EN BANC

G.R. No. 260650 - ROBERTO 'PINPIN' T. UY, JR., Petitioner, v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, VERLY TABANCURA-ADANZA,
in her capacity as PROVINCIAL ELECTION SUPERVISOR and
CHAIRPERSON of the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the Province
of Zamboanga del Norte, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS
FOR THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, and ROMEO
M. JALOSJOS, JR., Respondents.

G.R. No. 260952 - FREDERICO P. JALOSJOS, Petitioner, v. ROMEO

M. JALOSJOS, JR. and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.

Promulgated:
August 8, 2023
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DISSENTING OPINION

LEONEN,J.:

On June 23, 2022, the Provincial Board of Canvassers reconvened and

proclaimed respondent Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr. (Romeo) as the winning
candidate for Z81nboanga de! N01ie's first district representative. 1 He took
his oath of office before Senator Cynthia A. Villar2 and assumed office at noon
on June 30, 2022. 3

With these developments, the Petitions should be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction.

I take exception to the majority's ruling that the concurrence oi't4{,ee

requisites-a valid proclamation, taking of oath, and assumption of dutie,i.,,---
vests the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal with jurjsdictio~ cfyer
election contests: It is time that we abandon Reyes v. Cqmmissirqn ·r,,rn
Elections,4 which the majority cited as legal basis, for being contrary to the
Constitution and established jurisprudence. /
1
Rollo (G.R. No. 260650), pp. 399-400.
1
Id. at 401.
Id. at 402.
4
712 Phil. 192 (2013) [Per .I. Perez. En Banc].
 Dissenting Opinion 2 G.R. Nos. 260650 & 260952

Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution provides: "The Senate and

the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members." 5 In Lazatin v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 6 this Court stated that an electoral
tribunal's jurisdiction is original and exclusive:

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred. The exercise of the power by the Electoral
Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended
to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature." Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized
by Justice Malcolm as "ji1ll, clear and complete." Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral
Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously
granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be said
with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987
Constitution. 7 (Citations omitted)

Further, in Rasul v. Commission on Elections, 8 this Court defined the

extent of the tribunal's jurisdiction and again stressed its exclusivity:

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as Section

250 of the Omnibus Election Code prove that "(t)he Senate and the House
of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of'a/1 contents relatinx to the election, returns, and qualifications
of' their re.1pective ~Members . . . . . " In Javier vs. Comelec, this Court
interpreted the phrase "election, returns and qualifications" as follows:

"The phrase "election, returns and qualifications"

should be interpreted in its totality as refe1Ting to all matters
affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is
necessary to specify, we can say that "election" refe1Ted to
the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the
holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and
counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns
and the proclamation of the winners, including questions
concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and
the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications"
to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding
against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or
ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy."

The word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

and Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscore the exclusivity
of the Tribunal's jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

(Emphasis supplied)
6
250 Phil. 390 (I 988) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc].
Id. at 399-400.
8
371 Phil. 760 ( I 999) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, En Banc].
Dissenting Opinion 3 G.R. Nos. 260650 & 260952

Inasmuch as pet1t1oner contests the proclamation of herein respondent

Teresa Aquino-Oreta as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the
Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the
complaint of petitioner. 9 (Citations omitted)

The Constitution grants the exclusive privilege to determine

membership in the Senate and the House of Representatives through their
respective electoral tribunals. The earliest moment when there can be
members of each chamber is upon their proclamation as winners in the
election.

Accordingly, this Court has consistently ruled that once the winning
candidate is proclaimed, jurisdiction over any election contest against the
proclaimed candidate is vested in the electoral tribunal. 10

This doctrine was pronounced as early as in Angara v. Electoral.

Commission, 11 where this Court held that the grant of power to the Electoral
Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly would begin with the
certification by the proper provincial board of canvasser of the member-elect:

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly

confirming the election of members against whom no protests had been filed
at the time of its passage on December 3, I 935, can not be construed as a
limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there
might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of
the election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to
decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confinnation
alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral
Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of
said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the
returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is,
to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral
Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of
the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua, confim1ation of the election of any member is not required by the
Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter
of fact, cerfificafion by the proper provincial board of canvassers is
sufjicienf to entitle a member-elecf to a seat in the National Assembly and

9
Id. at 765-766.
10
Penson v. Commfa·sion on Elect;ons ConstiWted as the National Board (if Canvassers for Senators and
Party-list Representatives, G.R. No. 211636, September 28, 2021 [Per J. J. Lopez, En Banc];
Limkaichong v. Commission on Elections, 601 Phil. 751, 779-780 (2009) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc];
Planas v. Commission on Elec:tions, 5 I9 Phil. 506 (2006) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc]; Barbers v.
Commission on Elections, 499 Phil. 570, 581, 585 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc]; Carzmcho III v.
Commission on Elections, 374 Phil. 308 ( I 999) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc]; Perez v. Commission
on Elections, 375 Phil. I I 06, I 115 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]; Rasul v. Commission on Elections,
371 Phil. 760, 765 ( I999) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, En Banc].
11
63 Phil. 139(1936) [PerJ. Laurel, En Banc].
Dissenting Opinion 4 G.R. Nos. 260650 & 260952

to render him eligible to any office in said body. 12 (Emphasis supplied,

citation omitted)

Through the years, this was the prevailing doctrine. Thus, in Vinzons-
Chato v. Commission on Elections:°

The Comi has invariably held that once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the
House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET's own jurisdiction begins. Stated in another manner, where the
candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional
elections, the remedy oft he petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the
HRET. 14 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

And in Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 15

The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins. The
proclamation ofa congressional candidatefiJllowing the election divests the
COMELEC ofjurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications ofthe proclaimed Representatives in favor ofthe HRET. 16
(Emphasis supplied)

Proclamation is the operative act that removes jurisdiction from this

Court or the Commission on Elections and vests it in the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal. 17 It is a validation by the Commission on
Elections, to the best of its knowledge, that the winner is the choice of the
people. By proclamation, the winner acquired a presumptively valid title to
the office. As held in Angara, "certification by the proper provincial board of
canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the National
Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body." 18

Reyes did not change this doctrine. As pointed out in my dissenting

opinion to the Resolution 19 in that case, the ratio decidendi of Reyes was based
ultimately on the pronouncement in Guerrero v. Commission on Elections,2°
which existing jurisprudence does notsupport. I opined:

12
Id. at 179-180.
" 548 Phil. 712 (2007) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].
1
' Id. at 725-726.
15
689 Phil. 192 (2012) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
16
Id. at I 98.
17
Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 689 Phil. 192, 198 (2012) [Per J. Abad, En Banc]; Vinzons-
Chato v. Commission on Elections, 548 Phil. 712, 726 (2007) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc]; Barbers v.
Commission on Elections, 499 Phil. 570, 58 I, 585 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc]; Aggabao v.
Commission on Elections, 490 Phil. 285,291 [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
i:-: Angara v. Elec:toraf'Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 180 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
19
The Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration in that case was supported by five justices, with four
dissenting and five taking no part. One justice was on official leave.
20
391 Phil. 344 (2000) [Per J. Quisurnbing, En Banc].
Dissenting Opinion 5 G.R. Nos. 260650 & 260952

In Guerrero, this Court held that" ... once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the
House of Representatives, [the] COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET's ovmjurisdiction begins." The case cited Aquino v. Commission on
Elections and Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections to support
the statement.

A closer reading of Aquino and Romualdez-Marcos will reveal that

this Court did not mle that three requisites must concur so that one may be
considered a "member" of the House of Representatives subject to the
jurisdiction of the electoral tribunal. On the contrary, this Court held in
Aquino that:

Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction

between an unproclaimed candidate to the House of
Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the
highest number of votes in an election does not automatically
vest the position in the winning candidate.

Under the above-stated provision, the electoral

tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative
to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for
either the Senate or the House only when the latter become
members of either the Senate or the House of
Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed
and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be
a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section
17 of Article VI of the Constitution. While the proclamation
of the winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P.
881 in conjunction with Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 allows
suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned
therein .....

In Romualdez-Marcos, this Court held that:

As to the House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections, suffice it to say that HRET' s jurisdiction as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House
of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point
has no jurisdiction over the question.

To be sure, the petitioners who were the winning candidates in

Aquino and Romualdez-Marcos invoked the jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal though they had not yet been
proclaimed. Thus, this Court held that the Commission on Elections still
had jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.
Dissenting Opinion 6 G.R. Nos. 260650 & 260952

This Court did not create a new doctrine in Aquino as seen in the
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Francisco where he said:

The operative acts necessary for an electoral candidate's

rightful assumption of the office for which he ran are his
proclamation and his taking an oath of office. Petitioner
cannot in anyway be considered as a member of the House
of Representatives for the purpose of divesting the
Commission on Elections of _jurisdiction to declare his
disqualification and invoking instead HRET's jurisdiction, it
indubitably appearing that he has yet to be proclaimed, much
less has he taken an oath of office. Clearly, petitioner's
reliance on the aforecited cases which when perused
involved Congressional members, is totally misplaced, if not
wholly inapplicable. That the jurisdiction conferred upon
HRET extends only to Congressional members is further
estabiished by judicial notice of HRET Rules of Procedure,
and BRET decisions consistently holding that the
proclamation of a winner in the contested election is the
essential requisite vesting _jurisdiction on the HRET.

In fact, the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza in Romualdez-

Marcos will tell us that he espoused a more radical approach to the
jurisdiction of the electoral tribunals. Justice Mendoza is of the opinion that
"the eligibility of a [candidate] for the office [in the House of
RepresentativesJ may only be inquired into by the [House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal]," even if the candidate in Romualdez-
Marcos was not yet proclaimed. Justice Mendoza explained, thus:

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of

an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of a candidate.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against

pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, Section 15) The purpose is
to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges"
under the Constitution of the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of Congress of the President and
Vice President, as the case may be.

Thus, the pronouncement in Guerrero that is used in the main

ponencia as the basis for its ruling is not supported by prior Decisions of
this Court. More importantly. it cannot be considered to have changed the
doctrine in Angara v. Electoral Commission. Instead, it was only made in
the context of the facts in Guerrero where the Decision of the Commission
on Elections En Banc was issued only after the proclamation and the
assumption of office of the winning candidate. In other words, the
contention that there must be proclamation, taking of the oath, and
Dissenting Opinion 7 G.R. Nos. 260650 & 260952

assumption of office before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

takes over is not ratio decidendi. 21 (Citations omitted)

Parenthetically, in Guerrero, this Court stressed the importance of the

mutually exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections and the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:

[I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning

candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as
Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason
for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity ofproceedings and a
clash ofjurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the
people's mandate. 22 (Emphasis supplied)

At any rate, Reyes was the "most unusual case"23 considering the
procedural actions taken by this Court. There, the majority24 went beyond ·
hastily dismissing the Petition outright. Without fully hearing the parties,
it attempted to declare a new doctrine on the jurisdiction of the Commission
of Elections vis-a-vis the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
without any clear or special reason to do so. It proceeded to rule on the
validity of the petitioner's proclamation without this even being raised as an
issue, and without any comment required from and filed by the
respondents. 25

Reyes cannot be used as authority to depart from the time-honored

doctrine first pronounced in Angara. It is an aberration that must be
abandoned.

Here, the Commission on Elections En Banc issued a Resolution on

June 7, 2022, affirming its Second Division's ruling that petitioner Frederico
P. Jalosjos (Frederico) was a nuisance candidate and directing that his votes
be credited to respondent Romeo. 26 The Resolution became final and
executory, such that on June 15, 2022, the Commission En Banc issued a Writ
of Execution27 ordering the Provincial Board of Canvassers to reconvene,
credit the votes of petitioner Frederico to respondent Romeo, and proclaim the
winning candidate. Thus, the Provincial Board of Canvassers was well within
its right and duty to proclaim Romeo as the winning candidate on June 23,
2022.

21
f
J. Lconen, Dissenting Opinion in Reyes v. Commission on Elections, 720 Phil. 174, 299-302(2013) [Per
J. Perez, En Banc].
22
Guerrero v. Commission on Elections, 391 Phil. 344, 354 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, En Banc].
23
J. Brion, Dissenting Opinion in Reyes v. Commission on Elections, 712 Phil. 192,222 (2013) [Per J.
Perez, En Banc].
24
The Resolution was supported by seven members of this Comi, with four dissenting and another three
taking no part. One was on official leave.
25
J. Leanen, Dissenting Opinion in Reyes v. Commission on Elections, 720 Phil. 174, 307-308(2013) [Per
J. Perez, En Banc].
26
Rollo (G.R. No. 260650), pp. 167-178.
27
Id. at 258-261.
 Dissenting Opinion 8 G.R. Nos. 260650 & 260952

II

The Status Quo Ante Order is no longer within this Court's jurisdiction
because June 30, 2022 had lapsed.

In G.R. No. 260650, petitioner Roberto T. Uy, Jr. (Roberto) prays for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and/or status
quo ante order against the implementation of the Commission En Bane's May
12, 2022 Order suspending his proclamation and its subsequent June 7, 2022
Resolution. 28 On the other hand, petitioner Frederico in G.R. No. 260952
prays for a temporary restraining order, status quo ante order, and/or writ of
preliminary injunction against its June 7, 2022 directive to credit his votes to
Romeo. 29

Events transpired after the filing of the Petitions, resulting in respondent

Romeo's proclamation on June 23, 2022. By operation of the Constitution,
Romeo's term of office began at noon of June 30, 2022.

Status quo ante, in its ordinary meaning, refers to "the state of affairs
that existed previously." 30 Hence, "[a]n order of this nature is imposed to
maintain the existing state of things before the controversy." 31

In Garcia v. Mojica 32 and Megaworld Properties and Holdings, Inc. v.

Majestic Finance and Investment Company, Inc., 33 this Court distinguished
between a status quo ante order and a temporary restraining order:

There have been instances when the Supreme Court has issued a
status quo order which, as the very term connotes, is merely intended to
maintain the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things which
preceded the controversy. This was resorted to when the projected
proceedings in the case made the conservation of the status quo desirable
or essential, but the affected party neither sought such relief or the
allegations in his pleading did not sufficiently make out a case for a
temporary restraining order. The status quo order was thus issued motu
proprio on equitable considerations. Also, unlike a temporary restraining
order or a preliminary injunction, a status quo order is more in the nature
of a cease and desist order, since it neither directs the doing or undoing of
acts as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief. The further
distinction is provided by the present amendment in the sense that, unlike

28
Id. at 159.
29
Rollo (G.R. No. 260952), pp. 43-44.
30
Dynamic B11ilders & Constr11ction Co. (Phil.). Inc. v. Presbitero, Jr., 757 Phil. 454,481 (2015) [Per J.
Leonen, En Banc]. (Citation omitted)
31
Remo v. Bueno, 784 Phil. 344, 385 (2016) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
'.' Garcia v. Mojica, 372 Phil. 892 (1999) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
3
·' 775 Phil. 34 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
 Dissenting Opinion 9 G.R. Nos. 260650 & 260952

the amended rule on restraining orders. a status quo order does not require
the posting of a bond. 34 (Emphasis supplied)

A status quo ante order is similar to a temporary restraining order or

preliminary injunctive writ, as both are ancillary to the main action and aims
to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are fully heard. 35
However, while a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive writ
operates on unperformed or unexecuted acts, 36 a status quo ante order may be
issued even when the event has happened or the act has been done. It restores
or maintains the condition prior to the challenged act or event. 37

However, there are instances when a status quo ante is deemed

infeasible or improper. For instance, in Remonte v. Bonto, 38 this Court stated
that a status quo ante cannot be restored because the acts complained of
cannot be undone. In that case, the investigation conducted by agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation, which the petitioner sought to restrain, had
long since been concluded. It resulted in the filing of a criminal case against
the petitioner's officials and its manager, although subsequently dismissed for
reasons undisclosed.

In Juan P. Pellicer & Company, Inc. v. Phil. Realty Corporation, 39 this

Court held that a return to the status quo ante would undo the consolidations
of titles over the parcels of land and be a waste of time, effort, and money
when there was still a pending action.

In Repol v. Commission on Elections, 40 this Court found that the

Commission on Elections acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issued
the status quo ante order, which effectively ove1iurned the trial comi's order
allowing execution pending appeal in the petitioner's favor. 41 This Court held
that it was well within the trial cou1i's discretion to grant execution pending
appeal of its judgment in the election protest case. 42 It further held that the
status quo ante order-which was actually a temporary restraining order
because it ordered the petitioner to desist from assuming the position of
municipal mayor--exceeded the 20-day life span under the Rules of Comi. 43

Unlike a temporary restraining order, which is governed by Rule 58 of

the Rules of Court, no specific rule governs a status quo ante order. Instead,
this Court has been guided by the following considerations in issuing a status
34
Id. at 52.
35
See Los Banos Rural Bank, Inc. v. Afi-ica, 433 Phil. 930 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]. /?
36
Bernardez v. Commission on Electfons, 628 Phil. 720, 732(2010) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc]; Remonte v. X
Banta, 123 Phil. 63 (1966) [Per J. Sanchez, En Banc].
37
See Banzon v. Cnc, 150-A Phil. 865 (1972) [Per J. Teehankee, En Banc].
38
123 Phil. 63 (l 966) [Per J. Sanchez, En Banc].
39
87 Phil. 302, 308-309 ( I 950) [Per .I. Tuason, £11 Banc].
40
472 Phil. 335 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
41
Id. at 356.
42
Id. at 355.
43
Id. at 354.
Dissenting Opinion 10 G.R. Nos. 260650 & 260952

quo ante order: "justice and equity considerations, when conservation of the
status quo is desirable or essential, [to prevent] any serious damage, and where
constitutional issues are raised. " 44

These factors are wanting here. More important, this Court, through a
status quo ante order, cannot undo or render inoperative Romeo's
proclamation and assumption into office without violating the Constitution.
Such power now lies only with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, which has exclusive jurisdiction over contests relating to the
election of respondent Romeo, now a member of the House.

There is no legal impediment to the proclamation. Allowing the status

quo ante would effectively suppress the will of the electorate and create a
vacuum in the congressional post, which is prejudicial to public interest. In
Limkaichong v. Commission on Elections: 45

The unseating of a Member of the House of Representatives should be

exercised with great caution and after the proper proceedings for the ouster
has been validly completed. For to arbitrarily unseat someone, who
obtained the highest number of votes in the elections, and during the
pendency of the proceedings determining one's qualification or
disqualification, would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom ·
sovereignty resides. 46 (Citation omitted)

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to dismiss the Petitions on the ground oflack

of jurisdiction. The Status Ouo Ante Order dated July 17, 2022 must be lifted.

44 J L S .
· eo_ne?, eparat~ ConcmTmg Opinion in ABS-CBN Corp. v. National Telecommunications
,s Comn11ss1on, 879 Ph,!. 507, 551 (2020) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Rane].
60 I Ph,!. 75 I (2009) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
46
Id. at 79 I.