S

Śaṅkara (Śamkara) Śaṅkara’s Date

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Aleksandar Uskokov Like most dates in Indian history, the precise dates
Department of South Asian Languages and of Śaṅkara are uncertain, and scholars have relied
Civilizations, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, on several different methods to establish them.
USA One is the explicit attribution of dates to Śaṅkara
in later works: in fact, the most common dates of
Śaṅkara’s birth and death that we find in scholarly
Introduction literature were proposed based on a short manu-
script of an unknown title, which says that
Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda (ca. 650–800 AD) was a Śaṅkara was born in the year 710 of the Śaka era
Vedāntic theologian and a philosopher, belonging and died in 742, which is equivalent to 788 and
to the school of monistic or Advaita Vedānta and 820 AD. Several other works repeat these dates,
often identified as its systematic founder. He is none of which, however, is earlier than the six-
arguably the most important Indian philosopher in teenth century ([20], pp. 48–52; [23], pp. 45; [8],
terms of public recognition – indeed, no Indian pp. 93–99). There have been other attempts to
philosopher has been studied more thoroughly come with the precise dates from mentions in
than Śaṅkara, both in India and in the West – other works, all of which turn out to be late and,
and without a doubt, he is one of the most impor- therefore, unreliable ([20], pp. 52–57).
tant cultural heroes of modern Hinduism. His Another dating method is based on pursuing
commentaries on the Upaniṣads, the Brahma- what is known from other sources about the
Sūtra, and the Bhagavad-Gī tā have often been flourishing of cities that Śaṅkara mentions in his
taken as the golden standard of interpretation of works. Hajime Nakamura, however, had shown
these canonical works of Vedānta. Consequently, that in referring to names of specific cities,
he has always had a rich public persona and Śaṅkara was just following a customary practice
enjoyed a place of pride in the imaginations of and that his referring to such places was not
Vedānta, Hinduism, the study of Indian philoso- related to their contemporary significance ([20],
phy, and all things Sanskrit and Indian. pp. 59–62). Yet another dating approach is
through the attempt to locate historically three
kings that Śaṅkara mentions in his commentary
on the Brahma-Sūtra 4.3.5 – Balavarman,
Jayasiṁha, and Kṛṣṇagupta – under the assump-
tion that they were his contemporaries. From these
# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2018
P. Jain et al. (eds.), Hinduism and Tribal Religions, Encyclopedia of Indian Religions,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1036-5_224-1
2 Śaṅkara (Śamkara)
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names, and based on South Indian political his- witness of the sense of self when it assumes igno-
tory, Kengo Harimoto had argued that Śaṅkara rance as its adjunct. The plurals are likely honor-
likely wrote his Brahma-Sūtra commentary ifics, and the reference is to Gauḍapāda from the
sometime between 756 and 772 AD [8]. north and Śaṅkara from the south. He must have
Another method used for dating Śaṅkara is that been a renunciant: nothing different is imaginable
of relative chronology, that is, the method that from his works. As for religious affiliation, though
places him between philosophers and theologians he is often represented as a Śaiva and an incarna-
whose dates are better known and who were tion of Śiva himself, from his works and the
roughly contemporaneous with him. While the invocatory verses in the works of early Advaitins,
dates produced in this way still vary widely, it appears that he was a Vaiṣṇava ([7], pp. 33–39).
such that he can be placed anywhere from 650 to Śaṅkara, in fact, in his commentary on the Bṛhad-
800 AD ([20], pp. 65–89; [8], pp. 87–93), this Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad (3.7.3 [13]) explicitly iden-
relative chronology is, nevertheless, the most tifies Īśvara, the Lord and supreme Brahman, with
important issue from the perspective of intellec- Nārāyaṇa.
tual history. That is, it does not matter that much There are some twenty hagiographies written
just when he was born and when he died, as much about Śaṅkara, but since none of them predates
as it matters which philosophers and theologians the fourteenth century, it is questionable if they
were a significant part of his intellectual context contain a kernel of historically reliable represen-
and which were positively and negatively tation. Most famous among these hagiographies
influenced by him. What is known from the per- are Śaṅkara-Vijaya of Anantānandagiri, Śaṅkara-
spective of relative chronology, thus, is that Vijaya of Vyāsācala, and Śaṅkara-Digvijaya of
Śaṅkara lived sometime between 650 and Mādhava. The last was written between 1650
800 AD, but after the likes of Śabara, Bhartṛhari, and 1800 AD, and neither Anantānandagiri nor
Bhartṛprapañca, Gauḍapāda, Kumārila, Mādhava can be, respectively, identified with
Prabhākara, and Dharmakīrti and before his own Ānandagiri, the famous commentator on
students Sureśvara and Padmapāda, as well as Śaṅkara’s works, and with Mādhava-
Bhāskara. The only unclear detail relevant for Vidyāraṇya [1].
intellectual history is Śaṅkara’s precise relation- The following rough outline of important
ship with the other great Advaitin of his time, details about the public or received Śaṅkara can
Maṇḍana Miśra, and the best available evidence be drawn from the hagiographies (good summa-
points that the two seem to have been contempo- ries are available in [1, 12, 14]). Śaṅkara was born
raries but that Maṇḍana’s Brahma-Siddhi presup- as an incarnation of Śiva in the village Kālaṭi in
poses Śaṅkara’s Brahma-Sūtra commentary [33]. Kerala, to his father Śivaguru and his mother
Āryāmbā. Śivaguru died when the boy was five,
and Śaṅkara soon felt the need to seek liberation
Śaṅkara’s Life through formal renunciation. His bond with his
mother was strong, however, and fate had to inter-
Unfortunately, we are not able to tell much more vene to break it, in a form of a crocodile that had
about Śaṅkara’s life with any degree of certainty seized Śaṅkara while he was bathing in the river.
either, except for a few details. Śaṅkara’s full The boy implored his mother’s permission to take
name was Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda or renunciation, since liberation was not possible for
Bhagavatpūjyapāda: that is how his student non-renunciants, and in the circumstances, the
Sureśvara calls him ([7], p. 43). He was from the mother had little choice but to agree. Just as he
south of India, which is again known from formally announced his renunciation, he was
Sureśvara, who says in his Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi miraculously released by the crocodile. He prom-
4.44 that both the reverend “Gauḍas” and ised his mother to come back at her deathbed and
“Draviḍas,” that is, northerners and southerners, perform her funerary rites, a promise which he
have taught that the Supreme Self becomes the kept, and set out in search of his guru.
Śaṅkara (Śamkara) 3
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In the Himalayan Badarikāśrama or some- north, Purī in the east, and Kāñcī as the fifth,
where on the bank of the Narmadā river, he which remains a point of internal contention to
found a guru in Govinda Bhagavatpāda the disci- this day – which he entrusted to his four principal
ple of Gauḍapāda, the famed commentator on the students: Sureśvara, Padmapāda, Hastāmalaka,
Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad. Initiated by Govinda, and Toṭaka. He passed away young, at 32, in
Śaṅkara himself began taking disciples and Badarikāśrama, Kāñcī, or somewhere in Kerala.
started writing commentaries on the Brahma-
Sūtra, the Bhagavad-Gī tā, and the Upaniṣads.
Next, he set on debating the most important intel- Śaṅkara’s Works
lectual figures of his time. First, he intended to
debate the celebrated Mīmāṁsaka Kumārila Unlike his life, much more is known about
Bhaṭṭa to persuade him to write a commentary Śaṅkara’s works. This is thanks to the good
on his Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya, but having come work of Paul Hacker ([7], pp. 41–56), Daniel
to Prayāga, he found the aging Kumārila immo- Ingalls [9], and Sengaku Mayeda [16–18], who
lating himself for the sins he had committed by have formulated and applied several reliable
cheating his Buddhist guru. The young Kumārila criteria by which to adjudicate the authenticity of
allegedly studied in a Buddhist monastery, posing the works attributed to Śaṅkara. Although the
as a Buddhist, to become so intimately acquainted number of such works is over four hundred ([2],
with Buddhist philosophy as to be able to defeat it: p. 104), it is now known that Śaṅkara wrote com-
he is credited with expunging Buddhism from mentaries on the Brahma-Sūtra and the
India, but in the process, he committed the sin of Bhagavad-Gī tā (Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya and
lying to his teacher, which he was expiating at the Bhagavad-Gī tā-Bhāṣya) [13, 30–32], on the prin-
end of his life. Kumārila, thus, declined the cipal Upaniṣads (the Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka, Taittirī ya,
debate, but from the burning pyre, he sent Śaṅkara Chāndogya, Aitareya, I¯śā, Kaṭha, Muṇḍaka, Praś
to his student Maṇḍana Miśra. na, and two on Kena) [28, 29]. He also wrote the
Śaṅkara went to Maṇḍana’s home in independent treatise Upadeśa-Sāhasrī [19],
Māhiṣmatī and won the debate with Kumārila’s consisting of a verse and a prose portion. The
student, who took sannyāsa from him and became commentary on the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad attrib-
Sureśvara, the famous interpreter of Śaṅkara’s uted to him is not authentic.
commentaries on the Upaniṣads Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka The authenticity of two commentaries is still
and Taittirīya and the author of Naiṣkarmya- uncertain, on the Pātañjala-Yoga-Śāstra (the
Siddhi. Śaṅkara next debated Maṇḍana’s wife, Yoga-Sūtra with the commentary which is com-
who was an incarnation of the goddess of learning monly attributed to Vyāsa) and on the Āgama-
Sarasvatī, during which debate he had to learn the Śāstra of Gauḍapāda that includes the Māṇḍukya
science of carnal love by occupying the body of a Upaniṣad. Although relatively recent arguments
dead king by the name of Amaruka: only after he have been made in favor of the authenticity of the
understood this science did Sarasvatī acknowl- treatises Viveka-Cūḍamaṇi and Pañcī karaṇa [5,
edge his mastery of all branches of learning. Dur- 25], the two contain common Advaita concepts
ing his digvijayas or “victory tours,” in which he and expressions that are absent in Śaṅkara’s
visited important places of pilgrimage, he contin- authentic works and, eo ipso, later. Many hymns
ued debating Śaivas, Vaiṣṇavas, Śāktas, Bud- have also been attributed to Śaṅkara, some of
dhists, Jains, and other religious groups. which are quite popular, but Robert E. Gussner’s
Śaṅkara established four or five monastic stylometric analysis of 17 such hymns concluded
orders at the cardinal points – in Śṛṅgerī in the that only the Dakṣiṇāmūrti-Stotra could have
south, Dvārakā in the west, Badarikāśrama in the been written by Śaṅkara the Vedāntin [6].
4 Śaṅkara (Śamkara)
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Theology, Cosmology, and Psychology diversification, an entity with “distinguishing

characteristics.” We may illustrate this through
Introduction Chāndogya Upaniṣad 3.14 [22], which opens
To appreciate the nuts and bolts of Śaṅkara’s with the famous statement sarvaṁ khalv idaṁ
Vedāntic theology, it is apposite to begin with brahma, “this whole world is Brahman,” calls
some conceptual clarifications. Śaṅkara was, such Brahman “the inner Self,” and says eventu-
above all, an interpreter of the Upaniṣads, whose ally that this inner Self “contains all actions, all
specific domain was Brahman the great ground of desires, all tastes, and all smells.” Brahman, thus,
Being. For Śaṅkara, however, Brahman as pre- has distinguishing characteristics, whatever their
sented in the Upaniṣads was not a straightforward ontological relation to Brahman may be, because
matter: at the very least, there were two kinds of if Brahman’s creation possesses attributes such as
Brahman, one called the supreme Brahman, the taste and smell and it is not different from the
causal Brahman, or Brahman without qualities cause, then such attributes must somehow be
(para-brahman, kāraṇa-brahman, nirguṇa- derived from the cause.
brahman), as well as the Lord or the supreme Since Brahman the cause is the creator of
Lord (ī śvara, parameśvara), and another one everything and is everything, then, insofar as cre-
called lower Brahman, Brahman the effect, and ation is taken as real, it is required to see Brahman
Brahman with qualities (apara-brahman, kārya- as having distinguishing characteristics. The
brahman, saguṇa-brahman). The differences Upaniṣads, however, while indulging in
between the two were more a matter of concept, Brahman’s creation, may intend to affirm the real-
language, and perspective with regard to the ity of such creation, or not, and, with that, to
human good: ultimately there is just one single affirm Brahman’s distinguishing characteristics,
Brahman that may be described differently depen- or not. In other words, either they may intend to
dent on whether one intends to affirm or negate present the world as an effect of Brahman and,
something. What one may want to affirm or thus, as Brahman in kind, or they may intend to
negate was Brahman’s causal role with respect to present Brahman the cause as the sole reality, in
creation and with that ontological pluralism; argu- which case they must acknowledge the world that
ably different from both forms of Brahman is what is empirically knowable, but do not need to affirm
we may call the pure, śuddha-brahman, the non- that it is real (Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya [BSBh]
causal Brahman that is both everything and is 1.1.11). This, in fact, is the difference between
one’s own inner Self. While Śaṅkara does not dualism and true monism. When the Upaniṣads
always distinguish this pure Brahman from the do intend to affirm the reality of the world as an
causal Brahman and habitually calls both effect of Brahman, then creation in its totality
“supreme,” he does distinguish them occasionally becomes what is called kārya-brahman or Brah-
(for instance, in his Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣad- man the effect or apara-brahman or the lower
Bhāṣya [BĀUBh] 3.8.12). Brahman. Such Brahman is presented in the
The general definition of Brahman given in the Upaniṣads so as to serve the human good of “pro-
Brahma-Sūtra 1.1.2 (and referring to the motion” or “prosperity,” abhyudaya: by medita-
Taittirī ya Upaniṣad 2.1.1 [22]) was that Brahman tion on such Brahman, one rises to the highest
is the cause from which proceed all creatures, sphere in the world, brahma-loka. Or, by pre-
everything that is. Further, the general Vedāntic senting Brahman as the cause and by describing
account of causality, known as the doctrine of sat- its creation, the Upaniṣads may not intend to
kārya-vāda, was that these creatures being the affirm the reality of Brahman’s creation but rather
effect of Brahman were preexistent in Brahman bring home the point that Brahman is the sole
the cause. Such causal relation that posits a con- reality. When the Upaniṣads do that, they serve
tinuum between Brahman and its creation and the human good of niḥśreyasa, liberation or the
affirms that the creation is Brahman presents highest good.
Brahman as an entity that involves some
Śaṅkara (Śamkara) 5
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Cosmology is also used specifically for Hiraṇyagarbha as the

Here it is required to introduce briefly Śaṅkara’s world-soul (Muṇḍana-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya 1.1.8-9,
cosmology and psychology. The Brahman that 2.1.4; Aitareya-Upaniṣad-Bhāsya 3.3; Praśna-
Śaṅkara has in mind in terms of causality and Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya 5.5; BĀUBh 1.4.1, 1.4.6,
world creation is what he otherwise describes as 2.1.1, 3.7.1-2, 3.8.12). In this way, Brahman
Īśvara, the creator God (as we mentioned above, through the nāma-rūpe that is not different from
explicitly identified with Nārāyaṇa), whose two him becomes the material cause of the world
essential characteristics are omniscience and (upādāna-kāraṇa), while as Īśvara he becomes
omnipotence (BSBh 1.1.1, Kena-Vākya-Bhāṣya the efficient cause (nimitta-kāṛaṇa) and the Self
3.1). These two characteristics are sort of an that controls the world from within (antaryāmin);
adjunct that conditions Brahman to assume a as the totality of creation, he becomes the world.
causal role (BĀUBh 3.8.12), in which causal
role Brahman further subjects himself to what Psychology
Śaṅkara, following the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, This perspective looks at Brahman top-down.
calls nāma-rūpe, name-and-form, a category that However, because Brahman is also one’s own
may be likened to the Sāṅkhyan prakṛti or to inner Self, that is, the Self of every individual
Aristotle’s prime matter, that is, pure potentiality. from Hiraṇyagarbha to men and animals, he can
This nāma-rūpe is described as neither Brahman be looked at bottom-up as well, as the individual
nor not Brahman, insofar as Brahman is different Self. This individual Self in Śaṅkara’s system is a
from it, but without Brahman, its existence would complex that is built on an initial interaction
be impossible (although Śaṅkara gives other between Brahman the real Self, one and only for
instances of this nonsymmetrical relation, one everyone, and the so-called intellect or the internal
may think of the relation of the shadow to the organ (buddhi, antaḥ-karaṇa) that is a product in
substance on which the shadow is dependent; the evolution of nāma-rūpe. Brahman as the real
BSBh 1.1.5). When Brahman subjects itself to Self is, essentially, nothing more than what makes
this nāma-rūpe in its nondiversified state of pure phenomenal consciousness of any kind possible.
potentiality (avyākṛte nāma-rūpe, unevolved Śaṅkara quite often compares this Self to sunlight,
name-and-form), assuming it as its adjunct, from the necessary factor of any perceptual awareness
the causal Brahman (kāraṇa-brahman) that is that is formless, but assumes various forms con-
Īśvara, he becomes Brahman that is the effect tingent on the shapes that it illuminates. This pure
(kārya-brahman). Self is not the subject of conscious experiences,
To elaborate, the nāma-rūpe becomes diversi- because any cognitive act involves a distinction
fied in the elements of creation as the physical between a subject, an object, an instrument, and
world that we know (vyākṛte nāma-rūpe, evolved cognitive content and cancels monism. The Self
name-and-form), including the five common ele- is, rather, what makes subjectivity possible. The
ments, the accommodating features of psychic life pure Self, thus, is the consciousness that ever
such as the intellect, cognitive faculties and sense obtains but is never transitive (BĀUBh 1.4.10).
objects, etc. Brahman himself on the one hand The subject properly speaking is a reflection of
becomes the world-soul known as Hiraṇyagarbha, the pure Self in a set of adjuncts, upādhis, the
identical with the Purāṇic demiurge Brahmā and crucial among which is the intellect (BĀUBh
with prāṇa or life-breath that pulsates in the world 1.4.7). The intellect is the specific product of
and keeps it alive, and on the other, he becomes nāma-rūpe in which cognition (vijñāna) in gen-
the universal form or the universe as an organism, eral takes place. Owing to its proximity to the pure
virāṭ, that the world-soul embodies and that con- Self in the evolution process, the intellect
tains the divinities of the Vedic pantheon as its becomes the locus in which an empirical sense
sense organs, as well as all other living creatures – of Self can obtain. Śaṅkara illustrates the relation-
men, animals, etc. – as classes and individuals. ship between the Self, the intellect, and the sense
The totality of this is kārya-brahman, but the term of Self with the reflection that appears when a face
6 Śaṅkara (Śamkara)
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is placed in front of a mirror (Upadeśa-Sāhasri gocara, “the sphere of ‘I’ and ‘mine’”
[US] 1.18.43). The Self is not its reflection, just as (US 1.18.27).
the image is not the face, but it does become We can now appreciate one of the most striking
identified with this reflection. The reflection is passages written in the history of Indian
neither a property of the face nor of the mirror, philosophy:
but it is dependent on both, insofar as it can obtain As we said, superimposition, to define it, is the
only if both are present. It does not, however, notion of something in regard to something else. It
obtain necessarily: it is accidental because the is like when one superimposes external properties
face must be in front of the mirror for one to over the Self, thinking, ‘I myself am injured’ or ‘I
myself am whole’ when one’s son or wife are
think, “this is me.” injured or whole; or when one superimposes prop-
In a different sense, the face-mirror or Self- erties of the body and thinks, ‘I am fat,’ ‘I am lean,’
intellect is a necessary relationship for cognitive ‘I am fair,’ ‘I stand,’ ‘I go,’ or ‘I leap;’ or when one
subjectivity, because the intellect is not a con- superimposes properties of the senses, as in ‘I am
dumb,’ ‘I am blind on one eye,’ ‘I am emasculated,’
scious principle – it is the locus of cognition but or ‘I am blind;’ or when one superimposes proper-
is itself not conscious of anything – whereas the ties of the internal organ, such as desire, resolve,
pure Self is not an agent. So, the properties of the doubt and certainty. (BSBh 1.1.1)
one are placed over the other: the consciousness of
This superimposition (adhyāsa) whose cause
the Self is superimposed over the intellect so that
is false awareness is, Śaṅkara claims, called igno-
there can be a conscious experience, whereas cog-
rance or avidyā by the learned. We should note
nitive agency that involves the distinction of sub-
here that ignorance assumed an all-important role
ject, object, instrument, and cognition that belong
in post-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta: it subsumed not
to the intellect is superimposed over the Self
only the psychological ignorance but also nāma-
(US 1.18.65). Because the intellect is the place
rūpe, the “cosmic” ignorance that conditions
where the reflection of the Self obtains, the indi-
Brahman to create and becomes the stuff of crea-
vidual Self is commonly called the vijñānātman,
tion. As Hacker and Mayeda have shown, igno-
the Self of cognition, and is typically distin-
rance was not a cosmological item in Śaṅkara’s
guished from the pure, inner Self – Brahman –
thought ([7], pp. 57–100; [19], pp. 22–26, 76–84;
called the pratyag-ātman or paramātman.
also, [10]).
Now, agency in general and cognitive agency
In the Bhagavad-Gī tā-Bhāṣya (13.2), this psy-
in particular have the intellect as its location – it is
chological ignorance is said to be potentially of
there that cognition happens – but cognition is
three kinds: (1) failure to grasp an object, as in the
dependent on a set of other factors: it is dependent
case of darkness; (2) seeing one thing as another,
on the so-called manas, the faculty of attention; on
such as seeing a snake in a rope, silver in the
the cognitive faculties that function in their
mother-of-pearl, or when the simpleminded see
respective sphere, commonly called senses,
dirt and a flat surface in the sky; and (3) doubt,
indriya; and finally, on the body, which houses such as the uncertainty whether a silhouette in the
these senses. The light of consciousness is, thus,
distance is a man or a post. These are all cases of
further reflected in the rest of one’s personality,
cognitive errors, and Śaṅkara’s object in using
but it is also progressively restricted or dimmed them as examples is to show that they do not
because it is modulated by each previous reflec-
constitute an error on the part of the knower but
tion (BĀUBh 4.3.7). These are like nested mir-
a flaw in the causal conditions of perception: the
rors, and the Self could potentially identify – have Self is not in illusion in essentia, but in actu. They
the notion “this is who I am” – with regard to any
must be taken as no more than illustrations, how-
of them. This principle can be extended even to
ever, because the superimposition that Śaṅkara
things that are merely related to oneself, consid- talks about is evidently of a very different kind:
ered “mine,” and Śaṅkara calls the whole field of
it is the mistake that makes all other mistakes
potential items of identification ahaṁ-mama- possible – as well as all truths. This form of
Śaṅkara (Śamkara) 7
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ignorance is not just the common mistake of false action. Because the superimposition that is igno-
recognition that brings embarrassment: ignorance rance is natural and without a beginning, this
is the false awareness and the superimposition that circle of avidyā -> vāsanā -> kāma -> karma -
is natural (naisargika) and without a beginning > avidyā is a true circle: everything is logically
(anādi), that is, it obtains as a normal state and not predicated on ignorance, but ignorance histori-
as a cognitive oddity. We may take Mahadevan’s cally or temporally requires an existing embodi-
lead, therefore, and distinguish this from of igno- ment (US 1.10.9; BSBh 3.1.1; BĀUBh 1.4.16).
rance from the common as metaphysical [15]. Let us note, then, that the individual Self is just
However, the mere formation of the reflection Brahman the light of consciousness, which owing
of the Self, the consequent superimposition of to ignorance and its results can identify with any
agency, and the potential of identification with point in its immediate sphere that it illuminates.
anything that constitutes the field of “I and
mine” fashion the category of the individual Theology
Self, the universal to which the word “Self” can Now, the pure Brahman, to Śaṅkara’s mind, was
be applied: this is not what makes the Self of any that Brahman that is expressed in the identity
John Doe. Ignorance is the immediate factor of statements of the Upaniṣads, that is, those state-
distinguishing the category of vijñānātman or jī va ments that identify Brahman with the individual
from the Supreme Self, but it is not the immediate Self understood as the cognitive agent, the para-
factor of individuation. Two additional factors are digmatic among which are ahaṁ brahmāsmi of
required for there to be an individual Self. We may the Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka (1.4.10) and tat tvam asi of
put this another way. How the image of the Self the Chāndogya (6.8.7) (BSBh 4.1.2). This was so
will look like is contingent on the mirror: the because the identity statements expressed some-
image of the face conforms the mirror, and the thing about Brahman that could not be expressed
mirror can be variously inflected. There are some otherwise. Let us present this briefly.
contour points that need to be invariantly present I said above that, for Śaṅkara, the Upaniṣads,
in all images so that we could identify what kind while indulging in the discourse of ontological
of thing the image represents, and these are the pluralism, may intend not to affirm such pluralism
sense of Self – “I am this” – and agency. What but to negate it. What some Upaniṣadic texts do,
range of values “this” will take depends on two in other words, is take a stock of empirical reality
other factors: impressions that have the nature of and then use the discourse of creation on the side
habitual desire that prompts action (vāsanā, of the cosmic Brahman and the discourse of iden-
bhāvanā, saṁskāra, kāma) and the results of pre- tification on the side the personal Brahman to
vious action or karma. negate the reality both of the world and of the
The three, really, form a circle that reinforces individual, empiric Self, such that in the end
itself. The impressions are impressions of igno- only Brahman would remain as real. They present,
rance, results of past identifications involving in other words, the processes of creation and indi-
agency – past actions – that color, or rather per- viduation so as to introduce schemes by means of
fume, one’s awareness. They are in the form of which the world and the individual Self can be
volitional tendencies for something reduced to Brahman. The identity statements of
specific. Desires that are formed through impres- the Upaniṣads are the Upaniṣadic core because
sion are the medium that otherwise unproductive they juxtapose the two categories on which such
ignorance must take to become an instigator to reduction must be performed. Śaṅkara calls these
action (bhāvanā). Action and its resultant karma two sides the categories of tat, “that,” and tvam,
on their part produce one’s future embodiment “you,” following the paradigmatic identity state-
that is an instantiation of ignorance, as it involves ment tat tvam asi.
a wrong identification in which one becomes nat- The reduction on the side of Brahman goes
urally prone to specific desires and fit for the roughly like this. The Upaniṣads (such as the
attaining of specific goals, requiring specific Taittirī ya) define Brahman as satyaṁ jñānam
8 Śaṅkara (Śamkara)
˙

anantam ānandam, “being, consciousness, limit- discourse of causality is no more than a verbal
less, bliss.” Śaṅkara takes this as the essential handle whose purpose is to bring home the point
definition of Brahman, in which the individual that Brahman is the sole reality. That great ground
characteristics are not attributes of Brahman, but of Being that is Brahman is the only thing that
mutually denotative of its essence (Taittirī ya- exists.
Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya 2.1.1). Brahman as Being is A similar reduction is performed on the side of
the sole fact that something is, and as such Brah- the individual Self, which is gradually stripped of
man is coordinated with everything, insofar as all identification points in a manner of removing
about anything that really exists one must say layers of skin from a vegetable, until all that
that it is. The requirement of something to be, remains is the pure vijñānātman, the Self that is
however, does not allow that it is anything spe- not properly individuated. Ultimately, however,
cific, because the being of something specific the two categories, tat and tvam, the causal Brah-
changes (BGBh 2.16, BĀUBh 1.2.1). To illus- man and the Self, are still somewhat irreconcil-
trate, things like pots and pitchers are real, posi- able, because Brahman is still that great ground of
tive entities, not as pots or pitchers, however, but Being that is external, whereas the individual Self
solely as clay: their pot shape and pitcher shape even as no more than a category retains the sense
are in time destroyed and reshaped, but clay of being inner, and therefore different from Brah-
remains real throughout all changes. Clay, how- man. The pure Brahman, therefore, expressed in
ever, can also be reduced to something more the identity statements, must cease its being the
basic, such as the element of earth, which is fur- cause, and the Self must cease understanding itself
ther reducible to Being through the Upaniṣadic as different from Brahman: “When non-difference
accounts of creation that state how earth comes has dawned on one through statements such as
forth from Being. In the ultimate analysis, the final ‘You are that,’ the individual Self’s being liable to
point of reduction is Being. In terms of transmigration is lost, and so is Brahman’s being a
Upaniṣadic scriptural theology, this reduction creator, because full knowledge defeats the prac-
takes place because of the juxtaposition of tical reality of difference that extends through
“Being,” satyam, with “unlimited,” anantam. false awareness” (BSBh 2.1.22). Īśvara or the
A similar analysis is performed with Supreme Lord, omniscient and omnipotent under
Brahman’s characteristic of jñānam, conscious- the requirements of causality, in the ultimate anal-
ness. Brahman as consciousness can neither be ysis ceases being that, because he is, really, just
the subject of knowing nor the cognitive content, the light of consciousness that does not admit the
but simply the light of consciousness that makes discourse of causality at all. Brahman the great
cognition possible. This is so, again, because of ground of Being is, really, just the inner Self.
the juxtaposition of “consciousness,” jñānam, (The above account was presented solely from
with “unlimited,” anantam. Likewise, with bliss, Śaṅkara’s own works. Important discussions in
ānandam: Brahman is not experiential bliss, but the secondary literature include [3],
bliss solid – bliss as substance – and in the ulti- pp. 215–283; [7], pp. 57–100; [10, 11, 19],
mate analysis, it comes to mean that Brahman is pp. 18–68; [24], pp. 25–92; [26], pp. 89–160;
not liable to suffering, transmigration. What this [27].)
means for the initial definition of Brahman as the
cause from which all creatures proceed is that the
causal Brahman is not the kind of cause that we Practice and the Human Good
are generally acquainted with: things proceed
from Brahman just “in a manner of speaking,” as Śaṅkara’s purpose in presenting his monistic the-
there are no things to begin with: everything ology was not per se to deny the reality of the
except the permanently unchanging Brahman is world, or rather, not necessarily so. He was in a
just inconstant, changing name-and-form, appear- sense a realist, but with a twist. Along with his
ance which in substance is just Brahman, and the Buddhist peers, he subscribed to a worldview in
Śaṅkara (Śamkara) 9
˙

which things can be looked at from two incom- mind, was evident in the aspirant manifesting the
mensurable perspectives. One was that of realism, following four characteristics:
from which perspective things were just as they
appear to be, in the empiric world (loke) and in 1. The ability to discern things transient and eter-
Vedic world that is predicated on pluralism (vede). nal (nityānitya-vastu-viveka), more specifi-
The other perspective was that of ontological cally, to understand that the attainment of
monism, indeed, illusionism, in which there was Vedic ritual and meditation is not eternal; con-
no world, no creation, and no multiplicity of sequent on this
Selves, but just Brahman the light of conscious- 2. Dispassion toward the enjoyments of the here
ness. The two perspectives are known as and the hereafter (ihāmutrārtha-bhoga-
vyavahāra, the worldview of ordinary or conven- virāga); consequent on this
tional reality, and paramārtha, the absolute per- 3. The acquisition of certain personal virtues
spective or how things really are. The first is the (śama-damādi-sādhana-sampat), the classical
perspective of embodiment and transmigration, list of which consists of control of the mind and
the second of liberation. senses, tranquility, tolerance, concentration,
As indicated above, even the Veda was and faith; and, consequent on these
concerned with the perspective of conventional 4. Desire after liberation (mumukṣutva)
reality. The Upaniṣads as the concluding part of (BSBh 1.1.1.
the Veda, on the other hand, were split, insofar as
some Upaniṣadic texts were predicated on plural- When one had acquired these characteristics
ism and intended to affirm it, while other and was intent on inquiring into Brahman, one
Upaniṣadic texts had to indulge in pluralism, had to take formal renunciation; indeed, we will
with no intention to affirm it, but rather use it as notice that the four characteristics inherently
the subject of which something true can be pred- involve renunciation and dispassion. In fact,
icated, namely, which can be denied as real. The Śaṅkara and his followers were adamant that the
first kind of Upaniṣadic texts were concerned with inquiry into Brahman would be unsuccessful in
meditation on Brahman, a process dependent on a one who had not acquired these characteristics
distinction between Brahman and the meditator first, and the reason for this was simple: knowing
and leading to prosperity but remaining in trans- as a category was essentially different from doing
migration, while the second were concerned with something, and unless one was accustomed solely
knowledge qua knowledge (Chāndogya- to knowing, that is, to dispassion, one’s knowing
Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya, Introduction). Let us focus on would be constantly disturbed by false identifica-
the second. tion with some form of personal agency.
We saw that ignorance consisting in false iden- The process of inquiry into Brahman as the
tification was the cause of individuation and process of liberation consists in the successive
embodiment. The solution to embodiment and application of three methods: śravaṇa, manana,
the means to liberation had to be, consequently, and nididhyāsana. These three methods were
simply knowing one’s true nature as Brahman the based on a statement by Yājñavalkya to his wife
light of consciousness. When such knowledge had Maitreyī in the Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.5:
arisen, one would achieve liberation, defined as ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo
remaining in the state of the Self or simply as nididhyāsitavyaḥ, “The Self should be seen: it
being Brahman, without anything further to do: should be heard about, pondered over, meditated
no rituals to perform or meditation to engage on.” For Śaṅkara, śravaṇa and manana were a
in. But, perfect knowledge was not easy to theological and a philosophical inquiry with a
achieve. First of all, it was predicated on the teacher, focused on the identity statements of the
agent being sufficiently pure and qualified to Upaniṣads, whose respective purpose was to bring
inquire into Brahman, which purity, to Śaṅkara’s home the understanding that the Upaniṣads intend
to affirm full ontological identity of the Self with
10 Śaṅkara (Śamkara)
˙

Brahman by fixing the reference of the two indi- Śaṅkara, the Śaṅkara of the hagiographies; of the
vidual categories through removing identification monasteries; of the first feature film ever shot in
points and to facilitate through analogical reason- Sanskrit, G.V. Iyer’s (1983) Adi Shankaracharya;
ing the understanding of how such full ontological or of the more recent Telugu Jagadguru Adi
identity was possible. From the end of the second Sankara, the Śaṅkara who was Śiva born to banish
prose chapter of the Upadeśa-Sāhasrī, it is evi- Buddhism from India, the royal Śaṅkara who
dent that one could attain full understanding and, rules India from his seat at the four cardinal points.
consequently, liberation at the completion of the This public Śaṅkara, constructed as a paradig-
manana process. matic Advaitin, and indeed Hindu, to whom
The third process, nididhyāsana or meditation, everything of the Advaita or Hindu kind can be
was not Yogic meditation as a form of mental ascribed, was particularly important in the Indian
absorption on a single notion, but a personal encounter with modernity and with the challenge
reflection of the Sāṅkhyan kind whose idea was of the West: he had provided the doctrinal foun-
to analyze all possible identification points for the dation for many of the builders of modern, uni-
Self such that in the end only the Self as the light versalist Hinduism, such as Ram Mohan Roy,
of consciousness would remain as the residue Swami Vivekananda, and Dr. Sarvepalli
without which no cognition and no identification Radhakrishnan. Today more than ever, he con-
would be possible. The purpose of this meditation tinues to furnish doctrinal justification, but has
was on the one hand to supplement the first two also assumed the role as one of the few, select
processes if full understanding had not already venues for various battles concerning things San-
arisen and on the other to serve as an instrument skrit and Hindu in the public and digital spaces, in
of guarding the arisen understanding of one’s the West no less so than in India.
being Brahman.
The reason such guarding was required was
that in life one could achieve liberation from the
Cross-References
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▶ Adhikāra
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▶ Advaita Vedānta
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▶ Ānanda
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Śaṅkara (Śamkara) 11
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