the approach
that is most likely to yield results in a specific context.

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Goldenfel N., Kadanoff L. P. (1999), “Simple Lessons from Complexity”, Science,

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 CHRISTOPHE DUPONT’S PROFESSIONAL
EXPERIENCE AND ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS

Born on March 25, 1922 in Tourcoing (France), deceased on April 18, 2010.
Married, father of three children.

UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

Bachelor of Law.
Postgraduate degree in Public Law.
Postgraduate degree from HEC Paris (1943).
Postgraduate degree from the École libre des sciences politiques, Paris 1 .
PhD in Management (Université de Lille I, 1980).

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Positions held within International Organisations

Economist, Deputy Head of division of the Research Department, International
Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington D. C., United States of America (1947-1959).
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva, Switzerland (1959-
1960).
Member of the United Nations Mission for the first development programme in
Cyprus (1960-1961).
Observer at the GATT negotiations for the United Nations Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC).
Advisor at the European Investment Bank (EIB), Brussels, Luxembourg (1961-
1970).

Academic Responsibilities
Associate Professor at C.R.C. (Centre de recherche des chefs d’entreprises), HEC
Business School, Paris / Jouy-en-Josas. Director of the Negotiation Department
from 1970.

––––––––––––––
1
Which would after World War II become “Sciences Po Paris”.

International Negotiation: Foundations, Models, and Philosophies. Careers in Negotiation and Conflict
Management Research, Christophe Dupont. Aurélien Colson, Daniel Druckman, and William Donohue
(eds.) 273-278 © 2013 Republic of Letters Publishing. All rights reserved.
CHRISTOPHE DUPONT’S PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE & ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS

Adjunct Professor at the department of Economics, University of Lille I (1970-

1975).
Adjunct Professor at IPA-IAE (Institut de Préparation aux Affaires - Instituts
d’Administration des Entreprises) of the University of Lille I (1975-1976).
Associate Professor at IPA-IAE of the Université de Lille I (1976-1982)
Professor at Lille Graduate School of Business (until retirement in 2001).

Scientific Activities
Director of the Centre for applied studies and research on negotiation (Laboratoire
d’études appliquées et de recherches sur la négociation - LEARN) at Lille
Graduate School of Business.
Scientific Director of the Negoshare centre of expertise on negotiation.
Co-organiser of the International Biennial on Negotiation (Négocia, Paris).
Member of the following research groups :
- Processes of International Negotiation (PIN), Laxenburg, Austria 2 ;
- Groupe français de négociation (GFN), Paris ;
- Member of the International Scientific Board of ESSEC IRENE (Institute
for Research and Education on Negotiation), Cergy-Pontoise & Singapore.
Member of the Scientific Board of the peer-reviewed journal Négociations
(De Boeck, Brussels).
Member of several PhD theses supervision committees.

Consulting Missions for Companies and Organisations

Cooperation with the International Development Law Institute, Roma.
Consultant, CMC Conseils Associés, Paris (1980-1995).
Organised seminars on negotiation for numerous companies and organisations
(1980-1996).

ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS

PhD Dissertation
Finance d’entreprise et « buts multiples », contingence de la théorie moderne et
potentialité d’ouverture (1980), under the supervision of Professor
Debourse (University of Lille I).
––––––––––––––
2
PIN has now moved to Clingendael, in the Netherlands.

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Books
Les Banques de développement dans le monde (Dunod, 1964).
L’Entreprise et la concurrence internationale (Dunod, 1969).
Prévisions à long terme et stratégies (Dunod, 1970).
La Négociation: conduite, théorie, applications (Dalloz, 1982; revised editions:
1986, 1990, 1994).
La Négociation: exercices et applications, with Patrick Audebert-Lasrochas
(Dalloz, 1994).
La Négociation. Situations, problématiques, applications, with Guy-Olivier Faure,
Laurent Mermet and Hubert Touzard (Nathan, 1998 ; new edition, Dunod,
2000).
Prévisions financières et tableau de variation d'encaisse, with Patrick Audebert-
Lasrochas (Economica, 1999).
La Négociation post-moderne. Bilan des connaissances, acquis et lacunes,
perspectives (Publibook, coll. sciences humaines et sociales, 2006).
Négociation et transformations du monde, edited by Christophe Dupont
(Publibook, 2007).

Chapters
“The Negotiation Process”, with Guy-Olivier Faure, chapter 3 in International
Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues, edited by Viktor Kremenyuk
(Jossey-Bass, 1991).
“Coalition Theory”, chapter 7 in International Multilateral Negotiations, edited by
I. William Zartman (Jossey-Bass, 1994).
“A model of the negotiation process with different strategies”, chapter 4 in
International Business Negotiations, edited by P.-N. Ghauri and Jean-
Claude Usunier (Elsevier, 1996).
« La négociation commerciale », in Encyclopédie de la Gestion (Economica,
1997).
“Switzerland, France, Germany, the Netherlands: The Rhine”, chapter 8 in Culture
and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes, edited by Guy-
Olivier Faure et Jeffrey Z. Rubin (Sage Publications, 1993) ; Chinese
translation (2001).
“Environmental Problems on the Rhine”, chapter 8 in International Environmental
Negotiation, edited by Gunnar Sjöstedt (Sage, 1993).
“The Vienna Congress Negotiations”, with Patrick Audebert-Lasrochas, in Peace
Versus Justice, edited by I. William Zartman and Viktor Kremenyuk
(Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004).

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CHRISTOPHE DUPONT’S PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE & ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS

« Histoire et Négociation: le Congrès de Vienne et la négociation de Dayton », in

La négociation, regards sur sa diversité, edited by Guy-Olivier Faure
(Publibook, 2005).
« La négociation: du cloisonnement à la transversalité », concluding chapter,
ibidem.
“Structural Dimensions of Failure in Negotiation,” with Anthony Wanis-St. John,
chapter 13, in Unfinished Business: Saving International Negotiations
From Failure, edited by Franz Cede & Guy-Olivier Faure, Vienne, PIN-
IIASA, 2009.
« Aux sources de la négociation: formulations d’hier et formulations
d’aujourd’hui », in Négociations européennes d’Henri IV à l’Europe des
27, edited by Alain P. Lempereur & Aurélien Colson, Paris, A2C Médias,
2008.
“The Negotiator’s Risks: The General Case”, in Negotiated Risks. International
Talks on Hazardous Issues, edited by Rudolf Avenhaus and Gunnar
Sjöstedt (Springer, 2009).

Articles in Academic Journals

« L’évolution récente des disparités régionales de revenu dans la CEE », Cahiers
économiques de Bruxelles, n° 37, 1st quarter of 1968.
« Politiques industrielles et environnement financier », Revue du Marché commun,
January 1968.
« Coefficient d’intensité du capital, structures économiques et "défi américain" »,
Économie appliquée, XXIII, 1970, n° 2 and 3.
« Vers un ordre économique mondial », Chroniques SEDEIS, n° 14, August 1973.
« Macroéconomie et décision d’entreprise », Management France, March 1974.
« La pédagogie de la formation permanente des cadres supérieurs et dirigeants »,
Enseignement et gestion, n° 10, 1979.
« La formation des dirigeants dans les années quatre-vingt : inflexion ou rupture »,
Enseignement et gestion, n° 12, 1979.
« Gestion sociale et finance à buts multiples », Revue d’économie industrielle,
n° 10, 4th quarter of 1979.
« Negotiation as Coalition Building », International Negotiation, Vol. I, n° 1,
pp. 48-64, 1996.
« History and Coalitions: The Vienna Congress », International Negotiation,
Vol. 8, n° 1, pp. 169-178, 2003.
« La négociation décloisonnée », Revue de prévention et de règlement des
différends, 2004, vol. 2, n° 2, pp. 7-18.

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 CHRISTOPHE DUPONT’S PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE & ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS

« Le "négociable" et le "non négociable" », Revue française de gestion, vol. 30,

n° 153, novembre-décembre 2004.
Grand entretien avec Christophe Dupont : « Coopérer pour s’entendre ou
s’affronter pour vaincre ? », Négociations, volume 2006/1, pp. 95-115.
« Acquis et perspectives de la négociation », Négociations, volume 2009/2, pp. 51-
58.

Working Papers and Research Documents 3

« La politique de la Banque européenne d’investissement dans les régions
frontalières européennes », Université libre de Bruxelles, Institut d’études
européennes, November 1968.
« L’interculturalité dans la négociation », ESC Lille, Cahiers de recherche, 1996.
« Les approches cognitives de la négociation: théories et applications », ESC Lille,
Cahiers de recherche, 1996.
« La négociation raisonnée: ce qu’elle est, ce qu’elle n'est pas, ce qu’il faut en
retenir », ESC Lille, Cahiers de recherche, 1996.
« Méthodologies comparées dans l’étude de la négociation: Zartman versus
Druckman », ESC Lille, Cahiers de recherche, 1999.
« La négociabilité: un concept pertinent dans les négociations difficiles », Cergy-
Pontoise: ESSEC IRENE, Les Cahiers de la négociation, n° 1, 1999.
« L’apport de la recherche sur la négociation dans la décennie 1990-1999 :
tendances majeures dans la littérature » ESC Lille, Cahiers de recherche,
2001.
« Le risque du négociateur », Cergy-Pontoise : ESSEC IRENE, Les Cahiers de la
négociation, n° 2, 2001.
« La négociation et le risque », ESC Lille, Cahiers de recherche, 2003.

Papers Delivered at Conferences and Seminars

« La programmation financière: la nécessité d’une approche simple et intégrée »,
OECD, Paris Conference, February 1965.
« Disparités des revenus: régions, individus, nations. Quelques aspects
analogiques », IIIrd International Congress of Regional Economies, Roma,
1966.
« Les critères de décisions du point de vue de l’institution financière : la
préparation et l’évaluation des projets d’investissement dans les
––––––––––––––
3
We do not mention here Staff Papers in economics, finance and forecasting, written while
at the International Monetary Fund between 1947 and 1959.

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programmes de développement », OECD, Athens Conference, October

1968.
« Les grandeurs significatives en économie régionale », International Congress of
Regional Economies, Roma, 1971.
« Business Schools and the market place: A Delphi Survey », European
Foundation for Management Development, Lyon Conference, 1995.
« Aux sources de la négociation : formulations d’hier et formulations
d’aujourd’hui », colloque ESSEC IRÉNÉ, « Aux sources de la
négociation européenne: les penseurs français de la diplomatie à l’âge
classique », Paris, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 June 2003.
« Histoire et Négociation: le Congrès de Vienne et la négociation de Dayton »,
First International Biennal on negotiation, « La négociation
décloisonnée », Paris, Négocia, 2003.
« Les coalitions au Congrès de Vienne », colloque ESSEC IRENE, « Talleyrand,
prince des négociateurs ? », Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Palais du
Luxembourg and Institut de France, 1st-4th February 2004.
« La négociation post-moderne », Séminaire interdisciplinaire de recherche et
d’échanges sur la négociation (SIRENE n° 2), ESSEC IRENE, Cergy-
Pontoise, 4 October 2007.
« Acquis et perspectives de la négociation », in Penser la négociation en modernité
avancée (Cerisy-la-Salle, 29 May-3 June 2008).
« État de la recherche: à partir de I. W. Zartman », Séminaire interdisciplinaire de
recherche et d’échanges sur la négociation (SIRENE n° 13), ESSEC
IRENE, Cergy-Pontoise, 26 February 2009.

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