1. JEANETTE V. MANALO v. TNS PHILIPPINES INC., GR No.

208567, 2014-11-26

Facts:

Respondent TNS Philippines Inc. (TNS), with Gary Ocampo as its president and general manager, was engaged primarily
in the business of marketing research and information, as well as research consultancy and other value-added services to
a wide base of clients, both local... and international.[

Petitioners Jeanette V. Manalo, Vilma P. Barrios, Lourdes Lynn Michelle Fernandez, and Leila B. Taiño (petitioners) were
hired by TNS as field personnel on various dates starting 1996 for several projects. They were made to sign a project-to-
project employment contract.

Thereafter, TNS would file the corresponding termination report with the Department of Labor and Employment Regional
Office (DOLE-RO).[9

Petitioners were likewise assigned office-based tasks for which they were required to be in the office from 9:00 o'clock in
the morning to 6:00 o'clock in the evening, but most of the time, they worked beyond 6:00 o'clock without receiving the
corresponding overtime pay. These... office-based tasks were not on a per project basis and petitioners did not sign any
contract for these jobs. These assignments were not reported to the DOLE either

Later in August 2008, a meeting among the Field Interviewers (FIs) was called by TNS' field manager. They were told that
all old FIs assigned in the "tracking" projects would be pulled out eventually and replaced by new FIs contracted from an
agency. Old FIs would be... assigned only to "adhoc" projects which were seasonal. This prompted petitioners to file a
consolidated complaint for regularization before the LA.[11]

Issues:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT REGULAR
EMPLOYEES OF THE RESPONDENT COMPANY.

Ruling:

Upon review of the records, the evidence failed to clearly, accurately, consistently, and convincingly show that petitioners
were still project employees of TNS

….

Although TNS belatedly submitted the supposed lacking termination reports, it failed to show the corresponding project
employment contracts of petitioners covering the period indicated in the said termination reports.TNS itself stated in its
motion for reconsideration[28] before the NLRC that the project employee status of the employee could be proved by the
employment contracts signed voluntarily by the employees and by the termination report filed with the DOLE after the
completion of every project.[29]

Yet, no project employment contracts were shown. It is well-settled that rules of evidence shall be liberally applied in
labor cases, but this does not detract from the principle that piecemeal presentation of evidence is simply not in
accord with orderly justice.[30] The NLRC was correct in saying that in the absence of proof that the subsequent
employment of petitioners continued to be on a project-to-project basis under a contract of employment, petitioners were
considered to have become regular employees.[31]
CaseDig: Sasan vs NLRC

G.R. No 176240; 17 Oct. 2008

FACTS:

Sasan et al are employed by Helpmate, Inc (HI), a janitorial and messengerial service provider, and assigned to E PCI Bank in
Gorordo Branch, Cebu City. Their services were cut off when EPCI decided to bid out the janitorial and messengerial jobs to
two other service providers. Sasan et al then filed an action for illegal dismissal alleging that they are regular employees of PCI,
and HI has no authority to dismiss them.

After submission of legal positions to the Labor Arbiter, it concluded that HI is engaged in labor on contracting as it operates
without substantial capital as required by the Labor Code, declaring PCI as the principal employer and awarding money
claims to the employees for their illegal dismissal.

PCI and Hi appealed the LA's decision to the NLRC and submitted for the first time photocopy of documents proving that they
have sufficient capital to operate as an independent contractor. The NLRC modified the LA's decision taking into consideration
the documentary evidence submitted by HI.

On charges of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled that the complaint for illegal dismissal was prematurely filed, furhter, deleted
the award of backwages and separation pay, but affirmed the award of 13th month pay and attorneys' fee.

The petitioners appeal to CA, which affirmed the NLRC's decision. Further, appealed to the SC, hence, this petition.

Sasan et al are employed by Helpmate, Inc (HI), a janitorial and messengerial service provider, and assigned to E PCI Bank in
Gorordo Branch, Cebu City. Their services were cut off when EPCI decided to bid out the janitorial and messengerial jobs to
two other service providers. Sasan et al then filed an action for illegal dismissal alleging that they are regular employees of PCI,
and HI has no authority to dismiss them.

After submission of legal positions to the Labor Arbiter, it concluded that HI is engaged in labor on contracting as it operates
without substantial capital as required by the Labor Code, declaring PCI as the principal employer and awarding money
claims to the employees for their illegal dismissal.

PCI and Hi appealed the LA's decision to the NLRC and submitted for the first time photocopy of documents proving that they
have sufficient capital to operate as an independent contractor. The NLRC modified the LA's decision taking into consideration
the documentary evidence submitted by HI.

On charges of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled that the complaint for illegal dismissal was prematurely filed, furhter, deleted
the award of backwages and separation pay, but affirmed the award of 13th month pay and attorneys' fee.

The petitioners appeal to CA, which affirmed the NLRC's decision. Further, appealed to the SC, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the NLRC is allowed to received evidence and give merit with the same introduced for the first time during appeal?

HELD:

The submission of new evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its new Rules of Procedure. Rules of evidence prevailing
in in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and
procedure all in the interest of substantial justice.
The court further ruled that the petitioners were not illegally dismissed by HI. Upon the termination of the Contract of Service
between HI and EPCI , the petitioners cannot insist to continue work for the latter. Their pull-out from EPCI did not constitute
illegal dismissal.

WON the NLRC is allowed to received evidence and give merit with the same introduced for the first time during appeal?

The submission of new evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its new Rules of Procedure. Rules of evidence prevailing
in in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and
procedure all in the interest of substantial justice.

The court further ruled that the petitioners were not illegally dismissed by HI. Upon the termination of the Contract of Service
between HI and EPCI , the petitioners cannot insist to continue work for the latter. Their pull-out from EPCI did not constitute
illegal dismissal.
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondent

G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948

Tuason, J.

Rules of evidence are substantive rights found in common law chiefly and growing out of reasoning, experience and common
sense of lawyers and courts, it is true that weighing of evidence and the rules of practice with respect thereto form part of the
law of procedure, but the classification of proof is sometime determined by the substantive law.

FACTS:

Petitioner, accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the CFI Pampanga to remand the case to Masantol, court of
origin, for the petitioner to cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses. The motion was denied. Based from the
memorandum submitted by petitioner’s attorney to the CFI to support said motion, the accused appeared in preliminary
investigation where he pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her
witnesses could be examined and cross-examined. However, the fiscal and private prosecutor objected, invoking Section 11
of Rule 108 which denies the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation. Petitioner
contends that Sec 11 infringes the Constitutional right of the accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him. The
Court held that the said right does not apply in preliminary hearings. On motion for reconsideration, petitioner contends that
Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court infringes section 13, article VIII of the Constitution which deals with substantive
rights – his right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the witness for the prosecution.

ISSUE: WON the said Section 11 of Rule 108 infringes Section 13, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution

RULING:

No, the Court denies that the curtailment of the right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the
witness who had given evidence for his arrest is of such importance as to offend against the constitutional inhibition.
Preliminary Investigation is not an essential part of due process of law; it is eminently and essentially remedial and is the first
step in a criminal prosecution. It may be suppressed entirely and mere restriction of the privilege cannot be held to fall within
the constitutional prohibition. While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a
preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to be informed of
the charges against him ‘both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only
stage where the guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be confronted by and to
cross-examine the witnesses against him.

As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence-which is “the mode and manner of proving the
competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings"-is
identified with and forms part of the method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in
criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice. (Statevs.
Capaci, 164 So., 419; 179 La., 462.) The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We
cannot tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence
embodied in these Rules.

Notes:

Substantive law and adjective law, distinguished. – Substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights, or that which
regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action. Adjective or remedial law prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what
acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides
or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.
G.R. No. 173612 March 26, 2008

DOMINADOR MALANA and RODEL TIAGA, Petitioners,

DANTE O. TINGA

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00138 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole.

SO ORDERED.

FACTS:

The petitioners Dominador Malana (Dominador) and Rodel Tiaga (Rodel), together with their acquitted co-accused Elenito
Malana (Elenito), were charged with the crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12. The charges1 stemmed from an incident on 28 May 2000 that left Betty Capsa-Roxas (Betty)
dead, and her daughter and granddaughter injured. The appellants pleaded not guilty during the arraignment.

The prosecution presented the two adult survivors of the ghastly crime, Vicente Roxas Jr., (Vicente) and his daughter
Suzette Roxas (Suzette), as its main witnesses.

In the evening, Vicente, his wife, Betty, Suzette, and the latter’s infant daughter, Jenny Rose de la Cruz (Jenny), were
asleep inside their house. Their house is a single-storey.2Vicente and Betty slept at the living room, while Suzette and Jenny
occupied the bedroom. 3

Vicente testified that at around 11:30 p.m., he was awakened by the sound of dogs barking. He saw the kitchen door of
their house on fire. He tried to douse the flames with water, but the fire fuming of the smell of gasoline, spread out
instead. Vicente woke Betty and told her to fetch help. As Betty opened the main door of their house, Dominador, Rodel,
and a third man whom he identified as Ronnie Malana, suddenly appeared and entered the house. 4 Since these
individuals had previously threatened to kill Vicente and his entire family, Vicente, upon seeing them, ran through the
burning kitchen door and out of the house to seek help from his brother-in-law, Roberto Oredero, whose house was
merely 30 meters away.5 After escaping several meters from his house, Vicente heard an explosion and saw the fire
engulf his entire house.6

Meanwhile, Suzette, who was awakened by her parents’ panicked reaction to the kitchen fire, cradled Jenny and saw the
three men enter their house when her mother opened the main door. Dominador and Rodel were standing behind the
third man.7 She testified that the third man carried a round one-gallon container with a wick of three to four inches in
length. Rodel lit the wick with a match, and the third man threw the container into Suzette’s bedroom. After that, the
three men simultaneously ran away. Suzette saw the container burst into flames and explode. 8

The explosion killed Betty instantly. The doctors could not save Suzette’s shattered left leg so the same was amputated from
below the knee. Had it not been for the prompt medical attention she received, Suzette would have died from the injuries she
had sustained from the explosion.9 Jenny survived the blast with barely any injury.
Vicente also testified that appellants had been threatening to liquidate him and his family, due to their belief that he
was in the practice of witchcraft by which he had caused the deaths of Rodel’s parents-in-law.10

Appellants proffered the defenses of denial and alibi. Dominador testified that on the date and time of the crime, he was
working as a construction worker in Parian, Calamba, Laguna and that he had been in Laguna since 11 May 2000 until the end
of the month. He claimed that he was implicated by Vicente because the latter thought that he had something to do with the
elopement of Suzette.11 He pointed to Salvador Villafuerte, Roman Villafuerte, Boyet Villafuerte, and Mondring Erederos as the
perpetrators of the crime.12 Rodel testified that he was recuperating from illness in Binahaan, Pagbilao, Quezon when the
incident took place. He claimed that he was implicated because he helped Dominador in engaging the services of a
counsel.13 Elenito similarly gave the alibi that he was engaged as a construction worker together with Dominador in Laguna
when the crime occurred. He also denied that his alias is "Ronnie," the name of the third perpetrator identified by Vicente. 14

The RTC, found Dominador and Rodel guilty of two (2) separate crimes of murder and frustrated murder, and acquitted
Elenito on the ground of reasonable doubt. The trial court gave credence to the eyewitness accounts of Vicente and
Suzette who positively identified the appellants as two of the three perpetrators of the crime. However, the trial court
acquitted Elenito as he was not positively identified by Suzette as the third man and his physical appearance does not
fit the description of the tall fat man seen by Suzette.

Court of Appeal affirmed the guilt of appellants but modified their sentences. The Court of Appeals denied appellants’ motion
for reconsideration

Hence, the present Petition18 before this Court.

ISSUE:

RULING:

Except as to the penalty of death we affirm appellants’ conviction. There is no cogent reason to disturb the finding of guilt
made by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court. The issues raised by appellants involve weighing of evidence
already passed upon by the trial court and the appellate court.

Appellants question the credibility of the testimony of Vicente and Suzette and the weight given by the trial court to the
testimony of the bomb specialist. The age-old rule is that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses in
the stand and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms its first-hand impressions as a witness
testifies before it. It is also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony. 20

Vicente positively identified appellants as two of the three assailants who barged into his house and committed the
heinous crime.

Under Suzette’s circumstances, her relationship to the victim of this case, including her personal injury, in accord with
human nature, ensured that she would have the most interest in telling the truth, rather than prevaricate and send
innocent men to rot in jail.
On the other hand, while Vicente did not actually see the accused-appellants perpetrate the crime, Vicente’s testimony
lends credence to the fact that the accused-appellants were present in the place, time, and date of the crime. The
previous life threats made by the accused-appellants on Vicente and his family, and the exploding of the Roxas
residence following Vicente’s escape from his house, served to corroborate and shed light to Suzette’s account of the
crime.

There is no merit in appellants’ assiduous assertion that they should be acquitted under the equipoise rule in view of
what to them are doubts as to their guilt. This rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is
evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is,
therefore, no equipoise if the evidence is not evenly balanced. 27 Said rule is not applicable in the case before us
because the evidence here presented is not equally weighty. The equipoise rule cannot be invoked where the evidence
of the prosecution is overwhelming.

It is elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and
untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.28 It is incumbent
upon appellants to prove that they were at another place when the felony was committed, and that it was physically
impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. 29 This they failed to prove.

The Court of Appeals correctly resolved all the issues raised by the appellants.

The appellate court correctly found appellants guilty of the complex crime of murder30 with frustrated murder and
attempted murder.
5. People v. Mabait and Ayroso, G.R. No. 233690, December 2, 2020
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MERVIN MABAIT y HIBEK AND RAYMOND AYROSO y HIBEK, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 233690, December 2, 2020
Accused-appellants in a drug case are acquitted due to the prosecution's failure to establish an
unbroken chain of custody and the presence of irregularities in the buy-bust operation.
FACTS:
Prosecution's Version:
The police organized a buy-bust operation against Mabait and Ayroso based on information from
a confidential informant. Police officers, including SPO3 Melvin Llanes, P/Insp. Abowac, PO3 Arnel
Sanque, and PO2 Jose Marie Pena, conducted the operation in Barangay Uwisan, Calamba City.
P/Insp. Abowac approached Mabait's house, identified by the confidential informant, and saw Ayroso
nearby. Ayroso asked P/Insp. Abowac if he wanted to buy drugs, to which P/Insp. Abowac agreed and
handed him marked money. Ayroso went inside the house, returned with Mabait, who handed over a
plastic sachet containing shabu. The police immediately apprehended both men. The seized sachet
was marked, witnessed by barangay officials and media representatives, and submitted to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for testing, confirming it as shabu. Urine drug tests on Mabait and Ayroso also yielded
positive results.
Defense's Version:
Ayroso claimed that on the day in question, he was taking care of his nieces when police officers
in civilian clothes arrived, looking for Mabait. Ayroso stated he didn't know Mabait's whereabouts,
leading to his arrest. Meanwhile, Mabait asserted that he was at home with his children when the police,
without explanation, entered, searched, and handcuffed him. Both accused were taken to the detention
cell at the Municipal Hall of Calamba.
RTC Ruling:
The RTC, despite non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, ruled that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized specimens were preserved, not fatal to the case. It gave weight to the
police officers' testimony, relying on the presumption of regularity in their duties. The RTC convicted
Mabait and Ayroso of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, sentencing them to life
imprisonment and a fine of P500,000. The illegal drugs were ordered turned over to the PDEA for
disposition.
CA Ruling:
The CA affirmed the RTC decision, agreeing that non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 did not fatally affect the prosecution's case. It found the evidence established an unbroken chain
of custody of the seized shabu. The CA upheld the RTC's findings, leading to the same convictions.

Note: The People and Ayroso did not file a Supplemental Brief, while Mabait submitted one,
emphasizing the prosecution's failure to establish the chain of custody.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt for the violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

RULING:
The appeal of Mabait and Ayroso is granted, leading to their acquittal based on reasonable
doubt. The Court emphasizes the essential elements for convicting individuals of illegal drug sale under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. These include establishing the identity of the buyer and seller,
the object and consideration of the sale, and the delivery of the illicit substance along with the payment.
The Court criticizes the arresting officers for disregarding the established procedures under
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, which require a physical inventory and photographing of seized items in
the presence of the accused or their representatives, media, and DOJ or elected public officials. Non-
compliance, except under justifiable grounds, is explicitly allowed only if the integrity and evidentiary
value of the items are properly preserved.
In this case, the arresting officers failed to follow the required procedures, raising concerns about
the integrity of the 0.01-gram drug seized. The Court rejects the appellee's argument that despite the
lapses, the identity of the seized drugs was beyond doubt. The saving clause under Section 21(a) of
the IRR cannot apply due to non-compliance.
The absence of a pre-operation report, lack of proper documentation in the police blotter, and
failure to present the original buy-bust money further cast doubt on the legitimacy of the buy-bust
operation. The Court notes the absence of key witnesses, like the alleged backup team, and concludes
that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody, tainting the evidentiary value.
As a result, Mabait and Ayroso are acquitted based on reasonable doubt, and the Court orders
their immediate release unless they are lawfully held for another cause. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is instructed to report the actions taken within five working days. The March 21, 2017,
decision of the Court of Appeals and the March 12, 2015, judgment of the Regional Trial Court are
reversed and set aside.
Ramirez vs. CA G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging that the private respondent in a confrontation in the
latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to
petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” In support of her claim, petitioner
produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation in the
amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court’s discretion. The transcript
on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal,
private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled
“An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. the RTC granted the Motion. From the RTC’s order, the private respondent filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the CA. Respondent CA declared the RTC’s order
null and void, and holding that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
Petitioner filed a MR which the CA denied. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the consent of both of the party is a violation of R.A. 4200.

Held: Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides that it shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The aforestated
provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by
the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a
violator. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent
court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.
[ G.R. No. 110397. August 14, 1997 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.

ARMANDO BINAMIRA Y ALAYON, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

FACTS: The incident transpired when accused Binamira was arrested for being a suspect in a robbery with homicide incident
on October 1985.

That the Security Guards of Magallanes Village, Makati were alerted regarding a dead woman wherein they immediately
proceeded at the place reported to. That upon arrival, they saw the lifeless body of victim Jessie Flores and the security guards
immediately conducted a search around the area. That they saw a man walking very fast and they approached him; said man
is the accused who pretended to be urinating. Upon suspicion of the security guards, they searched the accused and found a
pair of pants and undershirt inside his bag soaked with blood. They brought him to the Police Station.

That at the police station, a custodial investigation was conducted and it was alleged that the accused was informed of his
constitutional rights, among others, his right to a counsel and if he did not have a lawyer, the State will provide for him. At this
juncture, the services of Atty. Romeo P. Parcon of the Citizen’s Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) of Makati was offered to which
appellant agreed. That an extrajudicial confession was executed by the accused admitting that he stabbed the victim in the
neck with a fan knife and divested the victim of her wrist watch and gold necklace.

The defense claimed that the extrajudicial confession was obtained through force and intimidation as he was tortured,
maltreated and tied by the police officers. That when the investigation was being conducted, the accused did not see one of
his relatives at the police station nor he was provided a lawyer of his choice.

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the court held the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide based on the Extrajudicial confession and circumstantial evidence. The accused
appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence?

Ruling: No.

Based from the existing Constitution at that time (1973 Consti), (a)ny person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. x x x Any confession obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.”

In this case, record shows that the lawyer was not the personal choice of the accused, or appointed by his relatives or the
court. The rights of the accused was merely recited and was not explained to him thoroughly. Records also show that the
lawyer appointed to the accused did not explain the consequences of the alleged admission and that said lawyer was only
present during the signing of the document and not during the initial investigation. The CLAO lawyer appointed by the police to
assist appellant did not provide effective or adequate legal assistance to the latter. He did not display any measure of zeal
commensurate to the magnitude of his responsibility.

ISSUE: WON the circumstantial evidence are sufficient to convict the accused.

RULING: No.
Under Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, “[c]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”

An unbroken chain should be proven. The prosecution miserably failed to prove the same. The police officers testified that
the accused surrendered the gold necklace at the police station. While the security guards who initially arrested the accused
and searched him did not found any jewelry but only bloodied clothes which were not presented in evidence during trial.
Hence, these circumstances do not form an unbroken chain adequate to justify the conviction of the accused.

THE COURT REVERSED and SET ASIDE THE APPEALED DECISION. The accused is ACQUITTED AND IS RELEASED FROM
CONFINEMENT.
Pollo v. CSC

G.R. No. 181881 (2011)

FACTS:

Petitioner Pollo is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge
of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the “Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na” program of the CSC. On
January 3. 2007, CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David received an unsigned complaint letter which was marked
“Confidential” and was sent through a courier service (LBC) from certain Allan San Pascual of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City.
The letter contains allegations stating that the petitioner has been helping a number of individuals who have pending cases in
the CSC. The letter sender’s intention was that the CSC should investigate this anomaly to maintain the clean and good
behaviour of their office. Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information
technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically “to back up all the files in the
computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”

After a briefing, the team went to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City. The backing-up of all files in the hard disk
of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by several employees, together with Directors
Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner
and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in
their divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the files yielded from search conducted in the petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files
without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a transgression of his constitutional right to privacy is justified.

RULING:

Yes. The search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified at its inception and scope, there being reasonable ground
for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by
the CSC as government employer of such misconduct subject to the anonymous complaint. The fact that these documents
were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises the presumption that he was the author thereof.

The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct
prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the
head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly “lawyering” for individuals with pending cases in the
CSC. A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds
for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible
adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith conducted
involving the computer resources in the concerned regional office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the
search was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store documents. Indeed, the
computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of
computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action.
Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the work-
related investigation.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless search in an open and transparent manner.
Officials and some employees of the regional office, who happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe the process
until its completion. In addition, the respondent himself was duly notified, through text messaging, of the search and the
concomitant retrieval of files from his computer.

Pollo’s claim that the search was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument
invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also
untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the
government workplace under the aforecited authorities.
Tomas Tan v. Jose Hosana, G.R. No. 190846, Feb. 3, 2016

FACTS:

The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C. Hosana (Milagros) on January 14, 1979. During their marriage, Jose
and Milagros bought a house and lot located at Tinago, Naga City, which lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 21229.

On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (Tomas) the subject property, as evidenced by a deed of
sale executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by
Jose in her favor. The Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price for the lot was ₱200,000.00. After the sale, TCT No. 21229
was cancelled and TCT No. 32568 was issued in the name of Tomas.

On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and Damages against
Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds of Naga City. In the complaint, Jose averred that while he was working in Japan,
Milagros, without his consent and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by forging Jose's signature making it
appear that Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the subject property to Tomas.

In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for value. Jose presented his brother, Bonifacio Hosana
(Bonifacio), as sole witness. Bonifacio further testified that Jose's signature in the SPA was forged. Bonifacio presented
documents containing the signature of Jose for comparison: Philippine passport, complaint-affidavit, duplicate original of SPA
dated 16 February 2002, notice of lis pendens, community tax certificate, voter's affidavit, specimen signatures, and a
handwritten letter.

In its decision dated December 27, 2006, the RTC decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject property to
Tomas.

Tomas appealed the RTC's ruling to the CA. In a decision dated August 28, 2009, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling that the deed
of sale and the SPA were void.

Despite Tomas' allegation that he paid ₱700,000.00 for the subject lot, the CA found that there was no convincing evidence
that established this claim.

Tomas filed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision on the ground that the amount of ₱200,000.00 as
reimbursement for the purchase price of the house and lot was insufficient and not supported by the evidence formally
offered before and admitted by the RTC. Tomas contended that the actual amount he paid as consideration for the sale was
₱700,000.00, as supported by his testimony before the RTC.

However, CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of sale can be used as the basis for the amount of consideration paid?
RULING:

YES. While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it does not preclude
the admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters that occurred in the course of executing the contract, i.e., what
each party has given in the execution of the contract.

Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact, sanctioned by the Rules of
Court. The purpose of introducing documentary evidence is to ascertain the truthfulness of a matter at issue, which can be the
entire content or a specific provision/term in the document.

The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the truthfulness of the consideration stated
and its actual payment. The purpose of introducing the deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms written in the
contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The deed of sale, rather, is used as a means to determine
matters that occurred in the execution of such contract, i.e., the determination of what each party has given under the void
contract to allow restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.

Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules. There is no provision in the
Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void document. The Rules only require that the evidence is relevant
and not excluded by the Rules for its admissibility.

Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the purpose of introducing it as evidence is to ascertain the truth
respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the terms of the document itself.

It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or
admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and not reject them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admit them unless
plainly irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the
court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent. On the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be
irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.56

In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive provision of the law prohibiting the sale of conjugal
property without the spouse's consent. It does not, however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the consideration stated
therein. The admission of the deed of sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal policy of the court to admit the evidence:
which appears to be relevant in resolving an issue before the courts.
G.R. No. 166944 August 18, 2014

JUANITO MAGSINO, Petitioner,

Facts:

The petitioner filed against the respondents a complaint for forcible entry with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction
and/or temporary restraining order in MeTC Antipolo City, alleging that he was the owner in fee simple of a parcel of
agricultural land and the respondents, through force, intimidation, threats and strategy and with the aid of armed men, had
unlawfully bulldozed the eastern and northern portions of his land, cutting lengthwise through the land, destroying ornamental
plants and fruit-bearing trees that he had himself planted several years before, thereby illegally depriving him of the
possession of the land.

Respondent De Ocampo countered that she had held a registered title in the land by virtue of the original certificate of title
issued to her mother and that the petitioner was a squatter on the land with no possessory rights. Ramon Guico, Jr. had
allegedly owned the titled land being occupied and possessed by De Ocampo.

MTC dismissed the complaint. RTC affirmed the judgment. CA dismissed the petition as it is not accompanied by copies of the
pleadings and other material portions as would support the allegations of the petition.

Issue:

WON the petition should be dismissed

Ruling:

YES. The insufficiency of the supporting documents coupled with the unjustified refusal of the petitioner to even attempt to
substantially comply with the attachment requirement justified the dismissal of his petition.

Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regardingthe payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition,
and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof.

Under the first guidepost recognized in Galvez, only the relevant pleadings and parts of the case records needed to be
attached to the petition for review. The test of relevancy is whether the document in question would support the material
allegations of the petition.

The first omitted document was the complaint in Civil Case No. 4141. Being the initiatory pleading, the complaint included all
the material facts and dates necessary to support the petitioner’s cause of action for forcible entry.

The next omitted pleading was the answer of the respondents. The omission of the answer from the petition deprived the CA of
the means to know the factual averments of the complaint that were admitted and those that were denied.
The third omitted document was the motion to dismiss. CA could have had good reasons for noting its omission as a ground to
dismiss the petition for review.

The memoranda on appeal the parties respectively filed in the RTC were the fourth kind of omitted documents.

Based on the foregoing considerations, the petitioner entirely bypassed the first guidepost recognized in Galvez.

The second guidepost – which stipulates that a document, although relevant to the petition for review, need not be appended
if it is shown that its contents could be found in or could be drawn from another document already attached to the petition –
refers to a process whereby the CA derives the contents of the omitted relevant document from another attached to the
petition for review filed in the CA.

Even with the copy of the MTC judgment being actually attached to the petition for review, however, the second guidepost
could not be complied with because the copy was hopelessly illegible. Moreover, the MTC judgment did not contain the
statement of the issues relied upon by the petitioner in his appeal in the CA, for such statement was made only in his
memorandum on appeal.

It is worth mentioning that pursuant to the third guidepost recognized in Galvez the petitioner could still have submitted the
omitted documents at the time he filed his motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the first assailed resolution of the CA. Yet, he
did not do so.

Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a
relaxation in the application of the rules, this was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable
causes and circumstances.

The petitioner did not deserve the liberal application of the rules of procedure that he was seeking.
Topic : ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

G.R. No. 186228. March 15, 2010.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, accused- appellant.

RAPE

FACTS : On March 15, 2000 at around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, AAA was sleeping and her father, the appellant herein, woke
her up, removed his pants, slid inside the blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear; warned her not to
shout for help while threatening her with his fist; and told her that he had a knife placed above her head. He proceeded to mash
her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and “inserted his penis inside her vagina.”

BBB then, AAA’s brother arrived and found AAA crying. BBB then decided to take AAA with him to their grandmother’s house.
AAA recounted her harrowing experience with their father. Upon reaching their grandmother’s house, they told their
grandmother and uncle of the incident, after which, they sought the assistance of MOISES BOY BANTING, a bantay bayan.
Moises went to appellant’s house and invited him to the police station. At the police outpost, appellant admitted to Moises
that he raped AAA because he was unable to control himself .

RTC DECISION : The RTC found appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua plus payment of damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modifications the decision of the
trial court and increased the damages awarded. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court via notice of appeal.

ISSUE : WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION MADE BEFORE A BANTAY BAYAN WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE
OF A COUNSEL IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE?

RULING : NO. The Court is convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the
case of the “bantay bayan” are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of
peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the
specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan” particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial
investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a
suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the
Miranda Rights, is concerned.

The Court find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.

The Court nonetheless agree with the CA that the conviction of the appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed
extrajudicial confession but “from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Security Bank & Trust Company vs. Triumph Lumber and Construction Corporation

G.R. No. 126696, January 21, 1999

FACTS:

Triumph Lumber claims that on March 23 and 24, 1987, three (3) checks all payable to cash and all drawn against plaintiffs
aforementioned current account were presented for encashment at Security Bank's Sucat Parañaque branch. Plaintiff claims
that due to defendant bank's gross negligence and inexcusable negligence in exercising ordinary diligence in verifying from
plaintiff the encashment of plaintiff's checks whose amount exceed P10,000.00 and in determining the forgery of drawer's
signatures, the aforesaid three (3) checks were encashed by unauthorized persons to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff
corporation. Triumph Lumber then requested Security Bank to credit back and restore to its account the value of the checks in
the amount of P300,000.00 but despite due demand the defendant failed to pay its liability.

Security Bank claims that on June 19, 1985 triumph Lumber opened a savings account and a current account with Security
Bank Sucat branch. Triumph Lumber herein provided Security Bank with the requisite specimen signature cards which in
effect authorized defendant bank to honor withdrawals on the basis of any two of three signatures affixed thereon, specifically
those of Mr. Dee Kong, Mr. Co Yok Teng and Mr. Chun Yun Kit. Subsequently, plaintiff executed an automatic transfer
agreement authorizing defendant bank to transfer cleared funds from plaintiff's savings account to its current . Defendant also
claims that the savings account pass book and the check booklets were kept by the plaintiff in its filing cabinet but on March
23, 1987 the plaintiff herein discovered that the door of his office was forced open including that of the filing cabinet where the
check booklets and other bank documents were being kept by the plaintiff. The defendant further claims that the incident was
not reported to the police authorities by the plaintiff, nor was there any advise given to defendant bank. On the same day, the
plaintiff nevertheless made three separate deposits in a total amount of P374,554.10, and immediately after the said deposit,
three checks, all payable to cash, were successively presented to the defendant bank for encashment, which was given due
course by the latter after said checks have passed through the standard bank procedure for verification the check signatures
and the regularity of the material particular of said checks.

The trial court found no preponderance of evidence to support Triumph Lumber's complaint. Triumph Lumber failed to show
that the signatures on the subject checks were forged. It did not even present in court the originals of the checks. Neither did it
bother to explain its failure to do so. Thus, it could be presumed that the original checks were willfully suppressed and would
be adverse to Triumph Lumber's case if produced. Moreover, the signatures on the checks were not compared with the
specimen signatures appearing on the specimen signatures cards provided by the private respondent upon opening its current
account with petitioner. Thus, the opinion of the expert witness is not worthy of credit. Besides, the private respondent failed
to present Mr. Co Yok Teng, one of the signatories of the checks in question, to deny the genuineness of the signatures.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the Security Bank to reimburse Triumph
Lumber. The Court of appeals held that it was not necessary for the private respondent to prove that the signatures on the
three checks in question were forged of the following admissions set forth in petitioner's answer.

After its motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether the signatures were forged is no longer an issue in the case considering the affirmative defenses set fort in
petitioner's answer.
HELD:

No. The Court of Appeals also erred in holding that forgery was duly established. First, Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court was not complied with by private respondent. The Section explicitly provides that when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. This is what is known as the
"best evidence" rule. The exceptions are as follows:

1. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

2. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails
to produce it after reasonable notice;

3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time, and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

4. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

In this case, the originals of the alleged forged check has to be produced since it was shown that any of these exceptions was
present. What the private respondent offered were mere photocopies of the checks in question marked as Exhibits "A," "B,"
and "C," It never explained the reason why it could not produce the originals of the checks.
G.R. No. 125812 November 28, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

Detention prisoners in Cells No. 2 and 6 of the Pampanga Provincial Jail staged a jailbreak. Two Jail Guards were killed, while
one was seriously wounded. Several pieces of firearms were also forcibly taken.

An Information was filed against herein accused-appellant Abelardo Parungao and 15 other prisoners charging them with the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries.

In an earlier and a separate trial, the court convicted four of the accused, while two were acquitted. Herein accused-appellant
Parungao who was arraigned and tried separately and thereafter convicted by the Regional Trial Court. The instant appeal is
thus with reference only to accused-appellant Parungao.

The prosecution presented its evidence having four witnesses to establish the existence of conspiracy and that accused
appellant was co-conspirator and a principal by inducement in the commission of the crime charged. Parungao denied the
allegations and claimed that he did not participate in the jailbreak and just remained in his cell at the time it happened.

Trial Court, persuaded by the prosecutions evidence, found Parungao guilty. Accused-appellant appealed the decision
assailing the reversible error on the part of the trial court in accepting and giving full probative value to the hearsay and
uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution witnesses.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to prove accused-appellant's involvement as a co-conspirator and principal by
inducement in the jailbreak, robbery, and murder case.

RULING:

NO. Plainly the foregoing testimony of 4 witnesses that accused-appellant was the mastermind of the jail break is not
sufficient to prove such fact, such evidence being merely hearsay because said witnesses testified and conveyed to the court
matters not of their own personal knowledge but matters only narrated to them by other detainees. There is nothing in their
testimony pointing to accused-appellant as the very source of their information that he planned the jailbreak.

The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the lack of objection to hearsay testimony may result in
its being admitted as evidence. But one should not be misled into thinking that such declarations are thereby impressed with
probative value. Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected
to or not can not be given credence for it has no probative value.

The Court is not convinced that there is enough evidence to prove accused-appellant's guilt beyond the shadow of a doubt.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Accused-appellant Abelardo Parungao is
hereby ACQUITTED and his immediate release from custody is ordered unless he is being held on other legal grounds.
TONGONAN HOLDINGS and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO ESCAÑO, JR. Respondent.

G.R. No. 190994 September 7, 2011

Facts:

Respondent Atty. Francisco Escaño, Jr. (Atty. Escaño) represented the petitioner, Tongonan Holdings and Development
Corporation (THDC) in an eminent domain case. After the dissolution of the law firm, Atty. Escaño continued to represent
THDC from July 1, 1999 until his services was terminated by THDC in April 2005. Eventually, THDC was awarded just
compensation. Atty. Escaño sought the entry of his attorney’s liens but only 15% of the judgment award in the name of the
partners was fixed by the trial court. THDC terminated the services of Atty. Escaño on the ground of loss of confidence, which
was approved by the RTC.

Afterward, Atty. Esca͠ño filed a "Motion to Enter Into the Records Attorney’s Lien"8 for additional attorney’s fees of 15% for his
professional services, rendered after the dissolution of their law firm. He also asked for another 33.7% as additional attorney’s
fees for Atty. Lino Dumas and partners, whom he claimed to be his consultants when the case was on appeal. These amounts
were on top of the 15% already finally awarded. In all, he was demanding a total of 63.7% of the judgment award.

The RTC held that Atty. Escaño was not entitled to an additional compensation on the ground that when he took over the case
from their law firm there was no separate contract for his legal services. After his motion for reconsideration was denied he
filed a Notice of Appeal which was later given due course. THDC then filed its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to
Dismiss Appeal which was granted. The CA, however, concluded that giving due course to Atty. Escaño’s Notice of Appeal and
putting in escrow the money judgment was proper and appropriate as there was still a need to determine the issue of
attorney’s fees.

At the outset, Atty. Escaño alleges that the petition failed to comply with Rule 45 as it did not distinctly set forth the questions
of law THDC raised before this Court, and that the seven (7) grounds raised by THDC involved questions of facts, rather than of
law, which are not proper in a petition for review under Rule 45.

Issue:

Whether or not the issues raised by THDC are questions of law

Ruling:

Yes. In Republic of the Philippines v. Malabanan, the Court distinguished a question of law from a question of fact. A question
of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must
rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the
appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the
issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of
fact.

A perusal of the present petition shows that the issues raised by THDC are questions of law, as the same can be resolved
solely on what the law provides under the undisputed facts. The issues are the correct appreciation of Atty. Escaño’s appeal,
the exact meaning, interpretation and application of "interlocutory order;" the rule that an interlocutory order cannot be
appealed; the legality of the CA decision on the issue of escrow; whether the CA can make a determination of an issue that it
did not recognize; the legality of the CA decision on the issue of attorney’s fees when there is no pending case yet on the
matter; the CA’s declaration in the questioned decision that the RTC Order dated April 2, 2007 is revived and immediately
executory; and the question of denial of due process. All of these, indeed, are questions of law. Thus, Atty. Escaño’s argument
that the grounds thereof are factual is misleading.

Atty. Escaño is not entitled to the escrow of the entire proceeds of the case. Neither is he entitled to the escrow of additional
claim for attorney’s fees of 15% for his personal services after the dissolution of their law firm and 33.7% in favor of his
consultant, Atty. Lino Dumas and Partners. Atty. Escaño has already collected his fees through his former law firm and is now
enjoying the fruits of his labor, the uncertainty of the release of his client’s award notwithstanding. He, therefore, has no more
right to prevent the release of the judgment award in favor of THDC.
22. PEOPLE v. JOHNNY M. QUIZON, GR No. 142532, 2003-11-18

Facts: Conchita Magpantay Pasquin was connected to Angeles City's Suarez Travel Services. Her living quarters were the
travel agency's offices.

Rowena Abril is a law firm secretary.

Rowena heard booming sounds emanating from

Conchita's office, but she didn't give the incident much thought. A man walked by Rowena as she was leaving her office to go
to a nearby store twenty-five minutes later. Rowena got the feeling that the man, hurrying along, was from Suarez's office.

Transportation Services. Rowena went to see Conchita at four-fifty in the afternoon to return the magazine. The main door was
closed, but she could see that the door leading to Conchita's office was open. Rowena made the decision to go because no
one had opened the door for her.

Miclat, Myla... additionally

To give Conchita P17,000.00 for Myla's round-trip plane ticket to Guam, Roel Sicangco went to see her. Conchita introduced
Johnny Quizon to them while they were in her office. entered as her nephew.

as soon as Myla... went back to Travel Services Suarez. She rapped on the door, but no one came to answer.

Myla went back to Conchita's desk. Once more, no one was visible. Myla visited the... the agency's neighbor to find out if
anyone was in the office. After climbing, the neighbor looked inside and noticed a body wrapped in a blanket.

The proprietor of Suarez Travel Services, Marietta Suarez, got a call. to let her know that Conchita had suffered a terrible injury

By then, there were a few people and a number of police officers on the scene. It seems that the policemen broke down the
door to discover Conchita's body covered in a white blanket. The jewelry box owned by Conchita and the... Myla's payment
was missing.

The court of trial held:

In reality, no one witnessed the victim's death or the robbery's execution. To prove Johnny Quizon's guilt, the prosecution is
only depending on circumstantial evidence. An accused person may still be found guilty under our evidence rules even in the
absence of... Eyewitnesses are available if the prosecution has established sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish the
accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The prosecution did not provide any concrete proof to prove the accused's guilt. We are forced to evaluate the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution in order to decide if it would be enough to find the accused guilty:

Consequently... This results in the conviction of accused Johnny Quizon for the crime of robbery with homicide beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Rather than submitting an appellee's brief, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a well-reasoned manifestation and motion
with the Court, claiming that the existence of all circumstantial evidence was not sufficiently established. The OSG upheld:

"Appellant should be declared not guilty and freed. The prosecution utterly failed to provide sufficient circumstantial evidence
to support a conviction.

Initially. It was incorrect for the trial court to accept Miclat's testimony, according to which the appellant was the victim's last
surviving companion. Similarly, the trial court erred in rejecting the appellant's and Sicangco's testimony that, after the
appellant had left... additional people entered the victim's office

But Miclat's testimony contained nothing that specifically contradicted Sicangco's testimony that... Later on, additional
people came into the office. After they left the office, Miclat said she didn't see if the man with the collectoSecondly. In the
case at hand, the trial court was unable to provide any specific circumstance that would have demonstrated the appellant's
motivation for committing the crime.

Third. The trial court interpreted the appellant's absence from the victim's funeral as an admission of guilt.

Fourth. The trial court finds fault with him for failing to clear his name after learning that he was a suspect and had fled.
The fifth. The appellant left the victim behind when they were traveling to Manila, and he left the premises quickly. Other
details about the appellant's unusual and strange behavior that the court accepted as evidence of his guilt included his...
purportedly uncooperative with the policer's bag came back.

Thus, the OSG prayed.

OVERTURNED AND SET AWAY, ACQUITING ACCUSED APPELLANT JOHNNY M. QUIZON.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the accused- appellant guilty of robbery with homicide without his guilt having
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

The Court upholds the recommendation of the Solicitor General.

Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

"Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a)

There is more than one circumstance;

(b)

The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c)

The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt."

The foregoing elements must all be obtaining in order to aptly warrant the conviction of an accused. The circumstances proved
must be congruous with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of... guilt.[6] It must be shown (a) that there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which
the inferences are derived have been firmly established and (b) that the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond... reasonable doubt.

Evidently, Conchita Magpantay Pasquin was a victim of foul play. The circumstances recited by the trial court, however, would
be insufficient to create in the mind of the Court a moral certainty that appellant was the one responsible for the commission
of the crime. Appellant's... mere presence at the locus criminis would be inadequate to implicate him[8] in the commission of
the crime. No evidence was adduced that appellant was the last person to see or talk to the victim before she was killed. Roel
Sicangco testified that... when he and Myla arrived at Conchita's office, the latter had just finished talking to a woman and a
man with a collector's bag. After Roel and Myla finished their transaction with Conchita, the same man and woman, whom
they saw earlier, again entered Conchita's office. Roel... testified that he saw Johnny come out of the office and board a
passenger jeepney going to Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The prosecution failed to show that Sicangco had any good reason to
lie. Even while the trial court had observed that Conchita's jewelry and money were never... found, no evidence was
introduced that appellant had them, or that he had them in his possession at anytime after Conchita's death. The trial court
found it strange that appellant did not wait for Conchita when the latter said that she was also leaving for Manila. Appellant
said... that he did offer to wait for Conchita but she told him to go ahead as she still had some other work to attend to.

The fact that appellant did not attend Conchita's wake is not an indication of either flight or guilt.

Significantly, no ill-motive was ascribed on appellant to either kill or rob his own aunt.

The circumstances recited by the trial court might be enough to create some kind of suspicion on the part of the trial court of
appellant's involvement, but suspicion is not enough to warrant conviction.

The evidence for the prosecution, it has been said, must at all times stand or fall on its own weight and it cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the defense.[10] An accused has the right to be presumed innocent, and this...
presumption prevails until and unless it is overturned by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

JOHNNY M. QUIZON... is ACQUITTED of the crime charged

G.R. No. 213215

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Facts: Ruben Caron was charged with the rape and killing of a seven year old girl identified as AAA. 8 witnesses testified for the
prosecution. AAA’s mother testified that , AAA sought permission to play at the day care center and at about 1:30 pm Baron
arrived with AAA, both of them wet from head to toe. They informed her that they bathed at the seawall. They then asked her
permission to go for a joy-ride in Baron’s trisikad. They returned at about 4 pm. At about 5:30 pm, she noticed that her daughter
was missing. AAA”s mother sought Baron’s assistance in searching for AAA. Baron initially refused, but with her prodding,
reluctantly relented. With the permission of the landowner Felix Gascon and Barangay Captain Segundina , entered the
seawall, where they found the lifeless body of AAA. Other witnesses mentioned that they saw Baron is with his trisikad with
AAA in the passenger seat. Other 2 witnesses who are minors were the acquintence of AAA, testified that they saw AAA
proceeded to the seawall herself and saw that Baron picked up AAA and never returned to play with them.

3 witnesses testified for the defense. Baron resorted to a denial. Trinidad Palacios said she rode Baron from the Molo
Supermarket to their house. Flordeliza Baron, Baron’s wife testified that baron sought permission from AAA’s mother for AAA to
go to the seawall, and much later, to join him on a joy ride. In cross examination she said she never saw Baron between 5 pm to
6pm.

RTC found Baron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. The case was referred for
review to the Court of Appeals but hereby denied.

Issue: Whether or not the accused- appellant’s guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt.

Held: The requirements for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are settled. Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence provides:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstances;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Moreover, "factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled
to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, unless the trial court is shown to have overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance."

A careful examination of the records shows that there is nothing that warrants a reversal of the Decisions of the Regional Trial
Court and of the Court of Appeals.

As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, a multiplicity of circumstances, which were attested to by credible witnesses and duly
established from the evidence, points to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant was responsible for the rape and
killing of the seven-year-old child, AAA:

(1) Seven-year-old Gennivive Belarma was playing with AAA when Baron picked up AAA and brought her to the river/seawall.

(2) Alcid Flores saw accused-appellant clad in a white sleeveless shirt and short pants with AAA walking towards the seawall
at about 4:15 p.m. on May 4, 1999.

(3) Twelve-year-old Ma. Concepcion Tacorda saw a man clad in a white sleeveless shirt and short pants right behind AAA as
she was going towards the seawall. Her description of what the man was wearing matched Flores’ and Valguna’s description
of what Baron was wearing.

(4) Arsenio Valguna saw accused-appellant, clad in a white sleeveless shirt and short pants, nervously and hurriedly leaving
the seawall and, thereafter, boarding his trisikad.
(5) Accused-appellant’s conduct when he was asked by AAA’s mother to join the search, in which he expressed much
reluctance despite his having been the last known companion of AAA.

(6) AAA’s body, which bore injuries at the vaginal area, was discovered at the seawall. The seawall is the same place several
witnesses identified as where AAA and accused-appellant went in the afternoon of May 4, 1999. This is also the same from
where accused-appellant nervously and hurriedly left in the same afternoon.

(7) The lacerations sustained by AAA on her vagina, which, per Dr. Doromal, could very well have been caused by the insertion
of an erect penis.

(8) The medico-legal findings pointing to asphyxiation by drowning as the cause of AAA’s death, along with other injuries on her
thorax, abdomen, and extremities.

Testimonies regarding these details were given by disinterested witnesses whom Baron himself had not managed to discredit
for having any ill-motive against him. Two (2) of the prosecution witnesses are even children of tender age.

There is, thus, no error in the Regional Trial Court’s and the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that accused-appellant Ruben Baron
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide of the seven-year-old child, AAA. His conviction must be
affirmed.
ANTONIO LEJANO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 176389/ 176864. December 14, 2010.

Abad, J.

Against positive evidence, alibi becomes most unsatisfactory. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of a credible
witness. Denial is self-serving negative evidence that cannot be given greater weight than the declaration of a credible witness
who testified on affirmative matters.

FACTS:

On June 30, 1991, Estrelita Vizconde and her daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were brutally murdered in Parañaque City,
triggering a high-profile investigation. Despite initial arrests and confessions, the trial court suspected a setup and released
the suspects, leaving the true culprits unknown. In 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation claimed to have cracked the
case, unveiling Jessica Alfaro as a key witness. Alfaro implicated several individuals, including Herbert Jeffrey Webb, in the
crime, also alleging police involvement. Based largely on Alfaro's testimony, prosecutors filed charges against Webb and
others for rape and homicide. Supporting witnesses, such as the medical examiner and individuals linked to the accused,
corroborated Alfaro's account. The case gained widespread attention, dubbed the Vizconde massacre, stirring public interest
in uncovering the truth behind the tragic events.

Webb and the others were convicted by the RTC and the decision was upheld by the CA. In April 2010, Webb requested DNA
analysis of semen from Carmela's cadaver. However, the NBI informed the court that it no longer had custody of the
specimen, which was turned over to the trial court but not presented as evidence. Webb filed a motion to acquit, citing denial
of due process due to the government's failure to preserve vital evidence. This invoked Brady v. Maryland, arguing lack of due
process for failure to produce the semen as DNA evidence, whether by negligence or willful suppression.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s testimony that he led the others in
committing the crime? (YES)

RULING:

No, Webb's request for acquittal due to the State's failure to produce the semen specimen was denied, as per Arizona v.
Youngblood, unless bad faith was proven. The medical evidence confirms rape and semen presence in Carmela, questioning
Alfaro's credibility. The semen's DNA, unique like fingerprints, could exonerate Webb if not matching. Despite Brady v.
Maryland, Arizona v. Youngblood dictates state non-obligation to preserve it without bad faith. Webb's DNA testing request
lacked legal framework and technology. Thus, acquittal isn't warranted solely due to specimen absence.

The absence of DNA testing regulations and technology at the time, coupled with no mention of preserving the specimen,
negated Webb's claim. Despite Webb's alibi, Alfaro's identification as the perpetrator stood, challenging the notion that all
denials and alibis are fabricated. Alfaro's credibility was questioned due to her background as a paid informant. Webb's
documented alibi, supported by passport records, contradicted Alfaro's testimony. Despite the Court of Appeals' skepticism
regarding travel documents, the presumption of truth in official records should prevail without substantial evidence to the
contrary. Webb's alibi undermined Alfaro's testimony against not only him but also other accused individuals. Thus, without
Webb's involvement, Alfaro's narrative collapsed, raising doubts about the case's integrity.

Against positive evidence, alibi becomes most unsatisfactory. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of a credible
witness. Denial is self-serving negative evidence that cannot be given greater weight than the declaration of a credible witness
who testified on affirmative matters
29. People v. Paulino de los Santos, G.R. No. 248929, November 9, 2020

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

VS.

PAULINO DELOS SANTOS, JR. ALIAS "SKYLAB," ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

G.R. No. 248929, November 09, 2020

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

A man is convicted of parricide for stabbing his father to death, and the court affirms his conviction based on the positive
identification of a credible witness and the consistency of the testimony with the physical evidence.

FACTS:

The case involves the appellant who was charged with parricide for allegedly stabbing his father to death. The incident
occurred in the evening of May 8, 2011, in Paracale, Camarines Norte. Witnesses testified to seeing the appellant engaged in a
heated argument with his father, leading to the fatal stabbing. However, the appellant presented a different version of events,
claiming he was awakened by noise and later found his father dead in a neighbor's house.

During trial, witnesses, including one of the appellant's cousins, positively identified him as the perpetrator. Police officers
corroborated the events surrounding the incident, and a municipal health officer confirmed the cause of death.

Despite the appellant's denial and alibi, the trial court found him guilty of parricide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and
ordering him to pay damages to the victim's heirs.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial court's decision, arguing that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He questioned the credibility of the witnesses and pointed out alleged inconsistencies in
their testimonies.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision but modified it to include interest on the monetary awards.

Now before the Supreme Court, the appellant seeks acquittal. Both the appellant and the prosecution opted not to file
supplemental briefs, instead adopting their arguments presented before the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming Paulino Delos Santos, Jr.'s conviction for parricide.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirms the conviction with modifications.

Parricide is defined under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, involving the killing of one's father, mother, or child. The
appellant admitted and stipulated that the victim, Paulino, Sr., is his father.

The main witness, Michael, positively identified the appellant as the killer, providing detailed testimony about the events
leading to the stabbing. The court finds Michael's testimony credible, straightforward, and consistent with the physical
evidence. The death certificate confirms a single stab wound as the cause of death.

The court rejects the appellant's claim of no motive, as Michael testified about the appellant's intoxicated state, heated
argument with his brother, and the ensuing challenge to fight his father.

The appellant's denial, alibi, and flight from the crime scene are dismissed, and the court emphasizes that denial and alibi,
without credible evidence, hold no weight.

The court affirms the conviction for parricide and sentences the appellant to reclusion perpetua. The phrase "without eligibility
for parole" is deemed unnecessary in this case. The awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are
increased, and temperate damages are granted. All awarded amounts shall earn six percent interest per annum from the
finality of the decision until fully paid. The appeal is dismissed, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with
modifications.
[ G.R. No. 216120. March 29, 2017 ]

PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY (ALSO KNOWN AS PHILTRUST BANK), PETITIONER, VS. REDENTOR R. GABINETE, SHANGRILA
REALTY CORPORATION AND ELISA T. TAN, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: Petitioner Philtrust, a domestic commercial banking corporation filed a complaint on March 2006 against Shangrila
Realty Corporation, a domestic corporation together with Elisa Tan and respondent Redentor Gabinete alleging that
petitioner granted Shangrila's application for a renewal of its bills discounting line in the amount of Twenty Million Pesos
(₱20,000,000.00) as shown by a letter-advice dated May 28, 1997 bearing the conformity of Shangrila's duly-authorized
representatives, Tan and respondent Gabinete. The said loan was conditioned on the execution of a Continuing Suretyship
Agreement dated August 20, 1997, with Shangrila as borrower and respondent Gabinete and Tan as sureties, primarily to
guaranty, jointly and severally, the payment of the loan.

Respondent Gabinete claimed that when he received a demand for payment from Philtrust, he immediately replied and
denied any participation in the transaction and informed Philtrust that his signature in the Continuing Surety Agreement
had been forged. That Respondent presented an NBI document examiner who testified that the questioned signatures and
the standard sample signatures were not written by one and the same person.

The RTC, however, still ruled in favor of petitioner and held the respondents liable to pay the petitioner. That on appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision for not giving credit to the testimony of the NBI signature examiner and held that
Gabinete is not liable to Philtrust. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC was correct in disregarding the findings of the NBI document examiner.

RULING: YES.

A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts and that the judge still exercises
independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny.

In this case, the RTC judge was able to exercise his independent judgment in determining the authenticity or
genuineness of the signature in question, and not rely merely on the testimony of the NBI Document Examiner. Needless
to say, the RTC's Decision is more in depth in its analysis of the absence of forgery than that of the CA's finding that forgery is
present.

As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence, the burden of proof lies
on the party alleging forgery. One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or
evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. In this case, the
respondent was not able to prove the fact that his signature was forged. A notarized document has the presumption of
regularity. The lawyer who notarized the same even testified in court and confirmed the presence of the respondent in signing
the subject document (Continuing Surety Agreement). Hence, Gabinete was not able to prove that his signature was forged.

The Court granted the petitioner and reinstated the RTC’s Decision. The respondent is ordered to pay Philtrust.

Rimorin vs People
G.R. No. 146481

FACTS:

Col. Panfilo Lacson received information that certain syndicated groups were engaged in smuggling activities somewhere in
Port Area, Manila.

Col. Lacson and his men returned to the same area,because as per information given to him, the said cargo truck will come
out from the premises of the 2nd COSAC Detachment in said place. COSAC stands for Constabulary Off-Shore Anti-Crime
Battalion. An Isuzu panel came out from the place of the 2nd COSAC Detachment. It returned before 4:00 a.m. of same day.

The cargo truck was intercepted. Col. Lacson noticed that the Toyota car following the cargo truck suddenly made a sharp U-
turn towards the North, unlike the cargo truck which was going south. Almost by impulse, Col. Lacson's car also made a U-
turn and gave chase to the speeding Toyota car. Lacson and his men searched the car and they found several firearms

When the cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 was searched, 305 cases of blue seal or untaxed cigarettes were found inside
said truck. The cargo truck driver known only as 'Boy' was able to escape while the other passengers or riders of said truck
were apprehended, namely: Police Sgt. Arturo Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force, Pat. Felicisimo Rieta of Kawit Police Force,
and Gonzalo Vargas, a civilian.

Rimorin claims that it was only two to three days later that he saw the alleged smuggled cigarettes at the office of the MISG
when it was presented by the investigator. They were not present when these alleged smuggled cigarettes were taken from the
truck they rode in.

In affirming the RTC, the CA ruled that the defense of denial interposed by petitioner paled in comparison with the
overwhelming testimonial and documentary evidence against him. In particular, it noted that while he and his co-accused
raised questions of fact in their appeal, they failed to show that the trial court had significantly erred in assessing the credibility
of the testimonies of witnesses for the respondent.

Petitioner argues that he cannot be convicted of smuggling under the Tariff and Customs Code, because respondent failed to
present the seized contraband cigarettes in court. Equating the actual physical evidence -- the 305 cases of blue seal
cigarettes -- with the corpus delicti, he urges this Court to rule that the failure to present it was fatal to respondent's cause.

ISSUE:

Whether it was necessary to present the seized goods to prove the corpus delicti.

RULING:

No. The Court, on several occasions, has explained that corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime
charged or to the body or substance of the crime.In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered. Hence, to prove the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for the
prosecution to be able show that (1) a certain fact has been proven — say, a person has died or a building has been burned;
and (2) a particular person is criminally responsible for the act.

Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witness'
uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be
established by circumstantial evidence.

Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the corpus delicti had been competently established by respondent's evidence, which
consisted of the testimonies of credible witnesses and the Custody Receipt issued by the Bureau of Customs for the
confiscated goods.

Col. Panfilo Lacson's testimony on the apprehension of petitioner and on the seizure of the blue seal cigarettes was clear and
straightforward. So, too, did Gregorio Abrigo — customs warehouse storekeeper of the Bureau — categorically testify that the
MISG had turned over to him the seized blue seal cigarettes, for which he issued a Custody Receipt dated October 15, 1979.
Raymundo v. Lunaria, G.R. No. 171036, October 17, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioners asked respondent Lunaria to assist them locate a buyer for their property in Marilao, Bulacan with an area of
12,126 square meters for ₱60,630,000. Respondent Lunaria was promised a 5% agent's commission if he found a buyer.

After respondents found a buyer, Cecilio Hipolito, an "Exclusive Authority to Sell" was executed embodying the agreement
made by the parties. After the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property was registered in the Registry of Deeds, a
copy thereof was given to the Far East Bank and Trust Co., which was then holding in escrow the amount of ₱50,000,000 to be
disbursed or paid against the total consideration or price of the property.

Ceferino G. Raymundo, one of the co-owners, advised respondents to go to the bank to receive the amount of ₱1,196,000 as
partial payment of their total commission.

Also, respondents were instructed to return after seven days to get the balance of the commission due them. Respondents
returned to the bank. However, the check covering the balance of their commission was already given by the bank manager to
Lourdes R. Raymundo, the representative of the petitioners. Respondents tried to get the check from the petitioners, however,
they were told that there is nothing more due them by way of commission as they have already divided and distributed the
balance of the commissions among their nephews and nieces.

For their part, petitioners counter that there was a subsequent verbal agreement entered into by the parties after the execution
of the written agreement. Said verbal agreement provides that the 5% agent's commission shall be divided as follows: 2/5 for
the agents, 2/5 for Lourdes Raymundo, and 1/5 for the buyer, Hipolito. The share given to Lourdes Raymundo shall be in
consideration

for the help she would extend in the processing of documents of sale of the property, the payment of the capital gains tax to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and in securing an order from the court. The 1/5 commission given to Hipolito, on the other
hand, will be used by him for the payment of realty taxes.

Hence, for failure of the respondents to receive the balance of their agent's commission, they filed an action for the collection
of a sum of money before the RTC of Valenzuela City. The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of the respondents. Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with the modification that the amount of moral and exemplary damages
awarded to respondents shall be reduced.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in requiring petitioners to establish their case by more than a preponderance of evidence.?

RULING:

NO. Petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in requiring them to prove the existence of the subsequent verbal
agreement by more than a mere preponderance of evidence since no rule of evidence requires them to do so. In support of
this allegation, petitioners presented petitioner Lourdes Raymundo who testified that she was given 2/5 share of the
commission pursuant to the verbal sharing scheme because she took care of the payment of the capital gains tax, the
preparation of the documents of sale and of securing an authority from the court to sell the property.

For their part, respondents counter that the appellate court did not require petitioners to prove the existence of the
subsequent oral agreement by more than a mere preponderance of evidence. What the appellate court said is that the
petitioners failed to prove and establish the alleged subsequent verbal agreement even by mere preponderance of evidence.

Petitioners' above-cited allegation has no merit. By preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced
by one side is superior to that of the other. It refers to the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and
is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence".
It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

Both the appellate court and trial court ruled that the evidence presented by the petitioners is not sufficient to support their
allegation that a subsequent verbal agreement was entered into by the parties. In fact, both courts correctly observed that if
Lourdes Raymundo was in reality offered the 2/5 share of the agent's commission for the purpose of assisting respondent
Lunaria in the documentation requirement, then why did the petitioners not present any written court order on her authority,
tax receipt or sales document to support her self-serving testimony? Moreover, even the worksheet allegedly reflecting the
commission sharing was unilaterally prepared by petitioner Lourdes Raymundo without any showing that respondents
participated in the preparation thereof or gave their assent thereto. Even the alleged payment of 1/5 of the commission to the
buyer to be used in the payment of the realty taxes cannot be given credence since the payment of realty taxes is the obligation
of the owners, and not the buyer. Lastly, if the said sharing agreement was entered into pursuant to the wishes of the buyer,
then he should have been presented as witness to corroborate the claim of the petitioners. However, he was not.
CORPUZ, RIZALYN B.

G.R. No. 204289 November 22, 2017

FERNANDO MANCOL, JR., PETITIONER

VS.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT

TIJAM, J.:

FACTS:

The Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) scheduled an Invitation to Bid for Negotiated Sale on

October 13, 2004, over a residential lot with a two-storey building. The petitioner, Fernando Mancol, Jr.,

executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) appointing his father, Fernando Mancol, Sr., to represent and

negotiate the sale of the subject property. DBP issued an Official Receipt in the name of Fernando R.

Mancol, Jr., paid by Fernando M. Mancol, Sr., in the amount of P265,200, as initial payment for the

purchase price of the subject property.

In 2006, DBP reneged on its undertaking based on the oral agreement. The petitioner made a deposit with

DBP for the payment of the CGT and documentary stamp tax (DST) in the amount of P99,450. In a letter

dated February 21, 2006, the petitioner demanded from DBP to comply with its verbal undertaking. DBP

disregarded the subsequent oral agreement and reminded the petitioner that DBP has no obligation to eject

the occupants and to cause the transfer of title of the lot in the petitioner's name.

The petitioner filed a Complaint for damages for breach of contract against DBP before the RTC of

Calbayog City, Branch. DBP alleged that the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale stated no condition that

DBP would work on the document of transfer and to eject the occupants thereon. DBP also argued that the

petitioner grossly violated the terms and conditions of the agreement of sale and did not comply with the

clear and express provisions of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the rules and procedures of sale on

negotiation.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the undisputed relevant and material evidence on record established the existence and

validity of the oral agreement ?

RULING :

NO.

The parol evidence rule prohibits adding or contradicting the terms of a written agreement by testimony or

other evidence. However, this rule is merely a general rule. If a party challenges any exceptions in Rule

130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, they can present evidence to modify, explain, or add to

the agreement's terms. Failure to object is considered a waiver, and parol evidence may be entertained. In

the case of Maunlad Savings & Loan Assoc., Inc. v. CA, the court ruled that objections to evidence must

be made as soon as the grounds become reasonably apparent. In this case, the petitioner invoked the
fourth exception under the parol evidence rule to prove the verbal agreement allegedly made by DBP.

However, the bank failed to object during the trial, leading to DBP waiving the protection of the parol

evidence rule. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while its probative

value refers to whether the admitted evidence proves an issue.

A witness's testimony in a case is considered hearsay evidence, as it is based on what they know of their

own perception. This is a prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a

disputed fact. Villanueva's testimony falls within this category, as he had no personal knowledge of the

contemporaneous verbal agreement between the petitioner and DBP. The alleged verbal agreement was

entered into between DBP and MancoI, Sr., by virtue of the SPA. Villanueva's testimony related only to

the fact that Atty. De Asis ordered him to bring documents, such as a check worth P99,450, the amount for

the CGT, title, TD, and the deed of sale. His testimony did not bolster the petitioner's allegation to any

degree.

Mancol, Sr.'s testimony also falls within the category of hearsay evidence, as there is no evidence to prove

that he personally entered into a verbal agreement with DBP. The RTC observed that nowhere in the

records would there be any mention of who personally appeared before DBP or its officials to forge the

alleged verbal agreement.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. XXX, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

PERALTA, C.J.:

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 20, 2018 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
02408 is hereby AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant XXX is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Rape by Sexual
Intercourse and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole. He is ORDERED to PAY
the victim AAA the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 by way of
exemplary damages. He is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of
this Decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

FACTS:

XXX was indicted for the crime of Rape by sexual intercourse in an Information

Upon arraignment, XXX pleaded not guilty to the charge. After pretrial was terminated, trial on the merits followed.

The prosecution presented the minor-victim AAA, her mother BBB, her sister CCC, and Dr. Naomi N. Poca (Dr. Poca) as its
witnesses.

XXX is AAA's uncle, being the younger brother of her mother BBB.

in the afternoon, AAA was at home because she only had a half-day class session for that day. Suddenly, XXX entered AAA's
house, grabbed her by the arm and dragged her inside the bedroom. There, XXX inquired from AAA the whereabouts of her
mother, sister and brother.Ꮮ In reply, AAA said that her mother and sister were both at work, while her brother was at school.
Upon learning that AAA was alone in the house, XXX took off AAA's shorts and underwear. Then, XXX also took off his shorts
and underwear. Thereupon, XXX went on top of AAA and inserted his penis inside AAA's vagina. AAA claimed that she was not
able to resist or fight XXX's sexual advances because he threatened her not to make noise.

CCC arrived home from work as she only went on a half-day duty. CCC saw a pair of slippers outside their door that she was
not familiar with. Upon entering, CCC was shocked by what she had witnessed. She saw XXX and AAA both naked waist down,
with XXX on top of AAA, who was then continuously crying. CCC caught XXX having carnal knowledge of AAA. Startled, XXX
immediately stood up. Failing to contain her fury, CCC berated and attacked XXX. CCC and XXX briefly wrestled with each
other until XXX's mother intervened, and asked CCC not to tell the incident to anyone. Meanwhile, XXX took his shorts and
underwear and ran away. CCC recalled that AAA could not utter a word and was in obvious state of shock. CCC told AAA to put
on her underwear and shorts.
CCC and AAA went to the place of work of their mother, BBB, and CCC apprised the latter of what happened. BBB and CCC
accompanied AAA to the police station to report the incident as well as to lodge a complaint against XXX. The following day,
they proceeded to the █████████ Memorial Medical Center where AAA was medically examined.

XXX was about 26 to 27 years old while, AAA was only 12 years, 3 months and 27 days old at the time of the rape incident.

Dr. Poca, observed redness around the hymen of the victim which can be caused by infection or irritation. She declared that
the medical evaluation cannot exclude sexual abuse.

RTC rendered a verdict of conviction. The RTC held that the prosecution was able to establish with certitude that XXX had
carnal knowledge of AAA through force and intimidation, and such fact was established through the clear and convincing
testimony of the said victim who has no motive to testify falsely against XXX. The trial court ruled that AAA's claim of rape was
amply corroborated by the testimony of CCC, who actually witnessed XXX having carnal knowledge of AAA against the latter's
will.

The RTC rejected the defense of denial proffered by XXX declaring the same to be unconvincing and self-serving
negative evidence which could not prevail over the positive identification of him by AAA and CCC as the culprit to the
dastardly deed.

CA rendered its assailed Decision affirming the conviction of XXX for Rape by sexual intercourse. The appellate court declared
that the credible testimony of AAA was sufficient to sustain XXX's conviction for the crime charged. The CA considered the
testimony of CCC to be in the nature of a circumstantial evidence of the sexual intercourse between XXX and AAA.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE AND ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

RULING:

NO. In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. While the accused in a rape
case may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-bound to
establish that their reliance on the victim's testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the testimony is credible,
convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature. If the testimony of the cerfeomplainant meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.

In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. Here, the trial court found AAA's
testimony to be credible as it was made in a "straightforward and spontaneous" manner.

The trial court's reliance on the victim's testimony is apt, considering that it was credible in itself and buttressed by the
testimony of her sister, CCC. Without hesitation, AAA pointed an accusing finger against XXX as the person who ravished and
sexually molested her.
The Court has held time and again that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit.

There is no evidence or even a slightest indication that AAA was impelled by an improper motive in making the accusation
against her uncle XXX. The absence of any improper motive of AAA to impute such a serious offense against XXX persuades us
that said minor victim filed the rape charge against appellant for no other reason than to seek justice for the dastardly deed
done against her. Settled is the doctrine that when there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a
prosecution witness should testify falsely against the accused or implicate him in a serious offense, the testimony deserves
full faith and credit.

Appellant's denial must be rejected as the same could not prevail over AAA's unwavering testimony and of her positive
and firm identification of him as the man who had undressed her and sexually gratified himself off her. As a negative
evidence, it pales in comparison with a positive testimony that asserts the commission of a crime and the identification
of the accused as its culprit.25 We find that the facts in the instant case do not present any exceptional circumstance
warranting a deviation from this established rule. Thus, it is clear that appellant could no longer hide behind the
protective shield of his presumed innocence.
People vs. Floresta y Selencio

Case

G.R. No. 239032

Ponente

PERLAS-BERNABE, J

Decision Date

Jun 17, 2019

In the case of People v. Floresta y Selencio, the court grants the appeal and acquits Gilbert Floresta y Selencio of murder due
to insufficient evidence and lack of positive identification as the assailant.

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Background and Procedural History

• The case involves an appeal filed by accused-appellant Gilbert Floresta y Selencio (Gilbert) against the Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming his conviction for the crime of Murder.

• The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Gilbert guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua.

• Gilbert appealed to the CA, which affirmed his conviction with modifications to the damages awarded.

• Gilbert now appeals to the Supreme Court.

The Facts

• The case involves the murder of Jay Lourd Bones y Zurbito (Jay Lourd) on December 28, 2012, in Masbate City,
Philippines.

• Jay Lourd was having a drinking session with his friend Allan Andaya when he was shot.

• Jay Lourd's wife, Jennifer Bones, heard the gunshot and found her husband bloodied on the floor.

• Jay Lourd told Jennifer to check if Gilbert was still there before he was taken to the hospital, where he later died.

• Jennifer went to the police station and identified Gilbert as the shooter.

• Gilbert claimed alibi, stating that he was watching a cockfight and playing a game with friends during the time of the
shooting.

The RTC Ruling

• The RTC found Gilbert guilty of Murder based on Jay Lourd's res gestae declaration and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua.

• The RTC rejected Gilbert's defense of alibi, stating that he failed to prove it was physically impossible for him to be at
the crime scene.

• The RTC considered Jay Lourd's statement as part of the res gestae and reliable evidence.

The CA Ruling

• The CA affirmed Gilbert's conviction but modified the damages awarded.

• The CA ruled that Jay Lourd's res gestae declaration positively identified Gilbert as the assailant.

The Issue before the Court

• The issue for the Supreme Court to resolve is whether Gilbert's conviction should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling

• The appeal is meritorious, and the Supreme Court reverses Gilbert's conviction.

• The prosecution failed to establish with proof beyond reasonable doubt that Gilbert is the perpetrator who shot and
killed Jay Lourd.

• Jay Lourd's res gestae declaration, while admissible as evidence, did not contain a positive and categorical
identification of Gilbert as the assailant.

• The Court applies the equipoise rule, which states that if inculpatory facts and circumstances can be explained in a
way consistent with the innocence of the accused, then the evidence is not sufficient to support a conviction.

• The prosecution also failed to present sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish Gilbert's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

• The testimony of Allan, who was with Jay Lourd during the shooting, further casts doubt on the identity of the
perpetrator.

• The Court concludes that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of Jay Lourd's killer beyond reasonable
doubt.

• Gilbert is acquitted of the crime of Murder, and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to release him
unless he is lawfully held for other reasons.