Cisco FIPS Object Module

FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

Cisco Systems, Inc.

DOCUMENT VERSION: 1.0

July 26, 2017

© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc.

This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
 Table of Contents

1 INTRODUCTION1
1.1 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................. 1
1.2 MODULE VALIDATION LEVEL ............................................................................................ 1
1.3 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 1
1.4 TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 2
1.5 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 2
2 CISCO FIPS OBJECT MODULE........................................................................................ 2
3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE CHARACTERISTICS ................................................... 3
3.1 MODULE INTERFACES ......................................................................................................... 4
3.2 ROLES AND SERVICES ......................................................................................................... 5
3.3 PHYSICAL SECURITY .......................................................................................................... 7
3.4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS .......................................................................................... 7
3.4.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms .............................................................. 7
3.4.2 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode ................................ 8
3.5 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT ................................................................................ 8
3.5.1 Key Generation ............................................................................................. 8
3.5.2 Key Storage................................................................................................... 8
3.5.3 Key Access.................................................................................................... 8
3.5.4 Key Protection and Zeroization ..................................................................... 9
3.6 SELF-TESTS ...................................................................................................................... 11
Self-tests performed ................................................................................................ 12
4 SECURE DISTRIBUTION AND OPERATION .............................................................. 14
4.1 SECURE DISTRIBUTION ..................................................................................................... 14
4.2 SECURE OPERATION ......................................................................................................... 14
APPENDIX A – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................... 15

© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. i

This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This document is the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Cisco FIPS
Object Module (FOM). This security policy describes how the FOM (Software Version: 6.2)
meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2, and how to operate it in a secure FIPS 140-2
mode. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-2 validation of the Cisco FIPS
Object Module.

FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security

Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for
cryptographic Modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program
is available on the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html.

1.2 Module Validation Level

The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
No. Area Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key management 1
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
9 Self-Tests 1
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Module validation level 1
Table 1 – Module Validation Level

1.3 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the Cisco FIPS Object Module in
the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic Module security policy. More information is
available from the following sources:

For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on
the Cisco Systems website at www.cisco.com.

The NIST Validated Modules website

(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html) contains contact information for
answers to technical or sales-related questions for the Module.

© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 1

This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
1.4 Terminology
In this document, the Cisco FIPS Object Module is referred to as FOM or the Module.

1.5 Document Organization

The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:

• Vendor Evidence document

• Finite State Machine
• Other supporting documentation as additional references

This document provides an overview of the Cisco FIPS Object Module and explains the secure
configuration and operation of the Module. This introduction section is followed by Section 2,
which details the general features and functionality of the Module. Section 3 specifically
addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation.

With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation
Submission Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-
disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems.

2 Cisco FIPS Object Module

The Cisco FIPS Object Module is a software library that provides cryptographic services to a
vast array of Cisco's networking and collaboration products.

The Module provides FIPS 140 validated cryptographic algorithms and KDF functionality for
services such as IPSec (IKEv2), SRTP, SSH, TLS, and SNMPv3. The Module does not directly
implement any of these protocols, instead it provides the cryptographic primitives and functions
to allow a developer to implement the various protocols. These protocols have not been reviewed
or tested by either the CAVP or the CMVP.

The Module is based on the OpenSSL FIPS canister with additions to support Suite B
algorithms.

© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 2

This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
3 Cryptographic Module Characteristics

Crypto
Algorithms

Figure 1 – FOM block diagram

The Module is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic Module. For the purposes of the FIPS 140-
2 level 1 validation, the FOM is a single object Module file named fipscanister.o (Linux /
FreeBSD Android) or fipscanister.lib (Microsoft Windows). The object code in the object
Module file is incorporated into the runtime executable application at the time the binary
executable is generated. The Module performs no communications other than with the
consuming application (the process that invokes the Module services via the Module’s API).

The Module’s logical block diagram is shown in Figure 1 above. The dashed red border denotes
the logical cryptographic boundary of the Module. The physical cryptographic boundary of the
Module is the enclosure of the system on which it is executing and is denoted by the solid black
border.

This Module was tested on the following platforms for the purposes of this FIPS validation:
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 3
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
 Operating
# Platform System Processor
1 Google Nexus 5x Android 3.10 ARM v8
2 Apple iPad Air 2 Apple iOS 9 ARM v8
3 Supermicro Intel Xeon E5 FreeBSD 10.3 Intel Xeon
4 Lenovo M900 Linux 3.10 Intel Core i5
5 Lenovo M900 Linux 3.10 Intel Core i5 (with AES-NI)
6 Cisco WLC 5508 Linux 3.10 MIPS 64
7 Cisco ASA FPR-2100 Linux 3.10 MIPS 64 (little Endian – with assembler)
8 Cisco WLC 5508 Linux 2.6 MIPS 64 (big Endian – with assembler)
9 Lenovo M900 MS Windows 10 Intel Core i5
10 Lenovo M900 MS Windows 10 Intel Core i5 (with AES-NI)
11 Cisco UCS C220 M4 FreeBSD 10.3 Intel Xeon E5
Table 2 – Tested Operational Environments (OEs)

3.1 Module Interfaces

The physical ports of the Module are the same as the system on which it is executing. The logical
interface is a C-language application program interface (API).

The Data Input interface consists of the input parameters of the API functions. The Data Output
interface consists of the output parameters of the API functions. The Control Input interface
consists of the actual API functions. The Status Output interface includes the return values of the
API functions.

The Module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the application (and the
device upon which it is running), and the physical interfaces provided by the Module are mapped
to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and
status output. The logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following table:

Interface Description
Data Input API input parameters - plaintext and/or ciphertext data
Data Output API output parameters - plaintext and/or ciphertext data
Control Input API function calls - function calls, or input arguments that specify commands and
control data used to control the operation of the Module
Status Output API return codes- function return codes, error codes, or output arguments that
receive status information used to indicate the status of the Module
Power Not Applicable
Table 3 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces

© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 4

This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
3.2 Roles and Services
The Module meets all FIPS 140-2 level 1 requirements for Roles and Services, implementing
both Crypto-User and Crypto-Officer roles. As allowed by FIPS 140-2, the Module does not
support user authentication for those roles. Only one role may be active at a time and the Module
does not allow concurrent operators.

The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services
implemented by the Module. The Crypto Officer can install and initialize the Module. The
Crypto Officer role is implicitly entered when installing the Module or performing system
administration functions on the host operating system.

• User Role: Loading the Module and calling any of the API functions. This role has access
to all of the services provided by the Module.
• Crypto-Officer Role: All of the User Role functionality as well as installation of the
Module on the host computer system. This role is assumed implicitly when the system
administrator installs the Module library file.

The following table lists the approved or non-approved but allowed services available in FIPS
Approved mode.

© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 5

This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
 Service Role CSP Access
Module Installation Crypto Officer None N/A
Symmetric Symmetric keys AES, AES-
User, Crypto Officer Execute
encryption/decryption XTS, 3-key Triple-DES
Symmetric legacy
User, Crypto Officer 2-key Triple-DES Execute
decryption
Symmetric Digest User, Crypto Officer AES CMAC key Execute
Key transport User, Crypto Officer Asymmetric private key RSA Execute
Key agreement User, Crypto Officer DH and ECDH private key Execute
Asymmetric private key RSA,
Digital signature User, Crypto Officer Execute
DSA, ECDSA
Key Generation Asymmetric keys DSA,
User, Crypto Officer Write/execute
(Asymmetric) ECDSA, and RSA
Key Generation Symmetric keys AES, Triple-
User, Crypto Officer Write/execute
(Symmetric) DES
Key Derivation User, Crypto Officer AES, Shared Secret, HMAC Write/execute
HMAC key
Keyed Hash (HMAC) User, Crypto Officer (Key sizes must be a minimum Execute
of 112-bits)
Message digest (SHS) User, Crypto Officer None N/A
Random number Seed/entropy input,
User, Crypto Officer Write/execute
generation V, C, and Key
Show status User, Crypto Officer None N/A
Module initialization User, Crypto Officer None N/A
Perform Self-test User, Crypto Officer None N/A
Zeroization User, Crypto Officer All CSPs N/A

Table 4 – Roles, Services, and Keys (Approved Mode)

© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 6

This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
The following table lists the non-Approved services available in non-approved mode.

Service Role CSP Access

Random number generation (as per User, Crypto Seed/entropy input,
Write/execute
the DRBG defined in SP 800-90A) Officer V, C, and Key
HMAC key
User, Crypto
Keyed Hash (HMAC) (Key sizes less than Execute
Officer
112-bits)
User, Crypto
Symmetric legacy encryption 2-key Triple-DES Execute
Officer
User, Crypto Asymmetric
Legacy digital signature Execute
Officer private key RSA
Table 5 – Roles, Services, and Keys (Non-Approved Mode)

3.3 Physical Security

The Module is comprised of software only and thus does not claim any physical security.

3.4 Cryptographic Algorithms

The Module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.

3.4.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

The Module supports the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations:

Algorithm Algorithm Certificate Numbers

AES 4233, 4234, 4235, 4236, 4237
CCM 4233, 4234
CVL 981, 982, 983, 984
SP 800-90A DRBG 1316, 1317
DSA 1129, 1130
ECDSA 978, 979
HMAC 2771, 2772, 2773, 2774, 2775, 2776
KBKDF (SP800-108) 108, 109
RSA 2285, 2286
SHS 3470, 3471, 3472, 3473, 3474, 3475
Triple-DES 2292, 2293, 2294

Table 6 – Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

It should be noted that the XTS-AES mode, included in the AES algorithm certificates numbers
4233 and 4234 in Table 6, and as defined in NIST SP 800-38E and referred to in “Annex A:
Approved Security Functions for FIPS PUB 140-2” ‘Symmetric Key’, Section 1, ‘Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)’, should only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on
storage devices.
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 7
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
3.4.2 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode
The Module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are permitted for use
in the FIPS approved mode:
• Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112
and 219 bits of encryption strength)
• EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between
112 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
• RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 132 bits
of encryption strength)
• MD5 – (Per IG G.13 may be allowed in Approved mode of operation when used as part
of an approved key transport scheme)

3.5 Cryptographic Key Management

3.5.1 Key Generation
The Module supports generation of DH, ECDH, FIPS 186-4 DSA, FIPS 186-4 RSA, and FIPS
186-4 ECDSA public-private key pairs. The Module employs a NIST SP 800-90A random
number generator for creation of both symmetric keys and the seed for asymmetric key
generation.

The entropy and seeding material for the NDRNG is provided to it by the external calling
application (and not by the Module) which is outside the Module’s logical boundary but
contained within the Module’s physical boundary. The minimum effective strength of the SP
800-90A DRBG seed is required to be at least 112 bits when used in a FIPS approved mode of
operation, therefore the minimum number of bits of entropy requested when the Module makes a
call to the SP 800-90A DRBG is 112. No assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys.

Module users (the external calling applications) shall use entropy sources which meet the
security strength required for the random number generation mechanism as shown in SP 800-
90A, Table 2 (Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG), and Table 3 (CTR_DRBG)). This entropy is
supplied by means of callback functions. Those functions must return an error if the minimum
entropy strength cannot be met.
3.5.2 Key Storage
Public and private keys are provided to the Module by the calling process, and are destroyed
when released by the appropriate API function calls. The Module does not perform persistent
storage of keys.

3.5.3 Key Access

An authorized application as user (the Crypto-User) has access to all key data generated during
the operation of the Module.
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 8
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
3.5.4 Key Protection and Zeroization
Keys residing in internally allocated data structures can only be accessed using the Module
defined API. The operating system protects memory and process space from unauthorized
access. Zeroization of sensitive data is performed automatically by API function calls for
intermediate data items.

Only the process that creates or imports keys can use or export them. No persistent storage of
key data is performed by the Module. All API functions are executed by the invoking process in
a non-overlapping sequence such that no two API functions will execute concurrently.

All CSPs can be zeroized by power-cycling the Module (with the exception of the Software
Integrity key). In the event Module power is lost and restored the consuming application must
ensure that any AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.

© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 9

This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
The Module supports the following keys and critical security parameters (CSPs):

ID Algorithm Size Description

Asymmetric Keys RSA RSA: 2,048, 3,072 bits Used for signature
DSA DSA: 2,048, 3,072 bits verification.
ECDSA ECDSA:
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, RSA: Also used for key
K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, transport (where the size of
B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571 the modulus is greater than
or equal to 2048 bits)
Asymmetric Keys RSA RSA: 2,048, 3,072 bits Used for signature
DSA DSA: 2,048, 3,072 bits generation with SHA-2 used
ECDSA ECDSA: in key pair generation.
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521,
K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, RSA: Also used for key
B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571 transport (where the size of
the modulus is greater than
or equal to 2048 bits)
Symmetric Keys AES AES: 128, 192, 256 bits Used for symmetric
Triple-DES AES-XTS: 256, 512 bits encryption/decryption
Triple-DES: 128, 192 bits
Diffie-Hellman/ DH DH: Public Key – 2,048-10,000 bits Used for key agreement
EC Diffie-Hellman Private Key – 224-512 bits
private key ECDH ECDH:
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521,
K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571,
B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571
Hash_DRBG DRBG − V (440/888 bits) CSPs for Hash_DRBG as per
(as per − C (440/888 bits) NIST SP 800-90A.
NIST SP − entropy input (The length of the
800-90A) selected hash)
HMAC_DRBG DRBG − V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) CSPs for HMAC_DRBG as
(as per − Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits) per NIST SP 800-90A.
NIST SP − entropy input (The length of the
800-90A) selected hash)
CTR_DRBG DRBG − V (128 bits) CSPs for CTR_DRBG as per
(as per − Key (AES 128/192/256) NIST SP 800-90A.
NIST SP − entropy input (The length of the
800-90A) selected AES)
Keyed Hash key HMAC All supported key sizes for HMAC Used for keyed hash
(Key sizes must be a minimum of
112-bits)
Software Integrity HMAC HMAC-SHA-1 Used to perform software
key integrity test at power-on.
This key is embedded within
the Module.

© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 10

This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
 ID Algorithm Size Description
SNMPv3 Session AES AES: 128 bits Derived via key derivation
Key function defined in SP800-135
KDF (SNMPv3).
TLS Master Secret Shared 48 bytes of pseudo-random data Derived via key derivation
secret function defined in SP800-135
KDF (TLS).
SSHv2 Session Key AES AES: 128, 192, 256 bits Derived via key derivation
function defined in SP800-135
KDF (SSH).
SKEYSEED Shared 160 bits Derived via key derivation
secret function defined in SP800-135
KDF (IKEv2).
SKEYID Shared 160 bits Derived via key derivation
secret function defined in SP800-135
KDF (IKEv2).
IKEv2 session HMAC HMAC-SHA-1 Derived via key derivation
authentication key function defined in SP800-135
KDF (IKEv2).
IKEv2 session AES AES: 128, 192, 256 bits Derived via key derivation
encryption key function defined in SP800-135
KDF (IKEv2).

Table 7 – Cryptographic Keys and CSPs

3.6 Self-Tests
The Module performs both power-up self-tests at Module initialization 1 and continuous
conditional tests during operation. Input, output, and cryptographic functions cannot be
performed while the Module is in a self-test or error state as the Module is single threaded and
will not return to the calling application until the power-up self-tests are complete. If the power-
up self- tests fail subsequent calls to the Module will fail and thus no further cryptographic
operations are possible.

1
The FIPS mode initialization is performed prior to the application invoking the FIPS_mode_set() function call
(which returns a “1” for success and “0” for failure). Initialization is performed by an OS Loader on Module power
up.
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 11
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
Self-tests performed
• POSTs
o AES Known Answer Test (Separate encrypt and decrypt)
o AES-CCM Known Answer Test (Separate encrypt and decrypt)
o AES-GCM Known Answer Test (Separate encrypt and decrypt)
o AES-CMAC Known Answer Test
o AES-XTS Known Answer Test (Separate encrypt and decrypt)
o SP 800-90A DRBG Known Answer Tests
 HASH_DRBG Known Answer Test
 HMAC_DRBG Known Answer Test
 CTR_DRBG Known Answer Test
o FIPS 186-4 DSA Sign/Verify Test
o FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Sign/Verify Test
o HMAC Known Answer Tests
 HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test
 HMAC-SHA224 Known Answer Test
 HMAC-SHA256 Known Answer Test
 HMAC-SHA384 Known Answer Test
 HMAC-SHA512 Known Answer Test
o ECC CDH KAT
o FIPS 186-4 RSA Known Answer Test (Separate sign and verify)
o SHA-1 Known Answer Test
o Software Integrity Test (HMAC-SHA1)
o Triple-DES Known Answer Test (Separate encrypt and decrypt)

• Conditional tests
o Pairwise consistency tests for RSA, DSA, and ECDSA
o SP 800-90A DRBG Continuous random number generation tests
 HASH_DRBG Continuous random number generation test
 HMAC_DRBG Continuous random number generation test
 CTR_DRBG Continuous random number generation test
• Critical Function Tests (applicable to the DRBG, as per SP 800-90A, Section 11)
o Instantiate Test
o Generate Test
o Reseed Test
o Uninstantiate Test

A single function call, FIPS_mode_set(), is required to enable the Module for operation in the
FIPS 140-2 Approved mode. When the Module is in FIPS mode all security functions and
cryptographic algorithms are performed in Approved mode.

© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 12

This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
FIPS mode can only be enabled after the application invokes the FIPS_mode_set() call which
returns a “1” for success and “0” for failure. Interpretation of this return code is the responsibility
of the host application. Prior to this invocation the Module has already gone through its
initialization sequence.

The FIPS_mode_set() function checks that the initialization sequence and POSTs (performed by
the OS Loader at Module power-up) have completed successfully. The initialization sequence
starts with a check of the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC-SHA-1 digest
computed at build time. If this computed HMAC-SHA-1 digest matches the stored known digest
then the power-up self-tests, consisting of the algorithm specific Pairwise Consistency and
Known Answer tests, are performed. If any component of the power-up self-test fails an internal
global error flag is set to prevent subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls. Any
such power-up self-test failure is a hard error that can only be recovered by reinstalling the
Module 2. If all components of the power-up self-test are successful then the Module is in FIPS
mode. This function call also returns a “1” for success and “0” for failure, and interpretation of
this return code is the responsibility of the host application.

2
The FIPS_mode_set() function could be re-invoked but such re-invocation does not provide a means of recovering
from an integrity test or known answer test failure.
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 13
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
4 Secure Distribution and Operation
4.1 Secure Distribution
The Cisco FOM is intended only for use by Cisco personnel and as such is accessible only from
the secure Cisco internal web site. Only authorized Cisco personnel have access to the Module.

4.2 Secure Operation

The tested operating systems segregate user processes into separate process spaces. Each process
space is an independent virtual memory area that is logically separated from all other processes
by the operating system software and hardware. The Module functions entirely within the
process space of the process that invokes it, and thus satisfies the FIPS 140-2 requirement for a
single user mode of operation.

The Module is installed using one of the set of instructions in the ‘CiscoSSL 6.2 FIPS
Compliance Guide’ document appropriate to the target system. A complete revision history of
the source code from which the Module was generated is maintained in a version control
database 3. The HMAC-SHA-1 of the Module distribution file as tested by the CSTL Laboratory
is verified during installation of the Module file as described in the ‘CiscoSSL 6.2 FIPS
Compliance Guide’ document.

The HMAC fingerprint of the validated distribution file is:

05184c2d26633c1ea1cdd4786ababdd09494467c

Upon initialization of the Module by the OS loader directly after Module power-up, the power-
up self-tests will execute. Successful completion of the power-up self- tests ensures that the
Module is operating in the FIPS mode of operation.

The self-tests are called when initializing the Module, or alternatively using the FIPS_selftest()
function call. Either of the aforementioned operations will enable the Module for operation in
the FIPS 140-2 Approved mode. When the Module is in FIPS mode all security functions and
cryptographic algorithms are performed in Approved mode.

3
This database is internal to Cisco since the intended use of this crypto Module is by Cisco development teams.
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 14
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
Appendix A – Acronyms and Abbreviations
Term Expansion / Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Program Interface
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
CDH Cofactor Diffie-Hellman
CMAC Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CSTL Commercial Solutions Testing Laboratory
CTR Counter
CVL Component Validation List
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FOM FIPS Object Module
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
KAT Known Answer Test
KBKDF Key Based Key Derivation Function
KDF Key Derivation Function
MAC Message Authentication Code
MS Microsoft
NDRNG Non-deterministic RNG
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS Operating System
POST Power-On Self-Test
RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SP Special Publication
SRTP Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 15
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
 Term Expansion / Definition
STM Security Management & Assurance
UCS Unified Computing System
TLS Transport Layer Security
WLC Wireless LAN Controller
XEX XOR Encrypt XOR
XOR Exclusive OR
XTS XEX Tweakable Block Cipher with Ciphertext Stealing

© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 16

This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.