SECOND DIVISION

lLOILO GRAIN COMPLEX CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versusHON. MA. THERESA N. ENRIQUEZ-

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DECISION LAZARO-JAVIER, J.: The Case This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Very
Urgent Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of I/ Decision 2 G.R. No.
265153 Preliminary lnjunction1 assails the following dispositions of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)-Branch 33, Iloilo City in Special Civil Action No. 22- 35139, entitled National Grid
Corporation of the Philippines v. Iloilo Grain Complex Corporation, viz.: 1) Order dated
December 12, 2022, granting the Motion for Actual Issuance of Writ of Possession of respondent
National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP); and 2) Order3 dated January 20,
Reconsideration of petitioner (IGCC). 2023, denying the Motion for Iloilo Grain Complex
Corporation Antecedents IGCC is a private corporation registered under the laws of the
Philippines. It is engaged in the business of agriculture, specifically in fanning of rice, soya beans,
flour feed meals, coffee, and the like, production, management, operation and development of
agricultural estate, and construction of dams, dikes, wharf, canals, reservoir, etc.4 It owns
35,682 square meters (sq. m.) of industrial property known as Lot No. 3429-B-l, situated in
Barangay Ingore, La Paz, Iloilo City.5 On the other hand, NGCP is also a private corporation
registered under the laws of the Philippines. It is the holder of a national franchise to operate
and maintain the transmission assets and facilities of the National Transmission Corporation
(TransCo) under Republic Act No. 9511. 6 Section 47 of said law vests NGCP the right of eminent
domain subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed by law. 8 Rollo, pp. 3--42. 2 Id. at
43--45. Penned by Presiding Judge Ma. Theresa N. Enriquez-Gaspar of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 33, lloilo City. Id. at 253-259. Penned by Presiding Judge Ma. Theresa N. Enriquez-Gaspar
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, !loilo City. 4 Id. at 184. 6 Id. at 8. An Act Granting the
National Grid Corporation of the Philippines a Franchise to Engage in the Business of Conveying
or Transmitting Electricity Through High Voltage Back-bone System of Interconnected
Transmission Lines, Substations and Related Facilities, and for other purposes. Approved on
December 01, 2008. Id. Section 4. Right o_f Eminent Domain. - Subject to the limitations and
procedures prescribed by law, the Grantee is authorized to exercise the right of eminent domain
insofar as it may be reasonably necessary for the construction, expansion, and efficient
maintenance and operation of the transmission system and grid and the efficient operation and
maintenance of the subtransrnission systems which have not yet been disposed by TRANSCO.
The Grantee may acquire such private property as is actualiy necessary for the realization of the
purposes for which this franchise is granted: Provided, That the applicable law on eminent
domain shaII be observed, particularly, the prerequisites for taking of possession and the
detern1ination and payment of just compensation. Id. at i8-l9. I Decision 3 G.R. No. 265153 By
Letter9 dated January 14, 2022, NGCP offered to buy 11,137 sq. m. ofIGCC's industrial property
in Iloilo City at PHP 1,075.00 per sq. m. for the construction of its Ingore Cable Terminal Station
and Panay-Guimaras 138kV Transmission Line Project. 10 In its Reply Letter11 dated January 20,
2022, however, IGCC informed NGCP that the current fair market value of the subject property
was already PHP I 0,000.00 per sq. m., hence, it was unable to accept the offer for a price way
below this amount. 12 NGCP then relayed to IGCC its desire to expropriate the property, albeit it
made a last offer of PHP 5,000.00 per sq. m. equivalent to the residential zonal value of the
property. 13 On September 30, 2022, NGCP filed its Complaint for expropriation with urgent
prayer for issuance of writ of possession entitled National Grid Corporation of the Philippines v.
Jloilo Grain Complex Corporation. It was raffled to RTC-Branch 33, Iloilo City and docketed as
Special Civil Action No. 22-35139. 14 On November 11, 2022, IGCC filed its Answer with motion
for preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses. 15 The preliminary hearing was sought for the
purpose of determining the necessity of expropriating the property vis-a-vis the project's alleged
lack of approval by the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC); 16 lack of negotiation in good faith
for the purchase of the subject property; 17 adoption by NGCP of a curved line instead of a
straight line option in the taking of the property; 18 unnecessary burden or damage the curved
iine option would cause to IGCC; 19 and imminent violation of its right to due process and equal
protection of law should a writ of possession be issued in favor of NGCP. 20 IGCC further
claimed to have indefinitely postponed the intended construction of a Storage and Warehouse
Facility on its property which was supposed to accommodate the expanding needs of its affiliate
company, the La Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation, relative to its adjacent private port
operations.21 The trial court set the case for hearing on December 9, 2022 and January 20,
2023, but these supposed hearings did not actually take place. On December 20, 2022, IGCC
received a copy of NGCP's Manifestation with Motion for Actual Issuance of Writ of Possession
dated November 23, 2022.22 9 Id.at21-22. 10 Id.at21-22. II Id.a\23. 12 Id. at 23. 13 Id. at 24-25.
14 Id. at 12 and 43. 15 Id. at I 38-162. 16 Id. at 140-143. 17 Id. at 143. 18 Id.atl5l-\52. " Id. 20 Id.
at I 53. 21 Id. at 8. 22 Id. at 12. Decision 4 G.R. No. 265153 Ruling of the Regional Trial Court By
Order23 dated December 12, 2022, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of possession
without hearing, viz. : 24 After due consideration of the Motion for Actual Issuance of Writ of
Possession, the Cow-t finds merit therein, hence the relief prayed for is GRANTED.
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the compliance with Section 2, Rule 67, Rules of Court and payment of
legal fees, let a writ of possession be issued in plaintiffs favor authorizing it to enter and take
possession of the portion of Lot No. 3429-B-1, subject of this Complaint, that will be affected by
the construction and implementation of the Ingore Cable Terminal Station and Panay-Guimaras
138kV Transmission Line Project; and if necessary, order the Philippine National Police of Iloilo
City, to assist the Sheriff in the enforcement of the writ. SO ORDERED.25 Emphasis in the
original. It held that under Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 113-2019, the
issuance of a writ of possession had become ministerial in nature upon the filing of the
complaint for expropriation and NGCP's payment of the deposit in the amount of PHP
111,370,000.00 equivalent to the full zonal value of the subject property.26 Under Order27
dated January 20, 2023, the trial court, still without conducting any hearing, denied IGCC's
affirmative defenses, and its subsequent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Stay writ of
possession. It held that the ERC approval is neither a jurisdictional nor an indispensable requisite
in an action for expropriation.28 For NGCP had sufficiently alleged its authority to expropriate
the subject property and complied with the requirements for issuance of the writ
ofpossession.29 The Present Petition Citing violation of its right to due process based on a pure
question of law, IGCC consequently filed directly with the Court the present Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.30 23
ld. at 43-45. 2, Id. 25 Id at 45. 26 Id. at 43--44. 27 Id. at 253-259. 28 Id. at 254. 29 Id. at 237-239.
30 Id. at 3-37. I Decision 5 G.R. No. 265153 Under Resolution31 dated February 13, 2023, the
Court issued a TRO, enjoining the trial court and the NGCP, and all persons acting on their
behalf, from implementing the writ of possession and other related orders pending adjudication
of the petition on the merits. IGCC seeks affirmative relief from the Court and prays that the
assailed dispositions of the trial court be nullified, and a new one rendered, permanently
enjoining the implementation of the writ of possession.32 In the main, it asserts that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the issuance of the assailed writ
ofpossession.33 First, the issuance of the writ is not ministerial in this case since NGCP failed to
comply with the requirements of its franchise, i.e., the expropriation must be made in
compliance with pre-requisites set by law like Section 9( d) ofRepublic Act No. 913634 or the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of2001 (EPIR.f.. ), which requires prior approval by the ERC
of any plan for expansion or improvement of the facilities of the TransCo;35 Second, there was
no honest to goodness prior negotiation for the proposed purchase of the subject property by
NGCP in violation of the procedural requirements of Republic Act No. 10752;36 Third, the line
path chosen by NGCP for its project is not reasonably necessary. The NGCP's Sketch Plan37
attached to the complaint shows there is an alternative straight-line path from NGCP's
substation to the public highway which is shorter than NGCP's chosen line path;38 and Fourth,
IGCC has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law since only
the Court may issue the temporary restraining order prayed for under Section 3(a) of Republic
Act No. 8975.39 31 Id. at 240-241. 32 Id. at 35-36. 33 Id. at 15. 34 Section 9. Functions and
Responsibilities. - Upon the effectivity of this Act, the TRANSCO shall have the foilowing
functions and responsibilities: xx x (d) Improve and expand its transmission facilities, consistent
with the Grid Code and the Transmission Development Plan (TDP) to be promulgated pursuant
to this Act, to adequately serve generation companies, distribution utilities and suppliers
requiring transmission service and/or ancillary services through the transmission system:
Provided, That TRANSCO shall submit any plan for expansion or improvement of its facilities for
approval by the ERC. 35 Rollo, pp.19-20. 36 Otherwise known as The Right-of-Way Act,
Approved on March 07, 2016. 37 Rollo, p. 108. 38 Id. at 26--3 i. :;9 Section 3. Prohibition on the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary A1andatory Injunctions. -·· No court,
except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining ord~r, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandawry injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or
any person or entity, whether public or private acting under the government direction, to
restrain, prohibit or compel the followi11g acts: a) Acqu]sition, clearance and development of
th_e right-of-way and/or site or location of any national government project; xxxx I Decision 6
G.R. No. 265153 In its Comment with Motion to Lift TRO,40 NGCP counters that the issuance of
the writ of possession is a ministerial duty of the trial court41 in view ofNGCP's full compliance
with the requisites for its issuance.42 IGCC's arguments, on the other hand, all refer to the
propriety of expropriation which are irrelevant to the issuance of the Writ43 and which must be
properly threshed out during the hearing on the merits.44 In fine, the trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed writ of. possession.45 At any rate, it is not
true that it has no ERC approval for the Ingore Cable Tenninal Station and the Panay-Guimaras
138kV Transmission Line Project. If necessary, it shall present the same during the hearing on
the merits before the trial court.46 Too, IGCC was never amenable to the taking of the property
as it does not want the property to be taken for public use. NGCP has thus exhausted all means
to negotiate with IGCC.47 More important, its chosen line path is reasonably necessary for the
project since IGCC's proposed alternative straight-line path will run through an area with live
transmission line and permanent structures.48 Finally, the Petition must be dismissed outright
for IGCC's failure to observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.49 Issues 1) Did the filing of the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition directly with the Court violate the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts? 2) Did the trial court commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed writ of
possession? (An Act to Ensure the Expeditious Implementation and Completion of ??vemment
Infras~~ture Projects by Prohibiting Lower Comis from Issuing Temporary Restramrng Orders,
Preltmmary Jnjunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions, Providing Penalties for Violations
thereof, and for other purposes. Approved on November 07, 2000). 4 o Id. at 274-292. 41 Id. at
277-280. 42 Id. at 280. 43 Id. at 281-282. 44 Id. at 282-284. 45 Id. at 284-285. 46 Id. at 286. ,, Id.
48 Id. 49 Id. at 289. II Decision 7 Our Ruling The Petition is meritorious. The case involves a pure
legal question excepted from the doctrine of hierarchy of courts G.R. No. 265153 The doctrine of
hierarchy of courts dictates that litigants must, as a rule, file their petitions before the lower-
ranked court5° since a direct recourse to the Court is generally improper. 51 It guides the
litigants as to the proper venue of appeals or the appropriate forum for issuance of the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus over
which the Court, the Court of Appeals, and the RTC have concurrent original jurisdiction. 52 It is
a constitutional irnperative53 founded principally on two reasons: first, the Supreme Court is a
court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its
constitutional functions, allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction and to prevent the overcrowding of its docket;54 and second, the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts. It is not equipped - either by structure or rule - to receive and
evaluate evidence in the first instance as these are the primary functions of lower courts or
regulatory agencies. 55 Disregard of the hierarchy of courts merits the immediate dismissal of
the action. 56 IGCC, however, takes exception to this rule. It justifies direct resort to the Court
since its prayer for TRO or writ of preliminary injunction against the impiementation of the writ
of possession allegedly falls within the exclusive authority of the Court by virtue of Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 8975, viz.: Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Orders, Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. - No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue
any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction
against the government, or any ofits subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether
public or private acting under the government direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the
following acts: 50 See Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC 849 Phil. 120 (2019), [Per .I. Jardeleza, En Banc].
51 See Dy v. Bibat-Palamos. 717 Phil. 776, 782 (2013), [PerJ. Mendoza, Third Division]. 52 Supra
note 48. 53 Id 54 Supra note 49 at 782. 55 Supra note 48. 56 See Palafox v. Mendiola, G.R. No.
209551, Pebruary 15, 2021, [Per J. Hernando, Third Division]. Decision 8 G.R. No. 265153 (a)
Acquisition, clearance and development of the rightof-way and/or site or location of any
national government project; (b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national
government as defined under Section 2 hereof; ( c) Commencement prosecution, execution,
implementation, operation of any such contract or project; ( d) Termination or rescission of any
such contract/project; and ( e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity
necessary for such contract/project. .. (Emphasis supplied) It posits that since the act sought to
be enjoined is the taking of its property for the acquisition, clearance, and development of a
right-of-way for the Ingore Cable Terminal Station and the Panay-Guimaras 138kV Tran.smission
Line Project, a national government infrastructure, both its principal action for Certiorari and
Prohibition along with its prayer for the issuance of a TRO or Preliminary Injunction may be filed
only with the Court. On this score, We reiterate our pronouncement in Spouses Soller v.
Singson, 57 viz.: In the case of Philco Aero, Inc. v. Secretary Tugade, this Cou,_'i recognized the
remedy of resorting directly before this Court in cases covered under R.A No. 8975. Section 3
ofR.A No. 8975 was explicit in excluding other courts in the issuance of injunctive writs.
However, in the case of Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Uy, this Court clarified
that the prohibition applies only to TRO and preliminary injunction, viz.: A perusal of these
aforequoted provisions readily reveals that all courts, except this Court, are proscribed from
issuing TROs and writs of preliminary injunction against the implementation or execution of
specified government projects. Thus, the ambit of the prohibition covers only temporary or
preliminary restraining orders or writs but NOT decisions on the merits granting permanent
injunctions. Considering that these laws trench on judicial power, they should be strictly
construed. Therefore, while courts below this Court are prohibited by these laws from issuing
temporary or preliminary restraining orders pending the adjudication of the case, said statutes
however do not explicitly proscribe the issuance of a permanent injunction granted by a court of
law arising from aJ1 adjudication of a case on the merits. 58 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted) In fine, the prohibition circumscribed under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8975 applies
to the issuancr by lower courts of temporary or preliminary 57 G.R. No. 215547, February 3,
2020 (P~r J. Reyes, Jr., First Division]. " Id. Decision 9 G.R. No. 265153 injunctive writs alone, but
does not preclude them from issuing permanent injunction arising from an adjudication of the
case on the merits. Thus, in Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. v. Presbitero, 59 the Court
dismissed the petition for prohibition with application for issuance of a TRO or writ of
preliminary injunction for violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts since what was prayed for
was an injunction against the implementation of the government infrastructure project itself,
which the RTC is not precluded from resolving under Republic Act No. 8975. In fine, the
injunction relates to the validity of the project itself. Similarly, in Spouses Soller, 60 the Court
ordained that it was the trial court which had jurisdiction over the petition for injunction with
prayer for issuance of TRO or preliminary injunction since the permanent injunction requested
pertains to the implementation and validity of the government project in question. The same is
not true in this case. The subject of the present Petition and Application for TRO or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction does not pertain to the merits of the main case for expropriation, which is
yet to be heard on the merits by the trial court. What IGCC seeks to enjoin is only the
implementation of the writ of possession and related issuances61 in order to protect itself from
being peremptorily ousted from its own property without due process of law. Verily, IGCC
correctly invoked t.he application of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8975 to justify its direct
recourse to the Court. In any event, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It
admits of exceptions. In Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, 62 the Court acknowledged that it has
full discretionary power to take cognizance of and assume jurisdiction over special civil actions
filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the
issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition. We :fihrther analyzed the commonality of
the exceptions to the doctrine in Gios-Samar v. Department of Transportation and
Communication, 63 where we finally clarified that the determinative factor to be considered
whether to allow direct recourse to this Court is the nature of the question at hand, a11d not
the mere invocation of compelling reasons, thus: 59 757 Phil. 454, (2015), [Per J. Leonen, En
Banc]. 60 Id. 61 Id. at 35-36. 62 75 l Phil. 301,330 (20 l 5), [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. 63 Supra note
48. Decision 10 G.R. No. 265153 A careful examination of the jurisprudential bases of the
foregoing exceptions would reveal a common denominator - the issues for resolution of the
Court are purely legal. Similarly, the CoTu'i in Diocese decided to allow direct recourse in said
case because, just like Angara, what was involved was the resolution of a question of law,
namely, whether the limitation on the size of the tarpaulin in question violated the right to free
speech of the Bacolod Bishop. We take this opportunity to clarify that the presence of one or
more of the so-called "special and important reasons" is not the decisive factor considered by
the Court in deciding whether to permit the invocation, at the first instance, of its original
jurisdiction over the issuance of extraordinary writs. Rather, it is the nature of the question
raised by the parties in those "exceptions" that enabled us to allow the direct action before
us.64 (Emphases supplied) Here, IGCC raises a pure legal question: Did the trial court commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued a writ of
possession, albeit the very authority ofNGCP to expropriate the subject property has been
incipiently assailed at the earliest opportunity? In other words, is the issuance of a wTit of
possession in expropriation cases ministerial upon the trial court where the authority of
petitioner to expropriate is in question? To be sure, this is a question of law which the Court
may take cognizance of by way of exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts especially
since it seeks to clarify our pronouncement in Municipality of Cordova v. Pathfinder
Development Corporation, 65 the enforcement of which is ordained per OCA Circular No. 113-
2019,66 as reiterated in OCA Circular No. 68-2022.67 The trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it issued the writ of possession, albeit NGCP's authority to expropriate the
subject property is in question The right of persons to life, iiberty, or property is constitutionally
protected. No one can be deprived of the same without due process oflaw.68 ,, id. 65 788 Phil.
622 (20i6), [Per J. Peralta, T'nird Division]. 66 Re: C]arificati~n on Expropriation Cases,
Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Issuance of Writs of Possession, and Entitlement to Interest
Pursuant to Repubiic Act No. 10752, Approved on March 07, 2016. 67 Re: Expeditious Resolution
of Expropriation Cases and other Related Processes, Approved on March 25, 2022. 68 Const.,
art. HI, sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Decision 11 G.R. No.
265153 For this reason, Section 9, Article DI of the Constitution limits the inherent power of the
State itself in the taking of private property, viz.: Section 9. Private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. This is the power of eminent domain. It is defined as
the right of the government to take and appropriate private property for public use, whenever
the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing reasonable
compensation therefor.69 It is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in the State. It is,
however, primarily lodged with Congress as the legislative branch of the government. Congress,
however, may delegate the exercise of the power of eminent domain to local government units,
other public entities, and public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations.70
In the hands of government agencies, local governments, public utilities, and other persons and
entities, the right to expropriate is not inherent and is only a delegated power.71 On this score,
it is undisputed that the legislature via Republic Act No. 9511 granted NGCP not only the
franchise to operate, manage, maintain, and develop the country's state-owned power grid and
to engage in electricity transmission service but also the right to eminent domain, viz.: SECTION
4. Right to Eminent Domain. - Subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed by law,
[NGCP] is authorized to exercise the right of eminent domain insofar as it may be reasonably
necessary for the construction, expansion, and efficient maintenance and operation of the
transmission system and grid and the efficient operation and maintenance of the
subtransmission systems which have not yet been disposed by TRANSCO. [NGCP] may acquire
such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this
franchise is granted: Provided, That the applicable law on eminent domain shall be observed,
particularly, the prerequisites of taking of possession and the determination and payment of just
compensation.72 (Emphases supplied) As clearly indicated, NGCP's right to eminent domain,
being a mere delegated power, is subject to several restrictions: first, it must conform to
limitations prescribed by law; and second, it must be exercised in accordance with the proper
procedure for expropriation. 69 See Masikip v. City of Pasig. 515 Phil. 364,373 (2006), [Per J.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Second Division], citing U.S. v. Toribio, G.R. No. 5060, January 26, 2010, [Per
J. Carson, First Divisi_on]. 70 Id 71 See PNOC Alternative Fuels Corp v. NCC?. G.R. No. 224936,
September 4, 20 l 9, [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division]. n Id. j Decision 12 G.R. No. 265153 NGCP
must exercise its delegated power of expropriation in strict compliance with these conditions.
For it is settled that the right of eminent domain, not being an inherent, but a mere delegated
power ofNGCP, its right to expropriate is restrictively limited to the confines of the deiegating
law. The scope of its delegated power is thus necessarily narrower than that of the delegating
authority.73 IGCC argues that NGCP failed to abide by the restrictions imposed by its franchise,
hence, the issuance of the writ of possession based on the questionable exercise of its right to
expropriate was highly improper, nay, tainted with grave abuse of discretion or such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack ofjurisdiction.74 We agree. The trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
issued the writ of possession without first determining whether NGCP has in fact complied with
the requirements of the law for a valid exercise of its delegated power to expropriate, among
them, the existence of a genuine necessity for the taking of the subject property, compliance
with the required ERC approval for the project, and compliance with the requirement that the
expropriation and the manner by which it is sought to be implemented is least burdensome to
the landowner. Under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the exercise of the power of eminent
domain has two stages:first, the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the surrounding
facts; and second, the taking of the iand by the State or its agency subject to payment of just
compensation. The first stage ends, if not in a dismissal of the action, with an order of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for public use. 75 In National Power Corporation v. Posada76 citing Vda. De Guano,
et al. v. Republic, et al.,77 we explained that in expropriation cases, the Court must first reckon
with the first part, i.e., any question on the validity of the exercise of the power of eminent
domain which primarily pertains to its necessity, viz. : 73 Id. In esse. expropna11m1 is forced
private property taking, the liu1downer being really without a ghost of a chance to defeat the
case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the private 74 See Lee v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 234664-67, January I 2, 2021, [Per J. Peralta, First Division]. 75 See
National Power Corporation v. Pt"JS(n:a, 75:5 Phil. 613,624 (2015), [Per J. Leonen, Second
Division]. 76 Id. at 638. 77 G.R. Nos. 168770 and 168812, February 9, 2011, [Per J. Velasco, Jr .•
First Division]. Decision 13 G.R. No. 265153 owner is deprived of property against his [or her]
will. Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that
the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take
private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or at least reasonably deducible from the
complaint.78 (Emphases supplied) The State or its agents may not proceed to the second part
without complying with the first. As stated, genuine necessity is a condition sine qua non to the
taking of one's private property. In the landmark case of City of Manila v. Chinese Community of
Manila, 79 the Court categorically decreed: The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the
land.80 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In De la Paz Masikip v. City of Pasig,81 We further
emphasized why the existence of genuine necessity prior to taking must be shown before
private individuals can be deprived of their property, viz.: The right to own and possess property
is one of the most cherished rights of [people]. It is so fundamental that it has been written into
organic law of every nation where the rule of law prevails. Unless the requisite of genuine
necessity for the expropriation of one's property is clearly established, it shall be the duty of the
courts to protect the rights of individuals to their private property. Important as the power of
eminent domain may be, the inviolable sanctity which the Constitution attaches to the property
of the individual requires not only that the purpose for the taking of private property be
specified. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of public character, must also be
shown to exist. 82 (Emphases supplied) When a question thus arises on whether the entity
exercising the right to expropriate does so in conformity with its delegating law, the same
should be heard and determined by the court pursuant to its vested authority, viz.: ,, Id. ... The
necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of
eminent domain is admittedly within the pmver of the legislature. But whether or not the
municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions
imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire
into.83 (Emphasis supplied) 79 40 Phil. 349 (19!9), [Per J. Johnson, First Divisionlso Id. at 368. 81
Supra note 67. 82 Id. at 375-376. 83 Supra note 77. Decision 14 G.R. No. 265153 Here, the trial
court never heard the issue of necessity incipiently raised by IGCC in relation to the alleged
absence of the required ERC clearance, lack of a genuine negotiation in good faith on the part
ofNGCP, and lack of any showing that the choice of the subject property is the least burdensome
to the landowner. Notably, these were promptly raised in IGCC's answer, by way of affirmative
defenses. The same were set for hearing by the trial court, albeit it was reset several times but
eventually, no hearing actually took place. What took place was the peremptory issuance of the
writ of possession dated December 12, 2022, which NGCP sought via a Motion for Actual
Issuance of writ of possession which was instantly granted, sai.,s the benefit of any hearing
either. 84 We now reckon with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, viz.: Section 2. Entry
qfplaintijf upon depositing value with authorized government depositary. - Upon the filing of the
complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall
have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved ifhe [ or she]
deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed
value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of
the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit
of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on
demand to the authorized government depositary. If personal property is involved, its value
shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be promptly fixed by the
court. After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper court officer to
forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report
thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties. OCA Circular No. 113-2019, as
reiterated by OCA Circular No. 68- 2022 cites the case of Cordova85 as basis for directing lower
courts to immediately issue a writ of possession in expropriation cases once the following twin
requisites are satisfied: (1) sufficiency of the complaint in form and substance; and (2) the
required provisional deposit, viz.: Pathfinder and Topanga contend that the trial court issued an
Order of Condemnation of the prope1iies without previously conducting a proper hearing for
the reception of evidence of the parties. However, no hearing is actually required for the
issuance of a writ of possession, which demands only two requirements: (a) the sufficiency in
form and substance of the complaint, and (b) the required provisional deposit. The sufficiency in
form and substance of the complaint for 84 Id. at 12. 85 Supra note 63. Decision 15 G.R. No.
265153 expropriation can be determined by the mere examination of the allegations in the
complaint. 86 (Emphases supplied) We focus on the first requisite, that is, the complaint must
be sufficient both in fonn and substance. In Spouses Munsalud v. National Housing Authority,87
we explained that a pleading is sufficient in form when it follows the required form provided by
the Rules of Court. Substance, on the other hand, comprehends all of the essential or material
elements necessary to sufficiently state a good cause of action invulnerable to attack by general
demurrer. In fine, it is determinative of whether a cause of action exists and whether jurisdiction
has been conferred upon the court. Therefore, to be deemed sufficient in substance, a
complaint for expropriation must clearly set forth the following requisites for the valid exercise
of eminent domain: ( 1) the property taken must be private property; (2) there must be genuine
necessity to take the private property; (3) the taking must be for public use; (4) there must be
payment of just compensation; and (5) the taking must comply with due process.88 Indubitably,
for entities exercising a mere delegated power of expropriation, they must likewise demonstrate
that they do have the authority to exercise such power of expropriation. 89 On this score, we
tum to Section 9( d) of the EPIRA which requires ERC's prior approval of any plan to expand or
improve TransCo's facilities now being operated and maintained by NGCP, thus: SECTION 9.
Functions and Responsibilities. - Upon the effectivity of this Act, the TRANSCO shall have the
following functions and responsibilities: xx x ( d) Improve and expand its transmission facilities,
consistent with the Grid Code and the Transmission Development Plan (TDP) to be promulgated
pursuant to this Act, to adequately serve generation companies, distribution utilities and
suppliers requiring transmission service and/or ancillary services through the transmission
system: Provided, That TRANSCO shall submit any plan for expansion or improvement of its
facilities for approval by the ERC. .. (Emphasis supplied) In fine, before NGCP may take any
concrete action for expansion, e.g., expropriating private la.nd for such project, it must first
secure prior approval from the ERC. Lacking this pre-requisite, it cannot be said that a genuine
86 Id. at 632. 87 595 Phil. 750 (2008), [Per J. Reyes, Third Division]. 88 See Manapat v. Court
ofAppeal.,, 562 Phi!. J 1, 4 7-48 (2007). [Per .J. Nachnra, Third Division]. 89 Id Decision 16 G.R.
No. 265153 necessity exists for the taking of petitioner's land simply because there is yet no
approved project for the use of such land. Remarkably, NGCP does not deny that prior ERC
approval is required before it can conduct preliminary activities for its transmission line projects.
It even admitted the necessity thereof in its Comment. 9 ° For the first time here and now,
however, NGCP denies petitioner's claim that it is not a holder of the requisite ERC approval for
its Ingore Cable Terminal Station and the Panay-Guimaras 138kV Transmission Line Project.
NGCP has even pledged to present its ERC approval during the hearing on the merits below.91
Interestingly though, NGCP did not attach this document to its Comment. In any case, NGCP's
failure to allege in its complaint that it had secured the requisite ERC approval and that the
expropriation sought, as well as its choice of the portion to be expropriated is the least
burdensome to the landowner renders the complaint insufficient in substance. To reiterate, for
a complaint for expropriation to be sufficient in substance, there is a need to, at the minimum,
allege that the expropriating agency possesses the authority to exercise the power of eminent
domain,92 which includes ailegations that all restrictions provided by the delegating law have
been complied with. In this case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9511 expressly required NGCP to
exercise its right of eminent domain "insofar as it may be reasonably necessary" and to acquire
private property as is "actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which the
franchise is granted." This, NGCP failed to allege, as well. Notably, these matters essentially
hinge on the issue of necessity vis-avis the expropriator's compliance with the statutory
requirements for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. Consequently, the
insufficiency of the complaint a; to substance precludes the trial court from proceeding to the
second stage, that is, the taking of the property which commences with the issuance of the writ
of possession. In light of these attendant circumstances, therefore, the trial court CaIL.'l.Ot
rightly claim to have been vested with the ministerial duty to order its issuance. It is dutybound,
however, to revert to the first stage of the expropriation proceedings and hear the parties on
the authority ofNGCP to expropriate the subject property. Specifically, it must determine at first
instance whether NGCP is armed with the required ERC approval, whether it initiated and
pursued an honest to goodness negotiation with IGCC before filing the case for expropriation,
and whether its chosen line path is reasonably necessary for the public purpose intended to be
served and proved to be the least burdensome to the landowner.93 !t is only after the trial court
shall have 90 Rollo, p. 285. 91 Id. n Id. 93 id. at 26---3 l. Decision . i7 G.R. No. 265153 determined
all these questions in the affirmative may it advance to the second stage of taking, starting off
with the issua..11.ce of the writ of possession so long as the twin requisites therefor are
present; otherwise, the complaint should be dismissed. So must it be. ACCORDINGLY, the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Very Urgent Application for Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED. The Orders dated December 12,
2022 and January 20, 2023 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Iloilo City in Special Civil
Action No. 22-35139 are NULLIFIED. Respondent Hon. Ma. Theresa N. Enriquez-Gaspar, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, lloilo City, and respondent
National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, and all other persons acting on their behalf, are
PERMANENTLY PROHIBITED from executing and/or implementing the writ of possession dated
December 12, 2022 and other orders related thereto. Further, respondent Presiding Judge Hon.
Ma. Theresa N. EnriquezGaspar of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, lloilo City is ORDERED to
determine, upon due notice and hearing, the authority of the National Grid Corporation of the
Philippines to expropriate the subject property vis-a-vis the specific matters heretofore stated.
The Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order dated February 28, 2023 filed by the National
Grid Corporation of the Philippines is considered academic. SO ORDERED. AMY 1/f-~~VU.R
A'.'ssociate Justice Decision WE CONCUR: 18 G.R. No. 265153 MARIO VICTOR F.
LEONEN .Seni.or-f\.ssoci.·-1te•.Jnstiee ATTESTATION .JHOS~r. LOPEZ Associate justice I attest
that tlic crn,clusio;is in the above Ded;;ion had been reached in consultation before the case wac
assi;;,,ned to the 'Nri~er nf the opinion of the CoE.rt' s Division~ Decision 19 ·G.R. No. 265153
CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the above Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to th.e writer of the Court's Division. R G.
GESMUNDO