EN BANC

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y

CORDOVA, Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. chanrobles virtual law library

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y
Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas
died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the
Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to
Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-
appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense
charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1insists
that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by
the lower court on which the civil liability is based. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor
General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending
appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said
counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and
Ocfemia 2which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal
liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final
judgment is rendered. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguish his civil liability? chanrobles virtual law library

In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the
affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo
Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of
the alleged crime? chanrobles virtual law library

It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished: chanrobles virtual law library

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary
penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;

With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain.
Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of
ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and
executory? chanrobles virtual law library

We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo
Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:

La responsabilidad penal se extingue. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las
pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is
"sentencia firme" under the old statute? chanrobles virtual law library

XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:

SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no

haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los
terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.

"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is

only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed -
"en condena determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused
becomes - "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada,
"no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna
clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment
becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or
not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple reason that
"there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421.
Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd
ed., pp. 859-860) chanrobles virtual law library

The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal
Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the
sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the
lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to
appeal."chanrobles virtual law library

By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one
positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code
means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become
executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony
charged against him. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in
this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be
rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the
case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See
also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol.
I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based
solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the
death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, supra. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His
civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we
dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced
with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a
case where the source thereof - criminal liability - does not exist. And, as was well
stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a
civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal
proceeding."

This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3was adopted by the Supreme
Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4People of the
Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6by dismissing
the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:

The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and

considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal,
the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by
his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717,
citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case
against him should be dismissed.

On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala
v. Marcelino Polinar 7and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8ruled
differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability
of one accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by
his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the
contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to
final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in
view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled
therein:

We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became
operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court
below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of
physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was
to be considered instituted together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings
were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under
Article 33 may yet be enforced separately. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the
criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act
as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently
of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso
facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final
judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability
springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of
purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)

xxx xxx xxx

In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who
was charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property
subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the
death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil
liability based on the laws of human relations remains."

Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused,
notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of
his conviction. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the
following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9requires the
dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the
final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions
for recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the
defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained
this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case
as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused
should be substituted as defendants-appellants." chanrobles virtual law library

It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule
established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can
be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim
for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely
based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10departed from this long-
established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and
convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his
conviction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only
to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it
was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action
already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of
Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of
determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8,
1977 stating thus:

The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of
malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the
total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23). chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and
distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa
vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8). chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court). chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67
SCRA 394). chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly
disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine
National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583). chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money
claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained
of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in
determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his
counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration
and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned
(Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).

Succeeding cases 11raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling
in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the
settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto)
is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the
accused. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision
in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil
action impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's
extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to
Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:

When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act
complained of.

Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling
in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death
supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate
civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings
are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed
to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and
that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of
the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex
delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished
by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished: chanrobles virtual law library

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary

penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;

xxx xxx xxx

However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It
allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil
action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no
criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the
effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the
criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not
even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12One would be hard put to pinpoint
the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in
recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the
criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors
Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination
of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action,
such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant
pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability
springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime.
Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be
declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that
which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution
of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this
fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to
under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement
to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that
contemplated under Article 30. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the
resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:

Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal
liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13 chanrobles virtual law library

In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made
a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was
indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it
upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil
liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already
extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved
in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on
appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable
therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:

"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court). chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal.

Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural
law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by
Justice Regalado:

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in

both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil liability
instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment
of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals
can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of
the component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been
followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant
to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as being clearly
erroneous and unjustifiable. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is
neither authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions
instituted together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law
for the summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the
death of the offender. . . .

Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of
civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as
that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased
accused. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which
in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated
in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14are contractual money
claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the
restitution of personal or real property." 15Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive
enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral
expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from
contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not
form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1)
treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim
therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished
upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending
finality of his conviction. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil
liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16(1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the
felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation
upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same
shall be enforced. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by
provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the
separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator 17of the estate
of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. - No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to
recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce
a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real
or personal, may be commenced against him.

This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18where we held that, in recovering
damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of
the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the
estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because
this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract,
express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely
personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the
separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein: chanrobles virtual law library

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado,
in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." chanrobles virtual law library

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused,
if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law 20

b) Contracts chanrobles virtual law library

c) Quasi-contracts chanrobles virtual law library

d) . . . chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
is based as explained above. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 21of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22 chanrobles virtual law library

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant
Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without
qualification. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de
oficio.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.