Electoral Politics: In Peru, 1978-1986

Author(s): Henry Dietz

Source: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs , Winter, 1986-1987, Vol.
28, No. 4 (Winter, 1986-1987), pp. 139-163
Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/165749

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 ELECTORAL POLITICS
INPERU,
1978-1986
by HENRY DIETZ*

SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE 1980s, a number of Sout

American nations have undergone the transition from military t
civilian/electoral forms of government. From any viewpoint, th
magnitude of this transition has been impressive. By early 1987,
several countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, a
Uruguay) had successfully weathered the change, leaving on
Chile and Paraguay under dictatorships, while Colombia and
Venezuela had been able to maintain civilian rule throughout t
period. Nevertheless, such a changeover has not been easy in any o
the nations where it has taken place. The reasons for both th
transition and the problems incurred have been idiosyncratic
each instance. In Argentina, for instance, return to civilian contro
occurred only after the military had involved itself in two wars: one,
a prolonged, internal, informal "dirty war," and the second,
disastrous, declared war against Great Britain over the Malvinas/
Falklands. Both Brazil and Uruguay experienced long, laboriou
and incremental transition processes before achieving civilia
rule, while Ecuador and Bolivia each had its own peculiar
difficulties to surmount. For Peru, 12 years (1968-1980) of highly
controversial, and at times tumultuous, military rule came to an
end only when both military and civilian leaders finally reached a
accord to that effect and agreed to work together to establish an
electoral system capable of functioning for more than a few years
At the time, prospects for such a development were anything bu

Henry Dietz is Associate Professor in the Department of Government a

the University of Texas-Austin. He has done work dealing with Lat
American politics, Third World urban politics, Peruvian politics, an
civil-military relations in Latin America, some of which has recent
appeared in Comparative Political Studiesand in the AmericanJournal of
Political Science.

*The author wishes to thank the Policy Research Institute and the Mik
Hogg Foundation, both of the University of Texas-Austin, for funding
collection of 1985 survey data employed in this article, as well as t
Tinker Foundation (New York) for funding collection of 1982 da
Thanks go also to Fernando 'Testa, Luis Bustamente Belaunde, an
Carlos Amat y Ledn, all of Lima, Peru, and to Captain Lynn Scott of the
Air Force Academy (Colorado) for his assistance and support.
139

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140 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

bright, inasmuch as Peru had witnessed a constitutionally elected

president turning power over to a duly elected successor only once
since 1920.
In addition to the difficulties unique to its own national
situation, each nation also faced problems peculiar to the transi-
tion processperse. Virtually all political forces and actors (civilian
or military, mass or elite) had to confront severe economic
problems in the form of (a) large foreign debts and increasing
interest payments on those debts, (b) high rates of inflation, (c)
rising costs of living, (d) decline in purchasing power - - and
many similar obstacles. The cumulative impact of these economic
difficulties only served to make the whole transition more
precarious.
This article explores this transition process as it was experi-
enced in Peru. It begins by tracing the electoral history of Peru since
1980 when presidential elections were held for the first time in 17
years (i.e. since 1963), and it examines the nexus between economic
problems and electoral politics. In a variety of ways, Peru reflects the
kind of dilemmas which confronted other Latin American nations in
the 1980s as well. Peru's foreign debt, though not of the same
magnitude as Brazil's, is still among the highest in the region in per
capita terms, and its struggle to meet its interest payments have been
the subject of extended, and frequently acrimonious, debate with
both foreign banks and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Furthermore, it has suffered from a prolonged economic slump,
which began under military rule back in the mid-to-late 1970s, and
which has continued within a framework of widespread poverty,
severe structural inequalities, and the vicissitudes imposed by a
virulent campaign of terrorism launched by the Sendero Luminoso
movement in 1980 and continuing to this day. All these factors have
made Peru's path to democracy especially rocky.
The focus here will be upon the electoral process during the
transition to, and consolidation of, civilian rule. The relationship
between elections and civilian government is, obviously, a close one.
Not only are elections the means by which civilians attain, maintain,
and transfer power, but they also serve as the principal channel
through which the citizenry can express its views and preferences -
in a regulated and peaceful manner.
As elections are held and results publicized (more or less
accurately), all the participants (politicians, parties, and observers)
are enabled to gauge their own performance in the light of public

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 DIETZ: ELECTORAL POLITICS IN PERU, 1978-86 141

opinion and over a period of time. This paper will examine data from
the several elections which have taken place since 1980, not only for
their overall results, but also to determine the fluctuations in party
support and affiliation which have taken place during this time. It will
also take a look at the findings of surveys which help us to understand
why voters acted as they did and why party support varied so widely
from one election to another.1 The principal, though not the only,
electoral arena analyzed is that of Lima, capital of Peru and home of
about a third of the national electorate.

THE PERUVIAN CONTEXT FOR

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

MOST OBSERVERS AGREE with the assertion that, since the

1970's, Peru has undergone more severe, prolonged economic di
culties than at any previous time in the 20th century. The fact
responsible for this depression are various, complex and can
attributed to any number of internal structural defects and ex
eneous pressures, as well as to miscalculations, errors, mismana
ment, and assorted faults of at least three administrations (Cot
1978; Sheahan, 1983; Lowenthal and McClintock, 1983; Actual
Econ6mica, various). However, examining the social impact of th
economic problems is even more important here than explainin
why the depression occurred, since our concern is with the context in
which electoral politics have had to function and with the socio
economic problems with which candidates and parties have had
contend, both during their campaigns and throughout their time
office. Therefore, let us begin by taking a look at some basic indicato
of economic well-being, such as the gross national product (GNP
per capita income, and the cost of living.
While the gross national product tells us little about the welf
of the individual citizen, it is a useful indicator of economic heal
and of the growth of the economy over time. In 1970 Peru's GNP
$11.2 billion, from which it rose to $14.3 billion in 1975 and to $1
billion in 1980; it peaked at $17 billion in 1982 and then slid alm
12%, to $14.9 billion. It still had not recovered completely ($
billion) by the end of 1985 (INE, 1986b: 62).
Throughout the 1960s, real income (as measured by wages a
salaries) progressed in a modest fashion until about 1968, at wh
point it embarked upon a period of sustained growth which reac
its peak in 1973. From that time on, it declined precipitously, reachin

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142 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

a nadir in 1985 when it bottomed out at about 65 (1973 = 100). Using

other indicators, real wages and salaries fell about 30% from 1973 to
1979 and then declined another 40% from 1980 to 1984 (Actualidad
Econ6mica, 1984: 12). Thus, by 1984, purchasing power was only
slightly more than a third of what it had been in 1973 and two-thirds of
what it had been in 1979.
As GNP declined and wages lost their purchasing power, the
cost of living went up. Using the consumer price index (CPI) for
metropolitan Lima as a guide, the CPI was 4.65 in 1960,14.2 in 1973,
and 100 in 1979, whereupon it took some enormous leaps: reaching
460 in 1982,970 in 1983,2038 in 1984, and rising from 3179 inJanuary
1985 to 7200 by December of the same year. The first half of 1985
(January-June) was the worst: the index jumped 88% in those six
months alone (INE, 1986a: 61-62). Salaries for white-collar workers
dropped precipitously as well. Using as a base year 1979 = 100,
salaries declined to 75 by mid-1984, then to a low of 59.1 by mid-1985,
and had recovered only incrementally to 68 byJune of 1986. For those
workers who earned an official minimum wage (usually equivalent to
about US$ 50 monthly), again with 1979 = 100, the real value of this
wage dropped to around 70 by mid-1986 (INE, 1986b: 28).
Any number of conclusions can be gleaned from such data. In
the first place, the impact of such economic facts of life is bound to be
severe and is going to affect virtually every sector of society except for
those in the very highest income bracket (Dietz, 1982). In the second
place, it is probable that the impact will be felt most strongly, and have
the most immediate effect, in the urban areas, especially Lima. Such a
claim can be made for several reasons: not only is Lima's cost of living
the highest in the country, but its populace is almost entirely
dependent upon a monetary economy and, therefore, very sensitive to
economic and policy shifts, especially those which involve wages
and salaries (Cline, 1979). In addition, and in contrast to those who
live in provincial cities or rural areas, its population feels it has little
choice but to remain in Lima. For decades, migrants have moved from
outlying regions to Lima in hopes of improving their lives, in a sense
burning their bridges behind them. Thus, for its present population
of six million or so, Lima is the place where they have cast their lot,
and there is no alternative to remaining in the city and coping as best
as possible.
Transition to democratic rule began in the late 1970's with the
convening of a constitutional convention. The delegates were se-
lected, by party affiliation, in a national election. There can be little

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 DIETZ: ELECTORAL POLITICS IN PERU, 1978-86 143

doubt that the principal reason for the decision by the military to
relinquish its power derived from its poor performance in economic
affairs, which led, in turn, to a dramatic loss of confidence by the
people in its ability to rule, and hence to its claim to legitimacy. The
presidential and congressional elections of 1980, which returned
Fernando Belaunde Terry to the presidency after his overthrow by the
military in 1968, restored civilian rule and the electoral apparatus to
Peru. However, it also gave a mandate to the victors, and to civilian
rule as well, to improve the nation's economy or, at the very least, to
improve upon the performance of the military.
Once the elections had been held and civilian rule installed,
the most pressing concern for Peruvians of all social classes
continued to be the economic problems of the country and, less
than a year following the elections, the inability of the Belaunde
administration to confront them. Virtually all opinion surveys done
during the Belatnde years in office reveal that economic diffi-
culties and the inability of the administration to deal with them
dominated the public consciousness. In February 1982, for exam-
ple, a survey in Lima, reported in Caretas (1982: 26-32), showed
that over three-quarters of the population gave inflation (and its
various effects) as the most important problem. At the same time,
the level of approval for Manuel Ulloa, who was Prime Minister and
the person most closely associated with the economic policies of
the government, had varied between 10% and 30% in the preced-
ing trimester. In another survey, of about 600 male heads of families
in 6 low-income barrios in Lima, over half the respondents cited
economic difficulties (unemployment, cost of living, and low
wages) as the most pressing problems facing Peru, and the same
percentage cited lack of work as the major reason for poverty in
Peru. Such judgements remained constant throughout the first half
of the 1980's and created an atmosphere of continual crisis in both
the administration and the nation as a whole.
Added to all the economic problems was the emergence, in
1980, of the Sendero Luminoso campaign of terror and assassina-
tion, first in the Ayacucho region of Peru and then, shortly after, in
metropolitan Lima itself.2 While relatively little verifiable informa-
tion is available about Sendero, it has become a topic of internation-
al concern due to a leadership shrouded in secrecy, its dedication
to violence as an end in itself, its intransigence, and its (frequently
spectacular) bloody tactics. These activities have added to its
notoriety and have created severe domestic difficulties, both social

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144 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

and political, for Peru. Terrorism has become an almost daily

occurrence owing to Sendero's indigenous base of support and
callous use of violence against all segments of the populace, on the
one hand, combined with the government's use of excessive
military force to combat it (including outcries against the latter),
on the other. Therefore, not only was 1980 a watershed year in Peru
because of the nation's return to a democratic system of govern-
ment, but it was also notable for its economic depression and for
the onset of terrorism - not a conyuntura of events to presage a
sanguine future for electoral rule.

PARTIES, CANDIDATES, AND ELECTIONS, 1978-1986

AS ALREADY SUGGESTED, Peru's experiences with civilian rule

since independence have been short-term, interrupted, and, until
recent times, dominated by elite groups who governed largely for
their own benefit. Mass politics of any significance did not really
emerge until the election of 1931 (Stein, 1980), and those parties
and candidates who did try to open the electoral process or to
expand the political arena frequently found themselves excluded
altogether or hindered in their efforts. However, by 1980 and the
end of the 12 years of military rule, the political spectrum had
begun to expand considerably, and to include parties and candi-
dates who not only spoke for a wide range of ideological
perspectives from Right to Left (a noteworthy development in
itself), but who also, and even more surprisingly, had to be taken
seriously as electorally viable. Let us take a brief look at elections
and parties, from the late 1970s on, to set the stage for an in-depth
discussion of electoral behavior.
Peru has held six elections since 1978. In June of that year, the
military government took the first step in returning power to
civilian hands by calling an election to select 100 delegates to a
national constituent assembly. Its task was to write a new constitu-
tion to become operable in 1980, the date set for restoration of
civilian rule. For the first time civilians were to be eligible to vote at
age 18 (instead of 21). Then, in May 1980, the first presidential
election since 1963 was held. It was conducted peacefully, and, for
the first time in the nation's history, the electorate included
illiterates. An entire Congress (both Chamber of Deputies and
Senate) was elected at the same time. The following November
(1980), local-level elections were held throughout the nation,
when all cities in Peru elected mayors and city council members.

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 DIETZ: ELECTORAL POLITICS IN PERU, 1978-86 145

These were the first such elections to be held since 1967. Three
years later,in November 1983, local elections were held again, as
the 1978 Constitution provided 3-year terms for all local officials. In
April 1985, presidential and congressional elections were held for
the second time and, for the first time since 1945, a constitutionally
elected president was able to turn power over to his constitu-
tionally elected successor. Finally, in November 1986, local
elections took place once again throughout the country.
The major actors (candidates and parties) in these elections
remained more or less constant during this time. From Left to
Right, they consisted of the following:

Izquierda Unida (IU)

A variety of leftist parties coalesced for the 1978 elections to
form the second largest bloc of delegates in the assembly. This
coalition collapsed, due to personal and ideological reasons
(CIED, 1980), in the 1980 presidential race and re-grouped under
the leadership of Alfonso Barrantes and the name of Izquierda
Unida. The IU coalition, which contains several Marxist, Leninist,
and Trotskyite parties, has been able to hang together, with
Barrantes as its head, throughout the period under consideration
despite the fact that they often disagree with one another publicly.
All member parties participate under the title of IU, all run
candidates and recognize the legitimacy of the electoral process,
and all have denounced the tactics and violence of Sendero
Luminoso (which, for its part, has rejected elections and labe
all other parties of the Left as "bourgeois" and "revisionist")
did quite well in 1983 when it took Lima and the mayoral races
several other major cities.

Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA)

APRA is Peru's oldest, best organized, and most controversi
political party (also known as Partido Aprista Peruana or PAP).
was founded in 1924 by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, who
dominated it until his death in 1978. At the time of its origin, it was
Peru's radical party but has so changed its image and policies over
time that by 1980 it resembled (at least approximately) a social
democratic party on the Western European model. Despite its
strength and longevity, it had never won a presidential election
prior to the period under discussion. APRA has always been
supported by a diehard core of party faithful, who have usually
numbered about a third of Peru's electorate. Its regional strength

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146 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

lies in the Peruvian north; and it has always had trouble in carrying
Lima, in both presidential and local races.

Accion Popular (AP)

AP was founded in the mid-1950's by Fernando Belaunde
Terry, who first ran as its presidential candidate in 1956. AP won the
presidential race with Belainde in 1963, only to be toppled from
power by the military in 1968. It then returned to win again in 1980.
AP did not participate in the 1978 constituent assembly race nor
did it in the 1986 municipal elections. AP has shown particular
strength when Belaunde ran as its presidential candidate. The
party has been strong among Peru's educated urban middle class
and has done well in central and southern Peru, especially in
Arequipa, Peru's second largest city and Belatnde's home town.

Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC)

The PPC was founded by its leader, Lufs Bedoya Reyes, an ex-
mayor of Lima, in the late 1960s. PPC speaks to, and for, the Right
wing of the electorate. From 1980 to 1985, it formed an alliance in
Congress with the AP, but it always ran its own candidates during
the elections under consideration. The major strength of the PPC
lies with Lima's middle and upper classes.
Since the late 1970s, the Peruvian party system has been domi-
nated by these four parties and their leaders. Not surprisingly, given
Peru's on-again, off-again experience with electoral politics, parties
have tended to be fragile creations whose fortunes rise and fall with
those of their individual leader. Historically, parties on the Left have
split, coalesced, merged, and disappeared in bewildering fashion
(Torres, 1985), and most parties have found it impossible, or, at best, a
severe struggle, to survive the retirement or death of their leader. The
challenge for all parties, therefore, has been to try to institutionalize
themselves and to become something more than an alter ego of their
leaders. APRA, for instance, went through a prolonged and bitter
struggle following the death of Haya de la Torre in 1978. Haya had
never officially named a successor, and, as a result, his demise gave
rise to a battle which not only pitted liberal and conservative factions
against one another but also pitted the old guard against a new
generation of young Tlrks. In the end, the conservative old guard
formed a new party following the 1980 presidential elections, but its
impact was minimal and it has not been able to play any subsequent
role.
Perhaps the most important phenomenon to have developed

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 DIETZ: ELECTORAL POLITICS IN PERU, 1978-86 147

since 1980, as opposed to to the pre-1968 era of politics, is the

emergence of an organized and well-articulated ideological spec-
trum which covers the whole distance from Left to Right. Peru's Left-
wing parties, be they parties which stand for change from the status
quo (traditionally APRA) or for a more standard brand of Marxism
and Leninism, have always had difficulty in being accepted by the
powers-that-be (the dominant landholding and industrial elites), in
articulating positions which would appeal to the Peruvian masses
(instead of becoming lost in ideological nuances), and in being able
to unite behind a single candidate. Development of a complete
political spectrum was accompanied by some fundamental develop-
ments in the electorate as well. In the first place, it was a considerably
expanded electorate, due both to the lowering of the voting age and to
extension of the franchise to illiterates. It was also a well-mobilized
electorate, due to a variety of factors. Among these were the attempts,
by the military government, to promote greater political participa-
tion, especially among the lower classes, rural as well as urban (Dietz,
1980; McClintock, 1981), which had made a significant impact. In
addition, the deteriorating economic situation had been blamed
primarily on the military, so much so that the 1978 elections for the
constituent assembly had been widely interpreted as a rejection of
the military and its policies. However, after that time any administra-
tion would have to realize that it would be judged on its performance,
and particularly by how well it could manage the economy, with its
attendant problems of un/under-employment and inflation.
Let us now turn to our basic concerns: the elections since 1980,
the shifting political allegiances displayed by the electorate, and
some explanations as to why this was so.
ELECTORAL PATTERNS

1978 Constituent Assembly Elections

While the 1978 constituent assembly elections were unusual (a
one-time opportunity to vote for party slates and to elect, by propor-
tional representation, 100 delegates), they offered the Peruvian
citizenry its first chance since 1966 to elect its own leaders.3 More-
over, these 1978 elections proved not to be an accurate predictor for
the presidential elections which followed. Nevertheless, their role in
opening the transition to democracy was significant. First and fore-
most, they allowed parties (existing, nascent, and would-be) across a
wide political spectrum to establish themselves in the public arena.
They were also viewed (by the civilian press and media in general)

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148 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

not only as the best way to remove the military from power, but also as
the best way to remove from the military its last shreds of legitimacy
as rulers. The various parties and fronts that participated in the
elections ranged from the far Left to the Right, and, even though
Accion Popular and Belaunde did not participate in the elections
(ostensibly because the military did not guarantee the "impartiality"
of the electoral process (Bernales, 1980: 35), voters had a chance to
make choices among a variety of clearly defined alternatives.
By and large, the vote was pretty evenly distributed across the
spectrum: APRA, with Haya de la Torre still at its head, finished first
(37 seats); followed by a number of Leftist coalitions and fronts in
second place (30 seats); PPC, on the Right, finished third (25
seats); while three other small parties managed to take 8 seats -
for a total of 100. Voters supported Haya and APRA both as the
dominant political party and politician of the nation, and as a 50-
year symbol of anti-militarism; they also supported the Left as
being clearly anti-military, as a symbol of independence, and as
representing something new in the political arena; while the urban
middle and upper classes sided with the PPC and Luis Bedoya
Reyes as an overtly pro-business party. Just how AP and Belaunde
might have done is, of course, unknowable; the most that can be
said is that they were not hurt by abstaining. The results sparked
extraordinary speculation: the Center and the Right became much
less sure of what they had previously considered the "docile
masses" since the Left took either a majority or a plurality in 10 of
Lima's barriospopulares; whereas the Left naturally made much of
its victories and of the supposed "radicalization of the lump-
enproletariat"

1980 Presidential and Congressional Elections

By May of 1980, when the elections designed to return Peru to
civilian rule were scheduled to take place, three major changes
had occurred. In the first place, Victor Ratil Haya de la Torre, head
of APRA and president of the constituent assembly, had died, and
the party split bitterly over his successor. Secondly, AP and
Fernando Belaunde were once again major contenders with a
strong centrist position already staked out and with enormous
public recognition and a certain amount of sympathy as additional
pluses. And thirdly, the Left, for a whole variety of ideological and
personality reasons (Roncagliolo, 1980: 92-94; CIED, 1980) splin-
tered badly. The 1978 coalitions disappeared as five separate

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 DIETZ: ELECTORAL POLITICS IN PERU, 1978-86 149

parties jousted with one another in their attempts to win the

support which had seemed so available just two years earlier.
AP and Belaunde dominated the elections, taking slightly
more than 45% of the popular vote for the presidency and
sweeping the congressional vote as well: 26 out of 60 Senate seats
and 98 out of 180 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In results from
Peru's 25 (state-level) departamentos, AP won either a plurality (in
9 cases) or an out-right majority (in 11 cases), losing in only 5.
APRA finished a distant second with 27.4% of the popular
presidential vote and with 18 senators and 58 deputies. PPC took
third place with slightly less than a tenth of the popular vote
nation-wide (about 16% in metropolitan Lima) and only 6 senate
and 10 deputy seats. The Left (made up of 5 parties) managed a
total of less than 14% of the total popular vote for president,
although it did marginally better (about 17%) in the congressional
race, ending up with 9 senators and 18 deputies.
The resounding endorsement given to Belaunde and the AP
can be interpreted both as a vote for a popular political figure with
a noticeable halo, and also as a vote for the individual viewed as
best able to negotiate a successful transition to civilian rule.
Eagerness to restore civilian government dominated most other
considerations, and a number of factors (the death of Haya, a
splintered Left, Beladnde's previous status as a president ousted by
the military) combined to make AP convincing as a party with a
highly symbolic anti-militarist appeal.
Therefore, the election of May 1980 produced the return of AP,
of Belaunde, and of electoral politics to Peru. However, as many
observers noted then and later, Peru had changed dramatically
during the 12 years that had elapsed between the two Belaunde
administrations. The country had grown, Lima had grown, political
mobilization was widespread, the political spectrum had enlarged
and become more complex, and, above all, economic conditions
had worsened the day-to-day life of the average (i.e., poor) citizen,
making it increasingly hard. This combination was bound to make
governing and policy-making more difficult for any administration
and to give its political opponents many opportunities to criticize
its actions and to attract the more disenchanted of the voters.

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150 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

1980 Municipal Elections

The 1980 local elections followed only 6 months after the
presidential one. Nevertheless, virtually all observers and most
politicians saw these elections as (among other things) something
of a referendum on the half-year of belazindismo just completed.
Belauinde was still firmly in control of the political arena, and his
personal popularity remained relatively high with no sign of
military re-emergence; nevertheless, the economic situation show-
ed no signs of improvement. Thus, when the parties lined up for
the Fall elections, AP was heavily favored to do well in most major
cities, but the opposition had hopes of regaining at least some of
the ground it had lost to the AP landslide earlier in the year.
The results were somewhat mixed. AP did finish first in the
popular vote, taking about 36% of the total (down from its previous
45%). Under the leadership of Alfonso Barrantes, IU ran a
somewhat surprising second, with 23.9% of the vote, followed
closely by APRA with 22.7%, and then PPC with 10.9% (various
independent candidates took about 6.5%). Throughout the coun-
try AP was again dominant, winning 103 of 152 mayoral races
contested. IU surprised many onlookers by taking some important
departmental races, especially in Arequipa (Belaunde's home
city), but fell short of winning the mayoral race in Lima where
Barrantes (with 28.3%) ran second to Eduardo Orrego (of AP),
who collected 34.7%. In all, IU took 14 mayoral races. APRA
finished third in the popular vote, just behind IU, but with 22
mayoral victories to its credit.
In Lima itself, the AP victory was substantial, even though
Orrego's total vote was considerably short of Belainde's presiden-
tial performance. AP took 20 out of 35 district mayoral races
(metropolitan Lima elects a mayor of the city as a whole plus
mayors for each of its approximately 40 districts), while IU was
victorious in only 4, all low-income and blue-collar in makeup.
APRA, which had had a long history of doing indifferently to poorly
in Lima, won only 2 of the mayoral races (while the PPC took one
mayoralty and independent candidates together won 7 of them)
but, overall, did badly indeed, dropping to an all-time low of 16.4%
of the total vote.
Taken together, the 1980 local elections held more or less true
to form. Belaunde and AP were still popular; only 6 months had
passed since their spectacular triumph in the national elections,
and the electorate, removed by only half a year from military rule,

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 DIETZ: ELECTORAL POLITICS IN PERU, 1978-86 151

was perhaps somewhat hesitant to cast a vote for an unknown or for

a candidate who might be perceived as a threat, either to the
military itself or to the stability of the recently restored civilian
system. It can thus be argued that a vote for AP was a vote to sustain
civilian rule, but that a vote for the newly formed Leftist coalition of
Barrantes could be interpreted as a warning to AP that its economic
performance was less than satisfactory. The November 1980
elections concluded campaigning for the next 3 years and gave the
public a chance to judge AP as it found itself confronted by an
economic situation which rapidly went from bad to worse.

1983 Municipal Elections

The 1983 elections allow us to make our first strict compara-
tive analysis. Comparing the 1980 presidential and municipal
elections is somewhat (although not quite) like comparing apples
and oranges. However, with results from two municipal elections
available, it is possible to see how party performance improved or
altered, or (if survey, instead of aggregate, data are available) to see
how individual voters may have switched their allegiances.
It should be emphasized that 1983 was perhaps the worst year,
economically, of the Belaunde administration. Peru's overall
economic performance was disastrous, as the gross domestic
product (GDP) dropped about 12% and the cost of living in Lima
rose by well over 200%. By November 1983, it was clear to the
electorate that the AP administration was unable to turn things
around. In addition, several important changes had occurred
during the period between elections. For instance, the Leftist
coalition had managed to hold together under Alfonso Barrantes
and to increase its respectability, and its legitimacy with the
electorate, by appearing on national television, by distancing itself
from Sendero Luminoso, and by staking out a clearly defined
position as champion of the masaspopulares, especially in urban
areas and among unionized workers. In addition, APRA had finally
overcome its internal troubles and, with Alan Garcia, a young,
dynamic leader, in the ascendant, was showing unmistakable signs
of reinvigorating its national image and organizational apparatus.
As a result, the elections were a resounding defeat for AP and
an equally resounding victory for both IU and APRA. The most
notable victory came in Lima, where Barrantes took 36.6% of the
popular vote and the mayoral race for the city. In addition, IU
candidates took 19 of the district races in Lima, sweeping all of the

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152 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

barriospopulares in the capital. Nationally, IU won 33 provincial

mayor's races. APRA, meanwhile, finished second in Lima but won
27% of the city's popular vote, a robust recovery from its anemic
16% total of 1980. Nationally, APRA's recovery was even more
impressive, as it won more provincial mayor's races than any other
party (75 out of 155) and commanded a plurality of the popular
vote in 16 out of 26 departments. Of course, the gains of APRA and
IU had to come at the expense of someone else - and that
someone was AP. AP took only 35 provincial mayoral contests,
down two thirds from its 1980 total of 102, and in Lima it ran last in a
4-party race, capturing less than 12% of the popular vote and taking
only 2 district races, compared to its 1980 record of almost 35% of
the popular vote and 22 district mayoralty victories. PPC main-
tained its customary position in Lima in 1983, garnering about a
fifth of the popular vote (as it had in 1980) and winning just 2 of the
provincial mayoral races.
Insofar as individual vote-switching goes, a 1985 survey (of
450 male heads of household in 6 low-income districts in Lima)
offers some telling evidence. As Table 1 indicates, vote-switching
across elections was commonplace among members of the sample
but became especially frequent in certain elections and for certain
parties. As far as changes between the 1980P (presidential) and the
1983M (municipal) elections are concerned, AP suffered the
greatest rate of desertion. Of the sample respondents who
reported that they had voted for AP in 1980P, almost 3 out of 5
switched parties to vote for IU (Barrantes) in 1983M, whereas only
a fifth remained loyal to AP The only other instance of desertion in
similar numbers occurred for PPC, which had about the same
percentage (61.5%) switch and vote IU in 1983. But AP's loss was
much the'more significant, of course, because of the absolute
numbers of voters who left AP and moved to IU.
Therefore, the 1983 election can be seen as one in which a vote
for IU sent a message to AP, and to the political Center in general,
that dissatisfaction with the economy was becoming increasingly
acute and that the electorate (especially the low-income urban
electorate) was willing to seek out new, and/or more radical,
alternatives- at least on the municipal level - when the time came
to vote. Whether that willingness would carry over into a presiden-
tial election, if an attractive candidate were to appear, was a
question that could not then be answered.

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 DIETZ: ELECTORAL POLITICS IN PERU, 1978-86 153

TPBLE I

VOTE-SWITCHING A;ROSS FOUR ELECTIONS IN PERU. 1980-1980

1980P VOTE

IU = 11.4% APRA = 27.6% AP = 52.6% PPC/CODE = 3.9%

(N=41) (N = 99) N = 189 (N = 14)

VOTES IN 1980M

IU APRA AP PPC IU APRA AP PPC IU APRA AP PPC IU APRA AP PPC

77.8% 2.8 11.1 5.6 9.3% 77.9 8.1 2.3 14.2% 8.6 66.7 4.9 9.1 9.1 18.2 63.6

VOTES IN 1983M

89.7% 5.1 - 5.1 | 26.1% 73.9 - -- | 59.0% 13.3 21.1 6.6 61.5% 15.4 7.7 15.4

VOTES IN 1985P

66.7% 25.6 -- 5.1 7.2% 92.8 - -- 18.2% 63.0 6.6 6.1 1 -- 64.3 7.1 21.4

Data may not sum to 100% because other parties, independents, blank ballots, etc., are not
Included. Total N for table = 343.

1985 Presidential Elections

It became answerable 18 months later when the 1985
presidential (and congressional) elections were held. Economi
problems were still paramount in the minds of the people, th
record of the AP had not improved, and, with Belafnde unable to
succeed himself, the race was seen as open and AP as having little
chance to continue in office. Again there were 4 major partie
competing: AP, with AP SenatorJavier Alva Orlandini as candidate
APRA, with Alan Garcia; IU, again with Alfonso Barrantes; and PPC
(now known as Convergencia Democrdtica or CODE), again with
Lufs Bedoya Reyes. The candidates for all parties had certain
liabilities. Alva, for instance, was viewed as a party profession
immersed in partisan activities and machinations and not as
dynamic public figure. Barrantes (for IU) had been Lima's mayor
for a year and a half but had a less-than-spectacular record an
some unkept promises against him. PPC (CODE) was saddled wit
Bedoya, who had a reputation as an old warhorse who never di
well outside of Lima; and Garcia, despite his youth, dynamism, and
energy, was considered perhaps too young (34 at the time of the
election), still relatively untested in national affairs, and strongly
identified with a party with a highly controversial history and th
reputation of being a loser.

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154 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

Nevertheless, all pre-election polls showed Garcfa to hold a

commanding lead, and when the votes were finally counted, APRA
had won a landslide victory and its first presidency ever. Garcfa
took 45% of the votes cast (and 53% of the valid votes), finishing
better than 2-to-l ahead of Barrantes (21% and 25%) and far in front
of both Bedoya (10% and 12%) and Alva (6% and 6%); the 5 other
parties took less than 3% of the popular vote. APRA's triumph was
truly national in scope. Garcfa commanded as much as 77.7% of the
popular vote in one department (La Libertad), a simple majority in
as many as 17 departments (out of a possible 27) and, at his worst
(in the department of Tacna), still gathered in almost a third of the
vote. By contrast, Barrantes managed to pull in more than a third of
the popular vote in only 6 departments and surpassed 40% only
once.

Insofar as the congressional vote is concerned

personal popularity provided immensely long a
coattails. APRA took absolute majorities in both h
legislature, winning 32 of the 60 senatorial and 10
deputy races. IU again finished second (with 15 a
while CODE (with 7 and 12 seats) and AP (with 5 a
ranked third and fourth, respectively. Independen
parties earned just one seat in the Senate and 3 s
Chamber of Deputies. APRA was thus in the enviab
not having to worry about a parliamentary coalit
opposition unless a significant number of its own me
desert the party - an unlikely event in a party known for
discipline.
In Lima, APRA paralleled its national performance, leaving IU
and Barrantes far behind and completely spoiling any dreams of
the Left for a strong urban core of ideologically committed voters.
Garcia took slightly more than half of the valid votes cast in the
capital, with Barrantes (23.8%), Bedoya (18%) and Alva (a truly
disastrous 4.1%) trailing far behind. Garcfa thereby came close to
doubling his party's performance in the 1983 municipal race. In
addition, Garcfa's strength shattered the IU grip on the barrios
populares; APRA took 35 of Lima's 41 districts in the popular vote
and a simple majority in 26, while IU did not win the popular vote
in a single district (CODE, with Bedoya, won the 6 that APRA did
not; while AP exceeded 10% of the popular vote in only 4 districts).
Again, Table 1 offers some data on voting of individuals to
illuminate the vote-switching and party defections which oc-

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 DIETZ: ELECTORAL POLITICS IN PERU, 1978-86 155

curred between 1983M (municipal) and 1985P (presidential). In

1983M, 9 out of 10 low-income 1980P IU voters voted for IU again,
but only two thirds did so in 1985P, with the great majority of the
defectors voting for APRA. AP's defection rate approached the
vanishing point for all respondents who reported having voted for
AP in 1980P; only 6.6% voted the same way five years later, while
almost two thirds of them (63%) voted for APRA. CODE's desertion
rates were more or less on the same scale, although not quite as
extreme, while (not surprisingly) APRA brought back more than
nine-tenths of its 1980P supporters, after having dropped off
noticeably in 1980M and 1983M.
The data used to produce Table 1 can be reshuffled to show
how individuals changed their support between 1983M and 1985P.
For instance, 1983M IU supporters deserted that party in 1985P in
substantial numbers: only 39% voted for Barrantes as a presidential
candidate in 1985, while 54% voted for Garcfa and APRA. The
1983M AP voters voted approximately in the same way: 29% voted
for AP in the presidential race in 1985, while 44% voted for APRA
and 12% for IU. APRA's 1983 supporters, of course, remained loyal
to the party and to Garcia in great numbers in 1985 (98%).
The 1985 survey data offer some insight as to why AP support
virtually disappeared and why Garcia won such a landslide victory.
To begin with, many people simply thought that Belaunde had
done a bad job as president. When respondents were asked to
characterize Belaunde's term in office, 46% ranked it as fair; about
the same number called it either poor or very poor; while only 6%
labelled it as good and none as very good. Respondents were also
asked to appraise the three last presidents of Peru (General
Velasco, 1968-1975; General Morales Bermudez, 1975-1980, and
Belaunde, 1980-1985) and compare them with one another.
Belatnde finished a distant second in all three paired compari-
sons and lost overall. Finally, on a more particularistic note, fewer
than 1 in 5 of those surveyed thought that the Belaunde administra-
tion had had any positive effect on their neighborhood of
residence, while more than 2 in 5 saw it as actually having had a
negative impact.
Those voters who switched from AP (in 1980) to Garcfa and
APRA (in 1985) were asked why they changed their votes. Over half
said that they switched because of the poor performance of the AP
administration, while another 22% saw APRA and Garcia as
representing a new face and image in politics. Among those voters

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156 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

who switched from IU (in 1983M) to APRA (in 1985P), a third gave
Garcia's image as a fresh, new face as the main reason for their
change; whereas 1 in 5 said that they had become disenchanted
with Barrantes as mayor; and an equal percentage said that while
theywould vote for IU in a municipal election, theywould not do so
in a presidential race. The Left, therefore, not only faced the
problem of running against Garcfa, new, dynamic, and head of
Peru's best-organized party, but also a problem of credibility, in the
sense of failing to convince many previous supporters (in munici-
pal elections) that the Left could be a viable candidate for national
office.

1986 Municipal Elections

The municipal elections of November 1986 came less than a
year and a half after the APRA triumph, and many expected that
Garcfa's enormous popularity, coupled with APRA's apparently
renewed vigor, would strengthen the party even more. Most
observers assumed that the major struggle - both symbolic and
real - would be the mayoral race in Lima,, where Alfonso
Barrantes (IU) was slated to run against a young, relatively
unknown APRA candidate named Jorge del Castillo, a former
mayor of Barranco (a district in Lima). It should be noted that the
defeat of AP, in 1985, had proved so disheartening that the party
chose not to participate in the 1986 local elections at all.
Nationally, APRA did just about as expected: it took a great
majority of the departmental capital city mayoral races (20 out of a
total of 24), carrying all of the departments it had won in 1983M,
winning in 4 departments previously taken by IU in 1983M, and
losing in 3 where it had won before. IU took 3 departmental races
while AP and CODE, along with one other independent party, took
the remainder.
In Lima, the race between IU and APRA was bitterly fought
down to the last days of the campaign. Barrantes ran on his record
of infrastructural improvements and attention to the city's low-
income districts, while del Castillo ran, quite publicly, on APRA's
popularity and on somewhat ill-defined and grandiose plans to
build a rapid-transit light-rail system for the city. The campaign in
Lima was both noisy and controversial. Following the last APRA
rally for del Castillo at the party headquarters, President Garcia
broke all precedent by staging an additional rally for del Castillo by
the presidential palace and by placing his own enormous personal

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 DIETZ: ELECTORAL POLITICS IN PERU, 1978-86 157

popularity squarely on the line. Despite much criticism of such

tactics, APRA managed to pull off a close victory (37.7% to IU's
35.3%; CODE took 27%) for del Castillo. APRA had a somewhat
easier time of it in the district-level mayoral contests, taking 9 such
races. IU lost a considerable amount of the ground gained in the
1983M elections when it had swept the city's low-income areas; in
1986 it took only 5 of them. CODE recaptured much of its
traditional strength in the capital's middle and upper class areas,
winning 9 races.

THE POCKETBOOK, PERSONALISM, PARTY STRENGTH,

AND IDEOLOGY

1 SAY THAT PERUVIAN electoral politics are alive and dy

is, based on the foregoing, to say the obvious. If indicato
maturity in an electoral system include the ability of that syst
allow different parties to acquire power, to permit a pe
transfer of power when an incumbent is defeated, and to ke
military out of the political arena when its historical enemyw
election, then Peru has taken some significant strides t
political development. It is now time to note some of the
themes and patterns that can be identified in the electi
described above.
Voting one's pocketbook, a phenomenon common in virtually
all electoral systems, has clearly been at work throughout the
period under discussion. The severity of the economic crisis - a
prolonged economic slump which began during the latter part of
the 1970's and lasted through 1986 - affected the country and its
entire citizenry in a variety of ways which, cumulatively, generated
a set of tribulations that had inevitable political repercussions.
Rightly or not, the Peruvian electorate blamed their economic
hardships on whichever administration was in office and voted
accordingly. Belafinde and AP became a major target of the blame,
and the drop in AP support, from 1980P to 1985P, was astonishing.
Perhaps the reasons given by people who voted for Belafnde in
1980 are worth noting. In a 1982 survey, a majority of low-income
urban respondents thought either that Belauinde deserved to be
able to finish his interrupted (1863-68) presidency or that he was
the most appropriate candidate to assume the presidency. This so-
called sympathy vote, along with Belaunde's own considerable
charm and attractiveness, unfortunately (for him) wore off quickly.
Even by 1980M the bloom was fading, and in 1983 and 1985 it had

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158 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

vanished almost entirely, until it reached a point (in 1986) when AP

did not field candidates at all. The same pocketbook factor might
be applied to IU and Barrantes after their 1983 victory in Lima.
After all, Barrantes had had his ups and downs as mayor of Lima -
but it is more likely, in his case, that three other variables came into
play: specifically, personalism, party strength, and ideology.
There can be little doubt that personal attractiveness or
charisma played a major role throughout the elections discussed
here and that, as a basis for political support, it is definitely a two-
edged sword. As a tool for generating support, personalismo has a
long history in Latin America, and Peru is no exception. In the
twentieth century, numerous political parties and movements have
proven, over time, to be little more than vehicles for their founders
or leaders. Manuel Odrfo and his Unidn Nacional Odrifsta, of the
1950s, is one example, and PPC/CODE with Bedoya, and Belaunde
with AP, are probably others, although the final verdict is not in as
yet. When Haya de la Torre died in 1979, there was considerable
doubt whether the party could survive his death, although Garcia
certainly seems to have answered this question now. However, as
easily as personalism can succeed, it can also fail. Should an
administration and/or party become firmly identified in the public
eye with a single leader, and should that leader fail, voter support
for the party may disappear with startling rapidity. In order to
regain the confidence of the public, it maybe necessary to replace
the leader - a difficult task if the leader is the principal raison
d'etre for the party in the first place. Belaunde certainly discovered
the two-edged nature of personalism during his administration,
and it is arguable that Barrantes did as well. When Barrantes ran in
1983, for instance, he represented a new phenomenon in Peruvian
politics: a Marxist candidate who appeared, first, as a rational,
sympathetic spokesman for Lima's poor and marginal inhabitants,
and, second, as a leader capable of muting, if not harnessing, the
usually bickering and self-destructive factions of the Left. Yet, in
1985P, Barrantes faced the problem of any coalition leader who
wins an election: the fissiparous tendencies of the coalition rise to
the surface and become increasingly fractious. In addition,
Barrantes was no longer a new face by 1985; he had been mayor of
Lima for a year and a half and, inevitably, had not been able to
accomplish all he had wanted or promised. He ran a close race but
was unable to overcome the concerted strength of an extremely
popular president and a strong, well-organized party.

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 DIETZ: ELECTORAL POLITICS IN PERU, 1978-86 159

This latter factor is a third major explanatory variable; it is

related to personalism, but it is also separable from it. Personalism
can, at least for a certain period of time, overcome structural
weaknesses in a party through the sheer presence of its leader.
Nevertheless, if a party does not exhibit a significant degree of
internal cohesion and organization, and if it cannot at least reach
the threshold of independent institutionalization, it is bound to
flounder eventually. When Belaunde could not run as AP's
candidate, in 1985, the party found itself not only with an abysmal
record to run on, but also with an unattractive candidate as its
presidential hopeful. Barrantes could run in 1985 as a presidential
candidate, but IU had to confront, in APRA, a party whose internal
strength and organization have been the admiration and despair of
all other parties in Peru for the past half century.
Finally, there is the matter of political ideology. It would
appear from the elections discussed here that, by 1985, those
parties and candidates that represented the Center and the Right in
Peruvian politics were (at least in their present form and under
their present leadership) no longer perceived as viable by the
electorate. Their platforms and policies vis-a-vis Peru's economic
problems were unsuccessful and outmoded, especially insofar as
AP and Belaunde were concerned. Belaunde has been a major
figure in presidential politics since the mid-1950s, but his ideas
and advisors have remained much the same for at least two
decades. By 1983, his leadership had come to seem vague and
unconvincing, and the electorate appeared to turn, especially
the municipal level, increasingly toward the Left.
Whether Barrantes' success, in 1983M, can be interpreted as
an ideological vote remains very much open to question. Barrante
certainly benefited from strong feelings of anti-belauzndismo in
1983. Yet the 1985P elections suggest that the strong support he
received from Lima's urban poor - presumably Barrantes's major
base of support - in the 1983M elections did not come from an
deep-seated, or permanent, ideological conviction. In 1985P, th
Left ran into obvious difficulty trying to persuade its erstwhile
supporters of Barrantes' viability as a serious presidential aspiran
Meanwhile, APRA seized 1983M as a chance to begin its comeback
so that, by 1985, the party was able to attract many new and/or
floating voters, former, but now disenchanted, supporters of IU an
AP, while still retaining its large core of party faithful.
What is perhaps the most noticeable aspect of the elections i

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160 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

the way in which all four of these factors - pocketbook, personal-

ism, party strength and ideology - played overlapping and
cumulative roles. APRA's triumphs in 1985P and 1986M occurred
because APRA was able to develop strength in all four. The
electorate's profound dissatisfaction with the economic perfor-
mance of the BelaCnde administration, Garcfa's enormous and
wide-spread personal popularity, APRA's internal strength and
organizational ability, plus its Center-Left/social-democrat ideo-
logical position - all came together to make the party virtually
unstoppable.
Some data from the 1985 low-income urban survey are
relevant here, since respondents were asked why theyvoted as they
did in both 1983M and 1985P. No single reason dominated: about a
third of the respondents gave the candidate himself as the most
decisive factor in determining their vote; another third reported
being swayed by what the candidate had said or promised in his
speeches; while yet another third said that they voted for the party
to which the candidate belonged. Only 10% defined their vote as
specifically anti-incumbent. Thus, no single factor, of the four
singled out here, can be said to have been decisive. All were
important, as is the fact that APRA excelled in all four. For instance,
anti-Belainde sentiment was a strong factor. Of those 1980P AP
voters who changed their support to APRA and Garcia in 1985P,
over half (55%) said they switched because of poor (AP) govern-
ment performance. Ideology played its role as well. Of those who
reported that they had switched from IU (in 1983M) to APRA (in
1985P), about 20% said that they were willing to vote for Barrantes
and the Left in a municipal race but not in a presidential one. In
1985P, all parties except APRA were deficient in one or more of
these factors. APRA alone was strong in all four.
LOOKING TOWARD 1989 AND 1990

POLITICS IN PERU, by early 1987, had reached a point where the

country could enjoy a breathing space. The next elections sched-
uled won't take place til November 1989 (muncipal), and will be
followed shortly thereafter by those of April 1990 (presidential/
congressional). APRA will be in charge, in every possible electoral
way, until then; all of which means that, the battle being won, APRA
must now demonstrate to the electorate that it can create and
implement policies capable of ameliorating economic conditi

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 DIETZ: ELECTORAL POLITICS IN PERU, 1978-86 161

APRA will have no one to blame but itself and no scapegoat

(except, of course, external factors and conditions over which it
has no control - e.g., world commodity prices or foreign bankers).
In 1985 and 1986, the electorate gave APRA, and Garcia, everything
that a political party could wish in the way of endorsement, and the
headiness of victory is in the process of being replaced by reality.
APRA must also realize that Garcia will, by law, be unable to
succeed himself in 1990, and that the party will therefore have to
find a candidate to follow Garcia, no easy task.
Other parties and candidates have equally difficult problems. IU
confronts the basic challenge of trying to maintain its viability as a
coalition. Barrantes was the major, and some would say the only,
factor which has bound IU together since 1980, and whatever he
decides will be critical to any future that IU might have. AP and
Belatnde have been faced with an almost complete rebuilding effort;
the desperate straits of the party can be guessed from reports that
Belaunde plans to run for president again in 1990 - a possibility
which, if true, testifies to the institutional weakness of the party and
the extent of its dependence upon a single individual, despite his
previous disastrous record. Moreover, should the AP decide (or, more
accurately, if Belauinde lets it decide) not to put Belatinde up again as
party candidate, then it will have to find a candidate with sufficient
legitimacy to be accepted as Belaunde's heir, both as candidate and as
leader of the party. The possibility still exists that another individual
mayyet emerge, during the latter 1980s, able either to reinvigorate AP
or to forge a new movement among the Center-Right to bring AP and
CODE supporters together. However, thus far, in early 1987, such an
individual has not yet appeared on the political horizon.
Whatever the future holds, the first half of the 1980s has provided
Peru with (for it) several historically unique elements and occur-
rences: an ideological spectrum with viable leaders and spokesmen
representing all points of view; a transfer of power from one elected
president to another (and from an incumbent to an opposition party);
the emergence of a new political generation in APRA, a development
which offers a clear signal to other parties to look for similar new
blood also, and an electoral landslide across presidential and local
elections which has given APRA (Peru's best-organized party) un-
precedented power. While such factors and events will probablywork
to Peru's long-term advantage as a democratic polity, just how they
will shape that polity remains to be seen.

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162 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

NOTES
1. Materials for the study of electoral processes in Peru are not large
and have only recently become comprehensive in any way. Sources
include Bernales (1980), CELADEC (1981), Chirinos Soto (1962a, 1962b),
Dietz (1985), Macera and de Souza Ferreira (1957?), Macera (1964?),
Roncagliolo (1980), and, above all, three works by Tuesta (1983, 1985,
1986) which are invaluable as data sources as well as analyses. The survey
data utilized in various places throughout the article come from surveys I
carried out in 1982 and in 1985; both of them were done in the same low-
income neighborhoods in Lima, and involved the administration of
questionnaires to several hundred male heads of households.
2. The materials on Sendero Luminoso, while considerable in num-
ber, are not detailed, since the organization refuses to grant interviews or to
publish materials about itself. Debate (1983), McClintock (1984), Sanders
(1984), and Werlich (1984) are all representative; virtually all Peruvian
newspapers and magazines have carried a variety of reports since 1980,
when Sendero L uminoso began its overt campaign.
3. See Note 1 for sources on elections; I depend heavily on data drawn
from Tuesta's works (1983, 1985, 1986). The discussion here does not
involve any statistical analysis of either aggregate data or the data from my
own surveys. For an example of some statistical analysis of Peruvian
aggregate electoral data, see Dietz (1985).

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