SECTION 17.

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal, which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

REGINA ONGSIAKO-REYES VS. COMELEC, G.r. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

VINZONS-CHATO VS. COMELEC, 520 SCRA 166

AGGABAO VS COMELEC, 449 SCRA 400

GUERRERO VS.COMELEC
Facts: The Petitioner contended that Rodolfo Farinas, the proclaimed winner in the May 1998 elections
for Congressman, had not been a qualified candidate since he had not filed a valid certification of
candidacy. The petitioner claimed that the certificate of candidacy filed by Farinas was defective due to
the fact that he was not an official candidate of the LAMMP (Lakas makabayan MasangPilipino)party, but
an independent party who had substituted for Chevylie V. Farinas. COMELEC dismissed the petition
claiming that it was beyond their jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of
the certification of candidacy of Farinas was already within the exclusive jurisdiction of HRET.

HELD: The court held that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC since the
latter's jurisdiction had ceased with the assumption of office of respondent Farinas as Representative for
the first district of Ilocos Norte. Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, HRET has sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of all contests related to the election, returns and qualifications of the HOR.

DIMAPORO vs COMELEC

LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC

Political Law – Jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals
FACTS: Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Paras, her rival, and
some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. Limkaichong is allegedly
not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese
and that her mom, though Filipino lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s dad.
During the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, Election day came and
votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras. COMELEC after due
hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. About 2 days after the counting of votes, COMELEC
declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days however, notwithstanding their
proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong
as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No.
8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with
pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and
resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the
COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’ petitioned arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner,
the COMELEC can no longer exercise jurisdiction over the matter. It should be the HRET which should
exercise jurisdiction from then on. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid. Whether or not COMELEC
should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD: The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint
Resolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En
Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her
proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of
the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was
suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2,
Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. – A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution,
order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such
motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution,
order and ruling.

The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held that
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of
the HOR, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of
a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of
the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper
proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a
Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications.
The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC
underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its
members.

LAZATIN VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Lazatin filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to annul his
proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties of
Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests. Buan, Jr., and Timbol (Lazatin’s
opposition), alleged that the instant petition has become moot and academic because the assailed
COMELEC Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6,
1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the instant petition should be given due course
because the proclamation was valid. The Telex Order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing
board to proclaim the winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code,” was in effect
a grant of authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate
Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void
because the board simply corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final
resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain election
returns.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET’s jurisdiction.

HELD: The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the petition.
The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional
elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as
Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be to usurp
the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been
previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and
despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed,
considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

FIRDAUSSI ABBAS VS. SET

Political Law – Inhibition in the Senate Electoral Tribunal
FACTS: On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of
the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator
members from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties
to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process
imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification,
Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24) —- requiring the concurrence
of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature —- is a proviso that where more
than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than
three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context
of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all
Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due weight.

HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its
composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”

It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the
Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share
the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution
of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not
to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from
sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his
personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is
saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members
alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

ENRILE VS SANCHEZ
Political Law – Electoral Tribunals – Jurisdiction – Pre-proclamation Controversy
FACTS: After the first senatorial elections under the 1987 Constitution, Sanchez, a candidate therein,
filed before the COMELEC to conduct a recount of the votes. Allegedly, votes intended for him, which
were merely written as “Sanchez”, were considered as stray votes because of the sameness of his last
name to that of Gil Sanchez – another candidate who was later disqualified. Sanchez was then running
as the 25th in ranking among the candidates (Sanchez vs COMELEC). He filed an urgent petition to re-
count or re-appreciate those votes in favor of him. Meanwhile, Rasul and Enrile, ranked 23 rd and
24th respectively intervened and filed before the COMELEC requesting the latter to proclaim them as the
duly elected senators elect completing the 24 senators-elect. They moved to dismiss Sanchez’ petition.
Rasul’s lead over Enrile is just about 1,910 and there were just 3 municipalities left to be counted (31,000
votes). Enrile’s lead over Sanchez was 73,034 votes. COMELEC then denied Sanchez’ petition.
Subsequently, COMELEC declared Rasul as the 23rd senator-elect but there was still a mathematical
possibility that Enrile can overtake Rasul. Enrile opposed Rasul’s proclamation as the 23 rd senator-elect
and he averred that COMELEC should complete the canvassing first before declaring who placed 23rd
and 24th respectively (Enrile vs COMELEC and Razul). COMELEC justified Rasul’s proclamation on the
ground that since the remaining 3 municipalities is in Muslim Mindanao, and that Rasul is a Muslim, there
is a logical presumption that majority of the votes therefrom would be for Rasul. While this was foregoing,
COMELEC, by a vote of 5 to 2 reversed its earlier decision in denying Sanchez’ petition and it granted
Sanchez’ request for recount and re-appreciation. Enrile then filed a petition against COMELEC and
Sanchez (Enrile vs COMELEC and Sanchez). Enrile alleged that the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction
in granting Sanchez’ petition for recount and abused its discretion in refusing to proclaim him (Enrile) on
the ground that Sanchez’ petition for recount is not a pre-proclamation controversy which involves issues
affecting extrinsic validity, and not intrinsic validity, of the said election returns and that Rasul’s lead over
him was only 1,916 votes while his lead over Sanchez was 73,034 votes, with only 31,000 votes
remaining to be canvassed in 3 towns, could not offset his lead over Sanchez.

ISSUE: Whether Sanchez’ petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed with the Comelec
may be considered a summary pre-proclamation controversy falling within the Comelec’s exclusive
jurisdiction (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code) or properly pertains to the realm of election protest falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal as “the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualification of the [Senate's] members.” (Art. VI, Sec. 17, Constitution).

HELD: Sanchez’ petition must fail. There is no clear showing that the said stray votes constitute
“omission in the election returns of the name of any candidate and/or his corresponding votes”
(incomplete election returns). The election returns are in fact complete as the total number of votes that
were counted and appreciated as votes in his favor by the boards of inspectors. The scope of pre-
proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy, is
restrictive and exclusive. In the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed
are incomplete or contain material defects (sec. 234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified or
prepared under duress (sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the
difference of which affects the result of the election (sec. 236), which are the only instances where a pre-
proclamation recount maybe resorted to, granted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and its
contents, Sanchez’ petition must fail. The complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question,
must be prima facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the
winning candidates. The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues that
may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation of “Sanchez” votes
intended for him bear no relation to the correctness and authenticity of the election returns canvassed.
Neither the Constitution nor statute has granted the COMELEC or the board of canvassers the power in
the canvass of election returns to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity.
‘Canvass proceedings are administrative and summary in nature, and a strong prima facie case backed
up by a specific offer of evidence and indication of its nature and importance has to be made out to
warrant the reception of evidence aliunde and the presentation of witnesses and the delays necessarily
entailed thereby. Otherwise, the paralyzation of canvassing and proclamation proceedings leading to a
vacuum in so important and sensitive an office as that of Senator of the Republic could easily be brought
about —- this time involving the eight place and next time involving perhaps all the eight places, when it is
considered that the position of senator is voted for, nationwide by all the voters of the 66 provinces and
57 cities comprising the Philippines.

BONDOC VS. PINEDA

Political Law – HRET – Removal of a Member
FACTS: Bondoc and Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4 th District of Pampanga. Pineda
is a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipno. While Bondoc is a member of the Nacionalista
Party, Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result and was subsequently declared
as the winner by the House Electoral Tribunal. One member of the Electoral Tribunal, Juanito Camasura
Jr and a member of LDP confessed to Rep. Jose Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that he voted for Bondoc.
This resulted to his expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the
HRET. They further prayed that a new election be held and that the new representative that they’d be
placing in the HRET will be voting for Pineda this time. Camasura was then removed by HRET’s
chairwoman Justice Herrera by virtue of a resolution passed by the HOR.
ISSUE: Whether or not such action by the HRET is valid?

HELD: The act is not valid for the HRET has already reached and rendered a decision and such decision
may not be annulled due the reason that LDP has withdrawn its representative in the HRET who
participated in the voting. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has already become moot
and academic. LDP change their representative to change the outcome of the election. Camasura should
be reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid
cause for termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to security of
tenure.
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the SC. 5 coming from the majority party
(LDP). And 1 coming from the minority.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective
members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be members of
the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”

JOKER ARROYO VS HRET

HRET’s Jurisdiction – Excess and Lack Thereof
FACTS: After the May 11, 1992 elections, Arroyo was declared as the duly elected Congressman of the
lone district of Makati. Arroyo won by 13,559 votes over his opponent. His opponent Syjuco protested the
declaration before the HRET. Syjuco alleged that Arroyo won due to massive fraud hence he moved for
revision and recounting. HRET gave way but during the process some HRET employees and personnel
conducted some irregularities to ensure Syjuco’s win. After some paper battles between the two, Syjuco,
realizing that mere revision and recounting would not suffice to overthrow the more than 12,000 votes
lead of Arroyo over him, revised his complaint by including and introducing in his memorandum cum
addendum that his complaint is actually based on a broader and more equitable non-traditional
determination of the existence of the precinct-level document-based anomalies and that the revision he
initially sought is just incidental to such determination. The 3 justices members of the HRET ruled that
such amendment is already beyond the tribunal’s jurisdiction and the 6 representative members ruled
otherwise. Consequently, by a vote of 6-3, the HRET did not dismiss the protest filed by Syjuco and the
HRET later declared Syjuco as the winner.

ISSUE: Whether or not HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

HELD: However guised or justified by Syjuco, this innovative theory he introduced for the first time in his
memorandum cum addendum indeed broadened the scope of the election protest beyond what he
originally sought-the mere revision of ballots. From his initial prayer for revision which lays primary, if not
exclusive emphasis on the physical recount and appreciation of ballots alone, private respondent’s
belated attempt to inject this theory at the memorandum stage calls for presentation of evidence
(consisting of thousands of documents) aside from, or other than, the ballots themselves. By having done
so, Syjuco in fact intended to completely abandon the process and results of the revision and thereafter
sought to rely on his brainchild process he fondly coined as “precinct-level document-based evidence.”
This is clearly substantial amendment of the election protest expressly proscribed by Rule 28 of the HRET
internal rules.

SECTION 18.
There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all
the Members.

DAZA VS LUIS SINGSON

Tribunal and its Composition
FACTS: The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political realignment
in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They
withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the
chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except
Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement.

ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of
the Commission on Appointments.

HELD: As provided in the constitution, “there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of

twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each House
respectively on the basis of proportional representation” of the political parties therein, this necessarily
connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with.
Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but
also subsequently thereto NOT the court.

GUINGONA vs. GONZALES

HRET’s Composition – Rounding Off
FACTS: After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC
senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each
house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of
Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula
would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5
member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party
because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party
to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the
elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one
LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that
the compromise is against proportional representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the CoA.

HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on
the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to
do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate
converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5
to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on Appointments to less
than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is
no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the
proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more
representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS
NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the
CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot
constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to
come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other
party.
 TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS
(LAKAS-NUCD), vs. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA,

SECTION 19.
The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after
the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the
President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in
session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and
functions as are herein conferred upon it.

SECTION 20.
The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in
accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish
annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each Member.

SECTION 21.
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO

Inquiry in Aid of Legislation
FACTS: This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of
the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined
by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a
partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault
refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the
Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned “until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . .
the name of the person to whom he gave the P440, 000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in
connection therewith.” Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus

ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a
congressional hearing in aid of legislation.

HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry
in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the
Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention
should not be too long as to violate the witness’ right to due process of law.

GARCILLANO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

GR 170338, DECEMBER 23, 2008
FACTS: These are two (2) consolidated cases regarding the tapes ostensibly containing a wire tapped
conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The tapes, notoriously referred to as the “Hello Garci” tapes,
allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to
manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the
subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both House of Congress.

Petitioner in GR 170338,Virgilio Garcillano, filed a petition to restrain the House Committees from using
the tape recordings of the “illegally obtained” wiretap led conversations in their committee reports and for
any purpose and be ordered that the said recordings be stricken off the records of the inquiry, and that
respondent house committees desist from further using the recordings in any of
the....House...proceedings.
Petitioners in GR 179275, both retired justices in the CA, filed a petition seeking to bar the Senate from
conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry, arguing that the inquiry violates RA 4200 and the
Constitutional mandate regarding the publication of its rules of procedure in the conduct of inquiries
in,,,aid,,,of...legislation.

Respondents in this particular case justified their non-observance of the constitutional mandate by
arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and despite that, they are published in
booklet form available to anyone for free and accessible to the public at the Senate’s Internet web page.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication, in the Internet and in pamphlet form, of the Senate Rules of
Procedure is deemed valid as publication mandated by the Constitution.

HELD: Absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without
more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with
duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have
undergone amendments or revisions. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over
any custom, practice, or tradition followed by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of RA 8792 or the E-Commerce Act of 2000, to
support their claim of valid publication through the Internet is all the more incorrect. RA 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document only for evidentiary purposes. The law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for being original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. It does not make the Internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only “in accordance with its duly published
rules,,,of...procedure.”

SPOUSES PNP DIRECTOR ELISEO DE LA PAZ & MARIA FE DE LA PAZ VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009
Inquiry in Aid of Legislation – Jurisdiction and Publication
FACTS: In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of 8 to attend
an Interpol GA. De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the scheduled GA, de la Paz is also
scheduled to retire. After the GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the departure area for he was carrying
with him €105,000.00 (P6, 930,000.00). He was also carrying with him €45,000.00 (P2, 970,000.00). He
failed to declare in writing that he is carrying such an amount and this is in violation of the United Nations
Convention against Corruption and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime. De La Paz and his group was later released but the €s were confiscated by the Russians. Upon
arrival to the Philippines, De La Paz was issued a subpoena by the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations for the investigation it was to conduct involving the Moscow incident. De La Paz averred that
the said committee does not have jurisdiction of the case. De La Paz argued that the Committee is devoid
of any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident as the matter does not involve state to state
relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate
Rules). They further claim that respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the
warrant of arrest without the required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent Committee.
They likewise assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not published as required by
the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the basis of any investigation involving them relative to the
Moscow incident.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Committee has jurisdiction over the matter.

HELD: The SC ruled against De La Paz. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution
states:”Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.” This provision has been traditionally
construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption
and promulgation of its own rules. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter that
is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question. Also, the
signatures were properly obtained as evidenced by the approval of the Senate president and it is shown
that the gathering of the signatures is in accordance with the Rules. It is also shown that the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation were also published in two newspapers of general
circulation.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL.,

VS. EXEC. SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., G.R. No. 16977, April 29, 2006
95 SCRA 170 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Branch – Question Hour – Constitutionality of E.O. 464
FACTS: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the
Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said
anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued
invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource
persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due
to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter.
Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements
were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are
covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered
by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the
President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s
approval.

The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked
EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military
personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before
legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their
military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed
for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of
legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of
EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The
Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In
other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true –
recourse must be had to others who do possess it.

Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with
the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry.
The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of
check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour,
whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that
matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was
thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to
be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and
22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other
pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit
of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of
executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of
separation of powers.

While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of
Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises
its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested,
hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her
being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of
government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential
consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For
under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour
is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads
in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either
by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes
which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as
Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In
such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may
only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their
appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons
stated in Arnault.

BENGZON VS. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

203 SCRA 767 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative Department – Inquiry in Aid of Legislation – When not Allowed
FACTS: It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses
unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with
the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa – Cory’s brother in law, among others, control over
some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines
and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over
various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing,
Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him.
Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile
categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.

Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an
inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea.

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their
attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and
irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer
for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.

HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of
RA No. 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose
of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives
of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39
corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended
legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of legislation”
because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation
is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of
RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter that appears more within the province
of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo
Lopa died during the pendency of this case.

ROMULO L. NERI VS.SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND

INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2009

CAMILO L. SABIO v. HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al.

G.R. No. 174340 17 October 2006,
FACTS: Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and
his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by
the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.

Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked
Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all
PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.

RULING: No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the
Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly,
there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism
which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to
the committees.

It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it
categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being
a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of
inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.”

Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section
21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. This
cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The
Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government
agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to
regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class.

A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it
creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect
violates the Constitution or its basic principles.

Moreover, Sec. 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent
with the constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of
public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access
to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the
absence of any constitutional basis.

NEGROS ORIENTAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE vs. SANG PANLUNGSOD (dumaguete)

Political Law – Inquiry in Aid of Legislation – LGUs
FATCS: In 1985, the SP of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in connection with pending
legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing are the heads of NORECO II –
Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed inefficient power lines in the
said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) and they
alleged that the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to
conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification Administration; and neither the
Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code (LGC – BP 337) grants the SP.
The SP averred that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to
conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on
matters within its jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.

HELD: There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting local
legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt.
Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification
for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would
be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the
contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant
of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions.
To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express
statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. There being no provision in the
LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to
punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac
for contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can
exercise these powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue
the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The
contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the
subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body

SECTION 22.
The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so
states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
SECTION 23.
The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall
have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

a. Note the limitations and restrictions for the delegation.

b. Note also that it could be withdrawn by mere resolution.
c. What is referred to by the phrase “next adjournment”?

ARANETA VS. DINGLASAN

Political Law – First Emergency Powers Cases
FACTS: Araneta is being charged under violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for
residential buildings. Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit
Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671. 3 other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an
appeal by Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is
seeking to have permit. L-3054 is filed by Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from
’49-‘50] pursuant to EO 225. L-3056 is filed by Barredo is attacking EO 226 w/c is appropriating funds to
hold the national elections. CA 671 is otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL
EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE
PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or
simply the Emergency Powers Act. All the petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and
effect hence all EOs passed pursuant to it had likewise ceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.

HELD: CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25,
1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In
setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the
point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National
Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may “consider general legislation or only such subjects as
he (President) may designate.” Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of
adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner amended or repealed by the
National Assembly.” Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in
order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.

RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA

Political Law – Second Emergency Powers Cases
FACTS: Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first
appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside
the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts,
earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. These EO’s were pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671.
Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but
the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still
subsisting as a fact.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EO’s are valid.

HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EO’s issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered
ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last
world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot
be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if
the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be
absurd to contend otherwise. For “while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might
not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to
delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law.” Act
No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary
only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal
cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that
the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.

RA 6826
An act to declare, in view of the existence of a national emergency, a national policy in connection
therewith and to authorize the president of the republic of the Philippines for a limited period and subject
to restrictions, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out the declared national policy and for
other purposes.

SECTION 24.
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.

TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE

Political Law – Origination of Revenue Bills – EVAT – Amendment by Substitution
FACTS: Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded
Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from
the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA
7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the
3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee
thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate
could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in
that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the
HB”. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill.

ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.

HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with
the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR.
What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the
HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather
than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of
amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere
matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his
over what has been done.

SECTION 25.
(1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation
of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget
shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in
its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported
by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding
revenue proposed therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to
be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill
for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed
reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the
Congress.

DEMETRIA VS. ALBA

Political Law – Transfer of Funds
FACTS: Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Alba,
then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177 or the Budget
Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of Section 44 of the said PD. This Section
provides that “The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the
General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.” Demetria averred that this is
unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency
of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether
or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or
whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made.
It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an
undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. HOWEVER, transfers of savings
within one department from one item to another in the GA Act may be allowed by law in the interest of
expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.

SECTION 26.
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before
its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
 TIO VS VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA 208
Political Law – The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill
FATCS: Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram
industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD 1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code.
The amendment provides that “there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for
playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.” The said law was brought about by the need to
regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of
videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such
loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Sec 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross
receipts payable to the LGUs. Tio countered, among others, that the tax imposition provision is a rider
and is not germane to the subject matter of the PD.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PD embraces only one subject.

HELD: The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include
the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and
every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute
are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a single general subject,
indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance
of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object.” The rule also
is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a practical rather than technical
construction. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video
industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to
that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the PD. The express purpose of the PD to include taxation of the video
industry in order to regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from
Preambles 2 and 5 of the said PD which explain the motives of the lawmakers in presenting the measure.
The title of the PD, which is the creation of the VRB, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes
expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those
objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the PD.

DE LA CRUZ VS.PARAS
Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title – Police Power Not Validly Exercise
FACTS: De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84,
Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the
said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out
their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with
customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing
declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT
WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a
valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were
deprived of due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful
trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing
hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly
the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with
the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy
of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could
qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end
can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its
face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance,
Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

INSULAR LUMBER vs. CTA

Political Law – One Subject Embraced in the Title of a Bill
FATCS: Insular Lumber (ILC) is an American company engaged as a licensed forest concessionaire. The
ILC purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the operation of its forest concession. In
1956, RA 1435 was passed. Sec 5 thereof provides that there should be a partial tax refund to those
using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions. In 1964 ILC filed with the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to have a tax refund of P19, 921.37 pursuant to the said RA. The Court of Industrial
Relations (CIR) ruled that ILC is not covered by such provision because Sec 5, RA 1435 is only effective
5 years from its enactment. Hence, in 1961 the provision ceased to be effective. ICL appealed the issue
to the CTA and the CTA ruled the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest
concession, hence, the refund provision of Sec 5, RA1435 allowing partial refund to forest and mining
concessionaires cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And out of the P19, 921.37 claimed,
only the amount of P14, 598.08 was paid on oil utilized in logging operations. The CTA did not allow the
refund of the full amount of P14, 598.08 because the ILC’s right to claim the refund of a portion thereof,
particularly those paid during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed.
Hence, ICL was credited the refund of P10, 560.20 only. Both parties appealed from the decision of the
CTA. The CIR averred that CTA should not have ruled this way. The title of RA 1435 is “An Act to Provide
Means for Increasing the Highway Special Fund.” The CIR contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to
increase Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the Act deals with another subject which is the
partial exemption of miners and loggers. And this partial exemption on which the Company based its
claim for refund is clearly not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5
provides for a decrease rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.

ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to ICL.

HELD: The SC ruled that there is no merit in the contention of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one
subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund
through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec 5 of the law
is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to
specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose of
the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might
completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or
its operation. But that is not so for in the passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings
bear out, a full debate on precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its complete subject was held by
Congress which passed it.

LIDASAN VS. COMELEC

Political Law – Effect if Title Does Not Completely Express the Subject
FACTS: Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled “An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan came to know later on
that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,
Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also
in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato
voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precints for voter
registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be nullified for being
unconstitutional because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating Dianaton, it would be
including in the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato.

ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province –
Cotabato – to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?

HELD: The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did
not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the
towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is
being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it
kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a
Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own
province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790

ALALAYAN vs. NAPOCOR

Political Law – Title Must Express One Subject
FATCS: Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company assails the power vested in
NAPOCOR that “in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder,” receiving at least
50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that such franchise holder “shall not
realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating
expenses.” Also it could “renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric
power and energy,” This is all in pursuant to RA 3043 and the amendments it offered to RA 2641.
Alalayan and PPDC are contractors with NAPOCOR. They are re-suppliers of power produced by
NAPOCOR. They aver that the provision of the said RA is a rider in only meant to increase the capital
stock of NAPOCOR.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3043 is constitutional.

HELD: No bill “which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in [its] title . . .” This provision is similar to those found in many American State Constitutions.
It is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills as log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious
or unconsidered enactments. Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the lawmakers
along with the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This
constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not
germane to the subject matter of the bill. Alalayan asserts that the provision objected to is such a rider.
To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or impede
proper legislation. To impart to it a meaning which is reasonable and not unduly technical, it must be
deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which
the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for its
accomplishment. Thus, mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title
of the act a complete index of its contents. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its
subject finding expression in its title. More specifically, if the law amends a section or part of a statute, it
suffices if reference be made to the legislation to be amended, there being no need to state the precise
nature of the amendment. “Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of
an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it
inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body
of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or
fraud upon the legislators.”

CORDERO VS. CABATUANDO

Political Law – One Title, One Subject Rule – Tenancy Act
FATCS: Cordero is the trial lawyer of the Tenancy Counsel Unit of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission
of the Department of Justice. He later appeared as the counsel of indigent tenant Salazar who filed a
case against landlord Sta. Romana in order to reinstate and reliquidate past harvests. Sta. Romana filed
a motion to disqualify Cordero as counsel for Salazar and he invoked Sec. 54 of RA 1199 or The
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. The said section indicates that representation by counsel of
tenants who cannot afford to pay should be done by the public defenders of the Dept of Labor. Judge
Cabatuando ruled in favor of Sta. Romana. Cordero appealed. During pendency of the appeal RA 2263
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED NINETY-NINE, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE
PHILIPPINES was passed. This law, particularly Sec 19 & 20 thereof, amended the previous law and now
allows trial lawyers from the TCU to represent indigent tenants and it is also the basis of creation of the
Tenancy Mediation Division. Cordero filed a Manifestation averring that by virtue of the amendment being
the done the issue has now become moot and academic. Cabatuando countered that the provision is not
embraced in the title.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the TMD is embraced in the title of the bill and whether or not to
allow trial lawyers from TCU to appear as counsel for indigent tenants.

HELD: The SC ruled that that the constitutional requirement in question is satisfied if all parts of the law
are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title of the bill. The constitutional
requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in the instant case, has a single general subject which
is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so
long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. To
declare sections 19 & 20 of RA 2263 null and void would in effect upset the transfer of the duty of
representing indigent tenants from the public defenders of the Department of Labor to the trial attorneys
in the Mediation Division of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the Department of Justice. In other
words, a declaration of nullity of these provisions of RA 2263 would do harm to, and would be nugatory
of, the intention of Congress to consolidate the function of enforcing our tenancy laws in the Department
of Justice.

Tatad vs. Secretary of Energy

“Equal Protection” – Oil Deregulation Law
FATCS: Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always
been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodates these
innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180.
This law allows that “any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum
products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil
facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement,” subject only to monitoring
by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that
the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products
violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the
three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry
who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3%
is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.

HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the
Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free
competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an
oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in
the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and
Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their
immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in
the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend
to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to
spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge
disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The
argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in
refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be
attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of
Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.

RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the “new players” insofar
as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the established oil companies by requiring them
to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.

SECTION 27.
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to
the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to
pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all
such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of
any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it
shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue,
or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

BENGZON vs. Secreatary of Justice

Political law – Bill – Veto – Veto a Bill
FACTS: Bengzon was appointed as Justice of the Peace in 1912 in Lingayen Pangasinan. Upon
reaching 65 years of age in 1933 he would have to retire in accordance to law. He later sought to claim
gratuity pursuant to Act 4051 “An Act to provide for the payment of retirement gratuities to officers and
employees of the Insular Government retired from the service as a result of the reorganization or
reduction of personnel thereof, including the justices of the peace who must relinquish office in
accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, and for other
purposes.” Sec 7 thereof specifically provides that gratuity may be availed of by justices like Bengzon but
that provision has been vetoed by the governor general. Bengzon said the veto is beyond the power of
the gov-gen hence he sought to file a petition to have the Sec of Justice to implement the gratuity
provision of the said law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bengzon is entitled to the gratuity provision of the Retirement Gratuity Law.

HELD: The governor – general in vetoing the said item of the law has acted within his power; for this is
also in compliance with the Organic Act. Section 19 of the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, established the practice for the enactment of a law, including the sanctioning of the veto
power by the Governor-General. Specifically it provided: “The Governor-General shall have the power to
veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.” The SC then is constrained to rule against Bengzon and to hold that the veto
by the Governor-General of section 7 of Act No. 4051 was in conformity with the legislative purpose and
the provisions of the Organic Act.

BOLINAO ELECTRONICS VS. VALENCIA

Political Law – Veto Power – Condition Attached to an Item
FACTS: Bolinao Electronics is co-owner an co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network Montserrat
Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the
Philippines. They were summoned by Valencia, then Sec of Communications, for operating even after
their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation sans license and
their continuing operation had caused damage to his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.

HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the
refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to
operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963
Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in
Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are
expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim
damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget
Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item
in the appropriation bill. This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does not carry with it the power to
strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is
unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by
the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.

Neptali Gonzales vs. Macaraig

Political Law – Veto Power – Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill
FACTS: Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section
55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the
1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto
power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she
exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision;
(2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto
power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers;
and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be
provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on
the exercise of that power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or
differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.

HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be
more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by
it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power.
The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the
executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the
budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the
purpose of the President’s veto power.

BENGZON VS. DRILON, April 15, 1992

What is a “pocket veto”?

 An indirect veto of a legislative bill by the president or a governor by retaining the bill unsigned
until it is too late for it to be dealt with during the legislative session.

What are the three ways by which a bill becomes a law?

 President signs
 Inaction of president within 30 days after receipt
 Vetoed bill is repassed by congress by 2/3 votes of all its members, each house voting separately

PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ, 235 SCRA 506

35 SCRA 506 – Political Law – Veto Power – Part of the Legislative Process
Constitutionality of the Pork Barrel “Countrywide Development Fund”
FACTS: This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president
involving the General Appropriations Act of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The
Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund.
PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which
those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive.

In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAA of 1994, neither
house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Tañada and Romulo sought the
issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this
petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items
in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public W orks
and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain
appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.

HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is
constitutional. In the Tañada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.

Veto on special provisions

The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs
Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting
that the scheme is already taken care of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by
revising the debt policy. He however did not delete the P86, 323,438,000.00 appropriations therefor.
Tañada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted
therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered
“inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign
Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.

Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs

The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s), the President vetoed special provisions
which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was
likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the
National expenditure Program. Tañada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is
valid for it is in compliant to the “One Fund Policy” – it avoided double funding and redundancy.

Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance

The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations.
The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special
Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to
the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be
expended – 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by
Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed
separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the budgetary sense.
The veto herein is then not valid.

Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment

As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the
Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall effectively alter
the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to
modernize the AFP”. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in
implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate
and substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions.

Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds

According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct
appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in
Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the
president.

Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s

Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including the payment of separation benefits. The
President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on
the CAFGU’s shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.
The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed
the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.

Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc

In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under
Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that ‘no elective or appointive public officer or
employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law.’
I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully
adhere to the well-established principle on compensation standardization. Tañada et al claim that the
conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme
court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the
conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The
Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can
only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the
disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse,
be treated as superfluities.

Pork Barrel Constitutional

The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their local districts
know more about the problems in their constituents areas than the national government or the president
for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position to recommend as to
where funds should be allocated.

What is the so-called “executive impoundment”?

 It means that although an item of appropriation is not vetoed by the President, he however
refuses for whatever reason, to spend funds made possible by Congress. It is the failure to spend
or obligate budget authority of any type. Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three
(3) principal sources of authority of the President. [1] Authority to impound given to him by
Congress, either expressly or impliedly; [2] the executive power drawn from his power as
Commander-in-chief; and [3] the Faithful execution clause of the Constitution.
 Note that in this case the SC held that the Countryside Development Fund (CDF) of
Congressmen and Senators is CONSTITUTIONAL because the same is “set aside for
‘infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities,
and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries as proposed and identified by said Senators and
Congressmen.

SECTION 28.
(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system
of taxation.
(2) The Congress, may by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-
profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
(4)No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress.

SECTION 29.
(1) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid or employed…directly or indirectly for
the benefit, use, or support of any sect, denomination, or system of religion…except when such preacher,
priest… is assigned to the AFP, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for
such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned,
the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.

GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SEC., 211 SCRA 219

PEPSI COLA VS. THE CITY OF BUTUAN, 24 SCRA 789

FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant Pepsi-Cola sought to recover the sums paid by it under protest, to the City of
Butuan, and collected by the latter, pursuant to its Municipal Ordinance No. 110 which plaintiff assails as
null and void because it partakes of the nature of an import tax, amounts to double taxation, highly unjust
and discriminatory, excessive, oppressive and confiscatory, and constitutes an invalid delegation of the
power to tax. The ordinance imposes taxes for every case of soft drinks, liquors and other carbonated
beverages, regardless of the volume of sales, shipped to the agents and/or consignees by outside
dealers or any person or company having its actual business outside the City.

ISSUE: Does the tax ordinance violate the uniformity requirement of taxation?

HELD: Yes. The tax levied is discriminatory. Even if the burden in question were regarded as a tax on the
sale of said beverages, it would still be invalid, as discriminatory, and hence, violative of the uniformity
required by the Constitution and the law therefor, since only sales by "agents or consignees" of outside
dealers would be subject to the tax. Sales by local dealers, not acting for or on behalf of other merchants,
regardless of the volume of their sales, and even if the same exceeded those made by said agents or
consignees of producers or merchants established outside the City of Butuan, would be exempt from the
disputed tax.

It is true that the uniformity essential to the valid exercise of the power of taxation does not require identity
or equality under all circumstances, or negate the authority to classify the objects of taxation. The
classification made in the exercise of this authority, to be valid, must, however, be reasonable and this
requirement is not deemed satisfied unless: (1) it is based upon substantial distinctions which make real
differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the legislation or ordinance; (3) the classification
applies, not only to present conditions, but, also, to future conditions substantially identical to those of the
present; and (4) the classification applies equally to all those who belong to the same class.

PROVINCE OF ABRA VS. HERNANDO, 107 SCRA 104

FACTS: The provincial assessor of Abra made a tax assessment on the properties of the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Bangued. The bishop claims tax exemption from real estate tax, through an action for declaratory relief.
Judge Hernando of the CFI Abra presided over the case.

The petitioner province filed a motion to dismiss, based on lack of jurisdiction, which was denied. It was
followed by a summary judgment granting the exemption without hearing the side of t he petitioner.

The Acting Provincial Fiscal, as counsel for petitioner, alleged that respondent Judge "virtually ignored the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court; ... wantonly violated the rights of petitioner to due process, by
giving due course to the petition of private respondent for declaratory relief, and thereafter without
allowing petitioner to answer and without any hearing, adjudged the case; all in total disregard of basic
laws of procedure and basic provisions of due process in the constitution, thereby indicating a failure to
grasp and understand the law.
ISSUE: WON Judge Hernando erred in denying the motion to dismiss of petitioner and in granting the tax
exemption through a summary judgment

HELD: YES. The petition must be granted. Respondent Judge would not have erred so grievously had he
merely compared the provisions of the present Constitution with that appearing in the 1935 Charter on the
tax exemption of "lands, buildings, and improvements." There is a marked difference. Under the 1935
Constitution: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation." The present Constitution added "charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit
cemeteries “and required that for the exemption of ": lands, buildings, and improvements," they should not
only be "exclusively" but also "actually and "directly" used for religious or charitable purposes. The
Constitution is worded differently. The change should not be ignored. It must be duly taken into
consideration. Reliance on past decisions would have sufficed were the words "actually" as well as
"directly" not added. There must be proof therefore of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and
improvements for religious or charitable purposes to be exempt from taxation. It has been the constant
and uniform holding that exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted
it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from
taxation; hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris

Petitioner Province of Abra is therefore fully justified in invoking the protection of procedural due process.
If there is any case where proof is necessary to demonstrate that there is compliance with the
constitutional provision that allows an exemption, this is it. Instead, respondent Judge accepted at its face
the allegation of private respondent. All that was alleged in the petition for declaratory relief filed by
private respondents, after mentioning certain parcels of land owned by it, are that they are used "actually,
directly and exclusively" as sources of support of t he parish priest and his helpers and also of private respondent
Bishop. It clearly appears, therefore, that in failing to accord a hearing to petitioner Province of Abra and
deciding the case immediately in favor of private respondent, respondent Judge failed to abide by the
constitutional command of procedural due process

APOSTOLIC PREFECT OF BAGUIO VS. TREASURER, 71 PHIL. 547

FACTS: In 1937, an ordinance (Ord. 137) was passed in the City of Baguio. The said ordinance sought to
assess properties of property owners within the defined city limits. APMP, on the other hand, is a religious
corporation duly established under Philippine laws. Pursuant to the ordinance, it contributed a total
amount of P1, 019.37. It filed the said contribution in protest.

APMP later averred that it should be exempt from the said special contribution since as a religious
institution, it has a constitutionally guaranteed right not to be taxed including its properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not APMP is exempt from taxes

HELD: The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the
Constitution. Based on Justice Cooley’s words: "While the word 'tax' in its broad meaning, includes both
general taxes and special assessments, and in a general sense a tax is an assessment, and an
assessment is a tax, yet there is a recognized distinction between them in that assessment is confined to
local impositions upon property for the payment of the cost of public improvements in its immediate
vicinity and levied with reference to special benefits to the property assessed. The differences between a
special assessment and a tax are that (1) a special assessment can be levied only on land; (2) a special
assessment cannot (at least in most states) be made a personal liability of the person assessed; (3) a
special assessment is based wholly on benefits; and (4) a special assessment is exceptional both as to
time and locality. The imposition of a charge on all property, real and personal, in a prescribed area, is a
tax and not an assessment, although the purpose is to make a local improvement on a street or highway.
A charge imposed only on property owners benefited is a special assessment rather than a tax
notwithstanding the statute calls it a tax." In the case at bar, the Prefect cannot claim exemption because
the assessment is not taxation per se but rather a system for the benefits of the inhabitants of the city.
 PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 PHIL. 331
"A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage or benefit, derived from such
expenditure, is merely incidental in the promotion of a particular enterprise."

FACTS: Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction,
upon the ground that RA No. 920, which appropriates funds for public works particularly for the
construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder roads, however, as
alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and planned
subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private respondent
Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not connect any government
property or any important premises to the main highway. The respondents' contention is that there is
public purpose because people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of
the roads, and the government also gains from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the
streets, made by its owner to the government.

ISSUE: Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of justifying
an expenditure of the government?

HELD: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for
anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of neither the expenditure
which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected
nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be
ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the
promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid
by the use public money.

The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is
designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals,
although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.

AGLIPAY VS RUIZ, 64 PHIL 201

FACTS: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay,
Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic
duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the
President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts
publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said
stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of
the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.

HELD: There has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of
Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse
postage stamps with new designs. Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor
judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to
take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a
gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming
within a constitutional inhibition. The court resolved that petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied,
without pronouncement as to costs.

MANUEL ALBA VS . PEREZ, G.R. NO. 65917, SEPTEMBET 24, 1987

Political Law – Appropriation
FACTS: Dr. Perez was named Outstanding Health Worker in 1980. Being an awardee, he is entitled to
have a salary increase pursuant to Letter of Instruction 562. The Ministry of Health submitted to the
Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City to have the funds be appropriated for the Perez’ salary. The
SP however denied the request claiming that the said LOI only applies to employees or officials of the
national government and Perez is a local government employee hence not covered. Upon appeal, the
Office of the Budget and Management determined that Perez is a national government employee hence
he is entitled to such increase. However, Alba – the City Health Officer – refused to recognize Perez’ right
to such increase because he averred that the constitution provides that no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Since there is no such appropriation, the
Minister of the Budget cannot be compelled to release the amount for the payment of the merit salary
increase because such allocation entails the exercise of judgment and discretion of the Minister of the
Budget which cannot be controlled by mandamus.

ISSUE: Whether or not Perez is entitled to such increment per LOI.

HELD: Provincial and city health officers are all considered national government officials irrespective of
the source of funds of their salary because the preservation of health is a national service. Also their
positions are partially funded by the national government. Some are receiving one-half of their salary from
the national funds and the other one-half from local funds. Others are wholly paid by either the local or the
national government. There is no basis in Alba’s allegations that they cannot be compelled by
mandamus as the appropriation is not authorized by law and it is discretionary on the part of the Ministry
of the Budget whether or not to allocate. Perez has been proven to be a national government official,
hence covered by the merit promotion plan of the government more particularly the Health Ministry
wherein private respondent is its lone beneficiary for the year 1980 in Region IV. It thus becomes the
ministerial duty of the Budget Minister to approve the request for allotment. Having failed to do so, he
could be compelled by mandamus.

SECTION 30.
No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

TERESITA FABIAN VS. HONORABLE ANIANO DESIERTO

G.R. NO. 129742, SEPTEMBER 16, 1998
Political Law – Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court
FACTS: Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business w/ Agustin. Agustin was the
incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he
was administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman. Misunderstanding and
unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when Fabian tried to terminate their relationship,
Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment,
intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him. A case
ensued which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman – who inhibited himself – later the case led to
the deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and
executory. Fabian appealed the case to the SC. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989)1 [Effective November 17, 1989.] pertinently provides that -In all administrative
disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to
the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of
the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not sec 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

HELD: Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30,
Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No
countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional
prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases
placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.

SECTION 31.
No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.

SECTION 32.
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any
act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a
petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.