Collector of internal revenue vs Campos Rueda (1971)

FACTS:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition to annul a municipal resolution in Morong, but the municipality did
not respond within 30 days. They then initiated a process to gather signatures for its repeal. However, the Vice
Mayor of Morong wrote to the COMELEC requesting denial of the initiative, which COMELEC later denied, stating
that the subject was a resolution, not an ordinance. The petition seeks to overturn these COMELEC decisions.
COMELEC and the Morong Sangguniang Bayan argue that the Local Government Code of 1991 does not allow
initiatives for resolutions.

ISSUE:
W/N Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper
subject of an initiative.

RULINGS:
The respondents' narrow interpretation of the provision collides with the Constitution and goes against the
lawmakers' intent when enacting the Local Government Code of 1991 regarding initiative and referendum. The
Constitution clearly includes resolutions as appropriate subjects for local initiatives. Article VI, Section 32 of the
Constitution explicitly states that the people can propose and enact laws or approve/reject acts or laws, which
encompasses resolutions. Even legal definitions support this broader interpretation, considering acts to include
resolutions.

In legal interpretation, it's crucial to ensure that laws are in harmony with the constitution, not in violation of it.
In a previous case (In Re Guarina), it was held that if there is doubt or uncertainty about the legislative intent or
if the language of the law is unclear or susceptible to multiple interpretations, the interpretation that avoids
unconstitutionality should be adopted, even if it requires disregarding the more common understanding of the
language used.

GENERAL RULE:

XPN:

a. test of delegation
i. completeness test
ii. sufficiency test
Bureau of Customs Employees Association v. Teves, G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011

FACTS:
RA No. 9335 was enacted to enhance revenue generation for the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
the Bureau of Customs (BOC). It establishes a system of rewards and sanctions to motivate officials
and employees of these agencies to exceed their revenue targets.

BOCEA, an association of rank-and-file employees of the BOC, filed a petition arguing that the law and
its implementing rules violate the constitutional rights of its members. They claimed that the revenue
targets were unattainable due to government policies, natural disasters, and economic factors. BOCEA
also alleged that some employees were coerced into signing performance contracts, while others
were harassed for refusing to sign.

The government argued that RA No. 9335 and its implementing rules did not violate due process or
security of tenure rights. They contended that the law provided valid grounds for dismissal and that
employees could only be separated from service with proper due process.

BOCEA further asserted that the law was unreasonable, oppressive, and discriminatory toward BIR
and BOC employees, with high-ranking officials benefiting the most from the reward system. They also
claimed that their requests for information on how rewards were distributed were denied.

The case was filed directly with the Supreme Court, and BOCEA sought to consolidate it with another
case, Abakada. However, due to the Court's decision in Abakada, consolidation became impossible.

ISSUE:
Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power to the Board

RULINGS:
No. The court has determined that RA No. 9335 meets both the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. This conclusion is based on the provisions of the law, particularly Sections 2, 4, and 7,
which outline the incentives and rewards for officials and employees. Section 5 also addresses the
allocation of rewards for District Collection Offices and specifies that the rules and regulations for this
allocation will be determined by the Revenue Performance and Evaluation Board.

Furthermore, Section 7(a) of RA No. 9335 provides clear instructions and parameters for the Board
when establishing rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution, and release of the fund.

Hence, the court believes that RA No. 9335, when considered as a whole, is comprehensive in its
essential terms and conditions and provides sufficient standards, negating any claims of undue
delegation of legislative power to the Board.
GENERAL RULE:

XPN:

Garcia v. Drilon, G. R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

FACTS:
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed a civil case in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, seeking a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia, under R.A. 9262, also known as the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act. She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological, and
economic abuse due to her husband's infidelity and threats regarding their children and financial support.

The couple has three children. Rosalie described her husband as dominant and controlling, forbidding her from
praying, isolating her from friends, and belittling her ambitions. Jesus had an affair with a bank manager, leading
to physical altercations between them and even violence towards their daughter Jo-Ann.

Rosalie attempted suicide due to the emotional turmoil but was found by her son and hospitalized. Jesus did not
visit her during her hospitalization. Rosalie sought therapy and was on anti-depressant medication.

She intended to file charges against the bank manager, which angered Jesus. He then left her, and she feared
losing her children and financial support. Jesus controlled family businesses, while Rosalie had limited access to
information and minimal financial resources.

The RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order, and despite modifications, Rosalie filed another application for a
TPO due to alleged non-compliance and harassment by Jesus. In response, Jesus filed a petition before the Court
of Appeals, challenging the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 and the validity of the TPO issued in the civil case.
However, the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition for procedural reasons, as he had not raised the
constitutional issue in the trial court and the challenge constituted a collateral attack on the law.

ISSUE:
W/N THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS

RULINGS:
No. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.

In proceedings before the Punong Barangay (Barangay Captain), the parties are allowed to be accompanied by a
non-lawyer advocate. Judicial power involves the authority of courts to resolve actual disputes concerning
legally enforceable rights and to assess whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion by any government
branch or instrumentality. In contrast, executive power pertains to the enforcement and administration of laws,
including ensuring their observance.

The Barangay Protection Order (BPO) issued by the Punong Barangay or a Barangay Kagawad, when the Punong
Barangay is unavailable, directs the perpetrator to refrain from causing physical harm to a woman or her child
and from making threats of physical harm. This action by the Punong Barangay is purely executive in nature, as it
aligns with their duty under the Local Government Code to enforce laws and maintain public order within the
barangay.

It is important to note that the mere fact that an officer is required to investigate certain facts and apply the law
to determine their official conduct, even when this affects private rights, does not constitute an exercise of
judicial powers.

GENERAL RULE:

XPN:
Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioners, including Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San
Diego, and Jose M. Villegas, Jr., filed a petition (Belgica Petition) seeking a writ of certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They requested the court to declare the annual "Pork Barrel System" embodied in
the provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2013, which provided for the 2013 Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), and the Executive's lump-sum, discretionary funds like the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, unconstitutional and void due to grave abuse of discretion.

They also asked the court to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) against certain government officials,
including Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad), and Rosalia V. De Leon, to stop any
expenditure from these funds. Additionally, they sought an order for these officials to release to the Commission
on Audit (CoA) and the public a complete list of legislators who utilized their PDAF and Very Important Persons
(VIP) funds from 2003 to 2013, including details of fund usage, projects, and recipients. They requested similar
disclosure for the Executive's lump-sum, discretionary funds, including proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and
PAGCOR remittances from 2003 to 2013.

Furthermore, they urged the court to include these off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds in budget
deliberations with the Congress.

ISSUE:
W/N the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (b) non-delegability of legislative
power.

RULINGS:
Yes. the 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article, which allows individual legislators to identify
projects and beneficiaries, violates the non-delegability principle.

This is because it effectively permits these legislators to exercise the power of appropriation, which is
constitutionally vested in Congress. The power to appropriate public funds must be exercised through
legislation, as mandated by Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. According to Bengzon v. Secretary
of Justice and Insular Auditor, the power of appropriation involves setting aside a specific sum from public
revenue for a specified purpose. The 2013 PDAF Article grants individual legislators the authority to determine
both the amount allocated from the fund and the specific project or beneficiary, essentially allowing them to
legislate, which the Constitution does not permit.

Therefore, the court declared the 2013 PDAF Article, along with any other Congressional Pork Barrel forms
containing similar legislative identification features, as unconstitutional, in accordance with the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power.

GENERAL RULE:
XPN:

Vivas v. The Monetary Board, G.R. No. 191424, August 7, 2013

FACTS:
The Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) was initially a registered rural banking institution whose corporate
life had expired on May 31, 2005. In January 2006, petitioner Alfeo D. Vivas and his associates acquired a
controlling interest in RBFI. An internal audit revealed the bank's poor financial condition, and efforts were made
to revitalize it.

On December 8, 2006, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) extended RBFI's corporate life for another fifty years
and approved a change in its corporate name to EuroCredit Community Bank, Incorporated, along with other
changes.

The BSP conducted a general examination of EuroCredit Community Bank, Incorporated (ECBI) as of December
31, 2007. Following this examination, ECBI was placed under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) due to serious
findings, including negative capital and supervisory concerns.

Disputes arose between ECBI and the BSP, including ECBI's refusal to allow further examinations and allegations
of unfair treatment. Legal actions were taken, including the imposition of monetary penalties and filing of
complaints.

In September 2009, the MB approved the issuance of a cease and desist order against ECBI. Eventually, the MB
placed ECBI under receivership in February 2010, citing its inability to meet financial obligations and unsafe
banking practices. The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) was designated as the receiver of the
bank.

ISSUE:
W/N The power delegated in favor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to place rural banks under
receiverships are unconstitutional.

RULINGS:
No. There is no Undue Delegation of Legislative Power.

In the context of delegation of legislative power, there are two accepted tests: the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test.

1. Completeness Test: According to this test, a law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature. The idea is that once it reaches the delegate the delegate should only need to
enforce the law without adding or changing any essential elements.

2. Sufficient Standard Test: This test requires that there be adequate guidelines or provisions in the law
that define the boundaries of the delegate's authority. It's meant to prevent the delegate from having
unchecked or unlimited authority. These guidelines are necessary to ensure that the delegate does not
assume a purely legislative role.
In the case being discussed, which involves R.A. No. 7653 (The New Central Bank Act), the court found that there
was no undue delegation of legislative authority. The law empowered the Monetary Board (MB) to monitor and
supervise banks and financial institutions, take actions such as forbidding them from doing business, taking over
their management, or placing them under receivership if necessary. The legislature had clearly defined the
parameters of the MB's power, and the MB was entrusted with implementing the law to protect the public, the
banking industry, and the economy.

GENERAL RULE:

XPN:

Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 11, 2014

FACTS:
The case involves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely
Ann C. Imbong, both as private citizens and lawyers, along with their minor children and the Magnificat Child
Learning Center, Inc., a private educational institution. They raised concerns about the Reproductive Health (RH)
Law, particularly alleging that it violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority.
Specifically, the petitioners questioned Congress's delegation of power to the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and should be included in the Emergency Drugs List
(EDL).

The court issued a Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) to temporarily suspend the implementation of the RH Law.
The case proceeded with oral arguments and clarifications of the issues raised by the parties. The SQAO was
extended, and the court requested the submission of memoranda from the parties to further address the
contentions and questions related to the case.

ISSUE:
W/N the RH Law violates the principle of non-delagation of legislative authority.

RULINGS:
No. The court found that there was nothing wrong with the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) under the Reproductive Health (RH) Law.

The FDA was deemed competent and well-equipped to evaluate, register, and oversee health services and
methods, which are considered part of "health products." The court emphasized that the FDA's specific
functions, powers, and duties were designed to fulfill the mandates of the law effectively.

The principle of necessary implication was invoked, suggesting that Congress intended the FDA to ensure public
health and safety by permitting only safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and scientifically supported health services
and methods. This delegation was in line with the increasing complexity of governance tasks and the
legislature's limited capacity to address them directly, given the evolving and intricate issues facing society.
Specialization and delegation had become necessary to address contemporary challenges effectively.

GENERAL RULE:

XPN:

Robosa v. NLRC - G.R. No. 176085, February 8, 2012

FACTS:
The case involves a labor dispute between employees of Chemo-Technische Manufacturing, Inc. (CTMI) and the
company, which later became Procter and Gamble Philippines, Inc. (P & GPI) after acquisition.

The dispute began when the employees filed a petition for certification election, which initially failed to make
the union the exclusive bargaining agent. Subsequently, CTMI issued memoranda implementing changes in its
operations, leading to allegations of union-busting and unfair labor practices.

The employees filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. The National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and later upgraded it to a preliminary
injunction. The NLRC also directed CTMI to cease various actions.

Despite NLRC directives, CTMI allegedly refused to comply, resulting in the loss of employment for the
employees. The NLRC dismissed the contempt charge against CTMI, prompting the employees to file a petition
with the Court of Appeals (CA).

The employees argued that the CA erred in upholding the NLRC's resolutions dismissing the contempt charge,
claiming that the NLRC had unconstitutionally applied the law and unreasonably delayed the case's disposition.

The employees contended that the NLRC's reversal of earlier rulings favoring them was unjust and questionable,
and they sought a review of the factual basis for the respondents' acquittal from the contempt charges.

ISSUE:
W/N the NLRC has contempt powers

RULINGS:
Yes. the NLRC has contempt powers

Under Article of the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any offending party in contempt,
directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance with law. The penalty for direct contempt
consists of either imprisonment or fine, the degree or amount depends on whether the contempt is against the
Commission or the labor arbiter. The Labor Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or the Commission to deal
with indirect contempt in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court

Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to initiate indirect contempt
proceedings before the trial court. This mode is to be observed only when there is no law granting them
contempt powers. As is clear under Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter or the Commission is
empowered or has jurisdiction to hold the offending party or parties in direct or indirect contempt.

The petitioners, therefore, have not improperly brought the indirect contempt charges against
the respondents before the NLRC.

GENERAL RULE:

XPN:
Monetary Board v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 189571, January 21, 2015

FACTS:
Respondent established pension and salary loan products for veterans, their surviving spouses, teachers, and
low-salaried employees as part of its mandate under Republic Act Nos. 3518 and 7169 to provide financial
assistance to these groups. To ensure repayment of these loans, given that borrowers often lack real estate or
security, respondent charged higher fees known as Credit Redemption Fund (CRF) premiums. Special Trust Funds
were set up for these loans, managed by respondent's Trust and Investment Department, with respondent as
the beneficiary. The fees collected from borrowers were credited to these trust funds, which would cover the
outstanding loans in case of death.
An examination by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) revealed that the collection of CRF premiums violated
Section 54 of RA No. 8791, which prohibits banks from directly engaging in insurance as insurers. Respondent
initially defended the CRF but later complied with the BSP's directive to stop collecting CRF fees.

The Monetary Board (MB) issued Resolution No. 1139, directing respondent's Trust and Investment Department
to return the CRF balances to borrowers and preserve records pending further legal proceedings. Respondent
requested reconsideration of this resolution, but it was denied.

Respondent then filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Makati City, seeking a declaration that its
CRF program was not insurance. The petition was dismissed by the RTC due to respondent's prior breach of RA
No. 8791. Later, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming it did not receive the RTC's order until
much later. The RTC allowed the motion for reconsideration, and petitioners were required to file an answer. The
RTC eventually declared MB Resolution No. 1139 null and void.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration against this decision, which was subsequently denied.

ISSUE:
W/N the petition for declaratory relief is proper

RULINGS:
No. The decision of the BSP Monetary Board cannot be subject to a petition for declaratory relief because it was
issued in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers. The authority of the petitioners to issue MB Resolution No.
1139 comes from their powers under relevant banking laws to impose administrative sanctions on banks for
violating banking laws.

The BSP Monetary Board's nature as a quasi-judicial agency, which determines whether sanctions can be
imposed on banks, has been recognized by the court. While the law does not explicitly list the BSP Monetary
Board as a quasi-judicial agency whose decisions can be appealed to the Court of Appeals, it is understood that
the list is not exhaustive.

A quasi-judicial agency, like the BSP Monetary Board, is an organ of government outside the courts and
legislature, and it affects private parties' rights through adjudication or rule-making. The BSP Monetary Board
exercises quasi-judicial powers and functions, and its decisions are not suitable for declaratory relief.

Hence, the court's order dismissing the petition for declaratory relief had become final and executory, adding to
the reasons why the petition for declaratory relief is inappropriate in this case.

Sps. Sinamban v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. 193890, March 11, 2015

FACTS:
The spouses Manalastas executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) in favor of China Banking Corporation
(Chinabank) to secure a loan for their rice milling business. Over the years, they increased their loan limit
through several amendments to the mortgage contract and executed promissory notes (PNs) to Chinabank. The
spouses Sinamban also signed as co-makers on two of these PNs.

Chinabank filed a complaint for the collection of the loan amount and related charges when the borrowers
defaulted on their payments. Extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were conducted, resulting in a deficiency
amount after the sale of the mortgaged properties. Chinabank sought to recover this deficiency from both the
spouses Manalastas and the spouses Sinamban.

The spouses Sinamban denied having knowledge of some of the promissory notes and refused to acknowledge
the deficiency. They claimed that Chinabank manipulated the foreclosure sale and excluded them from it.
However, they were declared in default during the trial.

The RTC initially rendered a decision against all defendants, holding them jointly and severally liable for the
deficiency. Later, in response to a motion for reconsideration by the spouses Sinamban, the RTC modified its
decision, ruling that they were not liable for one of the promissory notes. Chinabank filed a motion for
reconsideration, leading to the RTC reinstating its original decision, holding both the spouses Manalastas and the
spouses Sinamban liable for the deficiency.

The spouses Sinamban appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) but were denied relief as the CA
upheld the RTC's ruling.

ISSUE:
W/N Chinabank can seek payment from sps. Sinamban, who, in the promissory notes, appeared to be solidary
deptor.

RULINGS:

Yes. According to Article 2047 of the Civil Code, if a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the
provisions of Articles 1207 to 1222 of the Civil Code (Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I, Book IV) on joint and solidary
obligations shall be observed. Thus, where there is a concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more
debtors in one and the same obligation, Article 1207 provides that among them, "[t]here is a solidary liability
only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity."
It is settled that when the obligor or obligors undertake to be "jointly and severally" liable, it means that the
obligation is solidary.

In this case, the spouses Sinamban expressly bound themselves to be jointly and severally, or solidarily, liable
with the principal makers of the PNs, the spouses Manalastas.

Go v. Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 191810, June 22, 2015

FACTS:
The case revolves around the citizenship and deportation of Jimmy T. Go (also known as Jaime T. Gaisano),
referred to as Go in the summary, and his father Carlos Go, Sr. (Go, Sr.). The Concerned Employees of Noah's Arc
Group of Companies filed a complaint, alleging that Go, Sr. was an undocumented alien who later adopted the
Filipino name 'Carlos Go, Sr.' They argued that since Go, Sr. was an undocumented alien, Go, his child, was also
an alien as he was born to Chinese parents.

Subsequently, a complaint-affidavit for the deportation of Go was filed by Luis T. Ramos. Ramos claimed that Go
misrepresented himself as a Filipino citizen, but his birth certificates and family history indicated that he was a
Chinese citizen born in the Philippines, violating the Philippine Immigration Act.
Go refuted these allegations, asserting that his father, Go, Sr., had elected Philippine citizenship through the
Oath of Allegiance and an Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship. He also mentioned that Go, Sr. was a
registered voter who participated in Philippine elections.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation and found that Go, Sr.'s election of
Philippine citizenship complied with the law, and any discrepancies in Go's birth certificate were not attributable
to them. As a result, the Bureau of Immigration (BI) dismissed the complaint for deportation.

However, the BI Board of Commissioners later reversed this dismissal, stating that Go, Sr.'s election of Philippine
citizenship was made out of time. The Board ordered the preparation and filing of deportation charges against
Go.

Go and Go, Sr. filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, challenging the jurisdiction of the BI
Board to proceed with the deportation proceedings. The RTC initially issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction but later dissolved it and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Their petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals (CA) was also dismissed.

Meanwhile, Go was apprehended and detained pending deportation.

Go and Go, Sr. appealed their case to the Office of the President (OP), which concurred with the findings of the
BI Board. The CA dismissed their petition for review, upholding the Board's decision. Subsequently, the Supreme
Court resolved Go, Sr.'s case separately.

The CA dismissed Go's Rule 43 petition, holding that the BI Board's April 17, 2002 Decision, which was subject to
appeal before the OP, had become final and executory.

ISSUE:
The Honorable Court erred in dismissing the instant petition;

RULINGS:
The rule regarding second motions for reconsideration is very strict. Generally, a second motion for
reconsideration is not allowed, as stated in Rule 52 of the Rules of Court and further emphasized in A.M. No. 10-
4-20-SC, as amended (Internal Rules of the Supreme Court). This means that after a decision has been made and
a first motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied, a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited.

However, there can be exceptions to this rule, but they are rare and require compelling and extraordinary
reasons. Such exceptions must be granted by the Court en banc, which means a vote of at least two-thirds of its
actual membership is needed. These exceptions are typically made when the decision is not just legally incorrect
but also grossly unjust and could cause significant and irreparable harm to the parties involved.

A second motion for reconsideration can only be considered before the decision becomes final, either through
operation of law or by a declaration from the Court. In cases where a second motion for reconsideration is
elevated to the Court En Banc from a Division, it requires a vote of three Members.

Ultimately, the Court has the discretion to suspend its own rules and make exceptions when it believes that
justice demands it. This decision is typically made when an issue of great importance and consequence is at
stake, making it an exception to the usual rule.
GENERAL RULE:

XPN:

Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193314, June 25, 2013

FACTS:
This resolution addresses the motions for reconsideration filed by both private respondents and the petitioner
regarding a previous decision.

The main issue raised by the private respondents is who should assume office between the vice-mayor and the
second placer following the petitioner's ineligibility to run for office and the lifting of the Status Quo Order.
The petitioner, on the other hand, challenges the decision on several grounds, including questioning the alleged
inconsistencies in the joint affidavit of her witnesses, arguing that her stay in Brgy. Punta Miray should be
considered for the one-year residency requirement, and contending that her voter registration implies at least
six months of residency in the municipality.

The petitioner also argues that her certificate of candidacy should not be canceled unless there is evidence of a
deliberate attempt to deceive the electorate. Lastly, the petitioner questions the jurisdiction of COMELEC to
decide on the matter.

ISSUE:
W/N Jalosjos complied with the one-year residence requirement for local officials

RULINGS:
No. The petitioner claimed that she has been an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008 to
establish her eligibility for the elections. However, the court found inconsistencies in her case. The affidavit of
her witnesses indicated that while her house was being constructed, she used to stay at another residence in
Brgy. Punta Miray. They also mentioned that construction was ongoing until December 2009.

The petitioner challenged these inconsistencies but failed to provide a clear and specific date when she
established her legal residence in Brgy. Tugas.

GENERAL RULE:

XPN:

C. The Senate

Jalover v. de la Pena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014

FACTS:
Eduardo Osmeña filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor in Toledo City, Cebu, indicating
that he had been a resident of Toledo City for fifteen (15) years prior to the May 2013 elections. The petitioners
filed a petition before the COMELEC, alleging that Osmeña made false statements in his COC and failed to meet
the residency requirement.
The petitioners presented evidence, including a certification from the Toledo City Assessor’s Office stating that
Osmeña did not own any real property in Toledo City, tax declarations, photographs of Osmeña’s alleged
residence in Toledo City, a certification from the Business Permit and Licensing Office, and affidavits from
witnesses claiming Osmeña was not a resident of Toledo City.

Osmeña defended himself by stating that he had established ties with Toledo City through his family’s business
interests and political connections. He claimed to have bought property in Toledo City in 1995, built houses
there, became a permanent resident in 2004, and registered as a voter in 2006. He also provided various
documents and affidavits to support his claims.

The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition, stating that Osmeña did not commit material
misrepresentation in his COC. The COMELEC en banc upheld this decision, and the Office of the Solicitor General
argued that the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, as Osmeña presented substantial
evidence to prove his residency in Toledo City.

ISSUE:
W/N the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

RULINGS:
No. the court pleadings should be interpreted liberally to ensure that substantial justice is served, allowing the
actual merits of a dispute to be resolved swiftly and cost-effectively. Courts tend to be favorably disposed toward
permitting amendments to pleadings. This approach is driven by the goal of avoiding the need for multiple
lawsuits and ensuring that the genuine issues between the parties are presented and resolved on their merits,
without unnecessary delays.

In cases where not allowing an amendment would likely result in the initiation of another legal action, leading to
two separate cases, two trials, and two appeals, the court should admit the proposed amendment. Therefore, if
the trial court finds that the allegations in the pleadings are inadequate, it should grant the party requesting the
amendment the opportunity to make the necessary changes. This approach aligns with the rules of court, which
encourage the liberal allowance of amendments to pleadings.
GENERAL RULE:

XPN:

Caballero v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015

FACTS:
In the May 2013 mayoralty election for the Municipality of Uyugan in Batanes, both the petitioner and private
respondent ran as candidates. Private respondent filed a petition seeking the cancellation of the petitioner's
certificate of candidacy (COC). The basis for this petition was the alleged false representation made by the
petitioner in his COC, where he declared his eligibility for mayor despite being a Canadian citizen and a non-
resident of Uyugan.
The petitioner argued that before filing his COC, he had taken an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada, which granted him dual Filipino and
Canadian citizenship in accordance with Republic Act (RA) No. 9225. Subsequently, he renounced his Canadian
citizenship and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation in Batanes in 2012.

However, the COMELEC issued a resolution stating that while the petitioner had complied with RA No. 9225, he
failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code for those
seeking elective office. Despite this finding, the petitioner won the election, was proclaimed as Mayor, but later
filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC to cancel his COC.

The COMELEC, including its En Banc, denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, the
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the court and sought a temporary restraining order. COMELEC
Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution, and private respondent assumed office as Mayor.

Private respondent contends that he did not abandon his domicile in the Philippines, as he was born, baptized,
registered as a voter, exercised his right to vote, and even built a house in Uyugan. He also claimed that he
regularly returned to Uyugan.

The petitioner maintains that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling his COC.

ISSUE:
W/N COMELEC ENBANC gravely erred in finding that petitioner abandoned his Philippine domicile when he
worked in several foreign countries for greener pasture.

RULINGS:
No. RA No. 9225 allows natural-born Filipino citizens who have acquired foreign citizenship to reacquire or retain
their Philippine citizenship, without specifying any residency requirement for this purpose. The law treats
citizenship independently of residence, allowing individuals with dual citizenship to establish residence either in
the Philippines or their foreign country of citizenship.

However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks elective public office, residency in the
Philippines becomes a material consideration. The Local Government Code mandates that candidates for
elective office must be residents of the place they intend to represent for at least one year immediately
preceding the election day.

In this case, the petitioner, a natural-born Filipino, was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. He later became a
Canadian citizen while working in Canada. Acquiring Canadian citizenship required him to have permanent
resident status in Canada, which effectively meant he abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and established
a domicile of choice in Canada.

The petitioner's reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically reinstate his
residence in Uyugan, Batanes. To qualify as a resident for the May 13, 2013 elections, he needed to prove that
he had reestablished Uyugan as his domicile of choice within one year before the election. However, he failed to
provide evidence of such reestablishment.

The cancellation of the petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy (COC) by the COMELEC was based on a material
misrepresentation, which Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code pertains to. In this context, "material
representation" refers to qualifications for elective office, such as residency, citizenship, age, or other legal
qualifications necessary for running for a local elective office as provided by the Local Government Code. The
misrepresentation must also involve a deliberate attempt to mislead or hide a fact that would render a candidate
ineligible.

Hence, the COMELEC's decision to cancel the petitioner's COC for material misrepresentation regarding
residency requirements was not found to be a grave abuse of discretion.

GENERAL RULE:

XPN:

Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R.

Nos. 206844-45, July 23, 2013

FACTS:
In May 2010, the nominees of the political party SENIOR CITIZENS signed an Irrevocable Covenant, specifying the
list of nominees who would share power in their agreement. Following the 2010 elections, which resulted in a
vacant seat in Congress due to the resignation of Rep. Kho, the COMELEC issued an Omnibus Resolution in SPP
No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). This resolution declared that the list of nominees submitted by
SENIOR CITIZENS would be permanent, with Rep. Arquiza and Rep. Kho allocated seats in the House of
Representatives as the party's representatives.

Rep. Arquiza, in light of Rep. Kho's resignation, announced that their fourth nominee would assume the vacant
seat, as the third nominee, Datol, had previously been expelled from the party. However, the COMELEC
maintained that they would adhere to the list provided by SENIOR CITIZENS, regardless of Datol's expulsion.
Additionally, they refused to recognize Rep. Kho's resignation because it would alter the order of nominees.

ISSUE:
W/N there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC for issuing Resolution without due process.

RULINGS:
Yes. The review of SENIOR CITIZENS' registration was conducted in compliance with COMELEC Resolution No.
9513, involving a summary evidentiary hearing held on August 24, 2012, as part of SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and
SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). During this hearing, both the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group were given the chance
to present evidence demonstrating their ongoing compliance with the requirements for party-list accreditation.

However, a violation of due process occurred because neither group was informed that the term-sharing
agreement among SENIOR CITIZENS' nominees in 2010 would be a significant factor in assessing the
organization's qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. Consequently, both factions of
SENIOR CITIZENS were unable to effectively address this issue or present evidence in support of their respective
positions, thus depriving them of the opportunity to explain their side adequately.

GENERAL RULE:

XPN:

D. The House of Representatives a. composition

i. district representatives
ii. party-list representatives (RA 7941)

COCOFED v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013

FACTS:
The COMELEC conducted a hearing to assess COCOFED's compliance with legal requirements for participating in
the May 13, 2013 party-list elections. A resolution on November 7, 2012, canceled COCOFED's registration for
failing to submit at least five nominees, as mandated by Republic Act (RA) No. 7941.

COCOFED later submitted additional nominees to meet the requirement. They challenged the COMELEC's
cancellation in court, seeking a preliminary injunction. COCOFED's name appeared on the ballots due to a status
quo ante order.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued a resolution reiterating COCOFED's registration cancellation, citing
incomplete nominee lists. COCOFED claimed due process violations, good faith efforts, and unequal treatment
compared to other groups.

Despite the resolution, COCOFED remained on the ballot, receiving 80,397 votes or 0.36% of the total. The
COMELEC defended its decision, citing RA No. 7941 requirements and arguing against mandatory summary
hearings, citing Atong Paglaum.

ISSUE:
W/N the COMELEC indeed gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed resolution. We hold that it did not.

RULINGS:
No. The cancellation of COCOFED's registration due to its failure to submit a list of at least five qualified
nominees before the election is warranted by law. Section 8 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandates registered
parties or organizations to submit such a list not later than 45 days before the election. COCOFED's inability to
fulfill this requirement is a violation under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941.

The language of Section 8 of RA No. 7941 emphasizes the mandatory nature of this provision, using the term
"shall" in connection with both the requirement of submitting a list of nominees and the specific number of
names, which is set at not less than five. The Court's previous decision in Atong Paglaum did not authorize any
party-list group to neglect or refuse to comply with the law's clear directive regarding the submission of at least
five nominees.

Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206987, September
10, 2013

FACTS:
The COMELEC canceled ANAD's registration for three reasons:
1. ANAD did not represent marginalized sectors,
2. it didn't provide evidence for some nominees, and
3. it failed to submit financial reports.
ANAD challenged this in court. The COMELEC confirmed its decision. ANAD now questions if COMELEC's decision
was valid without a proper hearing and if it erred in assessing the nominee count and financial reports.
ISSUE:
W/N the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in promulgating the assailed Resolution without the benefit of a
summary evidentiary hearing mandated by the due process clause.

RULINGS:
No. The COMELEC found that ANAD failed to comply with election requirements, including submitting
incomplete financial reports. ANAD didn't contest this finding. The court emphasizes that the COMELEC's factual
findings are generally upheld unless there's no evidence to support them. Since the COMELEC has authority in
election matters and can cancel party-list organization registrations for violations

Hence. the court sees no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's decision.

Abang Lingkod Party-List v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013

FACTS:
ABANG LINGKOD, a party-list organization representing peasant farmers and fisherfolks, participated in the May
2010 elections but failed to secure a seat in the House of Representatives. They expressed their intent to
participate in the May 2013 elections.

The COMELEC required previously registered party-list groups to undergo a summary evidentiary hearing to
verify their compliance with election requirements.
ABANG LINGKOD submitted documents to prove their compliance with the law.

However, the COMELEC canceled ABANG LINGKOD's registration, stating that they failed to establish a track
record in representing marginalized and underrepresented groups, and that they used manipulated images to
support their claims.

ABANG LINGKOD filed a petition with the Supreme Court, alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in canceling their registration.

ISSUE:
W/N the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD's registration under the party-list
system.

RULINGS:
Yes. The essence of due process involves providing an opportunity to be heard or to explain one's side in
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings. It does not always require a formal trial-type hearing, as long as the
parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to present their case. What is unacceptable is an absolute
lack of notice or hearing.

In the case at hand, ABANG LINGKOD was given sufficient opportunity to establish its qualifications as a party-list
group. The COMELEC notified them of the registration review, and ABANG LINGKOD filed the necessary
documents to prove their compliance with the requirements. The claim that they were denied due process does
not hold.

After reviewing the case's factual background and considering the new screening parameters set in Along
Paglaum, the Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling ABANG LINGKOD's
registration under the party-list system.
Lico v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015

FACTS:
This case involves a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul two COMELEC Resolutions. Ating Koop, a multi-
sectoral party-list organization, filed for participation in the 2010 elections.

Petitioner Lico was its first nominee. A term-sharing agreement was made, allowing Lico to serve for the first
year of the three-year term.

However, he was expelled for disloyalty almost a year into his term, leading to a petition for him to vacate his
office and be succeeded by the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina. Ating Koop expelled Lico due to alleged
acts like malversation and corruption.

ISSUE:
W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the expulsion of a member of House of Representatives (Congressman
Lico) from his party-list organization.

RULINGS:
No. The COMELEC does not have jurisdiction over the case.

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is the body with jurisdiction to resolve questions about
the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET gains jurisdiction
over disqualification cases when the winning party-list group is proclaimed, the nominee takes the oath, and
they assume office in the House of Representatives.

Hence, the COMELEC cannot expel Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives as his expulsion from
Ating Koop affects his qualifications as a member of the House, and the HRET has jurisdiction over such matters.

b. Apportionment
i. Gerrymandering
Tobias vs Abalos, GR L-114783

FACTS:

Prior to Republic Act No. 7675, also known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong," Mandaluyong and San Juan were part of a single
legislative district.
A plebiscite was conducted to determine if the residents of Mandaluyong approved of the city's conversion. The
plebiscite had a low turnout, with only 14.41% of eligible voters participating. However, of those who voted,
18,621 supported the conversion, while 7,911 opposed it.

ISSUE:
W/N the ratification of RA 7675 was unconstitutional based on Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4, and 26(1)

RULINGS:
No. The Supreme Court, using a liberal interpretation, rejected the argument that the ratification of RA 7675 was
unconstitutional based on the following:

Article VI, Section 26(1): The Court stated that this provision should be practically, not technically, interpreted. It
considered compliance sufficient if the law's title expresses the general subject, and all provisions are related to
that subject.

Article VI, Section 5(1): The Court enforced the clause "unless otherwise provided by law," justifying the
legislature's authority to increase the number of congressional members.

Article VI, Section 5(4): The Court dismissed this argument, noting that Congress itself drafted the bill for
reapportioning legislative districts.

Hence, the petition was dismissed for lacking merit.

Mariano vs COMELEC, GR 118577

FACTS:
A petition was filed by several individuals, with only one which is Mariano, Jr being a resident of Makati,
questioning the constitutionality of sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854, which converted Makati into
a highly urbanized city. They raised the following constitutional issues:

1. Section 2 of RA 7854 did not properly define Makati's territorial jurisdiction, violating constitutional
provisions.

2. Section 51 of RA 7854 attempted to modify the term limits for local officials, which was deemed
 unconstitutional.

3. Section 52 RA 7854 increased Makati's legislative district through a special law rather than a general
reapportionment law as required by the Constitution.

Additionally, this change was not reflected in the title of the bill, and it did not conform to population criteria
outlined in the Constitution.

ISSUE:
W/N there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned sections
of R.A. No. 7854.

RULINGS:
The requirements for challenging the constitutionality of a law are well-established:

1. There must be an actual case or controversy.

2. The constitutional question must be raised by the proper party.
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.
4. The decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

In this case, the petitioners did not meet these requirements. Their petition was based on hypothetical and
contingent events, such as the possibility of Mayor Binay running for re-election in future elections. This created
an abstract issue that had not yet ripened into an actual case or controversy. Additionally, the petitioners, who
were residents of Taguig (except one), were not the proper parties to raise this issue in a petition for declaratory
relief, over which the court had no jurisdiction.

DOCTINE:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
(3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Montejo vs COMELEC, GR 179271

FACTS:
The province of Leyte is composed of 5 legislative districts. Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte, was
made its sub-province by virtue of RA 2141.

When Biliran was converted into a regular province, 8 municipalities of the third district composed the
new province. As a consequence, the composition of the third district was reduced to 5 municipalities.

To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in Leyte, the
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the second
district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte
ISSUE:
W/N the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another legislative
district

RULINGS:
No. The COMELEC claimed its power to redistrict based on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
However, the Constitutional Commission discussions reveal that the COMELEC was not granted the major power
of legislative apportionment, which was reserved for Congress. The Ordinance empowered the COMELEC to
make only minor adjustments to reapportionment.

The conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province led to an imbalance in the distribution of
voters and inhabitants in Leyte's legislative districts. However, the issue of reapportionment fell under the
authority of Congress, as stated in Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution.

Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued a resolution transferring municipalities
between districts in Leyte.

c. qualifications
Jalover v. de la Pena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014

FACTS:
Eduardo Osmeña filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor in Toledo City, Cebu, indicating
that he had been a resident of Toledo City for fifteen (15) years prior to the May 2013 elections. The petitioners
filed a petition before the COMELEC, alleging that Osmeña made false statements in his COC and failed to meet
the residency requirement.

The petitioners presented evidence, including a certification from the Toledo City Assessor’s Office stating that
Osmeña did not own any real property in Toledo City, tax declarations, photographs of Osmeña’s alleged
residence in Toledo City, a certification from the Business Permit and Licensing Office, and affidavits from
witnesses claiming Osmeña was not a resident of Toledo City.

Osmeña defended himself by stating that he had established ties with Toledo City through his family’s business
interests and political connections. He claimed to have bought property in Toledo City in 1995, built houses
there, became a permanent resident in 2004, and registered as a voter in 2006. He also provided various
documents and affidavits to support his claims.

The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition, stating that Osmeña did not commit material
misrepresentation in his COC. The COMELEC en banc upheld this decision, and the Office of the Solicitor General
argued that the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, as Osmeña presented substantial
evidence to prove his residency in Toledo City.

ISSUE:
W/N the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

RULINGS:
No. The law doesn't require a person to be at home 24/7 to fulfill the residency requirement. In the case of
Fernandez v. House Electoral Tribunal, it was established that a person may not always be at home due to work
or other commitments. In this case, the evidence provided by the petitioners didn't definitively prove that
Osmeña didn't reside in Toledo City for the required year before the election day. Sworn statements from
residents about not seeing Osmeña in the city were countered by statements from others who claimed he did
reside there.

The absence of registered property under Osmeña's name doesn't disqualify him from being considered a
resident of Toledo City. Property ownership is not a requirement for candidates in local elections. What matters
is that the candidate lives in the locality, even if it's in a rented house, a friend's house, or a relative's house.
Relying solely on property ownership to determine residency would unfairly favor those who own land.
GENERAL RULE:

XPN:

Residency

d. terms of office

Naval v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014

FACTS:

Julia filed a petition with the COMELEC to cancel Naval's Certificate of Candidacy (COC) because Naval had
already served three consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, regardless of the district he
represented. The COMELEC agreed and canceled Naval's COC, citing the strict three-term limit rule enshrined in
the Constitution and the Local Government Code.

The COMELEC's decision was based on the case of Latasa v. COMELEC, where the Court ruled that the conversion
of a municipality into a city did not change the nature of the local government post. In Latasa, the Court
considered several factors, including the same territorial jurisdiction and the same group of voters, to apply the
three-term limit rule.

In Naval's case, the COMELEC applied the same reasoning, finding that he was running for the same government
post for the fourth time, and thus, the three-term limit rule should be strictly enforced.

ISSUE:
W/N COMELEC made an erroneous decision in determining that Naval had already served three consecutive
terms in the same government post, which would disqualify him from running for another term.

RULINGS:
No. The Court denied the petition, stating that the essence of republicanism is representation and renovation,
where public functionaries are selected by the citizenry to serve for a limited period. The creation of a new
legislative district and the renaming of another district were carried out in accordance with the law, and the
interpretation of these terms must adhere to the language of the legal provision. The rationale behind
reapportionment is to achieve equality of representation among districts, and Naval's ineligibility due to the
three-term limit rule does not undermine the right to equal representation as another eligible person would
represent the renamed Third District.

Codilla vs De Venecia, GR 150605

FACTS:
This case involves a petition for mandamus and quo warranto against the Speaker and Secretary-General of the
House of Representatives. The petitioner, who was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte, sought to compel the House to implement the decision of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc, which ordered his proclamation as the duly-elected Representative.
The petitioner and respondent were candidates in the 2001 elections, and a disqualification case was filed
against the petitioner for allegedly soliciting votes in violation of election laws. The COMELEC Second Division
issued an order to suspend his proclamation pending the investigation. However, the petitioner was not
disqualified until after the elections. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed as the winner, and she assumed office.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc, which eventually ordered his
proclamation. The Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed him as the winner, and he took his oath of office.
However, the House of Representatives did not take any action on his letter-appeal.

Respondent Locsin argued that the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to annul her proclamation and that the
proper forum to question her membership was the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

ISSUE:
W/N the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.

RULINGS:
No. The petitioner's due process rights were violated in the proceedings leading to the proclamation of
respondent Locsin. COMELEC rules require the issuance of summons to the respondent candidate within three
days of filing a disqualification petition, but there is no evidence that summons was served to the petitioner. He
claims he wasn't properly notified of the disqualification petition until after the elections, and he only had the
opportunity to file his answer a day later. Furthermore, he was not disqualified by final judgment during the
election, and there was a lack of proper notice and service in the motion to suspend his proclamation.

Therefore, the proclamation of respondent Locsin is null and void.

E. Common Provisions for both Chambers

1. election and filling vacancies
i. regular
ii. special

Tolentino vs COMELEC, GR 148334

FACTS:
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice President, confirmed by Congress, and
he took his oath as VP on February 9, 2001. The Senate passed Resolution No. 84 on February 8, 2001, calling for
a special election to fill the Senate vacancy left by Guingona's VP appointment, with the 13th placer serving only
until June 30, 2004. On June 5, 2001, Comelec issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally declaring Ralph Recto
and Gregorio Honasan as elected Senators.

Voters Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica filed a petition to prohibit Comelec from proclaiming the 13th placer
as the winner in the special election and sought the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They argued that
Comelec lacked jurisdiction because it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled, didn't require
candidates to specify their election type, and didn't distinguish special and regular election results during
canvassing.

Comelec, Honasan, and Recto claimed the special election was valid and raised issues of mootness and the
petitioners' standing, with Honasan suggesting it's a quo warranto case. Recto argued he's not a proper party
because the petition concerns the 13th placer's proclamation.

ISSUE:
WON a special election to fill a vacant 3-year term Senate seat was validly held

RULINGS:
Yes, a special election to fill a vacancy in the Senate may be called, as provided in Section 9, Article VI of the
Constitution, and implemented through RA 6645. Section 2 of RA 6645, as amended by RA 7166, requires
Comelec to call a special election within 60 to 90 days after a Senate vacancy occurs. However, it does not
mandate specific notice requirements for such elections.

In the case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election is to be held simultaneously with the next regular
election. This statutory notice is deemed sufficient, and Comelec's failure to give additional notice does not
invalidate the special election.

For vacancies in the House of Representatives, the time of the special election is at Comelec's discretion, and
there are specific notice requirements. However, the absence of formal notice does not invalidate the election if
there's no evidence that it prejudiced voters.

The manner in which Comelec conducted the special election, including the use of Resolution No. 84 to
determine the 13th placer, was within its discretion and not subject to legal challenge.

GENERAL RULE:

XPN:

2. salaries

Phiconsa vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966)

FACTS:
RA 4134, which provided for an increase in the salary of certain government officials, including members of the
Senate and House of Representatives, took effect on June 30, 1966. However, records show that the increase
was implemented in 1964. The Philippine Constitution Association challenged the validity of RA 4134, arguing
that it violated Section 14, Article 6 of the Constitution, which states that no increase in the compensation of
members of Congress shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate
and House of Representatives who approved such an increase. This led to a petition for a writ of prohibition.

ISSUE:
W/N Section 14 (now Section 10) of the Constitution requires that not only the term of all the members of the
House of Representatives who approved the increase but also that of all the Senators who approved it must
have fully expired before the increase in compensation becomes effective.

RULINGS:
Republic Act No. 4134, which provided for an increase in the compensation of certain government officials,
including members of the Senate and House of Representatives, is not effective until December 30, 1969, when
the full term of all members of Congress who approved it in 1964 will have expired. Therefore, any appropriation
for this increased compensation cannot be disbursed until December 30, 1969. Any provision in Republic Act No.
4642 (the 1965-1966 Appropriation Act) that authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation before
that date is also unconstitutional and must be declared null and void.
Ligot vs. Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974)

FACTS:
Ligot served three consecutive terms as a member of the House of Representatives from 1957 to 1969. During
his second term, RA 4134 was enacted, increasing the salaries of members of Congress. However, the law stated
that these increases would take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. When Ligot's term
ended in 1969, he filed a claim for retirement based on the increased salary. The House of Representatives
approved his petition, but Congress Auditor Velasco and Auditor General Mathay disallowed it.

Ligot's argument is that he should receive retirement gratuity based on the increased salary of members of
Congress, as provided by RA 4134, which was already in effect at the time of his retirement in 1969. He contends
that the increases should apply to him even though they became operative for members of Congress elected
after December 30, 1969, as stated in Philconsa vs. Mathay.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

RULINGS:

No. Granting Ligot a retirement gratuity based on the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum would be a way
of indirectly increasing his compensation during his term of office, which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Retirement gratuity is considered a form of compensation, and the Constitution limits the compensation and
"other emoluments" of members of Congress to their salary as provided by law.

Therefore, granting retirement gratuity based on the increased salary to members of Congress whose terms
ended on December 30, 1969, would violate the Constitution by paying them prohibited emoluments, effectively
increasing their salary beyond what was allowed during their tenure.

3. privileges
i. immunity from arrest
ii. privilege of speech
Pp vs Jalosjos, Feb.3, 2000

FACTS:
Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while
his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal.
Jalosjos, filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge his duties of a Congressman including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having convicted in the first instance
including of a non-bailable offense.

Jalosjos argument is the mandate of sovereign will which he states that he was re-elected as Congressman of Firs
District of Zamboanga del Norte by his constituents in order that their voices will be heard and since the
accused-appellant is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges co-equal
branch of government to respect his mandate.

ISSUE:
W/N accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos, be allowed to discharge his mandate as member of the House of
Representatives.

RULINGS:

No. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators or members of the House of Representatives arises from
a provision of the Constitution and shows that this privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense.

It is true, that election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, the rights and privileges
from being elected as public official may be restricted by law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred
from the duties of a position, the higher the rank the greater the requirement of obedience rather that
exemption.

The accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation
of Section 11 Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the abuse is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman with a crime
punishable imprisonment by more than six (6) months is not merely authorized by law, has constitutional
foundations. Allowing Jalosjos to attend in Congressional sessions and meetings for five (5) days in a week which
will make him a free man with all the privileges and would make his status to that of a special class, it also would
be a making of the purpose of the correction system.

DOCTINE:
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people
expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our
first task is to ascertain the applicable law.

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A
congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim
parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be
tried or whose convictions were pending appeal, x x x For offenses punishable by more than six years
imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest.
Jimenez vs Cabangbang, GR L-15905

FACTS:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by
plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez. Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages
for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.

Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is
not libelous, and that, -even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This motion having been granted
by the lower court; plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.
ISSUE:
W/N the publication in question is a privileged communication.

RULINGS:
No. The defendant, a member of the House of Representatives, is not protected by absolute privilege for an
open letter he published to the President of the Philippines, as it was not part of his official duties and was not
made during a congressional session. Absolute privilege applies to official functions within Congress, such as
speeches, statements, and votes during sessions, as well as bills introduced, but not to external communications
like open letters.

DOCTRINE:
The phrase “speech or debate therein,” used in Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution, refers to utterances
made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements
made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress,
whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside
the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as Members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of
the acts in question. (Vera vs.Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U.S, 367; Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass.
1.)

An open letter to the President of the Philippines when Congress was not in session which defendant-
Congressman caused to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines is not a
communication which the defendant published while he was performing his official duty, either as a Member of
Congress, or as officer of any Committee thereof. Said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Antonio vs Valencia, GR L- 26526

FACTS:
This case involves a dispute between Gaudencio E. Antonino and Brigido R. Valencia arising from political
conflicts following local elections. Antonino accused Valencia of sabotaging the Liberal Party's candidate in the
elections. Subsequently, Antonino filed charges against Valencia related to alleged anomalous acquisitions of
public works supplies and equipment while Valencia was Secretary of Public Works and Communications. These
charges were widely reported in the press.

Valencia responded with a press release, accusing Antonino of misconduct, abuse of power, and suspicious
connections with various corporations. Antonino then filed a civil action seeking damages against Valencia for
libel.

The lower court ruled in favor of Antonino, finding that Valencia had caused the libelous press release and
rejecting Valencia's defenses of qualified privilege and defensive libel. The court ordered Valencia to pay
Antonino P50,000 in moral damages, with interest, P5,000 as attorney's fees, and costs. Valencia appealed to the
Supreme Court.

The appeal raises both factual and legal issues for the Supreme Court to consider.

ISSUE:
W/N Brigido R. Valencia is liable for libel for his press release that accused Gaudencio E. Antonino of
misconduct, abuse of power, and other allegations, which were widely reported in the press.

RULINGS:

NO. The trial court concluded that when the defamatory statements were published, the plaintiff, Gaudencio E.
Antonino, was not a candidate for any public office, and there was no impending election. Furthermore, his term
as Senator would continue for several more years. As a Senator, Antonino was accountable to the Senate for any
misconduct, as the Senate had the authority to take disciplinary action against its members. The court noted
that if the defendant, Brigido R. Valencia, had been motivated by a sense of duty rather than malice, he should
have filed his accusations with the Senate or one of its committees, especially regarding the alleged threat
against an American. Instead, Valencia publicly disseminated these accusations through various metropolitan
newspapers, seemingly in retaliation for the charges filed against him by Antonino with the Senate's Blue-Ribbon
Committee.

4. disqualification and other prohibitions

i. incompatible office
ii. forbidden office
Puyat vs De guzman (1982)

FACTS:
After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI), the respondent Acero
group contested the election through quo warranto proceedings at the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).

Justice Estanislao Fernandez, a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, initially appeared as counsel for the
respondent Acero. The petitioner, Puyat group, objected to his appearance, citing a constitutional provision
prohibiting Assemblymen from acting as counsel before any administrative body, with the SEC being considered
an administrative body.

Assemblyman Fernandez withdrew his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero. Subsequently, he
purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 at the request of respondent Acero. After notarizing his share purchase,
Assemblyman Fernandez filed a motion to intervene in the SEC case, claiming a legal interest in the matter due
to his ownership of the 10 shares. The SEC allowed his intervention based on his share ownership.

ISSUE:
W/N Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec.
11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution

RULINGS:
No. the Court finds that there was an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body, effectively
circumventing the constitutional prohibition laid out in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention
seemed to be an afterthought designed to facilitate his active involvement in the proceedings in some other
capacity.

Adaza vs Pacana, Jr. 135 SCRA 431 (1985)

FACTS:
Adaza is the governor of Misamis Oriental and Pacana is the vice-governor. Their respective term of office
expires on March 3, 1986. Both parties ran in the Batasang Pambansa (BP) elections in 1984 and respondent lost
to petitioner.

On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as the governor. Adaza has brought this petition to exclude
Pacana therefrom, claiming to be the lawful occupant of the position.

ISSUE:
W/N Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province simultaneously.

RULINGS:
No. Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. A member of the BP may not hold any
other office in the government. A public office is a public trust. A holder thereof is subject to regulations and
conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions on his holding of more than one
office. The contention that Pacana, as a mere private citizen, runs afoul of BP Blg. 697 which provides that
governors, or members of Sanggunian or barangay officials, upon filing a certificate of candidacy be considered
on forced leave of absence from office. When respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after the BP
elections, he was acting within the law. Thus, the instant petition is denied.

GENERAL RULE:

XPN:

Avelino vs Cuenco, GR L-2821

FACTS:
During a Senate session, a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were present at the appointed
time, and the petitioner (Senate President) was already in his office. However, he deliberately delayed his
appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M. Once he arrived, he further postponed the
commencement of the session by requesting a copy of a resolution submitted by Senators Tañada and Sanidad.
In full view of the public, he read the resolution slowly and meticulously. Afterward, he called for and held
discussions with his colleagues, Senators Francisco and Tirona.

It wasn't until shortly before 12:00 noon, prompted by the insistence of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco to open
the session, that the petitioner finally called the meeting to order. All the senators were in attendance at this
point.

Unexpectedly, the petitioner abruptly struck the gavel and hastily left the session hall, with Senators David,
Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona, and Clarin following suit. Meanwhile, the remaining senators, with Senate
President Pro-Tempore Arranz taking the chair after the respondent (the petitioner) had relinquished it,
introduced and unanimously approved Resolution No. 67, which declared the position of the President of the
Senate vacant and designated Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco as Acting President of the Senate.

ISSUE:
W/N legal capacity of the Cuenco group to act as a senate cannot be considered a political question the
determination of which devolves exclusively upon the Senate.

RULINGS:
No. The court ruled that a "majority of each House" does not mean all the members must be present; rather, it
refers to a majority of the total number of members in that House. In this case, an absolute majority of 12 out of
23 senators constitutes a constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of establishing a quorum.

i. discipline of members Cases

Santiago vs Guingona, GR 134577

FACTS:
The issue in this case revolves around the determination of who should rightfully hold the position of Senate
minority leader.

Senator Tatad and Senator Santiago are challenging Senator Guingona's claim to the position, asserting that
Senator Tatad should be the legitimate Senate minority leader.

The dispute arose from differing interpretations of who constitutes the Senate "minority" and who has the
rightful claim to the minority leadership role. The petition for quo warranto seeks to resolve this matter.

ISSUE:
W/N Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader.

RULINGS:
No. Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without
color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to
determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action
may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public
office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise by another.

In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a
clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully
held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise
to the office of the Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to
characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
Arroyo et al., vs De Venecia, GR 127255

FACTS:
Members of the House of Representatives are challenging Republic Act No. 8420 (RA 8420), which imposes "sin
taxes" on beer and cigarettes, claiming it violated House rules that are constitutionally mandated.

RA 8420 started as House Bill No. 7198, passed the House on September 12, 1996, and was approved by the
Senate on November 17, 1996. During House deliberations, a quorum issue was raised, but a quorum was
declared, and the bill was approved.

Petitioners argue that discrepancies in session transcripts and the rushed approval make RA 8420 invalid.
Respondents counter that enforcing House rules isn't the court's role and that the bill followed proper
procedures.

ISSUE:
W/N the House of Reps committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA 8240.

RULINGS:
No. The Court has determined that Congress did not commit grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA 8240. The
alleged violations pertained to internal rules of the House and not constitutional requirements for lawmaking.
Parliamentary rules, which are procedural, can be revoked, modified, or waived by the body adopting them. In
this case, the issue raised relates to internal House procedures, and the Court should not intervene.

Hence, the main complaint was not about the absence of a quorum but rather the petitioner being prevented
from questioning its presence.
Osmena vs Pendatun (1960)

FACTS:
Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr. accused the President of bribery in a House speech.

The House formed a committee to investigate, and Osmeña sought to annul this action, citing his parliamentary
immunity. The committee found him guilty of disorderly behavior and suspended him.

Osmeña challenged this in court, but respondents argued the court lacked jurisdiction, and Congress could suspend
its members.

ISSUE:
W/N the House Resolution violated petitioners constitutionally granted parliamentary immunity for speeches is
vacated.

RULINGS:
No. The Constitution grants parliamentary immunity to members of Congress, allowing them to speak freely during
sessions without fear of legal repercussions outside the legislative body. However, this immunity doesn't shield
them from internal disciplinary actions by Congress itself if their conduct is deemed disorderly or unbecoming. In
this case, the House of Representatives has the authority to judge what constitutes disorderly behavior, as the
matter depends on factual circumstances best known to the House.

Therefore, the petition to annul the House's resolution and suspension of Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr. is
dismissed.
 F. Legislative
Journal and other Congressional Records a. record and
books of account
i. records and books of account
ii. legisla>ve journal
1. entries
2. enrolled bill theory
3. journal entry vs enrolled bill

US vs Pons (1916)

FACTS:
Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte were charged with illegal importation of opium. The opium was
shipped as wine from Spain, consigned to Lasarte, but it was discovered in the Philippines. Beliso, a wine
merchant, received the shipment, and Pons was involved in the transactions. Customs agents found opium in
barrels linked to Beliso's warehouse and Pons' residence.

During the trial, Pons and Beliso were tried separately and found guilty. Pons argued that the law under which
he was charged, Act No. 2381, was not valid because it was passed on March 1, 1914, not on February 28, as
required by the Governor-General's proclamation ending the special legislative session.

ISSUE:
w/N the Court can take judicial notice of the journals.

RULINGS:

Yes. The court ruled in favor of recognizing the legislative journals as conclusive proof of the adjournment date.
RA 1679 designated the Secretary of the Commission to perform the duties of the Recorder of the Commission,
which included accurately recording the proceedings on the journal. The Legislative Procedure rules required the
proceedings to be briefly and accurately stated on the journal.

The journals of the 3rd Philippine Legislature clearly stated that the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12
midnight on February 28, 1914. These journals were considered conclusive proof of the adjournment date, and
there was no need to question their veracity. The court followed the established practice in the United States, as
the Philippine Constitution was modeled after the U.S. Constitution.

Hence, the court upheld the validity of Act No. 2381 based on the clear and explicit information provided in the
legislative journals regarding the adjournment date.

Casco vs Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, (1963)

FACTS:
the petitioner is seeking a refund of margin fees it paid for foreign exchange transactions involving the
importation of urea and formaldehyde, claiming exemption based on a Monetary Board Resolution.

However, the Auditor and Auditor General have denied the refund, citing non-compliance with the law.

ISSUE:
W/N urea and formaldehyde are exempt from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee.

RULINGS:

No. "Urea formaldehyde" is a distinct finished product and should not be confused with "urea and
formaldehyde," which are raw materials used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea
formaldehyde." The National Institute of Science and Technology also confirmed that "urea formaldehyde" is not
a chemical solution but a synthetic resin created through the condensation of specific proportions of urea and
formaldehyde.

It is a well-established principle that the enrolled bill, which uses the term "urea formaldehyde," is conclusive in
court. Any errors in the bill's wording prior to its certification by Congress and approval by the Executive branch
cannot be speculated upon by the court without violating the separation of powers doctrine. The appropriate
remedy for such issues is through legislative amendment or curative legislation, not judicial intervention.
 G.Electoral Tribunal
a. composition
b. power: identity separate from congress

Tanada v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 207199-200, October 22, 2013

FACTS:
In the 2013 elections, Wigberto R. Tañada, Jr., Alvin John S. Tañada, and Angelina D. Tan vied for a House of
Representatives seat in Quezon Province. Wigberto filed petitions with the COMELEC to disqualify Alvin John,
but they were initially dismissed. Later, Alvin John's candidacy was canceled due to false information about his
residency.

Wigberto sought to credit Alvin John's votes to himself, but the Provincial Board of Canvassers rejected this
request and proclaimed Angelina as the winner. Wigberto filed a petition with the Court, challenging the
COMELEC's decision on Alvin John's candidacy.

Meanwhile, Wigberto also lodged an election protest with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) against Angelina. The Office of the Solicitor General confirmed these actions.

So, there are two parallel cases: one before the Court regarding Alvin John's candidacy and another before the
HRET concerning the election results.

ISSUE:
W/N Alvin was not a nuisance candidate and that the cast votes be favor and credited to him.

RULINGS:

No. The petition is bound to fail.

According to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) is the sole judge of all matters related to the election, returns, and qualifications of its members.
Once a congressional candidate is proclaimed as the winner, the COMELEC loses jurisdiction over any disputes
concerning their election, and these matters are under the HRET's purview. The term "election, returns, and
qualifications" encompasses various aspects of the electoral process, from conducting the polls to determining
the eligibility of the proclaimed winner.

Hence, the COMELEC no longer has authority over such cases once a candidate is proclaimed.

Lico v. Commission on Elec>ons, G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015

FACTS:
This case involves a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the Resolutions issued by the COMELEC. Ating Koop, a
multi-sectoral party-list organization, participated in the 2010 elections and was proclaimed a winning party-list
group. Petitioner Lico, one of its nominees, assumed office as a Party-list Representative.

However, Ating Koop expelled petitioner Lico almost a year after he took office due to alleged acts detrimental to
the party-list group, including malversation and graft and corruption. A petition was filed with the COMELEC,
requesting the removal of Lico from office and the succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina, as
Ating Koop's representative in the House of Representatives.

ISSUE:
W/N the COMELEC have jurisdiction over the expulsion of a member of the House of Representatives
(Congressman Lico) from his party-list organization

RULINGS:
No. The COMELEC has no jurisdiction over this case. According to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has jurisdiction over questions regarding the
qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET gains jurisdiction once
the winning party-list group is proclaimed, the nominee takes the oath, and they assume office in the House of
Representatives. Since Ating Koop was proclaimed a winning party-list group, and petitioner Lico took his oath
and assumed office, the COMELEC has no authority to expel him from the House of Representatives.

This issue falls under the jurisdiction of the HRET as stated in the Constitution.
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULINGS:

GENERAL RULE:

XPN:

H. Commission on Appointments
1. composition
 2. powers: identity separate from congress Cases

Daza vs Singson (1989)

FACTS:
The House of Representatives redistributed its seats in the Commission on Appointments (CoA) due to political
realignment. Congressman Raul Daza, who was a CoA member, had his seat taken away and given to the Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) party. A new set of CoA representatives was elected, including one from the
LDP.

Daza challenged his removal in the Supreme Court, arguing that his CoA seat was permanent and that the LDP's
inclusion wasn't based on a stable political alignment because it wasn't a registered political party.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner’s removal from the Commission on Appointments is valid.

RULINGS:

The controversy centers on Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution, which establishes the Commission on
Appointments (CoA). The CoA is composed of the President of the Senate as its Chairman, along with twelve
Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives. These members are elected based on
proportional representation from the political parties and party-list organizations in each house. The Chairman
can only vote in case of a tie. The CoA is tasked with acting on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days, and its decisions are made by a majority vote of its members.
GENERAL RULE:

XPN:
Guingona Jr vs Gonzales, GR 106971

FACTS:
The dispute involves the mathematical representation of political parties in the Senate for the Commission on
Appointments (CA). The parties and their respective fractional representations are as follows: LDP - 7.5, LP-PDP-
LABAN - 0.5, NPC - 2.5, and LAKAS-NUCD - 1.5.

The LDP, which holds the majority in the Senate, converted its fractional half membership (0.5) into a whole
membership (1) to elect Senator Romulo to the CA. This adjustment led to a reduction in the fractional
membership of another party, resulting in their representation in the CA being less than their proportional
representation in the Senate.

ISSUE:
W/N there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18 is vacated.

RULINGS:

No. The Constitution doesn't require that all 12 senators be elected to the Commission on Appointments (CA)
before it can function, and it's not obligatory to have a full 12-member CA. The key requirement of Article VI,
Section 18, is proportional representation of political parties in the CA, and the specification of 12 members is
just a maximum limit. The CA can operate with a smaller number of members as long as proportional
representation is maintained, even if it leads to fractional membership in unique situations. The CA can perform
its functions as long as it has the necessary quorum, despite the fixed composition mandated by the
Constitution.
 I. Powers
a. general legislative powers
i. limitations 1. substanve
a. express
b. implied 2. procedural
a. title of law: One subject, one title

Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. v. Military Shrine Services, G.R. No. 187587,
June 5, 2013

FACTS:
The case concerns Fort Bonifacio, a military reservation in the Philippines. Over the years, there have been
proclamations and amendments regarding its land use, including exclusions and subdivisions. Informal settlers
have occupied parts of it.

Petitioners, including Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) and Western Bicutan Lot Owners
Association, Inc. (WBLOAI), filed petitions seeking reclassification, subdivision, and distribution of the land to its
occupants.

ISSUE:
W/N

RULINGS:
Lidasan vs. Comelec, 21 SCRA 479 (1967)

FACTS:
The petitioner, Lidasan, challenges the constitutionality of RA 4790 and seeks the nullification of Comelec's
resolutions implementing it. RA 4790 involves the transfer of 12 barrios in Cotabato to Lanao del Sur, resulting in
a change in provincial boundaries.

Lidasan argues that certain barrios remain part of Cotabato and that the statute's implementation should be
suspended. However, Comelec insists on implementing it unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:
W/N RA 4790, is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title

RULINGS:
Yes. The Constitution sets forth two limitations on legislative power: the avoidance of combining heterogeneous
subjects within one statute and the necessity for the title to adequately inform legislators and the public about
the subject matter of the bill.

In this case, the focus is on the second limitation, which demands that the title of a bill sufficiently convey the
nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed law. The title of RA 4790, "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur," is considered misleading. It implies that only Lanao del Sur is
affected by the creation of Dianaton, failing to mention that communities in the neighboring province of
Cotabato are also incorporated into this new municipality.

The title did not provide adequate information to members of Congress or the public about the full impact of
the law, particularly the fact that parts of Cotabato were being taken away and added to Lanao del Sur. This lack
of clarity in the title raises constitutional concerns about the statute's validity.

approval of bills
1. signed by the president
 2. vetoed by the president, congress overrides veto
3. failure to act 30 days aeer transmi^al
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra

FACTS:

This case involves challenges to the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716, which seeks to expand the tax
base of the existing value-added tax (VAT) system and improve its administration by amending the National
Internal Revenue Code. The VAT is imposed on the sale, barter, or exchange of goods and properties, as well as
on the sale or exchange of services, with a rate of 10% applied to the gross selling price or gross value of goods
and properties or the gross receipts from services. Several lawsuits were filed, seeking to declare RA 7716
unconstitutional on various grounds.

ISSUE:
W/N the law violates the following other provisions of the Constitution?

1. Art. VI, § 28(1)

2. Art. VI, § 28(3)

RULINGS:
No. The presidential certification dispenses with both the requirement of printing and reading the bill on
separate days. This means that when the President certifies the necessity of immediate enactment of a bill, it no
longer needs to go through the usual process of being printed and read on separate days before becoming a law.
The purpose of this certification is to expedite the passage of a bill in cases of public calamity or emergency, and
it overrides the standard legislative procedure.